ID: 01110386

April 11, 2018

Philosophy of Science: 311
It’s long been held by many scientists and philosophers of science that their field of study

is somehow distinct from others. This is in part because of its ability to explain with

“objectivity,” so that scientists can say true statements about what is really objectively real

independent of a subject. Thus they accord science a distinct epistemic status; that its ways of
gaining knowledge about the world are better or should be privileged over others. In making
sense of objectivity, some philosophers have introduced the concept of neutrality, which has as a
Commented [RS1]: Minor point probably, but I am not
sure objectivity is anything really distinctive about
scientific inquiry. Mathematics seems objective. A lot of
people think that ethics is objective. And a lot of non-
scientific knowledge of the ordinary physical world is
objective.

requirement of science that it not presuppose, nor work to support non-scientific or non-

epistemic values, whether they be political, social, or moral. Some have assumed that in order for

science to be considered objective then, it must maintain this neutrality, and exclude the privilege

or presence of non-epistemic values in inquiry. As mentioned, many philosophers of science and

scientists believe that science actually maintains this distinct epistemic status of neutrality and

objectivity. Some feminist philosophers of science have responded to these presumptions of

science with challenges to its claim of neutrality. Far from believing that science shouldn’t be

accorded a distinct status, they still believe that science in fact does include many non-epistemic

values and that it is actually impossible for science to totally exclude such values. Commented [RS2]: The contrast here isn’t as clear as
one might want. After all, many would think that the
presence of non-epistemic values in scientific inquiry
One argument brought forward by feminist philosophers to show that all inquiry is in would be a discredit to science.

someway value laden is the argument for the underdetermination of theory by evidence.

According to this argument, the evidence that we have to support any belief is always

insufficient for determining exactly what belief we should have. For any amount of evidence that

we have to support a belief, there are always certain background assumptions that must be in

place in order to support a particular hypothesis. Even if evidence points to a certain explanation,

or relationship between two phenomena, we may vary our background assumptions, making it
possible that the evidence will support a different explanation for the same phenomena. In terms

more relevant to our discussion, given the fact that the evidence never fully determines what

belief we should hold, there are necessarily other values, or non-epistemic values (political,

moral, social) that play a role in helping us make that determination. Commented [RS3]: Minor point- move from evidence
to “epistemic values” here might be a bit quick.
Feminist philosophers of science use arguments such as this to show that allowing for

distinctly “feminist” values in scientific inquiry is actually not unscientific. Given the fact that all

science must to some extent be done with certain background presuppositions or goals, feminist

scientists should be afforded the license to permit their values as background suppositions or

goals in their research as well. Many feminist philosophers of science thus have a different

conception of objectivity as well; the different values permitted in scientific inquiry will allow

for new and diverse forms of criticism, which increases standards of evidence, scientific rigor,

and improvements in methodology, among other outcomes. Yet, this different conception of Commented [RS4]: New paragraph.

objectivity, and the general impetus to explicitly allow feminist and/or other values into the

practice of science raises some difficulties as well. To criticize certain biases in science that lead

to “bad science” from a feminist perspective is to privilege one particular set of values as being

able to legitimately criticize another perspective, yet by priledging their own perspective, these Commented [RS5]: Why? It doesn’t seem like the
underdetermination issue affects them. Why not just
say that the feminist standpoint is privileged?
philosophers seem to fall into the same trap that those they criticize have fallen into.

Additionally, by saying that criticism of science from new perspectives might engender more

objective forms of inquiry assumes then that objectivity might be achieved. Yet, this greater level

of ‘objectivity’ seems to be the kind of objectivity that feminist philosophers critiqued in the first Commented [RS6]: Why? Isn’t it objectivity-involving-
values as opposed to objectivity-as-neutrality?
place. Still, the concerns that these philosophers raise cannot be ignored, and highlight
Commented [RS7]: OVERALL COMMENTS:
This was an interesting paper. I thought the first half of
unavoidable epistemic concerns that scientists should be aware of, namely, of the great the paper did a good job setting up the discussion. I
think the second half of the paper needed the most
likelihood of their own biases influencing their inquiry. improvement. See previous two comments in
particular.
Good work!
B-/B.
 Citations
Anderson, Elizabeth. "Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science." Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy. August 05, 2015. Accessed April 11, 2018.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/.
Crasnow, Sharon, Alison Wylie, Wenda K. Bauchspies, and Elizabeth Potter. "Feminist

Perspectives on Science." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. March 31, 2015.

Accessed April 11, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-science/.

Stanford, Kyle. "Underdetermination of Scientific Theory." Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. October 12, 2017. Accessed April 11, 2018.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.