of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.
[10] She argued that
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]GERARDO B.
CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs
special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection
before as well as after birth.[1] In case of assault on his rights by those
who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will
rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his
best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private
respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29,
1989.[2] After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in
Fairview, Quezon City.[3] Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990,
Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-
lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy.[5] He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa
on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario
was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty
years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and
that she never lived with Mario at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage
to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to
Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.[9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had
their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the
above decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which
grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation rights between the hours
there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child.[11] She further maintained that
Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to
Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate
child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights
and the retention of Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court
denied Ma. Theresas motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or
to hurt the other, something they should never do if they want to
assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor
needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a father
figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot give.
Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological
well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to
maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the
other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as
amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to
wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property
of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as
it is hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning
as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo.
She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos surname
(Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been
declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte).
The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.[13]
 On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the
law that granted a putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate
child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of the child policy
invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs
welfare and not the convenience of the parents which (was) the
primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a
week.[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot
use the mothers surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the
mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil
registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set
the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the
issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the
parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It
reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son
of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case
that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and
that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee
[Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was
void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these
facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario
Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child
of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario
Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void
and non-existent marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but
is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family
Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can
claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo.
Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is
it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate
child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any
possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would
mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave
little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was
born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence
exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that
the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot
overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot
be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the
mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law
and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change
his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by
the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says
and not what a parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of
the above decision but the same was denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is
conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained the rationale of this rule in the
recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration
in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He
cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born
to his wife.[26] Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal
right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[27] Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception.[28] To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the
Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is
not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the
contrary.[30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by
the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child.[31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses
must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible.[32] This may take
place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception.[33] Or, the husband was in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
the violation of prison regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights
which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city
but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal
access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was
certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to
engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to
defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer[35] to the
petition for annulment of marriage[36] that she never lived with Mario.
He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual
relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on
her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is
not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo.
This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of
the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not
mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with
Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between
them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City
during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far
from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to
each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the
impossibility of physical access was never established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her
to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in
a proper case, his heirs.[37] A mother has no right to disavow a child
because maternity is never uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not
permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
 Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married
woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and
that her offspring is illegitimate.[39] The proscription is in consonance
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the
intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.[40]
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never
an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not
hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted
and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That
was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the
Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to
allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of
her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by
persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which
the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status
and filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of
those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is
misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not
offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court
shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally
offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the
moment of his birth.[43] Although a record of birth or birth certificate
may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is
necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned,
or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
termination of marriage is sought to be established.[45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not
under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then,
only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the
presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and
uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein.[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in
the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence.
It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties.[47] Between the
certificate of birth which isprima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable
only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter
shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with
the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would
doggedly press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that they
both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and common
sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In
the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and
superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father
and mother, full support and full inheritance.[48] On the other hand, an
illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under the
parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a
more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
counterpart.[49] Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the
discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually
regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state,
the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors
his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the
bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately
declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made
to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is
specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was
barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost
fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering.
The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which
has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption
of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear
the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.[50] A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he
belongs and is passed on from parent to child.[51] Hence, Gerardo
cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the
law, not related to him in any way.
 The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the SO ORDERED.
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and
filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a THIRD DIVISION
parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and G.R. No. 163209
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others FILOMENA LIM,
company. There being no such parent-child relationship between Petitioners,
them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo. Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD QUISUMBING,*
603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear CHICO-NAZARIO,
and unequivocal: - versus - PERALTA, and
ABAD,** JJ.
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the MA. CHERYL S. LIM,
care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall for herself and on behalf of
be the paramount consideration. her minor children LESTER
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO Promulgated:
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic: S. LIM, III,
Respondents. October 30, 2009
Article 3 x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by DECISIOn

public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.[52] Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one,
even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development
as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant
where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at
their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14,
1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April
2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to
provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
The Facts
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
(Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes
Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua
Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very
compromising situation.[3]
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua
Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward
to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.[4]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering
Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to
respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the
balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.[5]
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The
trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and
Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latters
inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.[6]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others,
their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while
Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by
providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. On the issue material to this appeal, that is, whether there is
basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable with him to support
respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this
matter. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually
support one another and this obligation extends down to the
legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the
Family Code clearly provides that should the person obliged to give
support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other
persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the
necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the
relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and
only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives
and so on.[8]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to
provide support to respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed
judgment by limiting petitioners liability to the amount of monthly
support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond
cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to
the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are
liable. Relying on provisions[11] found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability
is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination[12] or suspension[13]during the childrens minority.
Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their children,[14] petitioners submit
that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports
this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give
support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant
provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not
the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a
common ground in that parental authority encompasses the
obligation to provide legal support,[15] they differ in other concerns
including the duration of the obligation and itsconcurrence among
relatives of differing degrees.[16] Thus, although the obligation to
provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child,[17] the same obligation arising from spousal
and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. . Also,
while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental
rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its
termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support
passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also
for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in
another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to
give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand
support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art.
199. We agree with this view.
xxxx
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to
support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner,
as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandson's legal support. x x x[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations
omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her
obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all
school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to
sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal[19] lines, following the ordering in Article 199.
To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material
deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate
support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able
to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support
from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond.[20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of
monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from
the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial
court for this limited purpose.[21]
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be
allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at
petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case
there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive
support are petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a
well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the
house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not
rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge
against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient
evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to
a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the
exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April
2004 with theMODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena
Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the
case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to
set aside the Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated
October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition
for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting respondent's
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children,
petitioner sought the amount ofP500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite, as
follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to
take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One
hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both
her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from
the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the
date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03
September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00)
Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to
such date until the hearing of the support pendente lite. P250,000.00 x
7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from September,
2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven
Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the
month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is
ordered to pay a monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five (5) days of each
corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00
is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court
may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending
on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the
main action for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does
not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and
respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance
and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial
standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly
support pendente lite, as well as theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support,
respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of
the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004
Order had become final and executory since respondent’s motion for
reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the
threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the court for
disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in
respondent’s contention that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without
evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due
course. The assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June
4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu
City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua
versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a
new one is entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite
of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every
month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a
month multiplied by the number of months starting from
September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as
her and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a
Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a copy of a
check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner.
Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he
deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to
March 2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00
(April, May, June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances
given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16
(with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the expenses deducted
by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support
contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting
petitioner’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected
respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for
inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005,
Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are
DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under
the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of
execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the
accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears
pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of
Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim
Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-
G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders
of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as
SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated
27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-
29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of
PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears
of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two
(2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his
monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from
the time payment of this amount was deferred by him
subject to the deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of
preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars,
payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly
inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother
(petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring the
monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not
contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons.
Respondent said he just wanted the issue of whether to deduct his
advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by the
trial court of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It
also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint
obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by
the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT
GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION
OF THE AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A
TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT
IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR
CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the
respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing
to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12,
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or
to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have
allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and their
maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not
indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive.
She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA
already considered the said items which it deemed chargeable to
respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was
fixed on the basis of the documentary evidence of respondent’s
alleged income from various businesses and petitioner’s testimony that
she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and
other miscellaneous expenses excluding the P135,000.00 medical
attendance expenses of petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject
deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for
the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children resided in
one residence, the groceries and dry goods purchased by the
children using respondent’s credit card, totallingP594,151.58 for the
period September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the
children alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen
Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought for his daughter Angelli
Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too, are to be
considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being children of
parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan
had never in their entire life commuted from one place to another,
nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their
maintenance are indispensable to the children’s day-to-day living, the
value of which were properly deducted from the arrearages in
support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
to the needs of the recipient.18 Such support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal
separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or
designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite
prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits
of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a
court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record.20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner
and her two children was determined after due hearing and
submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the
amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that
the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA
was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and
other household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the
cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children
every month?
A Presently, Sir?
ATTY. ZOSA:
Yes.
A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a
month for the food alone.
 xxxx Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2)
drivers?
ATTY. ZOSA:
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers.
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place? And I need another househelp.

A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would
a decent living, Sir. charge you something between P3,000.00 toP4,000.00. That’s quite…

Q How much other expenses do you incur? A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another
which I will give a compensation of P5,000.00.
WITNESS:
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.
A My clothing.
Q Why do you incur that much amount?
COURT:
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and
medicines. And also I am having a special therapy to straighten my How about the schooling for your children?
back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a
driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight is not WITNESS:
reliable for driving. And I still need another househelp to accompany
me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I cannot carry A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
anymore heavy loads.
COURT:
xxxx
Everything?
ATTY. FLORES:
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you
mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00? ATTY. FLORES:

A Yes, for the food alone.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in
those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver, am I correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else,
what specific need that you would like to add so I can tell my client,
the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special
therapy for my back because I am scoliotic, three (3) times a week.
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both
of my eyes. And I am also taking some vitamins from excel that will
cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Let’s have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how
much would it cost you for the operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will
cost P60,000.00 and the other eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00
is P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q You talk of therapy?
A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around P5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that
he can solely provide for the subsistence, education, transportation,
health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children, as
well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time
housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested during the
same hearing that respondent was willing to grant the amount of
only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children
and petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses
submitted in court unmistakably show how much respondent lavished
on his children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a
different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioner’s prayer
for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00 monthly
support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the
monthly support pendente lite at P250,000.00. However, since the
supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the
allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents
of various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by
him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the amount of
support pendente lite to P115,000.00, which ruling was no longer
questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s
compliance with the final CA decision indicated that he deducted
from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum
of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the
children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner
and his children. Respondent explained that the deductions were
made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in arrears less the
amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two
children’s monthly support.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under
Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipts22:
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50
Suzanne
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52
Php2,482,348.16
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting that the following
amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as
additional advances given to petitioner and the children23:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
 Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15
Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08
Suzanne
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70
Suzanne
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64
GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing
expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in equity, be
considered advances which may be properly deducted from the
support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said
court also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint
obligation of support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal
separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on
Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the
court may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such
amount and for such period of time as the court may deem
just and reasonable based on their standard of living during
the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1)
whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child
whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not
to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking
support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse’s
future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4)
the comparative financial resources of the spouses, including
their comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the
needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of
each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in
home-making, child care, education, and career building of
the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the
physical and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the
ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into
account that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and
unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any
other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may
be ordered to give an amount necessary for the support,
maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may
likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of
the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the
physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special
needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been
accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents
will make toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support
from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA
was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its
sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions
made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against
accrued support, we find as relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the
Circuit Court which found him in arrears with his child support
payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He
complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should have
been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property
given by him to the children themselves, even though he referred to
them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to
determine amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for
support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled to
credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he
entitled to credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a
television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the
custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money
paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to
the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts
refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the
requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is
fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments
made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and
made payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills v.
Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d
191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in part: "The payments
to the children themselves do not appear to have been made as
payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly
interest in the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should
be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be
determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should
expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their
mother will not give them money, especially as they may realize that
such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating
them right the courts are open to the father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a
father, who is required by a divorce decree to make child support
payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting
such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be
done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a
divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their
dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments
become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim
credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting
such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be
done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are
justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such
credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by
respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite.
As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by
the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses
such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s
scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars
bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost,
travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit
card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should
have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment
awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive
portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered
herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and
their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions should be
limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and
appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge
deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her
children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the
respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely
ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and
well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts.
This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support
pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court
observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some
forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit
cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however,
devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point
in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is
incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical and
financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of
defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the
amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held
that considering respondent’s financial resources, it is but fair and just
that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic
necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any
amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should
only cover those incurred for sustenance and household
expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been
admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of their
two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars
and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely:
clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to
him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the
private respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for
the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses
and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his
two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are
chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them in the
amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly
support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed
as of the present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be
sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs. This
monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount
of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eyes
which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise,
this monthly support ofP115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase
or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent
as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof
submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action
for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.30 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be
allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for
petitioner and her children:
1âwphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that
respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not
only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the
due administration of justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act must
be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.32 The
good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be
considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately
executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondent’s act was
not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually
providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that
respondent continued shouldering the full cost of their education and
even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the family’s social
status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and
appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset
the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to
generate income on her own because she presently maintains a
boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time
engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two
children have finished their education and are now employed in the
family business earning their own salaries.
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari
docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y.
Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new
one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php
648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his
monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from
the time payment of this amount was deferred by him
subject to the deduction aforementioned.

Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this
should be submitted to the trial court in which the action for judgment.
declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of
facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased SO ORDERED."
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35

…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is
of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during
Republic of the Philippines
the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
SUPREME COURT
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased
Manila
or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be
regarded as subject to final determination.36
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April
20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
ALBINO JOSEF, petitioner,
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: vs.
OTELIO SANTOS, respondent.
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua DECISION
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the November 17, 20031 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80315, dismissing petitioner’s special civil action of
certiorari for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration, and the
May 7, 20042Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant in Civil Case No. 95-110-MK,
which is a case for collection of sum of money filed by herein
respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay
the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on
various dates in 1994.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, found
petitioner liable to respondent in the amount of P404,836.50 with
interest at 12% per annum reckoned from January 9, 1995 until full
payment.3
Petitioner appealed4 to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court’s decision in toto.5Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated
February 18, 2002.6 The Judgment became final and executory on
May 21, 2002.
On February 17, 2003, respondent moved for issuance of a writ of
execution,7 which was opposed by petitioner.8 In an Order dated July
16, 2003,9 the trial court granted the motion, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for issuance of
writ of execution is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be
issued commanding the Sheriff of this Court to execute the
decision dated December 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.10
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 11 and enforced on
August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties
subject of the writ of execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real
property located at Marikina City and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. N-105280 was sold on October 28, 2003 by way of
public auction to fully satisfy the judgment credit. Respondent
emerged as the winning bidder and a Certificate of Sale 12 dated
November 6, 2003 was issued in his favor.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the
abovementioned personal and real properties. Petitioner claimed that
the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and
that the real property covered by TCT No. N-105280 was his family
home thus exempt from execution.
On November 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition for failure of petitioner to file a motion
for reconsideration of the trial court’s July 16, 2003 Order granting the
motion for execution and ordering the issuance of a writ therefor, as
well as for his failure to indicate in his petition the timeliness of its filing
as required under the Rules of Court. On May 7, 2004, the appellate
court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Thus, the instant petition which raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LEVY AND SALE OF THE PERSONAL
BELONGINGS OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS WELL AS THE
ATTACHMENT AND SALE ON PUBLIC AUCTION OF HIS FAMILY
HOME TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT AWARD IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT IS LEGAL.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER’S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Petitioner argues that the trial court sheriff erroneously attached,
levied and sold on execution the real property covered by TCT No. N-
105280 because the same is his family home; that the execution sale
was irregular because it was conducted without complying with the
notice and posting of requirements; and that the personal and real
properties were sold for inadequate prices as to shock the
conscience. The real property was allegedly worth P8 million but was
sold for only P848,448.64.
Petitioner also argues that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the petition based purely on technical grounds,
i.e., his failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
order granting execution, and his failure to indicate in his petition for
certiorari the timeliness of filing the same with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioner’s alleged family
home has not been shown to have been judicially or extrajudicially
constituted, obviously referring to the provisions on family home of the
Civil Code – not those of the Family Code which should apply in this
case; that petitioner has not shown to the court’s satisfaction that the
personal properties executed upon and sold belonged to his children.
Respondent argues that he is entitled to satisfaction of judgment
considering the length of time it took for the parties to litigate and the
various remedies petitioner availed of which have delayed the case.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner, in his opposition to respondent’s motion for issuance of a
writ of execution, claimed that he was insolvent; that he had no
property to answer for the judgment credit; that the house and lot in
which he was residing at the time was his family home thus exempt
from execution; that the household furniture and appliances found
therein are likewise exempt from execution; and that these furniture
and appliances belonged to his children Jasmin Josef and Jean Josef
Isidro. Thus, as early as during proceedings prior to the issuance of the
writ of execution, petitioner brought to the fore the issue of exemption
from execution of his home, which he claimed to be a family home in
contemplation of the civil law.
However, instead of inquiring into the nature of petitioner’s allegations
in his opposition, the trial court ignored the same and granted
respondent’s motion for execution. The full text of the July 16, 2003
Order provides, as follows:
This resolves the "Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution"
filed by plaintiff thru counsel and the "Opposition" thereto filed
by the defendant on her own behalf.
The records show that a decision was rendered by this Court in
favor of the plaintiff on December 18, 1995 which decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001 and by the
Supreme Court on February 18, 2002. On June 18, 2003, this
Court received the entire records of the case from the Court of
Appeals.
Considering the foregoing, it is now the ministerial duty of the
Court to issue a writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for issuance of
writ of execution is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be
issued commanding the Sheriff of this Court to execute the
decision dated December 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.13
The above Order did not resolve nor take into account petitioner’s
allegations in his Opposition, which are material and relevant in the
resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This is
serious error on the part of the trial court. It should have made an
earnest determination of the truth to petitioner’s claim that the house
and lot in which he and his children resided was their duly constituted
family home. Since it did not, its July 16, 2003 Order is thus null and
void. Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.14
The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land
on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right
to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases.15
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly
constitutes petitioner’s family home, the trial court should have
observed the following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioner’s obligation to respondent falls under
either of the exceptions under Article 15516 of the Family Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner’s claim that
the property was his family home;17conduct an ocular
inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an
interview of members of the community where the alleged
family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner
actually resided within the premises of the claimed family
home; order a submission of photographs of the premises,
 depositions, and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a
solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and other
witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given the
opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the
contrary;
3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner’s
family home, the court should determine:
a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or
incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family
Code;18
b) if petitioner’s spouse is still alive, as well as if there are
other beneficiaries of the family home;19
c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the
purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his
family home;20 and
d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of
applying the provisions of Articles 15721and 16022 of the
Family Code.
The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories
that last during one’s lifetime.23 It is the sanctuary of that union which
the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a
shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms
the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just
as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social
institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of
the family shall be recognized or given effect,24 the trial court’s failure
to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of
petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and
sold at auction. Despite petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the
trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same,
whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether
they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.25
Respondent moved for issuance of a writ of execution on February 17,
2003 while petitioner filed his opposition on June 23, 2003. The trial
court granted the motion on July 16, 2003, and the writ of execution
was issued on August 20, 2003. Clearly, the trial court had enough time
to conduct the crucial inquiry that would have spared petitioner the
trouble of having to seek relief all the way to this Court. Indeed, the
trial court’s inaction on petitioner’s plea resulted in serious injustice to
the latter, not to mention that its failure to conduct an inquiry based
on the latter’s claim bordered on gross ignorance of the law.
Being void, the July 16, 2003 Order could not have conferred any right
to respondent. Any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
Although we have held in several cases26 that a claim for exemption
from execution of the family home should be set up and proved
before the sale of the property at public auction, and failure to do so
would estop the party from later claiming the exemption since the
right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment
debtor which must be claimed by the judgment debtor himself at the
time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter, the
circumstances of the instant case are different. Petitioner claimed
exemption from execution of his family home soon after respondent
filed the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, thus giving notice
to the trial court and respondent that a property exempt from
execution may be in danger of being subjected to levy and sale.
Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe the procedure as herein
laid out; on the other hand, the respondent should observe the
procedure prescribed in Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to
obtain an order for the sale on execution of the petitioner’s family
home, if so, and apply the proceeds – less the maximum amount
allowed by law under Article 157 of the Code which should remain
with the petitioner for the rebuilding of his family home – to his
judgment credit. Instead, both the trial court and respondent
completely ignored petitioner’s argument that the properties subject
of the writ are exempt from execution.
Indeed, petitioner’s resort to the special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals was belated and without benefit of the requisite
motion for reconsideration, however, considering the gravity of the
issue, involving as it does matters that strike at the very heart of that
basic social institution which the State has a constitutional and moral
duty to preserve and protect, as well as petitioner’s constitutional right
to abode, all procedural infirmities occasioned upon this case must
 take a back seat to the substantive questions which deserve to be
Associate Justice
answered in full.
*DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZAR
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Associate Justice Associate Justice
November 17, 2003 and May 7, 2004 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80315 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHUR
16, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 Associate Justice
in Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, as well as the writ or writs of execution thus
issued in said case, are herebyDECLARED VOID, and all acts
proceeding therefrom and any title obtained by virtue thereof are
likewise DECLARED VOID.
ATTESTATION
The trial court is hereby DIRECTED (1) to conduct a solemn inquiry into
the nature of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
No. N-105280, with a view toward determining whether the same is in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
petitioner Albino Josef’s family home, and if so, apply the pertinent opinion of the Court’s Division.
provisions of the Family Code and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) to conduct an inquiry into the ownership of all other properties that CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
were levied upon and sold, with the aim of determining as well Associate Justice
whether these properties are exempt from execution under existing Chairperson
law.

Respondent Otelio Santos is hereby DIRECTED to hold the

abovementioned real and personal properties, or the proceeds
thereof, in trust to await the outcome of the trial court’s inquiry. CERTIFICATION

Finally, the trial court is DIRECTED to resolve, with utmost dispatch, Civil Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Case No. 95-110-MK within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision. Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Chief Justice
Associate Justice

Footnotes
WE CONCUR:
*In lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, per
Special Order No. 539 dated November 14, 2008.
A. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
1Rollo, p. 64; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and the family home;
Noel G. Tijam.
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
2 Id. at 72-73. premises before or after such constitution; and

3 Id. at 29-33; penned by Judge Reuben R. De la Cruz.
4 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56952.
5Rollo, pp. 34-38; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V.
Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon A.
Barcelona and Alicia L. Santos.
6 Id. at 13, 51; docketed as G.R. No. 150720.
7 Id. at 50-52.
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
17 Family Code.
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated.

8 Id. at 53-55. Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a

house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long
9 Id. at 56.
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from
10 Id.
execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
11 Id. at 57-58. allowed by law.

12 Id. at 61-62. Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
13 Id. at 56. applicable.

14 Abbain v. Chua, No. L-24241, February 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 748. 18 Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA
766; Manacop v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 735 (1997); Taneo
15Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.
1999, 304 SCRA 308.
19 Family Code.
16 Family Code.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
 (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for legal support.
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.
20 Family Code.
Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a
family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person
may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one
family home.
21 Family Code.
A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
23
Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not
Code of the Philippines, Vol. I (1990 ed.), p. 508, citing Code
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
Commission of 1947, pp. 18-19, 20.
Three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and Two
hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such
amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
24
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after
25
the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for
the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of
evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to
include chartered cities and municipalities whose
annual income at least equals that legally required for
chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural
areas.
22 Family Code.
Art. 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among
those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the
maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to
the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The
court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the
family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed
by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased
actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article
157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of
the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same
rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed
for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds
shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article
157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and
the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
judgment debtor.
Family Code, Art. 149.
Sec. 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:
(a) The judgment obligor's family home as
provided by law, or the homestead in which he
resides, and land necessarily used in connection
therewith;
(b) Ordinary tools and implements personally
used by him in his trade, employment, or
livelihood;
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three
carabaos, or other beasts of burden such as the
judgment obligor may select necessarily used
by him in his ordinary occupation;
(d) His necessary clothing and articles for
ordinary personal use, excluding jewelry;
(e) Household furniture and utensils necessary
for housekeeping, and used for that purpose by
the judgment obligor and his family, such as the
judgment obligor may select, of a value not
exceeding one hundred thousand pesos;
(f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient
for four months;
(g) The professional libraries and equipment of
judges, lawyers, physicians, pharmacists,
dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen,
teachers, and other professionals, not
exceeding three hundred thousand pesos in
value;
(h) One fishing boat and accessories not
exceeding the total value of one hundred
thousand pesos owned by a fisherman and by
the lawful use of which he earns his livelihood;
(i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of
the judgment obligor of his personal services
within the four months preceding the levy as are
necessary for the support of his family;
(j) Lettered gravestones;
(k) Monies benefits, privileges, or annuities
accruing or in any manner growing out of any
life insurance;
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money
or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government;
(m) Properties specially exempt by law.
But no article or species of property mentioned in this
section shall be exempt from execution issued upon a
judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.
26Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, November 25,
2005, 476 SCRA 280; Gomez v. Gealone, G.R. No. 58281,
November 13, 1991, 203 SCRA 474 .
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015
ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V.
EULOGIO, Petitioners, v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-
BELL, PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL,
PATERNO FERDINAND BELL III, AND PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL
IV, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531 which granted the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondents and enjoined the execution sale of
their family home for the satisfaction of the money judgment awarded
to petitioners in Civil Case No. 4581, and the Resolution 2 which denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell,
Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings)
are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and
Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged
a Complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of
title and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad
Eulogio (the Eulogios). It was docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 84. The Complaint
sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses
Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as
the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the
Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable
to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum.
The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 15 July 1998 reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court hereby
declares:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That the sale of the subject house and lot under Deed of Sale
marked as Exhibit "F" is only an equitable mortgage in favor of the
defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio. However, the
mortgage cannot bind the property in question for being violative of
Chapter 2, Title 4 of the Family Code, its encumbrance not having
been consented to in writing by a majority of the beneficiaries who
are the plaintiffs herein;
2. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured
mortgage [sic] for which the Spouses Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell as mortgagors are liable to the defendants-spouses
Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio in the amount of P1,000,000 plus
interest of 12% per annum. However, under the Fourth Party Complaint
Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell have the right of
reimbursement from fourth party defendants Nicolas Moraña and
Julieta Moraña for whom their loan of P1,000,000 was secured by Sps.
Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell. Accordingly, the
fourth party defendants Nicolas Moraña and Julieta Moraña are
hereby ordered to reimburse Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell the loan of P1,000,000 plus interest of 12% per annum
to be paid by the latter to defendants Enrico and Natividad Eulogio;
3. The house and lot in question is free from any and all encumbrances
by virtue of said equitable mortgage or the purported sale; and
4. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit "F") is null and void for being contrary to
law and public policy.
Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby
ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the name
of defendants Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to re-
constitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-680-(5997) as "family
home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia Victoria C. Bell, Paterno William
C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno Benerano C. Bell IV
and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan
Bell; or in the alternative to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title
under the same tenor;
2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a tax
declaration covering the said subject property as family home for the
said plaintiffs and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell; and
3. Defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio are ordered to
pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P35,000.00,
as the plaintiffs have been compelled to litigate to protect their
property rights, and costs.3
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the CA, but the trial
court's Decision was affirmed en toto. Spouses Bell later brought the
case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners in the amount
of P1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed their Petition
for failure to show any reversible error committed by the
CA.4 Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.5chanrobleslaw
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which
respondents' property covered by the newly reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208 [formerly RT-680 (5997)] was levied
on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31
August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground
that the property was a family home.6chanrobleslaw
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of
execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that
the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory limit
of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area, and
that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.7chanrobleslaw
 and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's order was
The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine contrary to law.17chanrobleslaw
the present value of the family home of respondents. It also appointed
a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing market On 09 February 2009,18 the CA denied petitioners' Motion for
value of their house and lot.8chanrobleslaw Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.

Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and Issues

asked the RTC to cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-
shopping.9 They argued that petitioners' bid to determine the present
value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue that
had long been settled with finality.
The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration 10 of
respondents and directed the commissioners to canvass prospective
buyers of their house and lot.11chanrobleslaw
On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Injunction before the CA,12where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87531.
Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an
Order13 dispensing with the valuation report of the commissioners and
directing the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently,
respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition with an
urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.14chanrobleslaw
The CA eventually enjoined15 the execution sale set on 22 December
200416 by the RTC.
On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents'
Petition for Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res judicata had
already set in.
The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become
final and executory, only declared respondents' house and lot as a
family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution
was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was
as yet no res judicata.
Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home
after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The
basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according
to the appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of
forum-shopping; (2) whether a hearing to determine the value of
respondents' family home for purposes of execution under Article 160
of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res judicata; and
(3) whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution
under Article 160 of the Family Code.
The Court's Ruling
The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action but with different prayers, or by splitting of causes of action
(where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).19chanrobleslaw
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment through means other than by appeal or certiorari.20 Forum
shopping does not apply to cases that arise from an initiatory or
original action that has been elevated by way of appeal or certiorari
to higher or appellate courts or authorities. This is so because the issues
in the appellate courts necessarily differ from those in the lower court,
and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the original case
and treated as only one case.21chanrobleslaw
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which
declared that property in dispute was a family home, had long
attained finality. Accordingly, respondents maintain that petitioners'
bid to re-litigate the present value of the property in the course of the
execution proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that petitioners
should be cited for contempt of court because of forum-
shopping.22chanrobleslaw
Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over
respondents' family home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a written
consent from its beneficiaries as required under Article 158 of the
Family Code,23 the court still recognized the validity of the transaction
as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared Spouses Bell liable to
petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum.
Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered
an act of forum shopping. Simply, the execution of a decision is just
the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the life of the law.24 It
is not separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of the instant
Petition as a continuation of the execution proceedings does not
constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an adverse judgment
or order by appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping.
Such remedies are sanctioned and provided for by the
rules.25chanrobleslaw
Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main
proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the consequent execution
proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that the danger
of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, which
the judicial policy against forum shopping seeks to prevent, does not
exist in this case.
Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents' family home is
barred by res judicata.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental
principle of law that precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually
litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.26 Under the
1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects of res judicata, namely: bar
by prior judgment27 and conclusiveness of judgment.28chanrobleslaw
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in
which the judgment has been rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The judgment or
decree on the merits of the court of competent jurisdiction concludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action before the same or any other tribunal.29chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there
is an identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action. Under this rule, the first judgment is conclusive only
as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Stated
differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.30chanrobleslaw
In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars
petitioners' move to have the property in dispute levied on execution.
There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581
and the subsequent execution proceedings involved the same
parties31 and subject matter.32 For these reasons, respondents argue
that the execution sale of the property in dispute under Article 160 of
the Family Code is barred byres judicata, since the trial court has
already determined that the value of the property fell within the
statutory limit.
The CA held that the trial court's Decision, which is indisputably final,
only settled the issue of whether the property in dispute was a family
home. The CA ruled thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We rule that there is no res judicata.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the decision of the trial court
dated July 15, 1998, which has become final and executory, only
declares the subject property as a family home. As a matter of fact,
private respondents never questioned that such property is a family
home, and consequently, the issue as to whether or not the property is
family home is settled and res judicata lies only with respect to this
issue.
But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject
of an execution sale was not resolved by the trial court. This issue[was]
raised only when the writ of execution was issued and hence, [was
not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether or
not the [f]amily [h]ome of petitioners under the facts and
circumstances of the case could be the subject of a writ of execution
and sold at public auction.33
The Court disagrees with the CA.
"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another.34 It may be argued that the cause of action in the
main proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute, while in the
execution proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to
petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not
mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the
operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the
relief sought.35 The test to determine whether the causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity of the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action.
Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a
different method of presenting the case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies.36chanrobleslaw
Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the
second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case
may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of action in
the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.37chanrobleslaw
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil
Case No. 4581 - including the bid of petitioners to execute the money
judgment awarded to them by the trial court - is founded on a
common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence
submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the
Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main
proceedings. Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by
petitioners in the main proceedings,i.e., that they had bought the
property from Spouses Bell for P1 million - was utilized to substantiate
the claim that the current value of respondents' family home was
actually PI million. In fact, the trial court's order for respondents' family
home to be levied on execution was solely based on the price stated
in the nullified Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the
same property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence
advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over
respondents' family home have already been used to support their
arguments in the main proceedings.
Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case
should be put to rest by the trial court's discussion of the nature and
alienability of the property in dispute, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family
home which has been constituted on the house and lot in question is
exempt from alienation and that its value does not exceed P300,000.
Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey house was built in 1947
and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from
his parents and has been living there with his family. In 1976, when an
extra-judicial settlement was made of the estate of his parents, the fair
market value of the house was P70,000.
City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and presented Tax
Declaration and others, (Exhibit "J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047)
beginning 1985 showing that the subject lot with an area of 329 sq. m.
had a fair market value of P76,000.00 and the residential house
located thereon of P50,000.00, for a total value of P126,000.00. She
testified that during the prior years the assessed values were lower. This
shows that the limit of the value of P300,000.00 under Article 157, Title 5
of the Family Code has not been exceeded. The testimonies of the
plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in that house together with
their said parents. The Court therefore concludes that the said house is
a family home under Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family Code. Its
alienation by the said Spouses without the written consent of the
majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary to
law and public policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family
Code.38[Underscoring supplied]
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the
property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 has
already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution. material for the construction of the building.
Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the main
proceedings and in the execution proceedings are different, the ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those
parties are still barred from litigating the issue of whether respondents' mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
family home may be sold on execution sale under the principle of reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
conclusiveness of judgment. more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to
the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that
160 of the Family Code. the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from
expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or
Code.39chanrobleslaw persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the
property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, shall apply.
inalienable and free from attachment.40 The great controlling purpose
and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family
the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the
is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the
which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has judgment debtor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
been gathered and sheltered.41 The family home cannot be seized by Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which
creditors except in special cases.42chanrobleslaw provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to the time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand
be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas,
exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the
statutory limit.43chanrobleslaw In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption
of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions home shall be the basis of evaluation.
mentioned in Article 153, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include
sale or attachment except:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed
(1) For nonpayment of taxes; to be rural areas. [Underscoring supplied]
The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; Article 160 are enlightening, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after reply, Judge Diy opined that the above Article is intended to cover a
such constitution; and situation where the family home is already worth P500,000 or P1M.
Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home, originally
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, valued at P300,000. later appreciated to almost P1M because of
improvements made, like roads and plazas. Justice Caguioa,
however, made a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
improvements in the sense that if the value of the family home
exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements
by the one establishing the family home, the Article will apply; but if it
is through an involuntary improvement, like the conversion into a
residential area or the establishment of roads and other facilities, the
one establishing the family home should not be punished by making
his home liable to creditors. He suggested that the matter be clarified
in the provision.
x x x x
Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify
that the family home is worth more than the maximum amount at the
time it was constituted, they will avoid the suit because the creditor
will be given proper warning. Justice Puno opined that this is a
question of fact. Justice Caguioa added that, under the second
sentence, there will be a preliminary determination as to whether the
family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law.
x x x x
Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to
subsequent voluntary improvements by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the
property, the same rules and procedure shall
apply.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect
penalize the owner for improving the family home. On the other hand,
Justice Puno opined that the provision covers only the excess in actual
value over that allowed by law. Judge Diy added that the owner may
improve the family home up to P300,000. Justice Caguioa stated that
without the above provision, one can borrow money, put it all on
improvement of the family home even beyond the maximum value of
a family home and, thereby, exempt it from levy on the part of the
creditor. He added that anyway, if one voluntarily improves his family
home out of his money, nobody can complain because there are no
creditors.
Justice Puno posed the question: What is "due to the subsequent
improvement?" Is it the "excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the
"increase", which constitutes the "excess"? In reply. Justice Reyes
opined that it is the "increase" which constituted the "excess". Justice
Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last sentence
as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in
Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home or
by the owner or owners of the property, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value"
does not include the original value. Justice Puno suggested that they
just say "increased actual value", which the Committee
approved.44 [Underscoring supplied]
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution,
forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by
law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the
present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the
amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most
favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess
of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the
obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by
the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still
be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the
following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the
time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory
limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an
increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the
family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount
above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles
155 and 160.
Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the
family home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to
enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their
creditors.46chanrobleslaw
Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the
exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale. They
claim that the actual value of respondents' family home exceeds the
P300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the
Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to sell the property
for PI million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly assailed order is bereft of any factual or legal
ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy justification.50chanrobleslaw
the money judgment awarded to them in Civil Case No.
4581.47chanrobleslaw WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that G.R. SP No. 87531, enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the
the property in dispute is a family home, and that its value at the time sale of the family home of respondents, is AFFIRMED.
of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents
have timely claimed the exemption of the property from SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
execution.48 On the other hand, there is no question that the money
judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.
Republic of the Philippines
Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money SUPREME COURT
judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense Manila
of respondents' rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those
asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must
SECOND DIVISION
bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy
any statutory requirement for its enforcement.49chanrobleslaw
G.R. No. 200169 January 28, 2015
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under
Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner.
an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary vs.
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondent.
the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the
increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article DECISION
157.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged -
much less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 30,
the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with 2006 Decision2 and December 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of
finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17,
an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell 1999 Decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch
executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 and denying petitioner's Motion for
the actual value of the property in dispute. Reconsideration.5

The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court Factual Antecedents
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution
of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court had already
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar
determined with finality that the property was a family home, and
spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and
there was no proof that its value had increased beyond the statutory
February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels
limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it ordered
of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of
the execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion
Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago
when one acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
and Bacolod (the subject titles).6
manner in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in which the
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod
City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with
damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-9591 and assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the
Complaint7 alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving
heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the
subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from
the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the
Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he
filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second
owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent
opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent
presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject
titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that
respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate
copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was
raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart;
that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses;
that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon
the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters
inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles
were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent
prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the
Aguilar spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the
following documents, among others:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary
School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC),
Bacolod City (Exhibit "C" and submarkings), wherein it is stated
that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent;
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated
that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated
October 10, 1957 (Exhibit "G"), a public instrument subscribed
and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his
employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb
marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5,
1945, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment with
BMMC dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit "L"), indicating that
petitioner is his son;
5. Petitioner’s Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit
"M"), where it is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his
parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a
BMMC supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son
and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod
City Civil Registry to the effect that the record of births during
the period 1945 to 1946 were "all destroyed by nature," hence
no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could
be issued as requested (Exhibit "Q").9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-
Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano),
his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed
petitioner’s identity, and she testified that petitioner is the son of the
Aguilar spouses and that during her marriage to petitioner, she lived
with the latter in the Aguilar spouses’ conjugal home built on one of
the subject properties. On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano
testified that she is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses
have only one son – herein petitioner – who was born at BMMC; that
after the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not
claim ownership of the subject properties because they recognized
petitioner as the Aguilar spouses’ sole child and heir; that petitioner
was charged with murder, convicted, imprisoned, and later on
paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner
continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in one of
the subject properties, and continues to live there with his family.10
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a
retired teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but only
heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not
related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she attended to
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under medication in a
hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s hospital and
funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue
and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar’s estate;
that she did not steal the subject titles, but that the same were
entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned
sale of the subject properties did not push through because when
petitioner’s opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement
as to the agreed price.11
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera
(Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses
were married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although
she admitted that she knew a certain "Rodolfo" whose nickname was
"Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar spouses; and that
Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano.12
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit "2")announcing among others that
she and Alfredo have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s
estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as
follows:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence
attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a
legally adopted one was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of
live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological
relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria
S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar
(Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she
have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is
(sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by
consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses
Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient
interest in this action to be considered qualified or entitled to the
issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint with cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of
legal basis.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV
No. 64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the
Aguilar spouses’ son; that under Article 172 of the Family Code,15 an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned constitutes
proof of filiation; that through the documentary evidence presented,
petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate biological son of the
Aguilar spouses and the sole heir to their estate. He argued that he
cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering
the period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were
destroyed as shown by Exhibits "Q" to "Q-3"; for this reason, he
presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his
relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular
reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G"),
arguing that the same was made under oath and thus sufficient under
Article 172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of
the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner questioned the trial court’s
reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s affidavit (Exhibit "2")
attesting that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the
sole heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has
been discarded by the trial court in a previous Order dated April 1,
1998, stating thus:
Except for defendant’s Exhibit "2", all other Exhibits, Exhibits "1", "3", "4"
and "5", together with their submarkings, are all admitted in
evidence.17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the
trial court’s August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing thus:
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation
with the deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this
Court. The Elementary School Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant
cannot be considered as proof of filiation. As enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439:
"Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not
constitute evidence of filiation."
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, WE hold thatit cannot be considered as
evidence of filiation. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA 360:
"A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of
filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof."
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown
that the parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat
Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that a
marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not
competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract recognition
in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1
(Exhibit "G") and the Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo
Aguilar (Exhibit "L"), allegedly tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant
has been and is presently known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has
been bearing the surname of his alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Use of a family
surname certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of
Alfredo Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient
proof to establish and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the
deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a public instrument and
the latter bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute
clear and convincing evidence to show filiation based on open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a
serious matter that must be resolved according to the requirements of
the law. All told, plaintiff-appellant’s evidence failed to hurdle the
"high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to
establish one’s legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased
spouses Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of
the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of
mandatory injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a
clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had he
shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in
denying the same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to
show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so that he has not
sustained any damage by reason of the withholding of the TCTs from
him, there is no clear testimony on the anguish or anxiety he allegedly
suffered as a result thereof. Well entrenched in law and jurisprudence
is the principle that the grant of moral damages is expressly allowed
by law in instances where proofs of the mental anguish, serious anxiety
and moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a December 20,
2011 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due
course to the Petition, which raises the following issues:
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC
Branch 49, Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed reversible error [in] not taking into consideration
petitioner’s Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a
notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner
as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article
172 of the [Family] Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation
of the petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with
respect to the application of Article 172 of the Family Code
particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating to public document
which is substantial enough to merit consideration of this Honorable
Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall future litigation.21
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed
CA dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered ordering
respondent to surrender the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code. Petitioner contends that said SSS Form E-1 is a
declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as
the latter’s son; this recognition should be accorded more weight than
the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said
evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of court action.
He adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public
instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is the "highest form of recognition
which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of recognition
bestowed upon" him as the son of the late Alfredo Aguilar; that
respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot
collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his
legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code;23 and that having proved his filiation, mandatory
injunction should issue, and an award of damages is in order.
Respondent’s Arguments
In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the
pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash
of the CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the
appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that –
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during
the marriage of their parents.1âwphi1 The certificates of live birth
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is
perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of
the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it
must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945,
or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar28 and before their respective deaths29 – has sufficiently proved
that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner
correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses
under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document
constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live
Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local
Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the
introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to prove filiation. It was erroneous
for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of
filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express
recognition in a public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and
such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. And, relative to said form of
acknowledgment, the Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to
adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied
by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that
the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration"
in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."30 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he
obtained a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy
thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the
trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy
would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the Certification
dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry
(Exhibit "Q") contained just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to
the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila to secure
a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in
the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said
office.
As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to
impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy,
and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed
pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has
held before that -Article 26331 refers to an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's
child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of
Jose at all.32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the
Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter's estate.
Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since succession pertains, in the first
place, to the descending direct line.33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision
and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-
9591 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is
hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the
owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005]
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented
by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-
VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the Decision[2] dated 29
November 2000 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders[3] issued by
Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (trial court) in SP No. 98-
88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera
(petitioner) to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing,
while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba
(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the
trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents
mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion,
respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When
she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the
University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-
NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she
developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular
Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it
has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted
respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner,
respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and
the relevant individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and
respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a
laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of the Order, and to submit the results thereof within a
period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further
reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of
other evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000
Order. He asserted that under the present circumstances, the DNA test
[he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.[6]
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February
2000 and 8 June 2000 in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further contended that there is no appeal nor any [other]
plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA
paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support his
objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs.
Court of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering
the limitations on, and conditions precedent for the
admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious
constraints affecting the reliability of the test as admitted by
private respondents expert witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public
respondent relying on scientific findings and conclusions unfit
for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field
and scientific treatises.
4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is]
compelled to take will be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the
petitioner, unconstitutional.[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision
denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial
court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to
correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an
available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that
the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against
self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial
compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner
can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and ordered dismissed, and the
challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court
denied in its Resolution dated 23 May 2001.[9]
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid
probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks
for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated
into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of
DNA test results in a paternity suit.[10]
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused
its discretion when it authorized the trial court to embark in [sic] a new
procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of legislation
to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as
made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the presence of technical
and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation.[11] Petitioner
maintains that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.[12]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it
appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the
facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family
Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity,
such as citizenship,[13] support (as in the present case), or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.[14]
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual
relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative
proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the
putative father.[15]
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations
with the mother, because of either physical absence or
impotency.[16] The putative father may also show that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate.[17] The childs legitimacy may be impugned only
under the strict standards provided by law.[18]
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and
child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is
a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However,
although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical
formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look
like his biological father.[19] This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four
aspects. Armi Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima
facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological
father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial
court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and
pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion. He
denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that
respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered
petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner
side by side, to show how much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility
contests. We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence
to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity
and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The
relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy,
in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family
portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are
acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,[20] a
case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has
to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father.
Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the
claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father.[21] A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence.[22] Letters to
the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of
the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together
with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation.[23] However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot
be taken as authentic writing.[24] Standing alone, neither a certificate
of baptism[25] nor family pictures[26] are sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence
of paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However,
advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and
filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are
conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.[27]
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,[28] the result of the blood grouping
test showed that the putative father was a possible father of the child.
Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the possibility of
paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and
circumstances other than the results of the blood grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the child, the mother, and the
putative father agreed to submit themselves to a blood grouping test.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted the test, which
indicated that the child could not have been the possible offspring of
the mother and the putative father. We held that the result of the
blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the
putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now
asked whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove
paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic
make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell
of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA
profile can determine his identity.[30]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is
processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual
from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each
person, except for identical twins.[31] We quote relevant portions of the
trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint
called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual
(except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a
component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals
blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles,
semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order
in which the four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines his or
her physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule,
it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-
G. These are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed
in a particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code.
Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that
differ. They are known aspolymorphic loci, which are the areas
analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA
typing simply means determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or
extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several
ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are:
the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); reverse dot blot or
HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as
evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA
process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent
which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR
(short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by
most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of
replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times
through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13
separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported
theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are
determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to
identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the
crime scene is compared with theknown print. If a substantial amount
of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA
or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the
suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations
between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two
genetic types called allele, one inherited from each parent. In [a]
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the
DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which
half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half
must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the
mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.[32] (Emphasis in the original)
Although the term DNA testing was mentioned in the 1995 case
of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[33] it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v.
Court of Appeals[34] that more than a passing mention was given to
DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas corpus against
respondent who abducted petitioners youngest son. Testimonial and
documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to
establish parentage. However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not
necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would
be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and
identity issues.
Admissibility of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo[35] discussed DNA analysis as
evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts
wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997Pe Lim case,[36] where
we stated that DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA
profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched
the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds conviction of
rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.[37]
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA
evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of
the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue
of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the
issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact
on jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar[38] and In re: The Writ
of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.[39]In Yatar, a match existed
between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the
DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The
Court, following Vallejosfootsteps, affirmed the conviction of
appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with
homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results
to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of
commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between
the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the
victims child does not preclude the convict-petitioners commission of
rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and
respondent refer to two United States cases to support their respective
positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v.
U.S.[40] and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.[41] In Frye v. U.S.,
the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction
to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Fryes
counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic
blood pressure deception test[42] made on defendant. The state
Supreme Court affirmed Fryes conviction and ruled that the systolic
blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and
scientific recognition among physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far
made. The Frye standard of general acceptance states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz[43] modified the Frye standard. Schwartz
was charged with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and
blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for DNA
testing to a government facility and a private facility. The prosecution
introduced the private testing facilitys results over Schwartzs objection.
One of the issues brought before the state Supreme Court included
the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding. The state
Supreme Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained
general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that
admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the
laboratorys compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and
the availability of their testing data and results.[44]
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[45] further
modified the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability
case where both the trial and appellate courts denied the admissibility
of an experts testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of
general acceptance. The United States Supreme Court ruled that in
federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded
the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402
provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. Relevant evidence is defined as that which has any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert
testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of
general acceptance does not mean that the Federal Rules do not
place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the
judge must ensure that the testimonys reasoning or method is
scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would
depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can
be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the techniques operation; and (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v.
Carmichael,[46] further modified the Daubert standard. This led to the
amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these
American cases. Obviously, neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor
the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.[47] At best,
American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our
decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in
issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of
Court.[48] Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.[49] Section 49
of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony,
provides as follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received
in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA
analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue.[50]
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner
to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA
analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests
for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go
into the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts
should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence.
We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.[51]
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in
paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these
variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing
next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has
the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the
child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.[52]
It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the
putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the
child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily
establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard
adopted in an American jurisdiction,[53] trial courts should require at
least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior
to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of
paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference
population database, such as the Philippine population database, is
required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity
inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W
estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are
subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between
the putative father and child alone.[54]
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity
should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less
than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity.[55] This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against
Self-Incrimination
self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a
test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra);
the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as
evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong
Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on
pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244);
and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for
pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the
privilege is the restriction on testimonial compulsion.[56]
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative
parent to claim his or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid
this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science
and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the
limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June
2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no

person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Petitioner
asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his
right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial
evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from
the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of
respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that
is communicative in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154
SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against