DANOFRATA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Digests: Chapter 1-5 cases.

Radaza v. CA

Facts:

- There was an overpriced procurement of decorative lamp posts and street lights to be
used in the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, which led to the filing of an Admin Case against
the concerned public officials (Lapu-Lapu City Mayor & engineers; Mandaue City Mayor
& engineers; and DPWH officials) of DISHONESTY & MISCONDUCT
- The OMBIDSMAN placed the officials under preventive suspension for 6 months
- Petitioners filed with the CA for preliminary injunction and issuance of TRO against the
suspension; CA denied the petitioners
- Preventive suspension was served and was never interrupted
- Still, petitioners moved for the issuance of the TRO

Issue: W/N the Petition for TRO against the preventive suspension was properly dismissed by
the CA for being moot and academic

Ruling:

- TRO not granted; for there is no preventive suspension to speak of anymore

- There is no actual case or controversy
Belgica v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa (PDAF case)

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated
in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certaincabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by BenhurLuy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note
in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify
the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president
veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of
the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass
or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the
local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be
used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Planters Products v. Fertiphil

Facts:

- Pres. Marcos issued LOI 1465, imposing Capital Recovery component (CRC) on the sale
of fertilizers in the Phil. (Php 10/bag of fertilizer). PPI & Fertiphil are corporations
engaged in the importation * distribution of fertilizers.
- After EDSA I, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts of the CRC but PPI
refused to
- Fertiphil filed for collection of money; RTC & CA both in favour of Fertiphil; both ruled
that the CRC in an unlawful exercise of taxation. The power of taxation may be levied
only for PUBLIC PURPOSE, not for private purpose. PPI and Fertiphil are private
corporations.

Issue: W/N LOI 1465 was constitutional

Ruling: LOI 1465 is unconstitutional. CA decision affirmed, in favour of Fertiphil.

Churchill &Tait v. Rafferty

Facts

Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province
of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in
no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare
of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after
due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant
“decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a
nuisance.”

Issue

1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the Government?

Held

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or
billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of
the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to
further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy
social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people
are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such
territory is amenable to the police power. Judgmentreversed.
RP v. Cancio

Facts:

- Pres. Marcos, thru Proc. 1811, reserved parcels of land to Phil. Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. Some of the
parcels included private land owned by the Cancio Spouses.
- PEZA leased out the spouses’ land to Maitland & offered to purchase the same land
- PEZA filed for the expropriation of the land of the spouses, seeking a WRIT OF
POSSESSION for the land in accordance with A.O. 50
- The Cancio spouses filed a motion to require PEZA to comply with RA 8974, Sec. 4
- RTC ruled in favour of the Spouses but reversed a later decision
- Spouses aver that RA 8974 is applicable

Issue: w/N RA 8974 is applicable “for purposes of issuance of the writ of possession”

SC: ruled in favour of the Cancio spouses; that RA 8974 is applicable ; that PEZA, should upon
filing for expropriation, make the required payment for purposes of the issuance of the writ of
possession.

Guido v. Rural Progress Administration

Facts:

- There was an expropriation of Justa Guido’s land, which was part commercial, part
private. It was expropriated by the Rural Progress Administration (RPA)
- Guido avers that the land sought to be expropriated is part commercial, therefore
excluded within the purview of Act 539..

Issue: W/N the expropriation was constitutional

SC: Petition granted. In favour of Justa Guido. Land is commercial and excluded from Act 539.

- Expropriation must benefit the public. In this case, the expropriation of the land does
not inure to the benefit of the public. Only a few families would benefit from such
expropriation.
Artillero v. Casimiro

Facts:

- Chief of Police/Petitioner Artillero filed a criminal case against Brgy. Captaiun Aguillon
for illegal possession of firearms, the latter not able to present his Permit to carry
Firearm outside Residence.
- The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for insufficient evidence.
- Petitioner never got copies of the Ombudsman’s order.
- Petitioner avers that he was denied his right to due process by not being given copies of
the order.

Issue: W/N there was deprivation/denial of the right to due process on the part of the
petitioner Artillero?

SC: In favor of respondent Ombudsman.

- There was no deprivation of due process.

- Petitioner not denied of due process for not being furnished copies of the orders.
- The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and
lack of opportunity to be heard."

Phil. Judges Association v. Prado

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege
granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes).
Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the
judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need
is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order
to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking
privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking
privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its
operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result
in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
RP v. Eugenio

Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may
be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon
written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized
by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality,
and there have been other similar recognitions as well.[

Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire
into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong
before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto
Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the
testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the
documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an
Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine
the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being
satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank
accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense
of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution
before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant
to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits,
investments and related web accounts of the four.[16]

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote
a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez,
PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to
probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the
[accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9
December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive director
of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with
Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special
Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank
accounts of the persons and entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity
of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated.
Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts
may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon
written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section
8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this
Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there
have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the
AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No.
6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order
before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings
relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in
one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is
the subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve
as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a
full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the
Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle
established in the older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that
nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.
Alih v. Castro

Facts:

Zona was conducted by the men of Maj. Gen Castro in a compoud where petioners reside and
conducted illegal search and thereafter seized guns from them. The order was carried on by his
Castro's men with the contention that the petitioners are involved in the latest killing of the
town's mayor Cesar Climaco.

Issue:

Is the warrantless search and seizure legal?

Held:

The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodialegis and declared that the operation
conducted by Maj. Gen. Castro was ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a
search warrant granted that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC also held the protection of
the petitioner's human rights as stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding
illegal search and seizure. The presumption of innocence of the petitioners should be observed
and that they cannot be subjected to self-incriminating instances like paraffin tests,
photographing and finger printing.

As penned by J. Cruz in this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government."
Fermin v. People

Facts:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2)
criminal informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli Salazar Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Fermin was charged being the publisher of
“Gossip Tabloid” while Tugas was editor-in-chief.
The Informations quoted the portion of the article complained against which was published on
June 14, 1995, which read:
"MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE"
"IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA
DU'N, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING
PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO
NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA
MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG
SINTENSIYA SA KANYA"
Fermin raised the defense of press freedom. She admitted to having a close association with
congressmanRoiloGolez and Paranaque Mayor Joey Marquez, and that she used her skills as
writer to campaign for them during the 1995 elections where Eddie Gutierrez, was also a
candidate for congress running against Golez.
Fermin also argued that to sustain a conviction for libel it is mandatory that the publisher
knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous
article.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Fermin can validly raise trhedefense of press freedom.
2. Whether or not as publisher she is liable for libel.

Held:
1. Fermin cannot validly raise the defense of press freedom.
If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties
or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to
criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers
and commentators such as Fermin, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and
dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast
media or in print, about their personal lives.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in
the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest,
such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.
2. Fermin, as publisher is guilty of libel, whether or not she had actual knowledge and
participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article
purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees
under her control and supervision. It is worthy to note that Fermin was not only the
"publisher", as shown by the editorial box of Gossip Tabloid, but also its "president" and
"chairperson" as she herself admitted on the witness stand. She also testified that she handled
the business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take charge of everything.
Obviously, Fermin had full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse
of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article fails to
persuade TEAcCD
Note:
Instead of the penalty of imprisonment of 3 months 11 days to one year 8 months and 21 days,
the Supreme removed the penalty of imprisonment (pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-
2008) and imposed a fine of P6,000 each. But the Supreme Court slapped Fermin with moral
damages of P500,000 each private complainant.
Soriano v. Laguardia

Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program
against Michael Sandoval (Iglesiani Cristo’s minister and regular host of the TV program
AngTamangDaan):

Lehitimonganakngdemonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]

Gagokatalaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asaholka pa saputangbabae[,] o di ba[?] [‘]Yung putangbabae[,]
anggumaganalangdoon[,] [‘]yungibaba, ditokay Michael[,] anggumaganaangitaas, o di ba? O,
masahol pa saputangbabae [‘]yan. Sobraangkasinungalinganngmgademonyongito.

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a
“G” rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary
conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-
month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the
MTRCB.

HELD:

The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing
decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context
based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television
broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all
factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on
how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context
that they were used.”

The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the MTRCB to
issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly
impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit
fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right
of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued
to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his utterances in a
“G” rated TV program.” (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)