Community, Association and Communion as types of Sociality

Jessica Mjöberg, Uppsala Universitet

Paper for presentation at the 24th Conference of the Nordic Sociological Association, “Violence
and Conflict”, Århus 14-17 Augusti 2008

When looking back at the field of sociology, the shift from traditional to modern societies has
been a major concern of studies, resulting in many dualistic theories of social forms as well as types
of sociality. Social theories of today are though formulating a second societal shift in which they
argue that a new typical social forms and a new form of sociality has arisen.1 The most recent
theoretical approach to this shift is found in late modern social theories, claiming that
contemporary society is not changing from the modern, but rather is a change of the modern (See
for example Bauman 2000; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001; Giddens 1991; Giddens 1996).
Basically this stands in opposition to post modern ideas of a radical shift from the ideas as well
as the traits of modernity, instead arguing that the features of the modern society has expanded
to such an extent that it has resulted in an abundance of modern traits eventually transcending
into a new phase of modernity (See for instance Beck 1994; Giddens 1996).

Investigating the shift of modernity into late modernity special attention is given to
institutionalized forms of personal relationships resulting in formulations of an ideal typical form
of personal relations in contemporary society. In Bauman’s work we find a description of
contemporary relations as liquid relations (Bauman 2003), in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s work
centrifugal relations (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995) and in Giddens’ work pure relations (Giddens
1992). These three theoretical conceptualisations of a predominant social form of human
relations in late modern societies have in common being based upon a sociality where individuals
enter into relationships free from forced bonds of tradition and rather based upon affection for
and self identification with the group or person. The representation of such a relation is found in
the idea of friendship and romantic love.

Accepting this idea of a societal shift into late modernity, it is fair to argue that dualistic social
theories (of modernity) need to be challenged or developed if we are not to have only two

1Even if a second shift, into a third social form has been suggested before, for example by David Riesman as early
as 1950,Riesman, David. 1950. The Lonely Crowd. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books. it is only recently that there
seems to be a consensus about the shift.

1
alternative social forms to alter between. In the following analysis I will try to do this in two
ways. Ferdinand Tönnies book Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887) will be used as a representation
of dualistic theories concerning the shift from traditional to modern societies. This theory will be
(critically) examined in order to see what kinds of understandings are possible with dualistic
theories. In order to come further to a third social form and sociality, I introduce a critique and
development of Tönnies theory published in 1922 by the German phenomenologist and
sociologist Herman Schmalenbach (Schmalenbach 1977). My idea here is to consider whether
Schmalenbach’s critique of Tönnies and his conceptualisation of a third social form can be at any
help in defining a sociality of contemporary, late modern society. Secondly I focus on some
social psychological aspects of the theories used. The main ideas of Tönnies work, as well as the
works of Schmalenbach, Giddens, Beck & Beck-Gernsheim and Bauman are concerned with
social forms, by which I mean the actual substantial relations and groups emerging from
interaction. By focusing on the social psychological concept of sociality, understood as “modes of
being social” or “existential ways of relating to the social world” I want to highlight the ideas of
sociality found implicit in these texts. Discussing these texts with theories of sociality, I end by
discussing ways of understanding a sociality that would fit the ideal typical social forms of late
modernity.

1. A social psychological reading of Tönnies

The customary conception of Tönnies’ theory of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft is as a stage theory
of the development of society (See for example Asplund 1991; Mitzman 1971). This is not very
surprising in view of the fact that the subtitle of the first edition of the book was Abhandlung des
Communismus und des Socialismus als empirischer Culturformen.2 As a theory of the development of
society he notices a shift from a Gemeinschaft (Community) to a Gesellschaft (Association)
(Tönnies 1955:270-275).3 With the second edition in 1912 the subtitle of the book was changed

2 A Treatise on Communism and Socialism as Empirical forms of Culture.

3 Tönnies’ concepts are by some considered to be impossible to translate to other languages Asplund, Johan. 1991.
Essä om Gemeinschaft och Gesellschaft. Göteborg: Korpen, Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1955. Community and association.
Translated by C. P. Loomis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.. Although agreeing that the terms loose some of
their immediate meaning in a translation, and the concepts are seen as “a model of thought” which all of us
understand in its German origin, I of other reasons find the German terms difficult to use elsewhere than in the
original source. For applicability on sociality which is the aim in this text I find Community and Association to be better
suited. Throughout the text I will use the concept community when referring to Gemeinschaft and association when
referring to Gesellschaft. These are the concepts used in the English title that I use for this text, even though both
Loomis and Schmalenbach use the term “society” when referring to Gesellschaft in text. In order not to confuse
society as ordinarily used and as Gesellschaft I will use association and put association in brackets when citing the
authors.

2
into Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie (Falk 1999:69).4 If the first edition paid emphasis on the
development of society, the second edition rather paid attention to the forms of sociality
prevalent in the two different social forms. I see this shift as significant. From the perspective of
a life-work it might even be correct to suggest that Tönnies during his career made a shift in
focus with this change. 5 What he did was to move his focus from the evolution of society to a
focus on the ways people relate to each others, whilst using the same theory.6 His shift of focus
is made simply by switching places of the two central pairs of concepts in the book but also of
shifting from a historical outline to pure concepts of sociality, which are present in various
degrees in different situations and times (Mitzman 1971:508). This shifting emphasis could even
be interpreted as a shift towards social psychology. Tönnies main interest in understanding what
kept people together was then elucidated by emphasising the two types of wills differentiating
Communities from Associations.

Even if we accept the interpretation that Tönnies made a shift in focus during his life, I find it
necessary to stress that we would misunderstand him if reducing his text to being either about
the development of society or a theory of sociality. His idea was rather that they were basically
two sides of the same coin. The structure of society could not be understood without taking into
account the sociality that is expressed in it; neither can the forms of sociality be understood
without describing the social relations which emerges out of them. Tönnies idea was that the two
forms of sociality were prevalent in all societies, where either of them at every single moment
was dominant. Even if Tönnies himself applied his theory on social change and development, his
theory was meant to be applicable on synchronic as well as diachronic analyses (Lüschen and
Stone 1977:17). His theory can therefore be seen as a double theory both consisting of a theory
of two forms of societies and as a theory of two forms of sociality found in all societies. This
way, Tönnies shift in focus gives Asplund right when arguing that Tönnies views his object of
study as well as his theory as a puzzle picture. Depending on where to focus, different parts

4 Basic Concepts of Pure Sociology. After the second edition only the head title remained Mitzman, Arthur. 1971.

"Tönnies and German Society, 1887-1914: From Cultural Pessimism to Celebration of the Volksgemeinschaft."
Journal of the History of Ideas 32:507-524..
5 Although Tönnies had a long list of publications there are scholars who argue that he only wrote one book during

his career Falk, Jørg. 1999. "Ferdinand Tönnies." Pp. 60-73 in Klassisk och modern samhällsteori (Classical and Modern
Social Theories), edited by H. Andersen and L. B. Kaspersen. Lund: Studentlitteratur, Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1955.
"Foreword." in Community and Association. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. His early work Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft received recognition quite late, and during his continuous career Tönnies was working on a development
of the theory put forth there.
6 See also Mitzman, Arthur. 1971. "Tönnies and German Society, 1887-1914: From Cultural Pessimism to

Celebration of the Volksgemeinschaft." Journal of the History of Ideas 32:507-524..

3
appear as being in the foreground and background (Asplund 1991:42).7 But a double theory is
not only advantageous. Rather, Tönnies is by some scholars seen as unable to decide which of the
two possible foci to choose. Above all this becomes problematic while his conceptual pairs
community/association and natural will/rational will are said to be both ideal types and empirical
relations. His concepts are thereby by some scholars comprehended as weak (Asplund 1991:42;
Lüschen and Stone 1977:21).

1.1 Relations emerge as actions based on will

The question that Tönnies keeps asking himself in his analyses is: [What are] the sentiments and
motives which draw people to each other, keep them together, and induce them in joint action
[?] (Tönnies 1955:3). Tönnies choice of question in itself, but above all his own answer to it, is
what we can consider his fundamental assumption about human sociality. At the bases for all
human social relation there is a will. The opening line of his book actually even gives an account
on how people relate to each other on the basis of will. ”Human wills stand in manifold relations
to one another. Every such relationship is a mutual action, inasmuch as one party is active or
gives while the other party is passive or receives” (Tönnies 1955:37).

Whether conscious or unconscious, our actions and relations are consequently actions based on
will (See for instance Loomis 1955:xv; See for instance Tönnies 1955:119). This fundamental
formulation would even, in order to make sociality more visible, be formulated as a will to relate.
With this emphasis we can understand Tönnies wills as acts of intentionality – or directedness –
towards someone. We could even go further, as the Norwegian sociologist Dag Østerberg does,
arguing that the wills are best understood as different existential modes (Østerberg 1990:29). But
people simply directing themselves towards others are not sufficient in order to understand how
they actually become related. A relation is only established when a mutual will to relate occur.
What binds people together are various kinds of mutuality? Tönnies theory is then not about
separate subjective wills, but rather about the encounter of several wills. Yet, his theory does not
involve all kinds of mutuality, which we recognise when we read further what his book is
supposed to cover.

These actions are of such a nature that they tend either towards preservation or towards
destruction of the other will or life; that is, they are either positive or negative. This study

7 I do not, as Asplund, mean that community and association are to be seen as the two possible puzzle pictures, but
rather that sociality and social structure would be the two optional pictures.

4
 will consider as its subject of investigation only the relationships of mutual
affirmation(Tönnies 1955:37).

Tönnies is both articulating his basic view on human sociality, and demarcating his study only to
take into account relations that are mutually confirming.

1.2 A sociality based on essence and choice

According to Tönnies:

The concept of human will, the correct interpretation of which is essential to the subject of
this treatise, implies a twofold meaning. Since all mental action involves thinking, I
distinguish between the will which includes the thinking and the thinking which
encompasses the will. Each represents an inherent whole which unites in itself a
multiplicity of feelings, instincts, and desires. This unity should in the first case be
understood as a real or natural one; in the second case as a conceptual or artificial one. The
will of the human being in the first form I call natural will (Wesenwille); in the second form
rational will (Kürwille) (Tönnies 1955:119).

If not convinced by the arguments so far, the will to relate (the existential mode; sociality), clearly
occupies a central place in Tönnies theory as seen in the quotation above. He makes a distinction
between the natural will and the rational will, signifying how people direct themselves towards
others in different ways. The idea underlying this distinction is that they are each others
opposites and only to be understood in relation to each other. Using the concepts natural and
rational, or rather essential and chosen as in the original German terms, the fundamental difference
between the two wills to relate is obvious. The natural will implies what is essential in order for
something to exist. In contrast we find the contingent, what in addition to the essential can vary,
or speaking with Tönnies, what can be chosen.

One of the most immediate differences that Tönnies stresses in these two wills to relate, and the
relations that occur is that the essential will is lasting while the chosen will is temporary in character.
The essential will is understood as a primary will, thus existing prior to feeling or expressing it.
This way, the essential will is also by Tönnies understood as organic in character. It is basically not
possible to separate the will from the rest of a person’s existence, the “natural will is the
psychological equivalent of the human body” (Tönnies 1955:119). Another way to formulate this

5
idea when it comes to relations is that what constitutes the will to relate and being in relation are
impossible to separate. The chosen or rational will is the complete opposite to this. It is a
conscious will which separates the will to relate from being in relation. This accordingly means that
the rational will, in contrast to the natural will is mechanic, consisting of parts that can combined
in different ways. It is best understood as artificial since consciously and instrumentally choosing
what it wants to achieve. Acting according to a rational will, several scenarios of the future are
possible, with the past as a fond. In this understanding of the wills to relate we find a dualism of
mutually exclusive concepts. The natural will is equivalent to organic, natural and necessary
relations while the rational will is equivalent to its antithesis, mechanical, artificial and accidental
relations.

We will now turn to some other dualistic theories of sociality emphasising the idea of two
possible ways of relating to others. The first theory worth comparing with Tönnies is Martin
Buber’s Ich und Du (1923).8

1.3 Sociality as an existential mode

Just as Tönnies makes a distinction between two possible ways to direct their intentionality or
will, Buber makes a distinction between two possible ways to relate to the world.

The world is twofold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude of man
is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak. The basic words are not
single words but word pairs. One basic word is the word pair I-You. The other basic word
is the word pair I-It. […] Thus the I of man is also twofold. For the I of the basic word I-
You is different from that in the basic word I-It (Buber 2002:181).

Buber has an even heavier emphasis than Tönnies on the relational aspect of a person’s
directedness towards his/her world. What I would like to emphasise here is that Buber explicitly
argues that the persons self is affected by the two ways of relating. Not only does the other
person appear differently in accordance to the two forms of sociality, but also the self differs in
relation to that other. Buber’s conceptualisation on how we relate to the other is in that sense
more social than Tönnies’ wills. Still Buber’s two forms of sociality are in many ways similar to

8 See also Asplund’s comparison of Tönnies and Buber Asplund, Johan. 1991. Essä om Gemeinschaft och Gesellschaft.

Göteborg: Korpen.. Asplund views Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as analogous with Buber’s conceptual pairs I-
You and I-It. It is true that the two theories have similarities, but while community and association are empirical
forms of relations I find that it is rather Tönnies’ wills that are useful in a comparison to Buber’s concepts.

6
Tönnies. The relational attitude of the natural will is obviously similar to Bubers I-You relation.
“The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one’s whole being” (ibid). The natural will and
the I-You relation are both expressing the primary and unmediated sense of being inseparable.

In a resembling manner, the rational will of Tönnies is similar to Buber’s I-It relation. “The basic
word I-It can never be spoken with one’s whole being”(ibid). Not being able to relate to the
other with ones whole being is associated with a conditional relation, and stands in contrast to
the natural expression of the natural will. In order to choose, we have to be aware of some
options; we need to know that various ways of relating will result in different relations. Having
several options to choose between makes it impossible to enter a relation with full attention and
existence. The rational will strives towards a goal with a calculating attitude.

So far our discussion of sociality has concerned the self and the directedness of the self. To
further emphasise the relational consequences following the different forms of sociality, we will
have a closer look at two aspects of how the two wills take form in the encounter with others.
My intention is to emphasise what people become to each other in the relation, using similar
dualistic concepts as those already used by Tönnies and Buber. The specific aspects of relations
that we will look further into are, the distinction between ends and means found in the work of
Immanuel Kant, and whether the bonds keeping persons together are best understood as
internal or external, as formulated by Dag Østerberg.

1.4 Considering the relation as an end in itself or as a means

Understanding the wills to relate as different existential modes constituting a foundation for
relational actions, the empirical relations resulting will differ according to the two possible wills.
To emphasise the impact of the differences in intentionality in the two wills I will discuss them
by their way of viewing the relationship in terms of means and ends. An end is understood as “the
reason to relate” and the means as “the ways of achieving a relation”. Immanuel Kant’s ideas of
reasons for action is the second dualistic theory to compare to Tönnies while his distinction
between categorical and hypothetical imperatives distinguishes between two forms of
motivations or wills to relate to others (Williams 1968:8).9 While the hypothetical imperative
“declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something
else that one wills (or that one may will)”, a categorical imperative “would be one which

9The comparison with Kant only concerns his concepts of categorical and hypothetic imperatives, not his entire
philosophy of morals. Often the categorical imperative is mentioned on its own without reference to the
hypothetical imperative. The two of them however seems to fit the ideas of Tönnies’ well.

7
presented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end”
(Kant 2005:89).

In order to apply this terminology to Tönnies’ theory we can ask questions to his text, like; Why
are you in a relationship with her? (Loomis 1955: Footnote 24, p. xvi). Acting according to the
organic features of the natural will the answers we would get to such a question could be – I
have a relationship with her, because I like her. Or even better – I have a relationship with her
because my way of liking her is a part of my self. These kinds of answers are characterised by
their incapacity to separate the relationship as an end and as a means. Relations based on natural
will are ends in themselves rather than means in order to achieve something else. We do not
engage in a relation in order to like the other or in order for the other to like us. We are not able
to separate what causes the relation and what the relation is. In this way, relationships based on
natural will could achieve Kant’s categorical imperative: ”Act as to use humanity, both in your
own person and in the person of every other always at the same time as an end, never simply as
means” (Kant 2005:106f)10. If Tönnies natural will is understood as a categorical imperative this
implies that the contents of the relation, or the outcome, of relating to the other is not the most
significant feature. In relations based on natural will, the relation in itself is in focus. The
closeness to the other is total, and the relation, of which the person is engaged is not separable
from the persons self.

On the opposite side, acting as from a hypothetical imperative can be understood as a rational
will imagining various options and results from which to decide what action or what relation to
choose. If asking the same question, why do you have a relationship with her? to relations based
on rational will, we will get another type of answer. The answer would be specified and clearly
defined – I have a relationship with her because she can support me in my studies. Here, means
and ends are clearly separated and the action takes the form of a conscious and deliberate
character of exchange.

What I do for you, I do only as a means to effect your simultaneous, previous, or latter
service for me. Actually and really I want and desire only this. To get something from you
is my end; my service is the means thereto, which I naturally contribute unwillingly. Only

10 See also a slightly different translation in Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy.
: Cambridge University Press..

8
 the aforesaid and anticipated result is the cause which determines my volition. This is the
simplest form of rational will (Tönnies 1955:20-21).

From this line of argument it would be easy to draw the conclusion that the rational will would
be more intellectual than the natural will but Tönnies did not intend the concepts to be
interpreted that way. Intellect understood as acts of thinking is prevalent in both forms of wills,
but the connection of thought and will differs (Tönnies 1955:14-15). The natural will is the will
that includes the thinking while the rational will emerges out of thinking (ibid:119). In its most
intellectual form, Tönnies argues that the rational will is found in self criticism, as an evaluation of
ones personal conduct and its outcome. When it comes to the natural will we find its most
intellectual form in a conscience (ibid:143), or a sense of right and wrong of the relation. This could
also be compared to Kant’s further discussion of the two different imperatives for action:

The will of a rational being must always be regarded as at the same time lawgiving, since
otherwise it could not be thought of as an end in itself. In the kingdom of ends,
everything has a price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as
is equivalent: What on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no
equivalent has a dignity (Kant 1996 (1785):84).

And further, if Tönnies’ conception of a natural will to relate would be the same basis for action
as Kant’s categorical imperative, and the rational will in Tönnies would be equivalent to Kant’s
hypothetical imperative the natural will must have a dignity, since it is unconditional and
incomparable in worth (ibid:85). The relations based on natural will then are estimated as having
an inner worth, while relations based on the rational will are estimated in relation to a market
price.

1.5 Internal and external relations

The discussion of the relation to the other as an end in itself or as a means to achieve an end can
also be expanded to embrace the character of the bonds between the ones in relation. Bonds
between people can either be seen as direct or mediated, stemming from either a fundamental
closeness or a fundamental distance. As we understand from Tönnies’ concepts on organic and
mechanic relations and their connection to the discussion on means and ends, relations based on
natural will are direct while relations based on rational will need to be mediated.

9
Deepening the understanding of the relational aspect of sociality I will discuss Tönnies organic
relations as relations based on internal bonds and his mechanic relations as relations based on
external bonds using Dag Østerberg’s distinction between internal and external relations. Starting
with the identity and recognition of the persons in relation relations based on internal bonds
presuppose each other for their own self-understanding and existence. They are what they are
through their relation to each other, and understand each other in relation to the other. This way,
they are not identical with themselves but rather become themselves by being more than merely
themselves (Østerberg 1966:8). Relations based on natural will, for example being a sister, can
only be understood in relation to my siblings. In a similar way I can only be a wife if I have a
spouse, and I can only be a friend in relation to my friends. All these social relations depend on
being related. They would not mean anything – not even exist – if they were to stand alone.

If a relation in contrast is characterized by external bonds, the persons involved would,

concerning their identity, not need each other (Østerberg 1966:7). The persons are who they are
in themselves and in their relation they build something additional, something that does not
necessarily (or not at all?) change their identity. The relationships have no significance for the
existence of the persons in relation. External relations are in this sense accidental or contingent,
unnecessary for the existence of the person. The two types of bonds are easily imagined as in the
first case being a totality or in the second case as a unit made up of parts. The external relations
are easiest to imagine when it comes to objects. But this kind of relating to others also goes for
relations based on rational will. If we imagine the typical example of a relation based on rational
will, we find the relation between a consumer and a producer. Even if they both need each other
as roles in relation to each other, the consumer in him/her-self is not dependent on that specific
consumer, and vice versa. They are exchangeable, and even more, competing with other possibly
better relations. One consequence for personal existence due to internal or external bonds is that
in external relations people tend to be reduced to already static or fixed units, while the internal
relations demand moving and acting subjects, exclusive persons who existentially matter to the
relation. Tönnies describes a development of society as gradually turning into being dominated
by a rational will, that is, on a sociality based where people relate to each other as external
entities, as if they were fundamentally distant.

1.6 When wills come together; community and association

After this excursion into theories of sociality it is time to turn back to the two social forms that
Tönnies argues will follow when wills to relate convene. The two possible social forms are

10
communities and associations, but what constitutes either of them is not easily spotted by sight.
Superficially viewing social relations or groups the two forms can be perceived as identical, and it
is first when taking into account their relational basis that it becomes possible to notice their
relational qualities and understand if they are communities or associations. Relations built on
natural will constitute communities. These relations are characterised by the fact that the
communal precedes the significance of the individuals in the community (Tönnies 1955:42). The
community is always already present, and impossible to question. The community is just as the
natural will on which it is based bound to what has already been, or what already is, rather than
on what is to come (Tönnies 1955:120).

The community is above all characterized by closeness which is primarily found within the family.
Tönnies though distinguishes between closeness through blood, housing and thought (Tönnies
1955:48). These three forms of closeness accordingly gives us three types of communities;
kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. Being born into a family or into a village is predisposed before
a person possibly is willing to choose those things and therefore in accordance to the natural
will, as something foregoing the consciousness of the relation. The bonds within the family,
through blood are lasting/permanent. Moreover the part of the family that the individual
occupies is impossible to exclude from the totality on behalf of choice. Being born into a family
is not possible to undo. For communities the family and especially the original family which we
are born into is the ideal type. Friendship, or closeness in thought, differ from this, and is the
sort of community least necessary in character. Tönnies notices this himself, without excluding
friendship from the social form of community (Tönnies 1955:50). Why he does this is difficult to
answer. One possible answer could be that the two ways of relating to others are opposites and
as theoretical concepts always understood in contrast to the other. Friendship could then be
understood as being more about the private than the public, and hence a form of community
rather than association. On the other hand it could be that Tönnies, when looking at empirical
relations, views friendship as the most equal of all relations and hence as the typical “fellowship-
like relation” (Tönnies 1955:21). In this respect it is just as interesting to notice that he views
romantic relations between women and men (which he argues to be the most important of the
relationships of the community) as not fellowship-like but rather as “mixed” and thus as
containing authoritarian aspects (ibid:22). We will notice further on, that it is a shortcoming in
Tönnies theory that he fails to recognise the difference between closeness in thought from
closeness in blood or housing. As mentioned earlier these two particular relationships, friendship
and romantic love are central in understanding a late modern sociality.

11
The features presented as fundamental to community are that it exists a priori, and that it is built
on closeness. Another feature for the community is a shared understanding of the significance of
the relation (Tönnies 1955:55). In this understanding lies implicitly that everything is shared;
friends, foes, threats and happiness. This shared understanding makes communities consist of
people who are united and above all directed towards each other, towards the centre of their
relationship. This is also a consequence of the internal bonds. The community is held together
by individual bonds towards each other (Tönnies 1955:90). This is, according to Tönnies, also
valid for friendship in the same amount as for the family and the village (ibid: 57).

If we instead consider the association as a social form we will according to Tönnies notice that
what seems to be communal, in fact is a way of artificially bringing together the individuals that
are fundamentally separated. The persons are bound to each other through bonds made to
resemblance a community (Tönnies 1955:74). These artificial bonds take the form of contracts
which by definition means “the resultant of two divergent individual wills, intersecting in one
point” (ibid:82). In contrast to the community that is always communal no matter how much the
individuals in it would like to separate, the association evaporates as soon as the exchange or the
contract is fulfilled.

As a consequence of this fundamentally separated group the persons are always aware of the
possibility for the relation to end. Tönnies argues that this awareness of an eventual break-up
gives rise to a tension (Tönnies 1955:74). While this tense way of relating to each other is the
regular way of relating it is not experienced at all times but rather lies as a fundamental tone
towards others (ibid). In order to overcome the tension every interactive or relational approach
needs to contain a proposal on how to make the relationship permanent or equal. This is
achieved by using objective values and constructions of contracts and exchanges. In contrast to
the community where ownership is communal, in the association exchanges are made for
personal owing. This makes relations based on rational will market like, continuously exchanging
relational bindings, binding the individuals to the group/relationship (Tönnies, 1955: 21). Based
on exchanges the association is directed out from its centre towards something outside its own
parts and a possible better catch or exchange (Falk 1999:64; Tönnies 1955:90).

12
The intention of this social psychological reading of Tönnies has been to bring into light how
people relate to each other (and how a dominant way of relating is understood as a dominant
form of sociality for that epoch). Having illustrated traces of sociality as expressions in terms of
external or internal bonds and as means and ends Tönnies seems to be useful in, as well as
similar to other, dualistic theories of sociality. As long as we have only traditional and modern
societies to take into account, we can argue that one form of sociality was prevalent in the first
epoch and the other sociality in the second epoch. Wanting to understand a late modern
sociality, in relation to this theoretical scheme, we will now turn to a suggestion of a threefold
sociality.

2. Herman Schmalenbach’s contribution to theories of social forms

In the essay Communion – A sociological Category (1922)11 the German sociologist and
phenomenologist Herman Schmalenbach criticises as well as develops Tönnies theory. Although
Schmalenbach considers Tönnies work to be one of the most important sociological pieces he
finds its definitions vague and unable to cover all social relations (Schmalenbach 1977:65). This
critique is mainly directed to the category of community. Whereas the association is clearly
defined as market-like relations, Schmalenbach argues that the community seems to have
emerged out of a sentimental longing back to a time of authentic community, insufficiently
defined and ambivalent in usage (Schmalenbach 1977:69).

2.1 The communion – a proposition for a third social form

I have already brought to your attention that friendship and romantic love are difficult to fit into
Tönnies’ description of the natural will, and thus the community as a social form. Schmalenbach,
though, uses yet another example to make explicit this incongruence in Tönnies theory. He
points out that every young generation necessarily needs to break free from the bonds of the
original family and go on to new, chosen families and peer-groups.12 This step is necessary in the
social development of human beings. What young people do when breaking free from the family
is to choose a community that they consider fits their essence better. The relationship emerging

11 The text was originally published in the journal Die Dioskuren, 1922 (2):35-105. But for this article I use the
English translation found in the edited book On society and experience Schmalenbach, Herman. 1977. On Society and
Experience, Edited by G. Lüschen and G. P. Stone. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press..
12
Schmalenbach is not the only one to takes youth culture into consideration when regarding a sociality of breaking
free. David Riesman, for example, also makes a distinction of a triadic sociality where above all the young
generations stand for what he calls the other-directed character where the individuals are directed towards others in
such an extent that their reactions is more influential than her own individuality Riesman, David. 1950. The Lonely
Crowd. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books..

13
is in that sense chosen but not necessarily chosen by rational will but rather chosen by self
identification and a sense of congruence with ones true essential self. Besides the fact that this is
a conscious choice it is the emotional basis for the relation that separates friendship from family.
Relying on Max Weber’s distinction of traditional and affective relations, Schmalenbach points
out a weak spot in Tönnies, arguing that community only embraces traditional relations, while
the social form that he himself introduces as a necessary third social form – the communion –
contains affective relations (Schmalenbach 1977:72f).

What separates the communion from the community as social forms is the place that emotions
have in the relations. Schmalenbach argues that it would be possible to view communities as
containing both traditional and affective relations, but since the communion can not be said to
rest upon an essential or natural will they rely on two different types of sociality and hence result
in two different social forms, (Schmalenbach 1977:82). The social forms of community and
communion resemble each other while both contain emotions of belonging and communality,
but whereas the communion is entered due to emotions communities already exist before
emotions arise in them (ibid:82-83). The significance of emotions also bears consequences on
how the bonds between the persons involved emerge. In the communion people are bound
together by actually experienced emotions, not by a given common ground as in the community.
To be kin or neighbours is based upon circumstances rather than emotions. The emotions in the
communion are the cornerstones of the relation whereas they in the community according to
Schmalenbach are meaningless (Schmalenbach 1977:92). One result of Schmalenbach’s analysis
is though that there are two types of social forms and two types of sociality in contrast to the
mechanic relations.

2.2 Three types of sociality

In order to further clarify that community and communion are based upon two separate types of
sociality Schmalenbach brings the association in to the discussion, showing the necessity of all
three forms of sociality.

When all three fundamental sociological categories are considered together, it can be
demonstrated with full penetrating force that the principal difference between community
and communion is not of less consequence, but of exactly the same consequence as the
difference between those two concepts and society [association] (Schmalenbach 1977:93).

14
In Tönnies dualistic theory we find the fundamental difference between communities and
associations in their relation between part and totality, and as either fundamental communalities
or fundamental separations between the people in relation. As a dualism these two categories are
not just mutually exclusive, but even each others antitheses. Schmalenbach’s triadic theory of
social forms implies a relation between them where they can not continue to hold this position
towards each other. Since Schmalenbach does not use Tönnies’ concepts of the wills but rather
focuses on other questions in order to characterize them as types of sociality we can not ascribe
the communion with a specific will. His conclusions are best to be given in his own words, even
if the quotation is of considerable length:

The concrete separateness of the individual is maintained in the society [association].

Individuals who enter into these relationships, and by so doing recognize the possibility of
and even the necessity from the outset of joining associations, realize this. As frequently as
they do join associations, they remain essentially separate. There remains some distance
between them that may be shortened only by single links, i.e., relationships. These remain
clearly visible at a glance and consequently rational, just as the wholeness of the society
[association] relationship is only relational. The ethos of cool reservation is the spirit that
inspires society [association]. The members of every community are originally united with
one another; the parts of society [association] are essentially separated from one another.
The comrades of the communion have nothing at all to do with one another in the
beginning. The communion is originally established when they meet each other (also after
a community has already been established). The experiences that give rise to communion
are individual experiences. While it appears here that the communion is closer to society
[association], it approaches community after it has been established. The friend is an alter
ego. We feel his joy and his sorrow as our own. The weakening of such a communion stirs
up our very souls. Indeed one can not speak of coalescence; one should call it fusion –
perhaps a more intense statement. Certainly it appears in different degrees. Still, actual
separation completely vanishes in the communion. In this view, if communion may be
placed somewhere in the middle between community and society [association], it may be
placed over and against both from another point of view, so that they belong together
when opposed to communion. In any case, one can establish a sequence from society
[association] to community to communion, just as one can also establish a sequence from
community to society [association] to communion (Schmalenbach 1977:94f).

15
The results of Schmalenbach’s intention to identify the characteristics of the three types of
sociality behind the social forms is that the communion is more similar to the association in its
origin as it is based on a conscious choice, though in its development it becomes more similar to
the community, due to the focus on emotions and “natural belonging”. According to
Schmalenbach the communion therefore has an inbuilt tendency to be temporary, sooner or later
turning into one of the other two social forms. The communion is not permanent as the
community, neither as brief as the association evaporating as soon as the contract is fulfilled.
”Instability from within is ultimately symptomatic of the communion. As long as it persists, it
persists only in separate discrete acts and never outside these acts” (ibid, 96). The communion is,
as Bauman would say, liquid in character (Bauman 2003). To overcome this inbuilt instability the
community takes the norms of fidelity through an oath, most explicitly found in blood-brothers.

Now comrades seal blood communions by drinking a few drops of one another’s blood,
and presume to establish a community as cohesive as blood bonds. Up to the final
weakening, the name “brother” (communion brother), is the designation per excellence
that binds comrades to communion (Schmalenbach 1977:99).

The communion holds a middle position between the contractual relation of association; do ut
des13character, and the pre given exclusivity of the community. In this way friendship and romantic
relations are the representative relation for the communion in contrast to the family in the
community and the contractual relation of the association.

2.3 Socialities in transition (or a dialectic understanding of sociality)

Schmalenbach’s critique of Tönnies though does not end by pointing out the need for a third
social form containing relations based on emotional choice. Rather he continues to argue that the
“liquid” character of the communion is valid for all social forms. Social forms need to be
understood as constantly changing rather than constant. The community, he argues, will
eventually be drained into an association and the association will by commitment turn into a
community. The family, which is the typical relation of the community, is taken as an example.
This relationship actually starts as a communion between two lovers. When the two lovers
decide to get married, they become an association due to the marital contract and when (if) they
have children finally they turn into a community. Arguing that all relationships and all societies
are characterized by constant motion a developmental line does not need to go from community

13 I give, so that you may give.

16
(to communion), to association, but rather from any of the three forms into any of the other
two. The understanding of them needs to be dialectic – they all have some inherent conflict that
makes the relationship turn into another form or phase of relationship. Similar to Tönnies,
Schmalenbach though suggests that the different types of sociality becomes predominant during
different historical eras (Schmalenbach 1977:119f). This suggestion of Schmalenbach’s turns us
back to the point of departure concerning contemporary society and the formulation of a late
modern sociality.

3. Concluding remarks on sociality and contemporary society

A main object for this analysis has been to investigate modern dualistic theories of social forms
and sociality from the perspective of late modern theories. Focusing on sociality social
psychological aspects of these theories have been highlighted.

Following the dualistic theories only two social forms and two types of sociality are possible
while they are described as mutually excluding. This dualism was appropriate as long as
sociologists were concerned with the shift from traditional to modern societies. Understood as
stage theories of social development they suitably presuppose that the traditional ways of living
precede the modern ways of living, that natural will precede rational will, and communities
precede associations. After modernity the only possible options though are either falling back to
communities or a development of the free choice and instrumental behaviour of the rational will
and the association even further than as described by Tönnies. Tönnies feared this development
which also implies that all intimate, private, and exclusive living together, found in communities
would evaporate and be replaced by estranged relations (Tönnies 1955:37f). A development like
that would mean that we could end up living in a society where all individuals would experience
themselves as fundamentally separated, and who due to a wish to relate from time to time would
engage in accidental, contractual and temporal relations.14

But having in mind that Tönnies wrote his book when the industrial society and the Gesellschaft
was at its peak, making his fears well grounded, it is today relevant to have in mind that the late
modern social theorists can be seen as possibly writing their theories on another peak of societal
change. If accepting this thought their concerns are legitimate to take into account as well as to
bee seen as an argument to have another look at Tönnies’ ideas. It seems possible, as suggested

This is basically what happens in Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World Huxley, Aldous. 1932. Brave New World:
14

A Novel. London: Chatto & Windus., and to some extent in Bauman’s analyses of contemporary society. Bauman,
Zygmunt. 2003. Liquid Love. On the Frailty of Human Bonds. Cambridge: Polity Press.

17
by others (Asplund 1991) that Tönnies distinction of wills and the following social forms are
only valid during the era of modernity and as understood in contrast to the traditional. After the
culmination of modernity we now have three phases of society and three types of sociality to
take into account, and it might be that Tönnies dualistic theory is no longer valid.
Schmalenbach’s critique and development of Tönnies, with emphasis put on three fundamental
“styles of experience” which are all changing in character seems to be useful in trying to expand
Tönnies’ ideas into the late modern era. First by its dialectical rather than dualistic approach,
secondly for its suitability to the attempts of writing the characteristics of social forms and types
of sociality of the late modern society. The communion as introduced as a third social form is as
we have seen based on a sociality of free will as well as on essence. Romantic love and friendship,
the two relations that Tönnies has problems categorising as pure community relations, but which
Schmalenbach see as typical relations for the communion are also the ideal typical relationship in
late modern social theories. The instability from within that Schmalenbach emphasise is also one
of the features social theorists of today emphasise as characterizing contemporary social
relations.

One thing still missing though is a concept for this particular type of sociality. Both
Schmalenbach and the late modern social theorists have named the ideal typical social forms
emerging from this type of sociality, but the sociality itself is not named. The characteristics of
the sociality of the communion are suggested to be strong, conscious feelings of authenticity,
and belonging which are manifested by ritual bonds. One possible way of naming or describing
the late modern sociality in a similar dialectic way to that of Schmalenbach’s naming of the social
forms is as a reflexive sociality. Late modern theorists have excessively used the concept of
reflexivity to describe the late modern man and his/her relation to him/her self, others and the
society. What I suggest in relation to the discussion found in Schmalenbach is that reflexivity, in
the usage of late modern theorists, can be understood as an attempt to merge the two
contrasting ways of being social found in traditional and modern society without falling into any
of them in characteristics. Instead of seeing a development of instrumentality in rational thought
and will reflexivity stresses a kind of knowledge that is not merely accumulative but rather a
”constant revision in relation to new information or knowledge” (Giddens 1997:30). Ulrich Beck
emphasise reflexive acts in terms easy to compare to Tönnies while it means “the familiar added
by the desired” (Beck 1994:2) In relation to Tönnies’ wills a reflexive sociality could be
interpreted as the natural will added by the rational will.

18
A reflexive sociality might then be understood as a transcendence of, or a synthesis of, both the
rational and the natural will. The reflexive will knows what it wants to be, whom to be with and
how to be in order for it to happen. Such a reflexive will could also mean a way of understanding
the fact that relations in contemporary society not necessarily mean an expanded market-like-
rationality and an increase in external bonds. Rather the reflexive will would imply a choice of
relations based on self identification and strong emotions. As in the rational will, the reflexive
will does honour the free choice of the individual, but not through an exchange or market but
rather through emotions.15 The ideas put forth by Schmalenbach on the communion seem to be
useful in order to understand and formulate a late modern sociality, both on its own and as a
part of social development without denying the importance of previously developed dualistic
theories.

References
Asplund, Johan. 1991. Essä om Gemeinschaft och Gesellschaft. Göteborg: Korpen.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
—. 2003. Liquid Love. On the Frailty of Human Bonds. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, Ulrich. 1994. "The Reinvention of Politics: Toward a Theory of Reflexive Modernization."
in Reflexive Modernization, edited by U. Beck, A. Giddens, and S. Lash. Oxford: Polity
Press.
Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 1995. The Normal Chaos of Love. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
—. 2001. Individualization: Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences. London:
SAGE.
Buber, Martin. 2002. "I and Thou." Pp. 181-188 in The Martin Buber Reader. Essential Writings,
edited by A. D. Biemann. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Falk, Jørg. 1999. "Ferdinand Tönnies." Pp. 60-73 in Klassisk och modern samhällsteori (Classical and
Modern Social Theories), edited by H. Andersen and L. B. Kaspersen. Lund:
Studentlitteratur.
Foa, Uriel and Edna Foa. 1974. Societal Structures of the Mind. Springfield: Springfield, cop.
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
—. 1992. The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
—. 1996. Modernitetens följder (Consequences of Modernity). Lund: Studentlitteratur.
—. 1997. Modernitet och självidentitet. Självet och samhället i den senmoderna epoken. Translated by A.
Sten. Göteborg: Daidalos.
Huxley, Aldous. 1932. Brave New World: A Novel. London: Chatto & Windus.
Kant, Immanuel. 1996 (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In The Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy.
: Cambridge University Press.

15 Exchange theories in the field of Social Psychology early recognised that not only things were exchangeable, but
also emotions and beliefs, even if it is much more difficult to turn them into a market value Foa, Uriel and Edna
Foa. 1974. Societal Structures of the Mind. Springfield: Springfield, cop..

19
—. 2005. The Moral Law. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by H. J. Paton.
London: Routledge.
Loomis, Charles. 1955. "Translator's introduction." in Community and association. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Lüschen, Günter and Gregory P Stone. 1977. "Introduction." Pp. 1-48 in On Society and
Experience, edited by H. Schmalenbach. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Mitzman, Arthur. 1971. "Tönnies and German Society, 1887-1914: From Cultural Pessimism to
Celebration of the Volksgemeinschaft." Journal of the History of Ideas 32:507-524.
Riesman, David. 1950. The Lonely Crowd. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
Schmalenbach, Herman. 1977. On Society and Experience, Edited by G. Lüschen and G. P. Stone.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1955. "Foreword." in Community and Association. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul
Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1955. Community and association. Translated by C. P. Loomis. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Williams, T.C. 1968. The Concept of the Categorical Imperative. A Study of the Place of the Categorical
Imperative in Kant's Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Østerberg, Dag. 1966. Förståelseformer. Göteborg: Korpen.
—. 1990. "Handling og samfunn." Oslo: Pax forlag.

20