The Naval Reform of Emperor John II Komnenos

Mediterranean Historical Review
ISSN: 0951-8967 (Print) 1743-940X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmhr20
The naval reform of Emperor John II Komnenos: a

re-evaluation
Maximilian C.G. Lau
To cite this article: Maximilian C.G. Lau (2016) The naval reform of Emperor John
II Komnenos: a re-evaluation, Mediterranean Historical Review, 31:2, 115-138, DOI:
10.1080/09518967.2016.1248641
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Mediterranean Historical Review, 2016
Vol. 31, No. 2, 115–138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518967.2016.1248641
The naval reform of Emperor John II Komnenos: a re-evaluation

Maximilian C.G. Lau*
Department for Economics, Economic History and Regional Economies, Hitotsubashi University,
Kunitachi-shi, Japan
The eleventh and twelfth centuries have traditionally been interpreted as the era
Downloaded by [Australian Catholic University] at 20:43 01 August 2017
when the Byzantine navy declined, and then was allowed to disappear. Historians
often mark the death knell of the Byzantine navy with Emperor John II Komnenos
ending the collection of taxes for localized defence fleets. Niketas Choniates
describes the act as a money-hungry measure devised by the finance minister John
of Poutza, whereby fleet taxes would be collected and spent centrally, leading to the
end of localized fleets as funds were diverted to other sectors. This reform has tradi-
tionally been interpreted as one that led to losing a war with Venice in the 1120s,
provincial insecurity, the eventual outsourcing of the Byzantine navy to the Italians,
and finally the sack of Constantinople itself by the forces of the Fourth Crusade
when the Italians turned against them.Such an interpretation does not however sit
easily with the reign of John II Komnenos, during which on numerous occasions
the navy is referenced as playing a crucial part in the emperor’s campaigns, a fea-
ture that began in Alexios’ reign and continued into Manuel’s. Though Pryor and
Jeffreys have previously expressed doubt that such a centralising naval reform could
really spell the end of the Byzantine fleet, and possibly the empire itself, this paper
will build upon that doubt with evidence that necessitates a re-evaluation of the tra-
ditional interpretation. First, the narrative of John’s war with Venice in the 1120s
will be examined, followed by how the subsequent naval reform was shaped by
these events, which themselves only confirmed the experiences of the Byzantine
Navy in previous decades, and so highlighted the need for reform. This analysis will
demonstrate that a centralising reform was a coherent measure undertaken to
increase the efficiency of the fleet, and to recognize officially trends in organization
that had already emerged under Alexios. Subsequent fleet operations in John and
Manuel’s reigns reveal that the role of the navy did indeed change in the early
twelfth century, but the narrative of decline is false. Throughout this section it will
also be shown that analysis of the Byzantine navy has been overly shaped by use of
hostile sources. The second part of this paper will then move on to highlight three
major uses of the fleet that have been undervalued by scholars focused on traditional
sea battles: its use on rivers as well as the sea, its use for transport and logistics,
and its ‘soft power’ diplomatic capacity. The combination of these factors reveal a
Byzantine navy that was a crucial part of the Komnenian restoration of Byzantine
fortunes in the twelfth century, and that its decline after the death of Manuel must
be seen as a product of other factors, rather than a cause of the late twelfth-century
imperial decline in itself.
Keywords: John II Komnenos; Byzantine history; medieval history; naval history;
Komnenos; Alexios I Komnenos; Manuel I Komnenos; Venetian history; twelfth
century
*Email: m.lau@oriel.oxon.org
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

116 M.C.G. Lau
The eleventh and twelfth centuries have traditionally been interpreted as a period of
decline for the Byzantine navy. The thematic fleets had declined early in the eleventh
century, as the empire had faced no major naval threat, and the traditional interpretation
posits that with the crises of the late eleventh century, and the onslaught of the Norman
and Italian fleets, Byzantium was forced to rely on the Venetians for naval support.
Historians often mark the death knell of the Byzantine navy with Emperor John II
Komnenos ending the collection of taxes for localized defence fleets. Niketas Choniates
describes the act as a money-hungry measure devised by the finance minister John of
Poutza, whereby fleet taxes would be collected and spent centrally, leading to the end
of localized fleets as funds were diverted to other sectors.1 This centralizing reform has
traditionally been interpreted as one that led to losing a war with Venice in the 1120s,
provincial insecurity, the eventual outsourcing of the Byzantine navy to the Italians,
and finally the sack of Constantinople itself by the forces of the Fourth Crusade when
the Italians turned against them.2
Such an interpretation does not, however, sit easily with the reign of John II
Komnenos, during which on numerous occasions the navy is referenced as playing a
crucial part in the emperor’s campaigns, a feature that began in Alexios’ reign and con-
tinued into Manuel’s. Though Pryor and Jeffreys have previously expressed doubt that
such a centralizing naval reform could really spell the end of the Byzantine fleet, and
possibly the empire itself, this paper will build upon that doubt with evidence that
necessitates a re-evaluation of the traditional interpretation.3 First, the narrative of
John’s war with Venice in the 1120s will be examined, followed by how the subsequent
naval reform was shaped by these events, which themselves only confirmed the experi-
ences of the Byzantine Navy in previous decades, and so highlighted the need for
reform. This analysis will demonstrate that a centralizing reform was a coherent mea-
sure undertaken to increase the efficiency of the fleet, and to officially recognize trends
in organization that had already emerged under Alexios. Subsequent fleet operations in
John and Manuel’s reigns reveal that the role of the navy did indeed change in the
early twelfth century, but the narrative of decline is false. Throughout this section it
will also be shown that analysis of the Byzantine navy has been overly shaped by use
of hostile sources, with Choniates’ personal opinion of John of Poutza and him being
blamed for the decline of the navy as part of his polemic search for causes of Byzan-
tine decline around 1204 being a major case in point. The second part of this paper will
then move on to highlight three major uses of the fleet that have been undervalued by
scholars who focus on traditional sea battles: its use on rivers as well as the sea, its use
for transport and logistics, and its ‘soft power’ diplomatic capacity. The combination of
these factors reveals a Byzantine navy that was a crucial part of the Komnenian restora-
tion of Byzantine fortunes in the twelfth century, and that its decline after the death of
Manuel must be seen as a product of other factors, rather than a cause of the late
twelfth-century imperial decline in itself.
John II’s war with Venice is often labelled as the first event that soured Byzantine-
Venetian relations, such that conditions were incubated for the Byzantine disaster that
was the Fourth Crusade. It has been described as a ‘needless war’ in the Dumbarton
Oaks biography of John II for their sigillography exhibition catalogue, and indeed ‘like
an ember buried in ashes’ in the title of a recent paper on the subject.4 The conven-
tional narrative runs that on coming to the throne in 1118, John refused to renew the
trade concessions granted to Venice by his father Alexios. Then, when the Venetian
Doge Michiel sailed east with the Venetian fleet in 1122 in response to Pope Calixtus
II’s appeal for a Crusade following the battle of Ager Sanguinis, the Doge took the
Mediterranean Historical Review 117
opportunity to seize supplies and winter on Corfu. This he did either opportunistically,
or indeed he may have planned it that way before the fleet even left, though a raid on
Byzantium does not appear in our sources in his appeal for support.5
It has been argued by Ahrweiler, Lilie, and Devaney that Venice may have carried
out this attack since there was no fear of reprisal. Ahrweiler reasons that Alexios had
not replaced the garrison that had been based there prior to the Norman invasions due
to faith in his new Venetian allies. Lilie and Devaney instead argue that Poutza’s
reform that centralized collection and expenditure of naval taxes had deprived the
island of a defending fleet and coastal garrison.6 Aside from the problem of ascertain-
ing whether Venice even knew the status of the island’s defences, whether the empire
had enacted this policy, or indeed that it was in place yet even if Venice did know
about it, more crucially it has been pointed out by Herrin that this policy was only
instituted after 1126.7 In her view this was done in response to the renewed promise
that Venice would grant Byzantium naval support when it needed it. In this case, when
Venice carried out its raid in 1122 it would have faced the fleets that John had before
their funding and organization were changed by Poutza’s measure. At this point, how-
ever, the Venetians caused no further damage, and therefore this was a local incident of
not much interest to nor having much effect upon the empire, and the Byzantine navy
had barely come into contact with the Venetians. The details of this will be outlined in
the next paragraph, but before that let me highlight one of many historiographical prob-
lems with this Venetian war: it is too often seen as a continuum, from John’s deprival
of privileges to years of open warfare. In fact Venetian records show that the Venetians
continued to trade in Constantinople without privileges between 1118 and 1122, and
that aside from this possible raid on Corfu for supplies, nothing else happened in 1122,
so it is only in 1124 that any real damage was done, and a true war began.8
Only thirteenth-century Venetian sources and the contemporary Fulcher of Chartres
describe the events of this war, and none of them provide specific reasons for why they
occurred. Nicol, Madden, Devaney, Queller, and Katele all argue that the doge left the
Levant after the siege of Tyre with the specific intention of putting pressure on John to
restore Venetian trade privileges. Tyre had fallen on 7/8 July 1124; had the Venetians
left immediately they would have easily reached Venice before winter, so delaying until
late summer meant that they left knowing they would have to winter in an imperial
port, necessitating hostilities.9 Whether this was the case or simply that campaigning
merely lasted longer than planned, both Andrea Dandolo and the Historia Ducum
Veneticorum tell us that the Venetians landed on Rhodes unopposed and sought provi-
sions, but were refused by the inhabitants.10 The antagonism may have been mutual:
Devaney has argued that Venice and Byzantium were in ‘a state of undeclared war’ in
1124, and that John had ‘ordered the Venetians to be treated as an enemy’, and there-
fore to refuse them provisions, though there is no source that states this explicitly.11
However it is certainly true that provisioning a medieval fleet of 70 vessels to voyage
from Venice to the Levant and back would always be a major undertaking, and
arrangements for this would have been made in advance if relations were peaceful;
although water might be easy to come by, food and naval supplies were not. Therefore,
it is reasonable to conclude that the doge must have engineered this situation to justify
his using a fleet, ostensibly on crusade, in order to attack the empire.12 I would add to
this that the inhabitants of Rhodes, with winter upon them and their own mouths to
feed, would have been much more likely to refuse provisions and winter accommoda-
tion to such a huge Venetian fleet, particularly if they had heard news of what had hap-
pened at Corfu. Therefore there is every likelihood that this entire incident could have
118 M.C.G. Lau
occurred as a result of this local refusal without any direct orders from John to treat the
Venetians as enemies, particularly as the Venetians knew they had the strength to take
what they wanted: the doge had everything to gain and nothing to lose in this situation,
whatever John’s orders or lack thereof.
Having crossed this Rubicon, the Venetians followed the attack on Rhodes with a
series of raids. According to Fulcher (who grieves for such sins as the Venetians com-
mitted by his own admission) they attacked Samos and then Methone before wintering
on Chios. There they destroyed the walls of towns, seized property, and took boys and
girls into captivity.13 All sources, including Kinnamos, then confirm that the Venetian
fleet used Chios as a base from which to plunder Lesbos and Andros in early 1125,
before finally leaving on 29 March with the relics of St Isidore the Martyr (still in
Venice’s San Marco Basilica) and many prisoners. They arrived back in Venice in June
as the conquering heroes of both the Levant and the Aegean.14 Plotting these raids on
a map leads to the conclusion that perhaps Fulcher has the order of attacks wrong, and
that Methone was only raided as the Venetians left the Aegean. Alternatively, he has
perhaps confused Methone with the port of Mytilene on Lesbos; or if he is correct, that
the Venetians changed their minds and headed back to Chios to execute further assaults
on imperial territory. Either way, the narrative sources mention no response from John
to these raids, which Devaney explains as due to the complete lack of local defence
fleets owing to the centralization of naval taxes and John’s preoccupation with cam-
paigning on land. However, the explanation fails if, as seems likely, this measure was
not yet in place.15 Böhm has suggested that these attacks were not merely for plunder,
but were specific strikes targeting the empire’s shipbuilding facilities in the Aegean.16
If so, this again tells us that there were active naval bases worth destroying in these
areas, and that the empire had not abandoned its naval capacity. This too is hidden in
the histories written later, but the near contemporary rhetorical sources contain hints
that the emperor did respond militarily to the Venetian attacks (Figure 1).
One such hint is to be found in the introduction to one of the poems of Theodore
Prodromos written for the Triumph of 1133, where he recounts many of John’s past
victories.17 Along with more familiar references to Anatolian and Balkan victories,
there is a reference to a victory at Lemnos, along with a line about how John had had
‘as many [victories] by land as by sea and islands’.18 Though rhetorical exaggeration
Figure 1. Map of the Venetian Raids, 1122–5, Source: Author.

of the emperor’s deeds is to be expected, a specific example of a victory at Lemnos is

noteworthy, as John would have been too young to campaign against Tzachas as a
three- to five-year-old in 1090–2, and short of another completely unknown conflict,
the only military operations in this region would be against the Venetians. This unique
reference must be treated sceptically, although what benefit Prodromos and John’s court
would have gained by fabricating a victory in imperial rhetoric almost 10 years later
makes its invention equally unlikely, and equally, if there were any imperial naval vic-
tories then Lemnos would be a likely site. Imperial ships would have gathered from
across the Aegean and beyond in response to the marauding Venetians, both to guard
the approaches to the Hellespont and to amass in numbers sufficient to confront their
enemy after the winter. Equally, the acts of the Lavra mention that in 1016 there was
an arsenal, ‘neosoikon’, on the island, thus this would fit in with Böhm’s theory that
Venice were deliberately targeting Byzantine naval installations.19 If the Venetians had
continued on to Lemnos, having left Chios and sailed north to raid Lesbos in the
spring, they would then have come across the imperial fleet; whether there was truly a
battle at Lemnos or merely a small incident that Prodromos is exaggerating, the impe-
rial fleet’s presence in the north Aegean would have been sufficient to convince the
Venetians to quit while they were ahead, and return west.
Though this is a single reference to an unspecified victory at sea, there is also
specific mention of John’s Megas Domestikos, John Axouch, commanding triremes and
other ships in a fragmentary encomium by Nikephoros Basilakes, and throughout the
works of Prodromos there are several mentions of John’s dominion over the sea as well
as the land. Although these could be considered rhetorical flourishes, they would per-
haps be less likely had John never succeeded at sea at all.20 Together with this possible
military response, Dandolo tells us that John burnt the Venetian quarter in Constantino-
ple in retaliation for these atrocities, which though only mentioned in this source,
sounds like the obvious response for an emperor or a Constantinopolitan mob angry at
Venice to make, though the Venetians’ very presence again tells us that this conflict
was seemingly not pre-planned by either John or the Doge Michiel, otherwise these
Venetians would have already sought to leave the city.21
Whether the emperor had had a victory at Lemnos in 1125 and planned to follow
this up with further reprisals, or assumed that the conflict was over now that the Vene-
tians had returned home as Devaney suggests, or indeed the emperor planned some
other response, it is certain that John did respond in some way to Venetian aggression
22
Developments in the wider world would however overtake him as the eventful year
of 1125 continued. Up until this year, John had been able to choose his battles and
campaigns with care, unlike Alexios, who was constrained to reactive policies by the
sheer numbers and strengths of his enemies. Even in the case of the nomadic invasion
of 1122, John dealt with this challenge on his own terms at a time of his choosing,
such that the battle of Beroea was won, and nomads did not trouble the empire again
until Manuel’s reign – and never again on so great a scale.23 The year 1125 would,
however, see John forced to react to multiple events outside his control, having been
already put on the back foot by Venetian aggression. It is with good reason that this is
the least well-documented period of John’s reign, as from the perspective of Choniates,
or even the occasionally hostile Kinnamos, there were no good choices at this point,
but possibly only the best of many bad ones. Together with the Venetian challenge
came three princes who offered John a chance to accelerate his plans of restoring impe-
rial hegemony in the Balkans and Anatolia, but the resulting strategy caused a crisis of
overextension.
120 M.C.G. Lau
These events deserve a full analysis in another paper, but for this study the impor-
tant point is that 1125 saw the arrival in Constantinople of Mas’ud, ousted as Sultan of
Konya by his brother Arab, Álmos of Hungary (great-uncle to John’s Empress Piroska-
Eirene) who was fleeing his nephew King Stephen of Hungary, and Gradinja of Diok-
leia who was asking for aid against Juraj, the son of King Constantine Bodin, who had
ousted him as the imperial client ruler of Diokleia with the aid of Uroš of Raška.24 In
order to retain control of imperial possessions in the Balkans, and in an attempt to gain
an imperial client in Anatolia in the form of a friendly Konya, John prioritized aiding
these princes rather than commit resources to further operations against Venice, perhaps
also believing that, as the Venetians had returned west, the war was resolved.25
Whether the doge knew that John had made such a decision or not, the fourteenth-
century Venetian historian Dandolo tells us that, in response to the burning of the Vene-
tian quarter in Constantinople, Michiel launched fresh raids on imperial possessions in

the Ionian sea, plundering Cephalonia and seizing the relics of St Donatos from Corfu,
in addition to allegedly commanding all Venetians to shave their beards lest they be
mistaken for Greeks.26 If this late source is to be believed, these targets were either
chosen for their proximity to Venice in the Adriatic, or because John had by now
secured the Aegean with his remaining fleet, and so was still preparing a counter-cam-
paign; neither proposition has any documentary support, which on top of Dandolo’s
own dubious evidence therefore substantiates nothing more than that all chroniclers of
this period had an interest in not recording these events, to suit their narrative purposes.
Both the cause and the extent of further raids were to prove irrelevant with the news
that Constantine Gabras of Trebizond had taken advantage of John’s overextension as
the moment to rebel. With the Venetians willing not only to come to terms but also to
ally with the empire in return for trade privileges, John made the decision that peace
with Venice was needed lest the situation spiral further out of control; thus he sued for
peace and ended the naval war in order to concentrate on the four other threats to his
empire, rather than specifically because of naval weakness.27
The major lesson of this naval war was that the traditional localized Byzantine fleet
model was not up to the challenge of facing off against a major twelfth-century sea
power, and this was a lesson that first Alexios and then John learnt. Even in the mid-
eleventh century Kekaumenos had complained that local thematic commanders often
allowed those who would man or provision the fleet to pay them off instead, much as
the army began to be neglected in this period.28 Such neglect was tolerable, as the last
major victory of a thematic fleet was that of Basil Hexamilites with the Kibyrrhaiotai
theme over Tarsos off the coast of Lycia in 956 that facilitated the recapture of Crete,
and thus, quite simply, there had been no major naval threats to the empire.29 With the
crises of the late eleventh century, the Byzantine navy became virtually non-existent,
being completely unable to prevent the Norman conquest of southern Italy and then
fend off Guiscard and Bohemond’s Balkan invasions. Indeed, Alexios’ original
chrysobull for the Venetians had been given in thanks for their aid against the Normans
in the 1080s. However, this chrysobull did not mean that from this point onwards Alex-
ios relied on the Venetians for naval support. To the contrary, he did not ask for their
aid against Tzachas of Smyrna, who led a pirate fleet into the Aegean in the late
1080s; instead he invested in building a Byzantine fleet that enabled John Doukas and
Constantine Dalassenos to reconquer the Aegean islands and eventually Smyrna. The
former was the first to bear the title of Megas Doux, which in itself implied that Alex-
ios had initiated a new, centralized model for the fleet.30
This newly reconstituted Byzantine fleet was then able to supply the armies of the
First Crusade, as well as put down a revolt, and possibly to engage Pisan and Genoese
fleets in battle, though Pryor and Jeffreys are sceptical as to the historicity of the event
recorded by Anna Komnene.31 As such, Alexios had learnt that his newly reconstituted
fleet had been both combat- and cost-effective when it operated under central authority,
and that diffuse, localized fleets could not fend off the proliferation of naval threats in
the twelfth century. The Italian city-states and the Normans now challenged the Byzan-
tine navy, in ships of increasingly better design than the Byzantine ones, such that the
old organization of thematic fleets was in fact obsolete, given that now only in numbers
– and under centralized authority – could the empire compete.32 Equally, Alexios had
rebuilt the imperial fleet at the end of the eleventh century, and so his alliance with the
Venetians should be interpreted as a survival mechanism to defeat the Normans in a
time of crisis, rather than a permanent policy shift to outsourcing the empire’s fleet to
allies.
I would therefore propose that the experiences of the Venetian war on top of this
background convinced first Alexios and then John that the Byzantine navy should
henceforth be centralized, leading to the infamous Poutza reform. Papadopoulou, Mag-
dalino, and Böhm have also demonstrated that Choniates seems to have had something
of a vendetta against John of Poutza, pointing out several incidents in his Historia that
‘expose’ Poutza’s gluttony, miserliness and poor manners.33 Thus any judgement Cho-
niates makes with regard to any of Poutza’s policies should be suspect. Indeed, even
apart from Choniates’ personal loathing for Poutza, this unique reference in a conven-
tional historical source to the reform is the origin of more trouble when attempting to
discern any facts concerning it. As John’s reign predated Choniates’ text by over 30
years at least, the likely source for his knowledge of the navy would have been his
brother Michael Choniates, archbishop of Athens, who would have had personal experi-
ence of the decline of the navy, since Athens was one of the regions from which naval
taxes came.34 With his term being from c. 1175 until he was obliged to surrender to
the crusaders in 1205, such a picture of decline again says nothing about the navy dur-
ing John’s reign and most of Manuel’s. Accordingly, Choniates placing the blame for
this decline on a person he personally found despicable, and an act from 50 years
before, must be recognized as the chronicler’s need for a cause that fits his narrative
goal, rather than as the true origin of the late twelfth-century naval decline.35 His
removal of the account of the Venetian war from the narrative of John’s reign fits his
narrative goal of putting John’s reign as a peak from which every successive emperor
declined.36 Thus Choniates’ penchant for narrative tricks to fit his message rather than
the facts should be recognized as his favoured modus operandi, and his testimony only
used in conjunction with other sources. After 40 years during which the Byzantine fleet
only had success when it operated as a centralized unit, and given the near non-exis-
tence of the localized fleets in the first place, it should be no surprise that the emperor
formalized the situation by having naval taxes collected centrally. The facts simply do
not support Choniates casting the blame for naval decline back that early in the
century.
The renewed effectiveness of this fleet is, in fact, demonstrated by a variety of
sources throughout the reigns of Alexios, John and Manuel. Before addressing these
sources, however, it must be noted that this success has previously been undervalued
by scholars for three reasons. The first reason is that fleet actions on rivers are often
discounted as naval actions, despite the fact that these ships were designed to be able
to operate on rivers. Our sources often use the classicizing ‘trireme’ for any type of
122 M.C.G. Lau
ship, even though Byzantine ships almost certainly had two banks of oars and so
should at least be called biremes.37 Taking this to be either the standard dromon or
galeai type of vessel common in this period, as classified by Pryor and Jeffreys, it can
be seen that the maximum depth in hold of a Byzantine ship is just over a metre from
keel to waterline, making depth a complete non-issue for navigating rivers and coastal
waters.38 I reproduce their diagrams of a dromon type here to demonstrate that even
the larger-sized vessels were river-worthy, though the recent discovery of 37 Byzantine
shipwrecks at Yenikapı has supplemented these findings, and all of those are of the
galeai type (Figures 2–4).
The exact oarage system used by a dromon is disputed, but taking two of the most
likely oar lengths postulated by Pryor and Jeffreys, the maximum distance from the
end of the oar to the keel is 5 m, thus the width of the boat from oar-tip to oar-tip is
10 m.39 Such dimensions make this ship more than river-worthy, and indeed almost the
same length as the riverboats that traverse the Thames around Oxford. The Maple-
durham shown opposite is 31 m long, and as the dromons are twice as wide, the sec-
ond image of two riverboats side-by-side demonstrates the scale of these ships. With
the Thames being only around 20 m wide in Oxford where these photos were taken,
and two of these vessels still able to pass each other, a ship of this class would have
no problem with a river as wide as the Danube, which even at its minimum width
around Djerdap canyon is still over 100 m wide (Figure 5a and 5b).
The Yenikapı archaeological evidence confirms all of these projections. Of the 37
wrecks found, six were oared longships dating from the ninth and tenth centuries, with
at least one, YK2, having been sunk in a storm in the late tenth or early eleventh cen-
tury.40 These ships were found to be around 30 m in length and around 4 m in breadth,
Figure 2. Midships section of a dromon of the era of the Macedonian emperors, © John H.
Pryor, Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, Fig. 19, 193.
Figure 3. Longitudinal section of a dromon of the era of the Macedonian emperors. © John H.
Pryor, Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, Fig. 20, 205.
exactly in line with Pryor and Jeffreys’ diagrams, and the measurements between
benches reinforce their hypotheses regarding oarage systems, which were in line with
classical precedents.41 Pulak classes them as galeai-type vessels, and they are also of a
size and type with late antique Roman riverine warships from the Rhine, such as the
larger patrol vessel preserved at the naval museum in Mainz.42 Thus the evidence for
Byzantine warships points to their being of a size suitable for both river and sea usage.
This was indeed a necessity, as river-worthy ships were crucial for campaigning
during the reigns of both John and Manuel. To take one example in detail from the
reign of John, the fleet was essential for John’s campaign against the Hungarians in
1127–8. Choniates portrays the campaign as an irresistible imperial advance by both
land and river, with John, having driven back the Hungarians, personally crossing the
Danube in the ‘imperial trireme’ while the army did the same on other vessels, at
which point a cavalry charge by the Ligurian lancers scattered the Hungarians at the
battle of Haram.43 This victory allowed John free rein to seize the fortresses of Haram
and Zeugme and carry off much plunder in the process. The Hungarian Chronicle pro-
vides more detail, relating that the Hungarians were unable to prevent the Greeks cross-
ing at Haram due to the Greeks setting their ships ‘alight with sulphurous fires’, almost
certainly referring to the use of ‘Greek Fire’, which Madgearu notes was crucial to
imperial success in not having to fight to cross the Danube, and being able to bring the
Hungarians to battle on imperial terms near the River Keraš.44 There, a combination of
Ligurian knights, Turks and other imperial troops bested the Franks and Hungarians,
with the river alleged to have become ‘so infused with human blood that it appeared to
flow with gore alone’ and warriors threw corpses into the river to try and cross them
like a bridge: though most likely a literary exaggeration, the details of the battle, and
specifically the use of the fleet, are all referenced by Kinnamos in his briefer account.45
124 M.C.G. Lau
Figure 4. Projected oarage systems of a bireme dromon of the era of the Macedonian emperors.
© John H. Pryor, Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, Figs. 30 and 31, 297 and 301.
Figure 4.
(Continued)
Mediterranean Historical Review
125
126 M.C.G. Lau
Figure 5. Oxford Riverboats, the Mapledurham shown lengthwise and the Mapledurham and
Wargrave shown side by side, evidencing the length and breadth (with oars) of the Byzantine
dromon. Source: Author.
This victory is not found in Pryor and Jeffrey’s otherwise comprehensive work on
the navy of this period, and barely makes a footnote in Ahrweiler’s classic study,
despite it being important enough that the use of the army and navy together here made
it into Prodromos’ epitaph to John.46 The fact that the fleet facilitated the transport and
supply for this campaign raises the second aspect of the fleet that has gone underappre-
ciated in this period: its incomparable effectiveness for transporting and logistically
supporting the Byzantine army in John and Manuel’s wars, in addition to defending
imperial territory.
John’s army goes from campaigning in Anatolia in 1119–22, to the Balkans in
1122–3, back to Anatolia in 1124, back to the Balkans in 1125 while the war with
Venice was going on, and then back to Anatolia in 1130, which is a huge amount of
transportation for a decade. To take a few examples of fleet actions from Manuel’s
reign: he happily saw off a Norman fleet aimed at Constantinople in 1149, and indeed
invaded southern Italy in 1155, secured the Adriatic coast by 1168, sent 150 ships
against Egypt in 1167; the Fatimids ‘dared not engage’ his fleet during the major inva-
sion in 1176, and when Doge Vitale Michiel II brought the Venetian fleet to the
Aegean in 1171–2 there was no repeat of John’s Venetian imbroglio.47 It is noteworthy
in Manuel’s Hungarian campaigns that Kinnamos tells us the emperor was forced to act
before the fleet was ready, and then still devoted the resources to constructing new ves-
sels on the Sava that proved crucial to his victory over King Géza of Hungary in
1151.48 Such boats are referred to as ‘akatia’ and could be built without specialized
craftsmen by local people or the troops themselves.49 Their use highlights one of the
downsides of having a centralized fleet, in that without careful forward planning it
could be in in the wrong place at the wrong time, but Manuel’s capacity to improvise
boats on the spot demonstrates that such a shortfall could be dealt with by other means.
Manuel’s navy only suffered failure on only two occasions. First, the 1147 Norman
raids on Corfu, Corinth and Thebes, but these could just as easily be attributed to Man-
uel’s distraction with the siege of Ikonion, a Cuman invasion, the Second Crusade and
indeed the continuing instability following John’s sudden death. Secondly, Constantine
Angelos’ ill-judged battle against the Normans where he failed to wait for sufficient
numbers before attacking; once Manuel was firmly in control of imperial policy, and if
proper orders were followed, only naval success resulted.50 Overall therefore, such a
narrative of success cannot represent the actions of a declining fleet (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Major Locations, and Coastal Fortresses built by John II Komnenos. Source: Author.
128 M.C.G. Lau
The logistical and communications network that supported the fleet reinforces this
conclusion. John in particular invested in coastal fortresses that would both defend the
coast whilst being resupplied by the fleet, and allow that fleet to carry provisions in sup-
port of the emperor’s offensive campaigns. Smaller coastal fortresses that are likely to
date from John’s reign include Iasos and Anaia on the Aegean, and then Trebenna, Yar-
başçandır, Antiocheia-ad-Cragum, Kizilcasehir, Syedra, Iotape and Kalanoros on the
Mediterranean coast of Anatolia.51 In addition to a number of fortresses still in use from
previous reigns, a major fortress that almost certainly supported John’s navy is that of
Pegae on the sea of Marmora. Following Aylward, the fortress here was built during
John’s reign, and the cistern contained within it was designed to catch rainfall from the
fortress’ eaves, and has the same waterproofing material as three large cisterns outside
the fortress: thus four large cisterns would have been in operation here during John’s
reign.52 With there being no sign that the classical city (Priapos) was inhabited to an
extent that needed so many cisterns, they must then have been for supplying the fleet
with water. The importance of this base explains the market that had grown there when
Emperor Frederick Barbarossa came through the region in 1190, and why it became an
important city both for the Latin empire and John III Doukas Vatatzes in the thirteenth
century.53 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in John’s eastern campaign to Cilicia and
Syria in 1137–8 he is mentioned specifically by Ibn al-Athir as transporting his baggage
by ship, a source that also notes that John spent some time repairing the harbour at
Alexandretta for imperial use.54 Though perhaps irrelevant for Choniates’ and Kin-
namos’ later texts, on that same campaign the contemporary imperial oration of Michael
Italikos focuses upon John’s capture of the coastal fortress and port of Korykos in Cili-
cia, which would have been crucial for the speed of John’s campaign if his army was
being resupplied by ship, as this is one of the major fortresses sited on the coastal strip
between Seleukeia and Tarsus, themselves major river and coastal cities.55 Indeed, in
John’s second eastern campaign, when his heir and co-emperor Alexios died, his body
was immediately sent back to Constantinople by ship accompanied by his brothers
Andronikos and Isaac, and throughout the reign of Manuel the use of the navy for the
transport of people and supplies must be judged as a lynchpin in the modus operandi of
imperial government.56 As a counter example, the only major failed land campaign of
John was his attempted conquest of Neokaisareia in Cappadocia, where specifically his
troops began to run out of provisions, far away from the sea, while his reconquest of
Trebizond on the coast earlier that year had no such problems.57 Finally, John’s cam-
paign base at Lopadion in Anatolia, where he spent more time than any other place save
Constantinople, was also connected to the sea by the River Rhyndakos, a river that until
at least the eighteenth century often saw boats leave for Constantinople and return in a
day.58 Thus his forward base lay at the centre of a network of communications and logis-
tics that presumed a functional and thriving Byzantine fleet.59 Overall, John’s use of the
fleet by both river and sea to ensure logistical superiority should be accepted as one of
the most significant factors in his military success, living up to Clausewitz’s adage that
while an amateur focuses upon strategy, an expert focuses upon logistics.60
The interpretation of the Komnenian fleet as one in decline has derived from scholars
undervaluing its ability to engage in river actions and its continuing logistical importance.
Equally the narrative of the war with Venice has been misunderstood on account of the
tendency in historical studies to only focus upon one aspect of John’s reign, leaving his
overextension as he fought on five fronts in 1126 to go unnoticed. To close this study I
will briefly discuss the final use of the fleet in this period that is at once the least corpo-
real, but also perhaps one of the key uses of a powerful navy: its ability to project power
in the diplomatic sphere. We are fortunate to have a specific example of this use in the
aforementioned fragmentary oration by Basilakes to John’s Megas Domestikos Axouch.
This encomium mentions not only that a new fleet has been constructed out of timbers
from Cyprus, but also that this fleet was built with the express purpose of lying in wait
for the prince of Sicily, standing against his ‘disreputable intents and attacks’, while
equally mentioning how ‘the bold German … attempts to learn from the great victory of
our manly and most noble Autokrator’ in the same context.61 We have no exact date for
this source, but the references to past victories establish a terminus post quem after John’s
first eastern expedition in 1138, though shipbuilding on Cyprus may have already
occurred under Alexios too.62 Thus this work was produced in the context of negotiations
with the German emperor against the Normans, an alliance that Manuel would use later
to great effect. Therefore both the practical use of the navy to take on the Norman fleet
and the soft power the navy could wield in negotiations with the German emperor are ref-
erenced, and both are exploited in domestic propaganda at the court of Constantinople, if
not in the negotiations themselves, given that Basilakes’ speech may have been per-
formed in the presence of the German ambassadors expressly to underline the strength of
the imperial navy. Equally, the simple reference to John commanding that ships be built
in Cyprus yet again contributes to the picture that centralization of the navy by no means
meant its death.
There are, however, remaining questions to answer concerning how this naval
reform functioned in administrative practice, for which we have considerably less evi-
dence. Alexios’ initial centralizing measure had placed the navy under the command of
one official, the Megas Doux, and had linked that title with jurisdiction over the pro-
vinces of Hellas-Peloponnese, the Aegean islands and Cyprus.63 Combining fleet com-
mand with provincial government meant that from John’s reign onwards, these regions
retained the split between a military and a civil governor that had existed before the
crises of the eleventh century, with the position of praetor continuing to exist there to
govern while the Megas Doux was in Constantinople or at sea.64 These provinces were
also uniquely administratively divided into episkepseis and oria. Though episkepseis
were the standard tax districts used across the empire, the purpose of oria are less clear
from the sources, but as they were directly under the control of the Megas Doux, pre-
sumably they were specific regions earmarked to provide taxes and manpower for the
navy.65 Magdalino has pointed out that a similar specialized system existed for the pro-
vision of horses and pack animals for the imperial army from the reign of Alexios
onwards in the Balkans.66 As such, not only should the ‘Poutza’ reform be interpreted
as the end of a process ongoing since Alexios’ reign, but must also be seen as an exer-
cise in the specialization of regions’ resources for specific goals, and not necessarily as
centralization in Constantinople. If these provinces were contributing sailors rather than
soldiers it would also explain the complete absence of troops from the region
mentioned in John’s land campaigns, most notably during his eastern expedition when
Western, Macedonian and Pecheneg divisions are mentioned.67
Seeing this administration work in practice at any given time is however, rare, par-
ticularly as no Megas Doux is attested for all but the start of John’s reign.68 The solu-
tion here is again found in non-conventional historical sources, as in the Life of Leotios
(written in the thirteenth century, though the eponymous saint lived during the reigns
of John and Manuel) it is recorded that the Doux of Crete, John Straboromanos, was in
the service of John Axouch in the manner of taxes, and had come to the monastery on
Patmos for those taxes.69 This, together with the aforementioned fragmentary oration to
Axouch that mentions him commanding triremes and building ships on Cyprus,
130 M.C.G. Lau
strongly suggests that his role as Megas Domestikos included command over the fleet,
which would explain the lack of a Megas Doux during John’s reign. Equally, it is note-
worthy that John is personally given credit for the victory at Lemnos, alongside other
conquests when he was in command, since in Prodromos’ poem he is cited as possess-
ing ‘an imperial trireme’ in the Balkans, and that he chose to begin his triumph of
1133 by arriving by ship, landing theatrically at the eastern tip of Constantinople.70
Though I am in agreement with Magdalino’s suggestions as to why John may have
chosen this route, it is also possible that the regime wished to give a role to the impe-
rial fleet in the triumph, so as to emphasize the emperor’s abilities as a naval comman-
der alongside his prowess as a general. Indeed, such a demonstration would propagate
the idea that the empire had completely recovered from the Venetian war, and was once
more in full control of the seas. For an emperor almost constantly on campaign, the
emperor’s personal role in command of the fleet together with his Megas Domestikos
thus made an additional Megas Doux unnecessary. Further research on Komnenian
administration in general may illuminate these propositions further, though sources
relating specifically to the navy are few and far between, although the navy’s continu-
ing importance to the Byzantine government is certain. The coastal areas of the pro-
vinces of Hellas-Peloponnese, the Aegean islands and Cyprus had become special
naval regions under the Megas Doux, some providing manpower and taxes while others
built ships. Rather than centralization leading to the end of naval power, the Poutza
reform should instead be regarded as the further specialization of provincial resources
to fulfil specific roles, with the navy ‘centralized’ in these naval provinces, no less than
the person of the Megas Doux and the emperor in Constantinople.
Overall, it must therefore be concluded that, far from being an undervalued and
declining institution, the navy was an asset that Alexios I, John II and Manuel I used
to great effect during their reigns. Moreover, evidence of decline and provincial insecu-
rity date from after this period, when all imperial institutions began to degrade in the
growing chaos of the end of the twelfth century.71 The Poutza reform that centralized
naval taxes did not stem from one man’s miserliness, but was an informed decision
based on decades of naval warfare, made in light of the altered political order of the
late eleventh and twelfth centuries, and it was the Venetian war that gave the impetus
to institute that reform. This reformed navy proved equal to the task, both at sea and
by river, in terms of logistical superiority and its prowess in the diplomatic sphere. The
navy must therefore be interpreted as a success story of the Komnenian restoration: pio-
neered by Alexios, formalized by John, and then used to great effect by himself and by
Manuel after him.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Choniates, Historia, 54. I would like to thank Prof. Jeffreys, Prof. Pryor and the anonymous
reviewers for their feedback on this paper, as well as Prof. Otsuki and JSPS for funding this
research.
2. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 175–294; R-J. Lilie, Handel und Politik, 613–43; Devaney,
‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 137; Herrin, ‘Collapse in the Twelfth Century’, 114–6, 119,
122–4; Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 84–8; and Empire of Manuel, 233.
Malamut, ‘Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 70–1.
3. Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 111, n. 198.

4. God’s Regents on Earth, Curated by J. Shea, and Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’,
127.
5. William of Tyre, Chronicon, 12.9–12, 556–62; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymi-
tana 3.3, 621–3; Tafel and Thomas, ‘Handels- und Staatsgeschichte’ 1, No. xxxviii, 78;
Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 232; ‘Historia Ducum Veneticorum’, 73; ‘Translatio Isi-
dori’, 322–3; Riley-Smith, ‘Venetian Crusade of 1122–1124’, 339–50; Queller and Katele,
‘Venice and the Conquest of Jerusalem’, 29; and Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’,
135.
6. Choniates, Historia, 54; H. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 175–294; Lilie, Handel und Poli-
tik, 613–43; and Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 137.
7. Sathas, ‘Synopsis Chronikē’, 22–2; Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 86, n.
144. Sathas and Herrin give 1135 as the most likely date. Indeed, Poutza is not attested as
Megas Logariastes until Manuel’s reign, and his continued high office in 1157 suggests that
the 1130s were the earliest he could have been in a position to shape such a policy, particu-
larly in light of his lowly origins and assumedly longer path up the career ladder. Sakellion,
‘Council of 1157’, Πατμιακὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, 316. On the question of whether Venice knew
about the state of the empire’s naval defences, see n. 16.
8. Evidence of Venetians trading in Constantinople between 1118 and 1122 is found in: Della
Rocca and Lombardo, eds., Documenti del commercio veneziano, Nos. 41, 42, 45, and 46.
9. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, 79; T. Madden, Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice, 16–
17; Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 139; Queller and Katele state that they merely
left because the job was done and the other allies had also dispersed, rather than deliberately
antagonizing the empire: Queller and Katele, ‘Venice and the Conquest of Jerusalem’, 37.
10. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 234; and ‘Historia Ducum Veneticorum’, 74.
11. Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 139.
12. Ibid., 140; and Pryor, ‘Water, Water Everywhere’, 23–4.
13. Fulcher of Chartres, Historia 3.41, 758–60.
14. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 234–5; ‘Historia Ducum Veneticorum’, 74; ‘Translatio Isi-
dori’, 323–4; ‘Annales venetici breves’, 71; Kinnamos, Epitome, 281; and Cessi and Ben-
nato, eds., Venetiarum historia, 106–7.
16. Böhm, Flota i polityka, 144–54, 171–2. Here he references fleets built and anchored on
Chios, a fleet built near Smyrna, pirate fleets from Tzachas’ subordinates built on Chios,
Rhodes and unspecified other islands; and at one point a Byzantine fleet disembarking on
Samos, hauling their ships ashore and tarring them, again suggesting naval facilities of
some sort. Zonaras, Epitome historiarum, vol. 4, XVIII, 22, 14, 737; Anna Komnene, Alex-
ias, XI, 222, 335, 350–1. (My thanks to Böhm for providing me with English translations
of his work.) Such an argument is also supported by the only reference to shipbuilding in
John’s reign after this being on Cyprus, see n. 60.
17. Prodromos, Historische Gedichte. Poem IV, lines 270–3. For further analysis of these
poems, see Lau, ‘Power of Poetry’, 195–214; Magdalino, ‘The Triumph of 1133’, 53–70.
18. ‘Ὧ νἰκη Λαοδικεινή, νίκη Σωζοπολῖτις, / ἑτέρα νίκη Σκυθικὴκαὶ Δαλματῖτις ἄλλη, / ἑτέρα
δ᾽Ἀμωριανή, Λημναϊκὴ δ᾽ἑτέρα, / ἀπλῶς ὁπόσας κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ νήσους’, ibid.
19. Actes des Lavras I, Nos. 20, 79.
20. Basilakes, ‘μέγαν Δομέστικον’, 117; Prodromos, Historische Gedichte, V, l. 19; XI, l. 120;
XV, ll. 67–70; XVI, l. 213; XVII, ll. 130, 348; XXV, ll. 42, 64; all reference victories at
sea, in sea battles, or dominion over the sea and islands. Axouch was made Megas Domes-
tikos at John’s succession in 1118 according to Choniates, having been John’s childhood
friend and companion for his military training according to the same Basilakes oration, and
he is attested in that office commanding troops throughout John and Manuel’s reign by
Choniates, Kinnamos, Prodromos and in the sigillographic record until his death around
1150. Choniates, Historia, 9–10. For an overview, see ‘Ioannes Axouch, megas domesti-
kos’, Prosopography of the Byzantine World: http://db.pbw.kcl.ac.uk/pbw2011/entity/person/
109,598.
21. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 236.
23. Birkenmeier, Komenenian Army, 85, 138; and Lau, ‘Case for an Alliance’, 19–35.
132 M.C.G. Lau
24. Mas’ud: Michael the Syrian, Chronicle. 16.2, 608. Álmos: The date of Álmos’ flight is the
subject of debate, with Moravcsik and Chalandon believing that he fled immediately after
being blinded by Coloman c. 1116. However, Makk establishes uncontroversial termini on
the basis of three facts: (1) the Hungarian Chronicle tells us that Álmos fled ‘from King
Stephen’; (2) both Kinnamos and Choniates place Álmos’ flight in the reign of John; (3) he
died in Constantinople in 1127. He narrows this range of 1118–27 down however by noting
that Álmos’ sister Adalheid was married to the Bohemian prince Vladislav I and was wel-
comed at court in 1123. This would be unlikely if Álmos was a persona non grata. Finally,
Choniates tells us that the war started directly because of Álmos’ flight, and that therefore
it would not have been many years in advance of the war starting. This must mean Álmos
arrived in Constantinople around 1125, a date supported by Fine, though he advocates the
Hungarian wars started before the flight. Kinnamos, Epitome. 9; Choniates, Historia, 17;
‘Chronicon Pictum’, 459; Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, 57; Moravcsik, Byzantium and the
Magyars, 77–8; Fine, Early Medieval Balkans, 234–6; Makk, Árpáds and the Comneni,
22–3; Gradinja, Priest of Diokleia, Χρονικό. XLV, 174–6; Fine, Early Medieval Balkans,
233.
26. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 236.
27. Date of Gabras’ rebellion: Choniates in the context of the recovery of Trebizond in 1139
merely tells us that Gabras had long been a tyrant there, but in a monody by Prodromos for
his teacher Stephen Skylitzes, who had been made Metropolitan of Trebizond in 1140, he
tells us that the province had been detached for 14 years before his arrival, giving us a clear
date of 1126 for the rebellion. Petit, ‘Monodie’, 3. This argument was first advanced by
Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, 37, 84; and Cahen, ‘Une Famille byzantine’, 145–9.
28. Kekaumenos, Strategicon, 87, 297, Roueché translation: 87, 10; Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of
the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 89.
29. Ibn al-Athir, ‘A.H. 245’, 162; Theophanes continuatus, VI, 29; Eickhoff, Seekrieg und
Seepolitik, 325–43. Indeed, the thematic fleets had joined Bardas Skleros and Bardas Pho-
kas in revolt against Basil II in the late tenth century and had to be defeated by the imperial
fleet. As such, the benefits to the emperor of a centralised navy and the neglect of the
provincial fleets may date from as early as Basil II. Skylitzes, 16–8. Synopsis historiarum,
314–27, 334–8; Zonaras, Epitome historiarum, vol. 4. XVII.5–7, 107–10, 112–7; Pryor and
Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 72–3.
30. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 209–10; Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 100–1.
See below for discussion of the Megas Doux under John.
31. Anna Komnene, Alexias, XI.x.1–8; Malamut, ‘Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 65; Pryor and Jef-
freys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 109–10.
32. The exact typology of ships used, and the superiority of the Latin galea over the Byzantine
dromon by the end of the twelfth century, has been fully outlined in Pryor and Jeffreys,
Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 76–122 and 407–44. More recently, the evolution of the dromon
between the fifth and the tenth centuries has been outlined in: Zuckerman, ‘On the Byzan-
tine Dromon’, 57–98.
33. Choniates, Historia, 54–9, see 57–8 for the specific anecdotes; Papadoupoulou, ‘Problem of
Small Change’, 206; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 254; Böhm, Rola flot obcych, 34–42.
34. For further discussion of Athens and whence naval taxes came, see the final section of this
paper. For Michael Choniates, see Setton, ‘Michael Choniates’, 234–6.
35. See Malamut, ‘Les Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 70–1, for a conclusion that takes Choniates at
his word.
36. See Kaldellis, ‘Paradox, Reversal and the Meaning of History’, 75–99; Simpson goes so far
as to say John is portrayed ‘as an Ioannes imaginaire’. Simpson, ‘Introduction’, Niketas
Choniates, 45.
37. Terminology used for different ships is a subject fraught by evolving use and the literary
use of classicizing terms to further complicate the picture. The generic terms trireme and
dromon are used for not only the smaller galeai class vessel, which this article mainly con-
cerns, but also the larger chelandion bireme variant, originally used for transporting horses
and cargo, and the smaller akatia, see n. 48. All of these are referred to as triremes or dro-
moi in the sources, see: Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 164–73, 188–92; Zucker-
man, ‘On the Byzantine Dromon’, 57–98.
38. See Figs. 2 and 3, from Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, Figs. 19 and 20, 193 and
205.
39. Ibid., Figs. 30, 31, 297, 301.
40. Pulak et al., ‘Byzantine Shipwrecks from Yenikapı’, 62–8, storm reference on 62.
41. Ibid. See 67 for the oarage system, and 70 for conclusions.
42. Bockius, Die spätrömischen Schiffswracks aus Mainz; Museum für Antike Schiffahrt,
Mainz Website.
43. Choniates, Historia, 17–8.
44. Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier, 209; Madgearu, Byzantine Military Organization,
149 and Birkenmeier, Komnenian Army, 90–1.
45. Kinnamos, Epitome, 10–1.
46. ‘ἥπλωσεν Ἴστρος ὑπτιάσας τὴν ῥάχιν καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς πλώϊμος ὤφθη ναυμάχοις’, Prodromos,
Historische Gedichte, Poem XXV, ll. 41–2.
47. Prodromos, Historische Gedichte, Poem XXX, ll. 120–229; Kinnamos, Epitome, 98, 113,
278, 300; Choniates, Historia, 160. For discussion of the Komnenian navy from the 1160s
onwards, see Pryor, ‘Venetian Fleet’, 108–9, and Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ,
76–122.
48. Kinnamos, Epitome, 92, 113–4, 116.
49. Ibid. For a discussion on ‘akatia’, see Böhm, Rola flot obcych, 189–92.
50. Ibid., 120–1.
51. Iasos: Cornieti ‘Iasos di Caria’, 449–57. Anaea: Müller-Wiener, ‘Mittelalterliche Befestigun-
gen im Ionien’, 70; Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications, 146. Trebenna and Yar-
başçandır: Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 72–4, based on the archaeological surveys
of Akyürek, ‘Bey Dağları’, 6–7. Yarbaşçandır Kalesi: Akyürek, ‘Pamphylia‘da Bizans’,
234. Antiocheia-ad-Cragum: Rosenbaum et al., Coastal Cities, 21; Deluigi, Winter in the
Land of Rûm, 123. Kızılcaşehir: Redford, Landscape and the State, 16–8; Doğan, ‘Byzan-
tine Surveys around Alanya’, 65; Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 75–6. Syedra and
Iotape: Rosenbaum et al., Coastal Cities, 38; Redford, Medieval Anatolia, 19; Deluigi, Win-
ter in the Land of Rûm, 123; Kalanoros: Redford, Medieval Anatolia, 14–5; Krabbenhöft,
Walls of Alanya, 51–2; Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 74–5.
52. Aylward, ‘Byzantine fortifications at Pegae’, 179–203; his conclusions are supported by
Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 76–7.
53. ‘Expedition of the Emperor Frederick’, 96; Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications,
154.
54. Ibn Al-Athir, Crusading Period, 337.
55. Italikos, ‘Λόγος βασιλικὸς’, 251; Edwards, Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia, 161–7; Hild
and Hellenkemper, Kilikien und Isaurien, 191. Seleukeia dominates the river crossing at the
River Kalykadnos, while Tarsos is on the coast – John overwintering there in 1137–8 so as
to maintain contact with the fleet to provide supplies and communication back to Con-
stantinople may also be significant: William of Tyre, Chronicon, 702; Lilie, Byzantium and
the Crusades, 138; Foss, ‘Defences of Asia Minor’, 59.
56. Kinnamos, Epitome, 24; Choniates, Historia, 38; Italikos, ‘Μονῳδία εἰς τὸν σεβαστοκρά-
τορα’ and ‘Πρὸς τὸν βασιλικὸν γραμματικόν’, 130–1, 181–3 respectively; and William of
Tyre, Chronicon, 15.19, 700.
57. Choniates, Historia, 34–6; Kinnamos, Epitome, 21. See in particular an entire court poem
devoted to how John and his army survived despite the conditions: Prodromos, Historische
Gedichte, Poem XIX, in particular ll. 92–111 for how they lived in constant fear of attack
with no water to drink in blazing hot days and freezing nights.
58. Sestini, Viaggio da Costantinopoli, 83.
59. For further analysis of Lopadion and John’s fortress network, see Lau, ‘Ioannoupolis’,
435–63.
60. It also would have allowed John’s and Manuel’s army to spend less time foraging, accord-
ing to Haldon’s calculations on Byzantine logistics, a study that though invaluable on the
logistical support that an army would require from pack animals and a baggage train, does
not consider the effect of resupply by sea on an army’s speed of movement while on cam-
paign, which must be seen as a significant factor in John and Manuel’s successes, and
indeed failures in the case of the Neokaisareia campaign. Haldon, ‘Roads and communica-
tions’, 131–58.
134 M.C.G. Lau
61. ‘Τί φὴς ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν ἀρχηγέτης, ὁ διαπλοϊζόμενος κιβδήλοις βουλαῖς.καὶ ἀδοκίμοις
ἐννοίαις ἐπινηχόμενος; ὁρᾷς τὸ του βασιλέως προβούλιον,.τὴν ἑτοιμασίαν τὰς τριήρεις τοὺς
στρατιώτας’, and ‘ὁ θρασὺς Ἀλαμανὸς ὁ τὴν ὀφρῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κρόταφον αἴρων καὶ ὀνειρο-
πολῶν τὰ κενώτατα καὶ ἐπὶ κενοῖς ἐρειδόμενος καὶ ἀνεμώλιά τινα διανοούμενος σκέμματα,
πείρᾳ μαθών σου τὴν μεγαλονίκου ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορος εὐανδρίαν καὶ γενναιότητα’, Basi-
lakes, ‘λογος εἰς τὸν Δομέστικον’, 118.
62. See: Malamut, ‘Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 65–6. Here it is noted that after Cyprus revolted
against Alexios in 1092 he put Eutathios Philokales in charge with naval forces, with which
he fought the possibly unhistorical engagement with the Genoese and Pisans mentioned in
n. 31. From here Cyprus appears as a source of men and materials in support of both cru-
sader and imperial expeditions in the Levant, and in 1186 when Cyprus revolted under
Isaac Komnenos, Isaac II Angelos sent 70 boats against him, implying he had naval forces
at his command. Anna Komnene, Alexias, XI.x.1–8; Kinnamos, Epitome, 178; Choniates,
Historia, 369–70; Documents Arméniens I, 187.
63. Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 277; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 234.
64. Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 235; Haldon, ‘State Structures and Administration’, 544.
See n. 67 for Euthathios Philokales, who was both praetor and Megas Doux in 1118,
though the same man never held this position again.
65. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 276–9; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 174–5, 235, 257, n.
99.
66. Magdalino, Χαρτουλαράτα; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 235.
67. Choniates refers to John dividing his army into ‘Keltic’ (western), Macedonian and Pech-
eneg divisions at Shayzar: Choniates, Historia, 29–30. Serbian, Turkish and Anatolian
forces are mentioned in other engagements, but never troops from Hellas-Peloponnese, the
Aegean islands, or Cyprus.
68. In 1118, Eumathios Philokales, the former Doux of Cyprus, is attested as both praetor of
Hellas-Peloponnese and Megas Doux, but due to his age (having first been made governor
of Cyprus in 1093 and held that position until c. 1112) he cannot have held these positions
long. DO 2, Seal 22.15, 68; Miklosich and Muller, Acta Diplomatica graeca, 96. His suc-
cessor as praetor is a certain Kouropalates named Michael, and the praetor-ship was never
again linked with the position of Megas Doux: Catalogue of Byzantine Seals, Seal 8.33;
Zacos, Byzantine Lead Seals II, No. 1,010, 444; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 234. There
is no known Megas Doux until Stephanos Kontestephanos under Manuel, however.
69. ‘Καί ποτε τὴν τῶν κατ᾽αὐτὴν ποιουμένου ἐνέργειαν Ἰωάννου τινός, τὸ ἐπίκλην Στραβορω-
μανοῦ, ἐξυπηρετουμένου τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας Μανουὴλ τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ μεγάλῳ δομαστίκῳ
ἐκείνῳ Ἰωάννῃ τῷ Ἀξούχῳ, οὗ δηλαδὴ δικαίῳ καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην διεῖπεν ὁ δηλωθεὶς Στρα-
βορωμανὸς διοίκησιν’, Life of Leontios, 67. This quote is discussed extensively in n. 30 on
179–80 in the same volume. Also see Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 257, n. 99. This latter
reference notes how Theodore Mavrozomes, a future mezazon, or ‘prime minister’ had
experience of organizing the oria and commanding ships before coming into that role,
demonstrating a continued link between the role (though not the title) of prime minister that
Axouch held and organising naval taxes. Equally, the fact that there was a ‘Doux of Crete’
tells us that by Manuel’s reign at least, that there were provincial Doukes subordinate to the
Megas Doux in these provinces.
70. Magdalino, ‘Triumph of 1133’, 56–7.
71. Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 86–8.
Notes on contributor
Maximilian Lau completed his doctorate at Oriel College, Oxford University, in 2016 on
The Reign of Emperor John II Komnenos: The Transformation of the Old Order 1187-43.
He now holds a JSPS Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo.
There, he is working to produce a monograph on the era of John II entitled: Phoenix
Emperor: John II Komnenos and the Restoration of New Rome.
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Figure 1. Map of the Venetian Raids, 1122–5, Source: Author.

of the emperor’s deeds is to be expected, a speciﬁc example of a victory at Lemnos is

tian quarter in Constantinople, Michiel launched fresh raids on imperial possessions in

3. Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 111, n. 198.

Metropolis, 58–102. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

31–35. Arta, 27–31 May 1990.

lettere. Rome, 1794.

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