EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS

A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

ONG CHIA vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 127240 March, 27, 2000

FACTS: The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to state all his former place of residence
in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7 and to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner
admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with §7.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief without having been presented
and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal
of the Trial Court’s decision.

HELD: YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.

It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s argument
of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the
opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right
to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

ZULUETA vs CA

253 SCRA 699 (1996)

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check,
diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means
are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD: Indeed. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because
it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a
"lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE vs SALAFRANCA

G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012

FACTS: Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993,
after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño
to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital
on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed
him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical
attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

ISSUE: Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

HELD: Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.

Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be admitted when the
following requisites concur:

(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;

(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death;

(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and

(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim.

All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as the person who had
stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his impending death. Bolanon died in the
emergency room a few minutes after admission, which occurred under three hours after the incident.
 Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence when the following
requisites concur:

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he gave the identity of the
assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time to contrive his identification. His
utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to such startling occurrence. The statement was relevant
because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae for having borne the
requisites of the both principles.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA

G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001

FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo
(Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of
P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the
remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of
the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.

SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but
notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.

SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which
SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute
amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to
try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be
sued in this present action;

2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984
together with a statement of account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting
through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13,
1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to the plaintiff and
to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times
due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but
each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have
waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.

2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required by law.

3. Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.

HELD:

1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts,
which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as
to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied. Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is
excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right
of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that
the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated
failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several
opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial
court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late
for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and
Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been
made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 4
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission
by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late
for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient
to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other
forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it
held petitioner liable on its obligation.

B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BANAL

G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of agricultural land situated in
San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the
PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just
compensation.

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in another case
pending before it.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in another case pending
before it and applying the same to the present case without conducting a hearing and without the knowledge or
consent of the parties

HELD: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They
may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not
obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts.
In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a
court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of
a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.” (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.