|Vargas Case Digests|

MCia v. court of appeals

Facts and Controversy

Lot 941 consists of 13, 766 square meters in Lahug Cebu City. Lahug Airport occupied by the US army and
was turned over to the Philippine government vis-à-vis the Surplus Property Commission in 1947. On April 16,
1952, the Republic represented by the CAA filed an expropriation proceeding on several parcels of land in
Lahug, including Lot 941. June 1953, Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from original owner Faborada for P8k.
Dec. 29, 1961, judgment in favor of Republic paying Chiongbian P34, 415 with legal interest. No appeal.

RA 6958 passed by Congress to create MCIAA where the assets of Lahug Airport was transferred. July 24,
1995, Chiongbian filed complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with RTC. Some of the defendant-landowners
appealed the decision rendering favor towards the Republic to the Court of Appeals, where they were
allowed to repurchase expropriated properties while Chiongbian accepted compensation on the condition
that she be allowed reconveyance if the land would no longer be used as an airport. RTC decided in favor
of respondent. CA affirmed RTC decision. MR denied.

MCIAA Contentions:

1. Judgment rendered in the previous expropriation proceedings was unconditional and did not
contain the alleged stipulation. Claim of Chiongbian is not supported by documentary evidence.
The 26 owners who repurchased their property were allowed because they were able to secure a
rider in their contracts that entitled them to repurchase property.
2. CA erred in concluding that MCIAA did not object to evidence presented to prove repurchase
agreement.
3. Limbaco v. CA not applicable since it involved contract of sale of real property, not expropriation.
4. Erroneous application of Escaño v. Republic to prove existence of repurchase agreement because
Chiongbian did not join their appeal of judgment.

Chiongbian Contention:

1. Procedural junk. Violated requirement of certification of non-forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chiongbian can repurchase Lot 931 considering that the Lahug Airport has ceased its
public purpose.

Decision of the Supreme Court

Chiongbian cannot repurchase anymore. Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan makes it clear that
reconveyance depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator. If it has a condition
where it allows for a repurchase, then it may occur. However, if the decree is a fee simple title, then the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. Terms of judgment are clear and equivocal to grant title
of Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic.

She can’t rely on the ruling of MCIA v. CA where there was presentation of parol evidence to prove existence
of written agreement containing the right to repurchase. This case did not involve expropriation proceedings
but a contract of sale. Pronouncement of parol evidence rule where “terms of a written agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreements” only applies to written agreements, not to court judgments.

Even if Chiongbian were allowed to prove existence of evidence, it cannot be admissible under Art. 1403.
Agreement cannot be received without the writing or a secondary evidence of its contents. Records reveal
that MCIAA objected to the purpose for which testimonies were offered for being in violation of the Statute
of Frauds (requirement that certain kinds of contracts be memorialized in a writing, signed by party to be
charged, with sufficient content to evidence the contract). Testimonies also inadmissible for being hearsay
BECAUSE IT IS PROBATIVE VALUE NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF WITNESS BUT PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF ANOTHER PERSON WHO IS NOT ON THE WITNESS STAND.

She cannot rely on Pastrana’s testimony of Chiongbian executing a deed of sale over Lot No. 941 with
Republic prior to rendition of judgment in the expropriation case since it was never mentioned by
Chiongbian. No sale in fact took place and no compromise agreement was executed prior to the judgment.
If it were true, Republic would not have needed to pursue expropriation case since it would in effect, be
expropriating something it had already owned.

Finally, she can’t invoke Republic of the Philippines v. Escano since she did not appeal judgment and was
not a party to the appeal. Even if she were, she was not a party to the compromise agreements that were
entered into by her co-defendants.