Crim I Cases III

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc,
Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in
the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went
to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis
Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven
months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in
the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by
the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel
over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight,
and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he
had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep.
The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo
while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were
inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who
seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in
desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that
came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
1|Criminal Law I
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known
to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may
lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special
circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and
taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as
may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to
voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an
hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of
the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does
not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how
the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have
heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala,
intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that
he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife
was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be
confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds
that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
2|Criminal Law I
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison,
attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife,
thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the
right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior
and lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos
Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith
objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the
Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant
alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was again
called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another
order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the
complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio
Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution
and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental
condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial
court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant
alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report
as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic
3|Criminal Law I
Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr.
Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a
condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from
the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr.
Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27,
1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted
and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had
dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the
commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and
immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality
either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally
deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense
to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and
that the defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him
thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech,
who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned
around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who
said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed
Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the
scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine
General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December
15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge
in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that
of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was
insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
4|Criminal Law I
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp
conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog,
Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal
Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of
insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at
the time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the
ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an
affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is
not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car.
& K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United
States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This
liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the
outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as
one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it
becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez
[1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine
distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at
the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the
act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and
after that time. Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134
Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14;
People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs.
Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we
read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of
the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and
not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the
5|Criminal Law I
preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe
contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity,
mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission
of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission
of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be
overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in
arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that
the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from
January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital
suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it
is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a
circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurence of
the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental
disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder
in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal
Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular
Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are
similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears
"deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia
præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no control whatever
of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-
depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic
relations of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic
lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs
deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster,
Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne
at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 — the date
when the crime was committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which
is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr.
Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the
very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives
to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp.
9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the
commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the
6|Criminal Law I
mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by
the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was
made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis,
called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,

Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed
with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on
very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he walks
around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and other parts
of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food
offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did
not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have
his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse
his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as
stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short
interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent
motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without
provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and
would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen
with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would not answer
at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with a cross made of
small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in
the literature as for example the following.
7|Criminal Law I
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and
rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as
to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he could not
sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he
should escape. That he was going to be killed because he was benevolet. That he could
sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times
however when he could not hear or see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he

could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat.
He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La Loma
Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory
for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital
he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He
could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been
insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14,
1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous
condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement in his behavior as
to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form
of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.
8|Criminal Law I
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant
alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic
Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has
decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at
large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly
serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice with
his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action
over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too
idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the average conception of
an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon
arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-
appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to
kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of
policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine,
University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of
dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal
liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the
insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until
the Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
9|Criminal Law I
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch
54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other
parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said
Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the
generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside
the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
10 | C r i m i n a l L a w I
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of
2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where
Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times.
Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained
clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-
38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim
sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the
accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so
many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the
Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua
further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the
funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her
husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in
December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish
his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was
confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his
sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store which her
husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought
always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his
customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children.
There were also times when her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth
they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of
stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain
therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer
there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when
she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words
"mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her
parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked
her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my
heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would
die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was
corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10,
1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me."
However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to
Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August
25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane
long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under
organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988;
TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to finish
his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However,
he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only
came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14,
July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was
his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that
the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending
physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in
their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence.
(TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The act
of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade
arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed
the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-appellant.
The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the
crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense
entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity,
namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by
a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given
circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person
believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an
irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between
right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and
wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral
faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or
defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or
of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at
the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and
emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime
charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual
disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and
disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was
organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did not
have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals
unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated with
medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the
manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been
mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my
record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before
his contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first
manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-
occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that
was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three
(3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the
testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations
on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused
was really insane or not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has no
lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime
charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He
complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim.
We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused
at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he
wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him
to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he
wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen
Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell
him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of
me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a
request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the
accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of
the landholding in the name of my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during this
confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We
infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was
not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have been
aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked
by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that
he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the
postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts,
do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in
short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is
really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the
illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he
burst out into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have
encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this case we have
really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered.
Like for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was
aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this
case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the
act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983;
emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert
witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done
makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial
court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope
where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a
pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and
therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the
victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took
flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious
and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the
witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the
defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of
proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise is
that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34
Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever,
therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora,
52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the
crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting
him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya
in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who
was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines
Rafanan alias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at
Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the
accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away.
Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused
called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went
near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual
intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The
accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a
bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of
complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle.
After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her
mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house
of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and
the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only
left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the
night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them
prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and
asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried.
It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she
was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra
Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis
Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of
the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went
to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo,
Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course of
time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of
the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and
C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental
condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering
from insanity.
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he contends
are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct examination that she
immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the
effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she
left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she
(the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination. In
any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the
manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the
complainant.
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this
respect is clear and convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and
brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled
you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.
Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to
do. He was able to do what he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate,
if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the
bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do
immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A I was wearing pants, sir.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
A Yes, sir, I have a panty.
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to
your pants and your panty?
A He removed them, sir.
Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he
succeeded.
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A He was wearing pants.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he
still wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which
you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused
when he was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?
Fiscal Guillermo:
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a
leading question which is a follow-up question?
Witness:
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?
A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my
mother and to anybody in their house.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
Q After that where did you go?
A I went home already, sir. 4
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court
suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for
observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital
on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition of
the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief,
Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental condition
were set forth:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever
questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair,
would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and
when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when
persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times
would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers
are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon,
tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was
brought here.
The report then concluded:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is
found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in
grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately,
refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation,
disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane,
hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his
affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show
periods of being irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not
know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he
does not remember having committed any wrong act and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at
present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in
particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect,
mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved,
responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . .
free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the
hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-
ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and
as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while
alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could
not understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he
was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and
no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having
hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition
to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant
was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a
psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from
the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that
he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21,
1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation
of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239)
For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act
should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of
his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April
20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility
or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by
law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests:
(a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the
test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common
reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our
caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that
he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that
which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any
case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has
recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops
between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance of
association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic
attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism and the
ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of
schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in

no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's
first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations
that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's
thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of
having one's actions controlled or influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-
rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms
include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and
emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are

common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of
voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third
person. Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going
on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many
schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading
silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly
spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients,
but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual
hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients
hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously.
They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby,
clearly defined, in color, life size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost
never in one of the other sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and that
are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are among the
common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of
schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that exercises
its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all,
schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern
schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with
atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15 it has mostly been
rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was
impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he
was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in
this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his
penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you
said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what
we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal
individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the
standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer
withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or
psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is
suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the
acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet
there is no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to
commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The
reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of
the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be
sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she
had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two
(2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental
faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by
itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it is
complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding
his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry
into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the
act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr.
Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time.
They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their
testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with
schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant during
his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it
does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise
of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant
should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty
imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral damages
is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000

vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is
designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason.
Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the
accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA
MADARANG in an Information 1 which reads:
That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of

Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M.
MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2
inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es)
lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing
upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep,
located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the
apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.
Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not
guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that
his client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court
called the accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court.
Hence, on the same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the transfer of the accused to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from
the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him.
3
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence
on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter
LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally
married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen
(16) years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in
Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta,
Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire
fortune due to cockfighting. 4
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy
with their eight child and was about to give birth. 5
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous
of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their
children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise. 6
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying
inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew
barged into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While
passing by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from
the house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice
anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her. 8
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he
suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that
the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted
three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the
first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or
psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality
characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's
thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions.
The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become
destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic,
however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong. 12 Dr.
Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH
and it was highly possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the
crime. 1
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27,
1996, 14 showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The
accused was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial. 15
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he
committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court is of the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the
commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on
record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was
suspended or abolished at the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby
sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making
his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that
fateful day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited
the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may be violent and destructive,
or very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his
wife and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He
did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers
that this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime
would have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits
that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started
through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-
law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle.
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful
day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with
his wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he
committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth
child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his
right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient
reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable
or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An
insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is
served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control
over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. 18
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the
traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a
cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act,
and that the act was wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word
"wrong" referred to moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as
follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God
has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong"
means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also
assailed as it referred solely to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was
pointed out that the accused may know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or
consequences of his actions. 20 M'Naghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading
concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the
whole personality of the patient, including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the
elements of a personality and does not solely determine man's conduct. 21
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason
of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him
to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that
what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that
there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of
what is right and wrong. 22 This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse"
requirement is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also
restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will
not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not
be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse.
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." 24 Critics of this test argued that it gave too
much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity
beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental
disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely
dependent on the testimonies of experts. 25
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model
Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a
person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law. 26 Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and
"appreciate" as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness
was sufficient. 27 Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose
abnormalities are manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be
deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. 28
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory
formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law
applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused
is not required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to
the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and
provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. 29
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. 30
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused,
by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The
testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed
to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental
disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis. 3
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in
aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions
and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes
place and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual
social customs are disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a
withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem
preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and
manifests little concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of
rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people
to protect himself from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional
responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and
cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and
fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and
confusion and becomes distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in
his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic
may not speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to
stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the
record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. 37 Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense.
Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also
proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on
the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. 38
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity
at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was
completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments
advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he
has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made
with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo
after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on
reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he
stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-
remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful
day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is
not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had
been terminated for the flimsiest reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent
on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be
sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his
fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the
appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her
house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have
suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the
crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the
accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered
without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As the appellant, in
the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife,
we are constrained to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case for parricide
with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating circumstances.
Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños2 y Domingo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to death.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the victim; and P22,800.00 s actual damages."3
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and the fetus
inside her. It reads thus:
"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of Camiling,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Melecio Robinos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by means of a bladed
knife 8 inches long, his legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant
causing the instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside her womb." 5
When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, 6 pleaded not guilty.7 After
due trial, the RTC convicted him.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution's version of how appellant assaulted his
pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:
"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños
was in his parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking,
he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at the
sala, quarrelling.
"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?'
After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw appellant, with
a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was
hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo
immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the
incident.1âwphi1.nêt
"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the
victim Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San Isidro.
Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mother's house for the
purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his
uncle, Alejandro Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mother's
house, he received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by
appellant.
"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he was
afraid of what appellant might do. From his mother's house, which was about 150 meters away
from his sister's home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's good you would see how
your sister died.'
"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police station at
Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the other members of
the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro. The police,
together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the
scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of appellant and Lorenza. The
police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant failed to come out, the police, with
the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood
was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw
appellant embracing [his] wife.
"6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and holding
a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He was uttering
the words, 'I will kill myself, I will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing
upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.
"7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant away
from Lorenza's body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried
to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the barangay
officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away
from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a
neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained
knife.
"8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale and not
breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenza's body for
autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be
taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.
"9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac,
prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
'The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds
on the different parts of her body.
'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came
home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double
knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows.
'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.
'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches
long including handle.'
"10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who conducted
the autopsy on Lorenza Robiños' body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as evidence."8
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but seeks
exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:
"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented the
testimonies of the following:
"FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents had
occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person went
[sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told the
same thing to his mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and exchanged heated words.
"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know Melecio
Robiños only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself,
'laging nakatingin sa malayo', rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and the
accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:30 o'clock in
the afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of
prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of
the penal colony.
"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as
the accused's inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes was
lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and sometimes
crying.
"MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their
house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that he was
charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember when he was
informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife."9
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this Court for
review.10
The Issues
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:
"I
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of
Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or
insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.
"II
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity."11
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Main Issue
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the allegation that he
killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and the commission of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Appellant, however, interposes the defense of
insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability.
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of
will at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of
mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was
committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.14
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every
person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity has the burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was
committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting
in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence
that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his
wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation preceded the
fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without
knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and conscious
reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo
Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo's testimony in part as follows:
"Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if they talked to one
and the other?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: Did you hear what they talked about?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear?
A: 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?', Sir.
COURT:
In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.
ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your father do?
A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir."17
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to her
brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:
"ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already there in the
house of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead?
A: No, Sir.
ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Why?
A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.
COURT:
Q: Why do you know that he was amok?
A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.
Q: How?
A: It's good you would see how your sister died, Sir."18
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have
been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the
wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with
his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated
the clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even
showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Valdez's testimony proceeded as follows:
"Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robiños?
A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited for the police
officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going around the house
and when we saw blood, some of our companions removed the walling of the house and at that
time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robiños lying down as if at that moment, the wife of Melecio
Robiños was already dead, Sir.
Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?
A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?
A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he killed his
wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.
Q: What is that weapon?
A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.
COURT:
What is that, knife?
A: It's a double bladed knife, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
He admitted to you that he killed his wife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or what?
A: What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket ko' meaning 'I killed my wife,' Sir."19
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of his
act.
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of insanity. The
bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the
crime. Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robiños,20 all the other defense witnesses testified on
the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been detained in prison.
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused must have
been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible.21 Verily, his alleged
insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act was
committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v. Villa,22 this Court incisively ratiocinated on the matter as
follows:
"It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in
all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was
without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the
realization of the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence
of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be
stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry,
and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes
of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental
condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order
that the exempting circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x x."23 (Italics
supplied)
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence
points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.24
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination of the mental
condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind at the time of the killing. It
must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after the commission of
the crime.25 Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history of his mental condition
prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather data on the matter.26
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering from
psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion was not
definite and was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court, her declarations were merely
conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:
"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National Center for
Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio Robiños was
still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and it is
possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination; and in
her opinion accused was suffering from delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time
accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx
Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental, physical and neurological examinations
on the accused seven (7) months after the commission of the offense. That span of seven (7)
months has given accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza
had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused immediately
before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense. Her finding is conjectural,
inconclusive. She did not conduct background examination of the mental condition of the accused
before the incident by interviewing persons who had the opportunity to associate with him." 29
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely deprived of
reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had
been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a
defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is required to
establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow
the presumption of sanity.1âwphi1.nêt
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death
penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty was not only baseless, but
contrary to the rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the Office
of the Solicitor General concedes this error in the imposition of the death penalty.32
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with the
mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x."
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose
one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.33
The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion
perpetua.35
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable with death.
The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the
application of either one of which depends on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case No.
95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua.
Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as
civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 147674-75 March 17, 2004

vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle with
scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds
resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 1
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as
‘pisao,’ thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which wounds
resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 2
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued. 3
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution
witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang
were outside sitting side by side with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was
lying on a bench.4
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house, shouting: "There’s a long-haired man!" Bambi stood up
and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife
while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on
different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi’s house, with Anacito chasing him.
Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter tried to
force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw stones at the door. After a short
while, Anacito left.5
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the hospital. He
saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind
because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced."6 As nobody from among his neighbors responded
to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion of the
neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to the
hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.7
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the latter’s
wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people
running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.8
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise
noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-called
"lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to
four times.9
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He then
saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents’ house, but the latter did not make it because he collapsed
near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the
Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital, where he
died the following day.10
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers
of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allan’s body, one of which was fatal because it
affected the upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel.11 Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds and
died of pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage.12
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He declared
that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another barangay in
Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight policemen
entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the police station and
detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place and time of the stabbing
incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom he had not quarreled with.
As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He
asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and lowly regarded by his
accusers.13
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present witnesses.
Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the following grounds:
(1) on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing the
psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito underwent a psychiatric
examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a Medical Certificate
dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a "normal" mental status on that date but was "suffering from
some degree of Mental Aberration," which required further psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban City. 14
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for the psychiatric
examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.15
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist of the
EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20
November 2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through interviews. From her
interview with Anacito’s sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of Anacito’s psychiatric history of
"inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found that Anacito had a psychotic disorder characterized by
flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her medical findings that Anacito was psychotic
before and during the commission of the crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial
and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from
schizophrenia.16
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking
"irrelevantly."17 Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne.18 They
stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the same
medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments, Remedios requested
that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the NCMH, however, referred them to the
EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra.
Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the NCMH who came to
Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then until the year 2000, Anacito did not take
any medicine, nor was he subjected to examination or treatment.19
Anacito’s other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he heard a
loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When Francisco went
out to verify, he did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the street carrying
a knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him. Anacito struggled to free
himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios’ house. Before the incident, he observed Anacito to be
"sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes silent." 20
In its decision21 of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱43,500.00 by way of actual damages,
and to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amount
of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in disregarding
the exempting circumstance of insanity.22 He contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and
was, therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even assuming in gratis
argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 9, Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the
offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." He likewise maintains that since
treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted
of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to establish with the
required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. The
mental state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents.
Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain that Anacito was
"unconscious" at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues that treachery was duly alleged
and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a qualifying circumstance in the killing of
Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element. Without it,
the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally
sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is
dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A man’s act is presumed
voluntary.23 It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously,24 for the moral and
legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, 25 or that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person.26 Thus, the presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is
that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under
Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability.27
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, 28 for insanity as a
defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance.29 An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.30 It is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s counsel to
prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity
immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him. 31
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured
and judged by his behavior.32 Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means
of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.33
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct.34 However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.35 As consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so."36 Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of insanity
certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming three sticks
of marijuana before raping the victim;37 slurping the victim’s blood and attempting to commit suicide after
stabbing him;38 crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney.39
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones40 requires that there be a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment because of a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,41 we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the test
of cognition – whether there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act" and
(b) the test of volition – whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We observed that our
case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to
turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the
freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is expected,
since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is represented as desirable by his
intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.42
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane
based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.43
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacito’s defense of insanity. The appellant points to the
testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply stare at
the lady boarders a few days before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and long pants
when there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the testimony of
prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time interval between the two stabbing
incidents shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive.44
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of Anacito two
to three days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was
angry with her.45 His brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to himself,
laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet. 46 Also relied upon by the appellant are
the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and the expert testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr.
Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambi’s personal perception that there was no
reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to
be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to
himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he
was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be
considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability. 47
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What it
shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to remedy "his
lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental
illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and
Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the confinement of Anacito and that
the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito was never confined in a mental institution.
Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a recommendation for Anacito’s confinement, there was no
indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made, who made the recommendation, and
the reason for the recommendation.48
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,49 we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to the
incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged insane by
the institute. Applying this principle to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to reject his plea of
insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no
proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the
medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000 because he was
"again noisy in the jail."50 It seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his
symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations on Anacito were based on
incomplete or insufficient facts.51 For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only three
sessions lasting one to two hours each.52 Her one-page medical report53 reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in appearance, wearing blue shirt
and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory
hallucination, "kabastosan," "kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and complained of
occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a psychiatric disorder. It
is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and during the commission of the crime. He is presently
psychotic and cannot stand trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Verona’s conclusions have no supporting medical bases or data. She failed to
demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing.54 Further, she did
not have Anacito’s complete behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she mentioned that
Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not conscious of killing his
victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of schizophrenia, but stated in the next
breath that Anacito was not grossly insane.55
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Verona’s short psychiatric evaluation report and her
testimony that Anacito’s judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that
his mental condition in 1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically
examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident
and, hence, would prove Anacito’s mental condition only for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane at
the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability, insanity could have been contracted during
the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time.
He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought
of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the inquiry.56 His mental
condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal
liability.57
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in the
year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the
invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental
faculties.58 Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-
behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi
to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear
indication that insanity is a mere concoction59 or an afterthought.60 In any event, Anacito failed to establish by
convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus
presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction.61
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of
insanity, it was clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that
affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission of the act he was
being held for.62 The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito was
diagnosed as "psychotic" with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found to be schizophrenic.
There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at the time he stabbed the
victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her report, only at the witness
stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is concerned
because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault. 63 For treachery to be
considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed. 64
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim in a
dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his
hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacito’s attack came without warning; it was deliberate
and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend
himself.65
We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with
the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent amendments to the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.66
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower
of the two indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission
of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within
the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no modifying circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent ₱43,500 for the wake and
burial of his son, only ₱11,94567 is substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall
award to Demetrio Jr.’s heirs temperate damages68 of ₱25,00069 conformably with current jurisprudence.70
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent ₱10,000. However, he
failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the
amount of ₱10,000 on the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred
expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and Allan is affirmed in line
with recent jurisprudence.71 Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof other than the commission of the crime.72
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000 consistent with controlling case law.73 Moral damages are awarded despite the absence
of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victim’s family.74
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000 in
view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. 75
Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the total amount of ₱161,945
and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of ₱110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal
Case No. 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua
and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the ₱50,000 civil indemnity, he
is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages;
(b) ₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) ₱25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of ₱150,000; and (2)
the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; and (b) ₱10,000 as temperate
damages, or a total of ₱110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from one who is totally
deprived thereof and is unable to exercise sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the
actions made by the latter be measured under a lesser stringent standard than that imposed on those who
have complete dominion over their mind, body and spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10, 2014 Decision 1 and the
December 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed the
May 30, 2013 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 13283, finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder for killing
Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused SOLOMON VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the pre-trial, he invoked the
defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued. 6
Evidence of the Prosecution
The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo
were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that
Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.7
After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a tricycle
but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a
store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw
Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie. 8
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He again
struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero
attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in
the chest.9
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers arrested
Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based on the
Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds. 10
Evidence of the Defense
The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved around Verdadero's alleged
insanity, to wit:
Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as he claimed to hear
strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam), Verdadero's
sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC after he became violent and started
throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined for two (2) months and was
diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.
On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental
illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in
2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.
On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing incident. There, she saw
Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort
room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and was transferred to an isolation room after Miriam
informed the nurses of the incident.11
On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr. Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr.
Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that
Verdadero suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his violent behaviour.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a
mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already brought to CVMC
and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana
that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident.12
The RTC Ruling
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON VERDADERO y Galera
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him:
1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor [as maximum]
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; and,
2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however,
opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that
Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo
or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreed
that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable
to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment, dated May 30, 2013,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated December
15, 2014.
Hence, this present petition, raising the following

ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims that Maynard even
admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at the police station before the stabbing
took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as
testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse at the
time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the present petition presented a
question of fact, which could not be addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence presented failed to
completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.
In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he would no longer file a reply as his
petition for review already contained an exhaustive discussion of the issues.
The Court's Ruling
The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity. Before delving into the
merits of the case, a discussion of the procedural issue is in order.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; Exceptions
The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review as it principally revolves
around the issue of his insanity — a question of fact which should no longer be addressed in a petition for
review. The Court disagrees.
Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
as it is limited to reviewing only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein the Court
expands the coverage of a petition for review to include a resolution of questions of fact. In Laborte v.
Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the following exceptions to the rule
that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the stabbing incident.
Obviously, it is a question of fact, which, ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for review. As
will be discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in the case at bench warrant
the application of the exception rather than the rule.
Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had suffered a
relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from
criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must
be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary. 18
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed
with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a
relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the
stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained
is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering
from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.20
In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an exempting
circumstance, to wit:
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least
discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom
of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he
must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be
adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must
be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.
In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because such defense is
in the nature of a confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to establish with certainty that he was
completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing
which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death.
Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the accused. In People
v. Opuran24 the Court explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit:
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured
and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of
which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. xxx
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane
based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence of the mental condition of the
accused during a reasonable period before and after the commission of the offense is material, to wit:
In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor are
specific acts of disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only be
plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions may be evaluated to
determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and
convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that Verdadero
sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from
that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly proven.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the exact moment the crime
was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown
by circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr.
Pagaddu may also be taken into account.
Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the time of the stabbing
incident. During her testimony, she stated as follows:
On direct examination
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which involved your diagnosis as a life
long chronic disease?
Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.
Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx
Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of schizophrenia could
distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the commission of the crime that
the impulse control and judgment of an individual was affected sir.
Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia could not distinguish any
act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.
Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon admission on March 19,
2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must be a remission if the
symptom is abated, your Honor.
xxx
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged violent behavior of Solomon
Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the date of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible
that the violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Juliana in
diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet Taguinod and the
conclusion made by you, is it also your conclusion that Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March
12, 2009 due to violent behavior?
A: Yes, sir.
On cross examination
Prosecutor Aquino
Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be continued even when
medications is administered to him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the patient may have relapse (sic)
even with medication, sir.
Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case could that have a long
effect on his mental condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely eradicate the symptom.
Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the medication undertaken as
of January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.
xxx
Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26
[Emphases Supplied]
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a relapse of his schizophrenia at
the time of the stabbing incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a
lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the
testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he stabbed Romeo.
Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made by Maynard, a witness for
the prosecution. In his testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and appearance when
they met at the police station, to wit:
On cross examination
Atty. Tagurama
Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that you are familiar with
Solomon Verdadero even before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.
Q: You are immediate neighbors?

A: Yes, sir
Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic) time?
A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.
Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior did you observe from
him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.
Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or what you called not in his
proper mind occurred often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.
Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon Verdadero appears not in his
proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.
Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Court
Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the passed (sic) years before this
incident was he also violent like what happened on March 12, 2009?
Witness
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt do I get you right that
Solomon Verdadero was with you at the police station?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.
xxx
Q: Can you describe his appearance?

A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.
xxx
Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).
Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27cralawred
[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had observed that
there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become violent.
On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting
that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred to the
psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from harming himself and others. 28
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and
violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for
his previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of
a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu reiterated Dr. Andre-
Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that fateful day.
Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of schizophrenia.
Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be
appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or simultaneous to the
crime.30
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection
as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of
insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was
merely used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.
The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the defense of insanity and
remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped on his mental incapacity.
Unlike in previous cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised only when the
initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere afterthought.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the
responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an
insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order his confinement
in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be
confined in an institution where his mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a
member of society. He shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable
recommendation for his release.
Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He is,
nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting circumstance,
by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33
The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform to recent jurisprudence. 34
The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the RTC must each be
increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum should be
imposed on all damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the same have been fully
paid.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant Solomon Verdadero y Galera
of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental Health for
treatment and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation
from his attending physicians from the institution.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this decision until the same shall have been
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135981 September 29, 2000

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review. The Court may pass
upon all relevant issues, including those factual in nature and those that may not have been brought before
the trial court. This is true especially in cases involving the imposition of the death penalty, in which the
accused must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their defense. Even novel theories
such as the "battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense, should be heard,
given due consideration and ruled upon on the merits, not rejected merely on technical or procedural
grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in
connection with the automatic review of the September 25, 1998 "Judgment"1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City2 in Criminal Case No. 5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of parricide aggravated by
treachery and sentenced her to death.
In an Information3 dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta charged appellant-
movant with parricide allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and
tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the
brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura
and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."
After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y
Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the
penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as moral damages."
The Antecedents
Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion,4 to bring "to the
attention of the x x x Court certain facts and circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant the setting
aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of the death penalty."
Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the means she
employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had consistently claimed that she had shot her
husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary
to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which resulted from her
admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on
record, which bore no forensic autopsy report on the body of the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had
suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims
that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband, then she did not lie about
the abuse she suffered at his hands."
She thus prays for the following reliefs:5
"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and a re-
examination of the cause of death.
2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists of the Court to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben
M. Genosa.
3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists to form
part of the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, to allow a
partial re-opening of the case before a lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists."
On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,6 which substantially
objected to the Motion on the ground that appellant had not been "deprived of her right to due process,
substantial or procedural."
The Issues
In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and
reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his death, and (2) whether the appellant should be examined
by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for the reception of
evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists whom the parties may present to establish her state of
mind at the time of the killing.
First Issue: No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death
Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine his exact cause of
death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his head" rather
than shot, as claimed by appellant.
Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is
unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death. There is no
need to exhume the body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.
Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time and
again, we have said that this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception of
evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the party during the trial stage. Consistent
with this principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be
granted.
Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's State of Mind at the Time of the Killing
In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the
abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman
syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she
asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the
"battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.
Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was her
fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life
and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and
omniscient.7 Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to
occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert
to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle
of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to
perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an
existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her
acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.
Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United States
and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a form of
mental illness.8 It has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's perception of the danger posed
by the abuser.9
In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that her
relationship with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how
her experiences as a battered woman had affected her perception of danger and her honest belief in its
imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.
The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between appellant and her
deceased husband. A defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six (6)
times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for severe hypertension due to
emotional stress.10 Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses' quarrels every now and
then. The court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that since violence had not immediately preceded the
killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.
Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered woman syndrome" as
a possible modifying circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the accused. The
discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court that the syndrome
deserves serious consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very life. It could be that
very thin line between death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere technical or procedural
objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense, for any criminal conviction must be based on
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the death penalty must be
given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could save them from capital punishment.
In People v. Parazo,11 after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent Omnibus
Motion and allowed him to undergo mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation to
determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and mute, yet unaided
during the trial by an expert witness who could professionally understand and interpret his actions and
mutterings, the Court granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It justified its action on the principle that "only
upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused] be consigned to the lethal injection
chamber."
More recently in People v. Estrada,12 we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and remanded the case "to
the court a quo for a conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his
competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings." In that case, the defense counsel had moved to
suspend the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because of his
mental defect, and to confine him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the trial court denied the Motion, after
simply propounding questions to the accused and determining for itself that he could understand and answer
them "intelligently." After trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by cruelty and thus sentenced to
death.
In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:13
"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a
psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the
state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellant's competency to stand trial, the court,
in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light
of the latter's history of mental illness."
It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court practically
denied him a fair trial prior to conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.
Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not
performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court, through Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:
"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.
Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human
free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil.
When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable
for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired."14
In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely,
intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate her
battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and emotional state at the time
of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot
simply refer her for proper psychological or psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the findings and
evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes of automatic review. The prosecution has likewise
the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-examine the defense witnesses and to refute
the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is
apropos, so as to allow the defense the opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with our foregoing
disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to cross examine and refute the same.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the "battered woman syndrome" plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report
to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence,
if any, submitted.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938,
in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with
discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article
80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the
Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused
interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not
having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The
incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order
as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos
and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard,
intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this
act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped
him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude,
for which the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to
the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The accused, offended
by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than
he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but
finding none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him
his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the
latter not to give the accused his knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused,
however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants.
Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the
latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to
do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the
intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of
stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not
being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in
question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has
this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from
said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by
the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a
minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which
gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed,
the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and
the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense
mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other
mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the
conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting
petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both
dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions
thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had
carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old,
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor,
then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 9 Thus, trial
on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD,
EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were
close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught
petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in
turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different
occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and
son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2)
nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick.13 During the first night
at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her
daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion
occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner
brought AAA to their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into
her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents,
otherwise, he would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of
AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was
conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA to come to the room
of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner
pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a
standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five
(5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base
of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their
kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their
waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion.
Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the
incident to his mother, MMM.17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his
fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner
molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal
to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to her,
petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a
heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was
coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about
four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda
about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a
doctor for examination.18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health
Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested. 20 Refusing to
accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer
IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report 21 showing that there were
"abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She
also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions
were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her
certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner
to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the
locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty
clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At
this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing
the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. 24 He is the
second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations
made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA
and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC
while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or showed
his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's
comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet
bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996,
petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all
the other children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at
the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying
that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were only
playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were together with
her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did
not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's
house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his
parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being
maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda
agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the
incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her siblings
were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her
brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate
room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and conversing with
MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she
could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she
did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that
petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM
immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children
were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the
parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at
petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke
Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner
as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but
instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found
no indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of
the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda
learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped
AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek
advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein
petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost
two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his
dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist.
Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda.
Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.29
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and
credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a
serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed
of this case in this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case
for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the
sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal. 31
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense of
denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother
BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the
respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that the
slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an
element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts.
Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF

SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO

APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE
ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY
THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION
OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are
not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies
of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends
that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her
vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA,
taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such
allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape,
conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was
raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical
report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to
prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner
opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual
experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit
such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or
subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort
money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated
that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could
disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on
December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's
parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of
slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their
case and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally,
petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA;
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of
abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is
relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of
1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA
did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be
committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the
evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly
the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the
OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his
covert acts.36
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into
law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive system to
manage children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and
comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-
integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation,
the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and
vested it with certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent
juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and
rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No.
9344's Transitory Provisions.43
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment
of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer
the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is
contrary to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the Family
Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine
appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults,
the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. — The
PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90)
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their
custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court
proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and
development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling
Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate
disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child
in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other
similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation
Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of
R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the
pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the
alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape,
the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not
doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to
positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw
petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is
enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM
and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a
public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life
if the charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in
the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be
noted that in most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total
penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that
actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. 46 Therefore, it is not
necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest
touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.47
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by
the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no
criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in
Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances
embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on
intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine
the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
performing a criminal act.
In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions
of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the
conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the
petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.
Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if the
child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also
asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 3851 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for
automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized
principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such principle does not
apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under
at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the
time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue
of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia
sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the bill in
the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly

propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE
CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE
LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15
YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability
at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children who do
not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite
confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a
diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that.
That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting
process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to just
craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of
the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated
in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all
those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for
example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be immediately
released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for
example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the
counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those
who will benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago
amendment is accepted.55
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would like
to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that
would make this law apply also to those who might already have been convicted but are
awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory
Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section
67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and
below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the
child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer." So
that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the
instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment,
subject to style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to
address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that
at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the
benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose
and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule
of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of
the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest
manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.57
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the plain meaning of R.A.
No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein
petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape.
This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his
mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the
CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under
R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed
against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his
parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of
rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other
than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting
from the odious crime of rape.59
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our
children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and
children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major
concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the
Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, it was found that:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the
age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of
employment of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities,
Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become
more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug
trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge
of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below
who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their
age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. 60
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a
heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped
by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is
inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this
Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.62
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner
Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and
development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
No costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Council (JJWC).
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant
Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from
an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu
at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1
Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of ₱100
marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to
Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers
approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the
poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to
one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went
back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and
Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy
and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to
the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory
of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-
1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of
one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by
Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline
substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one
hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII
Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed that the
appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline
substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a
minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As
such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to
six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14, 2005
appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with
the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also
argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused
should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place. However,
based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was successfully
conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your
buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen
Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this Information
we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for
powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should
be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys,
approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the
suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the
pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was
no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the
suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-
buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already given by
the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline]
substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or
did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights and
we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not
immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of
the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso bills
as marked moneys.8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of
the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 9
From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements
have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject
dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The
testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic
containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that
the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of suspected
shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the result
was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the
marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is positive
to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses that a
buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug
peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing
lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.12 In People v. Roa,13 this Court had the opportunity
to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities
may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8614 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the
National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the
PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a
condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante
arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 11315 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully
resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation
is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their
informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that
there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,19
that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police
work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. 21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is
equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an
incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting
officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught
in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him.
However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable
doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your
possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found
another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no
money was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested by
the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for
ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for
it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of
the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the
request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust
operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.25 Its non-compliance will not render an accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 26 What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.27 In this particular case, it is undisputed that police
officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector
Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the
integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been observed. As
testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust
operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?

A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] in
substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights
and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not
immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of
the suspect.
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials.
Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of ₱100.00
peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the
marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets of
shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did you do [with] these 2
pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory. 28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which, in
the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking29 of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it
is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence
from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of
his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust
operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the
promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this
case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code31 and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,32 the laws that were applicable at the
time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is
life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the
said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under
its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice
of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years
old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the
appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows
the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of
Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may
be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided
that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in
the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be
graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under
special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and
should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses
punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised
Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the
minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with
the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation
of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in
the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the
former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the
former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a
special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature
and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said
Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the
Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the
penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article
71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under
paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or
even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the
proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid
anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy
therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in
their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the
former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case
consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and
reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There
could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.1avvphi1
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods
of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the
three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A
perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of
and is accordingly addressed to Congress.38
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty
should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being
no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40 The ISLAW is applicable in the present
case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death),
where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information, as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano
Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the
breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide
the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in
that the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one
could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification
and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts. The
accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa,
Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The
defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set
his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away
across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from
the rice filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other
side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for
a month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he
could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the
shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a
manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside
of the shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest
near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused
and the Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the
accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the
deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate the
accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused.
Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to be
found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have
something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I
shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I heard the
noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my companions
were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where
my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him
I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and
when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were
found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred.
The defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had
left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of
the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way
toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the
deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. It is
certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the
malecon, where his fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The
rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He
delivered it to the wife of the accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had
been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the
body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or
eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it
with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that
he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the
accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all
knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed
his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased
had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no
enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to
have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show
any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact
of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken
and the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or
intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of
a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or
accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm,
there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417;
Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed.
Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any
question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case
at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165): Where accidental killing is relied upon
as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was
intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But
where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional.
Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the
defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the
Cross case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be
submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which
constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from custody
ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172695 June 29, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Information1 dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was charged with the crime
of parricide, committed as follows:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y Completo, while conveniently armed with
illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife Consorcia
Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side of her neck causing the laceration
of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial thereafter ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the evening of November 5,
1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage due to "laceration of the jugular vein of her neck".
According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who conducted the autopsy
on the victim’s body, the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument like a nail". There is no dispute
likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife hitting her at the neck and causing her
instantaneous death. The letters written by the accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-in-
law, to his father-in-law, and lastly, the victim’s sister, speak so eloquently of someone who accepts the fault
for the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness from the close relatives of the victim is a clear
admission of authorship of the fatal act.
In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the fatal harm to his wife. This is
the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was
accidental.
xxxx
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of November 5, 1993, between
9:00 o’clock to 10:00 o’clock, the accused came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked
the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest.
But the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling and arrow from the house
ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of her x x x
daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the
accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the house of Consorcia,
and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia.
Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a
quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the accused’s version that he was practicing the
use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecution’s contention
that the shooting was intentional.
x x x To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the
incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused
was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the hospital and while on the
way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified that while the victim was being
attended to by the medical personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital premises, then
he disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside the comfort room of a
premises in an adjoining barangay. The accused’s omission to surrender himself to the authorities is a clear
indication of guilt.3
After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision, 4 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y COMPLETO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and hereby sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.5
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a Decision6 dated February 28, 2005, the Court of
Appeals denied appellant’s appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24 of Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Isaias Castillo y
Completo is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.7
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 16, 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his conviction was based did not
sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the prosecution failed to prove his motive in
killing his wife; or that they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident.
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who shot his wife with a deadly
arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all engaged in target
shooting using the sling and arrow. Hence, he surmised that any one of them could have shot the victim. At
any rate, even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not
intentional.
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining barangay, while his wife was being treated in the
hospital, likewise does not prove his complicity since the prosecution did not prove that he deliberately hid
inside the toilet.
Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law where he asked for forgiveness
should not be considered as admission of guilt.
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a
given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the guilty person.8 Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the
possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.9
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, are present.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence indubitably
established that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent behavior of her (Consortia) husband,
herein accused-appellant. And even if Consortia would not tell Leticia about the beatings, the latter would
see her face with black eyes as evident proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk and displaying violent
behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and unconscious, to be brought to the
hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound in the neck which fatally
lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the wound was a pointed object.
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister of Consortia asking for
forgiveness.
Also notable is accused-appellant’s behavior immediately after the incident. He disappeared and did not
enter the clinic where Consortia was rushed for treatment. And when Consortia’s sister later sought police
assistance in searching for accused-appellant, the latter was found by the police hiding inside a toilet at a
nearby barangay.10
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove motive in killing his wife. Intent
to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which his conviction rests. 11 Evidence to
prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors,
the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is presumed.12
In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill his wife:
First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and his wife. Leticia, the
victim’s sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent behavior of the appellant who would often
lay hand on the victim during their marital squabbles.
Guillermo, appellant’s father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident, appellant arrived in their
conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door and table and threw away the electric fan.
Guillermo tried to prevail upon appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and arrow which he
kept near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellant’s house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law, Yolanda, located about four
meters away; but he could still hear the victim and appellant arguing and shouting at each other. After a
while, Guillermo requested Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda met the appellant
carrying Consorcia soaked in blood.
Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature. 13 In the instant case,
appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed to the hospital. This is indeed contrary to human
nature. A husband is expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this case, however,
appellant took flight. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his
guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be
drawn.14
Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining barangay is not an
indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately hid in order to evade being
arrested.15
The contention lacks merit.
As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying wife, more so if his
absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation for his flight. In appellant’s brief, he claimed
that in "all probability, it might have happened that he (appellant) was merely answering the call of nature at
the precise time when he was arrested."16 However, we find it is highly illogical for appellant to go as far as
the adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially since he could do so inside the premises of the
hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was fearful of reprisal coming from the victim’s relatives 17 is
contrary to his claim of innocence.
Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellant’s intent to kill the victim. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the neck, a vital organ, which fatally
lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the
deceased manifests appellant’s intention to extinguish life.18
Fourth: As regards appellant’s act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and bringing her to the hospital,
the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an indication of an act of repentance or contrition on the
part of appellant.19
In fine, all these circumstances prove appellant’s intent to harm his wife.
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that he was not the one who shot the deadly arrow
because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all playing and practicing target
shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.
Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was alone with his wife inside
their house when the incident happened. This completely discounts the possibility that other than appellant,
there could be another person or persons who could have perpetrated the crime. There is no paucity of
evidence because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the victim up to the time Yolanda saw him
carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony of defense witness Galang supports the
prosecution’s contention that appellant was alone with his wife at the time of the incident. As noted by the
Court of Appeals:
Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies and headed home at about
9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00 p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being
rushed to the hospital. Instead of weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galang’s testimony even
supports the prosecution’s version that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night, accused-
appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably going home from that drinking session with his friends. x x
x20
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the
same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in the
instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this
exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.22
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s defense of accident must be struck down
because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the
legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury,
mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the standards as an
instrument for archery competitions. To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the use of said
weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s
testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.23
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of proof of establishing
the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to prove justification he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be
weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.24 Other than his claim that the
killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the same.
Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellant’s contention that the letters he wrote to his parents-in-law
and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
He claimed that he wrote the letters in order to explain that what happened was an accident and that he was
to be blamed for it because he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the sling and arrow.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be
settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some
wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise.25 Under the
present circumstances, appellant’s plea for forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.
Besides, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the killing of Consorcia was deliberate, and not by accident.
Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the lower court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze
and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal via certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional
matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. 26
Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, civil indemnity
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 were properly awarded by the
courts below.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 which
affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, finding
appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124058 December 10, 2003

vs.
JESUS G. RETUBADO alias "JESSIE," appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case
No. TCS-2153 convicting the appellant Jesus G. Retubado of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Emmanuel Cañon the sum of P50,000.00.
The appellant was indicted for murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on the 5th day of November, 1993 at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay I Poblacion,
Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Emmanuel Cañon with the use of unlicensed revolver of unknown caliber, thereby hitting the latter on
his forehead, resulting to the instantaneous death of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger
brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin.
He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner with his father.
Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr., The Cañons and the
appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted
an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain
considered the matter closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a day
and decided to go home after a day’s work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal and
Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial Luciño saw
him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The appellant
was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab which
nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house.
His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive.
Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the appellant continued following Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch. Emmanuel
suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The appellant told Emmanuel
that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the appellant that his son was already
asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead. The
latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The neighbors,
her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District Hospital, but the
victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar G. Arellano, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an autopsy on the
cadaver of Emmanuel and prepared a report thereon with the following findings:
Examination in Detail:
On detailed examination, a gunshot wound was found at the left side of the forehead, measuring 1 cm. in
diameter. At the skin surrounding this wound was found powder burns which measured 3 cms. in diameter as
the skin had been blackened and burned by powder of the bullet. The underlying frontal bone was fractured
and depressed. The underlying meninges of the brain as well as the frontal area of the brain was traumatized
and injured. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid were leaking from this wound. The edges of this bullet wound was
inverted thus this was the gunshot entry wound. The wound was found to be circular in shape. The exit
wound was found at the left parietal bone measuring 1.2 cm. in size or diameter for this wound
communicated with the entry wound of the left side of the forehead. The connection from the wound of entry
to the exit wound measured 8 cms. The parietal bone was fractured and was depressed and the parietal part
of the brain and meninges was traumatized. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid as well as brain tissues leaked out
from this wound.
Possible cause of death:
1. Gunshot wound at the head (left side) with injury to brain and meninges
2. Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe loss of blood)
(Sgd.) Ivar G. Arellano

MUN. Health Officer3
Dr. Charity Patalinghug and the victim’s daughter Loreta C. Claro signed Emmanuel’s Certificate of Death.4
The appellant surrendered to the police authorities but failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the
victim. Forensic Officer Myrna P. Areola of the PNP Regional Office subjected the appellant to paraffin tests.
The Chemical Analysis of the paraffin casts gave the following results:
FINDINGS:
1. POSITIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his left hand cast.
2. NEGATIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his right hand cast.5
Norberta also testified on the expenses incurred by her family due to her husband’s death. No documentary
evidence was, however, offered to support the same. She declared that she felt sad and lonely as a result of
her husband's death.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with due
care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victim’s death. He testified that when he insisted that
Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun with his
right hand. Emmanuel’s trigger finger was outside the trigger guard, and he held the firearm with the muzzle
facing downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant took hold of Emmanuel’s right hand with his
left, and pulled the gun towards Emmanuel’s stomach. The appellant grabbed Emmanuel’s free hand with his
right hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant
pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. The bullet hit
Emmanuel’s forehead. Norberta fled from the house. For his part, the appellant rushed to his house to
change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom. When he went back to
the dining room to get the gun, his younger sister, Enrica told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun.
He found Edwin outside their house near the church, and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun
into the sea. When the appellant asked his brother to show him where he threw the gun, Edwin refused to do
so.
Marcial Luciño corroborated the appellant’s testimony. He testified that he was talking with the appellant at
around 9:00 p.m. at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets when the victim Emmanuel passed by in his
pedicab. When the appellant called the victim, the latter ignored the call, prompting the appellant to chase
the victim, and eventually push the pedicab into a canal.
The appellant’s father, Iñigo Retubado, testified that on the evening of November 5, 1993, he was in their
house with Edwin, his son who was mentally-ill. It was already late when the appellant arrived. The appellant
was disheveled, and laid down the gun he was carrying on the table. The appellant told his father that he
would surrender to the police because he had shot somebody.6 The appellant thereafter went to his room to
change clothes while Iñigo went to the comfort room to answer the call of nature. When he was done, he saw
the appellant frantically looking for the gun. As Edwin was also nowhere to be found, Iñigo concluded that
Edwin might have taken the gun with him. He also testified on Edwin’s mental imbalance and on the latter’s
confinement at the Psychiatric Department of the Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City
sometime in 1991.7
On November 6, 1993, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Although he was required by the
municipal trial court to file his counter-affidavit, the appellant refused to do so.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. TCS-2153, convicting the
appellant of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder under Art. 248 R.P.C. and sentences the accused to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00.
However, accused is given full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I. First Assignment of Error THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED AS CAUSED BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF CAUSING IT
WHILE THE ACCUSED WAS PERFORMING A LAWFUL ACT WITH DUE CARE OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, IT ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING HIM JUST MERELY OF HOMICIDE INSTEAD OF
MURDER.
II. Second Assignment of Error THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VERY RELEVANT
AND MATERIAL CONTENTS OF EXHIBIT "B" OF THE PROSECUTION --- CHEMISTRY REPORT,
PARAFFIN TEST -- WHICH ARE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED.
III. Third Assignment of Error THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF
THE SOLE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION IS SATISFACTORY AND SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED OF MURDER.
IV. Fourth Assignment of Error THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ACCUSED HAS EXPLAINED WHY HE FAILED TO SURRENDER THE GUN WHICH HE GOT FROM THE
DECEASED.9
The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending himself when he grabbed the
victim’s hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the bullet hit the victim’s forehead. The
accident was not the appellant’s fault. The appellant asserts that when he wrestled with the victim for the
possession of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He contends that he had no intention of killing the
victim, as he merely wanted to talk to his son. If he had wanted to kill the victim, he could have easily done
so when he met the latter for the first time that fateful night of November 5, 1993. Moreover, the appellant
submits, he did not commit any felony; hence, under paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he
is not criminally liable for the death of the victim.10 In the alternative, the appellant asserts that he should be
convicted only of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is wanting. He and the victim had a heated exchange of words before they
grappled for the possession of the gun. Such heated discussion had already forewarned the victim and
placed him on guard; thus, treachery cannot be legally considered.
The contention of the appellant has no merit. Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. –
4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another provided
that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
The provision was taken from Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:
ARTICULO 8.
7. El que para evitar un mal ejecuta un hecho que produzca dañ en la propiedad ajena, siempre que
concurran las circumstancias siguientes:
Primera. Realidad del mal que se trata de evitar.
Segunda. Quesea mayor que el causado para evitarlo.
Tercera. Que no haya otro medio practicable y menos

perjudicial para impedirlo.
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not an accurate translation of the Spanish Penal Code.
The phrase "an injury" does not appear in the first paragraph in the Spanish Penal Code. Neither does the
word "injury" appear in the second subparagraph of the Spanish Penal Code.
The justification is what is referred to in the Spanish Penal Code as el estado de necessidad: Es una
situacion de peligro, actual o immediato para bienes, juridicamente protegides que solo puede ser evitada
mediante, la lesion de bienes, tambien juridicamento protegidos, pertenecientes a otra personas.11
The phrase "state of necessity" is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical theory of
criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril (un mal),
actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights (bienes juridicos)
such as right to life, honor, the integrity of one’s body, and property (la vida, la integridad corporal, el pudor,
el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another.12
It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the
party invoking the same.13
A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of necessity is
justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state of
necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not commit a crime in legal contemplation; hence,
is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil liability is borne by the person/persons benefited by the act of the
accused. Crimes cannot exist unless the will concurs with the act, and when, says Blackstone, "a man
intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful, the deed and the will act separately" and there is no
conjunction between them which is necessary to constitute a crime.14 Others are of the view that such act is
a cause for exclusion from being meted a penalty; still others view such act as a case of excluding the
accused from culpability.
According to Groizard, rights may be prejudiced by three general classes of acts, namely, (a) malicious and
intentional acts; (b) negligent or reckless acts; (c) acts which are neither malicious, imprudent nor negligent
but nevertheless cause damages.
Nuestra propiedad puede ser perjudicada, puede sufrir detrimentos por tres clases de hechos.1âwphi1 Por
actos maliciosos, intencionales, encaminados directamente a causarnos daño; por actos que, sin llevar ese
malicioso fin y por falta de prudencia, por culpa o temeridad del que los ejecuta, den ese mismo resultado, y
por actos que, sin concurrir en su ejecucion un proposito doloso, ni culpa, ni negligencia sin embargo
produzcan menocabo en nuestros bienes.15
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if such evidence is weak
but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved.
Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts by the trial court, its calibration of
the testimony of the witnesses of the parties and of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions
based on its own findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless
the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misapplied cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will change the outcome of the case. We have meticulously reviewed the records and find no
basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful
aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the
forehead.
First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch of their
house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the latter’s shoulders.
She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot the victim on the
forehead, thus:
Q Now, you said that when your husband was about to go out again in order to see his trisicad and as he
opened the door he saw Jesus Retubado near the door. What happened after that?
A He asked Jesus Retubado why Jesus Retubado chased him when he was driving his trisicad.
Q Now, as your husband was asking this question to the accused Jesus Retubado what was the distance to
your husband at the time?
A Just very near to him.
Q And you to the accused at that very moment what was more or less your distance?
A About an armslength.
Q When your husband asked Jesus Retubado why the latter chased him while your husband was driving his
trisicad what was the answer of Jesus Retubado, if any?
A My husband asked the accused Jesus Retubado what is his grudge to him and Jesus Retubado answered
that it is not you who has a grudge to me but it is your son.
Q When Jesus Retubado uttered that statement what transpired after that?
A He immediately pointed his firearm that he was bringing (sic) to my husband Emmanuel Cañon.
Q By the way considering that you were just near to both your husband and the accused where did that
firearm that you said was pointed by the accused to your husband come (sic) from?
A While the accused was standing in front of our door his hands were placed inside his T-shirt covered by his
T-shirt.
Atty. Pepito:
We move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive, Your Honor. The question was, where did it come
from?
COURT:
Let the answer stay in the record but let the witness answer again.
A From the hands of accused Jessie.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, just a while ago you were making a motion using your hand placed inside your T-shirt. Now, when
you saw the firearm for the first time where did you saw (sic) the firearm for the first time where did the
firearm come from as you saw it from the hands of the accused?
Atty. Pepito:
Already answered. It came from the hands of the accused.
Fiscal Pansoy:
I will reform.
Q Before you saw the firearm in the hands of the accused where did the firearm come from?
Atty. Pepito:
She is incompetent. We object.
COURT:
Reform the question.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, before this question was asked to you as to where the firearm came from you were
making a motion by placing your hands inside your shirt when you were only asked as to where the firearm
came from?
A That was what the position of the accused when he was standing in front of our door and I do not know
what was inside his T-shirt. I only know that he was carrying a firearm when it fired.
Q Now, when the accused pointed the firearm to your husband and fired the same more or less what was the
distance between the accused and your husband at the very precise time when the firing was made?
A It was just very near because his hand did not bend. (Witness demonstrating by pointing to her forehead).
Q Now, more or less, describe to the Court the approximate distance between the firearm that was pointed to
your husband and the forehead of your husband at the time when the firing was done?
A It touched the forehead of my husband.
Q That was the very time that you heard the gunburst?
A Yes.
Q When the accused fired the firearm that was carried by him, what happened to your husband?
A My husband fell down backward to the ground inside the house.
Q By the way, what was the flooring of your house where your husband fell backward to the ground?
A Cemented.
Q By the way considering that you were just very near to where the incident occurred can you describe the
length of the firearm that was used by the accused in firing your husband?
A It was a short firearm about 6 inches.
Q Now, as your husband fell down to the floor where did the accused proceed and what did the accused do?
A He was just casually walking away as if nothing had happened.
Q Now, what did you do to your husband, if any, after he fell down to the floor?
A I have done nothing because I was somewhat shocked. I could not move because I was shocked.16
Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the police
authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the victim. The
appellant’s claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to change his
clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the
victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea. The appellant never
presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the victim in a state of necessity.
Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.1avvphi1 The victim ignored the appellant as
the latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the poblacion of Tuburan. The
appellant was incensed at the effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The appellant followed the
victim to his house where the appellant again confronted him. The appellant insisted on talking with the
victim’s son but the victim refused to wake up the latter. The appellant, exasperated at the victim’s
intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt and shot the victim on the forehead. It was impossible for
the victim to survive. With the appellant’s admission that he shot the victim, the matter on whether he used
his right or left hand to shoot the latter is inconsequential.
We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present case to qualify
the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the
employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.17 The prosecution failed
to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned conditions. Thus, the
appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Although the Information
alleges that the appellant used an unlicensed firearm to shoot the victim, the prosecution failed to prove that
the appellant had no license to possess the same. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm to commit homicide should not be appreciated against the appellant.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned himself in to the
police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his arrest.
The trial court awarded ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity18 to the heirs of the deceased. In addition, the heirs
are entitled to moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.0019 and the temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of actual damages was offered.20
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Jesus G.
Retubado alias "Jessie" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and penalized by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten
(10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in
its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Emmanuel Cañon, ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150647 September 29, 2004
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and the
innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme Court
may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful reexamination convinces this Court that an
"accident" caused the victim’s death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses create a
reasonable doubt on appellant’s guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 28,
2001 Decision2 and the October 30, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–GR CR No. 18759.
The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 of Iloilo
City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The
assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner]
ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects."6
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any
justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting upon the
latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim
thereafter."7
The Facts
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent’s version of the facts as follows:
"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in
Concepcion, Iloilo.
"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the Concepcion
College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality
in December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by the Concepcion
Elementary School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with other School
Administrators. When his wife asked him, ‘Why will you be arrested?’ [H]e answered ‘[Even I] do
not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for
my arrest.’
"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary
Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar
Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.
"Later that day, about a little past 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant,
went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out,
purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa: ‘Let’s go to the
investigation room.’ The investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is
located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the
investigation room.
"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the
side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun
protruding from the holster.
"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation room, two
(2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still
holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet
away. When the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and
directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not provided) happened to be
at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma
examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for
he was dead.
"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an
autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
‘Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
‘Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by sutures,
surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior
midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially backwards from left to right,
penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and
thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture,
8th thoracic vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges, modified
by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel
(2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on its
widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From
anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into
penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas
and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially upwards, edges,
sutured, back, left side, level of 9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline,
110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.
‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest and

abdomen.
‘REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.’
"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboa’s body were gunshot
wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and
exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right.
As to the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was
probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and the gun must have been a little bit
higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of the ribs,
left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it
was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the gun’s nozzle to the right side front of the victim.
The distance between the entrance points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters."8
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them from the
trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to
the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:
"Erna Basa:
"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon; at
about past 2 o’clock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and
exchange of words which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the
door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun;
she was inside the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling
were two to three meters away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of
Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain
who pulled the gun. x x x.
"Eden Legaspi:
"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the investigation
room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 o’clock that same afternoon while there
inside, she heard a commotion outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the
commotion started they were seated on the bench and after the commotion that woman soldier
(referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and she saw two persons grappling for the
possession of a gun and immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place
where she was seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.
"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then
attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2
o’clock or past that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical
interrogation; as he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to
open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the
handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by the
police of Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked the
sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with
Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on
his waist; then as he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who
was two meters away from him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden
he held the handle of his gun with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and,
with that right hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold
of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he
used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right
hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled
and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun; more
grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was
to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was
drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already
loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during
the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used
his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other
and Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor
determine who of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying ‘stop that’ and he
saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer,
came, got his gun, and said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that
when his gun was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.
"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that happened
during the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of San
Dionisio and that case involves other persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he
had also the chance to invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t
was after he took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the interrogation;
when he took Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated
in the investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty meters, more or less,
from the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the commanding officer,
officer of the operations division and that of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the
victim tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked
the victim; the hand of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get
his gun; that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell
whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from the tip of
its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his gun was fully loaded and
cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed them and probably reported the incident to
their commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right
sense; when his commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took away his gun he
did not tell him anything.
"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas
Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he made an
autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with
trajectory medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach with
trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of his examination he saw this victim to be
wearing a light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see
or find any powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by
him to be powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the pocket of the
jacket of the victim."9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful in his
attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the
gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went off; it was
petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the
wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a
grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of Balboa
resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is not prone to
accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of
its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of
allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to
fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional because pressure on
the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire."11
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:
"[Petitioner’s] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been shot only
once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby
establishing [petitioner’s] determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even
assuming without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been followed
by another shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2)
times and was hit on two different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different
locations or angles, means that there was an intent to cause the victim’s death, contrary to
[petitioner’s] pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that the
location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of
what actually happened during the incident. x x x.12
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had miserably failed
to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion of the trial
court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the commission of the
crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate court in this manner:
"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official
must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his
purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there
is no abuse of public position.’ (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is
no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former fetched
the latter from the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner]
facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the said aggravating
circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the crime cannot be
sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved, the
maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty
imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x."13
Hence, this Petition.14
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioner’s conviction
despite the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to
petitioner’s overwhelming evidence to support his theory/defense of accident.
"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of the
petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full
control of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the
petitioner reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in
forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor general’s observation that the fact
that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioner’s determined effort to kill the victim.
"IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented when it
ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he
and the victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling ensued.
"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioner’s reaction to the incident
when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly argues against
his claim of accidental shooting.
"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in
determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at the victim
when the same was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-defense are
inconsistent.
"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages."15
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was
the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
are conclusive.16 Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But where some
facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn the erroneous
conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question
of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
‘4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intent of causing it.’"
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the fault
or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled. 17 Thus,
in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual standards
of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the
main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the
shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident firsthand.
Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon of January 4,
1990 as follows:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That
commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion which you
heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you were
inside the investigation room as part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking
somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this case?
Am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw both of
them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It was Sgt.
Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt.
Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the
possession of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboa’s hand was also there.
Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they
were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would touch each
other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was released
from its holster and then there was an explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because
the gun was turning.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one
holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was then
that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the handle
of the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front of Sgt.
Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoy’s right and Balboa’s left sides
[were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards each other.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun and the
right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held by
Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the gun with
his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same hand holding
the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore whose
hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, ‘Daw duha na sila nagakapot’, what you really mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have previously
said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoy’s right hand was still on
the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like
this (witness illustrating by showing his right hand with her left hand over her right hand as if
holding something. The thumb of the left hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its holster
and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up to the
time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand of Pomoy
was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab the handle of the
gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using his left
hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of Sgt.
Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir."18
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The
deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those
attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was categorically
asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully
engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the
victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively
be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the appellate
court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the left hand of the
victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead us to the
conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun." 19
Release of the Gun’s Safety Lock and

Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless released,
would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence showed that the
weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only mean
that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This conclusion appears to be non
sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied grappling
for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The
eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the course of
the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim that
the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45
caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question, explained how the
disputed second shot may have been brought about:
"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when
fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying
again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location
of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim
of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing
Balboa’s upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioner’s hand over the
gun; the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboa’s body as
he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioner’s hand x x x."20
Thus, the appellate court’s reliance on People v. Reyes41 was misplaced. In that case, the Court disbelieved
the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it over to the victim.
Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun accidentally fired in
the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic
pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes. 22 Unlike a
revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when
possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all frontal, the
appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that "if there
was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each other, the wounds
thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead to an inference that the victim
was shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta."23
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise moment
when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the existence of
variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes inconsequential.
Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction
of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon
fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic
scuffle shows that the parties’ positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely
aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because
the gun was turning."24
xxx xxx xxx
"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were
grappling for the possession of the gun force against force."25
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First, because the
position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons holding the
gun when it fired. This is especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession of the
gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.
"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the victim during the
grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit
Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45
pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun
down as he was going down. When the gun went off the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory
of the bullet in Balboa’s body was going upward because his upper body was pushed downward
twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination, petitioner
testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we separated from each other. This
sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were grappling over the gun and were
moving very fast. x x x."26
Presence of All the

Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due
care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no
fault or no intent to cause the injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the
time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the
victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the
law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a
detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his service
weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service
gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of
his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not
testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while being
fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the course of
the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the
release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the
victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of
petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s culpability.
Petitioner’s Subsequent Conduct Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident was
indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was "dumbfounded," according to
the CA; was "mum, pale and trembling," according to the trial court. These behavioral reactions supposedly
point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been
calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was
looking at his companion’s bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected of one in a state of shock at
events that had transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue: Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he
claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to kill.
On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend
oneself from imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against
any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’ attempts
to possess the firearm. Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun
of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,

vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of
presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest
Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in
the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he
is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the
prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not
a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property
gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by
Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of
their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9,
art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged
against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the
execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since
Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the
occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an
official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when
testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto
Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides,
from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing
would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without
force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the
Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be
one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is
not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according
to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit
the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984

vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Loreno y
Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery with Double Rape,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe, who are
still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose, did then and
there were Ifully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and intimidation upon the person
of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the members of his fully and on the occasion hereof,
while they were made lying flat on the floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away, without the
consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the following properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00

Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00
Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00
One One caserola 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00
Two cans of rice 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned
amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd design, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse
with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a plea
of not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by Par. 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided by
law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO
(2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias Monge in the
sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify Monica
Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment.
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each.
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio
Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single,
then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance to be
held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge, was
still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other
occupants present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years
old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fable. Cristina was then
vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp.
2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fable saw at
first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge
saving that there was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was in the sala, informing
him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the other in dark
sweater. came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed to
him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the
sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979
AM: pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp.
4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica to fetch
his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA",
which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her what she came to know about
camme visitors. Cristina Morgagor came attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back
by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. kitchen Elias
Monge turned to look at him the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all those inside the
on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a glass of water arid the latter
asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala Hence, fabie
himself outside inside the house to the the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he noticed the
man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked his
gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he wish pushed to go inside the
sala. Once inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable saw and recognized the man in red clothes these to
Estaquio loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized
Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All tile
occupants of the house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their
stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied them with
rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with which he and
Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together behind their backs. Thereafter, the man in dark
sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog away. Loreno held Fable and brought
him downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on the person of
Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors who remained on the
ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fable, and seeing the latter, he
kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fable
who managed to roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the
ground, and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and dragged
her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied, Inside the room,
Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was none. He
ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly removed her
pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle,
he was able to remove her panty and then made her he on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself,
he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his
organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do
anything to stop him from consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he was through with her, she
noticed blood in her private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct.
29, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle she put up
inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them, telling them not to
rise if they wanted to live, Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters room and then to the
teacher's room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the aparador and the trunk
respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata
Monge who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms were poured on the floor of the sala (pp.
7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose hair was
dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of the sala. He reached for a can
of pineapple j nice from the aparador and the sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he turned his
attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then rented by school teacher Miss
Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on
her but she resisted and struggled although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting
her on her right eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her.
When she regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he
had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (p. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM pp. 11-12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a third man entered
the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found instead a piece of
lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and when he returned
to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and he asked from Elias
Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied.
Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which
caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to the house of a nearby
neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to accompany Loreno who then held
Elias Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go
along. loreno desisted from his plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize the
Identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in dark sweater,
and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch her private parts.
One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man was approaching. Loreno
then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to breastfeed her daughter who was
continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the
things they robbed from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of
Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened to
them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the fence of the house
calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge replied from upstairs that he was not feeling
well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the others.
Fable then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized
Jimmy Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for the group that had just robbed them.
Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in dark sweater when
they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained on guard and could hardly sleep
(pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal properties:
jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one caldero of rice, P30.00; one
reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in
the amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the total of P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17,
tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a member of the youth
organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already known Loreno whose
occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place bobby traps in his (Monge's) place to catch
pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house, Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had
already known Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno
traverse the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where he was studying. Fable had also known
Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he
(Marantal) even married one of its members, He had engaged Marantal in conversations many times p. 3,
tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn,
Oct. 18-1979 AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful evening, Elias
Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC detachment in
Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing
along the ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors in tying him and his family during the
robbery-rape incident. He was given a written recommendation from the PC to the hospital with instructions
to have himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina Monge was informed that there
was no need for her to submit for physical examination because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company, stationed at
Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He was informed by
Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters were raped by the robbers
in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to Identify two of the robbers,
mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on that same
day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and
brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly Identified
upon confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica and
Cristina Monge, and their helper Fable. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to give their
written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of Elias Monge,
Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape incident. Upon being Identified
both said suspects told their victims ff they could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge replied that
what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family, The two suspects
retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6,
8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City, examined
Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was negative. But the doctor found him to
have sustained an external injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma, right cestal region" a close
wound, already spread out but and the process of healing, located on the right side of the middle portion of
the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as there was still slight
bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the corresponding medical certificate to Elias
Monge (Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital examined Monica Monge on
January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining her hymen, she found
fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations and, inserting her index
finger inside her patient's sex orifice, lt easily admitted her forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared
for spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory examination The doctor observed that the lacerations
did not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish and slightly
swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a
male's penis into the patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled that the laceration of the hymen heals after
five days. She also expeled that male spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72 hours.
She stated that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm must have
already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978 which was already beyond 72
hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM;
Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that
they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man
wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army
(NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be
killed. We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such
a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the
act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to
leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-
10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape
against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with
appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in
dark sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed
the gun to the victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn,
Oct. 30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno
positioned himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater
delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he
immediately positioned himself near the post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which
showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the
hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he
got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where
she was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to
point his gun to the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they
wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the
master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys
and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone,
without the threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater
consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the
floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the flashlight of
Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his flashlight on the
approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to
the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that Fable had recognized him and the
blows which he gave to Fable who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to
report his presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica
Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions
who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective
means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that Jimmy
Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts,
though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of
interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy
without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts
of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of
interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and
the degree of actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having
been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more than three
persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But,
for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With
costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127755 April 14, 1999

vs.
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual
guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the
heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.1
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John
Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the
occasion thereof shot and killed her.2
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, 3 Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong"
remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was
tried.
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent
Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of
Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance
of about one and a-half (1 1/2) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At
that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the
bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while
the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and
while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to
the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind
the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and
was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the
nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.4
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was
hired for P120.005 by a certain "Boy" Santos,6 his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would
drive him to a cockpit at the Bias Edward Coliseum.7 However despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos
directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario)
acceded.8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.9
Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where
Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and
grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong"
Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle
prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle "Jun"
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting,
"Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind del Rosario and
ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard
his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. 11
Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. 12 Del Rosario then went home.
13 Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the
barangay captain and the police. 14
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him to
death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of
threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among
co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with
Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not
considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules
of Court. 15
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12,
par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He
was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from
leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them
escape after the commission of the crime. 16
But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not be
considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because it fell
short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. 17
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does
not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my
act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not
only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 18
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed
man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun.
He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same
circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a
person whom he only saw for the first time that day. 19
Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was "Boy"
Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the head,
instantly killing her. 20 A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the testimonies of
witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran after the victim's helper
and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination —
Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that
time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag,
sir . . . .
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two
men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . . .
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by
the two men who grappled the same from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene
while the other man was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to the
ground, sir.
Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then
shot the woman who was then lying on the ground, sir . . . .
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.
Q: Will you please state before the the Court what you noticed from
the tricycle which was at a distance of about one and a half meter?
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . . .
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who
grappled for the possession of the bag?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else
happened?
A: They went away, sir . . . .
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did
these men sit in the tricycle?
A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver
while the other man entered the sidecar, sir.21
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene conducted by the
trial court, witness Alonzo categorically
stated —
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused
who was then holding the gun fired at the victim?
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other
companion holding a gun chased the helper of the deceased going
towards Burgos Avenue, sir.
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying
down in this spot the man holding a gun shot the victim, sir. 22
On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified —
Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?
xxx xxx xxx
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag
was given.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the
person with the gun?
A: Yes, sir. 23
On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that —
Q: . . . . On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the
tricycle as testified to by Eduardo Nalagon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the
Cathedral and the Nita's Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was
used by the assailants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?
A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.
Q: And what about Jun Marquez?
A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag
of the victim.
Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
Court: Did you not see any shooting?
A: There was, sir.
Q: Who was shot?
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . . .
Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that
what was transpiring was wrong and illegal?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?
A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle
prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you
see?
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez
and one in the possession of Boy Santos . . . .
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy
Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle
and when you tried to escape that was the time when Boy Santos
threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your
family?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?)
Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle
sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir. 24
On cross-examination, accused further stated —
Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while
Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . . .
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any
private persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun
to me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used
in shooting the old woman?
A: No, sir . . . .
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez
were grappling for the possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . . . 25
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot
leave the area where the incident occurred is because a gun was
pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you should
not do anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will
be killed also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle
which was loaded by your other three co-accused in this case, all of
them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim
going towards the public market along Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir. 26
Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at him and
threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez who shot the victim and
sat behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was grabbed,
her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot the victim and
then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, that the bag was given to a person who was inside the tricycle.
Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced
that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the
lady was chased "by the other man," and that this "other man" could not be "Boy" Santos who stayed inside
the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del
Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos stayed inside the
tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no
other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that
"Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he
saw the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy"
Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring
that he would not escape and leave them behind. 27
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-1/2) in front of the tricycle of
witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring
inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing
and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of
del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. 28
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him was real
and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the
moment an automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a
mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal liability since
by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the
crime scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario's conviction on his participation in the
orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. According to the trial court, del
Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between
accused and his passengers was evident because "while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper
of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del
Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;" 29 that the "accused did not
deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused in the
commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery,
killing and fleeing away from the scene of the crime." 30
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or
omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of
action and purpose" or for "common and joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could be shown by
"united and concerted action." 31
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in
utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of
minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy. 32 Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the
same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a
criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 33
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of the
getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no inkling
of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was
merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving
the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement
concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same." 34 Therefore, in order to convict
the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is insufficient
proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. 35 The only incriminating evidence
against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his
presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for
his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would be killed should he shout
for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly
participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed
the victim. 36
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer or to the
barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. 37 It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a
family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in
the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 38 As testified to by SPO4 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who
was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his cross-examination —
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in
the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and
who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver was
accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996.
On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's
location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these
findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy.
Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00
to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where
they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were
happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went
back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,
1996, and was only subscribed on May 22, 1996. All the while, he was detained in the
police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16,
1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done
with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. 39
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario
was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence
against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. 40
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41 This concept of custodial investigation has been
broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides
that —
. . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be
provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From
the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already under
effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario
had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his
actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and
the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of provides: 43
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro 44 we held that when a police officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since
the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the
act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested
on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence,
there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of
the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime,
a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into
custody has committed the crime. 45 Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these
requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not
immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was
arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.
However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo
because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any
objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this
case. 46
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property in the
process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we
must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other
persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has
been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his
co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of
any complicity in the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITO
DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVISED and SET
ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to
the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence
alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she
had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again
saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering
and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she
was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely
answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo
leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five
brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had
gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the
appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not,
the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her
lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of
blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in
her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living
maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous
relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had
killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was
not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the
appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he
maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of
man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at

least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes
are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be
in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held
liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another,
or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she
considers him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he
testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and
she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed
of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that
the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had
left the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be
as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth
were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied
having made any admission to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously
had fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being
then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or
difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer
earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or
learned from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not
aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or
dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting
circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so
as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to
respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If
by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it,
not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability
any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal
Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was
aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having
been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged
errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances
said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the
crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in
connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is exempt from criminal
liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year
of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover
knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love
should be born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January
31, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about four or five
brazas away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the
accused emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor
Valentin Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her, supported her and
aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what happened to her, she merely answered
that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano
Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage.
Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw the body of a newborn child near the path
adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a few moments before. Upon being informed of the
discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon being
asked whether or not the child shown to her was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an
autopsy had been made of the body, it was found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among young primiparæ who,
by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not
aware that they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne,
Precis de Medicine Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert,
Manual de Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in her
feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no
experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the child she was
carrying in her womb. Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which
brought her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to support herself and for being dizzy,
without suspecting that she was leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had given
birth when she was shown the already dead child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies, which
may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit
when the act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been exposed to the
rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed the crime of
infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision there is
deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from
dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently,
she could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to perish at
the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as
already stated, not knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful
physiological act, being natural — she might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be
considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the
pernicious consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her delivery, the accused
could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the rough weather or
of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be considered negligent because negligence is the omission to do
what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of
the compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot
contemplate complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be held that
the appellant lacked foresight because, having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not
foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result
of lack of skill because she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her
delivery, and as defecation is a natural physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural
physiological necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the
exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was
born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her
accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer
would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the
law to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive which
has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands. In the present case, what
the law requires of the accused-appellant, with respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not
abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her
dizziness resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and
her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or
insuperable impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the
child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its exposure to the
rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she had neither
deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the child.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was his answer?

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)

A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

AFFIRMED without costs.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

The instant appeal is anchored on the following:

xxx xxx xxx

A I went home already, sir. 4

The report then concluded:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —

The following are exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in

Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .

Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of

Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

Hence this appeal.

We find these arguments without merit.

G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

Version of the Defense

Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:

The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity."11

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Q: Did you hear what they talked about?

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. Nos. 147674-75 March 17, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,