G.R. No.

L-13479 October 31, 1959

MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Facts:
The Tiburcios, the petitioners in this case, filed an action on October 11, 1957 before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City alleging that they and their ancestors have been in actual,
adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of a parcel of land located
in Quezon City containing an area of about 430 hectares.

The petitioners also alleged that in 1955, People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began
asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 embraces practically
all of petitioner's property, while the other respondent, University of the Philippines “U.P.” began
also asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the
remaining portion; that defendants are not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice of
plaintiff's actual possession and claim for ownership thereof.

Subsequently, on October 31, 1957, University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that it is barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court ruled in favour of U.P. prompting the petitioners to make an appeal.

Issues: 1.) Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s complaint on the ground
of lack of sufficient cause of action
2.) Whether the defendants are innocent purchasers for value

Ruling:
1.) No. It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation
of the Torrens system since 1914 and in 1955, defendant People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of
plaintiff's property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favour.

In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what they
now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the name
of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and
jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the
ground of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38,
Act No. 496; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp.
1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within
to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof
becomes incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year
the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within which a
claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action may be instituted
beyond the one-year period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to
guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40
Phil., 520).

2.) Yes. The land in question is covered by Torrens title. There is nothing in the complaint
to show that when it acquired the property it knew of any defect in the title appealing on its face
in the form of any lien or incumbrace. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be purchasers
for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the law.

The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property.
He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the
register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects
of the Torrens System." (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105
Phil., 622; Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
 G.R. No. L-24114 August 16, 1967

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION and UNIVERSITY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, ELPIDIO
TIBURCIO, JOSE SALVADOR, SIMPLICIO SALVADOR, MARCOS SALVADOR, PIO
TIBURCIO, PETRONILO TIBURCIO, EMETERIO TIBURCIO, EULALIO TIBURCIO,
VERONICA TIBURCIO, DONATA TIBURCIO, MARGARITA TIBURCIO, CARMEN
TIBURCIO, SEGUNDA TIBURCIO, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:
The case stemmed from five orders issued by the respondent where the private respondents
herein, as complainants, asked for the annulment of Original Certificates of Title 730 and 735 in
the name of the Tuasons, and of Transfer Certificates of Title 16263, 9462 and 1356 in the names
of the Varsity Hills, Inc., the U.P. and the PHHC, respectively, aside from damages, on the ground
that these titles are fictitious and were issued in violation of Act 964. The Tiburcios alleged that
they are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City and that they (and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, peaceful, public, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said land from prior to 1877 up to the present.

The PHHC and U.P. filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action has prescribed and/or is barred by laches, among others. The respondent judge denied their
motions to dismiss and later on issued an order enjoining the PHHC from driving away the private
respondents and their children from the land subject-matter of the civil case.

The PHHC filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent judge.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending that respondent judge
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues: Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss?

Ruling:
Yes. We hold that the respondent court did abuse its discretion in not dismissing the
complaint in CC 5572 in so far as the U.P. and the PHHC are concerned, in the face of the obvious
conclusion that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, laches, and prescription.

Our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within which to review the
decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof become
incontrovertible (Section 38, Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the
period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within which a claimant
may ask for its revocation.
 Assuming arguendo, that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as
contended, their right however to bring the instant action may be considered barred by laches for
not having taken the action seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens
system. It appears that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it
was only on October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the
present action.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is granted, and (1) the orders of June 1, 1961, March
30, 1963, June 5, 1963, July 20, 1965 and September 28, 1965, are annulled and set aside; (2) the
writ of preliminary injunction issued per our Resolution of July 24, 1967 is made permanent; (3)
the respondent court is ordered to dismiss the reamended complaint as against the petitioners U.P.
and PHHC; and (4) all the private respondents Elpidio Tiburcio et al., their agents, and any person
or persons acting in their behalf, are hereby ordered (a) to withdraw from the Bureau of Lands
their application for the approval of Survey Plan SWO-40888, and (b) to cancel any and all existing
subdivision plans and to desist from making any further subdivision plans respecting any portion
of the land covered by TCTs 9462 and 1356. Costs against the private respondents.
 G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 81,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, respondent.
Facts:
On October 19, 1990 Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for specific performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP). INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale, IDP
sold to it two (2) parcels of land. The parties agreed that IDP shall evict all squatters in the property
within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract. IDP failed to fulfil this obligation.
Hence, INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its and to pay damages to INK.
In IDP’s defense, it alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying
the payment of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the court granted except INK’s prayer for
damages which was to be resolved later.

On January 22, 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia
Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP,
be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration
of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered
because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated
requests. The trial court granted the motion but later on reconsidered its order by directing
petitioner Ligon to deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Ligon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the
two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed the orders of the trial court.
Ligon elevated the case to the Supreme Court alleging that the trial court erred in ruling
that it had jurisdiction over petitioner and inholding that INK has a superior right to the possession
of the owner's copies of the certificates of title.

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner and inholding
that INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the certificates of title.

Ruling:
No. The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court
was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well
within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. When IDP, the defendant in the trial
court, did not question the genuineness and validity of said deed of sale and its obligations
thereunder, the summary judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also
an exercise of its general jurisdiction.

Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel
the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for
the registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary
incident to the main case. When the sale of the property was upheld by the court in its judgment
and the defendant was directed to comply with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to have
the same registered with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its
right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the surrender of the certificates
of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they may therefore take
cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction.

The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the
certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender
of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be
registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Thus,
all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or
without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the property. It
is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds
as ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her
 G.R. No. 149992 August 20, 2004
HI-TONE MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BAIKAL REALTY CORPORATION and ALEJANDRO R. VILLANUEVA, in his
capacity as Register of Deeds of Cavite, respondents.

Facts:
On 22 February 1995, Baikal Realty Corporation ("Baikal Realty") filed a petition for
mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the
RTC of Cavite to compel the Register of Deeds of Cavite ("Register of Deeds") to register two
deeds of absolute sale covering two parcels of land, separately executed by Honorata Hernale and
Benjamin Agrabiador in favor of Baikal Realty. The parcel of land purportedly sold by Honorata
Hernale is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2292 of the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite and denominated as Lot 5765-A. According to Baikal Realty, the Register
of Deeds refused to register the subject deeds of absolute sale despite the former’s compliance
with all the requirements for registration. On the day following the filing of the petition for
mandamus, respondent Judge Jose J. Parentela issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
commanding the Register of Deeds to desist from recording or annotating any transaction affecting
the properties covered by TCT No. T-2292 and No. T-27163.

On 28 March 1995, petitioner Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation ("Hi-Tone") filed a Motion

for Intervention, claiming to be the lawful and registered owner of the parcel of land subject of the
deed of sale executed by Honorata Hernale and sought to be registered by Baikal Realty. Hi-Tone
claimed that it was only on 28 March 1995 that it learned of the petition filed by Baikal Realty.
Hi-Tone presented its TCT No. T-11258 (Cavite) also covering Lot 5765-A and reciting the same
technical description found in Hernales’ TCT No. T-2292. The respondent judge denied Hi-Tone’s
motion for intervention for failure to comply with the three (3) - day notice rule. Hi-Tone orally
moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.

In an order dated 29 March 1995, the trial court directed the Register of Deeds to register
the subject deeds of absolute sale and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of Baikal
Realty.

On 31 March 1995, Hi-Tone filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Admit
Opposition, but on 20 April 1995 hearing, Hi-Tone’s counsel manifested that it was withdrawing
its motion for leave to intervene and would instead file an independent case. The trial court granted
the withdrawal.

On 21 April 1995, Hi-Tone filed a Petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals. It imputed grave abuse of discretion to respondent judge in and prayed
for the nullification of the questioned order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the
ground that Hi-Tone is not a party to the case, therefore, has no personality to participate, much
more to question the orders issued therein.

On 26 May 1995, Hi-Tone filed its Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that its petition,
though styled as a petition for review on certiorari, was in substance a petition for annulment of
judgment. The petition being such, Hi-Tone claimed it had personality to file it since under the
rules a person who is not even a party to the judgment may sue for its annulment. The Court of
Appeals did not grant the motion stating that the petition was not merely for annulment of a
Regional Trial Court judgment, but rather it made out an action for reconveyance which falls under
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue: Whether the petition before the Court of Appeals is a petition for annulment of judgment
or an action for reconveyance

Ruling:
An action for annulment of judgment is grounded only on two justifications: (1) extrinsic
fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. The purpose of such action is to have
the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. On the other
hand,an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of
land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose
of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. Its aim is to show that the person
who secured the registration of the questioned property is not its real owner. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.

Far from seeking conveyance, the thrust of Hi-Tone’s petition is to annul the judgment or
order in favor of Baikal Realty for the purpose of securing the preservation of its title and the
vindication of its right to the disputed property. Working in its favor are the available twin grounds
of due process violation and extrinsic fraud. On the other hand, Hi-Tone has never sought as a
relief the transfer of the title to, or the recovery of the possession, of the property. According to
the record, it did not have to as its title has remained valid and it has not lost possession of the
property.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 02 May 2001 and
Resolution dated 14 September 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38117 entitled
Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation v. Honorable Jose J. Parentela, Alejandro Villanueva and
Baikal Realty Corporation are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 29 March
1995 and the Decision dated 08 August 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite at Trece
Martires City, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. TM-582 are SET ASIDE. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-542567 (Cavite) covering Lot 5765-A in the name of Baikal Realty Corporation is
declared VOID. Costs against the respondent corporation.