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PeterOchs
A PragmaticMethodof Reading
ConfusedPhilosophicTexts:
The Case of Peirce's "Illustrations"
In 1878, Charles Peirce introduced a method for makingconfused
ideas clear. In this essay, I put Peirce's method to work as a method
for making confused writing clear, in particular,for clarifyingthe
meaning of confused philosophic argumentsas they appear in philo-
sophic essays. In Section I, I introduce the method as a Pragmatic
Method of Reading Confused Philosophic Texts. In Section II, I re-
view Peirce's 1877-78 "Illustrations of the Logic of Science"1 as
examples of confused texts. In Section III, I apply the Pragmatic
Method, reading Peirce's "Illustrations" as expressionsof fundament-
ally contradictory"leading tendenciesof thought." While it does not
resolve such contradictions,the PragmaticMethod rendersa confused
text clear by enabling us to read it as a collection of two "implicit"
texts,or two sets of meanings.
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252 PeterOchs
which rules, alone, our concepts find their meaning. What he later
calls the PragmaticMaxim is a rule forreforming
empiricistpracticeand
raising our apprehensionof intellectualconcepts to a thirdgrade of
clarity:
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Confused
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siderea the possibility that the religious principles which fix belief
and guide behavior may be governed by a logic that is irreducibleto
the distinctionhe makes between analytic and probable inferences.
He has thereforenot consideredthe possibilitythat scientificreasoning
need not be burdenedwiththe responsibilityof fixingbelief.
In "Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis/' Peirce suggeststhat
the rules of syntheticinferencemay also serve as models for under-
standing the fundamentalfaculties of psychology. His suggestionis
ingenious. Peirce's tendenciesto slide fromhis analysisof one entity
to another and to assimilate the charactersof one to the other are
a source of his creative insight;they encourage him to make con-
nections other thinkersmight not conceive of making. Employed
in the service of his a priorism, however,these tendencies can also
breed dogmatisms. It is one thingforPeirceto draw analogiesbetween
induction and habit, hypothesis-making and emotion, deduction and
volition. It is another for him to inferfromthese analogies - as he
does in the 1880's - that he can settledisagreementsin logic by claim-
ing that certain organic laws of the human animal urge one system
of logic as opposed to another. If he overburdenshis analogies in
this way, it is another sign of his assumingthat probable reasoning
must also fix belief and, therefore,that he must continuallyvalidate
his empiricalclaims by displayingtheirconsistencywithnecessaryrules
of reasoning.
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Thesis-type2a: "ScientificPragmatism"
I. The Norms of Reasoning: The normsof reasoningare the logica
utens displayed in particularpracticesof reasoning. These normsmay
be defined to three grades of clarity: first,identifyingthe normsby
providingconceptual labels for them; second, definingthem formally;
third, describingthe habits of belief and action throughwhich the
normsmay be interpreted.
I A. The Norms of ScientificReasoning. (1) These are rules for
gatheringinformationabout matters of fact, that is, rules of ampli-
ative reasoning.(2) The method of gatheringsuch informationis prob-
able inference,which is to identifythe object of inquiry with the
habit of action which displays sensible effectsbut which cannot be
identifiedwith any finitecollection of such effects. Scientistscollect
samples of such effects,offerinductivegeneralizationsofferedon the
basis of those samples, and then offerexplanatorytheoriesto account
for these generalizations. The theories are hypothetical inferences
about the characterof the object of inquiry as habit of action: that
is, about the probability that, given certain conditions, the object
would display certain characters. Scientists offerdeductions only in
the service of these probable inferences. By way of their probable
inferences,scientistsdefine the object of theirinquiryto a thirdgrade
of clarity.
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Thesis-type2b: "PragmaticConceptualismo
I. The Norms of Reasoning in General: All practicesof reasoning
display both rules of inferenceand guiding principles particularto
those practices and guiding principlesgeneral to all such practices.
Logicians identifythese principlesby explicatingthe presuppositions
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Drew University
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Philosophic
NOTES
Research time for work on this paper was made possible by a grantfromthe
Colgate UniversityResearch Council. I am gratefulfor the Council's generosity.
In revisingearlierdraftsof variouspartsof this essay, I have made use of helpful
commentsfrom Rulon Wells, Richard Robin, Tom Olshewskyand JerryBal-
muth.
1. Popular Science Monthly 12-13 (1877-78). In Writings of Charles
S. Peirce, 3, eds. Kloesel and others (Boomington: Indiana UniversityPress,
1986): pp. 242-338. Hereafter,referencesto the Writingswillbe to W + volume
and page number. Wherehelpful,I will also indicatecorresponding referencesto
the volume and paragraphnumberof the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce, eds. Hartshorneand Weiss (Cambridge: HarvardUniversityPress, 1934,
35).
2. The firstof the ' ♦Illustrations":
W3.242ff=5.358ff.
3. The second "Illustration":W3.257=5.388ff.
4. "A Surveyof Pragmaticism,"5.467: cl 907.
5. W3.266=5.403.
6. Cf. Thomas Olshewsky'sinsistencethat the Maxim is a "rule about
meaning" rather than a "theory of meaning": in "'Peirce's PragmaticMaxim,"
Trans.C S. Peirce Soc. XIX.2 (1983): 200.
7. I am followingRichard Smyth's lead here. In order to read the
PragmaticMaxim of 1878, he says he considers"the historicalcauses that are
known to have had an effecton Peirce's thinkingin this period. By appealing
to this type of evidence, I deliberatelyinvoke what I thinkis the spiritof the
pragmaticmaxim as it applies to the ideas of a deceased author: If you wish
to determinethe content of some fixed belief, considerthe circumstancesin
which the belief was firstoccasioned and any additional circumstancesthat
mighthave caused the belief to have been modified" in "The PragmaticMaxim
in 1878," Trans.G S. PeirceSoc. XIII (1977, pp. 94-lll):93.
8. Charles Hardwick,ed., Semiotic and Signifies,the Correspondence
Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby (Bloomington: Indiana
UniversityPress, 1977): p. 110. AfterBuczynska-Gorewicz,Kalaga definesan
"internal interpretant"as "the necessary element of the signifyingtriad, the
one which, itselfbeing a potentialsign,definesits own sign as "being interpret-
able" withina semiotic universe." He contraststhis with the "external inter-
pretant": "a way in which the actual understanding of the signmanifestsitself."
In these terms,I am examiningthe circumstancesin termsof which a text dis-
plays its "internalinterpreant." See Kalaga's "The Concept of Interpretantin
Literary Semiotics," Trans. C. S. Peirce Soc. XXII (1986:43-59):p.45. His
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Confused
Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series, E. Moore and R. Robin, eds. (Amherst:
The University of MassachusettsPress,1964): 304-322.
19. Examples of this kind of examination are Richard Rorty's Phi-
losophy and the Mirrorof Nature (Princeton,1979) and AlasdairMaclntyre's
AfterVirtue.
20. Goudge, The Thoughtof C. S. Peirce.
21. See The Senses and The Intellect (1855; repr. Frederick,Md.:
UniversityPubns. of America, 1978) and The Emotions and The Will (1859;
repr. U. Pubns., 1978); and Max Fisch, "Alexander Bain and the Geneology
of Pragmatism,"Journ.Hist,of Ideas XV (1954): 413-444.
22. As Smyth argues,Peirce tramed the PragmaticMaxim in Kantian
terms(see above, n. 7). Yet, Peirce fails to take responsibilityfor the method
of inquiryto whichthose termsbelong.
23. Marcus Singer makes a similarpoint about Peirces conflatingan
"Inquiry theory" and a "Belief theory"of truth. See his "Truth,Belief and In-
quiryin Peirce," Trans.C S. PeirceSoc. XXI (1985:383-406).
24. In 1903, Peirce criticizesthis claim: "My originalarticle carried
this back to a psychologicalprinciple.The conceptionof truth,accordingto me,
was developed out of an originalimpulseto act consistently,to have a definite
intention. But in the firstplace, this was not very clearly made out, and in
the second place, I do not think it satisfactoryto reduce such fundamental
things to facts of psychology" (5.28). Robert Meyers argues that Peirce is
objecting here to basing logic on "psychologicalgeneralizations1* but not "to
using psychological notions in logic." (See Meyers' review of Christopher
Hookway, Peirce, in Trans. C. S. Peirce Soc. XXII, 1986, pp. 327-338:332.) I
believe that Meyers understandsPeirce correctlybut also that Peirce's psycho-
logical "notions" may be more troublesome than Meyers suggests. In terms
of Peirce's science, these notions are a legitimatesource of analogicallyderived
abductivegeneralizationsabout the categoriesof a logic of inquiry,but there-
fore not a sourceof empiricalgeneralizationsabout thatlogic.
25. As interpretedby Peirce, De Morgan makes judgmentsof pro-
bability mere attributesof belief, which is equivalent to identifying our habits
of belief about a givenobject with some finitecollectionof concepts abstracted
fromthose habits. Similarly,Mill says the validityof inductiondepends on our
a priori conception of the uniformityof nature: in effect,suggestingthat our
inferencesabout mattersof fact rest on wholly a priori criteriaof validity.
Peirce's method of correctingthese conceptualistaccounts reflectshis method
of correctinga priori definitions. He argues that, just as the a prioristsought
to refertheir second-gradedefinitionsto the habits of belief from which they
have been abstracted,so De Morgan ought to referprobabilityto two terms
(belief and the amount of knowledge on which it is based) ratherthan one
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