People vs Pacayna Jr.

Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City.

Appellant claims that it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-defense, it
necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-month pregnant wife, and in the
process put to death their unborn child.

The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim; Angelina Paycana (Angelina),
appellant’s eldest daughter who personally witnessed the crime.

Facts

On 26 November 2002, at around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who worked as a butcher, came
home from the slaughter house carrying his tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener. His wife
was preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home from his work. For
reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times. Tito, whose house is at back of
appellant’s house, heard his daughter shouting for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying
prostrate near the door and her feet were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he
stepped back. Angelina told Tito by the window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and
stabbed her.

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed him first. According to
him, they had an altercation on the evening of 25 November 2002 because he saw a man coming out
from the side of their house and when he confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On
the following morning, he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things and
was on his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the knife from
Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not aware of the number of times he stabbed his
wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood was coming out of his wound.

The trial court found the appellant guilty for parricide with unintentional abortion.

RTC affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical evidence in the case.
Specifically, the number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all, indicates that appellant's act was no longer
an act of self-defense but a determined effort to kill his victim.

Issue:

WON is guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion?

Held:

Yes. The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 48 because by a single act, that of
stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony of
unintentional abortion. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies.

Under the article 48, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period
irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the
maximum penalty for the most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of Appeals
properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346.

The crime of parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key
element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a
spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be
taken as an admission against penal interest

As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion 25 are as follows: (1) that
there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus
dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is
necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence. 26
However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the
offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable. 27 In
the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code13 requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or
repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.14

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.
PEOPLE VS MORENO Y CASTRO

Evidence of overwhelming physical force is not necessary to sustain a conviction for the rape of an
imbecile. When the victim is a retardate with the mental age of a six-year-old child, the force required
to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult.

Jose Moreno y Castor was convicted for rape and was sentenced with reclusion perpetua in RTC Pasig
City.

Jose Moreno, a carpenter, and complainant Jocelyn Bansagales, a mental retardate, were neighbors in
Villa Tech, Palatiw, Pasig City. At the time of the incident, Jocelyn was twenty-six (26) years old. She
fondly calls appellant "Kuya Joe." In the afternoon of September 29, 1993, while Jocelyn was
laundering clothes, appellant approached and held her hand. He led her to a tricycle and drove off to
a rented house somewhere in Rotonda, Pasig. No one was in the house. Once inside, appellant began
to undress Jocelyn. Afterwards, he [lay] on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina and while
in this position, moved in an upward and downward motion. Jocelyn did not like what appellant was
doing to her. Terrified, she was forced to submission after appellant threatened that he [would] hurt
her some more. After satisfying his lust, appellant gave her twenty pesos (P20.00) and sent her home.

When Jocelyn's mother, Dolores, learned what had happened to her daughter, she immediately
brought her to the police station in Pasig City. When Jocelyn's mother, Dolores, learned what had
happened to her daughter, she immediately brought her to the police station in Pasig City.

Dra. Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer found deep healed lacerations and shallow healed
lacerations in Jocelyn's hymen. These lacerations, according to her, could have been caused only by
sexual intercourse.

Dra. Ester Regina Servando, a resident on training in Psychiatry at the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) also examined Jocelyn was diagnosed to have moderate mental retardation. This
condition is permanent and I.Q. range is between 35-50. Patient['s] mental age is equivalent to 6
years old.

The defense presented the accused himself who denied that he ever had any sexual intercourse with
the complainant. According to the accused's version, it was Jocelyn Bansagales who came to his house
while he was sleeping and who woke him up by mashing his penis. Furthermore, it was stated by Jose
Moreno that he only went as far as kissing, hugging and "fingering" the complainant. He denied
inserting his penis nor [sic] that he ever attempted to insert his penis inside the vagina of the victim.

RTC found the accuse guilty of rape under paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
because the offended party, having a mental age of six years old, was deprived of reason.
Alternatively, the accused is liable under paragraph 3 of the same article because at the time she was
raped, Jocelyn Bansagales [was] in the same category as a child below twelve years of age for lacking
the necessary will to object to the accused's lewd design.

Issue:

WON the court erred in convicting the accused on a ground other than that which has been alleged in
the complaint.

Ruling:

No.

Court has ruled that "an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be a violation of this constitutional right."

We concede that appellant cannot be convicted under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, appellant is here being convicted under paragraph 1, not paragraphs 2 or 3, of
Article 335.

Jocelyn's testimony clearly proved that appellant, by means of force and intimidation, had carnal
knowledge of her against her will.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed thus:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present

The force necessary in rape is relative, depending on the age, the size and the strength of the parties.
18 Hence, it has been held that "for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force and intimidation

employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, it is only

necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused
had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule
PEOPLE VS BOLATETE

On September 1, 1995, Reyah Lea Guivencan filed separate complaints accusing her stepfather
Melanio Bolatete of three counts of statutory rape.

Complainant testified that appellant is her stepfather, married to her mother Pedrita; she was raped
by appellant several times but could only remember three specific dates; the first date fell on the
second week of June 1993; she could recall this date because it was enrollment period

Another date complainant remembered was August 3, 1994. She particularly remembered this date
because it was the day after her brother Rogelio's birthday. She did not cry for help as she was afraid
of appellant who threatened that he would bring her two brothers with him to Cotabato.

The third date was sometime in the third week of March 1995. She recalled this date because it was
the last time appellant raped her. On that day, her mother, who was leaving for Tagbilaran City,
fetched her from the house of her neighbor, May Manliguez, and asked her to take care of her
brothers in their house. Appellant was in Tagbilaran City where he worked as a carpenter. However,
about noon, appellant arrived home drunk. He then undressed complainant, removed her panties and
proceeded to rape her. This time, appellant penetrated his penis deep into her vagina. She was then
11 years old.

After this last rape incident, complainant finally sought help from Zenaida Milay who brought the
matter to the attention of Helen B. Ho, a DSWD social worker.

The accused denied all the charges against him. He stated that Reyah had been living with Anastacia
Manliguis, the aunt of his wife, since the first week of January, 1995 until the last week of April, when
she was asked by her mother to stay in the house as she, together with the accused, was going to
Cebu. He admitted that Reyah was living in their house in August 1994 and in June 1993. The accused
claimed that he was accused by Reyah of three counts of rape because Reyah is a carefree child
("lakwatcha"), used to climb trees, and was always reprimanded for her wrong-doing.

The defense presented Pedrita Bolatete, the mother of the victim, who corroborated Melanio's
testimony.

Issue

WON the court erred in convicting the accused and penalizing him to death without giving credit to
his evidences.

Held

No.
SC affirms that accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the three counts of rape as charged.
However, the penalty imposed should be modified.

The first rape occurred in June 1993; the second on August 3, 1994; and the third in March 1995.
Statutory rape as defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetual
even after the amendment introduced by R.A. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993.
Although it was established that the accused is the step-father of the victim, this qualifying
circumstance was not alleged in the criminal complaints upon which the accused was arraigned.

Melanie was born on November 4, 1983i. She was accordingly nine (9) years and seven (7)
months old at the time of the first rape incident on June 1993, ten (10) years and eight (8) months old
at the time of the second rape incident on August 3, 1994, and eleven (11) years and four (4) months
old at the time of the third rape incident in March, 1995. She was clearly less than twelve years old at
the time of the three rape incidents subject of her complaints.
Rape is defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
This Court has held that if the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes
immaterial, not only because force is not an element of statutory rape ii but the absence of free
consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. The two elements of statutory rape are: 1)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and 2) that the woman is below twelve years of
age. Sexual congress with a girl under twelve (12) years old is always rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO ALCOREZA y MARCELINO

IRENEO ALCOREZA y MARCELINO was charged with rape by his 14-year old stepdaughter ESTRELLA
MANILA and two (2) counts of statutory rape by his 11-year old stepdaughter MARY JOY MANILA.

On September 21, 1997, 11-year old MARY JOY was left in their house with the accused. Her siblings
were then in church. The accused called Mary Joy into the bedroom. When she entered, accused
wasted no time and forcibly took off her shorts and panty. He then removed his shorts. He pushed
Mary Joy on the bed and mounted her. He kissed and embraced her and inserted his penis into her
organ. She could not shout as the accused threatened to kill her if she did. All she could do was cry.

On September 27, 1997 Mary Joy again found herself alone in the house with the accused. The
accused called Mary Joy into the bedroom. When the accused mounted her, his penis touched her
organ but he failed to insert it as he heard her 8-year old brother, Benito, arrive. The accused
immediately pushed her away and put on his clothing. Benito, however, still saw Mary Joy naked on
the bed. Before the accused left, he warned her that if anyone should ask, she should never reveal
what he did to her.

The following day, Mary Joy sought the assistance of her sister Fernanda and revealed to her the
sexual ordeal she suffered in the hands of the accused. Fernanda then accompanied Mary Joy to the
house of their grandfather BENITO GONZALES.

Benito then assisted Mary Joy in filing his complaint with the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When they
returned to the house, Benito learned that the accused had also been molesting his other
granddaughter ESTRELLA MANILA since the latter was eight years old.

On October 28, 1996, Estrella was sleeping in their bedroom together with her 3 siblings. They kept
their bedroom door open as the accused forbade them to lock it. Estrella sensed the presence of the
accused in their room when he laid down beside her. The accused then repeatedly tried to remove
her shirt and lower her shorts but she resisted. The movement awakened Melita who was sleeping in
the other room. Sensing that he might be caught, the accused hurriedly stood up. Melita then entered
the bedroom and asked the accused what he was doing there.

Estrella turned to her grandfather Benito for help as Melita (her mother ) did not make good her
threat to report the rape incidents to the police authorities. Estrella also learned that the accused was
also raping her younger sister Mary Joy. Benito assisted Estrella in filing a complaint for rape and
accompanied her to the hospital for medical examination.

The accused, a 49-year old jeepney dispatcher, simply denied the rape charges of Estrella. He
claimed that on October 28, 1996, at about 10:00 p.m., he was sleeping with his wife in their house,
while Estrella and her siblings were sleeping in the other room. He claimed that the alleged victims
could have filed the cases against him as he would spank them once in a while. He theorized that
Benito Gonzales, Melitas father, could have also plotted against him and used his granddaughters to
file trump up charges of rape. He alleged that Benito was opposed to his marriage to Melita as he was
poor. It could also be that Benito harbored ill-feelings against him when he ceased to give him
financial support.

As to the rape charge of Mary Joy, the accused proferred an alibi. He claimed that on September 21,
1997, he was out of the house collecting funeral contributions from the jeepney drivers to be given to
one of their members.

The defense presented the accused wife, MELITA GONZALES y ALCOREZA disclaimed knowledge
about the sexual assaults on Mary Joy as she was not in their house on those two dates.

The trial court found the accused guilty only of attempted rape in the case of Estrella and sentenced
him to an indeterminate penalty. However, on the two counts of statutory rape filed by Mary Joy,
the accused was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

Issue:

WON the court erred in convicting the accused with attempted rape and 2 counts of statutory rape
and sentencing the accused with death penalty.

Held:

For attempted rape, SC held that the accused is only guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code.

As recounted by Estrella, the appellant surreptitiously entered her bedroom and laid down beside
her. He repeatedly tried to pull down her shorts and panty but he failed as she resisted. He also tried
to remove her shirt but he was able to lift it only up to her abdomen as she would lower it again. The
appellant touched her private parts. These acts, as described by Estrella, are insufficient to prove
that the appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of Estrella. He did not lie on top of Estrella or
even made the motion of removing his underwear. In fact, he kept his clothes on during the entire
time that he was in the bedroom. Neither does it appear that he tried to insert his finger or any
object into the genital or anal orifice of Estrella. All that the appellant was able to do was touch her
private parts. From the circumstances thus proved, the appellant can only be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness.

For the 2 counts of statutory rape, SC modified the decision as follows.

For the first incident, SC held that accused is found guilty of simple statutory rape and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused can be convicted only of simple statutory rape and, accordingly, the penalty of death
imposed against him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Information alleged that the
appellant raped his 11-year old stepdaughter Mary Joy. The qualifying circumstance of minority of
Mary Joy was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the presentation of her birth certificate. However,
the relationship between the appellant and Mary Joy was not established with the same degree of
proof. Although the prosecution established that Mary Joy was the daughter of Melita, it failed to
offer the marriage contract of the appellant and Melita which would establish that Mary Joy is the
stepdaughter of the appellant. The testimony of Melita and even the admission of the appellant
regarding their marriage do not meet the required standard of proof.iii The Court cannot rely on the
disputable presumption that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, they are
presumed to be married. Relationship as a qualifying circumstance in rape must not only be alleged
clearly. It must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself.

For second incident, the SC found the accused guilty of attempted rape.

The testimony of Mary Joy shows that the appellant failed to consummate the crime of rape as his
penis merely touched Mary Joy’s organ.
In People vs. Campuhan, the Court clarified that mere touching of the private organ of the victim
should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the femal organ
and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or pudendum. x x x Thus, touching when applied to
rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis x x x.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into
the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape. As the labias are required to be touched by the penis, which are by
their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch with the penis is
to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence the conclusion that touching the
labia majora or minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by
removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other
than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus, his penis
merely touched Mary Joy’s private organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is
attempted rape.
People vs Hermocilla
The records show that M was born out of wedlock on May 30, 1989 to S1 and L.2 After they
separated, M stayed with her mother L who subsequently cohabited with appellant. Sometime in
1999, while M was preparing dinner, appellant suddenly grabbed and pulled her to the bed. He ripped
off her shorts and underwear and made her lie on the bed. After undressing himself, appellant
inserted his finger into Ms vagina then penetrated her with his penis. M cried and begged appellant to
stop.

Thereafter, appellant would insert his finger into Ms vagina whenever her mother is out of the house.
Such abuse temporarily ceased when M lived with her father S in Baguio City. But when he left to
work abroad, M went back to live with her mother and appellant. The abuse resumed and culminated
in a second rape incident which took place sometime in 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning their
house, appellant suddenly grabbed and pulled her towards the bed. He took off her clothes,
undressed himself and inserted his finger into her vagina.

Sometime in December 2004, appellant furiously hit M on the head and chased her out of the house
with a bolo because she resisted his advances. M fled but appellant caught up with her and forced her
to come back to the house. When M went to school the next day, her cousin saw her crying. M
eventually broke down and revealed her ordeal.

The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death for each count.

Issue
WON the testimony of M is credible because she failed to confide the alleged rape to her mother,
father and grand father despite the opportunities to do so.

Held

The court found M’s testimony to be credible.

Time and again, we have held that when a woman, more so if a minor, states that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. For no woman, least of all a
child, would weave a tale of sexual assaults to her person, open herself to examination of her private
parts and later be subjected to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape. In the
rape incident committed in 1999, the prosecution proved that appellant had carnal knowledge of M
by inserting his penis into her vagina through force and intimidation. Under Art. 266-B, in relation to
Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in Family Case No. A-435.

The second incident committed in 2002 whereby appellant inserted his fingers into Ms vagina likewise
constituted rape through sexual assault. In People v. Palma,3 we held that the insertion of the
appellants finger into the victims vagina constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under
Republic Act No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 which in part provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellant,
vs.
ROBERTO ABAY y TRINIDAD, Appellee

Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.