Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common Good

Author(s): Thomas W. Smith

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 625-636
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 3 September 1999

Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits

THOMAS W. SMITH Villanova University
C contemporary debates over liberal political theory should encourage renewed investigation of the
common good, and it is appropriate to begin by interrogatingAristotle's account. Aristotle argues that
injustice stands in the way of the common good. Injustice is motivated by both overgrasping for
scarce external goods, such as money, honor, and power, and by excessive desires. Aristotle argues that the
common good requires a reorientation away from external goods to satisfying activities that do not diminish
in the sharing. He sketches an analogical account of familial and political relationships that leads us to
wonder what the political conditions are for the common good. Reflecting on these conditions not only
points to the strict limits of the common good but also speaks to both sides in debates over liberal theory.

T he common good was once a central problem in
political theory because it provided a framework
for thinking about the relationship between in-
dividual interests and the interests of the community.
While the term has been used in many ways, it is
generally acknowledged to have Aristotelian roots and
to refer to "a good proper to, and attainable only by,
the community, yet individually shared by its members"
(Dupre 1993, 687). Yet, talk about the common good
has been all but abandoned. In the twentieth century,
only Catholic social and political theory still clings to
the concept (DeKonnick 1943; Finnis 1980, 168; Flan-
nery 1996, 191-2, 195, 256-61; Goerner 1966; Keys
1995; Novak 1989; Rourke 1996).
The ascendance of liberal theory led to the decline of
interest in the common good. For a variety of reasons
liberal theorists suspect that the common good cannot
be sustained politically because the "common" good is
always someone's bad. Some liberal theorists argue
that since no one is a better judge of what is ultimately
good for us than we are ourselves, neither moral or
religious elites nor any community have the right to
enforce their conception of ends on us (Ackerman
1980, 10-11; Mill [1859] 1947). Other liberal thinkers
are antiteleological, insisting that no summum bonum
exists which could provide a nonarbitrary, nondespotic
foundation for a common good (Hobbes [1668] 1994,
57-8). Still others insist that science cannot reveal any
uniquely human function which could provide a uni-
versally attractive image of human flourishing (Locke
[1690] 1959, 350-1). In a different vein, Rawls argues
that the diversity of opinions about what is good entails
that the liberal community must be based on overlap-
ping consensus rather than the kind of deep agreement
that the common good would seem to require. Con-
tested comprehensive doctrines should remain private,
partly because they are unable to provide reasonable
public claims to the community's allegiance (Rawls
1971, 395-407, 1993, 252, 215, 243-4).
Leaving the common good behind, liberal theorists
Thomas W. Smith is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vil-
lanova University, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085.
I am grateful to- V. Bradley Lewis, John Schrems, Colleen Shee-
han, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments, as
well as to E. A. Goerner, Stephen Salkever, and Walter Thompson
for conversations that helped me think through the issues contained
in this article.
articulated a constellation of concepts to manage the
tension between the individual and the community.
Liberal theory generally requires political neutrality so
as to provide for universal means that allow equality in
pursuit of individual ends (Lowi 1995, 15, chap. 6;
Rawls 1993, 191-4). This neutrality flows from the
community's social contract, which enables individuals
to pursue their preferred good free from coercion.
Thus, the basis for political authority and legitimacy in
liberal theory is not the common good but, rather, the
free contract among rational individuals for the pro-
tection of their natural rights.
Such concepts as political neutrality, social contracts,
and natural rights have come under sustained attack in
debates over liberal theory. Not surprisingly, these
debates have led to a renewed interest in the common
good (MacIntyre 1990). Communitarians blame the
liberal tradition for undermining community by pro-
ducing atomistic individuals. They also argue that
liberalism's focus on individual rights obscures the ways
people's identities are constituted by participation in
community and political life (Bellah 1985; Etzioni
1998; MacIntyre 1984; Sandel 1982; Taylor 1989; Wal-
zer 1983). Strains of postmodernism criticize claims
about the self-evidence of natural rights (Pangle 1992).
Political neutrality has been criticized as a myth at least
since Marx argued that liberal rhetoric obscures the
ways its political order promotes the interests of one
group over others. More recently, MacIntyre (1988,
326- 69) has argued that the liberal order is just
another tradition among many. Within the liberal
tradition itself, some argue that liberalism has substan-
tive conceptions of the good that should be promoted
over the alternatives (Macedo 1992, 1998).
For these reasons, political theory needs to raise
anew questions about the relationship between individ-
ual and community interests. Among other things, this
requires thinking through the concept of the common
good to see whether it can be sustained. It is helpful to
do so with someone like Aristotle for several reasons.
First, while he is often identified as a proponent of
community (MacIntyre 1984), I will argue that his
articulation of the conditions for the common good
force his readers to be more thoughtful about its strict
limits. Second, since his account is neither communi-
tarian nor liberal, reading him gives us a new perspec-
tive on the relation between community and individual

625

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 Aristotle on the Common
interests. Third, since Aristotle does not base his
arguments on contested religious doctrines, his account
of the conditions for community help foster a common
ground for the discussion.
Aristotle is not optimistic about the possibility of
common good. While it requires participants in the
community to be just, he emphasizes the persistence of
injustice.1 He thinks that most human beings are not
good because we have been formed by the mores of
more or less unjust regimes (NE 1179b15-6,
1150a15-6, 1179bl6-20).2 Indeed, most of us identify
political rule with the kind of rule masters exercise over
slaves (P 1252a7-9; 1324b32-3). Moreover, neither
political regimes nor households pay adequate atten-
tion to the kind of character formation the common
good requires (NE 1180a24-9; cf. NE 1103b25 and P
1337all). So, for an Aristotelian, perhaps it is best to
begin thinking about the common good by exploring
the injustice that stands in its way.
THE SUPPLY PROBLEM
Many liberal theorists argue that people possess pre-
political rights they can hold as trumps against individ-
uals, groups, or power structures that would force them
to act contrary to their conception of the good. From
this perspective, the origin of injustice is the inability or
unwillingness to be other-regarding. That is, the motive
for injustice is a lack of sensitivity to other people's
notions of the good. Often, the cure for this is some
form of sensitivity training, wherein the offender is toldovergrasp for these scarce resources in order to be free
not to violate another's right to self-respect.3
Aristotle has strikingly different accounts of the
motives for injustice. In one, he both sketches what
particular injustice concerns and explores the motiva-
tions of people who practice it. According to him, the
unjust person is guilty of "graspingness" or "overreach-
ing" (pleonexia; literally "having more"). Such a man
I This point bears emphasis since some scholars who overlook
Aristotle's critiques of politicians' motives wind up seriously under- Economic scarcity led to strife and domination in the
estimating his criticism of political practice (Casey 1990, 208; Hauer-
was and Pinches 1997, 46; Millbank 1990, 352; for an excellent
corrective to this tendency, see Mara 1995). This neglect leads some
to argue that Aristotle's goal is to train students who could grab the providing for material resources led ancient Greek
reigns of power to effect the kinds of political reforms he has in mind communities to see hierarchy and domination as cen-
(Bod6iis 1993). By contrast, I will argue that Aristotle's sober
assessment of the reality of injustice and his strict requirements for
the common good should lead his readers to be more pessimistic
about the possibility of political reforms for the sake of community.
2 References to Aristotle's works will be incorporated into the text,
with the Bekker pagination preceded by an abbreviated reference to
the work according to the following scheme: Eudemian Ethics (EE),
Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Politics (P), Posterior Analytics (PA),
Rhetoric (R), Topics (T).
3 For example, Philippa Foote states in Virtues and Vices: "Virtues
such as justice do not correspond to any particular desire or tendency
that has to be kept in check [as do such virtues as temperance and
courage] but rather to a deficiency of motivation; and it is this that
they must make good. If people were as much attached to the good
of others as they are to their own good there would no more be a
general virtue of benevolence than there is a general virtue of
self-love. And if people cared about the rights of others as they care
about their own rights no virtue of justice would be needed to look
after the matter" (quoted in O'Connor 1988, 419). Perhaps this is
why Rawls (1971, 440) calls self-respect the "most important primary
good."
626
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Good September 1999
takes more than his fair share of the external goods
involved in "good and bad fortune" (NE 1129b4-6).
Aristotle identifies these goods as material wealth,
honor, security, and any other thing people in the
the regime have to share. He does not have a single term
that encompasses them all and indicates that he is
struggling for one (NE 1130b3-4). Since it is clear from
the context that Aristotle is concerned above all with
the scarcity of these goods, I will use "scarce resources"
to describe them.
It is clear why these scarce resources have to do with
fortune. Human life is plagued by instability. We
depend on a range of contexts we do not create and
over which we have little control. Subject to bodily
limits, disease, natural disasters, and unjust treatment
by our fellows, human beings strive in various ways to
manage our dependence on the vagaries of fortune.
The external goods Aristotle identifies as the subject of
injustice apparently enable us to maximize our poten-
tial for good luck and minimize our potential for bad
(or at least soften its blows). For instance, a multimil-
lionaire has many more options if her loved one comes
down with malignant cancer than does a poor person.
A universally honored person has many more options if
she is sued by a rival than does a universally reviled
person. A knowledgeable person with powerful con-
nections has many more options in resisting a new tax
law that would devastate her business than does a poor
person. Aware of our own insecurity, and longing to
protect our lives in the face of it, people tend to
from a terrifying dependence on fate.4
The scarcity of these resources makes them the
subject of intense competition and conflict, and it often
prompts the desire for mastery. For this reason, Aris-
totle consistently calls them the "goods people fight
about" (NE 1169a21-2; EE 1248b27; R 1368bl2-4).
Material possessions are obviously scarce. This was
especially true in ancient economies, where (in contrast
to modern economies of growth) wealth was fixed.
ancient city. Factional conflict usually occurred be-
tween the rich and poor. Moreover, the difficulty of
tral to their life (P 1278a10-1, 1329al-3, 1334a19;
Booth 1993, 72-6). That is, citizens exercised mastery
over slaves and women, whose time was spent provid-
ing for their material needs so they could have leisure
for politics and culture.
Honor is also a limited resource. Honor is compar-
ative due to the finitude of human memory. Being
honored requires that people actually recall and cele-
brate one's excellent deeds. Yet, honor is scarce be-
cause human beings can remember and celebrate only
a few individuals. The scarcity of honor made it the
4 Nussbaum (1986) has explored the problem of luck in ancient
thought, but she does not focus extensively on the social and political
problems created by people's tendency to overgrasp for scarce social
resources so as to insulate themselves from fate. She emphasizes
instead the different ways philosophy tries through reason to manage
dependence on fate.
 American Political Science
subject of intense conflict in ancient Greece. Sensing
themselves to be bound up with the struggle for honor,
citizens were led to be suspicious of their fellows and to
take precautions against them. In this sense, the em-
phasis on freedom in Athenian political institutions can
be understood as motivated in part by fear of domina-
tion. Freedom of speech in the Assembly and demo-
cratic institutions, such as the lottery and direct voting
on law, protected the masses from honor-loving elites
(Ober 1989). Private prosecution protected citizens
from ambitious prosecutors, and popular juries pro-
tected them from the power held by experts in law. Law
courts generally served as mechanisms for competition
rather than the neutral adjudication of disputes (Co-
hen 1995). Thus, in the public struggle for honor and its
consequences, we discover part of the psychic root of
the civil strife (stasis) and domination endemic to
ancient Greek life. In line with a long tradition empha-
sizing success in agonal struggles as the criterion for
humanity, political elites in classical Athens competed
for political influence, often in savage ways (Ober 1989,
84-5; Salkever 1991, 165-90). In such a context, the
temptation was strong to seek mastery both to extend
the range of one's activities and to make preemptive
strikes against those who might take away one's free-
dom and security in their pursuit of honor. In foreign
affairs as well, Thucydides points out that the Athenian
empire was motivated largely by insecurity and lust for
mastery, which was seen as not merely natural but
divinely sanctioned.5
Finally, what conduces to people's security and pres-
ervation is also scarce, insofar as power and prestige
are scarce. Clearly, power and prestige seem to protect
us from fortune, and so political elites compete vigor-
ously for them. In short, overgrasping for more than
one's fair share of these scarce resources creates a host
of political problems.
THE DEMAND PROBLEM
Aristotle provides another account of the origin of
injustice, however. For him, human beings are unjust
because we desire far more than we strictly need. He
sketches the problem in his account of acquisition.
Aristotle identifies the true art of business expertise
with household management. This aims at the limited
goal of self-sufficiency in the household with a view to
the good life (P 1256b31-2). The art of trade initially
arose as a way of making mutually beneficial exchanges
for an adequate supply of necessary goods in the
household. Because necessary goods are not always
portable, money was invented as a medium of ex-
change. For Aristotle, trade involving money is accord-
ing to nature. Yet, over time and with the benefit of
experience, trade degenerated into the sham technique
of making the largest profit (P 1256b40-1257b10). On
5 In the Melian dialogue, the Athenians admit that their imperialism
is driven by fear and insecurity (Thucydides 1983, 402-3). And when
the Melians say they will trust the gods to protect them against
aggression, the Athenians reply that the gods favor the strong
(Thucydides 1983, 404).
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Review Vol. 93, No. 3
this view, business has no limit, and unlimited acquisi-
tion of wealth and property is good (P 1257al-2).
Aristotle differentiates the true art of business from
its sham counterpart by articulating the limit (peras)
that the goal of household management imposes on
acquisition. While the goal of household management
is the self-sufficiency that makes flourishing family life
possible, moneymaking strives for wealth and posses-
sions without limit. The maximization of profit appears
to be a true art, because the goal of any art is without
limit, in a sense (P 1257a28ff). Yet, if arts are not
directed by practical wisdom, which grasps the shape of
a flourishing human life, then in practice their ordering
principle will be the practitioner's own desires. In other
words, Aristotle argues that if we treat sham arts as
architectonic, then we paradoxically destroy the goods
we sought through the sham art in the first place. For
example, he argues that household management guides
the use of the goods that business expertise makes or
acquires. Since business exists to create the material
conditions for a flourishing household, it makes no
sense to seek unlimited wealth. If a businessperson
seeks unlimited wealth, she is treating moneymaking as
architectonic and thus subordinates all the activities of
her household to moneymaking (P 1257b30-3). But
this might preclude the possibility of a flourishing
household. For an Aristotelian, it makes no sense to
destroy one's household in pursuit of unlimited wealth
and possessions, for these goods exist as a means to a
happy home, not the other way around. In this way, the
goal of household management sets limits on acquisi-
tion. When people forget such limits, at the same time
they forget the purpose of the household, and the sham
art of trade takes over their lives (P 1257b30-5). In this
way, excessive desire for accumulation impedes flour-
ishing.
Aristotle says that people seek wealth without limit
because they are eager for life (to zen) but not for living
well (to eu zen, P 1257b40-1258a2). Since their desire
for life is without limit, they also desire what produces
unlimited things. Moreover, for most of us, living well
is equated with bodily pleasure, and this also leads
people to pursue unlimited acquisition, because plea-
sure seems to be available in and through external
possessions. Since their enjoyment is found in excess,
they seek what produces excess. Aristotle concludes
this discussion with the sobering observation that if
people cannot acquire what they want through the art
of moneymaking, then they will try some other way (P
1258a9-10; cf. NE 1095bl9-22).
Aristotle makes a similar point in his examination of
Phaleas of Chalcedon's proposal to equalize property
as a way of minimizing factional strife. In general
Aristotle criticizes the proposal by arguing that such
strife stems not merely from unequal distribution of
property but also from the strength of human desires
(P 1267a2). People desire far more than they need, and
often they will do wrong to meet those desires (P
1267a5). Indeed, Aristotle says that the nature of
desire is to be without limit (apeiros), and so people are
always demanding more and more (P 1267b1-5). In
627
 Aristotle on the Common
fact, the "greatest injustices" are done because of such
excess (P 1267al2-3).
REORIENTATION?
In sum, Aristotle thinks that the motivation for partic-
ular injustice is personal disorientation. The vicious
person misunderstands his own best interest, and this
intrapersonal problem has disastrous interpersonal
consequences.6 If the unjust person were not exces-
sively devoted to goods like honor, money, or power,
the community would be better off, for such overgrasp-
ing inevitably leads to social disorder and mastery (NE
1169a21-2; EE 1248b27; R 1368bl2-4). Conversely,
from an Aristotelian perspective justice will not mean
merely a sensitivity to other people's rights and con-
ceptions of the good but, rather, the disposition to
engage in cooperative ventures that foster the nonzero-
sum, shareable goods at the heart of a satisfying
common life. The Aristotelian insistence on the con-
nection between friendship and justice stems from his
assumption that there is no divergence between such
intrapersonal virtues as temperance and courage and
such interpersonal virtues as justice and friendship.
For Aristotle, the cure for injustice is personal
reorientation. That is, if the common good is to come
about, each citizen must undergo a radical conversion.
According to Aristotle, moderation is the cure for
some excessive desires (P 1267a10). This cure entails
forming reasonable people (epiekeis) so that they will
not want to overreach for external goods (P 1267b6-
8).7 That is, moderation involves not merely limiting,
but reorienting desire. The question is whether citizens
can somehow transform themselves from individualis-
tic competitors fighting over scarce resources to part-
ners in a flourishing community. If such a community
were possible, overgrasping would not be in one's
interest, because it would destroy the conditions of
one's own satisfaction.
Part of the goal of the discussion of friendship in the
Ethics is to show why such a reorientation is in our
interest. This entails meeting two conditions that ad-
dress the supply and demand aspects of injustice. First,
6 "Aristotle does not think of justice and other interpersonal virtues
(such as philia) as having a different aetiological basis from the
particular virtues concerned with pleasure and pain. He does not see
two realms of virtue, but one fundamental kind of human excellence
viewed from two perspectives. Injustice and other breaches of
community are not caused by a special incapacity linked to egoism
(such as a poorly developed sense of justice). They are the 'political'
or interpersonal symptom of psychic or intrapersonal disorientation.
Someone with an insatiable desire for money or honors will neces-
sarily find himself at odds with others. Thus for Aristotle the
self-indulgent man is at least potentially the unjust man, and the cure
for his self-indulgence would also be the cure for injustice. The only
guarantee of good citizenship is the proper psychic disposition
toward the pleasures and pains that motivate human action"
(O'Connor 1991, 163-4).
7 Moderation also involves structuring things so that base people will
be unable to overreach. Aristotle's silence about the possibility of
transforming the desires of the base implies fundamental limits on
the possibility of the common good. This recalls his pessimism about
the possibility of educating people in virtue in the last chapter of the
Nicomachean Ethics (Simpson 1998, 103).
628
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Good September 1999
the community would have to be able to attain nonze-
ro-sum goods, which do not necessarily lead to compe-
tition and mastery because they do not diminish in the
sharing. Second, a common life devoted to such goods
would have to be more satisfying than overreaching
individualistically for power and profit.8
The problems are obvious. Aristotle thinks that most
of us are unjust, and the sources of injustice-the
scarcity of the world's resources and the strength and
problematic character of human desires-are more or
less intractable. So it seems unreasonable to think that
people will actually reorient their lives. Moreover,
since the common good requires a shared life devoted
to cooperative activities, it would necessitate surren-
dering control of our lives to other people in the
community. Yet, given the way Aristotle says most of
us behave, we have little reason to trust that we would
be treated fairly if we did. Rather, any sacrifice for the
community exposes us to exploitation and domination.
Given Aristotle's account of the motivations for injus-
tice, how is it possible to argue for, much less actually
bring about, a common good and the reorientation it
would require?
FROM HAVING TO BEING
Among other things, Aristotle's account of friendship
(philia9) addresses this question. Often, Aristotle's
discussion of friendship is read as a didactic treatise
that is addressed to an indeterminate audience and lays
out an abstract account of the three kinds of philia and
their relationship (Cooper 1980; Price 1989; Walker
1979). Yet, Aristotle is emphatic that the discussion has
a pedagogical intent. At the beginning of the inquiry he
sketches a series of disagreements and questions about
philia (NE 1155b21-2). He then states that the answers
8 Here I must point out the limits of my account. In the Politics,
Aristotle sketches what I have called the demand side of the problem
by articulating three sources of injustice: necessity, wanting more
than one needs, and the desire for pleasure without pain (P
1267a4-9). One can acquire necessities with a little property and
some hard work and so become too busy to engage in faction. The
remedy for excessive desire is moderation (P 1267alO), or reorien-
tation of desire (P 1267b6-7). Yet, Aristotle says that the only cure
for people who want painless pleasures is philosophy (P 1267alO-2).
The activity associated with philosophy is most pleasant because,
unlike tactile somatic pleasures, which involve pain and fatigue (NE
1119a4-5, VII.12 and 14, X.4), theory neither involves pain nor
wears us out (NE 1152b36-1153a2). Indeed, for Aristotle, theory is
more satisfying than the political good (NE 1177b23ff, 1178b26,
1178al, 1179a4-5). So, while the common good may be part of the
human good, it is not the highest human good. One large problem
here is the relation between the common good and theory. Of course,
this is a hotly contested problem in contemporary Aristotelian
studies (e.g., Ackrill 1980; Hardie 1968; Kraut 1989; Mara 1987;
Nussbaum 1986, 373-7; Tessitore 1996, esp. chap. 1; Thompson
1994), which I must bracket for reasons of space. In order to sketch
the limits of politics, however, one would have to sketch the
conditions for its highest possibilities.
9 Philia is difficult to translate. Nussbaum (1986, 354) identifies two
problems. First, philia includes many relationships we would not
describe as friendship, such as business partnership or parent-child
relationships. Second, philia makes no distinction between the active
and passive partners in the relationship. I will either use philia or
translate it as friendship or relationship, but these caveats must be
kept in mind.
 American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 3

to these questions will become clear only if we know familial and political relationships not on the usual
what is worthy to be loved (ton phileton; NE 1155a33ff). paradigm of equality versus despotism but on that of
The goal of the inquiry is to investigate what is most complementarity and mutual concern for flourishing.
worthy of our love, and the discussion of philia is an Aristotle says that in friendships based on equality
argument for a reorientation based on an account of the goods exchanged are the same or commensurable,
what goods we need to love in order to flourish (cf. NE but in unequal relationships, such as the family or
1094bll, 1103b27, 1179bl-4). In sketching the attrac- politics, the partners do not receive the same things
tiveness of a new mode of being, the discussion invites from each other and should not seek to do so (NE
us into that new life by giving us a motive for its pursuit.1158a20-1). For instance, parents bestow life on chil-
For Aristotle most people have an ethics of having, dren and give them everything that is due to them. In
because most equate happiness with the possession of return for the gift of life, people say, children ought to
tangible external goods, such as pleasure, wealth, or give affection. In fact, in common opinion, affection
honor (NE 1095a22-3). His investigation of philia is seems to be a kind of currency that guarantees equality
meant to move us away from the excessive devotion to in such relationships. Yet, Aristotle is aware of the
such scarce resources. In keeping with his dialectical problems with this notion of affection as currency for
method (NE 1095a30-2, 1145a15; T 155bll-17), he equality. He says that children cannot return any gift
begins with the way philia initially appears. Aristotle commensurate with what their parents have given
says that in such relationships, equality is the overrid- them. In giving their children life, parents give them
ing concern for most people because of their attach- literally everything, for contained in the gift of life is
ment to external goods. That is, most of us value our every experience, joy, sorrow, or love that a person ever
relationships as ways of acquiring and protecting con- has, and affection can never cover that debt (NE
testable zero-sum goods, like material advantage (NE 1163bl3-7). So filial relationships cannot be based on
1158b3). When the relationship involves such goods, equality because the character of the goods involved
the partners insist on equality to protect their interests. renders it impossible to conceive of their exchange in
If they give more than they take from the relationship, terms of a balance sheet listing a just correlation of
then they feel themselves exploited and dominated. In affection given and favors bestowed. To conceive of the
this way, insisting on equality seems to guarantee family in this way is to invite disaster, as King Lear
freedom. Yet, Aristotle says that this view implicitly learns. This is why Aristotle winds up explicitly contra-
reduces all relationships to business partnerships in dicting the common account of the relationship of
which the goal is narrow self-interest.10 By contrast, equality to affection.
Aristotle asks whether the goods to which most rela- Throughout Book VIII of the Ethics, Aristotle artic-
tionships are devoted are most lovable. ulates again and again the common opinion that un-
Aristotle's account of philia is analogical. Analogical equal friendships must be based on equality. Yet, when
terms resist both definition and the application of a he takes up the motive for unequal friendships he
single account that does not vary from one context to argues that the opposite is true: Benefactors love the
another, yet still demand employment in diverse con- recipients of their favors more than vice versa. Since
texts in spite of acknowledged differences in meaning this seems unreasonable, people try to explain it. Many
(Burrell 1973). In other words, analogical language is analogize the situation to usury: The lender likes being
necessary for realities that are both different and alike. owed, and the debtor hates owing. Aristotle dismisses
The central case of philia is friendship based on the this analogy, insisting that the real answer lies "more in
mutual love of two excellent human beings, and the the nature of things" (phusikoteron).ll The analogy to
lesser kinds are both like and unlike this (NE usury is not applicable because there is no real affec-
1158b5-7, 1157al, 1157a30-2). So, for example, people tion between the creditor and debtor. In contrast,
say that friendship based on pleasure and usefulness is Aristotle insists that benefactors love the recipients of
real friendship, just as cities do when they speak of their favors even if they are not useful to them at the
alliances for mutual advantage (sumpherontos) (NE moment. He says that such a relationship is more
1157a28). analogous to the love craftsmen have for their work,
The relationships discussed up to this point are the love poets have for their poems, or the love parents
about pleasure and utility and are based on equality, have for children. "The cause of this is that being is
but Aristotle identifies other kinds of philia that involve choiceworthy and lovable to all. We all exist in activity
a superiority of one of the partners (NE 1158bll). for [we exist] by living and doing. Now in a way, the
Included in this group are both familial and political work is the maker in act. So [the benefactor] loves the
relationships. While we may be tempted to read this as
a justification for patriarchy, the goal of the discussion
11 This devalues the ethos of honor, which insists that every gift
is to explore whether it is possible to conceive of
entails a favor in return. "The individual who had received a gift [in
ancient Athens] owed his benefactor not mere thanks but a favor in
10 "The usual view is that friendship should be more like a business return. The benefactor could legitimately demand that the return
partnership: those who contribute more should also take more of the favor be rendered. With the institutionalization at a national level of
proceeds. The inferior partner who stands in need takes the reverse the charis relationship into the system of liturgies there were some
position. The argument is that it is the mark of the good friend to changes; especially important was the introduction of the idea that
come to the aid of the needy. What is the use of being a friend of a the corporate recipients had the right to judge the spirit in which the
morally good and serious person (spoudaics), they ask, if you get gift was given. Yet the essential concept of the recipient's duty to
nothing out of it?" (NE 1163a30-5). repay the donor was retained" (Ober 1989, 229).

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 Aristotle on the Common Good September 1999
work [i.e., the recipient] since he loves being. And that
is natural, for that which is potentially the work dis-
closes in activity (NE 1168a5-9).
For Aristotle, the human mode of being is being in
certain kinds of activity; being and act are in a sense the
same for us. So humans become happy when we bring
our potential into act; we discover who we are by
becoming what we are. We long for existence, and this
longing manifests itself in the need to actualize what-
ever activity we can in the world. This overflow of good
activity in deeds apart from ourselves allows us to be
more fully, to be more in act, and this abundant, active
existence satisfies our thirst for being.
Aristotle's is an ethics of being not having. For him
the appropriate question for human life is not "which
goods should I instantiate in a rational life-plan?"12
Rather, the appropriate focus is the search for activi-
ties that will satisfy because they allow us to pursue
what is lovable. Aristotle wants to move beyond the
notion that relationships must be conceived as a choice
between equality and despotism. He gives a motive for
the reorientation the common good requires by argu-
ing that our happiness depends in part on the commu-
nity we need to actualize our potential. Since we
depend on various communities to actualize our hu-
man potential (Salkever 1990a, 19ff), we must decide
whether we are going to be responsible with our
dependencies. If we decide against responsibility, we
only hurt ourselves, because our neglect erodes the
conditions for our own flourishing.
Aristotle gives several examples of the ways our
flourishing depends on surrounding communities. In
one case he argues that happiness can be pursued with
good friends who make possible and reciprocally con-
template the activities of one another (NE 1170a5-7).
For him, the guiding case of human life is awakeness
(noein) to or perception of (to aisthanesthai) one's own
specifically human modes of activity (NE 1170bl-5,
1170a18).13 Yet, since this kind of activity is only
possible with the help of good friends, we must includeaffection in our friendships and homes and then to
our friends in our awareness, for living with friends
makes possible the mutual sharing of thoughts and
words (NE 1170b9-13). This is why friends (not honor,
as was originally thought) are the greatest external
good (NE 1169blO). The benefits such friends bestow
are not the zero-sum kind that diminish in the sharing
and thus cause strife and envy. Rather, the best kinds
of friends make possible deeply satisfying moral and
intellectual excellences such as generosity, evenhand-
edness, practical wisdom, a persistent willingness to
render what is due, and an unwillingness to push one's
claims so as to avoid social disorder (NE 1137b34-
1138a2).
Aristotle also emphasizes the need for community to
actualize our potential by appealing to examples from
nature. He says that Euripides speaks of the parched
12 Ironically, this is the way many Aristotelians frame the question.
See Cooper 1986, 96; Finnis 1980, 103ff; Hardie 1968, 227; Kraut
1989, 156; Sorabji 1980, 206.
13 For the argument that awareness is the best translation for nous,
see Williamson 1986, 185-7.
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earth as loving the rain and of the majestic heavens
loving to rain upon the earth. In a like way, Heraclitus
says that opposites help each other and that different
elements produce the most beautiful harmony (NE
1155bl-2, 7-10). These examples illuminate philia not
by emphasizing equality between partners and com-
mensurability in what is given and what is received.
Rather, they point to diversity and complementarity as
the condition for human flourishing. For Aristotle, it is
"more profound" to think of philia as the mutual
meeting of need by providing what the partner lacks.
These examples mean that for an Aristotelian, far from
being the source of contention and distrust, diversity is
the condition for flourishing.
ANALOGICAL COMMUNITIES
While we might agree that a common good is possible
in loving families or in private friendships between rare
excellent people who mutually complete each other
through diverse talents, how does Aristotle argue for a
substantive common good in politics? He does so by
employing the concept of philia as both a diagnostic
and a normative tool of analysis. Aristotle uses "com-
munity" (koinonia) as a generic term for all social
groups. Thus the term comprises families, business
partnerships, trade organizations, and the different
kinds of political communities (Yack 1993, 28-33).
Aristotle differentiates political communities by de-
scribing the kind of philia that predominates in them
(NE 1159b30-2). The final chapters of Ethics VIII are
a kind of miniature Politics in which Aristotle uses the
concept he has developed to differentiate and rank
regimes (Voegelin 1978). Here he consistently com-
pares relationships within the city to relationships
within the household (Schollmeier 1994). Since philia is
an analogical concept, illuminating one of these com-
munities partly illuminates the others. Aristotle's ped-
agogical strategy is to begin with our experience of
point to the conditions for and limits of political reform
in the analogous community of the city.
He begins by repeating his claim that justice and
friendship are about the same things and the same
people (NE 1155al8-22, 1159b25-6). People engage
in communities for some common advantage (koine
sumpheron), and the political community is no different
(NE 1160alO-1). Aristotle calls homonoia the political
form of philia. Homonoia implies a certain unity of
vision about what is advantageous for the community
(NE 1167a26-9) and means agreement on anything
from how to elect officials to what a typical citizen
ought to value. In such a union the partners will see no
advantage in overgrasping for more than their fair
share, for this would destroy the web of community
that renders possible the cooperation for mutual ben-
efit in the first place. Indeed, people in such commu-
nities who are aware of what their common life is about
will see no profit in accumulating more than their fair
share of scarce resources, since they are oriented to
what is lovable. In sum, citizens in such a regime have
an incentive to act justly toward one another, because
 American Political Science
just actions guarantee the relationships that make
possible the striving for common advantage.
For Aristotle, the partners in every community are
united by some common agreement on the objects of
their love. The quality of the community's homonoia
thus fluctuates with the quality of what it loves or
strives to attain. In each political community justice
and philia mirror each other and fluctuate together, for
both depend on the vision of the good the community
shares (NE 1159b6-7, 1159b30). In tyranny, the worst
of all regimes, there is almost no philia, since the ruler
and ruled have nothing in common (NE 1161a31-3).
As citizens strive to make their regimes more just, their
homonoia improves in quality (NE 1167b2ff). Just as
problems of justice diminish on private levels as we
become friends with people, problems of justice dimin-
ish on public levels as citizens become "friendlier."
Political community is for the sake of mutual advan-
tage, and thus the specifically political form of friend-
ship is an advantage friendship. Clearly, this political
form of friendship cannot be transformed into virtue
friendship for Aristotle, and it may even be dangerous
to try (Yack 1993, 110-4). Yet, by asking what the
political community finds lovable, Aristotle asks what it
finds advantageous. And part of his point is that
flourishing becomes much more difficult in a commu-
nity of people who find overgrasping to be advanta-
geous because of their excessive devotion to zero-sum
external goods. The question is whether he thinks it is
possible to reorient citizens to a more flourishing
conception of what is advantageous for the political
community.
A large part of Aristotle's treatment of the different
regimes is devoted to showing the similarities between
political regimes and relationships within the house-
hold. Kingship, for instance, -is like the paternal rule
fathers exercise over sons, although in Persia, where
there is tyranny, paternal rule is tyrannical. In demo-
cratic families everyone is on an equal footing, and so
on. Why does Aristotle go into detail about the simi-
larities between households and regimes? Clearly, part
of the story is that Aristotle is presenting what we
would call a sociological analysis of how relationships
within the household are affected by the larger regime.ions between friends or fellow-citizens.
A guiding assumption of Aristotelian social and polit-
ical theory is the formative power of contexts. The
inability of the household to be self-sufficient entails
that the regime it inhabits will decisively form it, but
Aristotle emphasizes that most cities do not think
about the problem of formation (NE 1180a24-9). Only
in Sparta and a few other cities do legislators attend to
the way their activities affect the formation of their
citizens. Aristotle's famous reservations about Sparta
in the Politics (11.9) force us to realize that for him, in
the only places where formation is fostered, it is done
so badly. By implication, he thinks that most house-
holds are deformed more or less by the regimes they
inhabit. Moreover, Aristotle thinks that human social-
ization requires the force of law, since we are moti-
vated more by fear of punishment than anything else
(NE 1179b1-17). So even where paternal rule pos-
sesses the intelligence and order required to form
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Review Vol. 93, No. 3
character properly, it lacks the strength necessary to
form human beings. In short, Aristotle thinks that both
regimes and homes are more or less defective substan-
tively and in their lack of care for formation. In fact,
most fathers live as the Cyclopes do, laying down laws
for their spouses and children (NE 1180a24-9).14
It is important to emphasize Aristotle's sociological
account of the household because it prevents us from
jumping to conclusions about his examples from the
family. I will argue that Aristotle employs these exam-
ples to illustrate the conditions for a common good in
politics. Yet, in doing so he is not making abstract
normative statements about which family structure is
best. Since regimes differ, Aristotelian recommenda-
tion for reforming household life would always have to
take into consideration how this particular family with
its unique needs and strengths could improve, given its
dependence on this particular regime, which tends to
(de)form its households in these particular ways. For
Aristotle, there are different kinds of good households
because of the uniqueness of the individuals compris-
ing them and the uniqueness of the regimes on which
they depend.
In contrast to those in our time who extol "family
values," Aristotelians would insist both on the variety
of good households and on the fact that good house-
holds are a necessary but not sufficient condition for
the proper formation of human beings. Since the
household depends on the larger economic and polit-
ical structures of the regime, an Aristotelian could
never speak about "family values" in the abstract.
Thus, rather than see Aristotle's discussion of familial
relationships as intended to make potentially oppres-
sive recommendations, one must interpret his exam-
ples in light of their pedagogical intent. In keeping with
his goal to make us good (NE 1094bll, 1103b27,
1179b1-4), the account of philia is an inquiry into what
is most lovable. Once the guiding purpose of the
discussion is brought to light, the examples he employs
from family life can be seen as part of a pedagogical
strategy that draws on our experiences of affection
between parents and children to investigate whether
analogous affections could inform analogous commun-
FROM HOUSEHOLD TO POLITICS
In line with his analogical treatment of philia, Aristotle
draws our attention to the similarities between familial
and political relationships. As we have seen, these are
similar because the goods the partners exchange are
not commensurable. For example, sexual differences
14 By comparing most fathers to cannibalistic Cyclopes, Aristotle
implies that they do not provide a context in which their wives and
children can flourish. It should also be recalled that the Cyclopes
were not political. As such, they did not attend to the formation of
their household in light of the fact that the household is not
self-sufficient. Yet, since the interrelatedness of human society
renders the household dependent on its larger social and political
context, it is not enough to "lay down the law" within one's house in
a way that neglects the formative effect of the regime on the
household.
631
 Aristotle on the Common Good September 1999
between men and women make procreation possible.
In politics, the goods exchanged are also different, for
the interdependence of the political community is
based on recognition of different talents and abilities
(NE 1161alO-5, VIII.11 generally).
Right after the sketch of regimes and households,
Aristotle says that children are the good common
(koinon agathon) to parents (NE 1162a28-9). This
example reinforces what he previously said about how
individual happiness depends on heterogeneous com-
munity, and it is important to draw out the implica-
tions. Sexual differentiation is not merely a source of
difference for human beings. It is at the same time a
manifestation of our radical need and dependency. In
our sexuality, we discover that we are incomplete and
stand in need of the other. One of the many possible
ways this difference can be transformed from a wound
dividing us from ourselves and each other to an
opportunity for flourishing is through loving procre-
ation. Healthy sexual partnerships are not character-
ized by the individualistic pursuit of contestable zero-
sum goodies but by mutual love and respect. The
dominant concern between loving partners is not
equality in what is given and taken. Rather, it is
complementary self-giving. And when such partners
procreate, they aim for the creation of a mutually
beloved good. In procreation the partners' differences
can become the means by which they complete each
other by bringing forth a new life that provides an
occasion for increased joint activity.
The new life is both a mutual gift and a common
work. In thinking about how to rear the child, parents
are forced to step back and evaluate anew what is true
and good and beautiful and what is not. The child thus
presents parents with opportunities to grow in serious-
ness, wisdom, and goodness. Furthermore, in a sense
the parents' activity is present in whatever good the
child accomplishes through her life. The gift and work
of having and rearing children becomes a way for
people within a family to achieve mutual completion.
In this sense, it is not merely that the parents give to
the child in return for affection. In loving families,
children give back a host of different and intangible
gifts, often without being aware of it. Differences and
mutual dependence are the basis for the common good
in a household. In this way, the household can become
a loving, disciplined, mutually perfecting school for
virtue in which each partner is valued because each
contributes through individual differences to the com-
mon good. The particular example of parental love
draws our attention to the general fact that diversity is
the necessary condition for mutual completion (Yack
1993, 29-30, 55, 98).
Aristotle immediately draws the analogy between
the common good in the family and politics. After
identifying the child as a common good of the parents,
he says: "How a man is supposed to direct his life
toward his wife and his love toward his friend, appears
no different from inquiring how to act in a just way (pos
dikaion)" (NE 1162a29-30). For Aristotle, justice is an
essentially political term (NE 1129a35-1129b1). In
comparing familial relationships to the political prob-
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lem of justice, Aristotle points to the political implica-
tions of his discussion of common good in the family.15
The common good requires politically active people
to pursue practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than
reputation and power. For Aristotle, practical wisdom
is a single virtue with several manifestations; the per-
sonal disposition that makes phronesis possible is the
same for the familial and political communities (NE
114b31-5). Yet, the goals the practically wise person
has for her family must be different than those she has
for her political community, since these communities
are analogous rather than identical. So Aristotle says
household management isphronesis directed to matters
affecting the entire family. When directed to politics, it
is called political wisdom (NE 1141b23-4, 1141b29-
35).
In the family, the common good arises when each
person is valued because each contributes through
individual differences to the common good. In a like
way, political wisdom involves the capacity to arrange
the parts of a political community into a beautiful and
proportionate whole. That is, political wisdom involves
weaving the different talents of each citizen into the
fabric of a community that provides the context for the
flourishing of each member. Since this work requires a
familiarity with and concrete care for the participants,
such a community would be necessarily small. For this
reason, Aristotle would insist on the principle of sub-
sidiarity and emphasize that if the common good is
possible politically, it can only happen in local commu-
nities. Thus, one of the most pressing problems for a
contemporary Aristotelian is whether it is possible to
pursue policies that respect and foster local common
goods on the national level.
Due to the connection between interpersonal and
intrapersonal virtues, the common good in a political
community also requires the cultivation of a certain
kind of self-love. Self-love is often used in the pejora-
tive sense because those so named want a larger
portion of nonshareable external goods, such as mate-
rial things, honors, and bodily pleasures (NE 1168b17).
Yet, for Aristotle, there is another sense of the term.
The real self-lover would gratify only the most author-
itative part of herself. The good or equitable person's
(epieikes) self-love is radically different from the com-
mon notion of it.16 If everyone were to compete not for
external goods but for noble-beautiful actions, "all the
15 This does not mean that Aristotle subsumes the polis into the
family or that the common goods of these communities are the same.
The analogical character of philia entails that the political commu-
nity is unlike as well as like the household. Drawing the similarities
between family and political life obscures as much as it illuminates.
Most obviously, the political community lacks filial ties of natural
affection. In addition, Aristotle thinks that most fathers do not care
about the formation of their children (NE 1180a29), and politicians
fare even worse in his estimation (NE 1180a25, 1180b28-1181a13). If
it is difficult to strive for a harmonious family, then how much more
problematic would it be to strive for a harmonious political commu-
nity?
16 Aristotle employs epiekeia as a synonym for "goodness" and
"reasonableness." See, for example, NE 1137a35-1137bl, 1107bll,
1166alO, 1167b5; P 1308b27, 1452b34. MacIntyre (1988, 119-20)
suggests that we translate epiekeia as "reasonableness."
 American Political Science
needs of the community would be met and each
individual would have the greatest of goods, since that
is what virtue is" (NE 1169all).17
Aristotle says that the mature person will freely give
away all the zero-sum external goods over which peo-
ple usually fight in order to gain a much better prize
(NE 1169a20-2). This reorientation of perspective
reflects the shift that would be required in individual
citizens to reform political life. Advantage communi-
ties would have to redefine what they take to be
advantageous. Furthermore, since the common good
would depend on cultivating this self-love, a political
community would have to attend to the problem of
formation of its citizens. To take one obvious example,
since Aristotle thinks that injustice stems from a defec-
tive self-love that overgrasps for external goods, he
might urge contemporary citizens to think about how
to protect themselves from an economy that depends in
large part on reducing human beings to consumers with
artificially inflated desires for external goods.
Finally, the common good requires equity. Yack
(1993) has argued forcefully that in Aristotle's view the
partiality of all actual conceptions of justice and of law
entails that political community is as much the site of
competition and conflict as of harmony. Since this is so,
the common good demands the cultivation of equity,
which Aristotle says is the most comprehensive politi-
cal virtue. Equity is justice plus an awareness of when
more or less unjust laws require straightening out, and
thus when they should be followed strictly or not. This
noncompetitive virtue inclines people to take less
external goods for themselves, even when they have the
law and its partial justice on their side (NE 1137b34-
1138a2).
Since all regimes have only a partial sense of justice,
the common good requires that individuals refuse to
push their "just" claims too far. It is not enough for
people to render joyfully what is due. They must refuse
to push their advantage at the cost of another, even
when in the "right" (P 1301a38). Because Aristotle
thinks there are very few such people (P 1302al), he
seems quite pessimistic about the possibility of a gen-
uine common good. Yet, the alternative to striving for
it is frightening. In contrast to equitable people, bad
people aim at more than their fair share when it is
profitable and fall short in situations calling for sacri-
fice (NE 1167b9-12). Such narrow individualistic peo-
ple foster a community rife with mistrust, which will
undermine the possibility of their own flourishing. In a
society full of such people, civil strife (stasis) will
become prevalent (NE 1167bl2-6).
17 MacIntyre's account of external and internal goods helps illumi-
nate this passage: "It is characteristic of what I have called external
goods that when achieved they are always some individual's property
and possession. Moreover characteristically they are such that the
more someone has of them, the less there is for other people. This is
sometimes necessarily the case, as with power and fame, and
sometimes the case by reason of contingent circumstance as with
money. External goods are therefore characteristically objects of
competition in which there must be losers as well as winners. Internal
goods are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is
characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole
community who participate in the practice" (MacIntyre 1981, 190).
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Review Vol. 93, No. 3
In sum, Aristotle's pedagogical strategy is to ask
whether it is possible to address the problem of over-
grasping for scarce resources by satisfying our demand
for noetic goods and activities that do not diminish in
the sharing (P 1323blO-29). He seeks to moderate the
pursuit of scarce resources and the concomitant temp-
tations to competition and mastery by reorienting
human desire toward goods that do not necessitate
mastery because they are nonzero-sum and thus share-
able (e.g., NE 1170blO-3, 1178b34-1179alO; P
1267a8-13). Thus, for example, Aristotle argues that
friendship rather than honor is the most important
external good (NE VII.7, IX.9). He provides a variety
of political recommendations intended to preserve
states by moderating the excessively partisan stance of
their rulers (P V). Finally, he argues that the best kind
of regime will not seek domination of its neighbors in
foreign affairs (P VII.14) (see Thompson 1994, 117-8).
In other words, Aristotle argues that his audience will
become happier if only they can redirect their desires
for money, status, and power. The common good
flowing from this reorientation would lessen factional
strife because the community would be seen as collab-
orative and convivial rather than competitive and ex-
ploitative.
HOW DOES ARISTOTELIAN THEORY
INFORM POLITICAL PRACTICE?
What might this mean in today's politics? What would
modern political communities look like if they were
infused with the kind of affection present in analogical
relationships like friendship or marriage? Further-
more, since I have argued that Aristotle is relatively
pessimistic about the common good, what criteria
would he offer to help us discern when a political
community should strive for the common good and
when it should not?
I want this article to provoke precisely these ques-
tions. Yet, insofar as I agree with Aristotle's character-
ization of the way theory informs practice, I cannot
answer them in an abstract, universal way. A common
good would have to be made present in some irreduc-
ibly unique political community. There is no common
good in the abstract. There are only common goods
present in particular contingent regimes. Since each
community is unique, addressing these questions re-
quires not theoretical prescriptions but thoughtful de-
liberation (NE 1140a25-1140b4). That is, knowledge of
"ultimate and particular things" (NE 1143a25-1143b5)
is required to discern whether and how to bring about
the common good. The common good in an American
inner city neighborhood would look vastly different
from that in a farming community in Tibet because of
different economies, cultures, citizens, problems, and
opportunities. Just as there are a variety of good
households for Aristotle, there can be a variety of
common goods, depending on the community in ques-
tion. For an Aristotelian, since it is disastrous for
different regimes to follow the same path, abstract
prescriptions for the common good cannot be put
forward. Indeed, Aristotle says that virtue is extremely
633
 Aristotle on the Common
hard precisely because the variability of human affairs
renders it difficult to find the mean in particular
situations (NE 1109a24-32).
Aristotelian theory can improve political practice,
however, by cultivating the thoughtfulness required to
address these questions. Aristotle does not set out to
answer a set of specific political problems systemati-
cally in the Ethics and Politics. Still less is he interested
in supplying the theoretical ground for a set of univer-
sally applicable rules. Rather, he wants to make people
good (NE 1094bll, 1103b27, 1179bl-4). Specifically,
he uses theory to question the most respected opinions
(endoxa, see T lOOb2lff) of a given human community
to foster the habits of critical reflection needed to
deliberate well about politics (Salkever 1998; Smith
1994). Since endoxa set the terms of political debate in
a given regime, questioning them clears the ground for
new ways of speaking and acting.
Aristotle's political theory aims to supply us with a
set of questions and revisable standards for examining
our lives and the political regimes we inhabit. The
critical awareness of our presuppositions and blind
spots shocks us out of the self-satisfied complacency
that stifles thought. In this article, for example, I argue
that Aristotle brings to light our overgrasping for
external goods and the way that undermines political
community. This encourages thoughtfulness insofar as
it makes us aware of our lack of justice. In doing so it
provides the conceptual tools we need to explore better
ways of acting in particular situations. In short, theory
helps us raise and interrogate political questions so that
we can deliberate about them well in the concrete. For
instance, deliberation about whether and how to
achieve the common good is improved once theory
makes us aware of its conditions and limits.
ARISTOTELIANISM VERSUS
COMMUNITARIANISM AND LIBERALISM
Reading Aristotle also drives us to raise questions
about the debates over liberal political theory. Specif-
ically, his articulation of the conditions for the common
good speaks to both liberals and communitarians.
Liberal theorists often seek to avoid coercion by insist-
ing on neutrality among competing accounts of the best
life, but this means they often resist arguing straight-
forwardly that the liberal way of life is itself best. When
this strategy is followed, however, the question of the
best life is posed only rhetorically: Most typical people
would rather have comfortable self-preservation than
virtue, or righteousness or holiness, right? That is,
much liberal theory rests not on an argument about the
best life but proceeds from the assumption that, if
given the choice, most people prefer comfortable self-
preservation to any viable alternative (Salkever 1990b).
In some cases, liberal theory rests on a brilliant, often
convincing pitch: If you want the kind of life most
typical people in liberal societies want, here are the
institutions and practices that you need to get it. Yet,
this means that the moment the answer to its rhetorical
question is no longer self-evident to most, liberal
theory has a problem. Because its "neutrality" has been
634
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Good September 1999
exposed as a partisan way of life that its defenders will
not justify rationally, the liberal order will be criticized
as partial and oppressive (Goerner and Thompson
1996).
In this vein, it is possible that the current criticism of
liberal theory is a sign that the question of the good life
is no longer understood as straightforwardly rhetorical
in liberal societies. Such criticism bespeaks a profound
sense that something is missing from the way of life
liberal regimes have fostered. For all their excesses,
and all the ways they overlook or minimize the positive
aspects of liberalism (Holmes 1993), antiliberals speak
to the palpable sense that something has been lost in
our pursuit of wealth and physical comfort and free-
dom not guided by a deliberate reflection on what
satisfies the human heart. We are led to ask whether,
having lived through liberalism, we have learned the
Aristotelian lesson that overgrasping for the external
goods related to fortune inhibits individual and social
flourishing. Ironically, Aristotle is sometimes vilified as
hostile to liberalism, but liberal practice may require
the kind of resources Aristotelian theory provides.
Aristotle's account of the difficult conditions for com-
munity encourages the kind of thoughtful assessment
of human goods that might rescue liberal practice from
its own worst tendencies.
Yet, Aristotle would also raise questions about an-
tiliberal communitarian political theory. I have pointed
out that he refrains from issuing any abstract political
suggestions to achieve the common good. This means
that his articulation of its conditions may cut both ways.
On the one hand, one can read his account of the
conditions for the common good as a warning to be
more responsible with one's dependence on the polit-
ical community or suffer the consequences in one's own
life. On the other hand, given his strict conditions for
the common good, it is clear that Aristotle is extraor-
dinarily sober about the possibility of actually having it.
Thus, his emphasis on the strenuous conditions for the
common good can be read as a warning to deliberate
carefully in specific situations about the conditions for
the common good and the dangers in seeking it before
trying to achieve it (see Yack 1993, 118-20, 220-3).
In addition, Aristotle thinks that the common good
is inseparable from the reorientation of individual
citizens. Therefore, the Ethics teaches that community
cannot be imposed from above by well-meaning poli-
ticians or bureaucrats who try to force individualistic
and self-interested citizens to be good communitarians.
In a similar vein, those who argue that Aristotle's goal
is to form statesmen so they can grab power and effect
reform (Bodeus 1993) overlook his conviction that
reforms often produce more harm than good. Such
accounts seriously underestimate Aristotle's criticism
of actual political practice. Aristotle's own response to
the tension between individual and community interest
is not to try to grab power, or to articulate specific
demands for political reform. Rather, he tries to reori-
ent people through semipublic acts of persuasion. That
is, he addresses injustice by writing his Ethics and
Politics.
Yet, it is clear that Aristotle is quite pessimistic
 American Political Science
about the possibility that his arguments will effect the
change he desires (NE 1179b4-19, X.9 generally).
Perhaps for this reason his political recommendations
often have less to do with cultivating virtue than with
ensuring stability and prosperity (Nadon 1996). Aristo-
tle thus might emphasize that communitarian critics of
liberalism must be careful not to destroy what is good
in weeding out what is bad. For a modern Aristotelian,
criticism of liberalism should not proceed without
constant reminders of the greatness of that tradition
and the ways it fosters the common advantage through
its stability and prosperity. Furthermore, for an Aris-
totelian realist, criticisms of liberalism that long for its
end and demand the cultivation of community or the
common good would always raise the questions: Whose
community? Which "common" good?18
Aristotle's account of the conditions for common
good does not foster despotic homogeneity. If I must
depend on human differences to flourish, it is not in my
interest for everyone to be like me. Indeed, Aristotle
argues that human beings find individual happiness and
social harmony only when difference is understood to
be the condition for mutual completion.19 Further-
more, Aristotle is not a teleologist in the sense ex-
pounded by Kantians such as Rawls, for he does not
justify oppression by arguing for the maximization of
some state of affairs teleologically justified as best.20 He
does not seek to "maximize the good" independently of
the right but to foster satisfying common activities
(Cooper 1986, 87-8). Yet, what Aristotle's account
successfully avoids is far less interesting than what it
fosters. It leads us to wonder whether political life in
particular times and places can be invigorated by
thoughtful deliberation on the conditions for and limits
of the common good.
18 In fairness, I must ask such questions of my own account. I think
that the environment would be an example of a common good.
Responsible stewardship over the earth requires the political com-
munity to act, but its fruits can be enjoyed individually. At once
massive questions and problems arise, however. For one, reasonable
people disagree about how to balance possibly countervailing goods,
such as economic development or full employment. A larger problem
is that such stewardship requires the kind of reorientation that
Aristotle says is necessary for a common good. For an excellent
Aristotelian account of the origins of the overgrasping that yields
environmental problems, as well as a sketch of the radical reordering
of priorities that responsible use of the earth's resources would
require, see Berry 1977, 1992.
19 One could object to my interpretation by pointing out textual
evidence of Aristotle's misogyny and arguments for the naturalness
of relationships of domination, such as slavery. One response is to
note excellent scholarship that takes issue with the usual interpreta-
tion of such passages (e.g., Nichols 1992; Salkever 1991). Another is
to argue that following the implications of Aristotle's account of the
preconditions for community leads one to reject those texts that
justify domination of women and slaves. The question here is
whether we can become better Aristotelians than Aristotle.
20 Aristotle's teleology ultimately points to theory, but I have argued
that he does not employ theory to recommend abstract and coercive
political policies. Rather, Aristotelian theory provides a standard and
thus a starting point for a critique of regimes. This critique both
fosters the political activities that constitute part of a good life and
sketches the limits of those activities by pointing beyond them.
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Review Vol. 93, No. 3
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