Economic History Association

Manuel and the Genoese: A Reappraisal of Byzantine Commercial Policy in the Late Twelfth
Century
Author(s): Gerald W. Day
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jun., 1977), pp. 289-301
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

VOLUME XXXVII JUNE 1977 NUMBER 2

Manueland the Genoese:A Reappraisalof

ByzantineCommercial Policyin the
Late Twelfth Century
U NDER the year 1180 the Genoese annalistmade the following
entry:
In this year the lord Manuel of bountiful memory, the most blessed emperor of
Constantinople, just as it pleased the Divine Majesty, died in the month of Sep-
tember, on the feast of the blessed Thecla, virgin and martyr, according to the news
that Guglielmo Arnaldo, a noble Genoese citizen, brought, who came from Pera with
a ship loaded with grain; as a result of his death, all Christianity has sustained the
greatest ruin and loss.'

The Genoese lament over the death of the last great emperorof the
Comnenandynastymay soundodd to historianswho have readabout
Manuel'salleged greed and duplicityin his relationswith the Italian
commercialcities.2The purposeof this paper, however, is to demon-
The Journal of Economruc History, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (June 1977). Copyright ? The
Economic History Association. All rights reserved.
I must express my gratitude to Professor Donald E. Queller, Department of History,
University of Illinois, whose suggestions contributed considerably to the final version of this
paper, and to Professor Bennett D. Hill, also of the University of Illinois' history department,
for his careful reading of the manuscript.
1 "Hoc siquidem anno dominus Emanuel dive memoriae Constantinopolitanus beatissimus
imperator, sicut divine placuit maiestati . . . obiit, mense septembris, festo beate Tecle virginis
martyris, secundum quod retulit Willielmus Arnaldus, nobilis Ianue civis, qui venit de Peyra
cum navi honerata frumento; unde Christianitas universa ruinam maximam et detrimentum
incurrit." L. T. Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, eds., Annali genovesi di Caffaro
e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII, 2 vols. (Rome, 1890-1901), II, 14-15. The
translation is my own.
2 Much of the calumny against Manuel began with the version of his expulsion of the
Venetians in 1171 that appears in Monumenta Gernmaniaehistorica, scriptores, vol. 14, Historia
ducum Veneticorum, H. Simonsfeld, ed., p. 78. Contrary information relative to the
Venetian expulsion was given by John Cinnamus, Epitome rerum ab Joanne et Alexio Comnenis
gestarum, August Meineke, ed. (Bonn, 1836), pp. 281-82; by Nicetas Choniates, Historia,
Immanuel Bekker, ed. (Bonn, 1835), pp. 222-24; and by the Genoese instructions to the city's
289

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290 Day
strate through the story of Manuel's relations with the Genoese that
his policies towards the Italians were dictated not so much by greed
or by diplomatic chicanery as they were by his legitimately imperial
concern with maintaining peace in his capital. The Genoese mer-
chants, who were consistently peaceful and loyal, had very little to
fear from the emperor; and enjoying his good will, they were able to
expand their business enterprise in the Greek empire restricted only
by the limitations imposed by their formal agreements with Manuel.
In order to understand Manuel's policies towards the Genoese and
the Italians in general, it is necessary first of all to sketch briefly the
relationships between the economies of Western Europe and the
Byzantine empire.
The modern global economic situation makes it difficult to imagine
the twelfth-century Mediterranean economy, when Western Europe
was the world's underdeveloped area just beginning to emerge from
several hundred years of a near natural economy. Except for the
production of cloth and arms, industry was nonexistent. Money never
disappeared entirely from the West, but silver pennies were the most
widespread coins, and so small a monetary unit as the shilling was
only a money of account. A pound of money was just that: a pound by
weight of pennies. On the other hand, the Byzantine empire and the
lands of Islam were quite prosperous by Western standards. Gold
coins circulated freely; industry, though oriented towards luxury
goods, was healthy; and wares from the East were common in the
markets of the chief cities. During the late eleventh and twelfth
centuries merchants from particular Italian cities, most notably Ven-
ice, Pisa, and Genoa, began to develop commercial links between the
raw materials of the Latin West and the oriental goods and capital of
the East.

ambassador to Constantinople in 1174, printed in Angelo Sanguineti and Gerolamo Bertolotto,

eds., "Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll' Impero bizantino," Atti delta
Society figure di storia patria, 28, pt. 2 (1898), 368-405. Concerning Manuel's greed, see
especially Ferdinand Chalandon, Les Comnene, 2 vols. (Paris, 1900-1912), II, 586-87; A. A.
Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453 (Madison, Wis., 1952), p. 475; John
Danstrup, "Manuel's Coup Against Genoa and Venice in the Light of Byzantine Commercial
Policy," Classica et Medievalia, 10 (1949), 207. Danstrup, relying too much upon the mistakes
of Wilhelm Heyd in Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen dge, Furcy Reynaud, trans., 2
vols. (Leipzig, 1936), I, 216, and too little upon later scholarship, produced an interpretation of
Byzantine commercial policy under Manuel that saw the emperor as a fomenter of hostility
among the Italians to keep them docile ("Manuel's Coup," pp. 205 and 213). Half a century
earlier a similar conclusion had been reached by Camillo Manfroni, "Le relazioni fra Genova,
l'Impero bizantino, e i Turchi," Atti delta Societa figure, 28, pt. 3 (1902), 623. Charles Brand
betrays his reliance on Danstrup's interpretation, although he acknowledges Danstrup's mistake
in following Heyd, in Byzantium Confronts the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 220. Most
recently the traditional attitude toward Manuel has shown up in an article by Robert Lopez,
"Foreigners in Byzantium," Bulletin de l'Institut historique beige de Rome, fasc. 44 (1974), 351.

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 Manueland the Genoese 291
The Byzantine empire, historically and religiously connected with
the West, was the natural place for adventuresome Western traders
to make their entrance into the lucrative trade of the East. Venice had
never completely severed its economic relation to the Greek empire,
but the great opportunity for commercial expansion was given to the
city in 1081 when the Byzantines requested Venetian naval support
against a Sicilian-Norman invasion of the empire. For their efforts the
Venetians acquired in 1082 commercial facilities in Constantinople
and the privilege of trading freely throughout the empire without
paying any of the usual duties.3 Genoa and Pisa, which during the
eleventh century had been building up their trade in the western
Mediterranean, won their first mercantile bases in the East as a result
of the conquest in the First Crusade of the Syro-Palestinian coast.
Pisan merchants, attracted to the potential profits that Constantinople
offered, gained access to the Greek capital in 1111 when they were
granted a concession and a reduction of the usual 10 percent customs
duty to 4 percent.4 Although Genoa may have tried to obtain privi-
leges in Constantinople in 1142,5 no real progress was made until the
middle of the century.
The progress of Genoa's mercantile enterprise in Constantinople
during Manuel's reign was closely connected with Byzantine activities
in the West. By 1155 Manuel, who was known for his fascination with
Western ways and dreamed of reestablishing Byzantine hegemony
over lost portions of his empire, was eager to win Western allies to
support his expeditionary force then operating in southern Italy.6
Added to Manuel's hopes of conquest were the very real fears he had
for possible aggression against his territory on the part of either the
new German emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, or King William I of
Sicily. The Byzantine chronicler Nicetas Choniates dwells at length
on Manuel's fear of Western attack and says that the Byzantine
emperor won over Italian maritime cities including Genoa, Pisa,
Venice, and Ancona.7 Byzantine agents in Venice had been able to
confederate the cities of the Veronese Mark (Treviso, Vicenza, Padua,
and Verona) with Venice in an anti-German alliance that was the
3 G. L. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, eds., Urkunden zur alteren Handels-und Staatsgeschichte
der Republik Venedig, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1856-1857), I, 43-54.
4 Giuseppe Muller, ed., Documenti sulle relazioni delle citte Toscane coll' Oriente cristiano e

coi Turchi (Florence, 1879), pp. 52-54.

5 In 1142 a Genoese delegation met the emperor John on progress in the principality of

Antioch, but the death of the emperor the next year terminated whatever negotiations were
underway. See, Annali genovesi, I, 31; G. B. F. Raggio, ed., Statuta consulatus lanuensis, in
Historiae patriae monumenta, vol. 2, Leges municipiales (Turin, 1838), p. 252.
6 For Manuel's campaign in southern Italy, see Chalandon, Les Comnene, II, 353-81.
7 Historia, pp. 259-64.

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292 Day
beginningof the LombardLeague.8The SicilianNormansalso posed
a threatto Manuel. From RobertGuiscard'sunsuccessfulinvasionof
the empire in 1081, to his son Bohemond'sattempt in 1108 to con-
quer the empire, to RogerII's ravagesof CorinthandThebes in 1147,
Manuelcould drawupon severalexamplesof the Normanmenace to
justify his suspicionsabout them.
It was in keeping with Manuel's Western policy that in 1155
Demetrius Macrembolites,an agent for the Greek commandersin
Italy, came to Genoaand concludedan agreementwith the city. With
Genoa'sgeographicposition beside the plain of Lombardy,with its
neighboringnobilityhostile to any advanceattemptedby the German
emperors,and most of all, with the city'sgrowingmaritimeresources
tailor-madeto supportand to protect a Mediterraneansupply line,
the Liguriancity was a welcome ally to the expansionistemperorin
Constantinople.Justas importantly,Genoese navalpowerwouldgive
the empire one more line of defense against Western territorial
greediness, especiallyagainstthe demonstratedavidityof the Sicilian
Normans. The agreement provided for the establishment of a
Genoese commercialquarterin Constantinopleand for the reduction
of the customsduty to 4 percentin returnfor a Genoese promisethat
the city would not enter into any agreementinjuriousto the empire
(save Genoa'sinterests in Syria),and that Genoese merchantsin the
empirewould come to its defense in case of attack.9The Genoese did
not takepossessionof the quarteruntil 1160,10but once they were set
up in Constantinopletheir presence arousedthe jealousyof the other
Italiancities that traded with the empire. In 1162 the Pisans, with
Venetian aid, destroyed the Genoese quarter and expelled the
lately-arrivedmerchantsfrom Constantinople."1
While the specific reasons for the Pisan attack on the Genoese
quarter is unknown, it can still be clearly demonstratedthat the
disturbancewas not Manuel'sdoing. It is unlikely that Manuelper-
mitted the Pisan pillage of the Genoese quarter to punish the
Genoese for concludingan alliancewith FrederickBarbarossain June
1162.12Althoughwe do not knowthe exactdate of the attack,we can
8 W. F. Butler, The Lombaild Communes (1969 rpt.; London, 1906), p. 127.
9 "Documenti," pp. 343-45. Cafliro testifies to the customs reduction made at this time,
although it is not specifically mentioned in the agreement. Annali genovesi, I, 42.
10 Ibid., p. 60; Manfroni, "Relazioni," p. 604; G. I. Bratianu, Recherches sur la commerce
genois dans la Mer Noire au XIIIe sicle (Paris, 1927), p. 62.
11Annali genovesi, I, 67.
12 Brand, Byzantium, p. 207: "But in 1162, because of a Germano-Genoese alliance, Manuel
permitted the Venetians, Pisans and native populace to sack the quarter."

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 Manueland the Genoese 293
take a hint from Lopez that the Genoese lost their quarternot long
afterthe conclusionof the treatywith Barbarossa,andpossiblybefore
it. 13 The treatywas signed on 9 June,14 andthe Genoese ultimatumto
Pisawas dated around19 June.15 A ten-dayperiodwouldhardlyhave
offeredsufficienttime for news of the treatyto reachConstantinople,
for the Byzantinegovernmentto formulateanti-Genoeseaction, for
Genoese survivorsto reach home, and for Genoato draftits letter to
Pisa.
Manuel'spunishment of the Pisan culprits, moreover, seriously
weakenssuspicionsabouthis complicityin the crime. Aboutthis time
Manuel moved the Pisans outside the city, probably to Pera or
Scutari.16 It must be admitted that the Pisans did not lose their
trading privileges, but their relocationaway from the city strongly
indicates an effort on Manuel's part to assure peace in Constan-
tinople. Had Manuelinstigatedthe attackto punish the Genoese for
their pro-Germanism,no precedent requiredhim to punish the Pi-
sans to hide his duplicity. Modern historianswith their ingrained
belief in government'saccountabilitytend to forget that Manuel, as
Roman emperor, was considered to be the fountainheadof all
sovereignty, answerableto God alone for his actions. There was no
need for him to resort to deception in his dealingswith disagreeable
foreignersin his own capital.
Possiblythe Pisans'Venetianaccompliceswere allowed to remain
in their quarterbecause of their dominantcommercialposition and
the realizationthat if the Venetianswere the only large Italiangroup
in the city they would have no one to fight with. Moreover,we have
no idea of the number of Venetianswho actuallyparticipatedin the
violence nor of the officialVenetianreactionto their participation.In
any event, the apparentease with which Manuelremovedthe Pisans
makes one wonder why he would have thought it necessaryto use
violence againstthe weaker Genoese colony, had he wanted to do it
harm.
In 1164 Manuelasked Genoa to send ambassadorsto his court to
negotiate the return of the city's merchants to Constantinople.17 It
13
Roberto Lopez, Storia delle colonie genovesi (Bologna, 1938), p. 126.
14
Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, ed., Codice diplomatico della repubblica di Genova, 3
vols. (Rome, 1936-1942), I, 395-404, doc. 308.
15 June 19 is the date given by Lopez, Colonie genovesi, p. 126. Camillo Manfroni, working
from the fact that two naval encounters between Genoa and Pisa had taken place by July 8,
figures the ultimatum must have been sent in the middle of June or a little later. Storia delta
marina italiana, 3 vols. (Livorno, 1897-1902), I, 231, n. 1.
16 Heyd, Histoire du commerce, I, 213-14.
17 Annali
genovesi, I, 167-68.

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294 Day
was not until 1170, however, after years of complicated diplomacy in
which Manuel unsuccessfully attempted to lay upon Genoa the role of
a staging area for a potential Greek invasion of northern Italy, that the
Genoese obtained a new commercial area in the Greek capital.18
Almost as a reenactment of the events of 1162, the Venetians attacked
the Genoese quarter in early 1171, although this time the Genoese
did not lose their facility.19
There can be little doubt that the Venetians were in fact responsi-
ble for the violence. The Venetian source for Manuel's measures
against the Venetians cannot, of course, be expected to lay the blame
for the attack on the men of Venice. But two Byzantine sources,
Nicetas Choniates20 and John Cinnamus,21 see the Venetian expul-
sion in 1171 after the sack of the Genoese quarter as the fault of their
own arrogance, and Cinnamus goes so far as to blame it specifically
upon their attack on the Genoese.
A mistaken manuscript reading has generated a good deal of mis-
statement about Venetian culpability. Heyd, working with a defective
text of instructions to Grimaldi, the Genoese ambassador to Constan-
tinople in 1174/1175, thought that the Genoese had said of the Vene-
tians in regard to the sack of 1171, "cum non culpabiles essent et
sceleris ejusdem rei."22 lie concluded that the Genoese failure to
blame the Venetians exonerated the latter from responsibility in the
pillage. A later edition of Grimaldi's instructions, however, correctly
reports the manuscript reading of the passage as, "cum index cul-
pabiles essent et sceleris ejusdem rei."23 Danstrup, using Heyd and
not looking for a better reading of the text, constructed a scheme on
Manuel's part to exploit the Italians.24
Manuel attempted to solve the crisis by demanding that the Vene-
18 A clause pulling Genoa into an offensive alliance appears in a version of the unratified

agreement of 1169. The final agreement was made in the summer of 1170. "Documenti," p. 353;
pp. 364-67.
19 Brand assigns the event to early 1171 (Byzantium, p. 207). See also, Historia ducum
Veneticorum, p. 78. The instructions to the Genoese ambassador in 1174, three years after the
event, are only marginally concerned with Genoese property in Constantinople, and what little
mention is made of an establishment speaks of enlarging an existing compound, not of obtaining
one ("Documenti," p. 369).
20
Historia, pp. 222-24.
21 Epitome, pp. 280-82.
22
My italics. "Since they are not culpable and are chargeable for the same crime." Histoire
du commerce, I, 216. The document Heyd used was printed by Ludovico Sauli, Della colonia di
Genovesi in Galata, 2 vols. (Turin, 1831), II, 185.
23 My italics. "Since they are culpable thereof and are chargeable for the same crime."
"Documenti," p. 371. I have not seen the manuscript but Manfroni, who did, attests to the
correctness of "inde." "Relazioni," pp. 618-19.
24 See above, n. 2.

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 Manueland the Genoese 295
tians reimburse the Genoese and rebuild their victims' quarter.25
When the Venetiansrefused,the emperorpunishedthem even more
severely than he had the Pisans in 1162 when he had only moved
their quarteroutside the city. This time, perhapsto set an example
forthe Italiansor on accountof the treacherousnatureof this violation
of the trust Byzantiumhad traditionallyplaced in the Venetians,
Manuel confiscatedall Venetianpropertyand threw the guilty Ital-
ians into prisonwhile forbiddingVenetiansto trade in his empire.26
If Manuelhad dislikedVenetiancommercialdomination,it is odd
that he waited until the twenty-ninthyear of his reign to do some-
thing about the problem. The move, moreover, seriously weakened
the Byzantine position that Manuel had been assiduously building in
Italy through his diplomacy with Genoa, and the event occurred
precisely at the moment when Manuel desperately needed Venetian
support, or at least the city's neutrality, in order to maintain his
foothold in Italy at Ancona, on the coast of the Venetian-dominated
Adriatic Sea. Manuel's punishment of the Venetians and his firm
treatment of the Pisans nine years before are convincing testimony to
his unwillingness to disregard outbursts of Italian violence in his
capital. That the emperor was both strong enough and bold enough to
enforce his authority over the Italians goes far to dispel theories
concerning his alleged fear of Italian power.
In the Byzantino-Genoese agreements of 1155 and 1170 various
clauses establishing judicial procedures clearly demonstrate that
Manuel's relations with the Italian colonies in Constantinople were
increasingly influenced by the emperor's concern with the mainte-
nance of peace and order in the metropolis. The agreement of 1155
contained a provision setting up a procedure to be followed to handle
disputes arising between Genoese and other people in Constan-
tinople. If a Genoese should be the plaintiff, the matter would be
decided in an imperial court. If the situation should be reversed and a
complaint was brought against a Genoese, the consuls of the com-
mune were bound to do justice upon notification by the emperor.27
This reliance upon the Genoese home government is much more than
an indication that the Genoese had no representative officially as-
signed to their colony in Constantinople. The provision was an open
recognition by the Genoese consuls of their continued responsibility
for their fellow citizens' behavior after Genoese offenders had left the
25 Cinnamus, Epitome, p. 282.
26 Historic ducum Veneticorum, pp. 78-80; Cinnamus, Epitome, pp. 282-83.
27 "Documenti," p. 345.

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296 Day
effective jurisdiction of the Byzantine emperor. As far as the Byzan-
tine role in assuring a peaceful rapport was concerned, the fact that
Genoese would not be defendants in imperial courts meant that the
Byzantine judicial system could not be used to browbeat Genoese
merchants and to create unwanted animosity.
The convention of 1170 indicates much closer control by the Byzan-
tine government over resident Genoese, undoubtedly occasioned by
the disturbances of 1162. According to this arrangement, suits
brought by Genoese against Greeks and other foreigners were to be
settled in the imperial court, as in the agreement of 1155. In the
chrysobull of 1170, however, criminal Genoese were to be tried in
imperial courts as well, although they were not to be imprisoned if
they could find a guarantor.28Apparently Manuel wanted to have a
firmer hand in quelling Italian unruliness before it got out of control,
as it had done in the Pisan-Genoese disorder of 1162. As in the
agreement of 1155, the Genoese consuls were still held responsible
for apprehending and bringing to justice Genoese who had escaped
the emperor's grasp.
Manuel made it clear in his bull of 1170 granting the Genoese their
quarter that they were to be law abiding. They were not to attack
anyone, and if forced to take up arms against an attack, they were to
cease fighting at the command of imperial officers. They were not to
ally with any party or to take vengeance upon anyone, but they were
to restrain themselves and in everything to do as they were told.29
The next year the Venetians violated Manuel's peace and discovered
to their dismay how serious the emperor was on this point. Perhaps
the stiffer Byzantine policy explains the severity of the measures
taken against the Venetians.
On the Genoese side, the city rigorously observed the defensive
provisions of its agreements. In the vengeful campaign waged by the
Venetians in 1171 against the empire as a consequence of their
expulsion, some Genoese suffered for their loyalty to Byzantium.
Grimaldi's instructions of 1174 record the Venetian burning of a
Genoese ship abandoned by its crew at Almyros when the sailors
went to the defense of the city. The investment that the ship carried
was calculated at 1,856 hyperpers.30 Another ship valued at 5,333
hyperpers was destroyed by the Venetians at Negroponte.3' The
28 Ibid., p. 351.
29
Ibid., p. 367.
30
Ibid., pp. 388-89.
31 Ibid., pp. 387-88.

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 Manueland the Genoese 297
Marquis of Landola lost not only his ship but also his brother to the
Cumans while he was on imperial service, and later his son died
fighting under the emperor's banner.32
At other times as well individual Genoese served the emperor
loyally, even to their own discomfort. A Genoese named Calvus lost
his brother and his property while he himself was seriously wounded
on an imperial expedition to Cyprus.33 Lanfrancodi Radulfo, the son
of a Genoese ambassador to Constantinople in 1168, had five hundred
hyperpers confiscated by local Byzantine officials as he was hastening
to the service of the emperor.34 A certain Templar named Ogerio lost
seven hundred pounds and a galley he had armed for imperial use and
he was thrown into prison by the king of Sicily.35
The amicable rapport between Manuel and the Genoese, based
largely upon the latter's peacefulness and loyalty, was strengthened by
the emperor's sincere desire to see justice done for Genoese who
had incurred losses while under his protection. A provision of the
agreement of 1170 required the appointment of a Byzantine official
every fifth year to handle Genoa's claims against the imperial gov-
ernment.36 This procedure was surely what occasioned Grimaldi's
embassy in 1175, since Grimaldi went to Constantinople five years
after the procedure had been set up and the negotiations were con-
cerned exclusively with compensation for various Genoese losses. In
these negotiations Genoa asked for a total of 84,340 hyperpers: 42,843
hyperpers for the loss of six ships; 34,117 hyperpers for the losses
suffered in the destruction of the city's two quarters in 1162 and in
1171; and 6,800 hyperpers attributed to miscellaneous troubles rang-
ing from paying duties above the agreed 4 percent to sums of money
seized by local Byzantine officials or pilfered on the streets of Cons-
tantinople.37 Grimaldi was probably successful in obtaining a satisfac-
tory settlement since these claims are not mentioned in lists of
Genoese complaints appended to later treaty negotiations under the
Angelans. The grievance procedure was probably to be a recurring
mechanism because it is mentioned in Isaac II's renewal of Genoese
privileges in 1192.38 After Manuel's death, however, the vacillating
relations between Genoa and Byzantium did not allow the process to
32 Ibid., p. 400.
33 Ibid., p. 402.
34 Ibid., p. 401.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 351.
37 Ibid., pp. 368-405.
38 Ibid., pp. 422-23.

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298 Day
be used at regular five-year intervals, although submissions of
Genoese claims were made in 119239and again in 1201.40
Without envy or cupidity Manuel allowed Genoa'senterprise to
develop at a phenomenal rate. Undoubtedlythe Genoese profited
from Manuel'sexpulsionof the Venetians,even though the emperor
refused to grant Genoa the unusuallyadvantageousposition in his
empire thatVenicehad enjoyed.The Genoese spent the remainderof
Manuel'sreign tradingpeacefully. So prominentwas Manuel'sfavor
towardGenoathat in 1179 KingLouisVII of Franceput his daughter
Agnes on boarda Genoese galley captainedby BaldovinoGuercio,a
trusted Genoese vassalof the Byzantineemperor,4'for a safe voyage
to Constantinople and to her new husband, Manuel's son Alexius.42 It
is beyond doubt that the Genoese establishmentin 1180 was quite
prosperous.Eustathius'figure of sixty thousandItaliansin Constan-
tinople at Manuel'sdeath certainlyincluded many Genoese,43 con-
sideringthatthe Venetianswere probablystill banned.An impressive
indicationof how muchthe Genoese interestin Byzantiumhadgrown
in ten years is the sum of 228,000 hyperpersclaimed later by the
Genoese for losses sufferedin the destructionof their quarterin the
popular riots accompanyingAndronicus'usurpationof the throne
fromthe last Comnenan,AlexiusII, in 1182.44This figurerepresents
an increase of 4500 percent over the capitalinvested in 1171 at the
inception of the current establishment,45and it is eight times the
amountlost in 1162.46Moreover,there is no evidence that Manuel
ever madean attemptto despoilthe Genoese of their growingprofits.
Manuel'spolicy of allowingthe Italiansto trade extensivelyin his
empire as long as they were peaceful was probablyhealthy for the
Byzantineeconomy.47Not only did the increasedinterregionaltrade
39 Ibid., pp. 414-15.
40 Ibid., pp. 469-75.
41 For a brief summary of Guercio's career in Byzantine service, culminating in Manuel's
grant of a pronoia to him, see ibid., p. 471. (For Byzantinists interested in the relationship
between pronoiai and fiefs, it is perhaps noteworthy that the Latin Genoese document de-
scribes Guercio's grant as "possessiones in feudi beneficium.") Guercio's role in Byzantino-
Genoese relations can be found in ibid., pp. 406-08, 447, and 461.
42 Annali genovesi, II, 13-14.
43 As reported by Heyd, Histoire du commerce, I, 221.
44 "Documenti," p. 425. On the destruction of the quarter, see Heyd, Histoire du commerce,

I, 222-23.
45 In 1174 the Genoese claimed that 5,674 hyperpers had been lost in the violence.

"Documenti," p. 385.
48 The Genoese claimed 29,443 hyperpers lost in 1162. Ibid., p. 397. The annalist rounds off
the sum to 30,000 hyperpers. Annali genovesi, I, 68.
47 For an interpretation that differs radically from the accepted one about Byzantine eco-

nomic history in that it considers the twelfth century as the apogee of the Byzantine economy,

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 Manueland the Genoese 299
of the Italians in the Byzantine capital nourish the city's affluence, but
also the revenue from customs duties exacted on goods coming into
Constantinople contributed a substantial amount to the imperial trea-
sury. Long before Manuel came to the throne the Byzantines had
relinquished the long-distance carrying trade to the Venetians, and an
attempt to rebuild a Byzantine merchant marine would have resulted
only in a protracted disruption of the commercial flow that was so
beneficial to the empire even as it then existed. Nevertheless, much
of the local carrying trade within the confines of the empire was still in
the hands of the Greeks.448The prohibition of Genoese trade with the
Black Sea area demonstrates at once both Manuel's care to preserve
this profitable business for his subjects and his desire to prevent the
Italians from bypassing Constantinople, the duties paid there, and the
convenient surveillance available in the capital.49
On the Genoese side, in an age when the city was developing
strong commercial links with the western Mediterranean, the Latin
crusader states, and Moslem North Africa and Egypt, it was no more
than a natural concomitant that its merchants should become deeply
involved with the trade of Byzantium. It is indeed a credit to Genoese
diplomatic skill that the city maintained Barbarossa'sgood will, en-
tered into commercial agreements with the Sicilian ruler,50 and still
was able to gain a quarter in Constantinople. Much of the key to
Genoa's diplomatic success in Romania can be found in its constant
refusal to be bound by more than a simple defensive alliance. Never-
theless, the arrangements to which the Genoese did commit them-
selves were observed with a fidelity that could only increase the
Greek emperor's favor towards the city. Moreover, the Genoese also
continually observed the emperor's peace. The Pisans and the Vene-
tians, long established in Constantinople and surely resenting the
intrusion of the Genoese newcomers into their profitable activities,
resorted to violence and paid the penalty for their indiscretion.
see M. F. Hendy, "Byzantium, 1081-1204: An Economic Reappraisal," Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 20 (1970), 31-52. On the impact of the Italians on Byzantium,
see especially pp. 39-41 and 51.
48 Ibid., p. 40.
49 Steven Runciman is under the misapprehension that the Genoese were able to break into

the Black Sea trade before Manuel's death. "Byzantine Trade and Industry," The Cambridge
Economic History of Europe (Cambridge, 1952), II, pp. 99 and 101. He must be relying upon a
brief set of instructions sent to the Genoese ambassador in Constantinople in 1171 upon the
Venetian expulsion when Genoa attempted to obtain Venice's favored position in the empire.
"Documenti," pp. 347-48. It was not a formal treaty, and there is no evidence that the items
mentioned in it were ever implemented.
50 A Sicilo-Genoese trade agreement was signed in 1156. Annali genovesi, I, 46; Historiae
patriae monument, vol. 7, Liber iurium reipublicae Genuensis, Ercole Ricotti, ed., pp. 190-91.

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300 Day
Only the last nine years of Manuel's reign witnessed the free
development of Genoese commerce with the empire, but the rapid
growth of the Genoese investment demonstrates the intensity with
which Genoese merchants cultivated their new source of profit.
Twelfth-century Genoese traders surely felt constrained by the size of
their concession, for their home government repeatedly requested
the Byzantine emperor to expand the quarter and to provide addi-
tional docking space. Every indication is that Genoa was acquiring the
surplus capital to sustain an even more rapid development of its
Byzantine interest than Manuel would permit.
The Angelan emperors of the late twelfth century did grant Genoa
more liberal concessions, but the tumultuous consequences of the
Fourth Crusade destroyed the city's carefully nurtured Byzantine
establishment. Genoa's reentry into Constantinople in 121851did not
prevent the Genoese from supporting Michael Paleologus in his
successful bid to return the throne of the Caesars to Constantinople in
1261. The privileged Genoese merchants, based at Galata across the
Golden horn from Constantinople, built up an extensive direct trade
with the Black Sea area that by 1334 amounted to no less than
?1,648,630 Genoese annually.52 While the Genoese and the Vene-
tians fought for the Levantine trade, the truncated Byzantine empire,
bereft of the revenue that should have come from the commerce that
now bypassed imperial customs officials, entered into an irremediable
decline ended by the Ottoman conquest in 1453.
It was a definite diplomatic victory for Manuel in 1155 to overcome
Genoa's loyalty to the German emperor and its careful regard for the
favor of the Sicilian king, whose island realm was so strategically
located for Genoese ships rounding Italy on their way to the Levant.
Unfortunately for Manuel, however, he was never able to capitalize
on his triumph, for he continually failed to force the Genoese into an
irrevocable pro-Byzantine commitment. By the end of 1170 Manuel
had accepted the failure of his original Genoese policy and soon
learned to be satisfied with one more Italian colony in his capital.
On the whole, therefore, Manuel appears to have been fairer to the
Italians than many scholars have thought, and probably he was a
better emperor. His empire was no longer a formidable military
power, and his schemes for reconquering Italy seem unrealistic to-
day, but he showed true imperial mettle in his relations with the

51 Urkunden, II, 202-05.

52 Robert S. Lopez, "Medieval Trade: The South," Cambridge Economic History, II, p. 342.

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 Manuel and the Genoese 301
Italians. Manuel was firm in dealing with disorder, strong in quelling
the open rebellion of the Venetians, judicious in settling Genoese
grievances, and probably most importantly, he was prudent in main-
taining his empire's economic health. It was for good reason that the
Genoese annalist lamented the death of the emperor Manuel I Com-
nenus.
GERALDW. DAY, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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