Field Investigation of Collapse of a 13-Story High-Rise

Residential Building in Shanghai

W. D. Wang 1; Q. Li 2; Y. Hu 3; J. W. Shi 4; and C. W. W. Ng, F.ASCE 5

Abstract: In 2009, a 13-story residential building founded on lightly reinforced prestressed high-strength concrete (PHC) pipe piles in
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Shanghai collapsed completely during the excavation of an adjacent underground garage (i.e., on the southern side). In the course of con-
struction, excavated soil had been dumped on the northern side of the building and formed a 10-m-high fill slope before the collapse. In order
to identify the principal cause of the sudden building collapse, an extensive field investigation was carried out immediately after the accident.
In addition to geotechnical exploration of soil properties, physical evidence was collected and documented including the layout of collapse
debris, damage to piles, and induced pile movements. To assist in the investigation and provide insights into the collapse, three-dimensional
finite-element analysis was carried out to simulate the process of excavation and dumping. For piles located adjacent to the dumped soil on the
northern side of the building, uppermost fractures could be seen near the interface between the reinforced and unreinforced sections, which
were located approximately 1–2 m below the original level of the pile head. Most of these failure surfaces were flat, implying that these piles
failed under tension. For piles situated on the excavation (southern) side of the collapsed building, the uppermost fracture surfaces were tilted
at an angle and the concrete was severely damaged, suggesting that these fractures occurred mainly from compression. Photographs of the
pipe interior taken with a high-resolution digital camera and results of a low-strain pile integrity test revealed that most piles examined had
generally broken into three or more sections. According to results of the numerical analysis, the largest bending moment was developed in the
piles on the excavation side of the building at a depth corresponding to the interface of the soft and firm-stiff clay layers (13.5 m below the
ground surface), under the combined effect of excavation and dumping. This suggests that the failure occurred first for piles on the excavation
side, and eventually caused the building to fall flat onto the excavation site. A lesson learned from the accident is that geotechnical engineers
and contractors should be better trained to improve their understanding of the effects of surcharge loading on PHC piles. Moreover, proper
construction procedures and site supervision schemes should be explicitly spelled out and strictly followed by all parties during construction.
DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0001005. © 2017 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Building collapse; Field investigation; Three-dimensional finite-element analysis; Pile failure; Excavation; Dumped
soil; Bearing capacity failure.

Introduction life of one construction worker. As shown in Fig. 1, the superstruc-

On the early morning of June 27, 2009, a 13-story high-rise build-
ing (Number 7) under construction at the Lotus Riverside residen-
tial complex suddenly collapsed in Shanghai, China, claiming the
1
Senior Engineer (Professor-Level), Dept. of Underground Structure and
Geotechnical Engineering, Underground Space Engineering Design and
Research Institute, Arcplus Group PLC., Hankou Rd., Shanghai 200002,
People’s Republic of China. E-mail: weidong_wang@ecadi.com
2
Senior Engineer, Dept. of Underground Structure and Geotechnical
Engineering, Underground Space Engineering Design and Research
Institute, Arcplus Group PLC., Hankou Rd., Shanghai 200002, People’s
Republic of China (corresponding author). E-mail: qing_li@ecadi.com
3 (1992) reported the case history of a 16-story building that
Senior Engineer, Dept. of Underground Structure and Geotechnical
Engineering, Underground Space Engineering Design and Research
Institute, Arcplus Group PLC., Hankou Rd., Shanghai 200002, People’s
Republic of China. E-mail: yun_hu@ecadi.com
4
Lecturer, College of Civil and Transportation Engineering, Hohai
Univ., Xikang Rd., Nanjing 210078, People’s Republic of China. E-mail:
ceshijiangwei@163.com
5
Chair Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Hong Kong Univ. of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon,
Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China. E-mail: cecwwng@ust.hk
Note. This manuscript was submitted on June 14, 2016; approved on
October 28, 2016; published online on February 11, 2017. Discussion per-
iod open until July 11, 2017; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, © ASCE, ISSN 0887-3828.
ture of the collapsed building remained almost intact with a number
of broken piles still attached to it. A large area of soil dumped on
the northern side of the building can also be seen in the photograph
taken after the accident.
Building collapse can be broadly classified into two categories,
partial collapse and total collapse, on the basis of the extent of the
collapse (Wardhana and Hadipriono 2003). According to Wardhana
and Hadipriono (2003), 20% of the 225 cases of building failures
examined in the United States were total collapse failures. How-
ever, well-documented case histories of building collapse (particu-
larly total collapse) are rarely available in the literature for reasons
either to do with the law, or people’s reputations. Cuoco et al.
collapsed during construction using the lift-slab method. The super-
structure of the building collapsed entirely. During field investiga-
tion, the structural engineer of record located a slab jack remote
from the project site, providing evidence that the most probable
cause of the collapse is jack failure because of instability of steel
wedges. Another relevant work is that of Ghosh (2011), who at-
tempted to uncover the actual cause of the total collapse of a 5-story
residential building in New Delhi, India. Ghosh (2011) concluded
that the collapse was likely the result of structural failure. The lit-
erature has seldom reported case histories investigating foundation
failures for high-rise buildings.
Shortly after the accident in Shanghai, the local government
appointed the authors to lead a team and carry out forensic

© ASCE 04017012-1 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1

 changes. Fig. 2 shows a typical soil profile and geotechnical prop-
erties at the site. In general, there are seven soil layers within the
upper 50 m of soil below the ground surface. The approximately
3.5-m-thick crust is composed mainly of fill and silty clay, which
are overconsolidated because of desiccation. The desiccated
crust overlies a 10-m-thick soft clay layer which is followed by a
16-m-thick firm-stiff silty clay layer. Further down lies clayey silt.
Underlying these deposits is a fine sand layer.
The water content typically increases from nearly 30% in the
crust to approximately 50% in the soft clay layer, and then de-
creases gradually to 25% just above the silt layer. The natural water
content of the soft clay is larger than its liquid limit, so the soil
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exhibits soft and compressible behavior. Fig. 2 also shows the in

Fig. 1. View of the site after the building collapse (image by Y. Hu)
investigations and remedial work. Upon arrival at the site, the team
of investigators collected and documented collapse debris in order
to preserve as much physical evidence as possible. In order to iden-
tify the most probable cause of the collapse, the foundation piles
of the building were extensively investigated and the damage to the
piles and induced pile movements were assessed. To assist in the
investigation and offer insights into the collapse, three-dimensional
(3D) finite-element analysis was carried out to simulate the proc-
esses of excavation and soil dumping. Based on the facts collected
on-site and the interpretation of numerical results, the most prob-
able cause of the collapse of the 13-story high-rise building is
proposed and discussed.
Project
Geological Conditions and Soil Properties
Shanghai is located at the estuary of Yangtze River Delta along
the coast of the East China Sea. The geology is mainly composed
of alluvial and marine sediments deposited during the Quaternary
Period as a result of periodic warm and cold climates and sea level
situ undrained shear strength (su ) profile measured in two vane
shear tests. The undrained shear strength changes slightly in the
range from 20 to 30 kPa for soft (silty) clay, but increases all
the way up to 80 kPa for the silty clay layer underneath. According
to geotechnical field investigations, groundwater at this site mainly
comes from precipitation as well as the nearby Ding Pu river and
the phreatic surface fluctuates between 0.7 and 0.9 m below the
ground surface.
Description of Building and Foundation Piles
The entire Lotus Riverside complex measures approximately
42,300 m2 in plan, and consists of 11 reinforced concrete shear
wall buildings 10–13 stories high, together with an underground
space which actually comprises two independent, adjacent 1-story
garages. A plan view of the building of concern (Number 7) is
shown in Fig. 3. The underground garage is constructed on the
southern side of the building, which contains 13 levels of apart-
ments above the ground surface, with a total height of 37.7 m.
Pile foundations consisting of 118 prestressed high-strength
concrete (PHC) pipe piles supported the superstructure of the build-
ing. Fig. 4 shows the layout of the pipe piles for the building. All
PHC piles were steam-cured under a pressure of 1.0 MPa at 180°C
to improve early strength, allowing for earlier removal time of
forms. Each pile was 33 m long, and had an outer diameter of
400 mm and a wall thickness of 80 mm. The piles penetrated
the clay layers and rested on fine sand as a bearing stratum.

Unit weight Water content Void ratio Vane shear strength Cone resistance
3 wn (%)
γt (kN/m ) e su (kPa) qc (MPa)
Soil profile 16 17 18 19 20 15 25 35 45 55 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 0 40 80 120 0 5 10 15
0 Fill
(1.8m)
Silty clay
5 Soft
(silty) clay
10 Soft clay wp wL

pile
15

20 Firm-stiff
Depth (m)

silty clay
25

30
Clayey silt
35

40 (34.8m)
Fine sand
45

50

Fig. 2. Geological conditions and soil properties (wn natural water content; wL liquid limit; and wp plastic limit)

© ASCE 04017012-2 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1


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Fig. 3. Plan view of the construction site
The capacity of a single pile was designed to be approximately
1,300 kN. Ground beams were used to connect all the piles
and to transfer loads from the superstructure to the piles. The
ground beams had cross-sectional dimensions of 600 × 700 mm
(width × height). The upper 2 m of the hollow PHC piles was filled
with reinforced concrete and cast together with the ground beam to
enable a robust connection, and is hence referred to as the rein-
forced zone in this study. Full-scale bending tests show that this type
of pipe pile has a bending capacity of approximately 158 kN · m
under pure bending conditions.
Excavation
Fig. 5 shows the relative locations of building Number 7 and the
excavation for the underground garage (along cross section A-A
in Fig. 3). The excavation for the entire garage took up an area
of 8,000 m2 and the excavation depth was 4.6 m. The basement
was first excavated to 1.8 m below the ground surface using the
open cut method at a slope of 1∶1.5. Below 1.8 m, the excavation
was supported by a composite soil nail wall, which consisted of a
Fig. 4. Layout of foundation piles before and after the collapse
© ASCE 04017012-3
J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1
deep soil mixing wall and two rows of soil nails made of steel tubes.
The soil mixing wall was 0.7 m thick and 7.2 m long giving rise to a
penetration depth of 4.4 m below the formation level. The steel tube
had an outer diameter of 48 mm and a wall thickness of 3 mm. The
upper and lower rows of soil nails were 9 and 6 m in length, re-
spectively, and were installed at a downward angle of 15 degrees
from the horizontal direction.
Construction Status at Time of Collapse
Excavation of the Underground Garage
Prior to the accident, the superstructure of building Number 7 had
already been built. During excavation of the underground garage,
the building suddenly collapsed and tipped over onto the excava-
tion on the southern side. The western part of the underground
garage, i.e., Zone I, had been excavated to the formation level
(Fig. 3). A plain concrete layer had been completed in this area,
but structural reinforced concrete slab had not been cast. Zone
II had yet to be excavated. After the collapse, the building lay
on top of the excavation, although the superstructure remained
almost intact (Fig. 1).
Dumped Soil
According to construction logs, the dumping process can be
broadly divided into two stages and is schematically shown in
Fig. 5. In December 2008, a large amount of spoil was dumped
on the northern side of the building forming a 4-m-high fill slope
approximately 16 m away from the building. From June 20, 2009,
excavation of the underground garage began on the southern side of
the building. The excavated soil was dumped on top of the previ-
ously formed 4-m fill slope on the northern side of the building. By
June 27, the fill slope had grown to approximately 90 m in length
and 40 m in width (in plan) and stood 10 m tall. The vertical loading
from the trapezoidal dumped soil was equivalent to a uniformly
distributed loading of 94 kPa, assuming that the unit weight of
the dumped soil was 16.5 kN=m3 . Note that the size of the fill slope
was measured after the collapse of the building.
Because a 10-m-thick soft stratum lies beneath the stiff crust
(refer to Fig. 2), the soft clay could have lost its bearing capacity
because of the surcharge loading imposed by the dumped soil.
Based on the undrained assumption, the bearing capacity of the soft
J. Perform. Constr. Facil.
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Fig. 5. Construction status at time of collapse (along cross section A-A)
clay was estimated to be 5.14su ¼ 129 kPa, where su is undrained
shear strength, being equal to 25 kPa. For simplicity, the weight of
the fill and silty clay layers above was also considered to be a sur-
charge loading, which was estimated to be approximately 63 kPa.
Under this circumstance, the total stress exerted on the soft clay
stratum was approximately 157 kPa, exceeding the estimated bear-
ing capacity. Hence, the soft clay layer had likely lost its bearing
capacity.
Field Investigation Program
The field investigation program involved two stages. The inves-
tigative work in the first stage began shortly after the collapse.
In this stage, exposed broken piles that were still connected to
foundation beams adjacent to the dumped soil on the northern side
of the building were investigated. Special attention was paid to the
damage to the pile head. Six piles (A1–A6 as shown in Fig. 4)
embedded in the ground were dug out to inspect the failure
features of the pile shaft. Moreover, the fracture features of two
of these piles (A1 and A2) at large depths (2 m below the original
level of pile head) were inspected using a high-resolution digital
camera. Damage to the pile shaft can be directly identified in pho-
tographs taken.
After the debris of the collapsed building was removed com-
pletely, the piles located adjacent to the excavation on the southern
side of the building were investigated (i.e., second stage). In this
stage, excavations were carried out to expose a total of 24 piles
(B1–B24) and the elevation and tilt of fractures nearest to the
pile head were determined. Moreover, a high-resolution digital
camera was used to observe directly the damage to the shaft of
nine of the 24 piles. For some piles where underground water
kept flowing inside, the integrity of these piles was examined
using low-strain pile integrity testing method. The method uses
a hammer to generate stress waves and an accelerometer to
record input and reflection waves, based on which failure is de-
termined according to Chinese professional standard of JGJ
106-2003 (MCPRC 2003).
© ASCE 04017012-4
J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1
Results of Field Investigation
Pile Movements
Using the global positioning system (GPS) technique, the locations
of individual pipe piles after the collapse could be determined ac-
curately (Fig. 4). The pile locations changed significantly after the
collapse. However, because it was very difficult to match the post-
collapse locations with the original locations, the actual movement
of each pile could not be readily determined. Fortunately, two piles
at the southeast of the building, i.e., B23 and B24, were at least
3.4 m apart from other piles, and locations of these two piles before
and after the collapse could be identified with certainty. The two
pile heads had moved toward the excavation site by 3.9 and 3.8 m.
Moreover, both had moved slightly toward the west, indicating a
rotation of the building in falling over. Thus, it may be implied
that the foundation piles of the building had shifted substantially
following the collapse.
Damage to Piles near the Dumped Soil
As described previously, the superstructure of building Number 7
rested on 118 PHC pipe piles. After the collapse, the building lay
flat on the excavation site on the southern side of the building. The
piles on the northern side of the building, i.e., those adjacent to the
dumped soil, were pulled out and exposed. As shown in Fig. 6,
these piles broke but the pile head remained connected to the foun-
dation beam. Approximately half of the foundation piles of the
building were exposed. The piles near the excavation side were
buried in the soil and cannot be directly seen in Fig. 6.
The broken piles that were still connected to the foundation
beam had a residual length of approximately 1–2 m. The pipe pile
was connected to the bottom slab by filling the upper 2.0 m of its
hollow part with reinforced concrete. Therefore, the reinforced pile
shaft near the connection had a very different stiffness compared to
the unreinforced one. The decrease in stiffness with depth is likely
the reason why most piles broke near the depth of 2.0 m. For sev-
eral piles, the reinforced concrete block was even completely pulled
J. Perform. Constr. Facil.
 Reinforced concrete
block being pulled out
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Fig. 6. Pipe piles connected to foundation beams (adjacent to the
dumped soil on the northern side of the collapsed building) (image
by Y. Hu)
out. No obvious damage was observed at the connection between
the pile head and foundation beams for the majority of the exposed
pipes. A close examination revealed that most piles near the
dumped soil had failure surfaces (uppermost fractures) that almost
formed a right angle with the pile axis. These failure surfaces were
probably the result of tensile failure. As a result, some of the re-
inforced concrete blocks were pulled out.
Using a high-resolution digital camera, it was possible to ob-
serve directly the damage to the PHC piles that were still embedded
deep in the ground. In order to obtain clear photographs, the interior
of the investigated piles were cleaned with pressurised water before
the internal inspections. Muddy water inside the pile was pumped
out, and the camera, together with a lighting kit, were lowered into
Excavation side
(a)
Surcharge side
Excavation side
(c)
Fig. 7. Uppermost fractures in piles on the excavation (southern) side of the collapsed building (images by Y. Hu): (a) B1; (b) B12; (c) B18; (d) B19
© ASCE
J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1
the pile to take photos along the pile shaft. Piles A1 and A2 were
examined using this method. In A1, another two fractures were
identified, located approximately 2.2 and 10.5 m below the upper-
most fracture. As previously described, the broken pile section that
remained attached to the foundation was approximately 2 m long.
Therefore, pile A1 failed at three locations, i.e., 2, 4.2, and 12.5 m
below the original level of the pile head. The failure 2 m below the
pile head occurred in the soft clay layer, whereas the failure 12.5 m
below the pile head took place near the interface of the soft and
firm-stiff silt clay layers. Pile A2 failed in a similar pattern to
A1. The pile broke approximately 2, 4, and 11 m below the original
level of the pile head.
Damage to Piles near the Excavation
Because piles on the excavation side were covered by building
debris, only after the debris was removed could they be investi-
gated. Upon excavation of the soil at shallow depths during inves-
tigation, it was found that the uppermost fracture in piles exhibited
a different failure pattern to those in piles near the dumped soil.
Most failure surfaces were tilted at an angle. The concrete was frac-
tured severely or even crushed and some of the steel bars within the
concrete were jutting out at an angle as shown in Fig. 7. Based on
these observations, it is suspected that the upper part of the pile had
failed under eccentric compression, where one side of the pile had
compressed while the other side had come under tension.
In order to determine where the uppermost fracture occurred, the
precise levelling technique was used to measure the elevation of the
failure surfaces. It was found that the uppermost fracture occurred
1–2 m below the original level of the pile head, which agrees fairly
well with the finding for the piles adjacent to the dumped soil. The
tilt of the broken pile embedded in the ground was also measured.
The measured tilt angle varied from 0° to 60°. Piles tilting at 10–20°
from the vertical axis accounted for 46% of all piles investigated.
Surcharge side
Excavation side
(b)
Surcharge side
Excavation side
(d)
04017012-5 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.
 Ground surface
0 Elevation of pile head Fill
2 Uppermost Silty clay
Fracture 4 fracture
6 Intermediate Bottom of Soft silty clay
fracture reinforcement
8
10 Soft clay
12
Lowest (?)
14

Depth (m)
fracture (?) (?)
16 (?)
18
20
22 Firm-stiff
24 silty clay
26
28
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30
Clayey silt
32
34 B7 B13 Fine sand
(a)

Fig. 9. Locations of fractures in pipe piles on the excavation (southern)

side of the collapsed building

Fracture

the camera could not be used. The quick influx of water into the
pile was indicative of the existence of another fracture in each of
these four piles (possible failure location was shown in Fig. 9).
Comparing the photographs collected in the two stages of inves-
tigation, piles located on the excavation side of the building were
damaged more severely than those close to the dumped soil at larger
depths. The intermediate fracture surfaces of pile B1 and pile B8
were located at the depths of 4.1 and 4.2 m below the original level
of the pile head, respectively. In addition, pile B13 and pile B20
(b) broke into two at the depths of 4.4 and 5.8 m, respectively.
Several piles were blocked by soil at relatively shallow depths,
Crack thus it was not possible to insert the camera inside. Instead, the low-
strain pile integrity test, which has been widely applied for assess-
ing the structural integrity of concrete piles (Rausche and Seitz
1983; Hussein and Garlanger 1992), was performed to identify
the location of fractures at large depths. For instance, piles B23
and B24 were blocked at the depths of 6.2 and 5.3 m, respectively.
Based on the low-strain pile integrity test results, it was deduced
that pile failure took place 7 and 6 m below the original level of the
pile head for piles B23 and B24, respectively.
Based on the results of field measurements and the photographs
taken, fracture locations for 12 piles on the excavation side of the
building were determined and shown in Fig. 9, which shows that
most of the piles had broken into at least three sections. The upper-
(c) most fracture mainly occurred within 2 m below the original level
of the pile head. The intermediate fractures were found at depths
Fig. 8. Photos of the pipe interior taken with a high-resolution digital ranging from 4 to 6 m below the pile head in the soft clay layers.
camera for pipe piles on the excavation (southern) side of the collapsed The lowest fracture might occur approximately 11–14 m below the
building: (a) B1; (b) B8; (c) B20 elevation of the original pile head. This depth is close to where the
interface between the soft clay and firm-stiff silty clay layers was
located.

It was also found that piles located in the middle of the building
tilted at a smaller angle than those on either the eastern or western
side.
After the debris was removed, the internal damage in 12 piles
(B1, B3, B4, B7, B8, B10, B12, B13, B20, B22, B23, and B24 as
shown in Fig. 4) was inspected using either a high-resolution cam-
era or low-strain pile integrity test (or both). As shown in Fig. 8,
failures and cracks could be readily identified in four piles (B1, B8,
B13, and B20) down to 11–14 m below the elevation of original
pile head by using the same high-digital camera. Below 11–14 m,
because the underground water kept flowing into the pile quickly,
Three-Dimensional Finite-Element Analysis
Based merely on the pile failure features obtained from the field
investigation, it was not possible to deduce the mechanism under-
lying the building collapse. To assist in identifying the most prob-
able cause of the collapse, three-dimensional finite-element analysis
was carried out to simulate the process of excavation on one side of
the building and dumping on the opposite side. Special attention
was paid to stress created in the pipe piles by excavation and
dumping.

© ASCE 04017012-6 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1

 excavation and dumped soil, as well as a simplified profile of the
dumped soil are shown in Fig. 10(b). In the analysis, the subsoil
was modeled by 15-node wedge solid elements. Retaining walls
were simulated using eight-node quadrilateral shell elements,
whereas the soil nails were modeled by ground anchors. For both
foundation beams and structural beams, three-node beam elements
were used. The 118 pipe piles were simulated using the embedded-
pile model, which consists of beam elements connected to the sur-
rounding soil. It has been found that the embedded-pile model is
able to reproduce the behavior of laterally loaded pile in numerical
analysis (Dao 2011). The 3D model consisted of 65,439 elements
and a total of 181,147 nodes. Movements in all directions and all
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rotations were fixed at the bottom of the mesh. Roller boundaries

were adopted for the vertical faces of the mesh.

Constitutive Model and Model Parameters

(a) An elastoplastic model with a Mohr-Column failure criterion was
170 m
adopted to simulate the soil behavior and the finite-element analy-
sis was carried out based on total stress analysis (φu ¼ 0). In the
I analysis, the undrained shear strength of the clay (su ) was determined
90 m
6m Cross section I-I according to the in-situ vane shear strength. Following the recom-
mendations by Jardine et al. (1985), and Gourvenec and Randolph
39 m
10 m

Second dumping Dumped soil

1:1 (2003), the undrained elastic modulus of the clay was assumed to be
4m

1:1 First dumping

16 m 24 m 500 times su . The fine sand layer was modeled under drained con-
I Building ditions. The effective drained modulus E 0 was estimated from the
160 m

7m from the blowcount value N of standard penetration test (SPT).

The retaining walls and the pipe piles were assumed to be elastic
37 m

Excavation and their elastic moduli were 30 and 38 GPa, respectively. Table 1
summarizes all the parameters used in the finite-element analysis.
85 m
y

x
Numerical Modeling Procedures

(b) The construction sequence was simplified and modeled as follows:

(1) generation of initial stress conditions; (2) construction of foun-
Fig. 10. Three-dimensional finite-element mesh: (a) 3D isometric dation pipe piles and the building; (3) dumping of soil to a height of
view; (b) plan view 4 m (first stage) on the northern side of the building; and (4) con-
struction of retaining walls, excavation and dumping of soil to the
final height of 10 m (second stage).

Finite-Element Mesh and Boundary Conditions Interpretation of Computed Results

Fig. 10(a) shows a 3D isometric view of the finite-element mesh
adopted for the analysis. The finite-element program PLAXIS 3D
Foundation (PLAXIS 2008) was used. The length of the mesh in the
lateral (y) direction was 170 m. The width (x) and depth (z) were
160 and 50 m, respectively. The relative locations of the building,
Fig. 11 shows the bending moment distribution of a foundation pile
with depth. The pile (Pe ) located on the excavation side of the
building as shown in Fig. 4 is used for illustration. As illustrated
in the inset, a positive bending moment means that the pile bends
toward the surcharge loading side, whereas a negative one means

Table 1. Soil Parameters Used in Finite-Element Analysis

Soil layer Depth (m) Γ (kN=m3 ) su a (kPa) c 0 (kPa) φ 0 (°) Eu (MPa) E 0 (MPa) f s (kPa) fp (kPa)
Dumped soil — 16.5 22 — — 11 — — —
Fill 0–1.3 17.0 20 — — 10 — — —
Silty clay 1.3–3.5 17.5 50 — — 25 — 15 —
Soft silty clay 3.5–7.5 16.8 24 — — 12 — 18 —
Soft clay 7.5–13.5 16.6 21 — — 10.5 — 20 —
Silty clay 13.5–19.2 17.7 60 — — 30 — 35 —
Silty clay 19.2–21.5 18.3 80 — — 40 — 45 —
Silty clay 21.5–29.7 18.0 52 — — 26 — 40 750
Clayey silt 29.7–32.8 19.0 130 — — 65 — 70 3,500
Fine sand 32.8–50 19.0 — 1 30 65 50 80 4,000
Note: c 0 = effective cohesion; Eu = undrained elastic modulus; E 0 = effective elastic modulus; f s = ultimate skin friction; f p = ultimate end bearing;
su = undrained shear strength; γ = unit weight; φ 0 = effective friction angle.
a
Undrained shear strength was obtained from in situ vane shear tests.

© ASCE 04017012-7 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1

 0 Fill shown in Fig. 12. The pure bending capacity of 158 kN · m for pipe
Positive Silty clay
piles is also shown for ease of comparison. The maximum bending
Negative Soft
5 moments in the two piles developed similarly, i.e., they kept in-
(silty) clay
creasing as construction proceeded. At any given time, bending
Excavation +
10 side
Mmax Soft clay moments in the piles near the excavation were always larger than
those near the dumped soil. This means that the bending capacity
of the piles on the excavation side of the building was exceeded,
Depth (m)

15 -
Mmax and these piles failed before those on the soil dumping side did.
Pure bending Because the embedded pile model which actually consists of elastic
20 capacity Firm-stiff beam elements was adopted, the breakage of the piles could not be
silty clay
Pure bending simulated in the analysis. This is the reason why the bending mo-
25 capacity ment kept increasing after the bending capacity was exceeded.
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30 First stage dumping Likely Collapse Scenario

Clayey silt
Excavation and
second stage dumping Fine sand
In light of the observed damage to piles and induced pile move-
35 ments as well as the computed bending moments in the piles, a
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
likely collapse scenario is proposed. Owing to the surcharge load-
Bending moment (kN.M)
ing imposed by the soil dumped and adjacent excavation, the soft
Fig. 11. Typical computed bending moment distribution with depth in clay underneath the dumped soil area likely suffered a bearing
pipe piles capacity failure, giving rise to significant lateral soil movements.
These soil movements caused the pipe piles to deform. The maxi-
mum bending moment developed in the pipe piles on the excava-
tion side of the building at a depth corresponding to the interface of
the soft and firm-stiff clay layers (13.5 m below the ground sur-
Calculation phase
face). As the height of the dumped soil grew, the bending moment
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 eventually exceeded the bending capacity of the piles near the inter-
0
face. As a result, the piles near the excavation broke first, causing
the building to tilt toward the excavation. When the overturning
-100 moment exceeded the resisting moment, the tilt of the building
started to accelerate. The more slender the building is (i.e., larger
M-max (kN.m)

building aspect ratio), the more significant the overturning moment

-200 Pure bending capacity
-300
Pile along the excavation
Pile near the dumped soil
-400
Fig. 12. Comparison of maximum negative bending moments (M −
max )
for piles near the excavation and near the dumped soil
that the pile bends toward the excavation. Fig. 11 shows that after
soil had been dumped to a height of 4 m on the northern side of the
building, the maximum bending moment of the pile reached ap-
proximately 58 kN · m. This value is within the pure bending
capacity of the pile, suggesting that the pile had likely remained
intact at that point in time. This is consistent with the fact that
the building was not damaged in the first six months after the soil
dumping.
The maximum positive bending moment in the pile developed
approximately 10 m below the ground surface, where the soft clay
layer could be found. The maximum negative bending moment in
the pile occurred approximately 14.5 m below the ground surface,
corresponding to the interface between the soft and firm-stiff silty
clays. In addition, the absolute value of the negative bending mo-
ment exceeded the maximum positive bending moment. This im-
plies that the foundation piles of the building would have broken
first at the depth where the interface between the soft and stiff clay
layers was located.
In an attempt to identify the sequence of pile failure, computed
maximum negative bending moments (M − max ) in the piles near the
excavation (Pe ) and near the dumped soil (Pd ) are compared and
will be. As the tilting increased, the piles adjacent to the dumped
soil experienced a tension failure which caused the building to
topple over.
Lessons Learned
Similar buildings with PHC pile foundations and an underground
garage are commonly found in Shanghai (Hong 2013), but a com-
plete collapse of an entire building has not been reported before this
accident. Generally, the effect of surcharge loading from the dump-
ing of soil close to a building is not considered in the design stage in
Shanghai. PHC piles are normally designed to withstand vertical
loading only, rather than horizontal loading. Had it been possible
to identify the potential for excessive lateral soil displacement of
the soft clay layer under combined effects of surcharge and exca-
vation, the failure may have been prevented. Geotechnical engi-
neers and contractors should be better trained to improve their
understanding of the effects of surcharge loading and the impor-
tance of proper site supervision. In addition, proper construction
procedures should be clearly and explicitly spelled out to all parties
involved in the construction of buildings supported by PHC piles.
Conclusions and Recommendations
A 13-story high-rise residential building collapsed completely dur-
ing the excavation and construction of an underground garage on
the southern side of the building in June 2009 in Shanghai. In order
to identify the principal cause of the collapse, an extensive field
investigation was carried out immediately after the accident. In ad-
dition to geotechnical exploration of subsoil properties, the inves-
tigative work involved careful examination and collection of
physical evidence of the damage to PHC pipe piles and induced

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J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1

 pile movements. A total of 30 pipe piles were examined compre-
hensively. The postcollapse pile locations, damage, and tilt of
exposed pile heads were studied. Moreover, damage to pile shafts
embedded in the ground were inspected using a high-resolution
digital camera and low-strain pile integrity test. To assist in the
investigation and provide insights into the collapse, three-
dimensional finite-element analysis was carried out. Based on the
results of the field investigation and the 3D numerical analysis,
the following conclusions may be drawn:
1. For pipe piles located close to the dumped soil on the northern
side of the collapsed building, uppermost fractures mainly oc-
curred near the connections of the reinforced and unreinforced
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sections. Most of these fracture surfaces were flat, implying that
the pipe piles near the dumped soil had failed under tension.
Nevertheless, for piles on the excavation (southern) side of the
building, the uppermost fracture surfaces were tilted and
the concrete was severely damaged, suggesting the failure
was mainly caused by compression. The observed pile failure
modes are indicative of building overturning owing to bearing
capacity failure.
2. Most of the pipe piles investigated had broken into three sec-
tions and some into four. The uppermost fractures occurred
approximately 1–2 m below the designed elevation of the pile
head. The intermediate fracture surfaces were located 4–6 m
below the piled head. The lowest fractures probably occurred
11–14 m below the pile head, near the interface between the
soft clay and firm-stiff silty clay layers.
3. Under the combined influences of a 4.6-m-deep excavation on
the southern side of the building and the dumping of soil to a
height of 10 m on the opposite side, the soft clay underneath the
dumped soil area suffered a bearing capacity failure, leading to
significant lateral soil movements in this layer. Consequently, lar-
ger bending moments were developed in piles on the excavation
side than in those on the dumping side. As a result, the piles near
the excavation broke first, causing the building to tilt toward the
excavation. With enough tilting, piles adjacent to the dumped soil
broke as a result of tension, and the building toppled over.
4. Because surcharge loading is generally not considered in the
design of PHC piles in Shanghai, geotechnical engineers and
© ASCE 04017012-9
J. Perform. Constr. Facil., -1--1
contractors should be better trained to improve their understand-
ing of the effects of surcharge loading on PHC pile behavior.
Proper construction procedures and site supervision schemes
should be clearly and explicitly spelled out to all parties involved
in the construction of buildings supported by PHC pipe piles.
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