CHAPTER XVII- THE RIGHT AGAINST

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Section 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any from shall exist except as punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall be duly convicted.

GREENNOTES
154. M AY A COURT STENOGRAP HER WHO HAD RESIGNED FROM THE GO VERNMENT BE COMPELLE D TO
TRANSCRIBE HER NOTES UNDER PAIN OF CONTE MPT WITHOUT VIOLATIN G HER RIGHT AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE ?

Yes. This is so because the testimony was taken while she was still in the government
and as such, it was her obligation to transcribe the same, having received her salary
for the day when the testimony was taken. (Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131)

BAR QUESTION
N O . 16; - J OY , AN RTC STENOGRAPHER , RETIRED AT THE AGE OF 65. S HE LEFT UNFINISHED T HE
TRANSCRIPTION OF HER NOTES IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHICH WAS ON APPEAL . T HE C OURT OF A PPEALS
ORDERED J OY TO TRANSCRIBE HER NOTES . S HE REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER REASONING THAT
SHE WAS NO LONGER I N THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE . T HE CA DECLARED J OY IN CONTEMPT OF COURT
AND SHE WAS INCARCER ATED . J OY FILED A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AR GUING THAT HER
INCARCERATION IS TANTAMOUNT TO ILLEGAL DETENTION AND TO R EQUIRE HER TO WORK SANS
COMPENSATION WOULD BE INVOLUNTARY SERV ITUDE . D ECIDE .

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Joy can be incarcerated for contempt of court for refusing to
transcribe her stenographic notes. As held In Adoracion v. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 132,
her incarceration does not constitute illegal detention. It is lawful, because it is the
consequence of her disobedience of the court order. Neither can she claim that to
 require her to work without compensation is tantamount to involuntary servitude.
Since courts have the Inherent power to Issue such orders as are necessary for the
administration of Justice, the Court of Appeals may order her to transcribe her
stenographic notes even if she is no longer In the government service.

JURISPRUDENCE
ACLARACION VS. GATMAITAN, 64 SCRA 131- O N A UGUST 9, 1974 A CLARACION FILED IN T HIS
C OURT A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS . H E ADVANCED THE NOVEL CONTENTION THAT TO COMPEL HIM
TO TRANSCRIBE HIS ST ENOGRAPHIC NOTES , AFTER HE CEASED TO BE A STENOGRAPHER , WOULD BE A
TRANSGRESSION OF THE RULE THAT " NO INVOLUNTARY SERVI TUDE IN ANY FORM SHALL EXIST EXCEPT AS A
PUNISHMENT FOR A CRIME WHEREO F THE PARTY SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY CONVICT ED " (S EC . 14, A RT . IV,
B ILL OF R IGHTS , 1972 C ONSTITUTION ). H E WAS AVERSE TO BEING SUBJECTED " TO INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE SANS COMPE NSATION ". H E DESIRED TO BE RELE ASED FROM THE OBLIGATION OF
TRANSCRIBING HIS NOTES . (H E FILED HIS PETITION IN FORMA PAUPERIS ).

A CLARACION ' S CONTENTION THAT TO COMPEL HIM TO TRANSCRIBE HIS STENOGRAPH IC NOTES WOULD
CONSTITUTE INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE IS NOT TENABLE . I NVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE DENOTES A CONDITION
OF ENFORCED , COMPULSORY SERVICE OF ONE T O ANOTHER (H ODGES VS . U.S., 203 U.S. 1; R UBI VS .
P ROVINCIAL B OARD OF M INDORO , 39 P HIL . 660, 708) OR THE CONDITION OF ONE WHO IS COMPELLE D
BY FORCE , COERCION , OR IMPRISONMENT , AND AGAINST HIS WIL L , TO LABOR FOR ANOTHE R , WHETHER HE
IS PAID OR NOT (B LACK ' S L AW D ICTIONARY , 4 TH E D ., P . 961). T HAT SITUATION DOES NOT OBTAIN IN
THIS CASE .

CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR, SUPRA- A N EMPLOYMENT AGENCY , REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT IT MAY
ADVANCE TO A PROSPEC TIVE EMPLOYEE OR MAI D , HAS ABSOLUTELY NO P OWER TO CURTAIL HER FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT . T HE FACT THAT NO PHYSICAL FORCE HAS BEEN EXERTED TO KEEP HER IN THE HOUSE OF
THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT MAKE LESS REAL T HE DEPRIVATION OF HE R PERSONAL FREEDOM O F
MOVEMENT , FREEDOM TO TRANSFER FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER , FREEDOM TO CHO OSE ONE ’ S
RESIDENCE . F REEDOM MAY BE LOST D UE TO EXTERNAL MORAL COMPULSION , TO FOUNDED OR
GROUNDLESS FEAR , TO ERRONEOUS BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMAGINARY POWER OF AN IMPOSTOR
TO CAUSE HARM IF NOT BLINDLY OBEYED , TO ANY OTHER PSYCHO LOGICAL ELEMENT THAT MAY CURTAIL
THE MENTAL FACULTY O F CHOICE OR THE UNHAMPERED EXERCISE OF T HE WILL . I F THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF
SUCH PSYCHOLOGICAL SPELL IS TO PLACE A P ERSON AT THE MERCY O F ANOTHER , THE VICTIM IS ENTIT LED
TO THE PROTECTION OF COURTS OF JUSTICE A S MUCH AS THE IN DIVIDUAL WHO IS ILLE GALLY DEPRIVED OF
LIBERTY BY DURESS OR PHYSICAL COERCION .

Ratio:

On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for
respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebted ness
may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would not in any way subtract an iota
from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that power to control
said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the ag ency is no
reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be
controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not
merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental
freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.

Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in
order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for
him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer."

Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is
prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.

CHAPTER XVIII- RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL

AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any

prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

a. Is the Death Penalty already abolished by the 1987 Constitution?

Death penalty not abolished for two reasons:

Sec. 19 [1] Art. III. Congress may re-impose for heinous crimes
Section 5 (2) [d] Art. VIII
GREENNOTES
155. IS THE DEATH PENALTY ALREADY ABOLISHED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION?

While the Supreme Court answered the same in the affirmative in the cases of
P vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327; P vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113; P vs. Atencio,
156 SCRA 242; P vs. Intino, September 26, 1988 it held in People vs. Munoz,
170 SCRA 107, that it was merely suspended.

156. IS DEATH AS A PENALTY A CRUEL OR UNUASUAL PUNISHMENT?

No. (P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647). It is only when the punishment is shocking to
the conscience of the community and disproportionate to the offense charged
that the penalty becomes cruel and unusual. In fact, the Supreme Court held
in ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE that death through Lethal Injection is
the most humane way of implementing the death penalty.

JURISPRUDENCE
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE- IS DEATH AS A PENALTY A CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT? NO. DEATH
THROUGH LETHAL INJECTION IS THE MOST HUMANE WAY OF IMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY (LEO ECHEGARAY VS.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE)

PEOPLE VS. GAVARRA, 155 SCRA 327, 1987- THE CRIME COMMITTED IS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE BY
DEATH (ART. 335, REVISED PENAL CODE) BUT WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY IS
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

WE HOLD THAT THE ONLY CRIME THE ACCUSED CAN BE FOUND GUILTY OF COMMITTING IS MURDER. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN
KILLING AN 8-YEAR OLD DEFENSELESS GIRL, HE DID SO WITH TREACHERY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS SUPERIOR STRENGTH.
HE IS THEREFORE GUILTY OF MURDER. IN VIEW OF THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE IV
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE PENALTY THAT MAY BE IMPOSED FOR MURDER IS RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM
PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. SINCE IN THE INSTANT CASE, NO AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE
BEEN SHOWN OR PROVEN, THE PENALTY THAT SHOULD BE IMPOSED IS RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD.
APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, THE MINIMUM TERM TO WHICH THE ACCUSED MAY BE SENTENCED SHOULD
BE WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE PENALTY NEXT LOWER IN DEGREE, I.E., RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MEDIUM AND MINIMUM
PERIOD.

PEOPLE VS. MASANGKAY, 155 SCRA 113- THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER, QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY. THE
CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, ALTHOUGH APPRECIABLE, IS INHERENT IN TREACHERY. NO OTHER
MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY SHOULD BE RECLUSION PERPETUA AS
IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. HOWEVER, WITH THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
THE PENALTY FOR MURDER IS NOW RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PENALTY IS IMPOSABLE IN ITS MINIMUM PERIOD, OR RECLUSION
TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, THE RANGE OF WHICH IS SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
TO TWENTY (20) YEARS.

PEOPLE VS. ATENCIO, 156 SCRA 242, 1987- ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PRESCRIBES THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO DEATH FOR THE FELONY OF MURDER. THE ELIMINATION OF THE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION 23 WROUGHT A CHANGE IN THAT PENALTY, WHICH MUST NOW BE DEEMED TO
BE RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 77 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, 24 THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF SUCH A PENAL TY IS 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND 1 DAY TO 18 YEARS AND 8
MONTHS; THE MEDIUM, 18 YEARS, 8 MONTHS AND 1 DAY TO 20 YEARS; AND THE MAXIMUM, RECLUSION PERPETUA. NOW,
IN VIEW OF THE APPRECIATION IN CARDENAS' FAVOR OF THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, THE
PENALTY PRESCRIBED SHALL BE APPLIED TO HIM IN THE MINIMUM PERIOD. 25 HENCE, THE PENALTY PROPERLY IMPOSABLE
ON CARDENAS IS 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND 1 DAY TO 18 YEARS AND 8 MONTHS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS
MAXIMUM PERIOD. IN THE CASE OF AVELINO ATENCIO, THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY SHALL BE IMPOSED ON HIM IN ITS MEDIUM
PERIOD THERE BEING NO MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE AFFECTING HIS LIABILITY. 26 HENCE, THE PENALTY
PROPERLY IMPOSABLE UPON HIM IS 18 YEARS, 8 MONTHS AND 1 DAY TO 20 YEARS, ALSO OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS
MAXIMUM PERIOD. APPLYING, TOO, THE PROVISIONS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, THE APPELLANTS SHOULD
RECEIVE A PENALTY, THE MAXIMUM TERM OF WHICH SHALL BE THAT WHICH, IN VIEW OF THE ATTENDING CIRCUMSTANCES,
COULD BE PROPERLY IMPOSED UNDER THE RULES OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND THE MINIMUM, WITHIN THE RANGE OF
THE PENALTY NEXT LOWER TO THAT THE PRESCRIBED BY THE CODE FOR THE OFFENSE. 27 THE PENALTY NEXT LOWER IN
DEGREE TO THAT PRESCRIBED (WHICH IS RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUAL, IS
PRISION MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD; THIS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ARTICLE 61 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PERTINENTLY DECLARING THAT '(W)HEN THE PENALTY PRESCRIBED FOR THE CRIME
IS COMPOSED OF ONE OR TWO INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF ANOTHER DIVISIBLE PENALTY, THE
PENALTY NEXT LOWER IN DEGREE SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE MEDIUM AND MINIMUM PERIODS OF THE PROPER DIVISIBLE
PENALTY AND THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING IN SAID RESPECTIVE GRADUATED SCALE."
FURTHERMORE, THE APPELLANTS' CIVIL LIABILITY SHOULD BE INCREASED TO P 30,000.00 FOR EACH VICTIM PURSUANT TO
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

PEOPLE VS. INTINO 1988- WE NOW COME TO THE ISSUE OF TREACHERY RAISED BY APPELLANT. THERE IS NO QUESTION
THAT THERE WAS TREACHERY AS THE ATTACK THAT CAME FROM BEHIND WAS SO SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED LEAVING THE
POOR VICTIM HELPLESS TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, THE PENALTY NOW IMPOSED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IS
RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA.
CONSIDERING THE PROVISIONS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, THE MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE PENALTY IN THE CASE
AT BAR IS THE MEDIUM PERIOD OF THE AFOREMENTIONED PERIOD (THAT IS, THE HIGHER HALF OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL
MAXIMUM) AND THE MINIMUM IS ONE DEGREE LOWER THAN THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY NOW 3 OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL
MAXIMUM TO RECLUSION PERPETUA.

PEOPLE VS. MUNOZ, 170 SCRA 107- THE PENALTY FOR MURDER UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
WAS RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO DEATH, BUT THIS WAS MODIFIED BY ARTICLE III, SECTION 19(L) OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROVIDING AS FOLLOWS:

EXCESSIVE FINES SHALL NOT BE IMPOSED, NOR CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT INFLICTED NEITHER SHALL
DEATH PENALTY BE IMPOSED, UNLESS, FOR COMPELLING REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS CRIMES, THE CONGRESS HEREAFTER
PROVIDES FOR IT. ANY DEATH PENALTY ALREADY IMPOSED SHALL BE REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA.

CONFORMABLY, THE COURT HAS SINCE FEBRUARY 2, 1987 NOT IMPOSED THE DEATH PENALTY WHENEVER IT WAS CALLED
FOR UNDER THE SAID ARTICLE BUT INSTEAD REDUCED THE SAME TO RECLUSION PERPETUA AS MANDATED BY THE ABOVE
PROVISION. THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF THE PENALTY WAS THUS IN EFFECT LOWERED TO THE MEDIUM, THE SAME PERIOD
APPLIED, AS BEFORE, WHERE THE OFFENSE WAS NOT ATTENDED BY ANY MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE, WITH THE MINIMUM
PERIOD, I. E., RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM, BEING STILL APPLICABLE IN ALL OTHER CASES. THE THREE-GRADE SCHEME
OF THE ORIGINAL PENALTY, INCLUDING DEATH, WAS THUS MAINTAINED EXCEPT THAT THE MAXIMUM PERIOD WAS NOT
IMPOSED BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION.

THE ORIGINAL RULING AS APPLIED IN THE GAVARRA, MASANGKAY, ATENCIO AND INTINO CASES REPRESENTED THE
UNANIMOUS THINKING OF THE COURT AS IT WAS THEN CONSTITUTED. ALL BUT TWO MEMBERS 42 AT THAT TIME STILL SIT
ON THE COURT TODAY. IF WE HAVE SEEN FIT TO TAKE A SECOND LOOK AT THE DOCTRINE ON WHICH WE WERE ALL AGREED
BEFORE, IT IS NOT BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THIS BODY. IT IS VIRTUALLY THE SAME COURT THAT IS
CHANGING ITS MIND AFTER REFLECTING ON THE QUESTION AGAIN IN THE LIGHT OF NEW PERSPECTIVES. AND WELL IT MIGHT,
AND CAN, FOR THE TENETS IT LAYS DOWN ARE NOT IMMUTABLE. THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT ARE NOT PETRIFIED RULES
GROWN RIGID ONCE PRONOUNCED BUT VITAL, GROWING THINGS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AS ALL LIFE IS. WHILE WE ARE TOLD
THAT THE TRODDEN PATH IS BEST, THIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT US FROM OPENING A FRESH TRIAL OR EXPLORING THE OTHER
SIDE OR TESTING A NEW IDEA IN A SPIRIT OF CONTINUING INQUIRY.

ACCORDINGLY, WITH THE HOPE THAT "AS JUDGES, (WE) WILL BE EQUAL TO (OUR) TASKS," WHATEVER THAT MEANS, WE
HEREBY REVERSE THE CURRENT DOCTRINE PROVIDING FOR THREE NEW PERIODS FOR THE PENALTY FOR MURDER AS REDUCED
BY THE CONSTITUTION. INSTEAD, WE RETURN TO OUR ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION AND HOLD THAT ARTICLE III, SECTION
19(L) DOES NOT CHANGE THE PERIODS OF THE PENALTY PRESCRIBED BY ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE EXCEPT
ONLY INSOFAR AS IT PROHIBITS THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND REDUCES IT TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. THE
RANGE OF THE MEDIUM AND MINIMUM PENALTIES REMAINS UNCHANGED.

COMING BACK TO THE CASE AT BAR, WE FIND THAT THERE BEING NO GENERIC AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSES, THE APPLICABLE SENTENCE IS THE MEDIUM PERIOD OF THE
PENALTY PRESCRIBED BY ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH, CONFORMABLY TO THE NEW DOCTRINE HERE
ADOPTED AND ANNOUNCED, IS STILL RECLUSION PERPETUA. THIS IS THE PENALTY WE IMPOSE ON ALL THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS FOR EACH OF THE THREE MURDERS THEY HAVE COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY WITH THE OTHERS.

PEOPLE VS. ESTOISTA, 93 PHIL. 647- [IT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL IF THE PENALTY IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIME
COMMITTED AND SHOCKING TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; PENALTY PROVIDED FOR IN REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 4 DEEMED CONSTITUTIONAL. — WITHOUT DECIDING WHETHER THE PROHIBITION OF THE CONSTITUTION
AGAINST INFLICTION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT APPLIES BOTH TO THE FORM OF THE PENALTY AND THE
DURATION OF IMPRISONMENT, CONFINEMENT FROM 5 TO 10 YEARS FOR POSSESSING OR CARRYING FIREARM IS NOT CRUEL
OR UNUSUAL, HAVING DUE REGARD TO THE PREVALENT CONDITIONS WHICH THE LAW PROPOSES TO CURB.

CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT; FIVE YEARS’ IMPRISONMENT, NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL. — TO COME UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BAN AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, THE PENALTY IMPOSED MUST BE "FLAGRANTLY AND
PLAINLY OPPRESSIVE," "WHOLLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE AS TO SHOCK THE MORAL SENSE OF
THE COMMUNITY." (24 C. J. S., 1187-1188.) FIVE YEARS’ CONFINEMENT FOR POSSESSING FIREARMS CAN NOT BE SAID TO
BE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, BARBAROUS, OR EXCESSIVE TO THE EXTENT OF BEING SHOCKING TO PUBLIC CONSCIENCE.

PEOPLE VS. VILLANUEVA, 128 SCRA 488- THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR
CONTENTION THAT THE DEATH PENALTY IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL.

THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF IMPLIEDLY VALIDATES THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY WHENEVER APPLICABLE UNDER
THE LAW BECAUSE IT VESTS IN THE SUPREME COURT THE POWER OF REVIEW OVER ALL CRIMINAL CASES WHERE THE PENALTY
IMPOSED IS DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT. (ARTICLE X, SECTION 5, CONSTITUTION.) AS LONG AS OUR CRIMINAL LAW
PROVIDES FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CERTAIN CASES THE RULE HAS LONG BEEN TO APPLY IT WHERE THE
REQUISITES UNDER THE LAW ARE PRESENT AND THE EXTRAORDINARY VOTE IN THIS COURT ON APPEAL CAN BE SECURED.

XXX XXX XXX

... TODAY THE RE ARE QUITE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT THE SUPREME PENALTY IS EITHER
MORALLY WRONG OR UNWISE OR INEFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THAT PENALTY REMAINS IN THE STATUTE BOOKS,
AND AS LONG AS OUR LAW PROVIDES FOR ITS IMPOSITION IN CERTAIN CASES, IT IS THE DUTY OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS TO
RESPECT AND APPLY THE LAW REGARDLESS OF THEIR PRIVATE OPINIONS. IT IS A WELL SETTLED RULE THAT THE COURTS ARE
NOT CONCERNED WITH THE WISDOM, EFFICACY OR MORALITY OF LAWS. THAT QUESTION FALLS EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE
PROVINCE OF THE LEGISLATURE WHICH ENACTS THEM AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WHO APPROVES OR VETOES THEM. THE
ONLY FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIARY IS TO INTERPRET THE LAWS AND, IF NOT IN DISHARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTION, TO
APPLY THEM. AND FOR GUIDANCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY WE FEEL IT INCUMBENT UPON US TO STATE THAT
WHILE THEY AS CITIZENS OR AS JUDGES MAY REGARD A CERTAIN LAW AS HARSH, UNWISE OR MORALLY WRONG, AND MAY
RECOMMEND TO THE AUTHORITY OR DEPARTMENT CONCERNED, ITS AMENDMENT, MODIFICATION OR REPEAL, STILL, AS
LONG AS SAID LAW IS IN FORCE, THEY MUST APPLY IT AND GIVE IT EFFECT AS DECREED BY THE LAWMAKING BODY ... (PEOPLE
V. LIMACO, 88 PHIL. 35)

AS SPECIFIED IN THE INFORMATION, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WERE
AN QUASI-RECIDIVISTS BECAUSE THEY WERE SERVING SENTENCES FOR DIFFERENT CRIMES AFTER HAVING BEEN ,CONVICTED
BY FINAL JUDGMENTS. AS THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASI-RECIDIVISTS, THE DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER WAS
CORRECTLY IMPOSED ON THEM BY THE TRIAL COURT CONFORMABLY WITH ARTICLE 160 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DROVE THE ACCUSED TO KILL THE VICTIM OF THE CONTRIBUTORY ROLE PLAYED
BY THE INHUMAN CONDITIONS IN THE PENITENTIARY VIVIDLY DESCRIBED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN HIS DECISION, THE DEATH
PENALTY DID NOT GET THE NECESSARY VOTES AND IS, THEREFORE, COMMUTED TO RECLUSION PERPERTUA. FOLLOWING THE
PRECEDENT SETFORTH IN PEOPLE V. A. DE LA FUENTE, (G. R. NOS. 63251-52, DECEMBER 29, 1983)
VENIEGAS VS. PEOPLE, 115 SCRA 79- RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; NINETY TWO
(92) YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER IN CASE AT BAR SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 70, PARAGRAPH 4, REVISED PENAL CODE. — THE CLAIM THAT THE DECISION IMPOSED CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT BECAUSE FOR THE TWELVE (12) CONVICTIONS PETITIONER WOULD BE MADE TO SERVE NINETY TWO
(92) YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT WHICH IS "SHOCKING TO THE MORAL SENSE . . . AN OFFENSE TO THE CONSTITUTION" IS
NON-SENSE. THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 70, PAR. 4 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE MANDATES THAT "THE MAXIMUM
DURATION OF THE CONVICT’S SENTENCE SHALL NOT BE MORE THAN THREEFOLD THE LENGTH OF TIME CORRESPONDING TO
THE MOST SEVERE OF THE PENALTIES IMPOSED UPON HIM, AND NO OTHER PENALTY TO WHICH HE MAY BE LIABLE SHALL BE
INFLICTED AFTER THE SUM TOTAL OF THOSE IMPOSED EQUALS THE SAME MAXIMUM PERIOD."

PEOPLE VS. CAMANO, 115 SCRA 688, 1982- THE DEATH PENALTY IS NOT CRUEL, UNJUST OR EXCESSIVE. IN THE CASE
OF HARDEN VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 19 THE COURT SAID:

THE PENALTY COMPLAINED OF IS NEITHER CRUEL, UNJUST NOR EXCESSIVE. IN EX-PARTE KEMMLER, 136 U.S. 436, THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SAID THAT "PUNISHMENTS ARE CRUEL WHEN THEY INVOLVE TORTURE OR A LINGERING
DEATH, BUT THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NOT CRUEL, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT WORD AS USED IN THE
CONSTITUTION." IT IMPLIES THERE SOMETHING INHUMAN AND BARBAROUS, SOMETHING MORE THAN THE MERE
EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIFE."

CHAPTER XIX- RIGHT AGAINST NON-

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax

AJENO VS. INCIERTO, 71 SCRA 166- THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS REALLY ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WHEN HE
COMMITTED THE AFOREMENTIONED ERROR IS DEPICTED BY HIS FULL SUPPORT TO THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PROHIBITION IN
THE CONSTITUTION THAT "NO PERSON SHALL BE IMPRISONED FOR DEBT" PROTECTS ONLY DEBT ARISING FROM CONTRACTS
OR ACTION EX CONTRACTU BUT NOT AN OBLIGATION ARISING FROM CRIMES OR ACTION EX DELICTU, CITING THE CASE OF
PEOPLE VS. CARA, 41 PHIL. 828, WHICH DOCTRINE HAS SO FAR NOT BEEN CHANGED BY THIS COURT. RESPONDENT JUDGE
IS CORRECT IN RELYING ON SAID DOCTRINE, BUT HE FAILED TO REALIZE THAT IF SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT CANNOT BE
IMPOSED NOW IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY OF THE ACCUSED TO PAY THE INDEMNITY, IT IS NOT BECAUSE ITS IMPOSITION WOULD
CONSTITUTE IMPRISONMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF A DEBT BUT BECAUSE OF THE NEW AMENDMENT INTRODUCED TO
ARTICLE 39 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5465, IMPOSING SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT ONLY IN
CASE OF NON-PAYMENT OF THE FINE, IN THE CASE OF IN RE HORILLENO, 43 PHIL. 212, THIS COURT PREVIOUSLY RULED
THAT "FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT TO EXIST, THERE MUST BE RELIABLE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE JUDICIAL ACTS
COMPLAINED OF WERE CORRUPT OR INSPIRED BY AN INTENTION TO VIOLATE THE LAW, OR WERE IN PERSISTENT DISREGARD
OF WELL-KNOWN LEGAL RULES." TO HOLD THEREFORE LIABLE THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ADMINISTRATIVELY FOR IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW THERE MUST BE RELIABLE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE JUDICIAL ACTS COMPLAINED OF WAS ILL-MOTIVATED,
CORRUPT OR INSPIRED BY AN INTENTION TO VIOLATE THE LAW OR WERE IN PERSISTENT DISREGARD OF WELL-KNOWN LEGAL
RULES. NONE OF THESE HAS BEEN PRESENTED IN THIS CASE. ON THE CONTRARY THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SHOWS
THAT THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS AN HONEST ERROR OF JUDGMENT; IT WAS NOT INSPIRED BY ANY ILL-MOTIVE
TO OPPRESS THE COMPLAINANT; AND THAT IT WAS THE FIRST VIOLATION OF THE NORM OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT BY THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE DURING THE 36 YEARS THAT HE IS IN THE SERVICE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

BAR QUESTION
SEC. 13 OF PD 115 (TRUST RECEIPTS LAW) PROVIDES THAT WHEN THE ENTRUSTEE IN A TRUST RECEIPT
AGREEMENT FAILS TO DELIVER THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OR TO RETURN THE GOODS IF NOT SOLD TO THE
ENTRUSTEE-BANK, THE ENTRUSTEE IS LIABLE FOR ESTAFA UNDER THE RPC. DOES THIS PROVISION NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST IMPRISONMENT FOR NONPAYMENT OF A DEBT? EXPLAIN. (1993 BAR)

A: No, Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 115 does not violate the
constitutional right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. As held in
Lee v. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100, P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional provision on nonimprisonment for non-
payment of debt. The non-payment of debt is not the one being punish in the
said law, but the violation of a trust receipt committed by disposing of the
goods covered thereby and failing to deliver the proceeds of such sale. This act
constitutes violation Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

CHAPTER XX- THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE

JEOPARDY

Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT

ACCUSED MAY BE PROSECUTED FOR ANOTHER OFFENSE IF A SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT CHANGES

THE CHARACTER OF THE 1ST INDICTMENT WHICH HE MAY HAVE BEEN CHARGED OR CONVICTED.

DOCTRINE OF INSEPARABLE OFFENSE

when one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, they
cannot be subject of separate prosecutions. However, it is possible for 1 act to give
rise to several crimes, in which case separate prosecutions for each crime may be
filed, provided that the elements of the several crimes are not identical.

GREENNOTES
157. WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES BEFORE AN ACCUSED MAY VALIDLY INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

There is double jeopardy when there is:

[1] valid complaint of information;

[2] filed in a court of competent jurisdiction;

[3] the accused was validly arraigned; and

[4] the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (PEOPLE VS.
ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1)

158. IF THE DISMISSAL WAS WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED, MAY THE DISMISSAL RESULT IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?

Yes in two (2) instances.

 As a general rule, if the dismissal is through the instance of the accused or
with his express consent, there is no double jeopardy. However, this rule
admits of two (2) exceptions:

1) the motion to dismiss is based on insufficiency of evidence or Demurrer to

Evidence; and

2) the motion to dismiss is based on the denial of the accused’s right to

speedy trial (PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355 SCRA 1) .

-double jeopardy has set in. In these two (2) instances, the correct description
of what happened is that the accused was “acquitted” and not “the case
was dismissed with his consent”.

It must be pointed out, however, that in PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202
and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238, the SC reversed the dismissal of the
criminal case by the trial court based on “speedy trial” since the same was
not predicated “on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.” It is only
when there is a clear violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial that the
dismissal results in double jeopardy.

159. THE ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED WITH AN UNLICENSED FIREARM IN MABALACAT, PAMPANGA. HE WAS CHARGED
FOR VIOLATION OF PD 1866 WITH THE RTC OF PAMPANGA IN AN INFORMATION SIGNED BY THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY. AT THE MIDDLE OF THE TRIAL, THE JUDGE DISMISSED THE CASE WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED. WHEN ANOTHER INFORMATION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE WAS FILED BY THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF PAMPANGA, THE ACCUSED MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE 2ND CASE BASED ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. DECIDE.

Double jeopardy has not set in because the first requisite of valid complaint or
information is not present. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City has no
 jurisdiction to file an information for an offense that took place in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. (CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173)

160. THE ACCUSED WAS CHARGED OF THEFT OF ELECTRICITY BASED ON THE CITY ORDINANCE OF BATANGAS CITY.
AFTER ARRAIGNMENT, THE CASE WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS FOUND OUT THAT THE SAME HAS PRESCRIBED
BECAUSE IT WAS FILED AFTER MORE THAN 60 DAYS. THE FISCAL FILED ANOTHER INFORMATION BASED ON THE
REVISED PENAL CODE. HAS DOUBLE JEOPARDY SET IN?

Yes. If the accused was charged of “theft of electricity” based on the City
Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the Revised Penal Code and later on
the case is dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the crime has
prescribed, the government can no longer charge the accused of the same
crime under the Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in. If an act
is punished by law and an ordinance, acquittal or conviction in one shall bar
prosecution from the other. (PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292)

161. THE ACCUSED WAS CHARGED OF GRAVE COERCION BEFORE THE MTC AND WAS DULY ARRAIGNED. THE JUDGE
DISMISSED IT WITHOUT ANY MOTION FORM THE ACCUSED BECAUSE THE CASE IS ALLEGEDLY OUTSIDE THE MTC’S
JURISDICTION. ANOTHER INFORMATION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE WAS FILED WITH THE RTC WHICH WAS LIKEWISE
DISMISSED BECAUSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION. AS SUCH, THE FISCAL FILED A 3RD INFORMATION FOR GRAVE
COERCION BEFORE THE MTC. THE ACCUSED PLEADED DOUBLE JEOPARDY. IS HE CORRECT?

Yes. Since the accused was already arraigned in the 1st information before the
MTC which has jurisdiction over the same and the case was subsequently
dismissed without his express consent, then double jeopardy has set in.

162. THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED OF HOMICIDE AND ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY BUT PRAYED THAT HE BE GIVEN
THE CHANCE TO PROVE INCOMPLETE SELFDEFENSE WHICH THE COURT GRANTED. AFTER PRESENTING HIS EVIDENCE
TO PROVE “INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE”, THE COURT ACQUITTED HIM BECAUSE WHAT WAS ALLEGEDLY PROVEN BY
HIM WAS COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE. MAY THE ACCUSED VALIDLY INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY IF THE PROSECUTOR
MOVES FOR THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CASE FOR HIM TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION?

No because one of the requisites of double jeopardy is missing. There was no

valid arraignment. This is so because his plea was one of guilty and yet, he
 was acquitted. In this case, he has to be re-arraigned for him to enter a plea
of “not guilty” in order that he could be validly acquitted.(PEOPLE VS.
BALISACAN, 17 SCRA 1119)

163. THE ACCUSED WAS CONVICTED OF FRUSTRATED MURDER. WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM PROMULGATION, HE FILED A
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON A “NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE” WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE COURT.
AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF THE ALLEGED “NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE”, THE ACCUSED WAS ACQUITTED. MAY
THE PROSECUTION APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL SINCE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS NOT REALLY A NEWLY-DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE BUT A FORGOTTEN ONE AND THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE SAME IS A NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE, IT
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERTURN THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT AS PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.

In the case of P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121, the Supreme Court held
that indeed, the evidence presented was not “newly-discovered evidence” and
that assuming it to be so, it was not sufficient to overturn the evidence of
guilt as shown by the prosecution’s evidence. However, though the decision
was erroneous, double jeopardy has set in and the government could no
longer appeal the decision. So even if the court obviously erred in the
appreciation of the evidence resulting in a decision of acquittal instead of
conviction, appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. (Mazo vs. Mun.
Court, 113 SCRA 217)

164. MAY THE GOVERNMENT APPEAL A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OR FOR THE INCREASE OF THE PENALTY
IMPOSED?

As a general rule, No since double jeopardy has set in. (PEOPLE VS. HON.
VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340 SCRA 207, SEPT. 13, 2000). As mandated by
the Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the
trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on
certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman vs.
Sandiganbayan.

However, if the accused was the one who appealed the decision of the CFI
convicting him of homicide (though he was charged of murder), the appellate
court may convict him of murder if the evidence warrants and that the lower
court mis-appreciated the evidence. This is so because if the accused appeals
 the decision, the same will be subject to a complete reexamination of the
evidence on record. (PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, March 2, 2009)

Please take note, however, that in the case of [1] ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 ; [2] PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE HONOURABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No.
154954, February 1, 2012; [3] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT
DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012; and [4] YSIDORO VS. HON.
TERESITA CASTRO, February 6, 2012, the Supreme Court held that a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS ALLOWED IF THERE IS GRAV E ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT IN DISMISSING THE
CRIMINAL CASE OR IN IMPOSING A LOWER PENALTY.

165. MAY THE GOVERNMENT , BY WAY OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, QUESTION THE DECISION
OF ACQUITTAL BY THE TRIAL COURT, OR FOR THE INCREASE OF THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT?

Yes. In cases of: [1] in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction [PEOPLE VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA 185, June 16, 2000]; and [2] where the
prosecution had been deprived of due process due to misfeasance of the
prosecutor. [MERCIALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 379 SCRA 345; PEOPLE VS.
VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, September 13, 2000], cited PEOPLE VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN & IMELDA MARCOS, ET AL., February 7, 2012; VILLAREAL VS.
PEOPLE, February 1, 2012; YSIDORO VS. HON. TERESITA CASTRO, February 6,
2012.

Likewise if the penalty was wrong like imposing slight physical injuries to some
accused and Homicide for the others when all of them participated in
inflicting injuries resulting into the death of Lenny during his initiation rites
, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing and the Supreme Court increased
the penalties for those earlier sentenced to slight physical injuries only.
(VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE, February 1, 2012)
166. JASON IVLER WAS CHARGED OF: [1] RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES; AND [2]
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF HIS SINGLE
NEGLIGENT ACT OF BUMPING THE VEHICLE OF THE VICTIMS. HE ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND
WAS SENTENCED TO CENSURE. WHEN HE WAS ABOUT TO BE ARRAIGNED IN THE SECOND CASE, HE INVOKED
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PRAYED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE SAID 2ND CASE. DECIDE.

Yes, double jeopardy has set in. He could not be tried again for the 2nd case.
A single negligent act could not be the subject of two (2) criminal
informations. [IVLER VS. JUDGE PEDRO, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010]
(NOTE: Very important in your Criminal Law. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows complexing a crime if it involves grave and less grave felonies but
the Ivler case does not involve grave or less grave felonies. The Supreme Court
held that Art. 48 does not apply to negligence cases and should be complexed
regardless of the kind of felonies involved)

167. MAY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT VALIDLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT ACQUITTING HUBERT WEBB AND COMPANY OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND MURDER WITHOUT
VIOLATING THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

No. The acquittal of Hubert Webb and his co-accused by the Supreme Court in
the Vizconde Rape/Murder cases is final. Double jeopardy has set in. (LEJANO
VS. PEOPLE & PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEB ET AL., January 18, 2011)

168. SHARON CUNETA FILED TWO (2) CASES OF LIBEL AGAINST THE EDITORS AND COLUMNIST OF THE TABLOID
BANDERA. AFTER THE PROSECUTION RESTED ITS CASE, THE ACCUSED FILED A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WHICH THE
TRIAL COURT GRANTED. SHARON QUESTIONED THE DISMISSAL BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ON CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE LATTER AND ORDERED THE TRIAL COURT SHALL PROCEED TO RECEIVE
THE EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED. THE EDITORS WENT TO THE SUPREME COURT ALLEGING THAT THEIR RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS VIOLATED.

Yes, the right of said accused against double jeopardy will be violated by
remanding the case for the reception of evidence for the said accused.
Dismissal of a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence amounts to
acquittal and as such, double jeopardy has set in. Finally, the Court of Appeals
should not have entertained Sharon’s petition because only the Solicitor
General could file such a petition questioning the decision of the lower court
 in criminal cases before the CA or SC, not the private complainant. (BAUTISTA
VS. Sharon CunetaPangilinan, October 24, 2012)

169. WHAT IS THE "SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE."

It simply provides that an accused’s conviction shall not be a bar to another

prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information when the graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former
charge or that the facts constituting the graver charge became known only or
were discovered after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information. (Section 7, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; P vs.
Tarok, 73 Phil. 260; P vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268; Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766;
P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712; P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462; P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA
601; and P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637

1 70.If the same libelous article will be published by the author in the internet
and in a daily newspaper, can he be charged separately for Libel under the
Revised Penal Code and Libel under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
since the acts are covered by two (2) different laws?

No, that would violate his right against double jeopardy. (DISINI VS. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, GR No. 203335, February 18, 2014) 171. May a person be
criminally charged separately under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and
Anti-Child Pornography Act since they are punished by different laws? No, that
would violate his right against double jeopardy. (DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, GR No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

BAR QUESTIONS
NO. 21: THE FILIPINO SEAMEN DETAINED AT KOTA KINABALU, ALLEGEDLY FISHING IN MALAYSIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS,
HAD BEEN ACQUITTED, AFTER TRIAL, BY THE SESSIONS COURT IN THE SAME CITY. THEY COULD NOT BE RELEASED AND
RETURNED TO THE PHILIPPINES, BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION HAD APPEALED THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF MALAYSIA. ASSUME THE SITUATIONS HAD BEEN REVERSED AND A MALAYSIAN HAD BEEN
APPREHENDED IN SHASI, SULU, FOR AN ALLEGED OFFENSE, CHARGED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND AFTER
TRIAL ACQUITTED. MAY THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF SULU APPEAL SUCH JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL TO THE SUPREME
COURT, LIKE WHAT THE MALAYSIANS DID IN THE CASE OF THE FILIPINO FISHERMEN AT KOTA KINABALU? EXPLAIN YOUR
ANSWER.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, because it would place the accused in double jeopardy,
contrary to Art. III, sec. 21 of our Constitution. PD No. 1599 prohibits any person not
a citizen to explore or exploit any of the resources of the exclusive economic zone
and makes violation of the prohibition a crime punishable by a fine of P2,000.00
to P100,000.00 and/or imprisonment of not less than 6 months nor more than 10
years. If aliens are arrested for fishing within this zone but for some reason are
acquitted, the decision against them cannot be appealed to the Court of Appeals
because that would place them in double jeopardy. This is so well established that
the Supreme Court turned down many pleas for re-examination of the doctrine
first announced in Kepner v. United States. 11 Phil. 669 (1904). The doctrine is said
to be part and parcel not only of settled jurisprudence but also of constitutional law.
Nor does it matter that the accused are aliens. This guarantee has been applied
even to aliens without thought of their citizenship. (See e.g., People v. Ang Chio
Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954) (Chinese previously convicted of murder); People v.
Pomeroy, 97 Phil 927 (1955) ( American previously convicted of rebellion with
murder, arson and robbery).

Q: DISCUSS THE RIGHT OF EVERY ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY? (1999 BAR)

A: Article III (21) of the New Constitution reads: "No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act."

The first sentence sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
 available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set
of acts.

NO. 13: A PAJERO DRIVEN BY JOE SIDESWIPED A MOTORCYCLE DRIVEN BY NELSON RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO THE
MOTORCYCLE AND INJURIES TO NELSON. JOE SPED ON WITHOUT GIVING ASSISTANCE TO NELSON. THE FISCAL FILED TWO
INFORMATIONS AGAINST JOE, TO WIT: (1) RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY WITH PHYSICAL
INJURIES UNDER ART. 365, RPC, BEFORE THE RTC; AND (2) ABANDONMENT OF ONE'S VICTIM UNDER PAR. 2 ART 275,
BEFORE THE MTC. JOE WAS ARRAIGNED, TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR ABANDONMENT OF ONE'S VICTIM IN THE MTC. HE
APPEALED TO THE RTC. IT WAS ONLY A YEAR LATER THAT HE WAS ARRAIGNED IN THE RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE CHARGE
BEFORE THE RTC. HE PLEADED NOT GUILTY. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE RTC AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE MTC RELATIVE TO
THE ABANDONMENT OF ONE'S VICTIM CHARGE. JOE FILED A PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS,
INVOKING HIS RIGHT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY, CONTENDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FOR ABANDONMENT UNDER ART. 275
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS A BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR NEGLIGENCE UNDER ARTICLE 365 OF THE SAME CODE.
DECIDE.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Joe cannot claim that his conviction for abandoning his
victim in violation of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to his prosecution
for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in Lamera v.
Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186, there is no double jeopardy, because these two
offenses are not identical. Reckless imprudence is a crime falling under the chapter
on criminal negligence, while abandonment of one's victim is a crime falling under
the chapter on crimes against security. The former is committed by means of culpa,
while the latter is committed by means of dolo. Failure to help one's victim is not an
offense by itself nor an element of reckless imprudence. It merely Increases the
penalty by one degree.

NO. 2: THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF MANILA APPROVED AN ORDINANCE (NO. 1000) PROHIBITING THE
OPERATION IN THE STREETS WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS OF TAXICAB UNITS OVER EIGHT YEARS OLD (FROM YEAR OF
MANUFACTURE). THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF IS A FINE OF P4,000.00 OR IMPRISONMENT FOR ONE
YEAR UPON THE ERRING OPERATOR. THEREAFTER AND WHILE THE CITY ORDINANCE WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT. CONGRESS
ENACTED A LAW (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 500) PROHIBITING THE OPERATION IN THE STREETS OF CITIES THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY OF TAXICAB UNITS BEYOND TEN YEARS OLD. THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF IS THE SAME AS
IN ORDINANCE NO. 1000. A, AN OWNER/OPERATOR OF A TAXICAB UNIT OPERATING IN THE CITY OF MANILA, WAS
CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF THE CITY ORDINANCE. UPON ARRAIGNMENT, HE PLEADED NOT GUILTY; WHEREUPON, TRIAL
WAS SET FIVE DAYS THEREAFTER. FOR FAILURE OF THE WITNESSES TO APPEAR AT THE TRIAL, THE CITY COURT DISMISSED
THE CASE AGAINST A. THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MANILA FORTHWITH FILED ANOTHER INFORMATION IN THE SAME COURT
CHARGING A WITH VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 500 FOR OPERATING THE TAXICAB UNIT SUBJECT OF THE
INFORMATION IN THE FIRST CASE. THE ACCUSED MOVED TO DISMISS THE SECOND CASE AGAINST HIM INVOKING DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. HOW WOULD YOU RULE ON A'S MOTION IF YOU WERE THE JUDGE?
 SUGGESTED ANSWER: If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The dismissal of
the first case for failure of the witnesses to appear terminated the first jeopardy. As
held in Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54, the dismissal of a case
for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear constitutes an acquittal.
The acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance No. 1000 bars his prosecution for
violation of Republic Act No. 500. Under Section 21, Article in of the Constitution, if
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
bars another prosecution for the same act.

DISCUSS THE RIGHT OF EVERY ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: According to Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, the rule of double
jeopardy means that when a person was charged with an offense and the case
was terminated by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without his
consent, he cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1999)

C. ON OCTOBER 21, 1986, 17 YEAR OLD VIRGINIA SAGRADO BROUGHT A COMPLAINT AGAINST MARTIN GERALDE FOR
CONSENTED ABDUCTION. WITH THE ACCUSED PLEADING NOT GUILTY UPON ARRAIGNMENT, TRIAL ENSUED. AFTER TRIAL, A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS RENDERED AGAINST GERALDE. WHEN THE CASE WAS APPEALED TO IT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS REVERSED THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT, RATIOCINATING AND RULING AS FOLLOWS: "THIS IS NOT TO SAY
THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOTHING WRONG...SHE WAS SEDUCED BY THE APPELLANT WITH PROMISES (OF MARRIAGE) JUST
TO ACCOMPLISH HIS LEWD DESIGNS." YEARS LATER, VIRGINIA BROUGHT ANOTHER COMPLAINT FOR QUALIFIED SEDUCTION.
GERALDE PRESENTED A MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, WHICH MOTION AND HIS SUBSEQUENT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WERE DENIED: QUESTION: MAY GERALDE VALIDLY INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN
QUESTIONING THE INSTITUTION OF THE CASE FOR QUALIFIED SEDUCTION? HE PLACED RELIANCE PRINCIPALLY ON THE
"SAME EVIDENCE" TEST TO SUPPORT HIS STANCE. HE ASSERTED THAT THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH HE WAS CHARGED
AROSE FROM THE SAME SET OF FACTS. FURTHERMORE, HE AVERTED THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR QUALIFIED SEDUCTION IS
BARRED BY WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL ON THE PART OF THE COMPLAINANT, SHE HAVING OPTED TO CONSIDER THE CASE AS
CONSENTED ABDUCTION. FINALLY, HE ARGUED THAT HER DELAY OF MORE THAN EIGHT (8) YEARS BEFORE FILING THE
SECOND CASE AGAINST HIM CONSTITUTED PARDON ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY. HOW WOULD YOU RESOLVE
GERALD'S CONTENTIONS? EXPLAIN. (4%)
 SUGGESTED ANSWER: Geralde cannot invoke double jeopardy. According to Perez v.
Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 236, there is no identity between consented abduction
and qualified seduction.

CONSENTED ABDUCTION requires that the taking away of the offended party must
be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and the taking
away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand,
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION requires that the crime be committed by abuse of authority,
confidence or relationship and the offender had sexual intercourse with the
woman.

The delay in filing the second case does not constitute pardon, according to Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, to be valid the pardon of the offender by the
offended party must be expressly given.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (2000)

NO XV. CHARGED BY FRANCISCO WITH LIBEL, PABLO WAS ARRAIGNED ON JANUARY 3, 2000, PRE-TRIAL WAS DISPENSED
WITH AND CONTINUOUS TRIAL WAS SET FOR MARCH 7, 8 AND 9, 2000. ON THE FIRST SETTING, THE PROSECUTION MOVED
FOR ITS POSTPONEMENT AND CANCELLATION OF THE OTHER SETTINGS BECAUSE ITS PRINCIPAL AND PROBABLY ONLY
WITNESS, THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FRANCISCO, SUDDENLY HAD TO GO ABROAD TO FULFILL A PROFESSIONAL
COMMITMENT. THE JUDGE INSTEAD DISMISSED THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
B) WOULD THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSAILED DISMISSAL OF THE CASE PLACE THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY? (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: b) Since the postponement of the case would not violate
the right of the accused to speedy trial, the precipitate dismissal of the case is void.
The reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double Jeopardy.

NO X - FOR THE DEATH OF JOEY, ERNING WAS CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF VALENZUELA. HE WAS ARRAIGNED. DUE TO NUMEROUS POSTPONEMENTS OF THE SCHEDULED HEARINGS AT
THE INSTANCE OF THE PROSECUTION, PARTICULARLY BASED ON THE GROUND OF UNAVAILABILITY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES WHO COULD NOT BE FOUND OR LOCATED, THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS PENDING TRIAL FOR A PERIOD OF SEVEN
YEARS. UPON MOTION OF ACCUSED ERNING WHO INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE.
EVENTUALLY, THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES SURFACED, AND A CRIMINAL CASE FOR HOMICIDE, INVOLVING THE SAME
INCIDENT WAS FILED ANEW AGAINST ERNING. ACCUSED ERNING MOVED FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. THE PROSECUTION OBJECTED, SUBMITTING THE REASON THAT IT WAS NOT ABLE TO PRESENT THE SAID
WITNESSES EARLIER BECAUSE THE LATTER WENT INTO HIDING OUT OF FEAR. RESOLVE THE MOTION. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of a criminal case
predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for
the same offense.

NO IX. A TAMARAW FX DRIVEN BY ASIONG CASCASERO, WHO WAS DRUNK, SIDESWIPED A PEDESTRIAN ALONG EDSA IN
MAKATI CITY, RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURIES TO THE LATTER. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FILED TWO SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS AGAINST CASCASERO, THE FIRST FOR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND THE SECOND FOR VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE OF MAKATI CITY PROHIBITING AND
PENALIZING DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR. CASCASERO WAS ARRAIGNED, TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. WITH REGARD TO THE
SECOND CASE (I.E., VIOLATION OF THE CITY ORDINANCE), UPON BEING ARRAIGNED, HE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION INVOKING HIS RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. HE CONTENDED THAT, UNDER ART. III, SECTION 21 OF
THE CONSTITUTION, IF AN ACT IS PUNISHED BY A LAW AND AN ORDINANCE, CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL UNDER EITHER
SHALL CONSTITUTE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACT HE ARGUED THAT THE TWO CRIMINAL CHARGES
AGAINST HIM STEMMED FROM THE SAME ACT OF DRIVING ALLEGEDLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR WHICH CAUSED
THE ACCIDENT. WAS THERE DOUBLE JEOPARDY? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER (5%)

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second
sentence of Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved in the
two cases. The reckless imprudence which resulted in physical injuries arose from
the same act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-
12669, April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an accused who was acquitted of
driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance could not be prosecuted for damage
to property through reckless imprudence because the two charges were based on
the same act. In People v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was held that when there
is identity in the act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall bar prosecution under the other.

SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: There is no double jeopardy because the act

penalized under the Revised Penal Code is different from the act penalized by the
ordinance of Makati City. The Revised Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence
 resulting in physical injuries, while the ordinance of Makati City penalizes driving
under the influence of liquor.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY; REQUISITES (1999)

B. WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: As held in Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159, for a
claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) a
first jeopardy has attached; (2) the first jeopardy was validly terminated; and (3)
the second is for the same offense. A first jeopardy attaches: 1. upon a valid
complaint or information; 2. before a competent court; 3. after arraignment; 4. a
valid entry of plea; and 5. the dismissal or termination of the case without the
express consent of the accused.

REQUISITES Q: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY? (1999 BAR)

A: Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present:

a. a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

b. the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and

c. a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.

A first jeopardy attaches only:

a. after a valid indictment;

b. before a competent court;

c. after arraignment;
 d. when a valid plea has been entered; and

e. when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent (Cerezo v. People, G.R. No.
185230, June 1, 2011).

Q: ON OCTOBER 21, 1986, 17 YEAR OLD VIRGINIA SAGRADO BROUGHT A COMPLAINT AGAINST MARTIN GERALDE
FOR CONSENTED ABDUCTION. WITH THE ACCUSED PLEADING NOT GUILTY UPON ARRAIGNMENT, TRIAL ENSUED.
AFTER TRIAL, A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS RENDERED AGAINST GERALDE. WHEN THE CASE WAS APPEALED TO
IT, THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT, RATIOCINATING AND RULING AS
FOLLOWS: "THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOTHING WRONG...SHE WAS SEDUCED BY THE APPELLANT
WITH PROMISES (OF MARRIAGE) JUST TO ACCOMPLISH HIS LEWD DESIGNS." YEARS LATER, VIRGINIA BROUGHT
ANOTHER COMPLAINT FOR QUALIFIED SEDUCTION. GERALDE PRESENTED A MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY, WHICH MOTION AND HIS SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WERE DENIED: QUESTION:
MAY GERALDE VALIDLY INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN QUESTIONING THE INSTITUTION OF THE CASE FOR QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION? HE PLACED RELIANCE PRINCIPALLY ON THE "SAME EVIDENCE" TEST TO SUPPORT HIS STANCE. HE
ASSERTED THAT THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH HE WAS CHARGED AROSE FROM THE SAME SET OF FACTS.
FURTHERMORE, HE AVERTED THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR QUALIFIED SEDUCTION IS BARRED BY WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
ON THE PART OF THE COMPLAINANT, SHE HAVING OPTED TO CONSIDER THE CASE AS CONSENTED ABDUCTION. FINALLY,
HE ARGUED THAT HER DELAY OF MORE THAN EIGHT (8) YEARS BEFORE FILING THE SECOND CASE AGAINST HIM
CONSTITUTED PARDON ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY. HOW WOULD YOU RESOLVE GERALD'S
CONTENTIONS? EXPLAIN. (1999 BAR)

A: Geralde’s invocation of double jeopardy is improper. Although the two

crimes may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not identical
offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy. The gravamen
of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is still
under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to
the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the
rights of the parent or guardian. In cases of seduction, the gravamen of the
offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced.

Moreover, Virginia's filing of a subsequent case against the accused belies his
allegation that she has waived or is estopped from filing the second charge
against him. Neither could she be deemed to have pardoned him, for the
rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective, must be expressly
given (Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the 1985
 Rules on Criminal Procedure). Moreover the length of time it took her to file the
second case is of no moment considering that she filed it within the ten (10)-
year prescriptive period (Art. 90, RPC; Perez v. CA, G.R. No. L-80838, November
29, 1988).

Q: CHARGED BY FRANCISCO WITH LIBEL, PABLO WAS ARRAIGNED ON JANUARY 3, 2000. PRE-TRIAL WAS
DISPENSED WITH AND CONTINUOUS TRIAL WAS SET FOR MARCH 7, 8 AND 9, 2000. ON THE FIRST SETTING, THE
PROSECUTION MOVED FOR ITS POSTPONEMENT AND CANCELLATION OF THE OTHER SETTINGS BECAUSE ITS PRINCIPAL
AND PROBABLY ONLY WITNESS, THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FRANCISCO, SUDDENLY HAD TO GO ABROAD TO FULFILL A
PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENT. THE JUDGE INSTEAD DISMISSED THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. WOULD THE
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSAILED DISMISSAL OF THE CASE PLACE THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
(2000 BAR)

A: No, the reversal of the trial court’s assailed dismissal of the case would not
place the accused in double jeopardy. While generally, dismissal of cases on
the ground of failure to prosecute predicated on the clear right of the accused
to speedy trial is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution
of the accused for the same offense, the same rule is not applicable in this
case considering that the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, Pablo cannot invoke his right against
double jeopardy (People v. Tampal, G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995).

Q: FOR THE DEATH OF JOEY, ERNING WAS CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF VALENZUELA. HE WAS ARRAIGNED. DUE TO NUMEROUS POSTPONEMENTS OF THE SCHEDULED HEARINGS
AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PROSECUTION, PARTICULARLY BASED ON THE GROUND OF UNAVAILABILITY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES WHO COULD NOT BE FOUND OR LOCATED, THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS PENDING TRIAL FOR A PERIOD OF
SEVEN YEARS. UPON MOTION OF ACCUSED ERNING WHO INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, THE COURT
DISMISSED THE CASE. EVENTUALLY, THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES SURFACED, AND A CRIMINAL CASE FOR HOMICIDE,
INVOLVING THE SAME INCIDENT WAS FILED ANEW AGAINST ERNING. ACCUSED ERNING MOVED FOR DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. THE PROSECUTION OBJECTED, SUBMITTING THE REASON THAT IT
WAS NOT ABLE TO PRESENT THE SAID WITNESSES EARLIER BECAUSE THE LATTER WENT INTO HIDING OUT OF FEAR.
RESOLVE THE MOTION. (2001 BAR)

A: The motion should be granted. As held in Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54, the
dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a
speedy trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Q: A TAMARAW FX DRIVEN BY ASIONG CASCASERO, WHO WAS DRUNK, SIDESWIPED A PEDESTRIAN ALONG EDSA IN
MAKATI CITY, RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURIES TO THE LATTER. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FILED TWO SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS AGAINST CASCASERO, THE FIRST FOR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND THE SECOND FOR VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE OF MAKATI CITY PROHIBITING AND
PENALIZING DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR. CASCASERO WAS ARRAIGNED, TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. WITH REGARD TO THE
SECOND CASE (I.E., VIOLATION OF THE CITY ORDINANCE), UPON BEING ARRAIGNED, HE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH
THE INFORMATION INVOKING HIS RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. HE CONTENDED THAT, UNDER ART. III, SECTION
21 OF THE CONSTITUTION, IF AN ACT IS PUNISHED BY A LAW AND AN ORDINANCE, CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL
UNDER EITHER SHALL CONSTITUTE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACT HE ARGUED THAT THE TWO
CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST HIM STEMMED FROM THE SAME ACT OF DRIVING ALLEGEDLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
LIQUOR WHICH CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. WAS THERE DOUBLE JEOPARDY? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER. (2002, SIMILAR
QUESTION IN 1997 BAR)

A: Yes, there was double jeopardy. The constitutional protection against

double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given
rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. In this
case, the same act is involved in the two cases. The reckless imprudence which
resulted in physical injuries arose from the same act of driving under the
influence of liquor. The fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same
act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.

Q: BUTCHOY INSTALLED A JUMPER CABLE. HE WAS PROSECUTED UNDER A MAKATI ORDINANCE PENALIZING SUCH ACT.
HE MOVED FOR ITS DISMISSAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE JUMPER CABLE WAS WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
OF MANDALUYONG AND NOT MAKATI. THE CASE WAS DISMISSED. THE CITY OF MANDALUYONG THEREAFTER FILED A
CASE AGAINST HIM FOR THEFT UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE (RCP). IS THERE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

A. NO. THE FIRST JEOPARDY WAS TERMINATED WITH HIS EXPRESS CONSENT;
B. YES. THIS IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF THE SECOND KIND – PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACT UNDER AN ORDINANCE
AND A LAW;
C. YES. HE IS PROSECUTED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED BY THE CITY OF MAKATI;
D. NO. THE SECOND KIND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNDER SECTION 21, ARTICLE III ONLY CONTEMPLATES CONVICTION
OR ACQUITTAL WHICH COULD TERMINATE A FIRST JEOPARDY. (2012 BAR)

A: D. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only
contemplates conviction or acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy.
(Zapatos Vs People, 411 Scra 148)
Q: JC, A MAJOR IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINE, IS FACING PROSECUTION BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY FOR THE MURDER OF HIS NEIGHBOR WHOM HE SUSPECTED TO HAVE MOLESTED HIS (JC’S)
15 YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER.

ASSUME THAT UPON BEING ARRAIGNED, JC ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY AND WAS ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
TO PROVE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. JC THEN TESTIFIED TO THE EFFECT THAT HE STABLED THE DECEASED IN
SELFDEFENSE BECAUSE THE LATTER WAS STRANGLING HIM AND THAT HE VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL COURT RENDERED A DECISION ACQUITTAL VIOLATE JC’S RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY? WHY OR WHY NOT? (3%)

BY PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, JC EFFECTIVELY WITHDREW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY

(PEO VS. BALISACAN, G.R. NO. L-26376, AUG. 31, 1966). IN THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
PLEA, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND FIRST JEOPARDY WAS
ABSENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ACQUIT JC. THUS, AN APPEAL
BY THE PROSECUTION WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST SECOND JEOPARDY.

Jurisprudence
WHEN THE ACT IS PUNISHED BY BOTH A LAW AND AN ORDINANCE

JUDGE RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292- IF THE ACCUSED WAS CHARGED OF “THEFT OF ELECTRICITY” BASED ON THE CITY
ORDINANCE OF BATANGAS AND NOT BASED ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND LATER ON THE CASE IS DISMISSED
BY THE JUDGE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIME HAS PRESCRIBED, THE GOVERNMENT CAN NO LONGER CHARGE
THE ACCUSED OF THE SAME CRIME UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE SINCE DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS SET IN.

WHEN OFFENSES CHARGED ARE PENALIZED:

1. BY DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE SAME STATUTE
2. BY DIFFERENT STATUTES
…FOCUS IS ON IDENTITY OF OFFENSES. IF OFFENSES ARE THE SAME, DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES.

WHEN:
1. ONE OF THE OFFENSES IS CHARGED UNDER A STATUTE
2. THE OTHER UNDER A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE

…FOCUS IS ON THE IDENTITY OF THE ACTS.

IF OFFENSES CHARGED ARE BASED ON THE SAME ACT, THERE IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

SAME OFFENSE MEANS:

1. SIMILARITY OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS
2. ONE OFFENSE AMOUNTS TO AN ATTEMPT OR FRUSTRATION OF THE OTHER
3. ONE OFFENSE IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OTHER
CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173-[PETITIONER WAS ARRESTED OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM IN MABALACAT,
PAMPANGA BUT IT WAS THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY WHO SIGNED THE INFORMATION]

IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY INVOKE THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST BE PRESENT:

(1) A FIRST JEOPARDY MUST HAVE ATTACHED PRIOR TO THE SECOND;

(2) THE FIRST JEOPARDY MUST HAVE BEEN VALIDLY TERMINATED; AND
(3) THE SECOND JEOPARDY MUST BE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE OR THE SECOND OFFENSE INCLUDES OR IS NECESSARILY
INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE FIRST INFORMATION, OR IS AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE SAME OR A
FRUSTRATION THEREOF.

IN DETERMINING WHEN THE FIRST JEOPARDY MAY BE SAID TO HAVE ATTACHED, IT IS NECESSARY TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE
OF THE FOLLOWING:

(A) COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION

(B) VALID COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

(C) ARRAIGNMENT

(C) VALID PLEA

(E) THE DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED OR CONVICTED OR THE CASE WAS DISMISSED OR OTHERWISE TERMINATED WITHOUT
THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED.

PEOPLE VS. GALANO, 75 SCRA 193- CHARGED OF ESTAFA IN BATANGAS. DURING TRIAL, IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE IN MANILA. NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY IF A NEW INFORMATION WILL BE
FILED IN MANILA]

RESPONDENT ACCUSED INTENT ON THWARTING HIS PROSECUTION FILED ANEW A MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION
ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY. THERE IS MANIFESTLY NO JEOPARDY, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT
ACQUITTED BY THE BATANGAS COURT WHICH ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE COULD NEITHER CONVICT HIM BECAUSE IT
WAS THEREBY SHOWN TO HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE.

"SETTLED IS THE RULE ... THAT THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS DETERMINED IN CRIMINAL CASES BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF
THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION AND NOT BY THE RESULT OF PROOF.

PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN, 17 SCRA 1119-[ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CHARGE OF HOMICIDE BUT PRAYED FOR
PRESENTATION OF HIS EVIDENCE FOR INCOMPLETE SELFDEFENSE. HE WAS ACQUITTED INSTEAD. NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SINCE THERE WAS A VALID PLEA]

THIS COURT NOW TURNS TO SECTION 2, RULE 122 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT: "THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES CAN NOT APPEAL IF THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE PLACED THEREBY IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY." THE PRESENT STATE
OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THIS REGARD IS THAT THE ABOVE PROVISION APPLIES EVEN IF THE ACCUSED FAILS TO FILE A BRIEF AND
RAISE THE QUESTION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY (PEOPLE V. FERRER, L-9072, OCTOBER 23, 1956; PEOPLE V. BAO, L-12102,
SEPTEMBER 29, 1959; PEOPLE V. DE GOLEZ, L-14160, JUNE 30, 1960).
THE NEXT ISSUE, THEREFORE, IS WHETHER THIS APPEAL PLACED THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY. IT IS SETTLED THAT THE
EXISTENCE OF A PLEA IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY (PEOPLE V. YLAGAN, 58 PHIL. 851; PEOPLE V.
QUIMSING, L-19860, DECEMBER 23, 1964). IN THE PRESENT CASE, IT IS TRUE, THE ACCUSED HAD FIRST ENTERED A PLEA
OF GUILTY. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, HE TESTIFIED, IN THE COURSE OF BEING ALLOWED TO PROVE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT HE ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE. SAID TESTIMONY, THEREFORE — AS THE COURT A QUO
RECOGNIZED IN ITS DECISION — HAD THE EFFECT OF VACATING HIS PLEA OF GUILTY AND THE COURT A QUO SHOULD HAVE
REQUIRED HIM TO PLEAD A NEW ON THE CHARGE, OR AT LEAST DIRECT THAT A NEW PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BE ENTERED FOR
HIM. THIS WAS NOT DONE. IT FOLLOWS THAT IN EFFECT THERE HAVING BEEN NO STANDING PLEA AT THE TIME THE COURT A
QUO RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY WITH RESPECT TO THE APPEAL HEREIN.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE- ONLINE LIBEL IS DIFFERENT. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT IF THE
PUBLISHED MATERIAL ON PRINT, SAID TO BE LIBELOUS, IS AGAIN POSTED ONLINE OR VICE VERSA, THAT IDENTICAL MATERIAL
CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF TWO SEPARATE LIBELS. THE TWO OFFENSES, ONE A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AND THE OTHER A VIOLATION OF SECTION 4(C)(4) OF R.A. 10175 INVOLVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ELEMENTS
AND ARE IN FACT ONE AND THE SAME OFFENSE. INDEED, THE OSG ITSELF CLAIMS THAT ONLINE LIBEL UNDER SECTION
4(C)(4) IS NOT A NEW CRIME BUT IS ONE ALREADY PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 353. SECTION 4(C)(4) MERELY ESTABLISHES
THE COMPUTER SYSTEM AS ANOTHER MEANS OF PUBLICATION.75 CHARGING THE OFFENDER UNDER BOTH LAWS WOULD BE
A BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.76

THE SAME IS TRUE WITH CHILD PORNOGRAPHY COMMITTED ONLINE. SECTION 4(C)(2) MERELY EXPANDS THE ACPA’S SCOPE
SO AS TO INCLUDE IDENTICAL ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE. AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, ACPA’S DEFINITION OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY IN FACT ALREADY COVERS THE USE OF "ELECTRONIC, MECHANICAL, DIGITAL, OPTICAL, MAGNETIC OR ANY
OTHER MEANS." THUS, CHARGING THE OFFENDER UNDER BOTH SECTION 4(C)(2) AND ACPA WOULD LIKEWISE BE
TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

BAUTISTA VS. CA- THE RULING IS AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN
ACQUITTAL AND MAY NO LONGER BE APPEALED. ANY FURTHER PROSECUTION OF THE ACCUSED AFTER AN ACQUITTAL
WOULD, THUS, VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

SANDIGANBAYAN AND IMELDA MARCOS- AS A RULE, ONCE THE COURT GRANTS THE DEMURRER, THE GRANT
AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL; ANY FURTHER PROSECUTION OF THE ACCUSED WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROSCRIPTION ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY.20 NOTABLY, THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY ONLY ENVISAGES
APPEALS BASED ON ERRORS OF JUDGMENT, BUT NOT ERRORS OF JURISDICTION. JURISPRUDENCE RECOGNIZES TWO
GROUNDS WHERE DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL NOT ATTACH, THESE ARE: (I) ON THE GROUND OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION;21 AND/OR (II) WHERE THERE IS A DENIAL OF A PARTY’S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS.

JASON IVLER VS. JUDGE PEDRO- AFTER THE PETITIONER PLEADED GUILTY TO RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING
TO SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND WAS SENTENCED TO CENSURE, HE COULD NOT BE TRIED ANYMORE OF THE 2ND
CASE OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY WHICH AROSE FROM THE
SAME ACT. DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS SET IN.

LEJANO VS. PEOPLE & PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB- BUT, AS A RULE, A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL CANNOT BE
RECONSIDERED BECAUSE IT PLACES THE ACCUSED UNDER DOUBLE JEOPARDY. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES IN SECTION 21,
ARTICLE III, THAT:

SECTION 21. NO PERSON SHALL BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. X X X
AFTER THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED BY THE SC ON DECEMBER 14, 2010, DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS SET IN AND NO
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE ENTERTAINED.

DAYAP VS. SENDIONG- ACQUITTAL THROUGH DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS FINAL AND COULD NOT BE APPEALED.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS SET IN BUT CIVIL ASPECT MAY STILL PROCEED IF THERE IS NO EXPRESS FINDING THAT ACCUSED
HAS NOT COMMITTED THE CRIME]

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO- [IF AN ACCUSED OF MURDER WAS CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE ONLY IN THE RTC BUT APPEALS
THE SAME TO THE HIGHER COURT, HE COULD NOT COMPLAIN OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IF THE APPELLATE COURT
SENTENCES HIM OF MURDER SINCE THAT IS THE EVIDENCE FOUND DURING THE REVIEW OF THE CASE ON APPEAL]

MAY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT INCREASE THE PERNALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIALCOURT ON APPEAL BY
THE ACCUSED? YES.

YES BECAUSE IT WAS THE ACCUSED WHO INTERPOSED THE APPEAL MAKING THECOURT REVIEW THE EVIDENCE. AND IT IT
FINDS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION OFTHE CRIME OF MURDER, IT COULD INCREASE THE PENALTY.

PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO- THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE “DISMISSAL” IS ACTUALLY AN “ACQUITTAL” AND THEREFORE, ALL THE
REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY ARE COMPLETE.

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO- MAY THE GOVERNMENT APPEAL A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OR FOR THE INCREASE OF THE
PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT?

THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT APPEAL OR FILE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI QUESTIONING THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS SET IN.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE. APPEAL BY THE GOVERNMENT FROM VERDICTS OF ACQUITTAL.

AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND COGNATE JURISPRUDENCE, AN ACQUITTAL IS FINALAND

UNAPPEALABLE ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, WHETHER IT HAPPENS AT THE TRIAL COURTOF A JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL BROUGHT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI CANNOT BE HADUNLESS THERE IS A FINDING OF
MISTRIAL, AS IN GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN.

PEOPLE VS. MOLERO- THERE IS NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

a. DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CASE CONTEMPLATED BY THE RULE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDYPRESUPPOSES A DEFINITE
AND UNCONDITIONAL DISMISSAL WHICH TERMINATES THE CASE.(JACA VS.BLANCO, 86 PHIL. 452; PEOPLE VS.
MANLAPAS, 5 SCRA 883; PEOPLE VS. MOGOL, 131SCRA 296) AND "FOR DISMISSAL TO BE A BAR UNDER THE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THECONSTITUTION, IT MUST HAVE THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL.(PEOPLE VS. AGONCILLO, 40
SCRA579);
b. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSAL THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WASWITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF A NEW COMPLAINT AND/OR INFORMATION CHARGING MOLERO WITHTHE PROPER
OFFENSE. THE SAID DISMISSAL DID NOT THEREFORE AMOUNT TO AN ACQUITTAL.
c. IN FACT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE ADOPTED SUCH A CUMBERSOMEPROCEDURE. IT
COULD HAVE MERELY ORDERED AN AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT. SEC. 12, RULE119 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT APPLIES WHEN THERE IS A MISTAKE IN CHARGING THE PROPEROFFENSE, BUT NOT WHEN AN HONEST
ERROR OF A FEW DAYS IS SOUGHT TO BE CORRECTED AND THECHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED.
 d. THE PRECISE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THEOFFENSE OF RAPE.
THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT CHANGING THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OFTHE CRIME OF RAPE FROM
FEBRUARY 13, 1976 TO FEBRUARY 5, 1976 , A DIFFERENCE OF 8 DAYSWAS ONLY A MATTER OF FORM UNDER THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE AND DID NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OFTHE ACCUSED.
e. THE RELIANCE OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. OPEMIA, 98 PHIL. 698 IS NOTWELL-TAKEN. IN THE
SAID CASE THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT WAS THE CHANGING OF THE DATEOF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
FROM JUNE 18, 1952 TO JULY 1947, OR A DIFFERENCE OF5 YEARS. THE S.C. HELD THAT THE AMENDMENT THAT
WOULD CHANGE THE DATE OF THECOMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE FROM 1947 TO 1952 IS CERTAINLY NOT A
MATTER OF FORM.
f. THE DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST COMPLAINT DID NOT AMOUNT TO THE APPELLANT'S ACQUITTAL. IN EFFECT,THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PROPER BASIS FOR A CLAIM OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.(PEOPLE VS.
BOCAR, 138 SCRA 166)

PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT- IF A FACT (WHICH CHANGES THE CHARACTER OF THE OFFENSE) WAS IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF
THE 1ST PROSECUTION, SUCH FACT MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED A SUPERVENING EVENT SO AS TO ALLOW A 2ND PROSECUTION.

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA-REQUISITES FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO ATTACH:

1. VALID COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
2. BEFORE A COMPETENT COURT WITH JURISDICTION
3. DEFENDANT HAS PLEADED TO THE CHARGE
4. DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED, CONVICTED OR THE CASE AGAINST HIM WAS DISMISSED WITHOUT HIS EXPRESS
CONSENT

-DISMISSAL WAS BASED ON THE MERITS OR AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL

WHEN A DEFENDANT MOVES FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST HIM, DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH
BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF THE 4TH REQUISITE

PEOPLE V ADILL 1977- DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT > IF AFTER THE FIRST PROSECUTION, A NEW FACT
SUPERVENES ON WHICH DEFENDANT MAY BE HELD LIABLE, RESULTING IN ALTERING THE CHARACTER OF THE CRIME
AND GIVING RISE TO A NEW AND DISTINCT OFFENCE, THE ACCUSED CAN’T BE SAID TO BE IN SECOND JEOPARDY IF
INDICTED FOR THE NEW OFFENSE

CHAPTER XXI
RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW, BILL
OF ATTAINDER, ETC.

Sec. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted

GREENNOTES
172. WHEN MAY THE “EX-POST FACTO LAW” RULE BE INVOKED?

Only if the law sought to be applied is a “[1] criminal law or penal in nature;
[2] it is applied retroactively; and that [3] it is prejudicial to the accused”.
Otherwise, the same may not be invoked as when the questioned law involves
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is not a penal law. Ex post facto
law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. RA 8249 is not a penal law. It
is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. (PANFILO
M. LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.,
ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR., G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999)

173. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF EX-POST FACTO LAW?

In order that a law is an ex post facto law, the same must be one—

a. which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;

b. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;

c. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed;

d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required a the time of the commission of the offense
in order to convict the defendant;
 e. every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage;

f. 48 that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

g. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he

has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, 35 SCRA 429;
MEJIA VS. PAMARAN, 160 SCRA 457; TAN VS. BARRIOS, 190 SCRA 686; PEOPLE
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 211 SCRA 241).

Jurisprudence
NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN- IN ORDER THAT A LAW IS AN EX POST FACTO LAW, THE SAME MUST BE ONE—

1. WHICH MAKES AN ACT DONE CRIMINAL BEFORE THE PASSING OF THE LAW AND WHICH WAS INNOCENTWHEN
COMMITTED, AND PUNISHES SUCH ACTION;
2. WHICH AGGRAVATES A CRIME OR MAKES IT GREATER THAN WHEN IT WAS COMMITTED;
3. WHICH CHANGES THE PUNISHMENT AND INFLICTS A GREATER PUNISHMENT THAN THE LAW ANNEXED TOTHE CRIME WHEN
IT WAS COMMITTED;
4. WHICH ALTERS THE LEGAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND RECEIVES LESS OR DIFFERENT TESTIMONY THAN THELAW REQUIRED A
THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT;
5. EVERY LAW WHICH, IN RELATION TO THE OFFENSE OR ITS CONSEQUENCES, ALTERS THE SITUATION OF APERSON TO HIS
DISADVANTAGE;
6. THAT WHICH ASSUMES TO REGULATE CIVIL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES BUT IN EFFECT IMPOSES A PENALTY ORDEPRIVATION OF
A RIGHT WHICH WHEN DONE WAS LAWFUL;
7. DEPRIVES A PERSON ACCUSED OF A CRIME OF SOME LAWFUL PROTECTION TO WHICH HE HAS BECOMEENTITLED, SUCH AS
THE PROTECTION OF A FORMER CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL, OR A PROCLAMATION OFAMNESTY (KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, 35
SCRA 429; MEJIA VS. PAMARAN, 160 SCRA 457; TAN VS. BARRIOS, 190 SCRA 686; PEOPLE VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 211 SCRA241).

PEOPLE VS. FERRER- THE ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT OUTLAWING THE CPP IS NOT A BILL OF ATTAINDER FOR “APPLYING TO
NAMED INDIVIDUALS OR TO EASILY ASCERTAINABLE MEMBERS OF A GROUP”. THE USE OF THE WORD “CPP” IS ONLY FOR
DEFINITIONAL PURPOSES AND DOES NOT PURPORT REFER TO ONLY ONE COMMUNIST/SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION.
CITIZENSHIP

Art. 4

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided

by law.

Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to
have renounced it.

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law
BAR QUESTIONS
Q: FROM MAINLAND CHINA WHERE HE WAS BORN OF CHINESE PARENTS, MR. NYA TSA CHAN MIGRATED TO THE
PHILIPPINES IN 1894. AS OF APRIL 11, 1899, HE WAS ALREADY A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS AND CONTINUED TO RESIDE IN THIS COUNTRY UNTIL HIS DEATH. DURING HIS LIFETIME AND WHEN HE WAS
ALREADY IN THE PHILIPPINES, MR. NYA TSA CHAN MARRIED CHARING, A FILIPINA, WITH WHOM HE BEGOT ONE
SON, HAP CHAN, WHO WAS BORN ON OCTOBER 18. 1897. HAP CHAN GOT MARRIED ALSO TO NIMFA, A FILIPINA,
AND ONE OF THEIR CHILDREN WAS LACQUI CHAN WHO WAS BORN ON SEPTEMBER 27. 1936. LACQUI CHAN
FINISHED THE COURSE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN COMMERCE AND EVENTUALLY ENGAGED IN BUSINESS. IN THE MAY
1989 ELECTION, LACQUI CHAN RAN FOR AND WAS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE (CONGRESSMAN). HIS RIVAL
CANDIDATE, RAMON DELORIA, FILED A QUO WARRANTO OR DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST HIM ON THE GROUND
THAT HE WAS NOT A FILIPINO CITIZEN. IT WAS POINTED OUT IN PARTICULAR, THAT LACQUI CHAN DID NOT ELECT
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF 21.

DECIDE WHETHER MR. LACQUI CHAN SUFFERS FROM A DISQUALIFICATION OR NOT. (2001 BAR)

A: Lacqui Chan is a Filipino citizen and need not elect Philippine citizenship. His
father, Hap Chan, was a Spanish subject, was residing in the Philippines on
April 11, 1899, and continued to reside in the Philippines. In accordance with
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, he was a Filipino citizen. Hence, in
accordance with Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution. Lacqui Chan is a natural
born Filipino citizen, since his father was a Filipino citizen.

Q: MIGUEL SIN WAS BORN A YEAR AGO IN CHINA TO A CHINESE FATHER AND A FILIPINO MOTHER. HIS PARENTS
MET IN SHANGHAI WHERE THEY WERE LAWFULLY MARRIED JUST TWO YEARS AGO. IS MIGUEL SIN A FILIPINO CITIZEN?
(2003 BAR)

A: Yes, Miguel Sin is a Filipino citizen because he is the legitimate child of a

Filipino mother. Under Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, his mother
retained her Philippine citizenship despite her marriage to an alien husband, and
according to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution, children born of a
Filipino mother are Filipino citizens.

Q: ATTY. EMILY GO, A LEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF A CHINESE FATHER AND A FILIPINO MOTHER, WAS BORN IN
1945. AT 21, SHE ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND STUDIED LAW. SHE PASSED THE BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
ENGAGED IN PRIVATE PRACTICE FOR MANY YEARS. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL NOMINATED HER AS A
CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. BUT HER NOMINATION IS BEING
CONTESTED BY ATTY. JURIS CASTILLO, ALSO AN ASPIRANT TO THE POSITION. SHE CLAIMS THAT ATTY. EMILY GO IS NOT A
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN, HENCE, NOT QUALIFIED TO BE APPOINTED TO THE SUPREME COURT. IS THIS CONTENTION
CORRECT? (2006 BAR)

A: The contention that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen is not

correct. She was born before January 17, 1973 of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. She elected Philippine citizenship when she reached twenty-one
years of age. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Section 1(3), Article
IV of the Constitution are natural-born citizens.

Q: ATTY. RICHARD CHUA WAS BORN IN 1964. HE IS A LEGITIMATE SON OF A CHINESE FATHER AND A FILIPINO MOTHER.
HIS FATHER BECAME A NATURALIZED FILIPINO CITIZEN WHEN ATTY. CHUA WAS STILL A MINOR. EVENTUALLY, HE
STUDIED LAW AND WAS ALLOWED BY THE SUPREME COURT TO TAKE THE BAR EXAMINATIONS, SUBJECT TO HIS
SUBMISSION TO THE SUPREME COURT PROOF OF HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. ALTHOUGH HE NEVER COMPLIED WITH
SUCH REQUIREMENT, ATTY. CHUA PRACTICED LAW FOR MANY YEARS UNTIL ONE NOEL EUGENIO FILED WITH THE
SUPREME COURT A COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT AGAINST HIM ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS NOT A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
HE THEN FILED WITH THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AN AFFIDAVIT ELECTING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. NOEL
CONTESTED IT CLAIMING IT WAS FILED MANY YEARS AFTER ATTY. CHUA REACHED THE AGE OF MAJORITY. WILL
ATTY. CHUA BE DISBARRED? EXPLAIN. (2006 BAR)

A: ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA SHOULD NOT BE DISBARRED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 15

OF THE REVISED N ATURALIZATION ACT, HE BECAME A NATURALIZED PHILIPPINE CITIZEN
WHEN HIS FATHER BECAME A FILIPINO CITIZEN DURING HIS MINORITY . HENCE , THERE
WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP (C O V. HRET, 199 SCRA
692, [1991]).

Q: EDWIN NICASIO, BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES OF FILIPINO PARENTS AND RAISED IN THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA,
RAN FOR GOVERNOR OF HIS HOME PROVINCE. HE WON AND HE WAS SWORN INTO OFFICE. IT WAS RECENTLY
REVEALED, HOWEVER, THAT NICASIO IS A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN.
A. DOES HE STILL POSSESS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP?
B. IF NICASIO WAS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES, WOULD HE STILL BE A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES? (1992 BAR)
 A:

No, Nicasio no longer possesses Philippine citizenship. As held in Frivaldo vs.

Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245, by becoming a naturalized American
citizen, Nicasio lost his Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1(1) of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Philippine citizenship is lost by naturalization in a
foreign country.

If Nicasio was born in the United States, he would still be a citizen of the
Philippines, since his parents are Filipinos. Under Section 1(2), those whose
fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines are citizens of the Philippines.
Nicasio would possess dual citizenship, since under American Law persons born
in the United States are American citizens. As held in Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185
SCRA 703, a person who possesses both Philippine and American citizenship is
still a Filipino and does not lose his Philippine citizenship unless he renounces
it.

Q: DISCUSS THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JUS SANGUINIS AS BASIS OF FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE
1935, 1973, AND 1987 CONSTITUTIONS. (2015 BAR)

A: Section 1. Art. III of the 1935 Constitution adopted the jus sanguinis
principles as the basis of the Filipino citizenship if the father is a Filipino citizen.
However, Subsection 4, Section 1, Art. III of the Constitution provided that if the
mother was a Filipino citizen who lost her Philippine citizenship because of her
marriage to a foreign husband, her children could elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

Subsection 2, Section 1, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child
born of a father or a mother who is a citizen of the Philippines is a Filipino
citizen.

Section 2, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child whose father
or mother is a Filipino citizen is a Filipino citizen. Subsection 3, Section 1, Art.
IV of the 1987 Constitution provided that a child born before January 17, 1973,
 of Filipino mothers, who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1973 Constitution is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Tecson v
COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 [2004]).

Q: WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGES OF: 1. A CITIZEN TO AN ALIEN; 2. AN ALIEN TO A CITIZEN; ON THEIR
SPOUSES AND CHILDREN? DISCUSS. (1999 BAR) (SIMILAR QUESTION IN 1989 BAR)

A: 1. According to Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution, Filipino citizens

who marry aliens retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. 2. According to Mo Ya Lim
Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292, under Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, a foreign woman who marries a Filipino citizen
becomes a Filipino citizen provided she possesses none of the disqualifications
for naturalization. A foreign man who marries a Filipino citizen does not acquire
Philippine citizenship. However, under Section 3 of the Revised Naturalization
Act, in such a case the residence requirement for naturalization will be reduced
from ten (10) to five (5) years. Under Section 1(2), Article IV of the
Constitution, the children of an alien and a Filipino citizen are citizens of the
Philippines.

Q: ROSEBUD IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO WOMAN WHO GOT MARRIED TO ROCKCOLD, A CITIZEN OF STATE
FROZEN. BY VIRTUE OF THE LAWS OF FROZEN, ANY PERSON WHO MARRIES ITS CITIZENS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE
DEEMED ITS OWN CITIZEN. AFTER TEN YEARS OF MARRIAGE, ROSEBUD, WHO HAS SPLIT HER TIME BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND FROZEN, DECIDED TO RUN FOR CONGRESS. HER OPPONENT SOUGHT HER DISQUALIFICATION,
HOWEVER, CLAIMING THAT SHE IS NO LONGER A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN. IN ANY EVENT, SHE COULD NOT SEEK
ELECTIVE POSITION SINCE SHE NEVER RENOUNCED HER FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PURSUANT TO THE CITIZENSHIP
RETENTION AND REACQUISITION ACT (R.A. NO. 9225). IS ROSEBUD DISQUALIFIED TO RUN BY REASON OF
CITIZENSHIP? (2014 BAR)

A: No, because Rosebud never lost her status as a naturalborn citizen by

reason of marriage to a foreigner. In addition to her status as a natural born
citizen, she acquired the citizenship of her husband by operation of law and
not by a voluntary act of acquisition thereof and voluntary renunciation of her
former citizenship.
 In relation to election protest, what is prohibited is dual allegiance. Allegiance
to a foreign state is acquired through an express and voluntary act of
renouncing once allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and swearing
allegiance to a foreign state e.g. enlisting in the military services of another
state.

Q: ENZO, A CHINESE NATIONAL, WAS GRANTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN A DECISION RENDERED BY THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA ON JANUARY 10, 1956. HE TOOK HIS OATH OF OFFICE ON JUNE 5, 1959. IN
1970, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FILED A PETITION TO CANCEL HIS CITIZENSHIP ON THE GROUND THAT IN JULY 1969
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS FOUND THAT ENZO HAD CHEATED THE GOVERNMENT OF INCOME TAXES FOR THE
YEARS 1956 TO 1959. SAID DECISION OF THE TAX COURT WAS AFFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 1969. BETWEEN
1960 AND 1970, ENZO HAD ACQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL REAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.

A. HAS THE ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF ENZO’S CITIZENSHIP PRESCRIBED?

B. CAN ENZO ASK FOR THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD AVAILED OF THE TAX
AMNESTY FOR HIS TAX LIABILITIES?
C. WHAT IS THE EFFECT ON THE PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF ENZO'S CITIZENSHIP IF ENZO DIED DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE HEARING ON SAID PETITION? (1994 BAR)

No, the action has not prescribed. As held in Republic vs. Li Yao, 214 SCRA 748,
a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled at any time if it was
fraudulently obtained by misleading the court regarding the moral character of the
petitioner.

No. Enzo cannot ask for the denial of the petition for the cancellation of his
certificate of naturalization on the ground that he had availed of the tax
amnesty. In accordance with the ruling in Republic vs. Li Yao. 224 SCRA 748,
the tax amnesty merely removed all the civil, criminal and administrative
liabilities of Enzo. It did not obliterate his lack of good moral character and
irreproachable conduct.

On the assumption that he left a family, the death of Enzo does not render the
petition for the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization moot. As held in
Republic vs. Li Yao, 224 SCRA 748, the outcome of the case will affect his wife
and children.

Q: LIM TONG BIAO, A CHINESE CITIZEN APPLIED FOR AND WAS GRANTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY THE COURT. HE
TOOK HIS OATH AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES IN JULY 1963. IN 1975, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
FILED A PETITION TO CANCEL HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR THE REASON THAT IN AUGUST 1963, THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS FOUND HIM GUILTY OF TAX EVASION FOR DELIBERATELY UNDERSTATING HIS INCOME TAXES FOR THE
YEARS 1959-1961.

A. COULD LIM TONG BIAO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF HIS FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP?
B. SUPPOSING LIM TONG BIAO HAD AVAILED OF THE TAX AMNESTY OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HIS TAX LIABILITIES,
WOULD THIS CONSTITUTE A VALID DEFENSE TO THE CANCELLATION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP? (1998 BAR)

A:

No, Lim Tong Biao cannot raise the defense of prescription. As held in Republic
vs. Go Bon Lee, 1 SCRA 1166, 1170, a decision granting citizenship is not res
judicata and the right of the government to ask for the cancellation of a
certificate cancellation is not barred by the lapse of time.

The fact that Lim Tong Biong availed of the tax amnesty is not a valid defense
to the cancellation of his Filipino citizenship. In Republic vs. Li Yao, 214 SCRA
748, 754, the Supreme Court held: “xxx the tax amnesty does not have the
effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable
conduct which are grounds for denaturalization."

TRUE OR FALSE. DUAL CITIZENSHIP IS NOT THE SAME AS DUAL ALLEGIANCE. (2009 BAR)

A: TRUE. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application

of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by those states and is involuntary. On the other hand,
dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes
by some positive and voluntary act, loyalty to two or more states (Mercado v.
Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 [1999]).

Q: JULIO HORTAL WAS BORN OF FILIPINO PARENTS. UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, HE BECAME A
NATURALIZED CITIZEN IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. LATER, HE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. COULD HORTAL REGAIN
HIS STATUS AS NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN? WOULD YOUR ANSWER BE THE SAME WHETHER HE REACQUIRES HIS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP BY REPATRIATION OR BY ACT OF CONGRESS? EXPLAIN. (1999 BAR)
 A: Julio Mortal can regain his status as a natural born citizen by repatriating.
Since repatriation involves restoration of a person to citizenship previously lost
by expatriation and Julio Mortal was previously a natural born citizen, in case
he repatriates he will be restored to his status as a natural born citizen. If he
reacquired his citizenship by an act of Congress, Julio Hortal will not be a
natural born citizen, since he reacquired his citizenship by legislative
naturalization.

Q: CRUZ, A FILIPINO BY BIRTH, BECAME AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. IN HIS OLD AGE HE HAS RETURNED TO THE
COUNTRY AND WANTS TO BECOME A FILIPINO AGAIN. AS HIS LAWYER, ENUMERATE THE WAYS BY WHICH CITIZENSHIP
MAY BE REACQUIRED. (2000 BAR)

A: Cruz may reacquire Philippine citizenship in the following ways:

1. By naturalization;

2. By repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171; and

3. By direct act of Congress (Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 63).

Q: WARLITO, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, TOOK UP PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND
EVENTUALLY ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. HE THEN MARRIED SHIRLEY, AN AMERICAN, AND SIRED THREE
CHILDREN. IN AUGUST 2009, WARLITO DECIDED TO VISIT THE PHILIPPINES WITH HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN: JOHNNY, 23
YEARS OF AGE; WARLITO, JR., 20; AND LUISA, 17.

WHILE IN THE PHILIPPINES, A FRIEND INFORMED HIM THAT HE COULD REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
NECESSARILY LOSING U.S. NATIONALITY. THUS, HE TOOK THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE REQUIRED UNDER R.A. 9225.

a. HAVING REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, IS WARLITO A NATURAL-BORN OR A NATURALIZED FILIPINO

CITIZEN TODAY? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

A: Warlito is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Repatriation of Filipinos results in

the recovery of his original nationality. Since Warlito was a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he was restored to his former status as
 a natural-born Filipino citizen (Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545; RA 2630).

b. WITH WARLITO HAVING REGAINED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, WILL SHIRLEY ALSO BECOME A FILIPINO CITIZEN?
IF SO, WHY? IF NOT, WHAT WOULD BE THE MOST SPEEDY PROCEDURE FOR SHIRLEY TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP? EXPLAIN.

A: Shirley will not become a Filipino citizen, because under RA 9225, Warlito’s
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not extend its benefits to Shirley. She
should instead file with the Bureau of Immigration a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration on the ground that in
accordance with Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, because of her marriage
with Warlito, she should be deemed to have become a Filipino citizen. She
must allege and prove that she possessed none of the disqualification to
become a naturalized Filipino citizen (Burca v. Republic 51 SCRA 248).

C. DO THE CHILDREN --- JOHNNY, WARLITO JR., AND LUISA --- BECOME FILIPINO CITIZENS WITH THEIR FATHER'S
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER. (2009 BAR)

A: Under Section 18 of RA 9225, only the unmarried children who are below
eighteen years of age of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship shall be
deemed Filipino citizens. Thus, only Luisa, who is seventeen years old, became
a Filipino citizen.

Q: IN 1989, ZENY REYES MARRIED BEN TULOG, A NATIONAL OF THE STATE OF KONGO. UNDER THE LAWS OF
KONGO, AN ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING A KONGO NATIONAL AUTOMATICALLY ACQUIRES KONGO CITIZENSHIP. AFTER
HER MARRIAGE, ZENY RESIDED IN KONGO AND ACQUIRED A KONGO PASSPORT. IN 1991, ZENY RETURNED TO THE
PHILIPPINES TO RUN FOR GOVERNOR OF SORSOGON.

A. WAS ZENY QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR GOVERNOR?

B. SUPPOSE INSTEAD OF ENTERING POLITICS. ZENY JUST GOT HERSELF ELECTED AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
BULLETIN, A LOCAL NEWSPAPER. WAS SHE QUALIFIED TO HOLD THAT POSITION? (1994 BAR)
 A:

Under Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution. Zeny retained her Filipino

citizenship. Since she also became a citizen of Kongo, she possesses dual
citizenship. Pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, she is
disqualified to run for governor. In addition, if Zeny returned to the Philippines,
less than a year immediately before the day of the election, Zeny is not
qualified to run for Governor of Sorsogon. Under Section 39(a) of the Local
Government Code, a candidate for governor must be a resident in the province
where he intends to run at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election. By residing in Kongo upon her marriage in 1989, Zeny
abandoned her residence in the Philippines. This is in accordance with the
decision in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229

Although under Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution, mass media must
be wholly owned by Filipino citizens and under Section 2 of the Anti-Dummy
Law aliens may not intervene in the management of any nationalized business
activity, Zeny may be elected vice president of the Philippine Bulletin, because
she has remained a Filipino citizen. Under Section 4, Article IV of the
Constitution, Filipino citizens who marry aliens retains their citizenship unless by
their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Zeny is not guilty of any of acts or omission which will result in loss of
citizenship are enumerated in Commonwealth Act No, 63. As held in Kawakita v.
United States, 343 U.S. 717, a person who possesses dual citizenship like Zeny
may exercise rights of citizenship in both countries and the use of a passport
pertaining to one country does not result in loss of citizenship in the other
country.

Q: ANDRES ANG WAS BORN OF A CHINESE FATHER AND A FILIPINO MOTHER IN SORSOGON, SORSOGON ON JANUARY
20, 1973. IN 1988, HIS FATHER WAS NATURALIZED AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN. ON MAY 11, 1998, ANDRES ANG WAS
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF SORSOGON. JUAN BONTO WHO RECEIVED THE SECOND HIGHEST
NUMBER OF VOTES, FILED A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AGAINST ANG. THE PETITION WAS FILED WITH THE
HRET. BONTO CONTENDS THAT ANG IS NOT A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THEREFORE IS
DISQUALIFIED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE. THE HRET RULED IN FAVOR OF ANG. BONTO FILED A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT. THE FOLLOWING ISSUE IS RAISED: WHETHER ANG IS A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
OF THE PHILIPPINES. HOW SHOULD THIS CASE BE DECIDED? (1998 BAR)

A: Andres Ang should be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He

was born of a Filipino mother on January 20, 1973. This was after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Under Section (1),
 Article VI of the 1973 Constitution, those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines are citizens of the Philippines. Andres Ang remained a citizen
of the Philippines after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The following are citizens of the
Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;"

Q: A WAS BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES OF FILIPINO PARENTS. WHEN MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED IN THE
PHILIPPINES ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1972, HE WENT TO THE UNITED STATES AND WAS NATURALIZED AS AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN. AFTER THE EDSA REVOLUTION, HE CAME HOME TO THE PHILIPPINES AND LATER ON REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY REPATRIATION. SUPPOSE IN THE MAY 2004 ELECTIONS HE IS ELECTED MEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND A CASE IS FILED SEEKING HIS DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS NOT
A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOW SHOULD THE CASE AGAINST HIM BE DECIDED? EXPLAIN YOUR
ANSWER. (2002 BAR)

A: The case should be decided in favor of A. As held In Bengson v. HRET, 357

SCRA 545, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. Since
A was a naturalborn Filipino citizen before he became a naturalized American
citizen, he was restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino when he
repatriated.

Q: JUAN CRUZ WAS BORN OF FILIPINO PARENTS IN 1960 IN PAMPANGA. IN 1985, HE ENLISTED IN THE U.S.
MARINE CORPS AND TOOK AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IN 1990, HE WAS
NATURALIZED AS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. IN 1994, HE WAS REPATRIATED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2430. DURING
THE 1998 NATIONAL ELECTIONS, HE RAN FOR AND WAS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF
PAMPANGA WHERE HE RESIDED SINCE HIS REPATRIATION. WAS HE QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR THE POSITION? EXPLAIN.
(2003 BAR)

A: Cruz was qualified to run as representative of the First District of

Pampanga. Since his parents were Filipino citizens, he was a natural born
citizen. Although he became a naturalized American citizen, under the ruling in
Bengson v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545, by virtue of his repatriation, Cruz was
restored to his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Q: TCA, A FILIPINA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIST, LEFT IN 1975 TO WORK IN ZOZ STATE. IN 1988 SHE MARRIED ODH,
A CITIZEN OF ZOZ. PURSUANT TO ZOZ'S LAW, BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE, SHE ACQUIRED HER HUSBAND’S
CITIZENSHIP. ODH DIED IN 2001, LEAVING HER FINANCIALLY SECURED. SHE RETURNED HOME IN 2002, AND SOUGHT
ELECTIVE OFFICE IN 2004 BY RUNNING FOR MAYOR OF APP, HER HOMETOWN. HER OPPONENT SOUGHT TO HAVE
HER DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE OF HER ZOZ CITIZENSHIP. SHE REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH SHE ACQUIRED ZOZ’S
CITIZENSHIP BECAUSE OF MARRIAGE, SHE DID NOT LOSE HER FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP. BOTH HER PARENTS, SHE SAID,
ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS. IS TCA QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR MAYOR? (2004 BAR)

A: On the assumption that TCA took an oath of allegiance to ZOZ to acquire

the citizenship of her husband, she is not qualified to run for mayor. She did
not become a citizen of ZOZ merely by virtue of her marriage; she also took
an oath of allegiance to ZOZ. By this act, she lost her Philippine citizenship.
(Section 1 [3], Commonwealth Act No. 63.)

Jurisprudence
LABO JR. VS. COMELEC- PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST THROUGH:
1. NATURALIZATION IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
2. EXPRESS RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP
3. SUBSCRIBING TO AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE REACQUIRED BY:

1. DIRECT ACT OF CONGRESS
2. NATURALIZATION
3. REPATRIATION

MOYA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION- AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MA RRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN IF SHE POSSESSES NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS ENUMERATED IN THE PHILIPPINE NATURALIZATION LAW. SHE IS THEN DEEMED A FILIPINO
WITHOUT HAVING TO SUBMIT TO NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS AND MAY SETTLE THE MATTER OF HER
NATURALIZATIO N BY FILING A PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF HER ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION.