POWER SYSTEM CONTROL

S. Shahnawaz Ahmed
Professor, Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Engineering
Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology
ssahmed@eee.buet.ac.bd; sahmed90@hotmail.com

1. Introduction

The most convenient one among various forms of energy, electricity is the driving force behind all
types of human activities, developments and researches in other areas of technologies. In brief, it is
the electricity that gives birth to other technologies. Every year the demand for it rises by about 10%.
Use of per capita consumption or generation of electrical energy as a yardstick for assessing a
country’s socio-economic condition just reminds us of the indispensability of electricity.

The system which supplies the invaluable electrical energy, popularly termed “power system”,
originated in the late nineteenth century in a “primitive form” of an isolated tiny generator serving
few tungsten lamps just at its terminal. Then it evolved through various stages to become this early
twenty-first century’s “the largest man made complex engineering project” which comprises
innumerable generators varying in size and characteristics from few kilowatt renewable source units
to several hundred megawatt fossil fuel/hydro/nuclear units. These units are connected through step-
up substations to a transnational network termed “grid” formed by tens of thousand kilometres of
132 kV to 765 kV transmission lines. Through several layers of step-down substations and a mesh of
distribution lines/cables, the grid feeds to millions of far end consumers belonging to various
categories such as residential, commercial, industrial, public amenities, health, transportation,
banking, telecom and IT sectors, and even space craft control centres. This diverse array of
consumers have a wide spectrum of loads ranging from as simple as tungsten lamps to as
sophisticated as digital chip controlled appliances. Consequently today’s power systems are facing
much more stringent requirements and challenges than ever before regarding the major conflicting
criteria of reliability, quality, economy and environmental compatibility. A criterion of “99.9%
reliability i.e. 8.76 hours of power loss per year, considered to be enough a decade ago, is now going
to be substituted by a criterion of “99.9999% i.e. only 32 seconds of power loss per year.

2.Conceptual Model of Real-time Control

The basic objective of any power system control, be it in an analog or a digital way, is to match
continuously the consumers’ demand with generation economically and without exceeding the
allowed deviations in voltage and frequency. This holds good for a vertically integrated or a
deregulated or a smart grid system.

A central control entity called “National Load Despatch Centre” makes usually one day ahead (short
term) forecast of the hourly demand over the next day. Then it decides which generation units /
plants be committed and how much share each be allocated corresponding to different parts of the
forecasted load profile so that consumers’ demand can be met economically while maintaining the
system secure. However, provisions are always kept to adapt the decisions even several minutes
ahead to accommodate any real-time deviation likely to occur in the forecast made. Five major steps
termed “application functions” involved in the process of ‘forecasting’ to ‘decision implementation’
are respectively SLF (Short term Load Forecasting), UC (Unit Commitment), ELD (Economic Load
Dispatch), SC (Security Control) and AGC (Automatic Generation Control). While the first two are
performed at an interval of several minutes to one day the latter three are done at an interval of few
seconds to several minutes.

To implement the abovementioned real-time control strategy, a massive volume and a variety of
on-line data are transmitted to the master station or control centre from the remote stations i.e.
individual plants and substations in the system, through what is known as SCADA (Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition). These data are used in a plethora of analyses pertaining to various
functions including the above. The decisions are sent back to the concerned remote sites where again
SCADA implements the same and then sends confirmation back to the control centre. Figure 1
shows a conceptual model of the real-time control scheme what is known as the Energy Management
System (EMS) combining SCADA and application functions.

While frequency deviation is intimately related to the control of mismatch between demand and real
power generation, voltage control needs some additional steps known as VAR management which
includes generator excitation control, local VAR injection, transformer tap changing etc. The
corresponding devices (electromechanical or FACTS) are also interfaced to SCADA so that their
settings can be adjusted under a central command.

Apart from monitoring/metering the data and implementing the decisions related to real and
reactive power control, the SCADA can also integrate in it digital relaying for various types of
system protection. Even, the SCADA associated with a Distribution network Management System
(DMS) can be extended to consumers’ premises for remote meter reading and implementing DSM
(Demand side Management) actions i.e. to encourage the consumers to change their demand pattern
depending upon the supply side constraints.

Figure 1 Basic model of EMS

3. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA)

A basic SCADA system has a typical architecture shown in Figure 2. It comprises a number of
RTUs at various power stations/substations, communication network, a master station at the control
centre, and a man-machine interface.

Figure 2 Basic structure of SCADA

The analog quantities to be measured in a power system are too many covering non electrical
quantities like pressure, temperature, flow rate, speed etc. at power stations and electrical quantities
like current, voltage, active and reactive power, frequency, transformer tap position etc. at power
stations as well as substations. Through suitable transducers (for non-electrical quantities), CT, PTs,
analog filters and rectifiers these are converted into equivalent analogous dc signals in milliamps
range, fed into analog input module of RTUs and then converted into digital form.

Also there are digital quantities like CB and isolator position (OPEN or CLOSED contact status)
which are converted into pulses using suitable opto-electronic (e.g. opto-coupler) circuits. The
energy reading of conventional watt-hour meters are also converted in series of pulses by placing an
LED under the hole of the meter’s rotating disk. The pulse count between two successive scan
represents the energy consumed over the elapsed time period. All the pulse inputs are fed into digital
input module of the RTUs.

The acquired data are processed to some extent (e.g. checking for violation of operational limits,
keeping records or sequence of events) by the built-in microprocessors of RTUs and stored in data
base. Only the exceptional changes or limit exceeding data are transferred from the RTU database to
the master station or control centre’s Remote Communication Server (RCS) on periodic scanning
(termed polling) of RTUs via a variety of communication channels shown in Figure 3. The Modems
(Modulator-demodulator) are needed for transmitting and receiving digital information without
distortion over any distances exceeding few thousand feet.
 Figure 3 Various communication links used in SCADA

The RTUs are connected to the master station through communication links in a fashion what is
known as “combination of hub (star or radial) and party line”. This enables speedy and simultaneous
communication with various clusters of RTUs without hampering real time value of the data,
optimization of the available communication channel and of the computational power of the master
RTU. Figure 4 shows a typical scheme for interconnection of master station and RTUs. The SCADA
system may have multiple layer of hierarchy with one or more master stations in each level sharing
or coordinating the complex computational and decision making tasks in respective command area.
In the hierarchical scheme the RTUs are only at the bottom most level. Figure 5 shows a typical
configuration of hierarchy.

The master station is in fact a LAN connected assembly of more than one servers and a number of
terminals housed in the control centre. Figure 6 shows an overview of a typical control centre for the
SCADA system. Workstations are presently used as servers while only advanced processor based
PCs are used as terminals. PCs at distant locations may also act as terminals to the control centre
servers through a WAN. Each server is assigned specific task. However, there is provision for back
up servers for reliability reasons. Authorized persons can only access all or selected servers / other
terminals from any point of the LAN system through passwords.
Figure 4 Combination of radial (star) and multi-point (party line) master-RTU network

Figure 5 Hierarchical control of power system

 Figure 6 A typical layout of SCADA control centre

The data coming from RTU is stored in master station database and can be accessed by various
servers and terminals. Power system application functions are assigned with one of the servers or
distributed among more than one server. To allow “view-at-a-glance” a control centre is equipped
with a Mimic Board (in the form of a large wall map containing the single line diagram of the whole
power system) or an array of multimedia projector continually updating the SLD. The board or
multimedia screen is digitally updated showing violations of various operational data, CB status etc.
in the form of flashing indication using multicolours accompanied by audible alarm which ceases
when the operator acknowledges the indicated changes. Also operators are provided with software
assistance for an easy interpretation of huge alarms and data overloads. The decisions and output of
executing the application software are transmitted from the master station to the concerned RTUs
just in a manner opposite to that of receiving data from RTUs.

Figure 7 Connection of relay and transducers which are interfaced with a RTU

IED: A more recent development in SCADA system is use of IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices)
instead of RTUs. While RTU needs transducers for acquiring various data and got limited
computational power, IED is a transducer less data capturing device with more processing and
decision making power. For monitoring the electrical quantities, it simply receives a voltage and
current signal (waves) from PT and CT at each connection point and then computes all the relevant
data including energy, frequency and even phase angle. This enables the same IED to integrate
monitoring, metering, control and protection functions. Figure 7 shows the way the relay, CB, and
various transducers are connected in a power system. The transducer outputs are communicated to
the RTU and may also be taken to meters. Figure 8 shows how an IED is typically interfaced with a
power system.

Figure 8 Direct interfacing between power system and an IED

PMU: Another breakthrough just surfacing out is use of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites
in time synchronization among various IEDs at different locations of a power system. Time
synchronization ensures that each IED captures the signals (waves) at the same instant of time so that
the relative phase angles among different bus voltages can be computed with unimaginably high
accuracy as needed specially for digital protection and relaying. These are termed PMU( Phasor
Measurement Unit). The time error will be a maximum of 1 microseconds i.e. the computed phase
angles may vary by only ±0.018⁰ from the actual ones. Fig. 8a shows the conceptual design of a
PMU.

Below is an excerpt from Ref. [1] on how PMU operates.

Voltages and currents for which phasors are to be determined are measured, using current and
voltage transformers, as three-phase analogue signals and delivered to the PMU. Each analogue
signal is filtered using an anti-aliasing filter and sent to an analogue–digital converter (A/C). Here
the signal is sampled: that is, converted into digital samples. The sampler impulses are generated by
an oscillator operating with the GPS receiver in the phase-locked loop system. Consequent data
samples are sent to a microprocessor together with their time stamps. The microprocessor sends to its
memory the sequence of N subsequent data samples corresponding to a whole AC period. The
samples are then used to calculate the orthogonal components of each phasor using the discrete
Fourier transform (DFT):
The advantage of this measurement algorithm is that, apart from calculating the orthogonal
components of a phasor, it also filters both components using two orthogonal filters based on sine
and cosine functions. Consequently the calculated orthogonal components of the phasor are those of
the first (fundamental) harmonic. The higher harmonics and the DC component are washed out.

Figure 8a: Functional diagram of a PMU

Protocol: The protocols used in RTU-master communication are of wide variety depending upon the
requirement of simplicity, reliability and speed. Sometimes there may be compatibility problem if
the RTUs/IEDs do not belong to the same vendor. However, many standardization organizations are
currently attempting to promulgate unique and standard protocols such as TCP/IP (Transfer Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol) in power industry SCADA all over the world. Protocol means an agreed-
upon format for transmitting data between two devices. This format mainly determines type of error
checking, data compression method, and indication of the finishing points of data transmission and
reception respectively by sending and receiving devices.

4. EMS Application Functions

The EMS comprises a number of functions which are mostly interrelated and contribute directly or
indirectly towards a secure and economic operation of the system. The main components of an EMS
concerned with real time operation of a power system are outlined as follows.

Some of the components will also be discussed separately under the lecture plan.

4.1 Data base

Data base incorporates comprehensive information about the system. The information can broadly
be classified into three groups such as:
i) on- line data from the RTUs;
ii) fixed data entered through man-machine interface;
iii)output of state estimator and other application programs.

4.2 State Estimator

The raw telemetered data received from the RTUs is mainly corrupted by two types of errors-
random measurement noise and gross error i.e. bad data. The first type of error mainly results from
current and potential transformer errors, transducer (meter) inaccuracies, analog to digital
conversion, noise in communication channels or interference noise. Gross error mainly results from
faults or failures in metering and communication system. State estimator is a computer program
which uses a statistical criterion for systematically processing a redundant set of raw telemetered
measurements with a view to minimizing the effects of errors present in those. The outcome of state
estimation is a consistent and reliable estimate of a power system’s current operating state which is
required by other application functions.

4.3 Load Forecasting

Load forecasting is the prediction of future electricity demand by using some statistical techniques
to adjust past demands to present weather conditions and other anticipated events. Depending upon
system dynamics e.g. change in demanded MW/minute, short term forecasting takes place usually
once a day or every hour or few hours to develop an operating schedule.

4.4 Security Control

Security control can be defined as a complex decision making process to initiate correct control
actions for the maintenance of electric power services under all conditions of operation. The power
system operation can be characterised by three sets of constraints, namely operating, load and
security constraints. Mainly the operational limits on system variables and apparatus, for instance
voltage limit, generator loading limit, transmission line thermal limit, tap position limit and so on
constitute the operating constraints. The load constraints mainly refer to customers’ total power
demand. The security constraints are mainly the minimum reserve margin in generation and
transmission.

The basic conditions of power system operation can be categorized into four states depending upon
the fulfilment or violation of the constraints. These are normal, alert, emergency and restorative. A
system is in the normal state when all the constraints are met such that the occurrence of any credible
but unforeseen disturbances (e.g. loss of line/generator/transformer/load) will not lead the power
system to the emergency state. In emergency state the operating and security constraints are violated
and the load constraints are not necessarily satisfied. A system in normal state can go to alert state
when any of the security constraints are violated. If a sufficiently severe disturbance takes place
before control action can be taken, the system in the alert state enters the emergency state or its
extreme version i.e. blackout state. The restorative state is associated with the period in which
actions (ranging from fast valving, dynamic braking, etc. to load shedding, islanding,
resynchronization etc.) are taken to bring the system from the emergency to the normal state. Figure
9 shows the four states of power system operation.

Basic to the security control of a power system are three functions, namely
1) security monitoring;
2) security analysis;
3) security enhancement

The security monitoring function checks whether the system’s present state satisfies the load and
operating constraints. If so, the ability of the system to undergo a disturbance selected from a
predetermined list is tested in advance by the function security or contingency analysis. The two
well-known tools viz. load flow analysis and transient stability analysis are respectively applied for
static (steady state) and dynamic security assessment. If it is found by security analysis that at least
one contingency may bring the system into the emergency state, security enhancement measures
(such as generation rescheduling, line switching, VAR injection etc.) decided through security
constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) are adopted and if necessary, the system’s present
operating condition is altered before the contingency actually occurs.

Figure 9 Typical classification of power system security related states

4.5 Unit Commitment

Unit commitment is a procedure to decide which of the available generators should start up or shut
down usually over a time period of 24 hours in such a manner that the forecasted demand is met with
a spinning reserve which would satisfy the requirements of both the security as well as the optimum
saving in fuel cost.

4.6 Economic Dispatch

Economic dispatch function determines the best allocation of generation requirements among the
committed generating units so that the total cost of supplying the energy to meet the demand within
the constraints imposed by security considerations is minimised.

4.7 Automatic Generation Control

AGC is a closed loop control system for implementing the decisions of economic dispatch on each
generating unit while achieving the following objectives.
 1) maintain system frequency;
2) adjust generation from the base-point economic allocation in response to small-scale changes in
demand;
3) control tie line power flow to meet interchange schedule in case the power system is
interconnected with the another or the system comprises two or more interconnected areas.

The AGC action is suspended during the emergency state of a power system while reinstated on
return of the normalcy. Figures 10 and 11 show respectively an overview of AGC and a basic
generation control loop based on SCADA.

Figure 10 Underlying logics of an AGC scheme

Figure 11 Use of SCADA in generation control

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5. Control in Deregulated Power System

In a vertically integrated typical system both generation and transmission entities belong to the same
owner while the distribution side is either owned by the same party or tied to it under a power
purchase agreement. In a deregulated system all these are separate entities.

In a deregulated system the transmission asset is at the command of an ISO (Independent System
Operator) or a RTO (Regional Transmission Organisation). The ISO does the load forecasting and
initiates usually at 12 or 24 hours ahead a real-time bidding (which requires computer
communication among the participants) for each period of a time horizon. In this bidding the
intending generation companies (GenCos) and distribution companies (DisCos) respectively quote
their sales and buy volume (MW) against corresponding rates ($/MWh). The ISO applies a
mathematical model to the acceptable bids so that a marginal rate of purchasing electricity termed
market clearing price (MCP in $/MWh) evolves out of that. The buyers have to buy electricity at that
rate. In the next period the rate will change. In this way an electricity market with volatile unit rate
evolves that is also termed spot electricity market where ISO ensures receipt of payments and a
balance between generation and demand while the supplier (GenCos) need not know who is the
buyer (DisCo) of its product.

Besides above bilateral contracts or transactions negotiated among sellers (GenCos) and buyers
(distributors) directly are also accommodated by ISO in addition to what has been decided through
real-time bidding. However, the unavoidable flow of electrical energy between a given pair of the
supplier and the buyer in non-designated parallel paths needs to be accounted, though difficult, by
the ISO for billing purposes. ISO also allocates the transmission loss appropriately to the concerned
stakeholder (GenCo or DisCo).

ISO displays at regular intervals the available transfer capacity (ATC) of its transmission system
through an OASIS (Open Access Same- time Information System) for allowing further transactions
so that new parties may decide whether to participate in the real-time electricity market after the
bidding has already taken place. However, the exact market mechanism in deregulated environment
may vary from what has been mentioned here depending upon the socio-economic context of the
country.

The main challenge in deregulated system’s control an ISO has to face is system security. This is
because the GenCos like to enhance their sales volume or may manipulate (i.e. generate less than the
agreed quantum) without caring for the power system’s static and dynamic security. For this reason
ISO has to call for and always ensure on-contract ancillary services from some of the GenCos which
may not actually or may also be participating in real-time bidding. These services usually include
spinning reserve, frequency regulation or real time balancing, voltage/VAR support, emergency back
up etc.

6. Smart Grid

Smart grid is still a vision that aims at transforming the traditional power system so that it can (a)
accommodate dispersed small generations and storage devices (based on renewable or conventional)
including battery, fly wheel, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles besides large central power plants, (b)
deploy IT equipment and smart electrical appliances to enable consumers’ participation and feedback
in operation and control of the system and (c) retain the characteristics of a deregulated system or an
electricity market.
7. Final Note

The prime requirement for ensuring reliability, quality and affordability of the electricity supply
either in a regulated or a deregulated or a smart grid environment, is an on-line and real-time control
system which makes large scale use of emerging IT and communication technologies. However, the
software and hardware cost proportion in this is approximately 60:40. Development of the
customized software for a power system control centre requires about 20 man-years programming
effort. This necessitates involvement of experts with in-depth knowledge in power system dynamics
and modeling, and a few experts to assist in computer programming.

Bibliography

1. Jan Machowski, Janusz W. Bialek and James R. Bumby: Power System Dynamics Stability and
Control, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, UK, 2008.

2. Antonio Gomez-Expostio, Antonio J. Conejo and Claudio Canizares, “Electric Energy Systems
Analysis and Operation”, CRC Presss, New York, 2009.

3. S. Shahnawaz Ahmed: “Power System Control”, Proceedings of short course “Recent Trends in
Power System Operation” organized for the professionals in the academic/industrial sectors by the
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, UTM at Johor Bahru, Malaysia, 17-19 September 2001, pp. 2-1 to
2-16.

4. A.J.Wood and B.F. Wollenberg, “Power Generation, Operation and Control”, John Wiley & Sons,
1996.

5. W.A.Elmore, “Pilot Protective Relaying”, ABB-Marcel Dekker Inc., 2000.