PUBLICATIONS occasional

PAPER
APRIL 2018
ISSUE 11.4

AT A CROSSROADS:
ASSESsING THE
ASEAN CENTRALITY
UNDER RODRIGO DUTERTE’S
CHAIRMANSHIP
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2018

02
AT A CROSSROADS:
ASSESsING THE
ASEAN CENTRALITY
UNDER RODRIGO DUTERTE’s
CHAIRMANSHIP

Image Credit: admin.thcasean.org/assets/uploads/galeri/2016/02/asean_2

THE DUTERTE CHAIRMANSHIP

Arguably the most prominent leader in Southeast Asia today, left an indelible mark on the Philippines' hosting of the ASEAN in 2017. He largely adopted a hands-on approach to
his chairmanship of the regional body and leveraged the chairmanship to not only raise his international profile, but also rally support for his controversial presidency.

The Philippines’ chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) should be understood within the broader context of
how the regional body evolved overtime, both in terms of its institutional
structure as well as its long-term goals and aspirations. For five
decades, the ASEAN operated on the twin principles of Musyawarah
(Consultation) and Muafakat (Consensus), underlining its pluralistic,
egalitarian and inclusive model of regional integration. This modality
largely allowed the regional body to gradually and successfully expand
from its roots in archipelagic Southeast Asia, with Thailand as the only
continental Indo-Chinese founding member, to encompass almost
the entirety of nations in what used to fall within General Sir Archibald
Wavell’s South East Asian Command in August 1943, as the Allies tried
to mobilize their forces against Japanese expansionism in East Asia.
* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
It was also these principles that allowed the ASEAN to transcend its
Cold War roots, particularly the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) of Western-leaning post-colonial nations, to reach out to
non-aligned nations such as Sukarno’s Indonesia and, overtime,
communist and socialist regimes of Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia. By providing a flexible framework of engagement -- whereby
the sensitivities and primary concerns of each member state, no matter
how small or powerless is taken into consideration -- membership
in and engagement of the ASEAN became an irresistible temptation
for a highly diverse group of nations that encompass contemporary
Southeast Asia. The so-called “ASEAN Way”, namely
decision-making procedures based on the principles of
consultation and consensus has had its own share of critics for sure.

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OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2018
03
For instance, it creates the iron law of lowest common
denominator during deliberations of sensitive and divisive
issues, since each member state, regardless of its size or
strategic interest, carries a de facto veto power. As a result, it
often becomes almost impossible for the ASEAN to come up with
robust and coherent positions, whenever the interest of even just
a single state militates against the interest of the broader region.
It also makes the regional body susceptible to external pressure,
since any invested external power will have to pressure only
one member state to indirectly veto any unfavorable
outcome within the ambit of the ASEAN.
The result is what I call the “middle institutionalization trap”, since
the decision-making modalities that allowed the ASEAN to come
this far are no longer appropriate for addressing 21st century
challenges, particularly the rise of China. It is precisely within this
context that many experts have called for institutional reform and
innovation in order to ensure the ASEAN centrality. The regional
body can revisit its decision-making structure by, for instance,
more relying on the rarely, but effectively, tested “ASEAN Minus
X” formula, whereby unanimity isn’t a prerequisite for action or
even a robust joint statement. This formula proved effective in the
negotiation of the ASEAN economic initiatives, particularly the
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, as well as the ASEAN Convention
on Counterterrorism1. Even better, the ASEAN could adopt the
European Union’s often-used weighted qualified majority voting
modality, where the population density and geopolitical heft
of member states are taken into consideration.
C 2018 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Moreover, likeminded and more independent nations within
ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, can seize
the initiative and expand ‘minilateral’ cooperation among
themselves on issues of common and urgent concern.
Externally, the international community won’t have to
convince and engage all of ASEAN per se, but instead
only key players within Southeast Asia, in order to address
areas of common interest, whether it’s the threat of North
Korea or China’s revanchist activities in adjacent waters.
Follow the Chairman
Yet, often what’s missing in the analysis of the ASEAN’s operating
system is the crucial role played by the rotational chairman. There
are three specific powers that the ASEAN chairman -- an often-
underrated role filled by the head of state of the respective host
country -- enjoys, with clear ramifications for how Southeast
Asian nations shape not only their immediate geopolitical
environment, but also the broader regional security architecture.
First, the ASEAN chairman has the power of shaping the annual
policy agenda for the region and beyond. Chairmanship isn’t only
a ceremonial role, which often entails huge expenses for the host
nation, but also gives the rotational chairman the unique power
of agenda-setting, which in itself is far from trivial. Given the
limited bandwidth of regional organizations, especially those as
understaffed and loose as the ASEAN, it’s highly important what
issues are put at the center of multilateral discussions each year.
In 2012, for instance, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, as the
rotational chairman of the ASEAN, unilaterally decided to expunge
any discussion of the South China Sea disputes from the regional
agenda. For Cambodia, pleasing their chief strategic partner –
namely, China, which was eager to prevent a multilateral pushback
by its smaller neighbors amid the Scarborough Shoal stand off
with the Philippines -- was a priority. Perhaps more legitimately, the
Indochinese nation felt that it had no direct interest in the disputes,
thus the matter should be discussed by claimant states per se.
After all, only the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam are actively
involved in the disputes, with Brunei taking a more hands-
off approach to the disputes. Majority of the ASEAN nations,
Cambodia argued, had no direct interest in the South China Sea
disputes, even if, to most nations, what was at stake was no less
than stability at the maritime heartland of East Asia. The results
were the failure of the regional body to issue a joint communiqué
for the first time in its history in mid-2012 and, towards the end of
the year in November, heated exchanges with the leaders of other
ASEAN nations, including then Filipino President Benigno Aquino.
The second form of power exercised by the ASEAN chairman is
the issuance of the Chairman’s Statement, which tends to happen
twice a year, during April and November. In the Statement, the
head of state of the host nation has almost the unilateral power
to not only highlight issues of his/her concern, but also the
framing and presentation of those issues, which are deemed to
be of paramount interest to the ASEAN and its dialogue partners.
Usually, the Chairman’s Statement is where high-profile heads of
state express a more strident position on thorny regional issues.
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OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2018
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This was evident, for instance, when Prime Minister Najib Razak’s
relatively robust statement on the South China Sea disputes,
where he called for greater unity and coherence, in 2015.2
Third, the chairman has the power to issue a separate statement,
when member nations fail to arrive at a consensus over a
specific issue, as, per standard, expressed in the form of a joint
communiqué. In 2017, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter
Cayetano issued, on behalf of his country, a Chairman’s Statement,
when Malaysia refused to sign up to what it perceived as a too
acquiescent regional position on the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. In
response, the Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman struck back,
stating “Malaysia would like to disassociate itself with the Chairman’s
Statement as we are of the view that it is a misrepresentation of the
reality of the situation.” The Malaysian diplomat added, “Malaysia
has made known its concerns but they were not reflected in the
Chairman’s Statement…Hence, the Chairman’s Statement was
not based on consensus. The statement also omits the Rohingyas
as one of the affected communities.” The Filipino diplomatic chief,
however, defended the issuance of the Chairman’s Statement,
stating it accurately reflected the balance of opinion and positions
of respective nation states. In the Chairman’s Statement, Cayetano
mentioned, “Foreign Ministers acknowledged that the situation
in Rakhine State is a complex inter-communal issue with deep
historical roots.” He also called on all parties to “avoid actions
that will further worsen the situation on the ground.” The Philippines
maintained that the statement allowed for a constructive solution
to the issue, leaving Malaysia in position of isolation.3 Thus,
the Philippines effectively mediated the final stance of the
regional body on the ASEAN at the height of the
Rohingya crisis in Myanmar in 2017.
C 2018 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
The Duterte Chairmanship
The Filipino president, arguably the most prominent leader in
Southeast Asia today, left an indelible mark on the Philippines’
hosting of the ASEAN in 2017. He largely adopted a hands-on
approach to his chairmanship of the regional body and leveraged
the chairmanship to not only raise his international profile,
but also rally support for his controversial presidency.
Three issues stood at the heart of Duterte’s ASEAN chairmanship:
combatting transnational crime; counter-terrorism cooperation; and
advocating a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean Peninsula.
Crucially, he sidelined concerns over human rights and democracy,
emphasized the sanctity of the principle of non-interference in the
domestic affairs of regional states, and lashed out at international
criticism of his drug war. As expected,4 the Filipino leader placed
his domestic “law and order” agenda on the regional table. This
was particularly poignant in the Philippines’ emphasis on
combatting transnational crime – most especially drug
trafficking, in addition to piracy and human trafficking and
other forms of illicit criminal activities across borders.
In many ways, the Filipino president leveraged his chairmanship
of the ASEAN to rally regional support for his controversial war on
drugs, which elicited significant opposition among human rights
groups, international media, as well as Western nations. In his
April 2017 speech as the newly minted chairman of the ASEAN,
Duterte called on Western nations to, “learn to respect each
other’s independence and treat each other as sovereign
equals,” because, he maintained, “Relations bear fruit
when they are based on mutual respect and benefit.”5
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OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2018

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During his opening speech at the ASEAN Summit in Manila
(November 2017) seven months later, Duterte made “law and
order” a focal point in regional discussions: “Piracy and armed
robbery put a dent on our growth and disrupt the stability of both
regional and global commerce… The menace of illegal drug trade
continues to endanger the very fabric of our societies.” The Filipino
president went on to argue that, “These and other issues are high
on the agenda of our meetings along with the other non-traditional
security issues that challenge the prosperity of our economies,
the integrity of our institutions, and more importantly, the safety of
our people.”6 In his Chairman’s Statement, Duterte maintained,
“Recognizing that the illicit-drug problem is affecting not only
some ASEAN Member States, but also other countries outside
the region, we welcome the assistance of Dialogue Partners
and other external parties in addressing this problem.”7

The other top priority for the president was counter-terrorism

cooperation, an issue that gained huge traction after the surprising
mid-2017 siege by so-called Islamic State-affiliated militants
in Marawi, the Philippines’ largest Muslim-majority city. All of a
sudden, there was concern across the region that the IS would
be able to establish a foothold, even a caliphate, in Southeast
Asia, much to the detriment of regional security. To this end, the
Philippines leveraged the ASEAN chairmanship to mobilize greater
cooperation among regional states, especially in the form of tighter
intelligence-sharing, coordinated tracking of terrorist elements and
crackdown on their financial as well as (online/offline) propaganda
channels, equipment-sharing and training, and joint maritime
patrols, particularly in the tri-border of Malaysia, the Philippines

C 2018 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Image Credit:pcoo.gov.ph www.adrinstitute.org
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2018
06
and Indonesia. Under the Philippines’ chairmanship, regional states and
dialogue partners signed on November 14, 2017, the “Manila Declaration
to Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” which aims
to, among others, “[c]ounter radicalization and violent extremism,
in particular those which lead to terrorism in all forms and manifestations,
through means such as the prevention of radicalization, financing,
recruitment, and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups.”
It also calls on members to, “[c]ontinue information sharing and
exchanges on best practices among ASEAN Member States on
countering and preventing radicalization and the tools of extremism,”
while “provid[ing] mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and
extradition related to the rise of radicalization and violent extremism
that leads to terrorism, in conformity with the respective
domestic laws of the ASEAN Member States.”
Thirdly, Duterte pushed for constructive engagement with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), while overseeing
an unusually strong condemnation by the ASEAN of the regime’s
provocative actions, including successive ballistic missile and
nuclear tests in recent years. The Philippines also oversaw gradual
disengagement of the ASEAN states from economic interaction with
Pyongyang, with the chairman nation completely cutting off all trade
and financial ties towards the end of the year to comply with
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.8
Crucially, the collapse of the Six Party Talks in 2009 has left the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) as the sole mechanism for institutionalized
diplomatic interaction among all concerned parties, ranging from Seoul
and Beijing to Washington, Tokyo and Pyongyang. By and large, the
DPRK has displayed an unusual commitment to engage the world
through the regional body by sending high-level delegations to ASEAN
meetings. In mid-2017, DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho visited the
C 2018 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
ARF in Manila, where he held broadly constructive exchanges with
Philippine Foreign Secretary Cayetano. The North Korean diplomatic
chief’s meeting with Duterte, who was the current rotational chairman
of ASEAN, was even warmer. After a long and friendly conversation,
the Filipino President went so far as describing North Korea as “a good
dialogue partner”, encouraging sustained engagement between ASEAN
and Pyongyang. DRPK seemingly appreciates the ASEAN as a largely
neutral and sufficiently consequential regional actor.9 During the ASEAN
summit in April, Pyongyang sent an unusually heartfelt letter to the
Duterte, asking him to dissuade world powers, particularly the United
States, from threatening North Korea lest the world suffer a “nuclear
holocaust”. Pyongyang also asked the regional body to forward “a
proper proposal” to prevent the crisis from further escalation. Shortly
after, Mr Duterte held extensive phone conversations with both his
American (Mr Donald Trump) and Chinese (Mr Xi Jinping)
counterparts, discussing prospects of diplomatic resolution
to the crisis with the leaders of the two superpowers.10
Arguably, the Filipino president ensured a semblance of the ASEAN
centrality on the three concerns over transnational crime, counter-
terrorism and peaceful solution to the Korean Peninsula crisis. He also
pushed for regional agreements on issues of social justice, such as the
“ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of
Migrant Workers”, which aims to enhance social protection for migrant
workers in the region, ensuring host nations have necessary labor
laws to ensure their basic rights are upheld. He also pushed
for the accelerated negotiation of the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), reiterating the ASEAN’s commitment
to free trade and open economic exchanges among nations amid
rise in protectionism in the West. Both were commendable
developments in the right direction for the region.
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OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2018
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Relations with Great Powers
During his chairmanship of the ASEAN, Duterte also recalibrated
the Philippines’ (and broader Southeast Asian region’s) relations
with major powers, particularly America and China. The highlight
of the ASEAN Summit in November was the meeting between
Duterte and his American counterpart, Donald Trump. Duterte
managed to place the recently strained Philippine-US alliance
on a more even keel. He held extensive discussions with
Trump during their bilateral summit on November 13,
with focus on repairing frayed ties through expanded
cooperation in areas of common concern.
In particular, the two sides discussed avenues for deepening
their already robust counter-terrorism cooperation in light of the
recent liberation of the militant besieged city of Marawi, through
“additional exercises, increased information sharing, and by
addressing the drivers of conflict and extremism.” The two
allies also explored deeper cooperation in the realm of counter-
narcotics, with America’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
building the capacity of its Filipino counterpart, Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), in interdiction of smuggled drugs,
especially from Mainland China. Washington thus signaled its
willingness to support Duterte’s controversial drug war in ways
that are consistent with its domestic values and laws.
The meeting with Trump, however, had a largely bilateral,
rather than multilateral, significance to it, though the thaw
C 2018 STRATBASE ADR INSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
was part of a broader regional trend, with American president
managing to strike friendly ties with most ASEAN leaders during
his visit. Trump and Duterte’s cordial meeting effectively arrested
any further hemorrhaging in bilateral ties, injecting a new
element of normality into the century-old alliance.11
China, however, was the undisputed winner of Duterte’s
presidency. This isn’t only because of Duterte’s constant emphasis
on China’s role as the development partner for the region, a critical
source of capital and technology for an infrastructure renaissance
in Southeast Asia. Amid blossoming bilateral relations with Beijing,
the Philippines repeatedly blocked -- both in the Chairman’s
statements as well as joint communiqués -- attempts by member
states such as Vietnam, and to lesser degree Malaysia, to adopt
a tougher collective position on China’s massive reclamation and
militarization of disputed land features in the South China Sea.12
Unlike in previous years, the term “serious concern” was omitted
from ASEAN statement on the South China Sea disputes, with the
Philippines insisting, much to China’s delight, that the situation is
broadly stable, even if the Asian powerhouse continued to press
its claims in the area. The Philippines also repeatedly refused to
raise the 2016 arbitration award at The Hague, which nullified the
bulk of China’s expansive claims in adjacent waters, even going
so far as criticizing other states, namely America, Australia, and
Japan, for insisting on the finality and binding nature of the ruling.
“We will appreciate not being told what to do because we are a
sovereign nation,” Philippine Foreign Secreatry Cayetano curtly
said in response to calls by external powers for China to abide by
the arbitration ruling. “We will decide what is good for us, what
strategy is good for us, because we are a sovereign nation.”13
More troublingly for the ASEAN’s centrality, Duterte went so far
as telling the international community that the South China Sea
disputes should be “left untouched”.14 Instead, he called for the
negotiation of a Code of Conduct (COC) in the disputed waters,
even if there is little indication that China will agree to any rules-
based approach, in accordance to international law, anytime soon.
In effect, China was able to leverage its improved relations with the
ASEAN’s chairman to block efforts by external powers to ensure
stability and rules-based resolution of the disputes in one of the
world’s most important Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).
In addition to the regional body’s virtual silence on the campaign
of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya minority in
Myanmar, this is perhaps the biggest setback for the ASEAN
under Duterte’s chairmanship. As a result, this year’s ASEAN
chairman, Singapore, is under tremendous pressure to ensure
the regional body can play an effective and constructive role
vis-à-vis China’s unilateral building of facts on the ground, whether
through island-building, large-scale military drills or deployment
of military assets to disputed land features, across the
South China Sea, much to the detriment of smaller Southeast
Asian claimant states as well as broader regional security.
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08

REFERENCES

1
Emmers, Ralf. (2017). “ASEAN minus X: Should This Formula Be Extended?”, RSIS Com-
mentaries. 24 October.
2
For greater detail on Malaysia’s hardening stance on South China Sea during its chairmanship,
see Ng, Joseph & Trefor Moss. “Malaysia Toughens Stance With Beijing Over South China Sea.” Wall
Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysia-toughens-stance-with-beijing-over-south-china-
sea-1433764608
3
See Cayetano’s statement on Rohingya chairman statement here, http://www.gmanetwork.
com/news/news/nation/627029/malaysia-opposes-cayetano-s-asean-chair-statement-on-rohingya-
crisis/story/
4
You may refer to the author’s insights during his talk at the Institute for Southeast Asian Stud-
ies (ISEAS), August, 2016. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/event-highlights/item/3824-seminar-on-
southeast-asias-responses-to-the-arbitral-tribunal-award-on-the-south-china-sea
5
Salaverria, Leila (2017). “Noninterference policy: Duterte tells West to stop meddling,” Philip-
pine Daily Inquirer. April 30.
6
See copy of speech here: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/632922/remarks-
of-president-duterte-during-opening-ceremony-of-31st-asean-summit/story/
7
See copy of draft statement here: http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/11/13/Draft-ASEAN-
Chairman-war-on-drugs.html
8
Reuters (2017). Philippines suspends trade with North Korea to comply with U.N. resolution,
September 8. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-philippines-northkorea/philippines-suspends-trade-
with-north-korea-to-comply-with-u-n-resolution-idUKKCN1BJ113
9
Partly confirmed by the author’s exchanges with DPRK senior officials during a visit to Pyong-
yang in April, 2018.
10
This part based on the author’s article, “Asean can play larger role in Korean crisis”, The
Straits Times. September 23, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-can-play-larger-role-
in-korean-crisis
11
This part based on the author’s article, “Crowning diplomatic moment for Duterte,” Asia Times.
November 16. http://www.atimes.com/article/crowning-diplomatic-moment-duterte/
12
Martin Abbugao and Ayee Macaraig (2017), “Vietnam urges ASEAN to take stronger stance
towards China in sea row”, ABS-CBN, August 5. http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/05/17/vietnam-
urges-asean-to-take-stronger-stance-towards-china-in-sea-row
13
Del Callar, Michaela. (2017) “‘WE ARE A SOVEREIGN NATION’ PHL tells US, Japan, Australia
to keep off sea row with China,” GMA Network. August 9. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/
nation/621294/phl-tells-us-japan-australia-to-keep-off-sea-row-with-china/story/
14
Roxas, Patricia (2017). “Duterte: South China Sea dispute is ‘better left untouched”, Philippine
Daily Inquirer. November 12. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/161911/duterte-south-china-sea-dispute-
china-vietnam-asean-taiwan

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11.4
VOLUME

ABOUT
Richard Javad Heydarian
is a non-resident fellow with the Stratbase ADR Institute (ADRi), an
academic, opinion columnist, and media pundit as well as policy adviser,
focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. He has taught political science
at Ateneo De Manila University (ADMU) and De La Salle University
(DLSU), and was the Ten Outstanding Young Men (TOYM) in the
Philippines awardee in 2016 for his contributions to social sciences.
Authoring more than 800 articles and several books, he is a
regular opinion writer for Aljazeera English (Doha) and The Straits
Times (Singapore), Nikkei Asian Review (Tokyo) and South China
Morning Post (Hong Kong), and a columnist for the Manila Bulletin.
He is currently a resident political analyst for GMA Network, and
previously resident foreign affairs analyst for the ABS-CBN News
Channel (ANC).

Stratbase ADR Institute

is an independent international and strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the
issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia
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