RULE 128

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005

FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial
Court.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s
support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel
vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle
the case.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if
not recognized by the putative father. In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal
charges for falsification of documents against and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing
in Martin’s birth certificate. He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the said motion is against petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

No.

Significantly, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing
and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In the case of People vs. Yatar, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood
sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination,
as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as
follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice
or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision
and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, was correct.
 RULE 129

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her
minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed
JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-28100, November 29, 1971

FACTS:

The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff,
now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to
dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment. "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is
identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio
alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very
defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.

Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real
Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant,
involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the
widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat.

That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one,
has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from order of this Honorable Court.
There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for
prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of
the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which such a
conclusion may be inferred.

Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the
motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to
be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against
Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have
derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the
new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as
prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby dismissed.
 The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent
action against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same
plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him
resulting in the judgment relied upon.

HELD:

Yes.

A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same court in a
different case.

It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly
could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter
decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an
order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus:
"Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is
a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."

There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a

remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice
better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees
were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would
not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality.
 RULE 130

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990

FACTS:

Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops,
which are prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows that on May 27, 1986, at
about 3:30 p.m. Makati Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay
Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He
stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of the team
strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the
accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said
yes. The exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and
two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body
search of the accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more
rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati
Police Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to
remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1
Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination was performed on the confiscated
marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who
later testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was that
from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons
along Solchuaga St. when somebody suddenly said that policemen were making arrests. The
players grabbed the bet money and scampered. However, he and a certain Danny (another "cara y
cruz" player) were caught and taken to the Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There
they were mauled and warned that if they did not point to their fellow pushers, they would rot in
jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold marijuana to Singayan and insisted the bills taken
from him were the bet money he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game.
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to
listen to their respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers.
Applying the presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected
Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not
submitted sufficient evidence of his charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with
the peace officers whom he had met only on the day of his arrest.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appea that he court
a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox
copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money. The accused-appellant invokes the best
evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked
P10.00 bill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.

HELD:

No.
Since the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to
the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately
proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself
would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond
reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who
would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented
by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other
substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.
 SECONDARY EVIDENCE
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIO LAGMAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011

FACTS:

Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to
engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay in his warehouse
at Barangay Malacampa, Camiling, Tarlac. Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded
Warehouse Act, as amended, the approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash
bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company, the
amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not less than thirty-three and one third
percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of the maximum quantity of rice to be received.

Country Bankers Insurance Corporation issued Warehouse Bond through its agent,
Antonio Lagman. Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the
Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding
Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim
Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as co-signors. The latter
bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice,
losses, costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including attorney’s
fees and legal costs, which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bondSantos then secured a
loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his
payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the
bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay

Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only
for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds were never
renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on November 5, 1990, Country Bankers issued
Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no Indemnity
Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and renders
no force and effect the 1989 Bonds. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and
Lagman jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers.
Lagman filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. He insisted that the lifetime of the 1989 Bonds,
as well as the corresponding Indemnity Agreements was only 12 months. According to Lagman,
the 1990 Bond was not pleaded in the complaint because it was not covered by an Indemnity
Agreement and it superseded the two prior bonds. The appellate court held that the 1990 Bond
superseded the 1989 Bonds. The appellate court rejected the argument of Country Bankers that the
1989 bonds were continuing, finding, as reason therefor, that the receipts issued for the bonds
indicate that they were effective for only one-year.

Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990 Bond, which
allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds: First, Lagman failed to produce the
original of the 1990 Bond and no basis has been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence;
Second, the issuance of the 1990 Bond was not approved and processed by Country Bankers;
Third, the NFA as bond obligee was not in possession of the 1990 Bond. Country Bankers stresses
that the cancellation of the 1989 Bonds requires the participation of the bond obligee. Ergo, the
bonds remain subsisting until cancelled by the bond obligee. Country Bankers further assert that
Lagman also failed to prove that the NFA accepted the 1990 Bond in replacement of the 1989
Bonds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond is admissible in evidence.

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court rule as inadmissible such copy.

Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as follow:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
 (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that
the original is unavailable. Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC.5 When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on
the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually
four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the second is with the
Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers and the fourth was in his
possession. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for the non-production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must
appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals.

Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman
merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but he could no
longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did
not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of
the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a
bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the three
other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original
with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly,
Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.