Role of the Ombudsman
administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition
9. Dolalas v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 118808, December 24, 1996
Facts:
The petitioners were charged administratively by
private respondent Villarante for miscarriage of justice,
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, unnecessary delay in
the administration of justice and for failure to prosecute
a criminal case for an unreasonable length of time
before public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao.
The letter-complaint addressed to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao arose out of said criminal case
of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent
by a police officer. Private respondent alleged that:
1. there has been no pre-conference,
arraignment or pre-trial held or conducted by
petitioner judge;
2. the said criminal case was maliciously filed by
one P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with
petitioner judge in order to discourage the
former from instituting a criminal complaint
against said police officers men for abuse of
authority and police brutality with physical
injury; and
3. said criminal case filed against him has been
unnecessarily delayed in that P/Sgt. Salutillo
and petitioner-judge totally failed to prosecute
their own malicious action within a reasonable
length of time thus prejudicing the
constitutional right of the former to an impartial
investigation and a fair and speedy trial
On the basis of the letter-complaint filed by herein
private respondent, Graft Investigation Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed
petitioners to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
Petitioners motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration were denied by public respondent,
hence the petition before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman may take
cognizance of the complaint against petitioner
Ruling:
No.
This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The
complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of
the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In
essence, petitioner-judge is being charged with having
violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1[6] and Rule 3.05, Canon
3[7] of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the
of the said criminal case involves the determination of
whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case,
petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines
provided in the Rules of Court and in the Administrative
Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an
administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is
mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to assume administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda v.
Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The issue in this case is whether the
OMBUDSMAN may take cognizance of a case filed
against a judge.
The law provides that Supreme Court is
mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to assume administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
In this case, the Supreme Court states that the
complaint against a judge which is administrative
in nature is cognizable by the Supreme Court as
provided by the Constitution.
Therefore, the OMBUDSMAN cannot determine
whether a judge acted in accordance with the rules
provided by law.
Role of the OMBUDSMAN
10. BIR v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 115103, April 11, 2002
Facts:
Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon of the
OMBUDSMAN received information from an informer
regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds to
Limtuaco and La Tondea.
Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Atty. Mansequiao of the Legal
Department of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
ordering him to appear before the Ombudsman and to
bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds
granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR, through Assistant Commissioner for
Legal Service Jaime M. Maza, asked that it be excused
from complying with the subpoena duces
tecum because the Limtuaco case was pending
investigation by Graft Investigation Officer Baldrias and
the investigation thereof and that of La Tondea was
mooted.
Ombudsman issued another subpoena duces
tecum, addressed to BIR Commissioner Chato ordering
her to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the
complete original case dockets of the refunds granted
to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR moved to vacate the subpoena duces
tecum however the Ombudsman denied the Motion to
Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum.
The BIR moved to reconsider but the Ombudsman
denied the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its
directive to the BIR to produce the documents.
BIR filed before this Court the instant Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to take
cognizance of the complaints filed against the BIR
officials/employees with regard to its findings
Ruling:
Yes. No less than the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the
“Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of
the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof.” Clearly, there is no requirement of a
pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its
investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its
investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint
filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is
verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the
Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
The power to investigate and to prosecute which
was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses “all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and nonfeasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee x x x during his tenure of office.
However, such power or authority must done with
due process. The law clearly provides that if there is a
reasonable ground to investigate further, the
investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman
shall first furnish the respondent public officer or
employee with a summary of the complaint and require
him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72)
hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR
officials concerned were never furnished by the
respondent with a summary of the complaint and were
not given the opportunity to submit their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they
were summarily ordered to appear before the
Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the
tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea. They
are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of the
respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty
of granting anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent
Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with
the basics of due process in conducting its
investigation.
The issue in this case is whether the
Ombudsman has the authority to take
cognizance/investigate the findings of the BIR
officials/employees.
The Ombudsman Act provides that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses “all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee during his tenure of office.
In this case, the court ruled that the
Ombudsman has the authority to take
cognizance/investigate the allegedly anomalous
grant of tax refunds of the BIR.
Thus, the Ombudsman may take
cognizance/investigate the findings of the BIR
officials/employees.

Non-Delegation Doctrine
19. People v. Vera
G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial
court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the the case to the Supreme Court however
the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower
court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent
of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of
Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable
to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of
laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law
may be an encroachment of the power of the executive
to provide pardon because providing probation, in
effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issue:
Whether there was undue delegation of legislative
power.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court concludes that Section 11 of Act
No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on
how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system
of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non delegation of power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not,it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment
of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922],
43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the
foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is limited by
another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the
legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The power to make laws—the legislative power—
is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law
and in a unicameral National Assembly by the
Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the National
Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities
by delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated
with the glossators, was introduced into English law
through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a
principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in
the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into
America as an enlightened principle of free
government. It has since become an accepted corollary
of the principle of separation of powers.
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of
legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central legislative
body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is
empowered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it
may select, Courts have also sustained the
delegation of legislative power to the people at
large, though some authorities maintain that this
may not be done. Doubtless, also, legislative power
may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of
the Philippines provides that "The National As
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, -to fix
within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export
quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section
16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that
"In times of war or other national emergency, the
National Assembly may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy."
The issue in this case is whether there valid
delegation of power when the legislative delegated
the power to give pardon to the provincial boards.

The law provides that delegation is valid when the

statute is complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so -that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature.

In this case, the Congress did not set standard on

how provincial boards must act in carrying out a
system of probation.

Hence, the delegation is void.

Non-Delegation Doctrine
20. Pelaez v. The Auditor General
G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965
Facts:
In 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93
to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities. Then petitioner Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted
the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General,
to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or
any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner
alleges that said executive orders are null and void,
upon the ground said Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2370 which
provides that barrios may “not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed”
except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create
a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no
repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt
from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that
through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.
Issue:
Whether Congress has delegated the power to create
barrios to the President by virtue of Section 68 of
Revised Administrative Code.
Ruling:
No. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause
“as the public welfare may require” – which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require – is present, still, such will
not replace the standard needed for a proper
delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase
“as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text
which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the
seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation
of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative.
The issue in this case is whether the
Congress validly delegated the power to create
barrios.
The law states that although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
In this case Section 68 of Revised
Administrative Code lacked any standard
mentioned above.
Thus there is no valid delegation of power.