People v Lacson
This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries
Topic: Rule 117.8
FACTS:
This is an MR so walang facts. May 3 cases na People v Lacson. Ito iyong 3rd. Background:
a. Lacson was once indicted for murder for allegedly being responsible for killing 11
people. These criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir on March
1999.
b. Before the December 1, 2000 revision, the prevailing rule on provisional dismissal was
open-ended. The present rule now prescribes 1 year or 2 years.
c. Lacson questions the applicability of the time-bar under Rule 117.8
d. Petitioners (SOJ, Dir Gen of PNP, State Prosec etc.) re-filed informations against him on
June 6, 2001, which was beyond the 2-year bar, following Rule 117.8 (kaya gusto ni
Lacson RETROACTIVE)
ISSUE: WON the application of the time-bar under Rule 117.8 be given a retroactive
application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused. – NO! PROSPECTIVE ang gusto ng SC.
RATIO:
ARGUMENTS OF LACSON:
a. Lacson wants RETROACTIVE application of the new CRIM PRO since it is more
favorable to the accused. He used the CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE because he claims
that Crim Pro is a branch of Crim Law.
b. He insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case.
c. He also argues that if the time-bar were to be applied prospectively, it would give the
state more than 2 years to revive the cases against him, which would violate his right
to speedy disposition of the case and equal protection of the law. (VIOLATION OF
EQUAL PROTECTION: because he claims that he was singled out to derail his candidacy
for the presidency.)
ETO ANG SHORTCUT NG SAGOT SA ARGUMENT NI LACSON
The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and the
accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the
State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and
oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
1. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests, and those of the accused
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for
the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless
it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice
2. Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. Just
because there is no provision stating that it should be applied prospectively doesn’t
mean it should be applied retroactively.
3. The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution.
with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or
retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not
apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not
be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply
IN THIS CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME-BAR
a. When the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it
would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a
period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the
express consent of the accused.
b. It would be a denial of the State's right to due process and a travesty of justice for the
Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists,
considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on
March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive
application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to
the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
c. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year
and 3 months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The
period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule.
d. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two
years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 to revive the cases
e. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the
computation of the 2-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at
the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar.
f. Statues regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent,
procedural laws are retroactive.
g. However, this case is different, because when the petitioners re-filed the informations
on June 6, 2001, the original criminal cases had long been terminated (provisionally
dismissed).
h. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from March 29, 1999 but from
December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect
IN THIS CASE WITH RESPECT TO COMPLYING WITH PRE-REQUISITES OF RULE 117.8
a. Even assuming that the time-bar should apply retroactively, Lacson still failed to comply
with the essential pre-requisite of Rule 117.8. He admitted that HE DID NOT GIVE HIS
EXPRESS CONSENT TO THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL of the said cases. Thus, he in fact
admitted that one of the essential requisites of Rule 117.8 was absent.
b. In the CA proceeding, Lacson, through his counsel Atty. Fortun admitted that they are
not invoking the RULE 117.7 on double jeopardy. They are invoking Rule 117.8 with
respect to speedy disposition of cases.
c. Atty Fortun stated that they gave no express conformity to the provisional dismissal of
the cases by Judge Agnir. He said that what they wanted at the onset was simply a
judicial determination of probable cause for the warrants of arrest issued.
d. While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it
fines no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional
dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Rule 117.8 to bar the revival thereof