EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NATURAL JUSTICE : THE

ULTIMATE RELIEF
S.N. Jain1'
I Introduction
A JUDICIALLY created confusion is that failure of natural justice
makes the administrative decision either void or voidable—the over-
whelming view being the former—and to judge the fate of an administ-
rative decision by applying these appellations. This sterile way of solving
the controversy leads to confusion and ambiguity as the situations where
natural justice has to be applied are diverse, and the same result may not
be desirable both from the point of view of social policy and the individual
in all such situations. The nature and quality of administrative decisions
vary and so also the ultimate result should vary when failure of natural
justice has occurred.
If the concept of nullity or voidness is mechanically applied, then the
consequences of quashing an administrative decision will be that the party
will always have to be relegated to his original position, but the cases indi-
cate that this has not been so and rightly so. It may not be physically possi-
ble to restore the party to his original position for several reasons. The
property under dispute may have been already destroyed as a result of
administrative action, or because of the lapse of time it is physically impos-
sible to restore the original position, e.g., when a student expelled from
the college gets the relief after a lapse of considerable time when the acade-
mic session has already ended or is almost to end, or the situation has so
fundamentaly changed that restoring the party to the original position will
create administrative crisis or paralyze administration, adversely affecting
public interest, e.g., dissolving a democratically elected body and appoint-
ing someone else to take over its administration or ordering new elections.
Further, the administration is not generally debarred from taking the same
action again removing the deficiency of hearing. In such a case public
interest may require that the original position may not be restored for if
it is done the party may so act that it frustrates the ultimate adverse action
after hearing. Then the court may decline to make a consequential order
on quashing an administrative order if it is futile, or the authority may
pass immediately a fresh order under the powers given to it by the statute as
the original order, making a contrary order ineffective.1
It has been argued elsewhere by the author that the judicial invention
of vague and uncertain concepts as of ''void" and "voidable" is not
* LL.M., S.J.D. (Northwestern), Director, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi.
1. E.g., the situation of impounding a passport as in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1978 5-C 597,
 14 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 26 : 1 & 2

happy.8 There was no compelling necessity for the courts in India to adopt
these English concepts.2 But since the House of Lords did so in Ridge v.
Baldwin? we cannot escape the mesmerizing influence of that august judicial
body.
The terms "void" and "voidable" are the terms which basically find a
place in the law of contract. Even under that law there are no uniform conse-
quences which flow from the same. For instance, minor's contracts are void,
but the consequences of voidness depend upon such factors as whether the
minor is a mortgagor or mortgagee, whether he is a purchaser of immov-
able property, whether he is a promisee or promisor, whether he is a seller
or purchaser of movable property, whether the action of the minor is fraudu-
lent, etc.4
In answering the question as to what relief the individual is entitled to
at the hands of the court when failure of natural justice has occurred, it is
that pragmatic considerations should prevail rather than trying to answer
the question by applying such obtuse words as "void" and "voidable" or
conceptual logic. Let us consider a few situations under two separate cate-
gories : (i) Failure of the audi alteram partem rule; and (ii) failure to give
reasons.
II Failure of audi alteram partem
(i) Disciplinary action against public servant
In the case of failure of natural justice in any case the court will quash
the order and ordinarily remit the matter to the concerned body to decide
it again after a fresh hearing.5 This has been so in the case of disciplinary
cases as well,6 but it is not an invariable rule and in a suitable or an excep-
tional case, the court may prohibit the concerned authority from holding
a fresh enquiry.7 In Union of India y. M.B. Patnaik* the court prohibited
a fresh inquiry having regard to the long lapse of time of 20 years since
the alleged offences were committed. In Bhagat Ram v.. State of Himachal
Pradesh,9 taking into account the minor infraction of duty by the delinquent

2. S.N. Jain, "Is an Individual Bound by an Illegal Executive Order ? Distinction

between 'Void' and 'Voidable' Administrative Orders", 16J.I.L.I. 322(1974).
3. [1964] A.C. 40.
4. See S.N. Jain and A. Jayagovind, "Minor's Agreement', in S.N. Jain and Usha
Loghani (Eds.), Child and the Law 167-78 (1979).
5. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, A.I.R. 1955 S.C.
65; Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 606.
6. Eg., Mafatlal Naraindas Barot v. Divisional Controller, State Transport, A.I.R.
1966 S.C. 1364; Davendra Pratap Naratn Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.
1962 S.C. 1334; Anand Narain Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C.
1923.
7. CI. Subramanian v. Collector of Customs, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2178.
8. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 855. See also Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, A.I.R. 1984
S.C 636.
?0 A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 424.
1984] EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NATURAL JUSTICE 15

employee and his low status, the court posed the question "whether the
game of holding the fresh inquiry is worth the battle." In the interest of
justice and fairplay the court itself took the exceptional course of imposing
the minor penality of withholding his two increments.
Is an employee entitled to full wages when the order of dismissal against
him is quashed for failure of natural justice? This is a difficult matter as on
rehearing the result may remain the same, i.e., the dismissal of the emplo-
yeer Here a distinction may be made between a case where the employee
is under suspension and where he is not under suspension pending the
disciplinary proceedings against him. In the former case, if the government
decides to take back the employee, there is no problem and he will get his
full salary. But if it is not so and the employer proceeds with rehearing, the
better view will be to treat him under suspension for the period between
the initial dismissal and the final quashing of the order by the court. This
view is embodied in the Central Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules 1965 which provide that where the dismissal of a civil ser-
vant is set aside and the disciplinary authority decides to hold a further
inquiry against him on the same allegations, the government servant shall
be deemed to be under suspension from the date of the original order of
dismissal.
Where the employee continues to work regularly and is not under sus-
pension till the day of dismissal, the problem is difficult. If, when his dis-
missal is set aside for failure of natural justice, he is given full salary for
the period, he gets compensation for doing nothing or rendering any service
to the employer. It may be that after rehearing the initial order of dismissal
stands, and if the employer is made to pay full salary for the period invol-
ved, it is too much punishment on him for a technical defect. On the other
hand, the employee suffers for no fault of his. Perhaps it may be better to
have a compromise in this matter. The employee may be paid the subsis-
tence allowance as if he was under suspension. If he gets back his employ-
ment after rehearing, the equity demands that he should be paid the full
salary in question. But if he loses, he should remain satisfied with the sub-
sistence allowance. However, the judicial approach has generally been to
mechanically follow the result of quashing, namely, reinstatement and full
salary.10 But a new approach is depicted by Managing Director, U.P. Ware-
housing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee.11 Here the court found the
dismissal of an employee of a public undertaking to be wrongful for not
observing natural justice by the undertaking. In a writ petition before the
High Court, the court not only ordered reinstatement but full back wages.
The Supreme Court demurred. It held that the writ is not an appropriate
remedy to order payment of full wages as this involves a "question of fact
depending on evidence to be produced before the tribunal. If after the

10. See, e.g., Devendra Pratap, supra note ^

11. A.LR. 1980 S.C. 840
16 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 26 : 1 & 2
termination of his employment the workman/employee was gainfully emplo-
yed elsewhere, that is one of the important factors to be considered in
determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full back
wages and with continuity of employment."12 It appears the formula sugges-
ted by the author is the best to be followed considering every aspect of the
matter.

(ii) Fixing prices of a commodity

In fixing the price of a commodity, where failure of natural justice has
occurred, the individual may never be restored to his original position when
the court quashes the order. This problem is very well reflected by the English
case F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. A.G. v. Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry.1Z Following the Monopolies Commission's report on the excessive
profits made on the sale of certain drugs by the appellant company, the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry made orders reducing their prices.
The company sued for a declaration that the commission's procedure was
contrary to natural justice and, therefore, its report and the orders made by
the Secretary of State based on that report were invalid* The company also
informed the government that it would not obey the impugned order. The
secretary then sued for an injunction asking the company to obey the order
in question. The company demanded from the government an undertaking
that it would indemnify the company for the loss suffered by it in obeying
the order if it was held void by the court. The government refused to give
any such undertaking and the question was whether the court could issue
an injunction against the company to obey the order pending a decision on
merits. The House of Lords granted the injunction against the company
and upheld the government's contention not to give any such undertaking.
The main arguments developed by the House were as follows : The instant
case was not one between subject and subject; it was a "law enforcement
action" in which proceedings were brought by the Crown to restrain a
subject from breaking a law where the breach was harmful to the public;
its purpose was "to enforce or to protect jus publicum." The impugned
order was law until it was invalidated by the court. Even where a strong
prima facie case of invalidity had been shown upon the application for an
interim injunction, it would still be inappropriate for the court to impose
as a condition of the grant of injnction a requirement that the Crown
should enter into the usual undertaking as to damages. The burden of
implementing such an undertaking would fall upon public funds raised by
taxation from the general public and public interest would be affected
thereby. While the benefit of the order would go to those who purchase
the drugs involved, the fulfilment of the undertaking would fall on the
entire public.
12. Id. at 845.
13.[1975JA.C.295.
1984] EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NATURAL JUSTICE 17

(iii) Miscellaneous
A few other miscellaneous situations may be examined to indicate
that it may not be practical or expedient to restore the party to his
original position when failure of natural justice has occurred. In
Uaneka Gandhi v. Union of India,14, after the passport of the petitioner
was impounded no hearing was given to her which was the requirement
of the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. She was also not given
the reasons, though they were supplied to the court. The court did not
quash the order of impounding the passport as the Attorney-General gave
the undertaking that the government would comply with the requirements
of hearing. In justification of the court's order it may be said that in spite
of the failure of natural justice, it would not have been appropriate to give
back the passport to the petitioner for it would have frustrated any final
adverse order passed by the government after hearing. Even if the court
would have ordered the return of the passport, the order would have been
futile for the government could have immediately passed a fresh order
impounding the passport. Such an order by the court would have
meaning, had the court stopped further proceedings in the matter, but
apparently it could not have done so.
In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan,15 the term of the New Delhi Municipal
Committee was to expire in October 1980 but the government superseded
the municipality in February 1980 and appointed an officer to exercise the
powers of the committee. The Supreme Court by its judgment in September
1980 found the action to be in violation of natural justice when only 15
days or so were left for the normal expiry of the term of the committee. It
expressed an anxiety—if the municipality was to be reinstated "it may
lead to confusion and even chaos in the affairs of the Municipality."
It was relieved of its anxiety in view of the appellant not pressing for such
an order.
Again in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India,16 it was held that the
takeover of the mills by the government under section 18-AA of the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 was in violation of the
principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court, however, refused to quash
the order of takeover but directed the government to give a full, fair and
effective hearing to the undertaking within three months, and to take just
and proper remedial action. The unstated consideration for such a course of
action by the court appears to be that it would create confusion and chaos
if the undertaking is handed back to the owners and if after hearing the
government again passes an order of takeover.
Ill Failure to give reasons
Giving of reasons is now a part of natural justice. It is accordingly
necessary for quasi-judicial bodies to give reasons. What is the effect of
14. Supra note 1.
15. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 136.
16. AJ.R, 1981 S,C, 818,
18 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 26 :1 & 2

failure to give reasons? A number of cases have occurred on the point but
the result has not been uniform. It may also be noted that even in case of
purely administrative bodies statutes may require reasons to be given, and
from the point of analyzing the resultflowingfrom failure to give reasons,
it matters not whether this has happened in the case of a quasi-judicial
body or an administrative body. Therefore, it is proposed to examine the
cases irrespective of the fact whether it is one type of the body or the
other that has not given reasons.
The court's approach is ordinarily to quash an administrative order for
failure to give reasons but this has not always happened. Where the court
adopted the former course, in many cases, apart from the absence of
reasons, there were other factors justifying court's action, such as, non-
application of the mind, failure of the audi alteram partem, or some other
illegality.17 These cases may, therefore, be not much of relevance, except
that they may be used to substantiate the otherwise established proposition
that failure to give reasons, wherever required, makes the order invalid.
Three situations may be contemplated in the context: (i) Non-supply
of reasons both to the party and the court; (ti) non-supply of reasons to
the party but communicating reasons to the court ; and (iii) supply of
reasons to the party after undue delay of the communication of the non-
speaking order, but before the individual has approached the court,
The situation of failure of audi alteram partem has to be distinguished
from the failure of giving reasons. The former involves, when the
administrative action has been quashed, bilateral acts both on the part of
the individual and the authority—individual getting an opportunity to
present his case and the authority required to consider the case on the
basis of evidence and arguments presented by the individual. In the latter
case, the matter normally will be unilateral—^dividual having no further
role in the decision making process, but the authority removing the defect
by supplying reasons. In such a case the quashing of administrative action
may still serve certain advantages from the point of view of the individual :
(a) The administration will be obligated to give reasons along with the
order rather than defer reasons and this introduces an element of
fairness in the administrative process ; (b) he may get some incidental
advantage, e.g., in the case of dismissal from service; (c) he gets the
psychological satisfaction of vindicating his right; and (d) by lapse of
time the authority may change its views. In addition there may be two
substantial advantages to the affected person : Firstly, the statute may
provide that once an order has been cancelled or revoked the authority is
debarred from taking the same action against the individual on the same

17. E.g., State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2083; Mahabir
Prasad Santosh Kumar V. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302 ; State of Gujarat
V.Krishna Cinema, AJ.R. 1971 S.C. 1650 ; Papanasam Fishermen Co-op. Society Ltd.
v. Collector ofThanjavur, A,I.R. 1975 Mad. 81 ; State of Gujarat v. PatelRaghav Nltha,
AJ.R. 1969S.CJ297,
 1984] EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NATURAL JUSTICE 19

facts unless, in the meanwhile, new facts have arisen, e.g., in the case of
preventive detention ;18 secondly, when there is more than one adverse
party interested in the same matter, e.g., a trading licence, quashing of the
action may necessitate the authority to consider the matter afresh.19
Keeping these factors in view let us analyze the three situations
mentioned above in the light of judicial decisions.
(i) When no reasons given to individual or even supplied to court
Here the rule should be that the order be quashed and the authority
directed to examine the matter "afresh". Examination of the matter afresh
does not mean that the authority is to give "de novo" hearing but the
affected individual may be given an opportunity to make written or oral
submissions either because of the discovery of new point or facts which
may have arisen either due to the lapse of time or otherwise.
Let us examine the judicial approach in the matter.
We may begin with cases relating to mining leases by the government
under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957.
Under the Act the government has the power to grant a mining lease to a
person and to choose him from amongst different applicants. The situation is
like that of lis inter partes. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India?0 after refusing a mining licence to the petitioner without giving any
reasons, the government invited fresh application. Though Subba Rao, J.
(as he then was), one of the three judges constituting the bench, found the
action of the government to be bad for failure to give reasons; yet in the
circumstances of the case he refused to quash the order of the government,
though the petitioner had contended that due to the fresh notification he
had been placed in a disadvantageous position as he would have to compete
with others who were not in the field earlier. In the opinion of the judge,
due to the circumstances of the case, "if we interfere at this stage, there
would be unncessary complications and public interest might suffer." The
result in the case could be justified on the ground that this was the first
significant case where the court laid emphasis on the necessity of a quasi-
judicial body to pass a speaking order or to give reasons for its action.
A contrary approach is depicted by Bhagat Raja v. Union of India.21
In this case, the appellate authority (Central Government) affirmed the
order of the state government which had rejected the appellant's appli-
cation for granting a mining lease. No reasons were given by any of the
governments. The court found that the appellate authority had a special
form which was to be used whenever a review application was to be
rejected by it. The court quashed the order and directed the Central
18. Chotka Hembramy. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 432; Baidya Nath
Mandv. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1155.
19. See infra note 21.
20. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671.
21. AJ.R. 1967 S.C. 1606.
20 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 26 : 1 & 2

Government to decide the review application afresh. To the same effect

is Chowgule & Company {Hind) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India.22
In Travancote Rayons Ltd. v. Union of India23 was involved the assess-
ment of excise duty. The first decision was made by the deputy superin-
tendent of central excises against the assessee. The assessee appealed to
the collector who rejected his contention by a detailed order. The
assessee went in revision to the Central Government which affirmed the
collector's decision by a non-speaking order. The Supreme Court quashed
the government's order on the ground that the government failed to give
reasons and remanded the case to it.
Again in Narayan Das Indurkhya v. State of Madhya Pradesh,2* under
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1961, a state government could forfeit
any book if it appeared to it that the book questioned the territorial
integrity or frontiers of India in a manner likely to be prejudical to the
interests or safety or the security of India. The government was required
to state the grounds for its opinion. While forfeiting a book, the govern-
ment merely repeated the words of the stautory provision. The order of
the government was quashed as merely repeating the statutory language
did not amount to giving of reasons. All the books seized by the govern-
ment were ordered to be returned. It may be noted that in Travancore
Rayons the matter was remanded to the government, but in Narayan Das,
the court set at rest the controversy by ordering the return of the books.
However, it seems the order passed by the court in Narayan Das would not
prevent the government from passing a fresh order of forfeiture after
giving reasons,
In Mayer Simon, Parur v. Advocate-General of Kerala25 the advocate-
general refused his consent to the petitioner for filing a suit uuder section
92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. No reasons were given for the
refusal. The High Court quashed the order of the advocate-general for
failure to give reasons and directed him to deal with the matter afresh
with expedition.
(ii) No reasons communicated but reasons on record
Where reasons have not been communicated to the individual but they
are on the record, the judiciary has adopted different postures. In some
cases the action has been upheld but not in others. In Ahmedabad
Municipal Corpn. v. Ramanlal Govindram2* a municipality passed an
order of eviction against a tenant but did not communicate the reasons to
the party though they were on the record. Without quashing the order
22. AJ.R. 1971 S.C. 2021.
23. A.I.R. 1971 S.C.862.
24. AJ.R. 1972 S.C. 2086. See also State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalai Singh, AJ.R.
1977 S.C. 202.
25. AJ.R. 1975 Ker. 57.
26. AJ.R. 1975 S.C. 1187.
1984] EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NATURAL JUSTICE 21

the Supreme Court merely contended by saying that it showed inefficiency

and warned that it should not happen again. It ordered the municipality
to give reasons.
A few other cases depict the same approach In Nandram Hunatram v.
Union of India21 the government found that the partners of a firm to
whom a mine was leased out by the government were quarrelling among
themselves and that wages of labourers had not been paid and the mine
was being flooded because essential services had stopped working. In
the circumstances, the government terminated the lease and took over
the mine without giving any reasons. The Supreme Court upheld the
government's action. It found that the facts were quite clear and well
known and that it was satisfied on the facts before it that the government's
action was justified.
In Bhagat RamPatangav. State of Punjab®* the government passed an
order removing a member from a municipality. The order was challenged
on the ground that it did not state the reasons for removal. The Supreme
Court reiterated the general principle, viz., that in such cases, the authority
concerned should give reasons for making an order; nevertheless, in the
instant case, the court refused to quash the order primarily on the ground
that the state government had produced the relevant file before the High
Court from which the court was satisfied that there had been a proper
consideration of the petitioner's explanation and that there had been no
violation of natural justice.
In Rangnath v. Dautatrao2* the appellant had sought to recover from
his tenant the possession of land of which he was the inamdar. All inams
were abolished by the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act
1954. The government denied him the relief because of the abolition of
inams by the Act by a non-speaking order. The Supreme Court still
upheld the order in the absence of reasons because the decision rested on
a point of law and not facts. Again in Woolcombers of India Ltd. v.
Woolcombers Workers* Union,*0 which involved a dispute between an
employer and his employees with regard to wages, the industrial tribunal,
while fixing wage rates, failed to give reasons. Though the Supreme Court
emphasized the necessity of adjudicatory authorities to give reasons by
giving cogent arguments, it, nevertheless, refused to set aside the award for
failure of the tribunal to give reasons and went on to examine the record to
find material in support of the tribunal's conclusions. Having failed to find
such material, it did not ultimately uphold the award of the tribunal.
In J.M.A. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India*1 the petitioner applied
for the registration of a trade mark to the registrar of trade marks who
27. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1922.
28. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1571.
29. A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2146.
30. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2758.
31. A.I.R. 1980 Del. 200.
22 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 26 : 1 & 2

passed on the application to the Central Government for disposal under the
statute concerned. The government refused to register the trade mark as
it was not in the public interest to register it without giving any reasons.
The reasons, however,were on the record though they were not communi-
cated to the petitioner. The High Court refused to quash the government's
decision simply because the government failed to communicate these
reasons to the petitioner. Though the court deprecated the tendency of
the administrative authorities of not supplying reasons to the affected
individual, yet it argued that it "would be wasteful and unjust for this
court to refuse to see the reasons which were originally given in the order
on the file and to allow the writ petition only because before the writ
petition was filed the reasons were not communicated."32 Here, of course,
even if the government's order would have been quashed, the court could
not have given the positive relief of asking the government to register
the trade mark. At the most, the petitioner had the remote chance that
the government would reconsider the matter and he might get the relief on
reconsideration.
In two important cases, the Supreme Court has taken a strict view of
not communicating the reasons to the party by the government. In
Ajantha Industries v. Central Board of Direct Taxes,™ under section 127
of the Income Tax Act 1961, the board may transfer a case from one
income tax officer to another after giving the assessee a reasonable
opportunity of being heard and after recording the reasons for doing
so. It was held that merely recording of reasons on the file was not
sufficient. It was essential to give reasons to the affected party. If
a case is transferred from the usual place of residence or office of the
assessee to a distant place it puts an assessee into a great deal of
inconvenience and monetary loss. The order of transfer was quashed for
not communicating reasons to the petitioner.
In Rajamallaiah v. Anil Kishore,** the statute required the auctioning
authority to record reasons in writing if it was regrouping any liquor shop
or splitting any group of shops before the auction. It was held that the
requirement to record reasons was mandatory. It was not enough
compliance of the statute if the reasons were recorded immediately after
the auction. The reasons must be recorded " before and not after the
action is taken." A departure from this proposition is not permissible
even on the ground that no citizen has any right in the sale of intoxicants.
This is an extremely good case where the quashing of the order was
justified as on reauction of the shops, due to the competition amongst
various bidders, the result may be different from the earlier one.

32. Id. at 206.

33. AJ.R. 1976 S.C. 437.
34. AJ.R. 1980 S.C. 1502.
1984] EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NATURAL JUSTICE 23

(iii) Supply of reasons to party after undue delay of order but before matter
goes to court
Here the situation is more or less the same as in (ii). The delay in
giving reasons, however, may cause financial loss to the individul as in the
absence of reasons he may not be able to choose his remedy against the
administration. For instance, if a person imports certain goods and
there is a dispute with regard to the rate of customs duty to be imposed
on such goods, and the customs authorities decide against the individual
and delay the giving of reasons, it may cause him financial loss and
subject him to wharfage charges for he may not know what to do. For
this delay, the only remedy that the individual may have is to file a suit
for damages against the administration but the law relating to damages
for wrongful administrative action is still in obscurity and in a developing
stage.

IV Conclusion
The cases do not depict a uniform approach in the matter of giving
ultimate relief by the court when failure of natural justice including giving
of reasons has occurred.
In the matter of failure of audi alteram partem the courts have adopted
any of the three alternatives as the justice of the situation demanded—
simply quashing the order, not quashing the order but maintaining the
status quo and directing the government to give a hearing, and finally not
only quashing but prohibiting the government from reconsidering the
matter. Further, the Supreme Court has waivered in giving further relief
naturally flowing from the quashing of the order. A good example is that
of the U.P. Warehousing Corporation. The court may refuse to give
further relief because of various difficulties and reasons.
As far as failure to give reasons is concerned, where the reasons have
neither been supplied to the party nor to the court, the task of the judiciary
is somewhat easy. The courts have more or less quashed the administrative
order. In such a case, there is not only failure of natural justice but the
non-communication of reasons may be indicative of the fact that the
authority has not applied its mind to the matter.
Where, however, the reasons have been given to the court, though
not to the party, the cases do not depict a uniform approach. In a
number of cases the court has upheld the administrative order once it is
satisfied that the reasons placed before the court justified the same. There
are a few cases also to the contrary. Here perhaps the matter may have
to be decided on the basis of justice but the concept of justice is a fluid
andfleeingone. Where the new result is likely to be substantially different
from the earlier one, as in Anil Kishore, the quashing of the order will be
the natural outcome. Similarly, the court may not quash an order where
it affects the interests of a third party or there are other policy reasons.
24 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 26: 1 & 2

In the matter of preventive detention, affecting personal liberty, even where

the reasons are on the file and have been communicated to the court
(though not supplied to the individual) the invariable rule is to quash the
order of preventive detention. On the whole, whether the court
should quash or not would depend upon the nature of the order and the
justice of the matter.