Douglas F.

Anama, Petitioner vs Court of Appeals, Philippine Savings Bank, Spouses Saturnina Baria The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the
and Tomas Co and the Register of Deeds, Metro Manila, District II, Respondents. judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the
January 25, 2012 | G.R. No. 187021 Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to
enforce the same as provided in Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Facts: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the March 31, 2008 Decision of the Court of Procedure.
Appeals (CA) and its February 27, 2009 Resolution granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses
of respondents. Co. The records clearly show that the motion for execution was duly served upon, and received by,
petitioner's counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a "signed
 In March 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent, Philippine stamped received mark" appearing on said pleading. The said law office, as a matter of fact, did not
Savings Bank (PSB), entered into a "Contract to Buy," on installment basis, the real property present any written denial of its valid receipt on behalf of its client, neither is there proof that the
owned and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 301276 in the latter's name. Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Offices has formally withdrawn its appearance as petitioner’s counsel-of-
 However, Anama defaulted in paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB rescinded the said record. Thus, there was compliance with the rules.
contract and title to the property remained with the latter. The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where
 Subsequently, the property was sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co (Co the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has
Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the registration of the same in not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
their names and were, thus, issued TCT No. 14239. Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
 Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of nullity of the deed of inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to
sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and specific performance with damages against facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would
PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II. result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Through such notice,
 The Respondent Court dismissed Anama's complaint and upheld the validity of the sale between the adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
PSB and the Co Spouses on August 21, 1991. The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is not based solely
 Anama appealed, at first, to this Court, and after failing to obtain a favorable decision, to the on a mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural
Supreme Court. rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and
 On January 29, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered judgment denying Anama's petition and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.
sustaining the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its decision became final Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement as in the case at bar, it is not essential that he be given
and executory on July 12, 2004. notice before the issuance of an execution against his tangible property; after the rendition of the
 Pursuant thereto, the Co Spouses moved for execution, which was granted by the Respondent judgment he must take "notice of what will follow," no further notice being "necessary to advance
Court per its Order, dated November 25, 2005. justice."
 Anama filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the Respondent Court, denied his motion(s)
for reconsideration.
 January 29, 2004 Decision of this Court became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Hence,
execution was already a matter of right on the part of the respondents and the RTC had the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution enforcing a final and executory decision.
 Not satisfied with the CA's unfavorable disposition, petitioner filed this petition praying for the
reversal thereof:
1. The respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and hearing
when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC.
Issue: WoN the respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and hearing when they
filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC.
Ruling: No, respondents did not violate the Rules of the Court. Wherefore, the petition for review is
denied.
The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements is considered a
worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are
motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other
party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of
motions.
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION (RULE 39)
1. ASSOCIATED BANK (PL) vs. JUDGE GONONG
1.) Asso. filed complaint for the recovery of a sum of money against ROLE, Incorporated and Romeo
R. Echauz before CFI of Manila, Branch 37.
2.) TC RULING: in favor of Asso.
3.) ROLE filed its notice of appeal.
4.) respondent Echauz followed suit.
5.) Asso. filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
6.) TC Judge resp. issued the questioned order denying Asso.'s motion for execution on the ground that
the notices of appeal seasonably filed by private respondents had already been given due course when
he issued his previous orders.
* filing of respondents' notices of appeal and its approval of those notices deprived TC of jurisdiction to
entertain motion for execution pending appeal.
7.) Asso. filed petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
to — (a) annul and set aside TC order denying its motion for execution pending appeal; (b) enjoin and
prohibit respondents, specifically the TC from elevating records of the case to CA pending resolution of
petition; and (c) command TC to assume its jurisdiction and resolve Asso's motion for execution pending
appeal.
ISSUE: W/n TC is correct in denying Asso’s Motion for executing = NO
SC: 1.) Section 39 of BP. 129 removed record on appeal as requirement for perfection of an appeal.
* entire original records are now transmitted to appellate court.
*Section 23 of the Interim Rules of Court provides: In cases where appeal is taken, perfection of the
appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.
*As long as any parties may still file his, appeal, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the case.
*The plaintiff/defs cannot deprive the plaint/def/co-plaint/co-def of the right to file MR or to move for a
new trial or an execution pending appeal by immediately filing notice of appeal
*The filing of an appeal by losing party NOT automatically divest party favored by a decision of the right
to move for a more favorable decision or to ask for execution pending appeal.
*It is only after all the parties' respective periods to appeal lapsed that court loses its jurisdiction over the
case.
2.) Contrary ruling would place it within the power of one of the parties, by the simple expedient of
immediately perfecting his appeal, to deprive the other party of the right to ask for a reconsideration of
the decision, let alone to have the court approve his own appeal if such a motion is denied.
3.) Rules must be interpreted to avoid impractical and absurd situations.
4.) TC ORDER is SET ASIDE and ordered to retain records of the case and to resolve the Asso's motion for
execution.
2. ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION, INC (PL) vs. NPC (DEF) (EQUALLY WON)
1.) ECI filed complaint for damages against NPC in CFI of Manila,
* it suffered damages to its facilities and equipment due to inundation of its campsite in Bulacan, as a
direct result of improper and careless opening by NPC of spillway gates of Angat Dam at typhoon
"Welming"
2.) TC RULING: infavor of ECI; found NPC guilty of gross negligence hence NPC must pay damages
(actual/compensatory damages, consequential, exemplary damages) & attorney's fees,
3.) NPC filed a notice of appeal from that decision but before it could perfect its appeal, ECI moved for
and was granted execution pending appeal upon posting covering bond of P200,000 w/c it later
increased to P1.1M to fully answer for whatever damages NPC might incur by reason of the premature
execution of the TC’s decision. 3
4.) In granting said motion for the exceptional writ over the strong opposition of the NPC, TC adopted the
grounds adduced by ECI :
* actual/ compensatory damages incurred by ECI, supported by documentary evidence, & no opposition
* case pending for years, as ECI and TC were led to believe that it may be settled amicably;
* appeal by NPC obviously for purposes of delay;
* ECI able to file bond to answer any damage w/c NPC may suffer as result of execution pending appeal
5.) Deputy Sheriff Quemada, garnished in favor of ECI all amounts due and payable to NPC w/c were in
possession of MERALCO and sufficient to cover the judgment sum of P1.1M
6.) NPC filed w/ CA Certiorari since its Attempts to lift order of execution & supersede bond were
rejected by TC.
7.) CA RULING: infavor of NPC; granted NPC's petition & nullified execution pending appeal of TC & all
issued writs
8.) MERALCO sought from CA a clarification and recon. on the ground, that the decision was being used
by NPC to compel MERALCO to return the amount of P1.1M
*CA held sheriff, MERALCO and ECI liable to restore to NPC amount due to NPC w/c MERALCO earlier
turned over to sheriff
9.) ECI and MERALCO filed separate Pet. for review before SC
ISSUE #1: W/n the execution pending appeal by TC is proper= YES as regards the actual/compensatory
damages but NO as regards consequential, exemplary damages) & attorney's fees
SC: 1.) SEC. 2 RULE 39- "Execution pending appeal. — On motion of prevailing party w/notice to adverse
party, the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before expiration of time to appeal,
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, motion and
the special order shall be included thereon.
*While rule gives court discretionary power to allow immediate execution, ff. requisites: a) motion by
prevailing party w/ notice to adverse party; (b) good reasons for issuing the execution; and (c) good
reasons stated in special order.
2.) Since list of estimated losses & damages submitted by ECI was duly supported by vouchers, and NPC
failed to submit proofs to refute, order of execution pending appeal by TC is proper as far as award for
actual/compensatory damages is concerned; not sufficiently shown that TC abused its authority.
3.) As to consequential, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, SC concur with CA that TC exceeded limits
of its discretion
* Execution should have been postponed until merits of case been finally determined in regular appeal.
* Execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on outcome of main case.
*Unlike actual damages w/c are fixed and certain, moral&exemplary damages remain uncertain and
indefinite pending resolution by CA and SC
*It’s not beyond realm of probability that NPC's appeal from TC’s judgment could result in substantial
reduction of consequential damages & attorney's fees and deletion of exemplary damages.
*CA rendered a decision on main appeal w/c affirmed TC’s conclusion that NPC was guilty of negligence
but differed in award of damages since while CA upheld TC’s award of actual damages, it reduced the
consequential damages and attorney's fees and eliminated exemplary damages. Altogether, award of
damages was modifed from P1.1M to P724,985.31. SC affirmed CA decision putting to rest the question
of negligence and NPC's liability for damages.
4.) Courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute judgment which has not acquired a final
character.
5.) Section 2, Rule 39, authorizing premature execution of judgments, being an exception to the general
rule, must be restrictively construed.
*The reasons allowing execution must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will
outweigh the injury/damages that losing party would secure
ISSUE #2 : W/N ECI & sheriff, are bound to restore to NPC judgment amount= YES but only pertaining to
consequential, exemplary damages) & attorney's fees
SC 1.) direct consequence would be to authorize NPC to proceed against covering bond filed by ECI but
only to extent of the difference between amount finally adjudicated by SC in main cases [P724,985.31]
and amount originally decreed by TC relating to the consequential and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees [P1,108.985.31]. In other words, ECI's bond is held answerable to NPC for P384,000.
2.) But CA erred in not absolving MERALCO, the garnishee, from its obligations to NPC
*MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ garnishment. Unless there
are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the writ/actual knowledge on part of the
garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of garnisher, it is not incumbent upon the garnishee to
inquire or to judge for itself w/n the order for advance execution of a judgment is valid.
3.) Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment
debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Garnishee [the third person] is obliged to
deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ
4.) MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay amount of the judgment
represented by funds in its possession belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released
from all responsibilities. To expose garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes
would only undermine the administration of justice.
3. ONG vs. CA
1.) Sarmiento (Sarm.) sued Dee for collection of amount as value of construction materials obtained by Sarm., for
atty's fees & expenses of litigation w/ prayer for issuance of writ of prelim. att.
*Dee issued checks but bounced for insufficiency of funds.
* complaint was amended to include Ong as def. on alleg. that Ong & Dee issued checks and construction materials
were delivered to piggery farm of Ong.
2.) Writ was issued by trial judge and served upon Ong, resulting in levy of hogs.
3.) TC later issued (TRO) against further enforcement of writ, pending resolution of motion to quash (MQ) filed by
Ong
4.) Trial judge rendered a decision, received by Ong on finding Dee and Ong jointly and severally liable
5.) Dee and Ong filed a notice of appeal
6.) Sarm. filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal," alleging that the appeal is dilatory and frivolous.
7.) Ong OPPOSITION: TC no longer had jurisdiction to act on said motion since appeal been perfected, and there’s
already writ of attachment to secure the court's judgment.
8.) Trial judge issued order granting Sarmi's motion for execution pending appeal, conditioned upon a bond in the
amount of P121,759.00.
9.) Ong filed certiorari and prohibition with injunction with the Court of Appeals w/c dismissed it
* trial judge had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the presence of requisites laid of Sec. 2, Rule 39
* accepted as "good reasons" Sarm's statements; appeal of Ong & Dee obviously frivolous (playful) and dilatory,
since they not adduced substantial valid and meritorious defenses against Sarm
*determination of sufficiency/ insufficiency of special reasons rests on discretion of court issuing writ of execution
pending appeal and appellate court cannot interfere with the exercise of this discretion unless grave abuse of disc
w/c is absent
*mere filing of Ong's notice of appeal does NOT divest TC of jurisdiction over the case, since " appeal is not perfected
on date notice of appeal was filed but on expiration of last day to appeal
ISSUE: W/n Trial judge’s order granting Sarmi's motion for execution pending appeal is proper=NO
SC: 1.) What determines perfection of appeal is the expiration of reglementary period for appeal
2.) Mere filing of appellant's notice of appeal NOT divest TC of its jurisdiction and court may still take cognizance of
other party's motion for new trial or, as in this case, motion for execution pending appeal, provided such motions
are filed within 15 days from said party's notice of the decision.
3.) But SC not agree that writ of execution pending appeal was premised on, good reasons, - that appeal was
dilatory, and sufficient bond required by court been posted.
*reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury should the
losing party secure a reversal of the judgment
*Where the reason is that appeal is frivolous (playful) and dilatory, execution pending appeal cannot be justified.
* not proper for TC to find that an appeal is frivolous and consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of an
appeal by TC constitutes deprivation of right to appeal.
*authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to appellate court
*since the trial judge may not rightfully determine that appeal from its own decision is frivolous or dilatory, the writ
of execution pending appeal would be premised solely on bond posted by Sarmiento.
4.)Hence, a question w/n the filing of a bond, without anything more, can be considered good reason
*to consider mere posting of a bond good reason would make immediate execution of judgment pending appeal
routinary, the rule rather than exception w/c is neither contemplated nor intended by law.
*In the landmark case of Hacienda Navarra, there was a special reason for immediate execution, in addition to
posting of a bond w/c is not the case here.
5.) writ of execution pending appeal for lack of good reasons to justify its issuance is to be struck down
6.) The other issues raised by Ong on her alleged solidary liability are not proper for discussion in this petition for
certiorari, being errors of judgment by the trial court, correctible by appeal.

4. ARANDA vs. CA
1.) Decision rendered by Judge Muñoz of CFI of Bulacan: infavor of Arandas; ordering private respondents (PR) to reconvey to
Arandas.
parcels of land situated Bulacan & moral damages plus, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. 1
2.) PR appealed that decision but Arandas, as prevailing parties, moved for execution pending appeal (MEPA) w/c TC
granted upon the filing by Arandas of a bond worth P10,000.
3.) Lots covered by Transfer were transferred to Arandas & a jeepney belonging to PR was sold at public auction and the amount
due from Tecson Chemical Corporation to one PR was garnished and turned over to Arandas.
4.) During pendency of appeal, Arandas mortgaged 8 of 10 reconveyed land to Alfredo Cruz to secure loan
* Arandas mortgaged 2 more lots to Aurelia Oxiles to secure another loan
* because of the failure of Arandas to redeem, 2 mortgages foreclosed properties sold at public auction to mortgagees Cruz and
Oxiles who consolidated their ownership and new TCT in their names.
5.) While PR’s appeal was still pending before CA, PR decided to register with RD notices of lis pendens on all TCT covering the
parcels of land mortgaged to Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles.
6.) CA RULING: infavor of PR; reversed TC and declared PR as owners of the disputed lots
7.) TC, pursuant to the reversal issued an order which required Arandas to reconvey to PR within five (5) days from notice the
properties w/ exception of property covered by TCT No. 98052.
*also required Arandas to return the jeepney and amt. garnished from Tecson Chemical Corporation.
8.) clerk executed the deed of reconveyance in favor of PR
9.) PR filed motion to nullify (16) titles to properties for refusal of Arandas to surrender their owner's copy
10.) TC issued an order (MARCH 15, 1979) cancelling 6 TCTs but denied motion of PR to nullify other 10 TCTS issued in favor of Cruz
and Oxiles respectively, w/o prejudice to PR’s filing a separate action for their invalidation.
11.) PR filed amended motion for restitution w/motion for contempt, w/c were rejected by TC w/c ruled that consolidated
ownership of said realty in names of Cruz and Oxiles could no longer be disturbed in said proceedings but this would not bar PR
from going after Arandas in a separate action to seek redress
12.) PR filed certiorari and mandamus before CA to set aside said order
13.) CA RULING: modified TC Ruling; proceeds of the sale of jeepney be return to PR; Arandas, must pay to all PR proceeds of
auction sale of the mortgaged parcels; The liability of Arandas can be enforced by writ of execution.
*PR may enforce restitution against Cruz and Oxiles, instead of demanding their rights under Sec. 5, Rule 39 but this must be done
in a separate civil action,
ISSUE #1: W/n CA erred in giving due course to the special civil action of certiorari despite the lapsed remedy of ordinary appeal=
NO.
SC: 1.) CA can legally entertain certiorari considering the broader and primordial interests of justice w/c compel an occasional
departure from general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, the order of March 15,
1979 having become final upon lapse of the reglementary period of appeal.
2.) While TC correctly denied motion to nullify subject titles in names of Cruz and Oxiles, it failed to provide PR complete restitution
as decreed in Section 5, Rule 39 w/c states: "Effect of reversal of executed judgment. — Where the judgment executed is reversed
totally or partially on appeal, the TC, on motion, after the case is remanded to it, may issue such orders of restitution as equity and
justice may warrant under the circumstances."
3.) When judgment is executed pending appeal and subsequently overturned in the appellate court, the party who moved for
immediate execution should, upon return of the case to TC, be required to make specific restitution of such property of the
prevailing party as he may have acquired at the execution sale.
4.) If specific restitution becomes impracticable, losing party in the execution becomes liable for the full value of property at the
time of its seizure, with interest.
5.) Tc’s action resulted in grave injustice to PR.
6.) It cannot be gainsaid that it’s incumbent upon (Arandas) to return whatever they got by means of the judgment prior to its
reversal. And if some of the properties might have passed on to innocent third parties as happened in the case at bar, the Arandas
are duty bound to return the corresponding value of said properties as mandated by the Rules.
ISSUE#2: W/n CA erred in granting reliefs to PR not mentioned in dispositive portion of its decision reversing TC= NO.
1.) Arandas argue that proceeds of jeepney and sum garnished from Tecson Chemical cannot be returned to PR because such
return is not expressly included in the dispositive part of the CA’s judgment
2.) To deny restitution of these items would be to close eyes to the unalterable fact that such items as acknowledged by both
parties were used specifically to complete and satisfy the judgment of TC in favor of Arandas,
3.) CA need not specify in the judgment of reversal that there should be restitution of properties, etc. Such restoration is expressly
provided for in Section 5, Rule 39 and should apply in the absence of any contrary disposition in the final judgment of the appellate
court.
4.) In sum, what TC failed to effect, CA sought to rectify in the decision under review.
5. MACEDA (PL) JR. vs. DBP
1.) Maceda (Mac) filed Complaint for Specific Performance w/Damages against DBP and its Manager
Oscar de Vera. 2.) TC RULING after trial on merits: in favor of MAC.
3.) TC, pending appeal, ordered immediate release by DBP of the unreleased amt. of loan agreement and
the sum needed to complete the construction of new Gran Hotel, subject to the filing of an equivalent
bond.
* "good reason" invoked by TC was the urgency resulting from almost 20 yrs of delay and the yearly
increase in costs that made completion of hotel construction more difficult.
4.) DBP appealed to CA.
5.) DBP filed with CA, Certiorari challenging TC’s Order granting execution of the said Decision pending
appeal.
6.) CA RULING: infavor of DBP since there’s no sufficient ground or compelling reason to allow execution
of judgment pending appeal.
ISSUE: W/n CA is correct that there were no "good reasons" to justify execution of TC’s judgment
pending appeal= YES.
SC:1.) Compelling reason given by TC for allowing execution pending appeal is far outweighed by the
injury or damage that DBP would suffer if it secures a reversal of TC’s judgment.
2.) If TC is reversed on appeal, Mac would be hard-pressed to make a complete restitution to DBP, to
which Maceda already owe more than P5 million — the amount of Maceda’s original loan plus accrued
interests.
3) There’s no likelihood that DBP, a government-owned and controlled corporation, would fail to answer
its obligation if TC decision is affirmed.
4.) Maceda failed to present adequate reasons to show that CA committed reversible errors in
overturning TC’s Order.
*As movants, they have burden of showing why TC’s Decision should be executed w/o awaiting the result
of appeal *Absent such justification, execution pending appeal cannot be legally granted.
5.) In the present case, no justification for execution, pending appeal, of the awards of P1.9 M under
disposition (a) and more than P17 million under disposition (e) since no guarantee that Maceda can
complete the project, said sum is immediately released.
*This was the amount needed to finish the project way back in 1987 and was based on 1987 prices.
6.) Equally unjustified is the release, pending appeal, of remaining portion of loan. As TC itself held in
1987, the award of more than P17 million under disposition (e) was amount needed to finish the project.
Consequently, there was no urgent need for unreleased portion of loan. The said amount was relatively
minuscule/small compared with that needed for remainder of the hotel project and would have little
effect on its completion.
7.) Petitioners' argument that project been delayed for 22 yrs not persuasive either.
*The release of the amount is tantamount to a pronouncement that DBP was responsible for the delay.
*these questions pertain to merits of the case, which is on appeal. It must be stressed that the only issue
in these proceedings is whether there are "good reasons" to justify the execution of the judgment
pending appeal.
PROPERTIES EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION
6.) PENTAGON SECURITY vs. JIMENEZ and NLRC
1.) Pentagon Security (PS), single proprietorship engaged in security services, was ordered to pay the
wages and COLA differentials due its employees, as computed in Decision of NLRC
2.)Notice of garnishment was issued against PS, addressed to PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp
Crame, EDSA, Q.C.
3.) Deputy Sheriff Silvino Santos issued Notice of Levy & Sale on Execution of Personal Properties against
PS, which are the licensed firearms
4.) PS filed urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution, claiming exemption from
execution under Sec. 12, par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
5.) Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno: against PS; denied the petition.
6.) NLRC RULING: against PS
*PS is a security agency & licensed firearm is an important implement used in the business but this
licensed firearm is not the tools and implements exempted from execution since person can still run the
business w/o such firearm because there are other alternatives open to him.
*no showing that the levied firearms are only firearms that PS has in its possession since there are
firearms still hidden in its armory sufficient enough to answer call of its security trade or business.
*assuming that no firearms remains in PS’ custody, PS can lease or buy from legitimate sources.
7.) OSG submit that firearms of a security agency are not exempt from execution
ISSUE: W/n NLRC erred in upholding sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution
against licensed firearms owned and used by PS= NO.
SC:1.) term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or manual labor needed by an
artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living.
2.) Here PS is a business enterprise. It does not use firearms personally, but they are used by its
employees.
3.) Not being a natural person, PS cannot claim that the firearms are necessary for its livelihood.
4.) There are security guards rendering service without firearms and PS w/o filing any reply moves for the
resolution of the petition.
5.) There is no question, that a security agency w/o firearms to equip its guards is useless.
6.) However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by provision involved is personal,
available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan
7.) As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution,
there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.
8.) However, for security reasons, and to prevent possibility that the firearms to be sold at the execution
sale may fall into the hands of lawless and subversive elements, the sale at public auction should be with
the prior clearance and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities.
8. CENTRAL SURETY (DEF) vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC (PL)
1.) Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership agreement with Planters Products, Inc.(PPI) whereby he agreed to
purchase, in cash/credit, fertilizers and agricultural chemicals from PPI for resale.
2.) To secure Olson's compliance of obligations, (Vista Insurance) and CS executed surety in favor of PPI
3.) Olson failed to pay PPI prompting PPI claim amount due from CS and Vista Insurance. However, both
refused
4.) PPI filed action for collection of sum of money against Olson, Vista Insurance and CS in (RTC) of Makati,
*Summons served (except as to Olson whose address could not be located).
5.) TC RULING: found CS and Vista liable to PPI.
6.) CS alone appealed to (CA).
7.) CA RULING: dismissed CS’ appeal for failure to pay the required docket fees; dismissal of CS' appeal became
final and executory; entry of judgment followed
8.) PPI filed in the RTC motion for execution of judgment following CA's dismissal of CS’ appeal.
9.) RTC issued the writ but was not implemented so PPI filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of alias writ
of execution which TC granted
10.) CS filed w/ CA Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the CA Resolution and to Re-Open Appeal w/ Prayer for
Prelim. Injunc./TRO
11.) CA issued a resolution restraining RTC judge and deputy sheriff from enforcing writ but, on motion of PPI,
CA lifted TRO and dismissed CS' urgent motion
12.) CS filed certiorari w/ SC w/c dismissed it and said dismissal became final
13.) 6 yrs from entry of judgment of RTC's decision, PPI filed another motion for issuance of alias writ of
execution in TC w/c granted it
14.) CS went to the CA via certiorari under Rule ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
judge for issuing the writ despite the fact that more than 5 years elapsed since RTC's decision of November 6,
1991 became final and executory hence TC decision could no longer be enforced by mere motion but only by
court action.
15.) CA RULING: infavor of PPI; dismissed the petition
*While true that judgment sought to be executed became final and executory on March 12, 1993, it bears
stressing that delay was caused by CS dilatory maneuvers filed in CA and to the SC, viz: the Very Urgent Motion
…, MR of CA Reso and Petition for Certiorari before SC
ISSUE: W/n execution of a final judgment may be made by mere motion despite lapse of 5 years=YES
SC:1.) Under Rule 39, Section 6, 15 the rule is that a final judgment may be executed by mere motion w/in 5
yrs from date of entry of judgment.
2.) Rule NOT absolute and admits one notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing judgment is
caused by party assailing the filing of the motion.
3.) Case falls within the exception.
*CS triggered series of delays in execution of RTC's final decision by filing numerous motions and appeals in
CA, even causing CA's issuance of TRO enjoining the enforcement of said decision.
*obvious that CS is merely resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
4.) purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party
from sleeping on his rights.
*Far from sleeping on its rights, PPI pursued its claim by persistently seeking execution of the TC final
judgment of
* unjust to frustrate PPI's effort to collect payment from CS on sheer technicality, hence, liberal interpretation
is
warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
9. TING vs HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO
1.) Decision of Judge Alfredo Marigomen of CFI of Cebu: granted application filed by Sps. Lirio (Sps) for
registration of title to a Lot w/c became final and executor, hence, Judge directed LRCommision to issue
decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of sps.
2.) Ting filed with RTC Cebu application for registration of title to the same lot.
3.) HEIRS OF SPS ANSWER:decision in LRC final and executory hence, barred filing of Ting’s app. since res
judicata. December 10 1976 decision in LRC filed by Sps had become final and executory on January 29, 1977
4.) TC dismissed Ting's application on the ground of res judicata.
5.) certiorari filed by Ting
6.) TING’s ARGUM:
*though the decision in LRC become final and executory, no decree of registration been issued by LRA;
*only on July 26, 2003 that "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of Heirs' motion to dismiss LRC filed
by Ting and since no action for revival of said decision was filed by Heirs after lapse of 10 yr prescriptive
period" the cause of action in the dormant judgment passed into extinction."
*Petitioner concludes that "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata
ISSUE: W/n TC is correct in dismissing the app. filed by Ting= YES
SC:1.) After judgment become final and executory, it shall pass to upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
to Commissioner for issuance of decree of regis. & corresponding cert. of title in favor of adjudged owner.
2.) In regis. proceeding of a private land, with/w/o opposition, judgment of court confirming title of applicant/
oppositor, & ordering its registration, constitutes, when final, res judicata against whole world.
* becomes final when no appeal w/in reglementary period is taken from confirmation and registration
3.) land regis. proceedings being in rem, approval of Sps’app. settled ownership & binding on whole world inc.
Ting
4.) Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC had become "extinct," Ting advances
that LRA not issued decree of regis., a certain Engr. Belleza, claimed that survey of Cebu Cadastral Extension is
erroneous
& that Sps did not comply with said requirement stated by Engr.
*But, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engr. Belleza and that it reported such claim to the
land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
5.) As for petitioner's claim that the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of failure of Heirs or
Sps to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same is not meritorious.
*Rule 39, SEC. 6- judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after 5 years but within 10 yrs, by
an action, refers to civil actions and is NOT applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case
because party in civil action must immediately enforce a judgment secured against adverse party,& his failure
to enforce the same w/in a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes decision unenforceable against
losing party
*In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings,
the ownership by person of a land. After ownership been proved & confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when adverse/ losing party been in
possession of land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
* no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding execution of judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
6.) decision in land registration case, unless adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final w/o any
further action, upon expiration of period for perfecting an appeal.
PROCEEDINGS WHERE PROPERTY CLAIMED BY 3rd PERSONS
10.) ARABAY vs. SALVADOR
1.)CFI of Manila ordered Soyangco (Soy) to pay Arabay (Arab) sum plus interest & attorney's fees.
2.) Soy not appeal.
3.) Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that case, sheriff of Rizal levied upon 40 pieces of personal property
found in Soy's residence at Rizal and served notice that same would be auctioned off to highest bidder
4.) Benjamin M. Pascual filed 3rd Party Claim (3PC) with the sheriff.
*He owned personal property being sold to him by sheriff of Caloocan City to satisfy judgment against Soy. in case of
" Ferrer vs. Soy" of the
5.) Arab. posted indemnity bond in favor of sheriff. T
6.) auction sale was rescheduled but the sale did not take place because Pascual sued (injunction suit) sheriff and
Arab. in CFI Caloocan praying that auction sale be enjoined, that levy be declared void and for moral damages and
attorney's fees.
* Caloocan court in an ex parte order enjoined the sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale.
7.) Arab, filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit invoking that no court has power to interfere by injunction w/
the judgment of a court of concurrent or coordinate Jurisdiction
8.) Pascual OPPOSITION: a sheriff has no authority to attach property of person other than the judgment debtor
9.) Caloocan court in denied motion to dismiss hence infavor of Pascual
10.)Arab., Inc. filed w/ SC the certiorari and prohibition wherein it assailed the injunction order.
ISSUE: W/N at instance of a 3rd-party claimant, the Caloocan court can enjoin the sheriff from selling props w/c he
levied to satisfy the judgment of CFI Manila= YES.
SC:1.) Caloocan court can stop execution of Manila court's judgment against properties not belonging to judgment
debtor.
2.) injunction in that case not constitute interference w/ the process of court of coordinate and co-equal jurisd.
3.) As a third-party claimant, Pascual has right to vindicate his claim to props. levied upon by means of proper action.
4.) third-party claimant NOT obligated to file action for damages against sheriff in case indemnity bond was filed by
the judgment creditor.
5.) third-party claimant may file separate and independent action to establish ownership to the property levied upon
by sheriff. In that action, he may secure injunction to restrain the sale of the attached property
6.) When sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his authority, seizes a stranger's property, writ of injunction, issued to
stop the auction sale, is not interference w/ writ of execution issued by another court because the writ of exec. was
improperly implemented by sheriff.
*Under that writ, sheriff could attach property of judgment debtor and he’s not authorized to levy upon the
property of the third-party claimant
7.) Caoocan Court is correct since a sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person under an execution
except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justifcation
8.). An injunction is proper remedy to prevent sheriff from selling property of 1 person for paying debts of another
9.) generally, the rule, that no court has authority to interfere by injunction w/ the judgments of a concurrent or
is applied in cases, where no third-party claimant is involved
*Rationale: To allow coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments by injunctions would obviously lead
to confusion and might seriously hinder the proper administration of justice

11. ESCOVILLA (sheriff) vs. CA
1.) Civil Case "Cuison Engineering v. del Rosario: a decision by CFI Davao City awarding to Cuison sum of
money and damages w/c CA and became final and executory
2.) Cuison sought execution of said decision and writ of execution was issued by RTC Davao City.
3.) Sheriff Esco. levied and seized (1) lectric welding machine
4.) 3PC over said item was filed by Mariano Rana, office manager of Sibagat Timber Corporation, one of
PR
5.) action for prohibition w/ prelim. inj. and damages filed by Sibagat against sheriff Esco. and Cuison in
RTC Butuan
6.) petitioner Sheriff Cecilio M. Meris seized and levied one (1) unit motor hence PR Conchita del Rosario,
claiming ownership over it launch filed a 3PC over the subject property.
7.) sheriffs indemnity bond filed for 3PC of Conchita was approved by Davao Court and Sheriff Meris
prepared notice of sale setting the auction sale of
8.) TRO issued by Butuan Court directing sheriff to refrain from public auction sale
9.) after TRO lapsed and upon motion of Cuison, RTC Davao issued an order directing Sheriff Esco. to
proceed with the auction sale of motor launch with authority to lawfully retrieve the same wherever it
may be stored or berthed.
10.) Esco. took custody of the motor & set the auction sale on March 27, 1985.
11.) Despite the orders of Butuan court directing the Sheriffs to return prop. & to desist from proceeding
with the auction sale, auction sale was conducted upon motion of Cuison and Judge of Davao Court
12.) Prop. was sold at public auction by Sheriff Robiza in lieu of Escovilla
13.) Meanwhile, trial on the merits was held in Butuan Court w/ ff ruling: commanding Esco.. to return
the motor at his own expense to Conchita in the event of loss or inability to recover to pay its value
* forfeiture of the indemnity bond; Declaring sale of public auction by Sheriff Ecobiza to be illegal and
void
*Ordering Esco. to return prop to Sigabat (same ruling as w/ conchita)
* Esco. and Cuison pay Conchita & Sigabat, jointly and severally unearned income and damages
14.) Sheriffs appealed to CA w/c affirmed Butuan Court RTC, Butuan City w/ modif.: to return at expense
of at the
all at expense of Cuison
ISSUE: W/n ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL STILL PROSPER AS A REMEDY FOR ACTS ALREADY
ACCOMPLISHED/ W/n CA is correct in affirming the Butuan Court’s Decision of granting prohibition
against Petitioners= YES
SC:1.) petitioners claim that when the public auction sale was conducted and sheriffs certification of sale
was issued in favor of the winning bidder, the petition for prohibition was already rendered moot and
academic because acts sought to be enjoined in the prohibition proceedings already been performed, is
untenable.
2.) no dispute that Conchita and Sigabat are the actual owners of the subject properties
3.) nothing in the petition nor in petitioners' memo. to suggest that properties sold in execution of the
judgment in belonged to the judgment debtor
4.) power of the court in execution of judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging
to judgment debtor.
5.) primary purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo, that is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status w/c preceded the controversy
6.) Conchita and Sigabat properly instituted Special Civil Case No. 454 w/c is a separate and independent
action to vindicate their claims over subject properties.
7.) If petitioners had any doubts to the veracity of 3PC, then separate action instituted was the proper
forum to ventilate such protestations.
8.) action for prohibition filed on February 5, 1985 and on February 18, 1985 Sheriffs admitted having
seized the disputed properties but assured the court that they will not remove them from its jurisdiction
nor sell or dispose of the same.
9.) From the start, Petitioners were cognizant of the 3PC filed with the sheriff and the separate action
instituted against them hence they are fully aware of their liabilities to these third-party claimants who
were not even parties to the case sought to be executed.
10.) Rule is clear that if a 3PC is filed, the sheriff not bound to proceed w/ the levy of property unless he
is given by the judgment creditor an indemnity bond against claim.
* judgment creditor, by giving an indemnity bond, assumes direction and control of sheriffs action; so far
as it might
constitute a trespass and thus he becomes, to that extent, the principal and the sheriff, his agent.
*This makes him responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and
conversion of the goods and for all real damages which the owner might sustain
11.) Thus, in this case, even if auction sale has been conducted and the sheriff's certificate of sale was
issued in favor of the winning bidder, the liability of judgment creditor and consequently, the purchaser
to real owners of the properties levied and executed is not extinguished.
12.) TC Finding: Sheriffs Escovilla and Meris misled the Davao court as to ownership of properties they
seized knowing quite well that Conchita and Sibagat, were the actual owners of the property.
13.) generally, the rule, that no court has authority to interfere by injunction w/ the judgments of a
concurrent or
is applied in cases, where no third-party claimant is involved
*Rationale: To allow coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments by injunctions would
obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the proper administration of justice

12. EVANGELISTA (PL) vs. PENSERGA (clerk and ex officio sheriff)
1.) Evang. was plaintiff in Civil Case of the MTCC of Ormoc City for unlawful detainer against def. spouses
Jose and Zoila Aguirre in w/c Judgment in favor of Evang. ordering sps. to vacate property pay accrued
rentals.
2.) RTC of Ormoc City affirmed MTCC.
3.) TC issued a writ of execution implemented by Penserga, Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the
MTCC of Ormoc City.
4.) writ returned by sheriff, who stated in her return that writ was partiall satified sps vacated
5.) Sheriff alleged that she accepted the money and promissory note from def. because she found that
none of movables found in house belonged to them.
6.) When sjheriff turned over payment to Evang, Evang. objected to manner of implementation of the
writ, alleging that it’s contrary to the court's judgment, and maintaining that Sps were still occupying
property.
7.) Sheriff explained that Sps. showed her documents evidencing their granddaughter's title to and
ownership of the house they were occupying, as well as their sonin-law's ownership of the movables in
the said house.
8.) Evang. filed instant admin. complaint against Sheriff for unreasonably refusing to implement the writ
9.) investigation, report and recommendation to Executive Judge Francisco H. Escano, Jr. of the RTC of
Ormoc City,
* parties consented to an ocular inspection of the premises in dispute.
*The ocular inspection revealed that Evang’s lot, is alleged by her to be facing the Agua Dulce Street and
from there continues down to the edge of the Malbasag River. The house of Sps stands on an old
abandoned river bed,
* Commissioner refrained from making a pronouncement in his report as to whether Sps' house is
inside/outside the property of Evang. He recommended that a surveyor be appointed
*Judge Escano pointed out that Sheriff misled the court in making it appear in her return that Sps already
vacated when in fact not
ISSUE: W/n admin complaint against sheriff must prosper= YES
SC: 1.) No valid reasons to warrant Sheriff's inability to implement the writ insofar as effecting ejectment
of Sps from the disputed house is concerned.
2.) Sheriff should have continued to implement the writ of execution despite presence of an alleged
claim of 3rd person on the subject property
3.) remedies of a third person whose property was seized by sheriff to answer for obligation of a
judgment debtor. may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution.
*Upon due application by 3rd person and after summary hearing, the court may command that property
be released from mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor.
*In this particular instance, court can determine whether sheriff acted rightly or wrongly in the
performance of his duties in the execution of judgment. The court cannot pass upon the question of title
to property w/ finality.
4.) Another remedy w/c 3rd person may avail of is the remedy known as terceria as provided in Section
17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
* done by serving on officer making the levy an affidavit of his title and copy thereof upon the judgment
creditor.
*officer shall not be bound to keep property, unless such judgment creditor/ his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the
property levied on.
5.) An action for damages may be later on brought against the sheriff.
6.) Said remedies are w/o prejudice to any proper action that 3rd party claimant may deem suitable, to
vindicate his claim to property.
7.) It did not help that Sps succeeded in utilizing legal processes to have house they were living in titled in
the name of their granddaughter, and the lot on which it stood transferred to their son-in-law,
*The latter transfer was effected in March 2, 1992, after RTC already affirmed MTCC's decision in the
ejectment case on February 10, 1992.
8.) Sheriff’s acceptance of the sum of P100.00 as initial payment and a promissory note from Sps in
satisfaction of the money judgment is another matter altogether.
*Sheriff acted w/o and in excess of her official duty in securing such manner of payment from the
judgment debtors.
9.) Under the law, sheriff was only authorized to do the following: oust the sps from property; place
Evang. in possession thereof; satisfy back rentals out of the personal properties of Sps, and if personal
properties could not be found, satisfy the money judgment out of real property of Sps,
10.) Sheriff failed to follow the procedure laid down by the Rules on execution of final judgment.
11.) She simply should have filed a return stating why she could not execute the writ instead of entering
into "compromise" with judgment debtors which she is not authorized to do.
12.) Executive Judge Escano also found that Sheriff asked for and received P500.00 from Anita Sumaljag,
Evang's niece, to cover expenses for enforcement of writ but w/o rendering accounting after the
execution w/c was admitted by her
13.) sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial.
14.) As a sheriff, shet is bound to discharge her duties with prudence, caution and attention which
careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. The sheriff, an officer of the court upon
whom the execution of
a final judgment depends must be circumspect and proper in his behavior.
15.) PENALTY: FINE in the sum of P5,000.00 with WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts
or omissions will be dealt with more severely

13. LORENZANA vs. CAYETANO
1.) Lor. filed in Municipal Court of Manila ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her tenants
occupying different stalls in hut, leased by her (which she afterwards purchased) from Manila Railroad
Company and later from the Bureau of Lands
2.) Cayet. occupied the area north of the quonset hut, which was also leased by her from the Manila
Railroad Company and subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on which her house stood. Hence,
the areas occupied by two principal protagonists are adjacent to each other.
3.) ejectment cases decided by Municipal Court in favor of Lor.affirmed by CFI w/c ordered the tenants to
vacate
4.) Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate, court granted partial execution of judgment hence a writ of
demolition was issued, commanding the Sheriff of Manila "to demolish the premises
5.) Lor. with her counsel, Atty. Nereo Paculdo and Sheriff entered the premises of Cayet. and in spite of
Cayet’s protests Lor. rt al destroyed Cayet’s fence, flower pots, trellises, and electric installations & built
another fence 5 meters into the premises of Cay., boring holes into the cemented garden of her house.
6.) Cay’s motion to declare Lor., et al guilty of contempt; The presiding judge held the motion in
abeyance until the decision of court in the ejectment cases shall have been rendered.
7.) Acting upon the Lor's ex-parte motion and urgent motion for demolition in the two appealed
ejectment cases, writ of demolition was issued by the Sheriff
8.) Lor., et al proceeded once more to Cay's premises and moved the fence where it was illegally placed
by them
9.) Cay’s urgent motion for the suspension of the execution of writ of demolition, denied by the court
10.) Cay’s filed an ex-parte motion to withdraw the petition for contempt on the ground that "conferring
with Judge Bayona after this petition was heard, Lor. was informed that not being a party to the
abovenumbered cases, she is like an intruder to act on her petition
11.) Cay. filed CFI of Manila, against Lor., et al , for damages with mandatory injunction.
12.) Lor., et al MOTION TO DIMSISS
13.) TC denied on the motion to dismiss and petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
14.) TC Decision dismissing the complaint of Cay. as well as the counterclaim of Lor., et al
15.) Cay. appealed to CA w/c reversed decision appealed from, and ordered Lor. to restore to Cay. the
possession of the property invaded and occupied by her
16.) Lor., et al contends that Cay. having voluntarily appeared before the court and invoked its
jurisdiction seeking affirmative relief by filing a petition to declare Lor, et al in contempt and holding
them liable in damages, and by filing an urgent petition for the suspension of the execution of the writ of
demolition, she could no longer contest the efficacy of the writ.
ISSUE: W/n the CA is correct in ordering Lor, et al to restore prop to Cayetano=YES
SC: 1.Cay. was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been
issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cay. only
went to court to protect her property from demolition after judgment in the ejectment cases had
become final and executory.
2.) Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cay. remains a third person to such
judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since she was
not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.
3.) Cay. did not derive her right or interest from the tenants nor from the plaintiff-landlord Lor. but from
the Bureau of Lands from which she had leased the property.
4.) Cay. remained a stranger to case and she cannot be bound by the judgment rendered therein, nor by
the writs of execution and demolition issued in pursuance to said judgment.
5.) Cay. not being bound thereby, may avail herself of proper action afforded by Section 17, Rule 39
6.) Cay. Respondent acted within and exercised her right when she filed the proper action to vindicate
her claim afforded to her by Rules of Court, against intruders or trespassers before CFI Manila
7.)if she did not insist on her motion for contempt, if she did not appeal from the order of the court
denying her motion to suspend the writ of demolition, such failure did not amount to a waiver of her
right to pursue the proper action or remedy provided to her by the Rules
8.) no legal compulsion Cay. to pursue the remedies suggested by theLor., for the rights of 3PC should
not be decided in the action where 3pc has been presented, but in a separate action to be instituted by
the third person.
9.) The petitioner’S contention that a writ of execution and an order of demolition cannot be collaterally
attacked in an action specifically brought for recovery of damages, and that said action for damages and
mandatory injunction filed by Cay. with Branch XVII was nothing less than an action to review the
validity of the order of demolition issued, is non-meritorious.
10.) civil case filed by Cay. for damages and the restoration of the property destroyed and her premises
taken unlawfully under writ of demolition was not brought to reverse, impugn or set aside the judgment
in the ejectment cases but to declare that the writ of demolition should not have been applied to that
portion of the land and the building occupied by her,
11.) the judgment and the demolition orders were valid and binding to the tenants but not to Cay. and
her property.
12.) If the judgment and the writs of execution and demolition were alleged in the complaint for
damages, this was not necessarily a collateral attack ;it is merely a statement of the legal basis which the
sheriff exceeded, abetted by the petitioner.
13.) The contention of the LOr. that a branch of a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with or nullify
decisions, of another branch of the same court
*"No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.
*For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by one court must interfere w/ the judgment or decree
issued by another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction and the relief sought by such injunction must
be one which could be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.
14.) Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property levied upon on execution may
vindicate such claim by action.
*A judgment rendered in his favor —declaring him to be the owner of the property — would not
constitute interference w/the powers or processes of the court which rendered the
15.) The right of a person who claims to be the owner of property levied upon on execution to file 3PC
with the sheriff is not exclusive, and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the judgment
creditor files an indemnity bond
16.) By "action," as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a separate and independent action."

14.CENAS vs.
SPS. ANTONIO P. SANTOS and DRA. ROSARIO M. SANTOS and HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge, CFI-Rizal,
Br. III,respondents.
W. Espiritu Taganas for petitioners.
Sta. Ana & Fonacier Law Office for private respondents.
FACTS:
On May 3, 1976, the spouses Jose Pulido and Iluminada M. Pulido mortgaged to Pasay City Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. their land covered by TCT No. 471634, subject of this case, to secure a loan of P10,000.00. The said
mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deeds on the same date and was duly annotated in the title of the
property.
On May 18, 1976, the said mortgaged land was levied upon by the City Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to a writ
of execution issued by the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-2029 entitled, "Milagros C.
Punzalan vs. Iluminada Manuel-Pulido"; and eventually, on July 19, 1976, the same was sold to herein petitioner
Josefina B. Cenas who was the highest bidder in the execution sale.
On January 18, 1977, Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. assigned to petitioner Cenas all its rights, interests,
and participation to the said mortgage, for the sum of P8,110.00, representing the unpaid principal obligation of the
Pulidos as of October 6, 1976, including interest due and legal expenses. Thus, petitioner became the purchaser at
the public auction sale of the subject property as well as the assignee of the mortgage constituted thereon.
On July 19, 1977, herein private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos redeemed the said property, paying the total sum
of P15,718.00, and was accordingly issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City a Certificate of Redemption.
On April 17, 1977, petitioner Cenas, as the assignee of the mortgage loan of the Pulidos which remained unpaid, filed
with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, a verified petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage
constituted over the subject property. Accordingly, the subject property was advertised for sale at public auction on
May 15, 1978.
On the other hand, private respondents, spouses Antonio P. Santos and Dra. Rosario M. Santos, apprised of the
impending auction sale of the said property, filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
claiming that they had become the absolute owners of the property by virtue of Certificate of Redemption, dated July
20, 1977, issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City; and on May 11, 1978, filed with the respondent court a verified
Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal from proceeding with the
public auction sale of the property in question. Private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Petition together with
the Amended Petition, which was opposed by the petitioners. The trial court, in its Order of July 17, 1978, denied the
motion and ordered the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
The trial court rendered its judgment dated August 28, 1978 in favor of private respondents,
The trial court held that the redemption of the subject property effected by the herein private respondents, "wipe
out and extinguished the mortgage executed by the Pulido spouses favor of the Pasay City Savings and Loan
Association, Inc."
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court, in its Order of December 4, 1978, denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W/Nthe redemption of the questioned property by herein private respondents wiped out and extinguished the
pre-existing mortgage obligation of the judgment debtor, Iluminada M. Pulido for the security of which (mortgage
debt) the subject property had been encumbered.
HELD: NO!
The answer is in the negative.
Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides for the time, manner and the amount to be paid to
redeem a sold by virtue of a writ of execution. Pertinent portion reads:
Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. —
The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve
(12) months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centumper month
interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes
which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same
rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the
judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. . . . .
Under the above-quoted provision, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the
redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the redemptioner has to pay, in
addition to the prescribed amounts, such other prior lien of the creditor-purchaser with interest.
In the instant case, it will be recalled that on May 3,1976, the Pulidos mortgaged the subject property to Pasay
City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. who, in turn, on January 8, 1977, assigned the same to petitioner Cenas.
Meanwhile, on July 19, 1976, pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-2029 (Petitioner Cenas is not
a party in this case No. Q-2029), the subject property was sold to petitioner Cenas, being the highest bidder in the
execution sale. On July 19, 1977, private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos redeemed the subject property.
Therefore, there is no question that petitioner Cenas as assignee of the mortgage constituted over the subject
property, is also a creditor having a prior (mortgage) lien to that of Dra. Rosario M. Santos. Accordingly, the
acceptance of the redemption amount by petitioner Cenas, without demanding payment of her prior lien — the
mortgage obligation of the Pulidos — cannot wipe out and extinguish said mortgage obligation. The mortgage
directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted (Art. 2126, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, a
mortgage creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. Hence, even if the mortgaged property is
sold (Art. 2128) or its possession transferred to another (Art. 2129), the property remains subject to the fulfillment of
the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
It will be noted that Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is silent as to the effect of the acceptance by the purchaser, who
is also a creditor, having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, of the redemption amount, without demanding
payment of her prior lien. Neither does it provide whether or not the redemption of the property sold in execution
sale freed the redeemed property from prior liens. However, where the prior lien consists of a mortgage
constituted on the property redeemed, as in the case at bar, such redemption does not extinguish the mortgage
(Art. 2126). Furthermore, a mortgage previously registered, like in the instant case, cannot be prejudiced by any
subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate of title.
Moreover, it must be stressed that private respondents redeemed the property in question as "successor in
interest" of the judgment debtor, and as such are deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the judgment
debtor and are bound by exactly the same condition relative to the redemption of the subject property that bound
the latter as debtor and mortgagor (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 [1989]; citing the case of Gorospe vs.
Santos, G.R. No. L-30079, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 191). Private respondents, by stepping in the judgment
debtor's shoes, had the obligation to pay the mortgage debt, otherwise, the debt would and could be enforced
against the property mortgaged (Tambunting vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 176 SCRA 493 [1989]).
15. ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA,petitioners,
vs.
MARINA BUAN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES, BRANCH 1 AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
ZAMBALES THRU HIS DEPUTY, ATILANO G. NANQUIL,respondents.
FACTS:
On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential house
and lot in favor of private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure the loan of P78,328.08 granted by the latter to the
former.
Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage which was duly published and advertised for public auction by Olongapo City Sheriff Ramon Y. Pardo on
September 29, 1977. Private respondent was the winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds on October 26, 1977. Valentin had a period
of one (1) year from the date of registration within which to redeem the mortgaged properties. The period for the
redemption of the property in question having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a Final Bill
of Sale was thereafter issued by the City Sheriff or, November 3, 1978.
After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed before the Court of First Instance of Zambales
a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession." As this was not contested, a decision was rendered by
respondent court on June 19, 1979
A writ of possession addressed to the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales was issued on August 22, 1979. The return on
the writ as embodied in the Sheriff's Report dated August 28, 1979 showed that when Deputy Sheriff Atilano G.
Nanquil tried to execute the writ of possession, he found that petitioners were occupying the premises and refused
to vacate the same, on the alleged claim of Atty. Roxas that he bought the house and lot in question from Valentin in
the amount of P100,00.00. Atty. Roxas also told Sheriff Nanquil that he introduced improvements consisting of one
bungalow house and one store and that Valentin is no longer residing in the premises.
In view of the petitioners' refusal to abide by the writ of possession, private respondent filed on August 30, 1979 a
"Motion for Contempt" against Alberto Roxas and Nenita de Guia. On September 12, 1979, the petitioners through
counsel filed with the respondent court their answer thereto arguing that they cannot be held guilty of contempt of
court because they were not made parties to the main action.
On January 16, 1980, the respondent trial court, finding merit in petitioners' position that they could not be declared
in contempt.
The respondents Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia are, however, ordered to immediately vacate the
disputed house and lot in question within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order under pain of
contempt of Court.
Disagreeing with the portion of the order directing them to vacate the property, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on January 28, 1980. However, the respondent court, denied their motion on February 28, 1980.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 12, 1979. This Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on May 19, 1980.
The petitioners maintain that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the order complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated upon a writ of possession which was
ineffective as against them, being third parties. Thus, the order is null and void. They also insist that the private
respondent should file an independent action to recover the property, otherwise, there will be a violation of due
process of law if they are not given their day in court to prove their adverse claim.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order
complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated upon a writ of possession which was ineffective as against
the petitioners, being third parties?
HELD: NO!
The Court finds petitioners' contention without any legal or factual basis.
Under Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgages by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures "unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor." As explained by the Court in IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera,
... The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 is Section 6 which provides that, in cases in which an extrajudicial sale is
made, "redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act." Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which in turn were replaced by Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly states that "If no redemption be made within twelve (12)
months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property ..."
The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the officer unless a party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that Roxas holds title to and possesses the property as Valentin's
transferee. Any right he has to the property is necessarily derived from that of Valentin. As transferee, he steps
into the latter's shoes. Thus, in the instant case, considering that the property had already been sold at public
auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, the only interest that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is
the right to redeem it within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is therefore the successor-in-interest of Valentin,
to whom the latter had conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption. Consequently, Roxas'
occupancy of the property cannot be considered adverse to Valentin.
It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named in the writ of possession, as he merely stepped
into the shoes of Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest. On the other hand, petitioner de Guia was
occupying the house as Roxas' alleged tenant. Moreover, respondent court's decision granting private respondent
Buan's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his
deputies to remove Valentin or any person claiming interest under him" from the property. Undeniably, petitioners
fell under this category.
As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as would warrant the issuance of the writ of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for, tainted the issuance of the assailed order, the petition must fail.

16. Napocor vs. Gonong, 1989
FACTS:
The case had been instituted by Allied Control and Electric Corporation (hereafter, simply ACEC) to recover a sum of
money from Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The judgment ordered BBGMI to pay ACEC its
indebtedness of P 264,401.00 interest thereon at the rate of 16% per annum and "penalty charge" at 3% per month
beginning May 15, 1985, and the further sum of P 66,100.00 equivalent to 25% of the overdue obligation as
attorney's fees. The judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court at ACEC's instance on
December 18, 1987.
Evidently the attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August 19, 1988 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination
of Debtor of Judgment Debtor," alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC) was a debtor of BBGMI and
praying that certain officials of the NPC be required to appear before the Court and examined regarding its debt to
BBGMI. This was granted by respondent Judge, who scheduled the examination 49 on September 28, 1988 and on
posterior dates." The Manager of NPCs General Accounts Division, Ariel Vinoya, appeared in response to subpoena
and was duly examined on oath. The gist of his testimony is set out in respondent Judge's Order of November
15,1988 2 viz:
... Witness testified that sometime in 1980, National Power Corporation and defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines
Inc. entered into an agreement, whereby at that time Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. needed the supply of electricity
from NPC, however, at that time there was no transmission lines connecting the mining site to the lines of NPC and it
was not yet within the program of activities of NPC to construct those lines. Thus, Batong Buhay ... offered to finance
the construction of the line which they did . Under that arrangement, NPC is going to reimburse Batong Buhay Gold
Mines Inc. the amount that they have spent for the construction of the line by crediting 25% of defendant's monthly
electric power bills until the actual cost shall have been fully paid and without interest.
(T)he transmission lines were in fact erected and installed by defendant and NPC supplied electric power to the
mining site and as agreed upon NPC deducted from the monthly power bills of defendant the sums equivalent to
25% thereof, as shown graphically in Exh. 'A-2- Motion' from October 15, 1983 to October 11, 1985. As reflected in
Exh. 'A-Motion' an amount of P 51,745,319.15 was due to defendant as of December 31, 1982 and after deducting
the 25%, a balance of P37,532,763.17 was left due to defendant. However, ... when defendant ceased operation in
1985 it left unpaid electric power bills in the amount of P15,941,625.35 plus interest of P2,643,514.76 as of August,
1986 or in the total amount of P18,585,140.11; deduct this from the P37,532,763.17 and a balance of
P18,947.623.06 was left due to defendant but Mr. Vinoya further testified that it is not due to Batong Buhay Gold
Mines, Inc. but a balance of the advances made by Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. in the construction of the power
lines.
On the strength of this testimony -- which included, it must be stressed, a denial by the witness that the amount of
P18,947,623.06 was due to BBGMI, this being "but a balance of the advances made by ... (the latter) in the
construction of the power lines respondent Judge resolved to direct the NPC to pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in
October 8,1987 out of the remaining credit NPC holds in favor of defendant," and ordered his deputy sheriff
(respondent Adriano) "to garnish and attach the said credit due Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc." In justification His
Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a money
judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" 3 in addition to "real property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal
property, or any interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that the NPC official, Vinoya, had
later admitted that "this amount of P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc." Sheriff
Adriano accordingly garnished such of the funds of the NPC on deposit at the Philippine National Bank, Escolta,
Manila, as were "sufficient to cover the sum" required to be paid by respondent Judge's Decision of October 8, 1987.
Hence, the present action of certiorari instituted by NPC praying for "the setting aside of respondent Judge's Order
dated November 15, 1988 ..and commanding respondent to desist from executing the writ of garnishment issued by
respondent Sheriff in Civil Case No. 87-39301."
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Judge correctly ordered the respondent to desist from executing the writ of garnishment issued by
respondent Sheriff?
HELD: NO!
For the reasons shortly to be explained, the Court decreed on March 15, 1989 the issuance of a temporary
restraining order "enjoining the respondents from enforcing and/or implementing the (challenged) Order," and a
preliminary mandatory injunction "commanding respondent Deputy Sheriff Dominador B. Adriano and/or Allied
Control and Electric Corporation to RETURN to respondent Philippine National Bank the amount of P828,806.20 ...
debited from petitioner's ... Account SA No. 010-572194-3." The Court subsequently gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit memoranda. Said memoranda have since been received.
The Court rules that in authorizing the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 87-39301 against l stranger to the
action, on the theory that the latter was a "debtor of the judgment debtor," respondent Judge was guilty of grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination of a judgment debtor. This is clear from Section 39
of the rule:
SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an execution against the property of a judgment debtor
has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and upon proof, by affidavit of a party or otherwise, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property of such judgment debtor, or is
indebted to him, the judge may, by an order, require such person, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer or
member thereof, to appear before the judge, or a commissioner appointed by him, at a time a place within the
province in which the order is served, to answer concerning the same. The service of an order shall bind all credits
due the judgment debtor and all money and property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the control of
such person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of service; and the judgment may also require notice of such
proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as he may deem proper.
It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require the appearance, by subpoena, of officials of the
NPC to appear and be questioned regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment debtor, BBGMI. But
just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's power to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the judgment
debtor to pay the claimed debt without indubitable admission or conclusive proof that the debt existed and was
demandable. The applicable provision is not, as was respondent Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule 39,
which merely states the procedure that the sheriff should follow in the enforcement of a money judgment against
the judgment debtor himself, i.e., to levy on property of the judgment debtor, including "debts" or "credits," and sell
the same, etc., but which obviously does not at all treat of the propriety and requisites for collecting such "debts" or
"credits" from third persons. The relevant provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule 39.
Section 42 reads as follows:
SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction of judgement.- The judge may order any
property of the judgment debtor, or money due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands of either himself or
other person, or of a corporation or other legal entity, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, subject to
any prior rights over such property, ....
Section 45, on the other hand, states the following:
SEC. 45. Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person claims the property. - If it appears that a person
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him claims an interest in the
property adverse to him or denies the debt, the court or judge may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the
judgment creditor to institute an action against such person or cor poration for the recovery of such interest or debt,
forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt until an action can be commenced and prosecuted to
judgment, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated by
the judge granting the same, or by the court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms as may be
just.
.. the only power of the court in proceedings supplemental to execution is to make an order authorizing the creditor
to sue in the proper court to recover an indebtedness due to the judgment debtor. The court has no jurisdiction to
try summarily the question whether the third party served with notice of execution and levy is indebted to
defendant when such indebtedness is denied. To make an order in relation to property which the garnishee claimed
to own in his own right, requiring its application in satisfaction of judgment of another, would be to deprive the
garnishee of property upon summary proceeding and without due process of law.
The only disposition that said Court could legitimately have made in the premises, was that indicated in Section 46
of Rule 39, above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor, to bring a separate action against NPC, as
alleged debtor of BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for establishment by satisfactory proof of the postulated
indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and consequent payment to it ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds
to the amount of its judgment.
17. YSMAEL V. CA
318 SCRA 215 (1999)
LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO
LEJANO and ANASTACIA LEJANO, respondents.
Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 29, and obtained judgment in their favor on October 2, 1980.
The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners were unable to locate property belonging to private
respondents. However, in 1989, before the right of action upon the judgment could prescribe, petitioners filed a case
for the revival of the judgment in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, which on March 14, 1990, rendered
a decision reviving the judgment in Civil Case No. 3039.
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, but their appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated October
8, 1992 of the appellate court. Private respondents brought the matter to this Court which likewise dismissed private
respondents petition on January 11, 1993.
Accordingly, on September 9, 1993, the trial court issued a writ of execution, as a result of which the rights, interests,
and participation of private respondents in several parcels of lands, covered by TCT Nos. T-47699, T-50009, T-54010,
T-50011, T-50391, T-50392, T-50393, T-50394, and 16274 of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, were levied on
execution.On March 15, 1995, private respondents rights, interests, and participation in said lands were sold at
public auction to petitioners,represented by their counsel of record Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr., who offered the
highest bid for P700,000.00. The sale to petitioners was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas on July 25, 1995. The certificate of sale stated in pertinent parts:
The periodof redemptionof the real properties described above will expire one (1) year from and after the date of
registration of this Certificate of Sale.
It is hereby required of said highest bidder, that a statement of any amount of assessment or taxes which may have
been paid on account of this purchase and such other liens chargeable to the redemptioners, with PROOF hereof, be
submitted within thirty (30) days immediately preceding the expiration of the period of redemption, furnishing the
defendants a copy thereof, as required by law, for purposes of computing the actual amount payable by the
defendants in case of redemption.
On July 16, 1996, private respondents counsel wrote to petitioners counsel Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr. and
Deputy Sheriff Sofronio M. Villarin, informing them that private respondents were exercising their right of
redemption. Private respondents asked petitioners for a computation of the redemption price.
The twelve-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996. Although the certificate of sale was registered on
July 25, 1995, the twelve-month period ended on July 19, 1996, considering that the latter year was a leap
year.However, thinking that the last day of the period of redemption was on July 25, 1996, private respondent
Pacifico Lejano went to the office of Atty. Arguelles on said date and tendered to him two cashiers checks drawn on
Far East Bank and Trust Company in the total amount of P784,000.00.One check was for P700,000.00, representing
the purchase price at the execution sale, and another was for P84,000.00, representing 1% interest per month on the
purchase price from July 25, 1995 to July 25, 1996.The checks came with a letter, dated July 25, 1996, giving notice of
private respondents intention to exercise their right of redemption.Atty. Arguelles, however, refused to accept the
payment. In a note to private respondent Pacifico Lejano, Atty. Arguelles claimed he had no authority to receive
payment for petitioner Luis Ysmael.
Accordingly, private respondent called up petitioner Ysmaels office, but he was informed that petitioner Ysmael was
not in, and it was not known when he would return.Unable to make a tender of payment, private respondent filed
the next day, July 26, 1996, a motion for consignation in the trial court.Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that
the period of redemption had already expired and that there was no valid tender of payment because the cashiers
checks were insufficient to cover the total redemption price.
In the order dated October 21, 1996, the trial court granted private respondents motion for consignation,
This was well within the redemption period which expired on July 19, 1996 per computation of the period made by
the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs or the Sheriff never bothered to answer the letter.In this regard, plaintiffs further argue that
they cannot be faulted for their failure to give defendants a statement of the total amount of the redemption price
since that is so provided in Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rejoinder, par. C).Be that as it may, since the
aforecited section in providing for the amount payable to the purchaser (herein plaintiffs) by way of redemption
speaks of the amount of his (their) purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the
time of the redemption,
togetherwiththeamountofanyassessmentsortaxeswhichthepurchasermayhavepaidthereonafterpurchase,andinterest
onsuchlast-namedamountatthesamerate; x x x (underlining supplied), there would appear to be a need for the
judgment debtor or redemptioner to inquire as to the total amount of redemption money to be paid and, therefore,
it would not be proper to argue that the plaintiffs or the Sheriff to whom the aforestated letter was addressed could
not be faulted for not answering the query.Thus the delay in paying the correct amount of the redemption price
could not be solely attributed to the defendants since the plaintiffs or the Sheriff are partly to blame.At least the
defendants have shown their good faith in trying to settle the redemption price within the period provided by law
which was simply ignored by the plaintiffs who appeared to profit more if the properties are not redeemed by
reason of the higher value of said properties.
As to the other argument that there was no valid tender of payment of the redemption price because the cashiers
checks are not considered legal tender, suffice it to state that in Ramon Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No.
100555, December 20, 1944), the Supreme Court ruled:
Now, what was presented for deposit in the instant case was not just an ordinary check but a cashiers check payable
to the depositor himself. A cashiers check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its
mere issuance.By its very nature, a cashiers check is a banks order to pay drawn upon itself, committing in effect its
total resources, integrity and honor behind the check.A cashiers check by its peculiar character and general use in
the commercial world is regarded substantially to be as good as the money which it represents. . . .
Anent the objection that the total amount covered by the two cashiers checks falls short of the correct amount of
the redemption price tendered by the defendants, the same should be rectified by requiring them to pay the right
amount.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.As their motion was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus in the Court of Appeals.However, the appellate court dismissed their petition on January 26, 1998.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner is still entitled for redemption?
HELD: YES!
First.Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that within twelve months after the sale, the judgment debtor
may redeem the property sold at public auction, thus:
Sec. 30.Timeandmannerof,andamountspayableon,successiveredemptions.Noticetobegivenandfiled. - The judgment
debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months after
the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereof in
addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser
may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same rate. . .
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the
registrar of deeds of the province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or
acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given
to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without
paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.
Under Art. 13 of the Civil Code, a month, unless designated by name, is understood to be equivalent to 30 days,
while a year is understood to be of 365 days.Thus, the rulings of this Court under the 1964 Rules stated that the 12-
month period of redemption under Rule 39, 30 is equivalent to 360 days counted from the registration of the
certificate of sale. Within the said period, the redemptioner must pay the purchaser the full amount of the
redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual.
In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995.Consequently, the right of redemption should have been exercised on
or before July 19, 1996, the 360th day after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996 was a leap year.
However, apparently equating the phrase twelve (12) months in Rule 39, 30 with one year of 365 days, private
respondents reckoned the period of redemption as ending on July 25, 1996 since the sale was registered on July 25,
1995.Indeed, the certificate of sale stated that the period of redemption . . . will expire one (1) year from and after
the date of registration. . .There was thus an honest mistake on a question of law. Rule 39, 28 of the 1997 Rule of
Civil Procedure now provides that the period of redemption shall be at any time within one (1) year from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale, so that the period is now to be understood as composed of 365 days.Neither
petitioners nor the sheriff corrected private respondents mistaken impression, leading the latter to believe that July
25, 1996 was indeed the last day of the period of redemption.
Moreover, private respondents on July 16, 1996 and July 17, 1996, i.e.,within 12-month period as provided in Rule
39, 30 of the former Rules of Court, gave notice to Deputy Sheriff Sofronio and petitioners counsel of their intention
to redeem the lands sold. In the same letter, private respondents requested a statement of the redemption price
which petitioners and the deputy sheriff chose to ignore.When private respondent Lejanos tender of payment was
refused by Atty. Arguelles, Jr., private respondents consigned payment in the trial court on July 26, 1996. The
combination of these circumstances makes it inequitable to rule that private respondents lost the right of
redemption by his delay of six days to redeem the property. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
held that private respondents had tried in good faith to exercise their right of redemption.As the appellate court
stated:
. . .such special circumstances exist, namely: (1) the highest bidders (petitioners) did not submit a statement of any
amount of assessment or taxes which may have been paid on account of their purchase to be submitted within 30
days immediately preceding the expiration of the period of redemption, furnishing the defendants (private
respondents) a copy thereof, as directed in the certificate of sale; (2) despite receipt of the letters from private
respondents, petitioners and deputy sheriff Villarin never made a reply; (3) notwithstanding that petitioners counsel
was their agent in the auction sale in which the properties in question were sold to petitioners, said counsel, Atty.
Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr., when private respondents wanted to exercise their right of redemption went into
technicalities by saying his authority was limited to just the bidding.
18. MONTENEGRO vs. MONTENEGRO
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro, for herself and as mother and guardian of her
two minor children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court below a complaint for support
against her husband, herein petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-8467. Four
years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement which
was submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October 1998.
On the same date, the trial court rendered a Decision approving the compromise agreement and ordering the
parties to comply with it. The parties did not appeal from the Decision; hence, it became final and executory.
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated himself to:
(1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) representing her entire share in their conjugal
partnership of gains, Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) of which is payable upon signing of the compromise
agreement while the remaining balance of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) must be paid within one (1) year from
the execution of the compromise agreement.
(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) in favor of his children Antonio Amelo
and Ana Maria Pia Isabel within sixty (60) days from the approval of the compromise agreement.
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and other matriculation fees for the college
education of Ana Maria Pia Isabel within one (1) year from the approval of the compromise agreement.
Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement despite the lapse of the
periods provided therein, respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. The trial court granted
the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15 February 1999.
A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the trial court on 21 May 2001 and on 28 May
2001, respectively, were returned unsatisfied.
In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply with his obligations under
the compromise agreement but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so as he was already insolvent. In
the conference held on 6 March 2002, respondent Teresa manifested that she would file a motion for examination of
petitioner as judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file the appropriate motion and
informed petitioner that he would have 30 days to file a comment or reply to the motion.
On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment obligor under
Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she alleged that there is an urgency for the
examination to be conducted at the earliest time since petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. Acting on the said
motion, the trial court issued on 19 March 2002 an Order granting the motion for examination of petitioner as
judgment obligor and setting his examination on 22 March 2002. On the same day the motion for examination was
granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation alleging that the grant of the motion for examination was
premature because he still would have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or until April 14, 2002, within which to file
a comment or opposition thereto as agreed upon during the conference on 6 March 2002.
On 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled hearing. On that date, the trial
court issued an order re-scheduling the hearing to 10 April 2002 and requiring the petitioner to explain why he
should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying the 19 March 2002 Order.
On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings. He explained that he did
not attend the 22 March 2002 hearing because he was under the impression that he still had 30 days from the filing
of the motion to examine him as judgment obligor within which to respond to the motion; besides, his counsel was
not available on 22 March 2002 due to previously scheduled hearings.
At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings, counsel for petitioner
manifested that his client already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will be unable to attend the 10 April 2002
hearing, and that petitioner would be available for examination on the last week of July or first week of August 2002.
Counsel prayed that the hearing be thus reset accordingly. The trial court denied the motion and informed the
parties that the hearing scheduled on 10 April 2002 will proceed as scheduled.
On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he would be unable to attend the 10 April 2002
hearing because he was already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner likewise manifested that he would also be
unavailable on the said date because he would be in Manila to attend to his other cases.
On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not held in
contempt of court for failure to appear on the 10 April 2002 hearing for his examination as judgment obligor. In his
Compliance and Explanation filed on 28 June 2002, petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April 2002
hearing because he was in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his obligation.
On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the examination of the petitioner on 3 July 2002.
A subpoena was issued against the petitioner and served at his address of record.Respondent Teresa also caused the
service of the subpoena at
8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
Village, MakatiCity where petitioner is allegedly residing.
The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum
on 28 June 2002. In the motion, petitioner admitted that 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio Village, MakatiCity, is his
present address but alleged that Makati City is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he may not
be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July 2002 hearing in Bacolod City. In this motion, petitioner did not allege
that he was still in Canada.
In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum, but re-
scheduled the hearing to 23 October 2002. On 22 October 2002, the day before the scheduled hearing, petitioner
filed a manifestation informing the trial court that he was still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23
October 2002 hearing; however, he would be in Manila on the first week of December 2002. He moved that the
hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December 2002. The manifestation, however, did not contain a notice of hearing.
On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing, prompting the trial court to issue an order
citing him in contempt of court.
In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared petitioner in contempt of court under Section 38 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for three months and ordered him
to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in its
Order of 3 January 2003, petitioner filed the petition in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt?
HELD: NO!
We rule in the negative.
The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate and unjustified refusal to be examined as a
judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His acts tended to
degrade the authority and respect for court processes and impaired the judiciary's duty to deliver and administer
justice. Petitioner tried to impose his will on the trial court.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to
the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which constitute indirect
contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides that a party or other
person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or commissioner to testify as provided
in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a
witness or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases. This provision relates
specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified
petition, complying with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated
the proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not
be punished for indirect contempt.
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to attend a hearing for his examination as
judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of
Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply
with its obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined, without justifiable reason, constituted
indirect contempt which is civil in nature.
Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial court are clearly shown in
the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
Section 36 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of right, the plaintiff who is a judgment obligee to
examine the defendant as judgment obligor, at any time after the return of the writ of execution is made. Section 36
reads as follows:
Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. When the return of a writ of execution issued
against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment
remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made, shall be
entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear
and be examined concerning his property and income before such court or before a commissioner appointed by it, at
a specified time and place; and proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of
the judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor shall be so required to
appear before a court or commissioner outside the province or city in which such obligor resides or is found.
Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling the examination of petitioner on 22 March
2002. On the contrary, it acted with utmost judiciousness to avoid a miscarriage of justice because petitioner was
reported to be about to leave for Canada, a fact which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March
2002.
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been
performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such, the penalty of
imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioners
absence in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the present controversy arose. Six years have
elapsed from the time the compromise agreement for the support of the children of petitioner and respondent was
executed. We take judicial notice of the amount of expenses which a travel outside the country, particularly to
Canada, entails, much more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to establish himself in the said country
as an immigrant. Petitioners claim for insolvency is negated by his frequent travels to Canada. We thus exhort the
parties, specifically the petitioner, to resort to all reasonable means to fully satisfy the judgment for support based on
the compromise agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor children.
19. FILINVEST vs IAC
20. DULAY vs. MINISTER | Nocon, J. (1993)
FACTS
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to confine public respondent Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of res judicata in
administrative proceedings by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of
private respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs. Angeles Dico
against Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and the "Cancellation of Fishpond
Lease Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" and (2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order "cannot be entertained" and
advising petitioner of the continuation of the formal investigation of the private respondent's letter-petition
scheduled for September 4 to 9, 1978.
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office of the President, both of which have attained
finality. As condensed by the Office of the Solicitor General, these are as follows:
1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898
entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete"
The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the Office of the President dated November 14, 1969, are as
follows:
That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan Quibete and Jose Padios sometime in 1932, the former
exchanged his parcel of land situated at Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio, province of Iloilo, for the latter's
fishpond area of about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-an, municipality of Cadiz, province of Negros Occidental
That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit over the area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709).
The application was disapproved because the area covered thereby was not yet declared available for fishpond
purposes. The records of that application were lost during World War II so much so that Juan Quibete had to renew
his application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was approved on February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No.
F-738-E was issued
That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles Dico) filed her fishpond application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to
occupy the area covered by petitioner's fishpond lease agreement
That her application was disapproved on the ground that the area she applied had already been awarded to
Juan Quibete, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E, and that a motion for
reconsideration thereon was denied
That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his rights and interests over the
area under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado
That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico filed a protest with the Philippine Fisheries
Commission alleging that Juan Quibete was occupying and improving lot (Lot No. 489-C) which was not the area
covered by his fishpond permit and that he transferred his rights and interests over the said area without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the protest on October 16, 1964 and declared that Lot
No. 489-C was the same area granted to Juan Quibete under his fishpond permit and not any other lot
That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico brought her case to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources who dismissed her appeal on December 7, 1965
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Office of the President. Her appeal was in
turn dismissed in the decision of November 14, 1969
2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447
entitled "F.P.A. No.V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
Applicant-Appellant v. Juan Quibete, Claimant-Appellee"
The facts of the case are as follows:
That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898, supra, was still pending decision by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free patent
application for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete
That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area applied for, protested to the application
That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30, 1967, rejected the application of private respondent
Dico and directed Juan Quibete to file the appropriate public land application, if qualified, for the 4-hectare dry
portion
That a motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondent Dico appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No. 2898 aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed on July 9, 1970
the decision of the Director of Lands, stating that the 4-hectare area subject of the appeal covered a portion of the
same tract of land which was the subject matter of DANR Case No. 2898
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's decision, Annex "F", but her motion was
denied on January 26, 1971. A second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order dated May 5, 1971.
3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the successor-in-interest of Juan Quibete by virtue of a deed of
transfer of rights and improvements executed by Juan Quibete in favor of Petronilo Retirado on February 29, 1964
over the area covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete
4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and interests over the area in question. On May
21, 1973, the heirs of Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights"
transferring their rights and interests in favor of the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 489-C consisting of 19.15
hectares, more or less, and covered by their Fishpond Permit No. 158-2.
5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner was
issued a fishpond lease agreement (No. 2169) over a portion of Lot 489-C consisting of 18.3675 hectares, expiring on
December 31, 1998.
6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico) submitted a letter-petition to the respondent officials
requesting for a "reopening of fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs.
Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly discovered evidence". It was there alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of
Juan Quibete did not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of Cadiz (now
Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement
No. 2169 be cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one be issued in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res judicata(Annex "M"). She argued that the two
administrative decisions in DANR Case No. 2898 and DANR Case No. 3447 (Annexes "A" and "F"), involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action, have already become final and settled the matter once and for all
8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. This was the
subject of a rejoinder which was again excepted to by private respondent on the argument that res judicata does not
apply in cases where the government has to exercise its inherent power to regulate.
Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in abeyance. In an "Interlocutory Order" dated
February 24, 1978, he reserved to resolve the motion "until after termination of the investigation" brought about by
private respondent's letter-petition.
By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-petition of respondent Angeles Dico dated
October 28, 1977 but also the denial of her motion for reconsideration5and the insistence of respondent Director in
conducting his investigation on September 4 to 9, 1978 at the Bacolod City Fisheries Office,6the situation had become
urgent for petitioner.
Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order claiming that unless one is immediately issued, respondent will proceed with the investigation as scheduled,
and if petitioner refuses or fails to appear in said investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will
proceed with the investigation and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly threatened by the respondent Director
in his telegrams to the petitioner and his counsel, marked as Annexes "I", "U", "W" and "W-1" herein.
Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case of "Dico vs. Quibete, et al." and the
cancellation of the Fishpond Lease Agreement of petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud committed by
Juan Quibete and Petronila Retirado is anchored, allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered evidence, to
wit:
(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Rolden, dated May 12, 1964, recognizing the fishpond
application (No. 18206) of private respondent, dated Feb. 6, 1958, over the area in question located at Barrio Daga,
Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City
(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of Lot 489 of which the subject area is a portion
(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete (herein petitioner's successor-in-interest) for 5 hectares
covered by Lot 489-B (25 hectares), situated at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City, was denied by Hon. Jose R.
Montilla Assistant Director of Fisheries on May 19, 1960 because Juan Quibete was already a holder of a previously
approved fishpond application under Permit No. 738-E under Lot 487 covering a 20-hectare area situated at Barrio
Luna, Cadiz City
(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487
(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact that Juan Quibete's fishpond area (Lot 487) is located at
Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. The witnesses are Mansueto D. Alarcon, then Municipal Secretary of the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental dated January 6, 1965; Patrolman Eligio O. Javier, member of the police force of Cadiz,
Negros Occidental, dated October 22, 1963 and Melecio Quibete, son of Juan, executed in May 1964.
ISSUE:
W/N the Res Judicata will set in the case at bar?
HELD: YES!
We grant the petition and make permanent the temporary restraining order issued earlier on September 7,
1978.
Private respondent's letter-petition, filed October 28, 1977, states clearly that it is a "Request for Reopening of
Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on New
Discovered Evidence . . . ."
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening
of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction.
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" was decided by the Office of the President on
November 14, 1969. Since the same was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has long become final
and executory.
DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No. V-3-385 of
private respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12The findings of fact in said DANR
case, which were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed conclusive by
operation of law. 13Said DANR case, not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial review has also
become final and executory.
To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights he sold to Retirado was
investigated TWICE after the Philippine Fisheries Commission reinstated private respondent's Fishpond Application
No. 18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both investigations - more than three years apart with investigators from
different offices - showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the different documents,
including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus, no merit can be given to private
respondent's alleged pieces of evidence, number 2 and 5(page 7-8, supra) as all these HAD already been studied
thoroughly by both Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate
investigations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give due course to private-
respondent's letter-petition of October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved
herein.
21. GUEVARRA vs. BENITO
FACTS:
On March 16, 1992 petitioner spouses Guevara and the PR Far East Bank & Trust Co. entered into a compromise
agreement in which P had brought in theRTC Manila, for the recovery of property foreclosed by the bank. Attached
to the agreement was a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by the parties and made a part of the agreement,
whereby in consideration of the sum of P498,960.00 the bank agreed to resell to petitioners the property which the
latter formerly owned, which had been foreclosed by the bank.Under the compromise agreement, p were to give a
DP of P45,000.00 and pay the balance of P453,960.00 in twelve (12) monthly installments of P37,830.00 each,
starting February 4, 1992, plus interest a t the rate of 32%. Should petitioners fail to pay any installment on time, it
was stipulated that they would forfeit all payments made and the bank would then be entitled to rescind the Deed of
Conditional Sale. the RTC approved the compromise agreement and rendered judgment in accordance with its terms
and conditions.P paid the first three installments. On September 30, 1992, however, they filed a complaint, which
they later amended on December 18, 1992, in the RTC of Makati, alleging that because of race rioting in Los Angeles,
California following the acquittal of police officers involved in the manhandling of Rodney King, a black, petitioners'
film business in California was disrupted, with consequent delay in payment by the State of petitioners' claim for film
and television projects, and that petitioners requested and private respondent agreed to waive the time clause of
the monthly installments. However, so it was alleged, the parties failed to fix the schedule of payment of the balance
of the purchase price. Petitioners prayed that a new period for payment of the balance be fixed and that private
respondent be ordered to reconvey the property to them upon full payment of the balance.
Private respondent denied that it had agreed to waive the time clause. It asked the court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint on the ground that it was barred by the judgement in the prior case (Civil Case no. 87-4140) decided by
the RTC of Manila.
The RTC granted private respondent's motion and dismissed the Civil Case filed by P. MR was also denied.
ISSUE: WON the judgment based on the compromise agreement in Civil Case constitutes res judicata in the
subsequent case between the same parties.
HELD: NO.
For a judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which rendered
it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. All elements of res judicata, except
the last, are present here. For while there is an identity of parties, there is none as to subject matter and cause of
action between Civil Case No. 87-4140 and Civil Case No. 92-2818.The subject matter of the first case (Civil Case No.
87-4140) was the resale to petitioners of the property which the bank had acquired through foreclosure sale,
whereas the subject matter of the second case (Civil Case No. 92-2818), is the rescheduling of payment of the
property after the parties originally fixed it in their compromise agreement.Nor are the causes of action in the two
cases the same, so much so that the same evidence would not support both of them, which is the test of the identity
of causes of action. Indeed the causes of action cannot be the same for the reason that, if true, the cause of action in
the complaint in Civil Case No. 92-2818 only arose after the judgment in Civil Case No. 87-4140.
The principle of res judicata does not apply, since it extends only to the facts and conditions as they existed at the
time the judgment was rendered. (Calña v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 252 (1994) Petitioners' claim is that private
respondent agreed to waive in their favor the time clause in the Deed of Conditional Sale starting with the
installment which became due on May 4, 1992. They are thus alleging facts which did not occur until after the
judgment by compromise had been rendered in Civil Case No. 87-4140 on March 30, 1992. This case is governed by
the ruling in Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 151 (1990) that a compromise agreement and that any cause of
action that might arise after the making of the agreement and that any cause of action which may arise from the
application or violation of the compromise agreement is not barred by what was settled in the prior case.
It may very well be that petitioners are claiming novation of the compromise agreement merely to escape the effects
of their noncompliance therewith or that if there is indeed any new contract it is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds. This is, however, a matter of defense and proof which is properly left for determination by the trial court
after trial.
22. SALUD vs CA
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and her late husband, Eusebio B. Salud, are the registered owners of an
undivided one-half (½) share in certain parcels of land situated in Bacoor, Cavite. They are referred to as the
Poblacion and Habay properties and the San Nicolas property, respectively covered by TCT No. RT-9269 and TCT No.
RT-9268 of the Cavite City Register of Deeds. 1 To be exact, these properties are registered in the name of "Isidora
Guerrero . . . married to Eusebio Salud, and Clemente Guerrero . . . married to Melania Andico." Petitioner Isidora
Guerrero Salud and Clemente Guerrero are sister and brother. The latter is the deceased husband of private
respondent.
On October 20, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, executed a deed wherein they sold their one-half (1/2) share
in the Poblacion property to their daughter Maripol Guerrero for TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00), while the
Habay property was sold to their children Norma Salud Vianzon and Eusebio G. Salud, Jr., for FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00). 2
On November 3, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, also sold their one-half (½) share in the San Nicolas property
in favor of their children Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud for THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). 3
After the execution of the deeds, it is alleged that petitioner and her late husband changed their minds. They did not
register the deeds of sale. Instead, they continued in possession of the properties, and exercised other acts of
ownership, including the mortgaging of the lots subject of the deeds.
The relationship between the Salud and Guerrero families soured.
On June 4, 1980, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private respondent, filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, two (2) complaints docketed as Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023. In
Civil Case No. 3022, he sued Eusebio Salud, Jr., the spouses Norma Salud and Artemio Vianzon and Maripol
Guerrero. In Civil Case No. 3023, he sued Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud. He sought to exercise his right of
redemption as a co-owner of the controverted properties.
In Civil Case No. 3022, defendants were declared in default. Petitioner claims that said defendants were then in the
United States and were unable to answer the Complaint. On February 19, 1982, the then CFI of Cavite rendered a
decision granting the late Guerrero the right to redeem the properties in question. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision which became final and executory on July 31, 1986. Efforts of petitioner to intervene in the appellate
court were in vain.
On the other hand, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3023 was tried on its merit. Teodoro G. Salud was able to
answer Guerrero's Complaint. After trial, the trial court dismissed the Complaint on January 10, 1982. It held that
the late Guerrero had no right to redeem the litigated property as its sale "is not in esse." The Court of Appeals, in
G.R. No. CV-2529, also affirmed this Decision.
The controversy between the parties did not die down. To frustrate the right of redemption granted to the deceased
Clemente Guerrero in Civil Case No. 3022, petitioner Isidora Salud initiated Civil Case No. BCV-86-60, dubbed an
Action to Quiet Title/Remove Cloud from Title, Declaratory Relief plus Damages before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Sued
was Clemente's widow, private respondent Melania Guerrero. The latter moved to dismiss the complaint on ground,
among others, of res judicata.
In an Order 4 dated March 19, 1987, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which, however, rendered an affirmance.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Res Judicata will set in the case?
HELD: NO!
The rules of res judicata are of common law origin and they initially evolved from court decisions. It is now
considered a principle of universal jurisprudence forming a part of the legal system of all civilized nations. 5 In our
jurisdiction, the principle of res judicata was incorporated as part of our statutory law.
The principle was enacted as sections 306 and 307 of Act No. 190. 6 Later, it became sections 44 and 45 of former
Rules 39. 7 Under the present Rules of Court, it appears in section 49 of Rule 39, viz:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other mater that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above rule expresses the two (2) aspects of res judicata. As pointed out by Moran, the first aspect is the effect of
a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The
second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact of issue in another action between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action. 8 The first aspect is known in traditional terminology as merger or bar; in modern
terminology, it is called claim preclusion. The second aspect is traditionally known as collateral estoppel; in modern
terminology, it is called issue preclusion. 9
There is universal agreement on the principles underlying res judicata, 10 viz:
. . . . Two maxims of the English common law best summarize the general policies underlying this doctrine.
They are: first, that no person should be twice vexed by the same claim; and second, that it is in the interest of the
state that there be an end to litigation.
Thus, principles of res judicata serve both private and public interests.
The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same dispute recognizes that judicial resources are
finite and the number of cases that can be heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is reheard means that
another will be delayed. In modern times when court dockets are filled to overflowing, this concern is of critical
importance.
Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of the public at large.
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has an interest in the stability of that judgment.
Parties come to the courts in order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes if
the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the same claims again and again. Although judicial determinations
are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals procedures, not through repeated suits on the
same claim. Further, to allow relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and presents the embarrassing
problem of determining which of two conflicting decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no reason to suppose that
the second or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate than the first, the first should be left
undisturbed.
In some cases the public at large also has an interest in seeing that rights and liabilities once established remain fixed.
If a court quiets title to land, for example, everyone should be able to rely on the finality of that determination.
Otherwise, many business transactions would be clouded by uncertainty. Thus, the most important purpose of res
judicata is to provide repose for both the party litigants and the public. As the Supreme Court has observed, "res
judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other
disputes."
In our age, where courts are harassed by crowded dockets and complaints against slow foot justice, frequent
technical reliance on the preclusive breadth of res judicata is understandable. The importance of judicial economy
and avoidance of repetitive suits are strong norms in a society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may, there should
not be a mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where more important societal values deserve protection.
So we held in Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 11
The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an inflexible application of the doctrine of res judicata
will not serve our constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of due process. Petitioner was not a party in
Civil Case No. 3022 and was not given any chance to contest the claim of Guerrero. Her children, then in the United
States, were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were declared in default. Thus, the late Clemente Guerrero,
husband of private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by default from the trial court pursuant to which he
was given the right of preemption over the contested lots. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but
unfortunately, her motion for intervention was denied. The late Guerrero, therefore, prevailed primarily because his
claim was not disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where Guerrero claimed the same right of
preemption against the other children of petitioner. In this case, however, one of the children of petitioner sued by
Guerrero, was in the Philippines and he answered the Complaint. The case was tried on its merit and the trial court
dismissed the Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of preemption of Guerrero was not yet in esse.
The difference in the results of Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity not to give res judicata effect
to the default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner was a non-party. The demands of due process
present a weightier consideration than the need to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than
the need to write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no justice that satisfies unless the litigants are
given the opportunity to be heard. The constitutional right to due process of petitioner cannot be defeated by the
argument that petitioner is a privy of her children in Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is bound by its judgment. Case
law, both here and in the United States, recognizes privity of interest under the following situation: 12
The historic and most common situation in which privity is upheld exists when a person acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the suit after it was filed or decided. Successors-in-interest, whether they obtain their interests by
virtue of an assignment, by inheritance or by law are bound along with their predecessors by the rules of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. This is necessary in order to preserve the finality of judgments; otherwise a person
confronted with an adverse decision might subject the winning party to the prospect of continual litigation simply by
transferring his interest in the subject matter of the suit to another who could begin the suit anew.
A second well-defined privity relationship arises when legal appointed representative parties, such as trustees and
executors, are involved; those individuals are deemed in privity with those whom they represent. Since parties
litigating in representative capacity have no interests of their own, but either sued or are sued on behalf of the
beneficiaries whom they serve.
Privity also has been universally recognized when it is determined that the newly named party in the second suit
actually controlled or participated in litigating the first action. Although the non-party will not be bound by res
judicata because different claims are involved, identical issues that were necessarily and actually litigated will be
precluded. Having received one opportunity to defend or prosecute those issues, he may not be allowed another.
Petitioner does not fall in any of the above categories. She is not a successor-in-interest of her children in Civil Case
No. 3022. Petitioner's children were not sued in Civil Case No. 3022 in a representative capacity. It is also clear that
petitioner did not control or participate in Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's
interest, therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022 where judgment was obtained by default. The
doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly applied where it will result in injustice.
23. ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
Facts:Marietta and Rodolfo were married in 1959. They had 8 children. In 1992, Rodolfo left the conjugal home and
abandoned Marietta and their children. Two years after, Marietta filed a complaint for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. At that time,
Marietta lived in Las Pinas. The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein their property located in
Carmona, Cavite was adjudicated to Marietta and her children. The court rendered judgment based on the
compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, Marietta and her children moved and began residence at the said
Carmona property.
In 1995, Rodolfo, wanting to marry again, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the Marietta
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the Rodolfo knew that the Marietta was already residing in
Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the Marietta was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue
corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of
the petition by substituted service on the the parties’ son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
Marietta failed to file an answer and was declared in default. Rodolfo was allowed adduce evidence ex-parte. On July
7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.
On July 7, 2000, the Marietta filed a verified petition against the Rodolfo with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC.
Marietta, alleged, among others, that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the Rodolfo’s marriage was null
and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was
collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
Held: The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the
motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court
when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of
the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family
Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9,
Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims
and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party
to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations (Ancheta vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004)