1
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V.
CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR
P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial
system, upon which the workings of the contentious and adversarial
system in the Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of
fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a
counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a
unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from
any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold
and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's
duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the
Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,
which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG
Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul
S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as
the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services
for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its members acted as
incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank
deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of
their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal
and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the
said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good
Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a
"Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from
the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No.
33.4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the
strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion,
Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G.
Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara
Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices
(ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed conspired
and confederated with each other in setting up,
through the use of the coconut levy funds, the
financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of
San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives
of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, being the
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks
ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest stockholders of
UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate
books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as
holding approximately 3,744 shares as of
February, 1984.5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners
ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in
the acts with which their codefendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate
lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of
rendering professional and
legal services to clients,
defendants-ACCRA
lawyers, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D.
Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan
and Eduardo U. Escueta,
became holders of shares
of stock in the corporations
listed under their respective
names in Annex "A" of the
expanded Amended
Complaint as incorporating
or acquiring stockholders
only and, as such, they do
not claim any proprietary
interest in the said shares
of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz
was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid
Marketing Corporation, which was organized for
legitimate business purposes not related to the
allegations of the expanded Amended
Complaint. However, he has long ago
transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in
his name in Annex "A" of the expanded
Amended Complaint are his assets.6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law
firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint
implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
 2

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore,
AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them defendants. In the same vein, they cannot
(exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
Roco.8 The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the treatment accorded to Roco.
complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Neither can this Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure
October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers
of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission
same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to
of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client
Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12
covering their respective
shareholdings.9
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution
but the same was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence,
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to
the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the
No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-
defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent
PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 I
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in
PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused
private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in
its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA
(a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices
lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in
dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of
serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict
private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation
application of the law of agency.
and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in
its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
II
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent
Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed
reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor grave abuse of discretion in not considering
had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as
acted as nominee-stockholder. 11 similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the
Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in 1. There is absolutely no
PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions evidence that Mr. Roco had
required by respondent PCGG. It held: revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for
xxx xxx xxx
whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of
not revealing the identity of the client for whom
2. Even assuming that Mr.
they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will
Roco had revealed, or had
be their choice. But until they do identify their
undertaken to reveal, the
clients, considerations of whether or not the
identities of the client(s), the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
disclosure does not
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA
constitute a substantial
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
distinction as would make
consequences of their acts until they have
the classification
begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
reasonable under the equal
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
protection clause.

This is what appears to be the cause for which

3. Respondent
they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
Sandiganbayan sanctioned
defendants herein.
favoritism and undue
preference in favor of Mr.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco Roco in violation of the
has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has equal protection clause.
apparently identified his principal, which
revelation could show the lack of cause against
III
him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to
exercise its power both under the rules of
Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed
relation to the Supreme Court's ruling grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). under the facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and
The PCGG has apparently offered to the
the other information requested by the PCGG.
ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of
by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for
exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, 1. Under the peculiar facts
PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). of this case, the attorney-
The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make client privilege includes the
the disclosures required by the PCGG. identity of the client(s).

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


2. The factual disclosures
required by the PCGG are
not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers'
alleged client(s) but extend
to other privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that
the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG
must be based on reasonable and just grounds
and with due consideration to the constitutional
right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for
reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied
by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent
Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds
averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-
defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment,
on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his
client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same
footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue
that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by
private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the
identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary
duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of
information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is
not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor
are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected,
because they are evidence of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent
PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because
he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to
dismiss Civil Case No.0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by
filing a notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his
principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as
co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients.
Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger
fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the
PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners — the names of
their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The
statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated
March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of
not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have
begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which
they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
3
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan,
Third Division, entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through
counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5,
1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that
their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the
Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds
of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular
persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I
propose to establish through these ACCRA
lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this
case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds
of trust, some in the name of a particular
person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds
are important to our claim that some of the
shares are actually being held by the nominees
for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of
these assignments have also blank assignees.
Again, this is important to our claim that some of
the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some
are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e
corporations are really just paper corporations.
Why do we say that? One: There are no really
fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at
the time of incorporation and even up to 1986,
which is the crucial year. And not only that, they
have no permits from the municipal authorities
in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now
are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have
no address on records. These are some of the
principal things that we would ask of these
nominees stockholders, as they called
themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients
as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted
solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course
of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as
co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG
has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should
exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman
Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum(contract of lease of
services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be
performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated
by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency)
wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract
in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the
person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is
more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an
attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the
court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to
those of an ordinary agent.20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies
what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact
an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of
courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
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Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No
fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and should restrain him from the full discharge of his
good faith, 22 that is required by reason of necessity and public duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to
interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking the benefit of any and every remedy and
legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the defense that is authorized by the law of the land,
administration of justice. 24 and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to
be borne in mind that the great trust of the
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to
lawyer is to be performed within and not without
his client that distinguishes him from any other
the bounds of the law. The office of attorney
professional in society. This conception is
does not permit, much less does it demand of
entrenched and embodies centuries of
him for any client, violation of law or any manner
established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton
of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
v. Ford,26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
conscience and not that of his client.

There are few of the business relations of life

Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships
involving a higher trust and confidence than that
are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In
of attorney and client, or generally speaking,
the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
one more honorably and faithfully discharged;
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a
few more anxiously guarded by the law, or
client were made to choose between legal representation without
governed by the sterner principles of morality
effective communication and disclosure and legal representation
and justice; and it is the duty of the court to
with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some
administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to
instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to
be watchful and industrious, to see that
lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
confidence thus reposed shall not be used to
amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be
the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the
curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat
party bestowing it. 27
this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right
to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil
Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services
Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without
opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would
authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the
otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a
client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
employment." 28Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of
dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between
Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages
a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the
communication. — The following persons lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a
cannot testify as to matters learned in matter of duty and professional responsibility.
confidence in the following cases:
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in
xxx xxx xxx refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at
bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
the answer must be in the affirmative.
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction
professional employment, can an attorney's as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31
without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
which has been acquired in such capacity. 29

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
not attach until there is a client.
client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from
him or with his knowledge and approval. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that: Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued
is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however
qualified by some important exceptions.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a
lawyer's fidelity to client:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the
activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
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In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the
order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity.
ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely The court said:
related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually
attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official,
That his employment came about through the
informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe
fact that the insurance company had hired him
to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end.
to defend its policyholders seems immaterial.
In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her
The attorney is such cases is clearly the
client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not
attorney for the policyholder when the
remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer
policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity
contemplating that it would be used in an action
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the
or claim against him. 38
state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case,
and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the
client was privileged. xxx xxx xxx

U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e. that All communications made by a client to his
client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong counsel, for the purpose of professional advice
probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would or assistance, are privileged, whether they
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to
legal advice was obtained. any other matter proper for such advice or
aid; . . . And whenever the communication
made, relates to a matter so connected with the
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford
into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the
presumption that it was the ground of the
illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents,
address by the client, then it is privileged from
law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the
disclosure. . .
leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.

It appears . . . that the name and address of the

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS
owner of the second cab came to the attorney in
issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce
this case as a confidential communication. His
documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino
client is not seeking to use the courts, and his
on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused
address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor
to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of
is the present action pending against him as
Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and
service of the summons on him has not been
circumstances of the case, held:
effected. The objections on which the court
reserved decision are sustained. 39
A client's identity and the nature of that client's
fee arrangements may be privileged where the
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the lawyer
person invoking the privilege can show that a
involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether he
strong probability exists that disclosure of such
represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of
information would implicate that client in the
the court's request was to determine whether the unnamed persons
very criminal activity for which legal advice was
as interested parties were connected with the purchase of properties
sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While
involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question
in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of
to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to
California law, the rule also reflects federal law.
divulge the names of his clients the court held:
Appellants contend that the Baird exception
applies to this case.
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed
by the order appealed from, that he represented
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with
certain persons in the purchase or sale of these
the principal policy behind the attorney-client
mines, it has made progress in establishing by
privilege. "In order to promote freedom of
such evidence their version of the litigation. As
consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
already suggested, such testimony by the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the
witness would compel him to disclose not only
legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law
that he was attorney for certain people, but that,
must prohibit such disclosure except on the
as the result of communications made to him in
client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec.
the course of such employment as such
2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the
attorney, he knew that they were interested in
client's identity and the nature of his fee
certain transactions. We feel sure that under
arrangements are, in exceptional cases,
such conditions no case has ever gone to the
protected as confidential communications. 36
length of compelling an attorney, at the instance
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity retainer, but the nature of the transactions to
is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances which it related, when such information could be
of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New York made the basis of a suit against his client. 41
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could
not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
latter to civil litigation.
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's
taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided name is privileged.
with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought
action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and
second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned
the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be
out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on
taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in
preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the
case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S.
lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of
legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were
probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients
themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws
and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they
had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the
taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to
Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed
as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee
for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the
IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but
without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on
the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name
the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged
communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS
summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was
found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in
settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no
government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability
pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name is
privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal
services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes
him to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies.
The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely
within that exception to the general rule. Here
money was received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they had not paid
a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or
more years in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but one
purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers think
they were delinquent, so that it may check the
records for that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment indicates a
belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or
interest or penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of
guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it
is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well
be the link that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of
guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved
was employed — to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations
which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer
lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity
which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has
been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise
result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of
a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's
name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case
at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at
least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the
alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection
with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not
attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or
legal service sought was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no
less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
6
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners'
ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce
that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as
lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework
and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave
their professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to their
clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties
as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that
identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for
which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's
name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution
to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a case where a
client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking
advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing
illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have
previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney
about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege
because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The
second case falls within the exception because whether or not the
act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name
cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not
yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible
action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege
cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first
example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the
client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client
relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the
first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer
to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the
second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are
founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client
privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein
stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the
length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant,
to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to
which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a
suit against his client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in
the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject
thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in
consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other,
are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as
privileged communications."50 Where the communicated information,
which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible
criminal activity but there would be not much in the information
known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged
information which would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions,
then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter
itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy
behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom

of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This
exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What these cases
unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in
what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the
prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel
as a convenient and readily available source of information in the
building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the
client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the
case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance.
When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure
of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the
privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe
their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's
identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their
expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients,
the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly
gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled
testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients,
information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the
transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus
between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case
the it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this
sense, the name is as much "communication" as information
revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a
communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer
cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to
charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire
attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client
therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on the former. The
ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients
informed and protect their rights to make decisions have been
zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the
petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by
helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's
benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead
ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context
comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally
stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in
favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola,
Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of
lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was
fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought
payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found
that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his
client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations
were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during
the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what
was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of
lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to
Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but
the punctilioof an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for
cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in
the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the
relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their
clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in
the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The
Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents' position
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
7
without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled
by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But
what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what
other does one plunge so deep in the stream of
life — so share its passions its battles, its
despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor?
. . . But that is not all. What a subject is this in
which we are united — this abstraction called
the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see
reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all
men that have been. When I think on this
majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to
speak of the law as our mistress, we who are
here know that she is a mistress only to be won
with sustained and lonely passion — only to be
won by straining all the faculties by which man
is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the
identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty
owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly
fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is
not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client
confidential privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does
not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict
fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their
duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the
defendants therein, including herein petitioners and
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in
setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led
to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and
that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investment Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as
dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of
official position and authority, flagrant breach of public
trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of
their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents
substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG
would exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error,
respondents alleged that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his
admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also
because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and
circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which
includes . . . the identity of the principal."59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent
merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made
in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient
 8

to state that petitioners have likewise made the same
claim not merely out-of-court but also in the Answer to
plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by
counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance
of "legitimate lawyering."60 Being "similarly situated" in this
regard, public respondents must show that there exist
other conditions and circumstances which would warrant
their treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary
consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's
dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his
promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question.
However, respondents failed to show — and absolute
nothing exists in the records of the case at bar — that
private respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to
be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr.
Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material
as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting
the private respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the
undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that
private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only
three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of
which were mere requests for re-investigation and one
simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA
lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were
clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent
rendered legal services while all of them were partners at
ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted
disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions.61
demand not only touches upon the question of the identity
of their clients but also on documents related to the
suspected transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it,
this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners
of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this
stage of the proceedings is premature and that they
should wait until they are called to testify and examine as
witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they
can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery
of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position
clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to
testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of
their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of
their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should
never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer
the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their
inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-
client relationship and as a means of coercing them to
disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to
continue with respect to them when this Court could nip
the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to
sanction an unjust situation which we should not here
countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable
threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners'
heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the

While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate
case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without
to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which
him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that
violate the equal protection guarantee and the right
Mr. Roco was treated as species apart from the rest of the
against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client
ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which
confidentiality privilege.
made substantial distinctions based on real differences.
No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of
the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
clause. Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners
a wall of protection against uneven application of status
Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz,
and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
operates against uneven application of legal norms so
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in
that all persons under similar circumstances would be
SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the
accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who fall within a
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to
privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
SO ORDERED.
. . . What is required under this constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and A.C. No. 5280 March 30, 2004
the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent
decision: "Favoritism and undue preference WILLIAM S. UY, complainant,
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal vs.
protection and security shall be given to every ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.
person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within
a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding the rest.63 RESOLUTION

We find that the condition precedent required by the

respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as
parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also
constitutes a transgression by respondents AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against
similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their
the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11

Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent
lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances
surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs,
respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the
petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his (complainant’s)
office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from
him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent
left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition
would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing
the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent
filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for
"Falsification of Public Documents."1 The letter-complaint contained
facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title
that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was
supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of
legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of 132-A
Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors
and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G.
Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of
Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with
office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed
as follows:
That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by
purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for the
amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at
Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C.
GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by
the latter in favor of the former…; that in the said date,
William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-33122, covering the said land;
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register of
Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his
name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land
Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children,
namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy,
wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said
children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales,
Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are
minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as
farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within
the coverage of the Land Reform Program;
That the above-named accused, conspiring together and
helping one another procured the falsified documents
which they used as supporting papers so that they can
secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug,
Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land
Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-
named children. Some of these Falsified documents are
purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of
Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the
signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that
said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead… ;
That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and
evident intent to defraud undersigned, still accepted the
amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and
P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of
TCT No. 33122…knowing fully well that at that time the
said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the
same was already transferred in the name of his children;
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered
by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by the said check
which was encashed by him…;
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
9
That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing,
William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse to deliver to
him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and
repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice
of the undersigned.2
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his
oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the
secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against
him just because he refused to grant respondent’s request for
additional compensation. Respondent’s act tarnished his reputation
and social standing.3
In compliance with this Court’s Resolution dated July 31,
2000,4 respondent filed his Comment narrating his version, as
follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a
4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan,
Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired
by purchase from his (respondent’s) son, the late Fermin C.
Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00
and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the
execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he gave
complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas
to deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the
said period, he went to complainant’s office and demanded the
delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed of Redemption.
Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and
TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already
transferred the title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his
children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was
misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting
to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get
hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his
assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that
all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for
transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be
shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition
for the lost title ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999,
he went to complainant’s office informing him that the petition is
ready for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was
with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom where he waited for
almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left
without leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition.
Complainant’s conduct infuriated him which prompted him to give a
handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the
petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer
to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between
him and complainant was terminated when he gave the handwritten
letter to complainant; that there was no longer any professional
relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-
complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and
allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were
culled from public documents procured from the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.5
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.6
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to
appear on April 2, 2003 before the IBP. 7 On said date, complainant
did not appear despite due notice. There was no showing that
respondent received the notice for that day’s hearing and so the
hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.8
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter
from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that
his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint
he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against
Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.9
 10

On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by
report and recommendation, portions of which read as follows: reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
The facts and evidence presented show that when
respondent agreed to handle the filing of the Verified
Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had This is because:
confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the
circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
the Code of Professional Responsibility which expressly
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
provides that "A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
is terminated." Respondent cannot argue that there was
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
no lawyer-client relationship between them when he filed
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after,
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
respondent had already terminated complainant’s
person who called the attention of the court to the
perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
duty to maintain inviolate the client’s confidences and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect
good citizens may have in the proper administration of
perpetual for "it outlasts the lawyer’s employment" (Canon
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
to preserve the client’s confidences and secrets remains
charges.12
effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall
not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which
unless the client with the full knowledge of the
requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or
circumstances consents thereto."
procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.13 While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who claims to capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case officer of the court,14 complainant failed to prove any of the
and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment
letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this or suspension of herein respondent.
nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
Notwithstanding respondent’s own perception on the matter, a
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship between
same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover,
complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction
in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that
or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by
"any person may bring to this Court’s attention the
respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken
redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from
regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the
his (complainant’s) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid
complainant, if the facts proven so warrant."
complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its
title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain
Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to
Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus
that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the
MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with
profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.10 complainant assuming the expenses therefor.

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.11
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the
manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the
administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no
persuasive bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
….
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a
lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a
person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults
a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.
It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been
paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of
the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession.15
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot
apply to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the
complaint for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents"
filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by
respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant.
Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the
certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant.
Respondent’s immediate objective was to secure the title of the
property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly,
there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition
was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
Canon 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 – A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or
secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of
the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself,
his employees or associates or by judicial action.
The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his
affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against
complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional
capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his
deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for
estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved
alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in
any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the
filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any
lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal
or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104600 July 2, 1999
RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, petitioner,
vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether
or not petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees amounting to
Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Seven Hundred
Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P26,350,779.91) for
handling the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its
services were terminated in midstream and the client directly
compromised the case with the adverse party.
The Facts
In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts
attendant to the case. On August 28, 1987, Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law
firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue
shares against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm appeared
for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
11
the trial court issued a resolution granting ETPI's application for
preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During this period,
SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law
firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over
as counsel in the case for ETPI. The latter signed a retainer
agreement with counsel dated October 1, 1987. 1
Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial
court. First, the traffic revenue shares which ETPI sought to recover
from PLDT in accordance with the contract between them. Second,
ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against the PLDT's threats to
deny ETPI access to the Philippines international gateway switch.
Third, ETPI called this the "foreign correspondentships aspect"
where ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against PLDT's
incursions and inducements directed at ETPI's foreign
correspondents in Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to break their
correspondentship contracts with PLDT, using the threat of denying
them access to the international gateway as leverage.
In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions
for restraining order, one on October 30, 1987 and another on
November 4, 1987. As the applications were not acted upon, ETPI
brought the case up to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari.
On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by
E. M. Villanueva, President and Chief Executive Officer. In
substance, the letter stated that ETPI was terminating the retainer
contract dated October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.
On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a
notice of attorney's lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the
signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On the same date,
petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing
statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
negotiations towards a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at
an amicable settlement and that the same was entered as a
judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for the
enforcement of attorney's lien with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
and then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by
manifestation. 2 We noted the manifestation in a resolution dated
July 23, 1990.
On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that
it is not a party to nor in any manner involved in the attorney's lien
being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for and in behalf of the law
firm, 3 while ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.
The Lower Court's Ruling
The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the
motion for enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
finds that the Notice of Attorney's Lien filed by
the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and
Africa has no basis in fact and in law, and
therefore denies the Motion for Enforcement of
Attorney's Lien.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.(s/t)
ZEUS C, ABROGARJudge 4
On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of
appeal from the above-mentioned order to the Supreme Court. On
November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal
contending that the case could be brought to the Supreme Court
only via a petition for review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of
appeal. In an order dated January 16, 1991, the trial court dismissed
RADA's appeal.
The trial court said:

There is no more regular appeal from the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court.
Under the amendment of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and
judgments of the Regional Trial Court may be
elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition
for review on certiorari.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, premises considered, the order
dated September 14, 1990 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. The Notice of
Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati,
Metro Manila.(s/t) ZEUS C, ABROGAR
Judge 5
Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which we remanded to the
Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition in a decision
promulgated on November 14, 1991, 6 ruling that the judge
committed no abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:
We therefore rule that respondent judge
committed no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave one, in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien.
Assuming that respondent judge committed an
error in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien, it cannot be
corrected by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are
DENIED, and the petition is hereby
DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(s/t) REGINA G. ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZAssociate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
(s/t) JOSE A. R. MELO (s/t)
EMETERIO C, CUI
Associate Justice Associate
Justice 7
DISCUSSION
A. The Procedural Aspect
There is nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which are
liberally construed in order to promote their objectives and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. 8 In analogous case, 9 we ruled that
where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial
justice 10, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts
are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the
rules.
In A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said —
Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicality.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
12
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice and
thereby defeat their very claims. As has been
the constant ruling of this Court, every party
litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. 11
A basic legal principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the
expense of another. 12 This principle is one of the mainstays of every
legal system for centuries and which the Civil Code echoes:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him. 13
The Code Commission, its report, emphasized that:
It is most needful that this ancient principle be
clearly and specifically consecrated in the
proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not
foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly
benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The
German Civil Code has a similar provision (Art.
812). 14
With this in mind, one could easily understand why, despite technical
deficiencies, we resolved to give due course to this petition. More
importantly, the case on its face appears to be impressed with merit.
B. The Attorney's Fees
We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from
its inception until ETPI terminated the law firm's services in 1988.
Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees hinges on two grounds: first, the
fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was
working for SAGA; and second, the retainer agreement dated
October 1, 1987.
We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys' fees. We,
however, are not convinced with the petitioner's arguments that the
services RADA rendered merit the amount they are claiming.
First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the
complaint. When a client employs the services of a law firm, he does
not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally
handle the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event
that the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to
provide a replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated
the filing of the complaint considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is
more, on September 17, 1987, ETPI paid SAGA the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,00.00) 15 representing services
performed prior to September 17, 1987. SAGA assigned one of its
associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza, to handle the case for the firm.
Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally, he did so for
and in behalf of SAGA.
Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which
provides:
6.2 B.Court Cases:
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary
to effect collection or judicial action be taken by
adverse party, our attorney's fees shall be fifteen
percent (15%) of the amounts collected or the
value of the property acquired or liability
saved. 16
the firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon.

However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True,
Attorney Rilloraza played a vital role during the inception of the case
and in the course of the trial. We cannot also ignore the fact that an
attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent no
longer existed during its culmination by amicable agreement. To
award the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One
Hundred Twenty Five Million Six Hundred Seventy One Thousand
Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos
(P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by
PLDT to ETPI would be too unconscionable.1âwphi1.nêt
"In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall
fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their
professional services. "17 "A lawyer has the right to be paid for the
legal services he has extended to his client, which compensation
must be reasonable." 18 A lawyer would be entitled to receive what
he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be
determined on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a
basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence
of a contract but recoverable by him from his client. 19 Recovery of
attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when
(1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees
agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although
there is a formal contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are
found unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and (3) when
the contract for attorney's fee's is void due to purely formal defects of
execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able
to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and client
disregard the contract for attorney's
fees, 20
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a
lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be
considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in
controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered, and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors
would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where
private respondents can adduce evidence to establish the right to
lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the
same. 21 The trial court has the principal task of fixing the amount of
attorney's fees. 22 Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
C. Charging Lien
Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, it is entitled to a charging lien. The rule provides:
Sec. 37. Attorney's liens. — An attorney shall
have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come
into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to
the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after
the time when he shall have caused a statement
of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client
and to the adverse party; and he shall have the
same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce
his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements." (Emphasis supplied).
We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for
the payment of attorney's fees requires as a condition sine qua
non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his
client 23. A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a
favorable money judgment for his client. 24 From the facts of the case
it would seem that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that
occurred, nor did it ever obtain a favorable judgment for ETPI.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
13
ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the
services of petitioner and through the effort of ETPI's new lawyers,
the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los
Angeles. Whether there was bad faith in the substitution of the
lawyers to avoid compliance with the retainer agreement could only
be determined after a trial of the case on the merits.
This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon
petitioner any additional burden in collecting its attorney's fees. The
petitioner must avail itself of the proper remedy in order to forestall
the possibility of any injustice on or unjust enrichment of any of the
parties.
The Judgment (Fallo)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 24463 and
REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the determination of the
amount of attorney's fees to which petitioner is entitled.
No costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor
General, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioner submits for
the Court's adjudication the twin issues of whether or not the
Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as
counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases he had filed in
court and whether or not the PCGG acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as a result of such withdrawal of
appearance.
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the
petition as a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of common
and general interest to all Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they
pertain to the enforcement of a public duty and the prevention of
unlawful expenditure of public funds.
According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for
the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three (33) cases before this
Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1)
case in the National Labor Relations Commission and another case
in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one hundred forty-four (144)
cases. 1 In December 1990, the Solicitor General withdrew as
counsel in said cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."2 The pleading states:
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this Honorable
Court, hereby respectfully withdraws as counsel
for plaintiff Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in the above-captioned
case, with the reservation, however,
conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478,
the provisions of Executive Order No. 292 as
well as the decisional law of "Orbos v. Civil
Service Commission, et al.," (G.R. No. 92561,
September 12, 1990), to submit his
comment/observation on incidents/matters
pending with this Honorable Court, if called for
by circumstances in the interest of the
government or if he is so required by the court.

Makati, Metro Manila, December 3, 1990.
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
IBP O.R. No. 289417-2.06.90
The Solicitor General filed a substantially similar pleading
in the cases where the Republic is a party.
As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty
(40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom are trial lawyers. They
would receive a monthly compensation of at least P10,000.00 plus
appearance fee of P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or P500.00 if trial is
postponed. 3
Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of
appearance was made without any reason, it implied that it was
"within the absolute discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, mandatorily require the Solicitor General to
stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG in
court. Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no discretion to reject by
withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.
Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal in Sta. Rosa
Mining Co. v. Zabala, 4 the petitioner further states that: "Similarly, it
is the duty of the Solicitor General to appear for the Republic and the
PCGG, hence regardless of his personal convictions or opinions, he
must proceed to discharge his duty (not withdraw, which is
equivalent to refusal to prosecute), and let the court decide the
merits of the case." 5
Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General cannot withdraw
his appearance "with reservation" nor can he file his
"comment/observation on the incident/matters" after such withdrawal
because by ceasing to appear as counsel, he loses his standing in
court. Unless a case involves the constitutionality of a treaty, law,
ordinance or executive order for which Rule 3 Section 23 of the
Rules of Court 6 mandates his appearance, the Solicitor General is
not authorized to appear therein after his withdrawal as counsel
inasmuch as he himself is not a party-litigant.
Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138,7 the Solicitor General
may not unilaterally withdraw his appearance without the consent of
the Republic or the PCGG unless the court authorizes his
withdrawal. Since there was no such court authority, the Solicitor
General's withdrawal of appearance in said several cases is null and
void, as it constitutes an act against a mandatory law and hence, it
may be attacked collaterally. Neither may the Solicitor General
withdraw on the authority of Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission 8 wherein this Court held:
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor
General must see to it that the best interest of
the government is upheld within the limits set by
law. . .
xxx xxx xxx
There are cases where a government agency
declines the services of the Solicitor General or
otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers
of the case to him for appropriate action. . .
The Court finds and so holds that this practice
should be stopped. To repeat, the Solicitor
General is the lawyer of the government, any of
its agents and officials in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. The exception is
when such officials or agents are being charged
criminally or are being civilly sued for damages
arising from a felony. His services cannot be
lightly rejected, much less ignored by the officer
or officials concerned.
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General
should be welcomed by the parties. He should
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
14
be given full support and cooperation by any
agency or official involved in litigation. He
should be enabled to faithfully discharge his
duties and responsibilities as the government
advocate. And he should do no less for his
clients. His burden of assisting in the fair and
just administration of justice is clear.
This Court does not expect the Solicitor General
to waver in the performance of his duty. As a
matter of fact, the Court appreciates the
participation of the Solicitor General in many
proceedings and his continued fealty to his
assigned task. He should not therefore desist
from appearing before this Court even in those
cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
government or any of its agents he is expected
to represent. The Court must be advised of his
position just as well. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner adds the following observations: 9
Therefore, this case militates more against the
Solicitor General than in his favor. For if the
government and its officials cannot reject the
services of the Solicitor General, neither may
the latter select the case he would represent by
withdrawing in some and retaining others. For
unlike private lawyers who are bound to their
clients by contract and, therefore, can reject
cases offered to them, the Solicitor General and
PCGG are wedded to each other by statute for
better and for worse. And only a divorce,
through the abolition of PCGG or resignation of
the Solicitor General, can untie the marital knot.
Otherwise, the relationship should continue
sans PCGG demurring, and the Solicitor
General withdrawing. Absent such resignation or
abolition, the Solicitor General has to prosecute
or defend the said cases to the best of his
ability.
Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the Solicitor
General. Nowhere in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14 does it
appear that the PCGG is authorized to hire said lawyers. Since the
Solicitor General is named by law as the lawyer for all government
agencies, the hiring of private lawyers by such agencies is impliedly
excluded. Thus, by employing private lawyers, the PCGG is creating
a public office and naming a public officer. However, in the absence
of a law providing for the creation of the office of PCGG counsel,
said hired lawyers are usurpers or intruders whose acts may be
challenged in a collateral proceeding such as an action for
prohibition.
Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the
Commission on Audit considering that any payment for the services
of the PCGG-hired lawyers would result in an unlawful expenditure
of public funds. Stressing the need to preserve the status quo until
the determination of his rights as a citizen and taxpayer, petitioner
prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order.
Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the respondent to
file their respective comments on the petition without granting the
prayer for a temporary restraining order. 10
In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it has
not allowed the disbursement of funds to pay for the services of
PCGG-hired private lawyers. It points out the fact that under COA
Circular No. 89-299 dated March 21, 1989, the COA has withdrawn
the pre-audit of transactions entered into by national government
agencies pursuant to the constitutional provision that the COA has
the exclusive authority to "define the scope of its audit and
examination, to establish the techniques and methods required
therefor." 11 Neither has the COA allowed in post-audit the
disbursements of funds in payment of the services of the hired
private lawyers. Moreover, under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated
April 2, 1986, the hiring of private lawyers by government agencies
and instrumentalities is prohibited unless there is prior written

conformity of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written concurrence of
COA.
For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren
and lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay, asserts in its comment that the scope
of its authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 is broad
enough to include the authority to engage the services of private
lawyers, if necessary, for the fulfillment of its mandate. While such
authority is not expressly stated in said executive orders, "it must be
deemed necessarily implied in and subsumed under the expressly
enumerated powers of the Commission." 12
The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all cases investigated by it"
includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in determining
the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases including the matter
of who, in particular, will control and supervise the prosecution of
said cases." The phrase "with the assistance of the Office of the
Solicitor General and other government agencies" simply means that
the Solicitor General is called upon to render assistance to the
PCGG and whether or not such discretion is required by the
Commission is a matter of discretion on its part. Such provision does
not preclude the PCGG from engaging the services of private
lawyers in the same way that it is "clearly authorized to hire
accountants, appraisers, researchers and other professionals as it
performs its functions." Since, upon the dictates of legal and
practical necessity, it has hired lawyers in the United States and in
Switzerland, "it may similarly hire Filipino lawyers in prosecuting its
Philippine cases." 13
The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private lawyers is "not
an ultra vires" act but a "means by which (it) can effectively exercise
its powers." It emphasizes the fact that it hired private lawyers "only
after the Officer of the Solicitor General had unilaterally withdrawn its
appearance" for the PCGG in the various pending PCGG-instituted
cases. Its own Litigation Division, which was constituted after the
Solicitor General's withdrawal, is "sorely undermanned" but it has to
contend with "affluent and influential individuals and entities" who
can "afford to hire skilled lawyers and organize vast litigation
networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance of the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel but only the former sent two additional prosecutors to
handle its cases. 14
The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed not only by the
executive orders aforementioned but also by the inherent police
power of the State. By hiring private lawyers, it was merely trying to
assist the President of the Philippines in protecting the interest of the
State. As such, it was acting as an alter ego of the President and
therefore, it was the Executive which determined the necessity of
engaging the services of private prosecutors. Contending that
"overwhelming necessity" impelled it to hire private lawyers, the
PCGG avers that inasmuch as the Central Bank of the Philippines or
the Philippine National Bank may engage the services of private
lawyers, with more reason may it be allowed to hire private
prosecutors after it was abandoned by the Solicitor General in the
prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth cases. Consequently, "the
Solicitor General's withdrawal of assistance is tantamount to his tacit
approval of the PCGG's hiring of private prosecutors in replacement
of the solicitors handling the said civil cases." 15
The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the compensation
for its hired lawyers can hardly be questioned considering the
expertise of said lawyers and the complexity of the cases they would
be handling for the PCGG. Thus, the prayer for a preliminary
injunction must be denied otherwise "the harm that would be done
would be far greater than the perceived mischief petitioner seeks to
prevent." 16
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself from appearing
in this case "considering that as far as the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG for brevity) is concerned, the subject is a closed
matter among the OSG, the PCGG and the Courts." 17 In the
comment filed by Assistant Solicitor General Edgardo L. Kilayko and
Solicitor Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG sets out at length the
history of the PCGG from its creation until the filing in the
Sandiganbayan of thirty-nine (39) " prima facie cases" for ill-gotten
wealth against former President Marcos and his cronies. As suits
and countersuits stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39) civil
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
15
cases, "the OSG had been put to a tremendous task and thus
invariably in urgent need of being consulted or informed by the
PCGG of the facts and circumstances material to the prosecution
and progress not only of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all
kinds of "incidents."
Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge and the odds if
only to live up to their task as "the best lawyers there are in the
country." The OSG further explains: 18
On many a time, however a time, however, the
lack of the above-mentioned consultation or
information resulted in situations that rendered
the OSG unavoidably incapable of performing
its functions and duties as Lawyer of the
Government, not only as mandated upon it by
law and as spelled out in Orbos v. CSC, G.R.
No. 92561, September 12, 1990, but also in
consonance with its office motto: "Integrity In
Advocacy."
Once the OSG argued before the
Sandiganbayan that an asset was under
sequestration, only to be informed by the
adverse party waving a document before the
Sandiganbayan Justices that the sequestration
had earlier been lifted, with a PCGG resolution,
the document, to boot (Razon case). Then,
again, OSG argued, even before this Honorable
Court, that an ill-gotten asset had "mysteriously"
disappeared, only to be informed by the
Honorable Court, that a PCGG Commissioner
had earlier by resolution authorized the
disposition of the asset (COCOFED case). All
the instances need not be enumerated here, as
they are not meat and substance, even as OSG
is rendered thereby a laughing stock in its
professionalism.
As to matters that are of great pith and moment,
suffice it to say that the recent Benedicto
"compromise" agreement, not to mention the
SMC-UCPB Compromise settlement, is sub
judice or under advisement not only of the
Sandiganbayan but also of this Honorable Court
in separate "incidents," and suffice it to state
that the relationship, obtaining between the
Government offices/agencies and the Office of
the Solicitor General as counsel, is not at all like
one that simply would obtain between private
client and private lawyer in private practice,
although constant consultation and advice
are sine qua non in both types of relationship.
The relationship is rather one, created as it is by
law, where imposed upon OSG is the
responsibility to present to the courts the
position that will uphold the best interests of the
People, the Government and the
State, albeit the same may run counter to its
client's position or route of action. At any rate,
the PCGG through nationwide TV broadcast
and print media, publicly announced that PCGG
had disposed with or otherwise did not need the
legal services of the Lawyer of the Government,
and thus OSG descended, not the unmerited
remark of having "abandoned" the ill-gotten
wealth cases, but the time-honored principle
of impossibilium nulla obligatio est, i.e., there is
no obligation to do impossible things (Lim Co
Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in any
way casting any aspersion on the moral integrity
of any Commissioner or PCGG official, as made
clear by the Solicitor General to the President in
a meeting with PCGG.
Hence, in the light of all the foregoing
circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so as
not to prejudice "the interest of the Government"
(Orbos), the Solicitor General withdrew as
counsel for PCGG in all said cases by filing a
 16

notice of "Withdrawal of Appearance with legal limbo simply because it has been "mooted" would be a clear
Reservation." case of misguided judicial self-restraint. This Court has assiduously
taken every opportunity to lay down brick by brick the doctrinal
infrastructure of our legal system. Certainly, this is no time for a
In arguing that the instant petition should be dismissed, the OSG
display of judicial timorousness of the kind which the Solicitor
contends that this case has become moot and academic as this very
General is untimely exhibiting now.
Court had resolved to allow the withdrawal of appearance of the
Solicitor General in all the cases pending before it "with reservation,
conformably with PD No. 478, Executive Order No. 292, as well as Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their far-reaching
the doctrine laid down in 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et implications, not alone on the instant case but on future ones as
al.,' G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, . . ." 19 For its part, the well, which the OSG will surely be called upon to handle again and
Sandiganbayan had also resolved that "the appearance of the again.
Solicitor General is deemed withdrawn to be substituted by the
PCGG's legal panel." 20
The resolution of the first issue laid down at the beginning of
this ponencia hinges on whether or not the Solicitor General may be
The OSG maintains further that the instant petition does not present compelled by mandamus to appear for the Republic and the PCGG.
a case and controversy as the petitioner himself does not even have This issue is best resolved by a close scrutiny of the nature and
a "court standing" and a "litigable interest." All the petitioner seeks is extent of the power and authority lodged by law on the Solicitor
an "advisory opinion." The OSG asserts that the "incident" (referring General.
to the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance) should be
distinguished from that in JPC Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of the Office of
et al., 21 wherein the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) decided to
the Solicitor General is in order. Incorporated in Act No. 136 dated
appear for itself because the law names the Minister of Justice only
June 11,
as its ex oficio legal adviser while by itself it can file suits and
1901 28 providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine
institute proceedings and engage external expertise in the fulfillment
Islands was Chapter III entitled "The Attorney General." Section 40
of its tasks. However, since the APT has no personality of its own, it
states:
should have appeared through the Solicitor General. The OSG
argues that said "adversarial incident" is not present in this case.
There shall be an Attorney-General for the
Philippine Islands, to be appointed by the
In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the OSG, the
Philippine Commission . . .
petitioner insists that although as between the Solicitor General and
the PCGG, this case may have been rendered moot and academic,
as between him on the one hand and the Solicitor General and the The catalog of his duties includes the following:
PCGG on the other hand, a "real controversy" still exists and the
issues raised herein have not ceased to exist either. Moreover, a
He shall prosecute or defend therein all causes,
judgment of prohibition and mandamus would have a "practical legal
civil and criminal, to which the Government of
effect and can be enforced." 22
the Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof, in
his official capacity, is a party . . . 29
Citing Miguel v. Zulueta, 23 and Tañada v. Tuvera, 24 petitioner
asserts that he has a standing in court because where a question of
Section 41 further provides:
public right is involved and the object of the mandamus is the
enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show any legal or
special interest in the result of the proceeding. It is sufficient that, as There shall be an officer learned in the law to
a citizen, he is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in assist the Attorney-General in the performance
question enforced. of all his duties, called the Solicitor-General who
shall be appointed by the Commission . . . In
case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney-
The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its power to hire
General, or of his absence or disability, the
private lawyers may be implied from its expressly enumerated
Solicitor-General shall have power to exercise
powers. He asserts that since P.D. No. 478 mandates that "the
the duties of that office. Under the supervision of
Solicitor General as law office of the government with the duty to
the Attorney-General, it shall be the especial
appear for the PCGG," no implication from the express powers of
duty of the Solicitor-General to conduct and
(the) PCGG can stand against the language of P.D. No. 478. On the
argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court,
other hand, the law regarding the PCGG and that regarding the
in which the Philippine Government is
Solicitor General should be harmonized. 25
interested, and the Attorney-General may,
whenever he deems it for the interest of the
The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases for resolving Philippine Government, either in person conduct
this petition and, on account of the importance and imperativeness and argue any case in any court of the
of the issues raised herein, the filing of memoranda by the parties is Philippine Islands in which the Philippine
dispensed with. Government is interested or may direct the
Solicitor General to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue interposed by the
OSG — whether or not this case has been rendered moot and Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the Office of the
academic by this Court's resolution granting the Solicitor General's Attorney-General and providing for the appointment of the said
motion to withdraw appearance as counsel in the several cases official and the Solicitor General by the Civil Governor and for an
pending herein. It should be clarified that the resolution had to be increase in their salaries. Their duties remained basically the
issued with the national interest in mind. Time was of the essence same. 30
and any hedging on the part of the PCGG and/or its counsel could,
not merely set back but prejudice, the government's all-out efforts to
In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on September 5, 1901
recover ill-gotten wealth.
providing for the organization of, among others, the Department of
Finance and Justice which embraced within its executive control the
Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the issues raised in a Bureau of Justice. 31
case, this Court has never shirked from its symbolic function of
educating bench and bar by formulating guiding and controlling
Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
principles, precepts, doctrines and rules. 26 More so, if the case is of
1917, the Bureau of Justice is specifically constituted "the law office
such magnitude that certain legal ambiguities must be unravelled for
of the Government of the Philippine Islands and by it shall be
the protection of the national interest. 27
performed duties requiring the services of a law officer." 32 Its chief
officials are the Attorney-General and his assistant, the Solicitor
To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG may withdraw General. 33
its appearance in a cluster of cases of national import to pass into

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


As principal law officer of the Government, the
Attorney-General shall have authority to act for
and represent the Government of the Philippine
Islands, its officers, and agents in any official
investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. 34
In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was phased out and his
functions were assumed by the Secretary of
Justice. 35 Subsequently, the Bureau of Justice came to be known as
the Office of the Solicitor General, 36 headed by the Solicitor
General. 37
Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after the Office of
Attorney-General, created by the First U.S. Congress in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 which called for a "meet person, learned in the law, to
act as Attorney-General for the U.S." 38 When the Department of
Justice was established in 1870, the position of Solicitor-General
was created as an assistant to the Attorney-General. 39 Over a
century later, their respective positions and functions remain the
same. The Attorney-General of the United States, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is now the
head of the Department of Justice. 40 In the same manner, a Solicitor
General, learned in the law, is appointed to assist the Attorney-
General in the performance of his duties. 41
In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines, emerging from
the shadow of the Attorney-General and later, of the Secretary of
Justice, has come to his own. On July 20, 1948, Republic Act. No.
335, amending Section 1659 of the Administrative Code, bestowed
on him the rank of Undersecretary of a Department. Subsequently, a
series of amendatory laws designed to enlarge the complement of
the Office of the Solicitor General was enacted 42 until on June 4,
1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, its pivotal role in the
government became clearly defined and delineated.
During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. Marcos leaned
heavily on his Solicitor General to provide legal underpinnings of his
official acts. Reflective of the tremendously enhanced power of the
official and the position was Executive Order No. 454 enacted on
September 23, 1975, conferring upon the Solicitor General the rank
of a member of the Cabinet "with all the rights, honors and privileges
pertaining to the position." Said executive order was superseded by
Executive Order No. 473 dated August 12, 1976 "making the
Solicitor General a member of the Cabinet." These executive orders
were capped by Executive Order No. 552 dated August 14, 1979
elevating the OSG into a Ministry with the same powers and
functions defined in P.D. Nos. 478 and 1347.
P.D. 478 became, as it were, the Magna Carta of the Office of the
Solicitor General. After the change of administration, or on July 25,
1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 292 instituting the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Book IV,
Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General is
described as an "independent and autonomous office attached to the
Department of Justice." Headed by the Solicitor General, "who is the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government," the
Office shall have a Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15) Assistant
Solicitors General and such number of Solicitors and Trial Attorneys
"as may be necessary to operate the Office which shall divided into
fifteen (15) divisions. 43 Among its powers and functions are the
following which are relevant to the issues:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. — The office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled
corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the
law office of the Government, and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied.) It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all
other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
17
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
a party.
(2) Investigate, initiate court action, or in any manner proceed
against any person, corporation or firm for the enforcement of any
contract, bond, guarantee, mortgage, pledge or other collateral
executed in favor of the Government. Where proceedings are to be
conducted outside of the Philippines, the Solicitor General may
employ counsel to assist in the discharge of the aforementioned
responsibilities.x x x xxx xxx
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices,
brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over
such legal Officers with respect to such cases.
(9) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality
of the Government for such service, assistance and cooperation as
may be necessary in fulfilling its function and responsibilities and for
this purpose enlist the services of any government official or
employees in the pursuit of his tasks.
Departments, bureaus, agencies, offices, instrumentalities and
corporations to whom the Office of the Solicitor General renders
legal services are authorized to disburse funds from their sundry
operating and other funds for the latter Office. For this purpose, the
Solicitor General and his staff are specifically authorized to receive
allowances as may be provided by the Government offices,
instrumentalities and corporations concerned, in addition to their
regular compensation.
(10) Represent, upon the instructions of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines in international litigations, negotiations or
conferences where the legal position of the Republic must be
defended or presented.
(11) Act for the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal,
body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his
opinion , affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require; and
44
(12) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to
gain a clear understanding of the nature of the functions and extent
of the powers of the Solicitor General himself, it is evident that a
policy decision was made in the early beginnings to consolidate in
one official the discharge of legal functions and services in the
government. These took the form mostly of representing the
Government in various legal proceedings.
The rationale behind this step is not difficult to comprehend. Sound
government operations require consistency in legal policies and
practices among the instrumentalities of the State. Moreover, an
official learned in the law and skilled in advocacy could best plan and
coordinate the strategies and moves of the legal battles of the
different arms of the government. Surely, the economy factor, too,
must have weighed heavily in arriving at such a decision.
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated
official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate
to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the
laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be
gathered from the term "shall," which is invariably employed, from
Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive Order No. 292
(1987).
Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law
students, the term "shall" is nothing if not mandatory.
In common or ordinary parlance and in its
ordinary significance, the term "shall" is a word
of command, and one which has always and
which must be given a compulsory meaning,
and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It
has the invariable significance of operating to

impose a duty which may be enforced,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this
meaning or when public interest is involved, or
where the public or persons have rights which
ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a
contrary intent appears. 45
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a
statute is used in an imperative, and not in a
directory, sense. If a different interpretations if
sought, it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context
which will justify a different meaning. 46
Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the OSG
"to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigations or matter requiring the services of the
lawyer?"
To "represent" is standing in place, supplying
the place, or performing the duties or exercising
the rights, of the party represented; to speak or
act with authority on behalf of another; to
conduct and control proceedings in court on
behalf of another.47
The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with respect to the duties
of Attorney-General well applies to the Solicitor General under the
facts of the present case. The Court then declared:
In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Attorney
General "to perform the duties imposed upon
him by law" and "he shall prosecute all causes,
civil and criminal, to which the Government of
the Philippines Islands, or any officer thereof, in
his official capacity, is a party . . ." 48
Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is "invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public." 49 Another role of the Solicitor
General is an officer of the Court, in which case he is called upon "to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same
manner that a special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court
from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert or
impede and degrade the administration of justice." 50
In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial court that he
would not prosecute the case in court for insufficiency of evidence
after his motion to dismiss had been denied, this Court granted a
petition for mandamus to compel him to prosecute the case. We
declared:
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or
opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of
presenting evidence to the Court to enable the
court to arrive at its own independent judgment
as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal
should not shirk from his responsibility much
less leave the prosecution of the case at the
hands of a private prosecutor . . . In the trial of
criminal cases, it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the government since
an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of
the State . . . This is so because "the
prosecuting officer is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy but of a
sovereignty where obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligations to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 51
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
18
Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well to the Solicitor
General who is sought to be compelled to appear before the different
courts to ensure that the case of the Republic of the Philippines
against those who illegally amassed wealth at the expense the
people maybe made to account for their misdeeds and return said
wealth.
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute
discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to
abandon a prosecution already started, 52 our own Solicitor General
may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suit either
with or without stipulations with other party. 53 Abandonment of a
case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just
drop it without any legal and valid reason for the discretion given him
is not unlimited. 54 Its exercise must be, not only within the
parameters set by law but with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal. Such are reflected in its policies, thus:
The discretionary power of the attorney for the
United States in determining whether a
prosecution shall be commenced or maintained
may well depend upon matters of policy wholly
apart from any question of probable cause.
Although as member of the bar, the Attorney for
the United States is an officer of the court, he is
nevertheless an executive official of the
Government, and it is as an officer of the
executive department that he exercises a
discretion as to whether or not there shall be a
prosecution in a particular case. . . . 55
The first executive order ever issued by President Aquino on
February 28, 1986, created the PCGG. It announced the
government's policy of recovering all ill-gotten wealth amassed by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close
associates. It charged the PCGG with the "task of assisting the
President" in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth,
investigation of "such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign" to it, and the adoption of safeguards to ensure that
corruption may not be again committed with impunity.
This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2 dated March
12, 1986 freezing all assets and properties of Marcos, his family and
cronies; prohibiting their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance or
concealment, and requiring all persons in and outside of the
Philippines who are in possession of said properties to make full
disclosure of the same to the PCGG.
On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules and
Regulations. A pertinent provision states:
Sec. 10. Findings of the Commission. — Based
on the evidence adduced, the Commission shall
determine whether there is reasonable ground
to believe that the asset, property or business
enterprise in question constitute ill-gotten wealth
as described in Executive Orders Nos. 1 and
2. In the event of an affirmative finding, the
Commission shall certify the case to the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance with law. Business, properties,
funds, and other assets found to be lawfully
acquired shall be immediately released and the
writ of sequestration, hold or freeze orders lifted
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No. 14 defining the
jurisdiction over cases involving such ill-gotten wealth was issued, it
contains the following provisions:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, with the assistance of
the Solicitor General and other government
agencies, is hereby empowered to file and
prosecute all cases investigated by it under
Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28,
1986, and Executive Order No. 2, dated March
12, 1986, as may be warranted by its finding.

Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof.
Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of
damages, or indemnification for consequential
damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for
under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing
laws, in connection with Executive Order No. 2
dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately
from and proceed independently of any criminal
proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied).
All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but
that under the law of its creation and the complementary Rules, the
law office of the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the Government, is the
Office of the Solicitor General. Although the PCGG is "empowered to
file and prosecute all cases investigated by it" under Executive
Orders No. 1 and 2, it does not thereby oust the Office of the
Solicitor General from its lawful mandate to represent the
Government and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Moreover,
such express grant of power to PCGG does not imply that it may
abdicate such power and turn over the prosecution of the cases to
private lawyers whom it may decide to employ. In those instances
where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the Philippines,
the Solicitor General, continuing to discharge his duties, may employ
counsel to assist him, 56 particularly because he may not be licensed
to appear before the courts in a foreign jurisdiction.
Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the provision
aforequoted, the PCGG certifies to the Solicitor General the cases
for which it had found reasonable ground to believe that certain
assets and properties are ill-gotten under Executive Order Nos. 1
and 2. The Solicitor General shall then proceed "in accordance with
law."
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General
exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may
start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in
court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything
within his legal authority but always conformably with the national
interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.
After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the event
that, along the way, he realizes that prosecuting the case would not
serve the government's purposes. In other words, because he was
appointed to the position on account of his qualification as a man
"learned in the law," the Solicitor General is obligated to perform his
functions and to perform them well. He may not, however, abdicate
his function through an arbitrary exercise of his discretion. We find
that a withdrawal of appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is
tantamount to withdrawing on no grounds at all and to a dereliction
of duty.
The Office of the Solicitor General repeatedly invoked the ruling
in Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 57 which hardly constitutes
authority to uphold its position with respect to the withdrawal of the
Solicitor General in the instant case. On the contrary, in said case,
this Court struck down private respondent's motion to disqualify the
OSG from appearing for petitioner Department of Transportation and
Communications Secretary Orbos. At the risk of being repetitious,
the parties were reminded that under Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 478 —
The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation
where one government office takes an adverse position against
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
19
another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General
should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the
government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he
considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a client's position. In such an
instance, the government office adversely affected by the position
taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its
case may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or
representative."
The Court further pointed out that it is not entirely impossible that the
Office of the Solicitor General may take a position adverse to his
clients like the Civil Service Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission, among others, and even the People of the
Philippines. In such instances, however, it is not proper for the
Solicitor General to simply decline to handle the case or arbitrarily
withdraw therefrom. The Court enjoins him to "nevertheless manifest
his opinion and recommendations to the Court which is an invaluable
aid in the disposition of the case." 58
However, in those cases where a government agency declines the
services of the Solicitor General or otherwise fails or refuses to
forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate action, the
Court categorically held that ". . . this practice should be
estopped." 59 By the same token, the Solicitor General should not
decline to appear in court to represent a government agency without
just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which is under the Office
of the President, he being a part of the Executive Department.
In the case at bar, the reason advanced by the Solicitor General for
his motion to withdraw his appearance as lawyer for the PCGG is
that he has been, more than once embarrassed in court and thereby
made "a laughing stock in its (his) professionalism." Examples are
when the OSG lawyers betrayed ignorance in open court of certain
moves taken by the PCGG, such as the lifting of a sequestration of
an asset or when it was under the impression that an asset had
mysteriously disappeared only to be informed that "a PCGG
Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the disposition of
said asset."
The last straw, as it were, was the public announcement through
media made by the PCGG that it had "dispensed with or otherwise
did not need the legal services of the lawyer of the government." 60 It
is evident that the withdrawal of the Solicitor General was
precipitated by institutional pique, the lawyers concerned having
allowed their collective pride to prevail over their sense of duty in
protecting and upholding the public interest.
One wistfully wishes that the OSG could have been as zealous in
representing the PCGG as it was in appearing for the head of their
office, the Solicitor General, in a civil suit for damages filed against
him in a Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly defamatory
remarks uttered by him.
Such enthusiasm, according to this Court, was misplaced. For
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 which authorizes the OSG
to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, admits
of an exception, and that it is, it stops short of representing "a public
official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages
arising from a felony."61
In instances such as the above, the OSG can, with reason, withdraw
its representation even if it has already entered its appearance. But
the Solicitor General, as the officially-mandated lawyer of the
government, is not empowered to take a similar step on the basis of
a petty reason like embarrassment, as that to which the individual
lawyers assigned to appear for their office were subjected. Had they
not been too preoccupied with their personal feelings, they could
have checked themselves in time. For a sense of professional
responsibility and proper decorum would dictate that they distinguish
between the institution which, from the very beginning, had been
constituted as the law office of the Government and
the individuals through whom its powers and duties are exercised.
No emotions, of whatever kind and degree, should be allowed to
becloud their high sense of duty and commitment to country and
people.
 20

The OSG itself admitted refraining from citing other incidents as agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
additional bases for the Solicitor General's withdrawal "as they are litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
not of meat and substance" but apparently, their overwhelming a lawyer."
sense of shame overcame them as the OSG was "rendered thereby
a laughing stock in its professionalism." 62
Sound management policies require that the government's approach
to legal problems and policies formulated on legal issues be
Now a word on the incidents that allegedly caused humiliation to the harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The government
OSG lawyers, thus provoking the Solicitor General into withdrawing owes it to its officials and their respective offices, the political units at
his appearance as counsel for the PCGG. No litigation can be different levels, the public and the various sectors, local and
assured of success if counsel does not enjoy the confidence of his international, that have dealings with it, to assure them of a degree
client. This is manifested by, among other things, holding regular, of certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
constant and untrammeled consultation with each other. Who can
say but that if the communication lines had been kept open between
From the historical and statutory perspectives detailed earlier in
the OSG and PCGG, no surprises would have been sprung on the
this ponencia, it is beyond cavil that it is the Solicitor General who
former by the latter in open court?
has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of being the
"principal law officer and legal defender of the Government." One
Petitioner's claim that the Solicitor General could not withdraw his would be hard put to name a single legal group or law firm that can
appearance as lawyer of PCGG inasmuch as he had neither the match the expertise, experience, resources, staff and prestige of the
consent of his client nor the authority from the court, applying the OSG which were painstakingly built up for almost a century.
pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, is not well-taken. Here is no
ordinary lawyer-client relationship. Let it be remembered that the
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal
client is no less than the Republic of the Philippines in whom the
interests of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may
plenum of sovereignty resides. Whether regarded as an abstract
be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a particular
entity or an ideal person, it is to state the obvious that it can only act
client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal.
through the instrumentality of the government which, according to
Given such objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the
the Administrative Code of 1987, refers to the "corporate
panoply that is the forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely
governmental entity through which the functions of government are
will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests
exercised throughout the Philippines . . ." 63 And the OSG is, by law,
of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the
constituted the law office of the Government whose specific powers
sovereign which it is committed to serve.
and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the
people before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require. In light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of his
appearance on behalf of the PCGG was beyond the scope of his
authority in the management of a case. As a public official, it is his
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity
sworn duty to provide legal services to the Government, particularly
that constitutes the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the
to represent it in litigations. And such duty may be enjoined upon him
distinguished client of the OSG is the people themselves of which
by the writ of mandamus. And such duty may be enjoined upon him
the individual lawyers in said office are a part.
by the writ of mandamus. Such order, however, should not be
construed to mean that his discretion in the handling of his cases
In order to cushion the impact of his untimely withdrawal of may be interfered with. The Court is not compelling him to act in a
appearance which might adversely affect the case, the Solicitor particular way. 64 Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent a
General has offered "to submit his comment/observation on failure of justice 65resulting from his abandonment in midstream of
incidents/matters pending with this Honorable Court, if called for by the cause of the PCGG and the Republic and ultimately, of the
circumstances in the interest of the government or if he is so Filipino people.
required by the court." However, as correctly pointed out by the
petitioner, while the Solicitor General may be free to express his
In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that the
views and comments before the Court in connection with a case he
petitioner has a personal interest in the case, as his petition is
is handling, he may not do so anymore after he has formally
anchored on the right of the people, through the PCGG and the
expressed his refusal to appear therein. For by then, he has lost his
Republic, to be represented in court by the public officer duly
standing in court. Unless his views are sought by the court, the
authorized by law. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied
Solicitor General may not voluntarily appear in behalf of his client
by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and hence, part of the
after his withdrawal from the case; otherwise, such reappearance
public which possesses the right. 66
would constitute a blatant disregard for court rules and procedure,
and that, on the part of one who is presumed to be "learned in the
law." The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and
granted in this petition. The said writ, being intended to prevent the
doing of some act that is about to be done, it may not provide a
In the face of such express refusal on the part of the Solicitor
remedy for acts which are already fait accompli. 67 Having been
General to continue his appearance as counsel of the PCGG in the
placed in a situation where it was constrained to hire private lawyers
cases to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Filipino people from the
if the Republic's campaign to legally recover the wealth amassed by
Marcoses and their cronies, the PCGG has had to employ the
the Marcoses, their friends and relatives was to prosper, the PCGG's
service of a group of private attorneys lest the national interest be
action is justified. However, it was not entirely blameless. Its failure
prejudiced. Were this Court to allow such action to remain
to coordinate closely with the Solicitor General has spawned the
unchallenged, this could well signal the laying down of the novel and
incidents which culminated in the withdrawal of the latter from
unprecedented doctrine that the representation by the Solicitor
appearing as counsel in its cases.
General of the Government enunciated by law is, after all, not
mandatory but merely directory. Worse, that this option may be
exercised on less than meritorious grounds; not on substance but on WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby
whimsy, depending on the all too human frailties of the lawyers in the GRANTED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED to immediately re-
OSG assigned to a particular case. Under such circumstances, it enter his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion to
were better to repeal the law than leave the various government withdraw appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the services of
agencies, all dependent on the OSG for legal representation, in a the lawyers it had employed but not before paying them the
condition of suspenseful uncertainty. With every looming legal battle, reasonable fees due them in accordance with rules and regulations
they will be speculating whether they can rely on the Solicitor of the Commission on Audit.
General to defend the Government's interest or whether they shall
have to depend on their own "in-house" resources for legal
This decision is immediately executory.
assistance.

SO ORDERED.
The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the spirit and the
letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec.
35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon Hilado v. David, supra.
the OSG to "represent the Government of the Philippines, its
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11

G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915
UY CHICO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Beaumont and Tenney for appellant.
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellees.
TRENT, J.:
An appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint upon the
merits, with costs.
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies
upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the
father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a
business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his
brother took over the business and continued it under the same
name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff
purchased his brother's interest in the business and continued to
carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire
"Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the
creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of
these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of
insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with
the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This
money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The
plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and
goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased
father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected
by the administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff
had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies, and for that
purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had
surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding
that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked,
while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's
testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he
replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that
purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the
waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony
of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this
appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the
client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon,
and cite in support thereof Ross vs. Great Northern Ry. Co., (101
Minn., 122; 111 N. W., 951). The case of Natlee Draft Horse Co. vs.
Cripe and Co. (142 Ky., 810), also appears to sustain their
contention. But a preliminary question suggest itself, Was the
testimony in question privileged?
Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate
the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be
permitted in any court, without the consent of his client, given in
open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in
professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice
upon legal matters." (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)
A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act.
It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings
of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of
the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between
attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for
the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of
the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a
communication made by a client to his attorney for the express
purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially
inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has
faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication
to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon
it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his
client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party
for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the
client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the
role of intermediary or agent. We quote from but one case among
the many which may be found upon the point:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
21
The proposition advanced by the respondent and adopted
by the trial court, that one, after fully authorizing his
attorney, as his agent, to enter into contract with a third
party, and after such authority has been executed and
relied on, may effectively nullify his own and his duly
authorized agent's act by closing the attorney's mouth as
to the giving of such authority, is most startling. A perilous
facility of fraud and wrong, both upon the attorney and the
third party, would result. The attorney who, on his client's
authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his reputation
and integrity that he binds his client. The third party may
well rely on the assurance of a reputable lawyer that he
has authority in fact, though such assurance be given only
by implication from the doing of the act itself. It is with
gratification, therefore, that we find overwhelming weight
of authority, against the position assumed by the court
below, both in states where the privilege protecting
communications with attorneys is still regulated by the
common law and in those where it is controlled by statute,
as in Wisconsin. (Koeber vs. Sommers, 108 Wis., 497; 52
L. R. A., 512.)
Other cases wherein the objection to such evidence on the ground of
privilege has been overruled are: Henderson vs. Terry (62 Tex., 281);
Shove vs. Martin (85 Minn., 29); In re Elliott (73 Kan., 151); Collins
vs. Hoffman (62 Wash., 278); Gerhardt vs. Tucker (187 Mo., 46).
These cases cover a variety of communications made by an
authority in behalf of his client to third persons. And cases wherein
evidence of the attorney as to compromises entered into by him on
behalf of his client were allowed to be proved by the attorney's
testimony are not wanting. (Williams vs. Blumenthal, 27 Wash., 24;
Koeber vs. Sommers, supra.)
It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's
attorney as to his authority to compromise was properly overruled.
The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the
policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a
compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of
the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no
objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the
plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies.
Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and
maintain an action for the recovery of their face value.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
with costs. So ordered.
ADM. CASE No. 4426 February 17, 2000
RAMON SAURA, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
ADM. CASE No. 4429 February 17, 2000
HELEN BALDORIA and RAYMUNDO SAURA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Two (2) petitions, one by Ramon Saura, Jr.1 and the other by Helen
S. Baldoria and Raymundo Y. Saura2, were filed before this Court
charging Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa for violation of her lawyer's
oath and disregard of Sections 15, 22, 25, 29, 31 and 32 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.3
The two (2) complaints are related and arose from the handling of
the respondent of a settlement case involving a piece of property
owned in common by the petitioners with their other siblings,
Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, all surnamed Saura, who were then

the administrators of the said property of the late Ramon E. Saura
who died intestate on May 15, 1992. 1âwphi1.nêt
The pertinent facts, as delineated in the report of the National
Grievance Investigation Office of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, are as follows:
It appears that negotiations for the settlement of the
property (referring to the intestate estate of Ramon E.
Saura) dragged on far three (3) years until on April 27,
1995, petitioners learned that the administrators of the
property, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, had, with the
assistance of the respondent, who in fact notarized the
Deed of Sale, sold the property to Sandalwood Real
Estate and Development Corporation without the
knowledge and participation of petitioners. To compound
matters, petitioners alledge [sic] that despite repeated
demands, the vendors or their counsel, respondent herein,
have refused to disclose the amount of the sale or account
for the proceeds. The petitioners have thus been
constrained to institute criminal and civil actions to enforce
and protect their rights.
This case was refered [sic] to the Integrated Bar by the
Supreme Court in a resolution dated November 20, 1995,
after its earlier resolution dated June 19, 1995, was
returned unserved with the Postmaster's notation that the
same was "unclaimed".
At the scheduled hearing of this case on February 5, 1998,
the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Carolina Esguerra-Ochoa
filed a written entry of appearance. There was no
appearance for the respondent but this office, noting the
new address of the respondent as furnished by Atty.
Ochoa, suggested that the latter furnish a copy of the
complaint to respondent at the latter's new address. In a
Compliance dated February 10, 1998, Atty. Ochoa
informed this Office that she had furnished the respondent
with a copy of the petition dated May 24, 1995, plus the
Supreme Court's resolution dated June 19, and November
20, 1995, plus our Order dated December 8, 1997, and
Notice of Appearance dated February 5, 1998.
On March 10, 1998, the petitioners counsel submitted a
Manifestation attached to which were photocopies of the
front and dorsal portion of the return card evidencing
receipt by herein respondent of the documents
enumerated by Atty. Ochoa in her Compliance dated
February 10, 1998. The return card is dated March 2,
1998.
To date, no response has been forth coming from Atty.
Agdeppa.4
For her continued defiance of orders of this Court for her to answer
the administrative charges leveled against her, respondent was
recommended to be penalized with a fine of P10,000.00 and
suspension from practice for one (1) year in each of the two (2)
cases pending against her.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the
petitions should be dismissed because she was not accorded her
right to due process and that she could not answer the
administrative charges against her without divulging certain pieces of
information in violation of the attorney-client privilege.
Respondent does not convince.
First. The respondent was given notice on various occasions but she
chose to ignore them and failed to exercise her right to be heard.
Sec. 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has
full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
22
charges against him, to produce witness in his behalf, and
to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and answer the accusations, the
court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Since respondent repeatedly ignored the notices sent to her by this
Court, we cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for her answer.
While respondent may have changed her address and did not, thus,
receive the previous notices, still, on March 2, 1998, she came to
know of the Supreme Court Resolution dated June 19, 1995. 5 The
prudent thing for her to do was to file an answer immediately and not
to delay the matter any further. Sadly, the respondent ignored the
Resolution6 of the Supreme Court ordering her to file an answer.
Second. The request for the information regarding the sale of the
property and to account for the proceeds is not a violation of the
attorney-client privilege. Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity.
The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The
petitioners are only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the
sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the right
to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs
of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of the property.
Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such information to
them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.
WHEREFORE, for the refusal of Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa to
comply with our Resolutions dated June 7 and 19, 1995 directing her
to file an answer to the petitions. the Court hereby penalizes her with
a FINE of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) which. should be paid
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof; otherwise, a penalty of
imprisonment for five (5) days shall be imposed. This resolution shall
be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4078 July 14, 2003
WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against
respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan, complainant alleged that in July
1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in
complainant's building in Quezon City for his law practice.
Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin
Dacanay, complainant's retained lawyer, who accommodated
respondent in the building and made him handle some of
complainant's cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship
between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which
he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car.
In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the
amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on
the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in

Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the
subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City
Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased
a new car. However, the document of sale of the car was issued in
complainant's name and financed through City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain
Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to borrow money from
complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this
transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount
of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay
respondent's arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car
and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant.
Complainant tried to encash respondent's postdated check with the
drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account therein
was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for
payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in
his Answer:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in
the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of
deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other
shady deals and has many cases pending in court;
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant denied respondent's charges and claimed
that respondent's allegation is libelous and not privilege as
it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant
further pointed to paragraph 12 of respondent's Answer,
thus:
12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next
installment on his car on January 30, 1993, defendant
Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a
Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but
the latter said that he will only do so after the termination
of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he
(complainant) wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former
counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members
of the review committee of the Department of Justice
where a petition for review of the resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or,
in the event that the said petition for review is denied, he
wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the
prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned Court, and
even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal,
which defendant Essex L. Silapan all refused to do not
only because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also
because the complainant confided to him that he was
really involved in the commission of the crime that was
charged of in the above-mentioned case. (emphasis
supplied)
Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false,
immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to
defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent
is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and
should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed
this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative
sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing
check.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
23
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained 1 that
it was complainant who offered him an office space in his building
and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the
way he handled a B.P. 22 case2 filed against complainant.
Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his
imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his
revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in
relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made
these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his
case and discredit complainant's credibility by establishing his
criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He
argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client
relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense
of his honor and reputation.
Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate
mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration and only as a
"formal requirement" so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and
for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the mortgaged
property to complainant.
Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not
for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as "some kind of
acknowledgment" that he already received in advance a portion of
his attorney's fees from the complainant for the legal services he
rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon
the cases he was handling for complainant.
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90
commission from Romero's loan which he allegedly helped facilitate.
He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorney's
fees, the latter being his client. He used this amount to pay his
arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before
paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to
execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him.
Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer ownership
of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which
respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently,
respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent
also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in
turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the
report of the investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty
as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the
various criminal and civil cases pending between the parties. It is for
the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of
the allegations made therein. For this reason, it is not for us to
sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check. His
liability has yet to be determined by the trial court where his case is
pending.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent
committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged
intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending
case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule
is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made
to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of
a client arises at the inception of their relationship. 3 The protection
given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.4

It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications or information is limited only to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope
of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made
in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.5 If the unlawful
purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's alleged
intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the
communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not
consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a
lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a
lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does
not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict
sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for
him to make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The
disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were
not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the
respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case
as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked
in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that
respondent's allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case
amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him. However, the recommended
penalty of one (1) year suspension of respondent from the practice
of law seems to be disproportionate to his breach of duty considering
that a review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first
administrative complaint against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
order of suspension to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211917
NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision 2 dated
November 25, 2013, and Resolution 3 dated February 21, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San
Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 15407 finding petitioner Norma C.
Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, while exonerating petitioner Josephine G.
Umali from the crime charged. The RTC also adjudged the
petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in
favor of private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code before
Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following
Information:
That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic
of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
24
helping one another, did then and there, defraud one JOAN
FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following manner, to wit: That Norma
C. Gamaro, pretending that she is knowledgeable in the business of
buy and sell of jewelry, other merchandise and financing, assuring
complainant of a sure market and big profit lure and entice
complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and
the latter purchased and delivered to her the jewelry amounting to
₱2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage the business for private
complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused,
far from complying, with her obligation, managed the business as
her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and pledging
jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused Josephine Umali work
while the checks issued by respondent Rowena Gamaro to
guarantee their payment were all dishonoured for having been
drawn against insufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged, while accused Rowena C. Gamaro remained at-
large.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence disclosed the following facts:
Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E.
Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business venture with petitioner
Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G.
Umali (Umali) and accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza would buy any
foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever
informed by Umali who was then the manager of the said pawnshop
located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces of jewelry
would then be sold for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees
at the Social Security System (SSS) in San Pablo City. The proceeds
of the sale would then be divided among them in the following
manner: fifty percent (50%) would go to Fineza, while the other fifty
percent (50%) would be divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro and
Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were
placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter
Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from
their joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised
amount of the pieces of jewelry.6
The business venture was initially successful. However, when
Fineza discovered that Norma Gamaro, together with her daughters
Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar business with
other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the
business. To wind up the business, it was agreed that Norma
Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or sell the
remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza
tried to encash the checks which were issued to her by Rowena
Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the account of the
Gamaros had been closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma
Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed that
she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks.
Fineza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to
several pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what they had
agreed upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list
of the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to redeem the
pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the pawnshop
tickets that it was the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick
San Diego who pledged the pieces of jewelry.7
To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the
remaining pieces of jewelry in her possession but the latter failed to
do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for the
pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer.8
A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro
and Rowena Gamaro, dated February 16, 2004, asking for the return
of the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of
jewelry which were not returned to her, including the cash given by
Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand letter was left
unanswered.9
For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in
the jewelry business of her daughters. Umali likewise denied having
any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro and with
Fineza. While admitting that there were pieces of jewelry pledged by

her cousin, Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where she was
the manager, Umali denied that she knew where those pieces of
jewelry came from.10
On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders
judgment, as follows:
a. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under Section
1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
her to suffer the indeterminate prison term of Four (4) Years and Two
(2) Months of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Twenty (20)
Years of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
b. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal
liability;
c. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine
Umali to pay the private complainant jointly and solidarily the
following amounts:
1. ₱1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on
February 16, 2004, until fully paid;
2. ₱50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;
3. ₱25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;
4. ₱50,000.00, for and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs.
Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau
of Immigration is likewise directed to issue a HOLD DEPARTURE
ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal circumstances
are as follows:
Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO
Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority
(NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San Pablo City
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision
dated November 25, 2013, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
The fallo of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated July 25, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San
Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the
same was denied by the CA on February 21, 2014.
Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:
A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION FINDING
NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER
SECTION l(B), ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
DESPITE THE INFORMATION ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME
OF ESTAFA UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(A) ARTICLE 315 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
25
B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT (RTC) RELIED ON THE FINDINGS ON THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WITH SSS
AGAINST NORMA GAMARO;
C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT (RTC) CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY. BALDEO DESPITE CONFLICT
OF INTEREST IN THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA
GAMARO ADVISE REGARDING HER CASE; AND
D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE RTC THAT NORMA
GAMARO RECEIVED THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE
INCOMPETENT AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION ITSELF.13
The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of
Estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally
permissible.
The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to
every person accused of a crime, among them the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.14
The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him" is for him to
adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is
not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the
offense by its formal name in the law. It is hornbook doctrine that
what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against
an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law.15
The controlling words of the information are found in its body.
Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v. Hon.
Layosa16as follows:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an
information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the
Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the
offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually
determines the nature and character of the crime charged are
the facts alleged in the information. The Court's ruling in US. v.
Lim San is instructive:
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption
and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the
characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the
information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated
in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the
defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The
establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal

Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with
the requirements of plain justice x x x.17
In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is
defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case maybe.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos
but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does
not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned,
the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
x x xx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits.18
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a
false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with
his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.19
However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is
estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa).
x x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x x xx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.
x x x20
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
26
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as
follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party
on the offender.21
The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed
constitute the crime of which petitioner Norma Gamaro was
convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) instead of paragraph 2(a)?
What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner
Norma Gamaro was convicted of a crime charged in the Information
as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of
the Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed
sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion.
Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry
amounting to ₱2,292,5l 9.00 on the condition that the same will be
sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro was under obligation to turn
over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of
complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to
M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch
Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice
of Fineza.
Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by
misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property. This, at least, is very clearly shown by the factual
allegations of the Information.22
There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual
allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts
constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the
elements of estafa by misappropriation. Petitioners are fully apprised
of the charge against them and for them to suitably prepare their
defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not deprived of
any constitutional right. She was sufficiently apprised of the facts
that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa, because the
RTC has the discretion to read the Information in the context of the
facts alleged. In the case of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,23 We explained
the rationale behind this discretion in this manner:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the
accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice
by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the
body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime
characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to
which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above
all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged.
The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law
some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by
name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the
body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the
designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until
the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not
know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever
for the protection of his substantial rights ... If he performed the
acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the
name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the
province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named x x x. 24

Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under
paragraph 1 (b). As held by the CA, Fineza positively and
categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her
and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to
account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner
Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry
which was received by her in trust. This already constitutes
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to
petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the
properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to
appropriating the same for his own personal use. 25 As in fact, in this
case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own
money.
The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion
of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom
a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not
only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give
an account of their whereabouts.26
Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them, petitioner Norma Gamaro
could be convicted of the said offense, the same having been
proved.
Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by
petitioners that the testimony of prosecution witness Atty. Baldeo
violated the rule on "privileged communication between attorney and
client" for the reason that Atty. Baldeo allegedly gave petitioner
Norma Gamaro "advise" regarding her case.
The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
that the client made the communication;
(2) The client made the communication in confidence;
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.27
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential. A confidential communication
refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure
between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so
far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was
given. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not
be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.28
Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on
record fails to substantiate petitioner's allegation. The testimony of
Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that petitioner Norma
Gamaro was indeed engaged in the business of selling jewelry
supplied by private complainant Fineza. We note that the testimony
is merely corroborative to the testimony of private complainant
Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma Gamaro.
Atty. Baldeo testified primarily on the fact that she personally saw
petitioner Gamaro, on several occasions, showing the jewelry for
sale to their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered to buy
the pieces of jewelry on some instances, and she was told by
petitioner Norma Gamaro that the pieces of jewelry came from
Fineza.29
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
27
The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC
to dispute the defense of petitioner Norma Gamaro that she had no
involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:
Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the
aforementioned administrative case, accused Norma Gamaro's
defense of denial of her participation in the business transaction
involving the sale of jewelry supplied by private complainant, fall flat
on its face.30
Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred
in finding that she was the one who received the pieces of jewelry is
a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings
of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered
conclusive between the parties. Though jurisprudence recognizes
highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which
would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision.31
We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by
the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro received some pieces of
jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned the
jewelry entrusted to them by Fineza which is a clear act of
misappropriation, thus:
x x x x. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and
Josephine through the testimony of Frederick San Diego is
understandable.1âwphi1 The argument, however, that it was
Frederick San Diego, upon instructions of RowenaGamaro who
pledged the jewelry, without the knowledge of Norma or Josephine is
unavailing. The records show that Frederick San Diego is not only a
mere nephew of Norma, and cousin to Rowena and Josephine, but
also the messenger and collector of Rowena, who had knowledge of
the fact that Rowena's partner was the private complainant,
Frederick San Diego also knew that the private complainant went to
the house of Norma asking the missing jewelry.
As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the
private complainant to Norma Gamaro, not Rowena Gamaro. Yet the
defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the same pieces
of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Cebuana Lhuillier, and the
owner of Collette's upon instructions of Rowena Gamaro. Clearly
then, Norma turned over the said jewelry to Rowena with knowledge
that they will be pledged to the pawnshops and to the owner of
Collette's. To hold otherwise would run counter to human nature and
experience.32
It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the
eighteen (18) index cards given by accused Rowena Gamaro to
Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by
Fineza, with the corresponding appraised values. The due dates of
the checks issued in favor of Fineza (Exhibits "F" to "F-7"and "F-
11""F-27") were also indicated on the index cards. 33 The pieces of
jewelry were pawned to various pawnshops and individuals, instead
of offering them for sale. Hence, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to
return the jewelry to the damage and prejudice of Fineza. She even
offered her house and lot to Fineza as payment for the jewelry.
We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner
Norma Gamaro was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. The
CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that Fineza
entrusted the possession of the jewelry to petitioner. The CA
observed that the prosecution duly proved petitioner's
misappropriation by showing that she failed to return the diamond
ring upon demand. That misappropriation took place was
strengthened when petitioner Norma Gamaro informed Fineza that
they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the terms of their
business agreement.
Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We
note the declaration of the RTC that Umali had knowledge as to who
owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. The RTC
further pointed out that Umali was part of the business transaction
between Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro with Fineza, as she
too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino
to enable them to open a checking account. It was against this
account that Norma and Rowena Gamaro drew the checks that they
issued to guarantee the share of Fineza from the proceeds of the
sale of the pieces of jewelry. These findings support the conclusion

of the CA that Umali's acquittal was based on reasonable doubt.
Hence, Umali's civil liability was not extinguished by her
discharge.34 We, therefore, concur with the findings of the CA:
On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to
private complainant Fineza. As may be recalled, appellant Umali was
exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding, she is not
entirely free from any liability towards private complainant Fineza. It
has been held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the
accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt
her from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is
required.35 There is no question that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is preponderant enough to sustain appellant Umali's civil
liability. Accordingly, We agree with the court a quo’s ratiocination in
this wise:
"What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by
Frederick that it was Rowena Gamaro who instructed him to pledge
the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were true, then, with
more reason Josephine had knowledge as to who owns the jewelry.
It may well be pointed out, as earlier stated, that Josephine is part of
the business transaction between Norma and Rowena with the
private complainant, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account
Agreement with Banco Filipino purposely to enable them to open a
checking account, and it was against this account that Norma and
Rowena drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of
Joan from the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry. It follows then that
Josephine also knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged
with her (sic) M. Lhuillier Pawnshop Branch. x x x"
With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a
quo’s ruling that herein appellants be held jointly and solidarily liable
to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there is no cogent
reason to depart from the ruling of the court a quo.36
There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both
the appellate and the trial courts agree on the facts. 37 We, therefore,
adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in
mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 25, 2013, and its Resolution dated
February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5804 July 1, 2003
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D.
RICAFORT, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort
filed an administrative complaint1 with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against respondent
Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict
of interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA
Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the
Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA).
Respondent’s brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the
PPSTA Board which approved respondent’s engagement as retained
counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-
corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for the
terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-
97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman,
docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
28
the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members
in the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty
of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of
which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its
corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being
told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent
refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06 2 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the
meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its members that he will
win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,3 respondent stressed that he entered his appearance
as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the
ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said law firm, he only
filed a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency" in OMB Case No. 0-97-
0695.4 On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled
by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent
claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated,
orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against
members of the PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat
was immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract
with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in
representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the
victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely
assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case
before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
considering that respondents therein are not public officials, but
private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the
same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa,
and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that
complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his
oath of office amounting to gross misconduct, malpractice and
unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty.
De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be
dismissed and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or
disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and
referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation,
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of
Governors thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated
June 29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
RULE 15.03. – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client."5 This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. 6 Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.7 Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of

undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.8
In this jurisdiction, a corporation’s board of directors is understood to
be that body which (1) exercises all powers provided for under the
Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the corporation; and
(3) controls and holds all property of the corporation. 9 Its members
have been characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a
fiduciary character.10 It is clearly separate and distinct from the
corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either
by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is
unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a
stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and
for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the
wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders.11 This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled
is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real
party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation’s
behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a
party in the suit.12
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles
pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the threshold
question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of
the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue,
the following disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized.
Although early cases found joint representation permissible where
no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual
representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be
retained to represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics
opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation
from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take
an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual
representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way;
the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid
consent.13(underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a
lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors
unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the
corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any
interest of the individual corporate officials. 14 The rulings in these
cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the
wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer
engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of
the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought
against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing
conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657,
entitled "Philippine Public School Teacher’s Assn., Inc., et al. v.
1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School
Teacher’s Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its
own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm,
of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of
PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent
Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of
conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his
other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board
of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a
Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board
Members. By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his
appearance therein.15 Again, this constituted conflict of interests,
considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name
of the individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of
and to protect the interest of the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Considering however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty
of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230
dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
29
admonish respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY
of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe
a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ADM. CASE NO. 6876 March 7, 2008
HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME,
LEO FALAME and JERRY FALAME,petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment
complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame (complainants)
against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case
No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on
15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio),
engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for
forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case)
and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo
Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh
Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the
defendants.3
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the
defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in the first civil case.
Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to
file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted
in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1
July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame,
appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of
Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in
which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the
first civil case.4
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of
Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil
case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser
and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8 September
1996.5
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh
and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case against complainants
allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case,
entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A.
Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings
and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and
persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568
(the second civil case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the
deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the
registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the
said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and
reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with preliminary
injunction and restraining order.6
Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the
spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were
impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and
duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses
Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.7
 30

Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made In the complaint, there is no specific charge against
false statements of fact in the complaint in the second civil case to respondent for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition
(d), Section 208 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,9 complainants against representation of conflicting interest. So, the
asserted further. allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants'
position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted
that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless
Code of Professional Responsibility" cannot be
and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for
countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary
complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased
principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled
client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for the
that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by
sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the
the complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint
possession of the subject property from complainants who are its
cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)
true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated
paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.11
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of
sufficient bases.
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, 12 respondent controverted
complainants' allegations. He emphasizes that it was only Raleigh
Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on xxx
Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the
attorney's fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03
affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case,
October 2000, or three years since the complainants
believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to
became owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit
support it. Insisting that he did not betray the confidence reposed in
against the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio
him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first civil case, respondent
Falame, but as owners of their respective aliquot interests
maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired
in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA
knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in
104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the
the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to
basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio
Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did
Falame on the material possession of the improvements
not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of fact in
found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor
the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any
even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in
means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case.13
the second amended and supplemental complaint which
give rise to their cause of action against them.
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as
counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing the long interval of
While the complainants could not specify under what
twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his
circumstances the respondent committed [the] alleged
acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the
breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of
first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather
secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has
between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and
shown that he did not commit any violation of such duties
Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at
or obligations of an attorney.
stake. Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil
case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as
plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal
Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendants services of the respondent for his and Lydio Falame's
—a case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death.14
xxx
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still
pending before the trial court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over the
The other allegations of the complainants that the
instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this
respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule
administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own
139, Rules of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he
favor as he had died a year earlier.15
allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his former
client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was
In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to
previous charges against respondent, complainants claimed that the Court that at one time his present clients categorically
respondent violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of Professional declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership
Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame
Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.18 over subject matter of both cases equally lacks evidentiary
basis.
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving Investigating xxx
Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for
the dismissal of this administrative case, thus:19
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to
conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the
lawyer's oath was violated by the respondent and what complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated.
confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive
mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the
information learned in confidence, but there is no subject of an administrative complaint against the
specification in the complaint what secret or information respondent.
learned in confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was
disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case
xxx
No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or
suspension against lawyers, the complainant must specify
in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
information disclosed or will be disclosed in the recommended that this complaint be dismissed on
professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four
431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for
must fail. lack of merit.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court reiterating their allegations in the
complaint and their position paper.21 They likewise assert that the
IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had
been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three
(3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second
civil case was filed on 23 October 2000. 22 In addition, in their
Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated
Reply),23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v. Bautista-
Lozada24to support their contention that administrative complaints
against members of the bar do not prescribe.25
In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges
imputed to him have never been proven by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have
the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the presumption
of innocence.27 Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
only in their position paper and in the instant petition, complainants
infringed his right to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him.28
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is
not barred by prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo,
Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to
disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that
the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a
crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is
barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x
(5 Am. Jur. 434)30
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v.
Bautista-Lozada31where the Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the
Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive
period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers,
should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra
vires.32
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the
Court concurs with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that
some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint are
unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable
for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put
forward in complainants' position paper filed with the IBP and in the
petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered his
defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and
likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading
before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he denied having
Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the
essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest,
as articulated in his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been
adequately apprised of and heard on the issue. In administrative
cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only
become necessary for clarification when there is a need to propound
searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due
process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their
arguments.33
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
31
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct,
act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to
another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such
situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. 36 In
addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely
probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention
to represent conflicting interests.37
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse to
any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may
only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former
client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The
rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. 38 In the course
of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 39
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for
a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after
the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which
will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the
client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.40
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client
at all hazards and costs even to himself. 41 The protection given to
the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation
between them. It even survives the death of the client.42
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented
Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the
attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was
established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him.
The case of Hilado v. David43tells us that it is immaterial whether
such employment was paid, promised or charged for.44
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the
stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In
the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as
counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent
position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with
Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts
which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of
Lydio's death or through the completion of the specific task for which
respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate
a position opposed to that of Lydio.45 Precedents tell us that even
after the termination of his employment, an attorney may not act as
counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,
while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which
could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment.46 And while complainants have never been
respondent's clients, they derive their rights to the property from
Lydio's ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil
case.
For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his
former client—Raleigh's supposed co-ownership of the subject
property— respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and
Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated
the

potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is
warranted.47 Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any
representation situation from "the point of view that there are
possible conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms of impaired loyalty"
that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty
to a client.48Considering, however, that this is respondent's first
offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with
admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of
his profession.49
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of
representing conflicting interests and meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree
of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9860 September 11, 2013
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA,
MARY ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA
OROLA-CALIP, and KARENOROLA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1
For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint filed against
respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court (Rules).
The Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola),
Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba
Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-
Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio). 2
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of
Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the
deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of
Emilio.3
In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special
Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the
following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in
behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie
(Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty.Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as
counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs 4 of
the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating
counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf
of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In
the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of
Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his
stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola,
which the RTC granted in an Order5dated September 20, 2007 (RTC
Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an
Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same
case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.6
Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the
instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines(IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the
Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the
subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he
breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients,
the Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while
Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same
was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
32
entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007. 9 In this
accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected
heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as
required under the Rules.10
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges,
contending that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of
Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records
of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented
by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented
by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's
request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of
record could not attend the scheduled June16 and July 14, 2006
hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge. 12 In
fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the
case as no further communications transpired after these two
hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to
represent Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he had no
knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in
this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to him by
Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance. 14 Finally, he
clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was
more of a mediator, rather than a litigator, 15 and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his
appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions,
respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar 17 and Atty.
Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his consultation
with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15,
2008submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr.(Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found guilty
of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the
records of the cases how that he never acted as counsel for the
other complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that
while respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express
conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the
consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there
was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as
complainants themselves admitted that respondent "did not acquire
confidential information from his former client nor did he use against
the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment."21Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the
Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too
harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely
reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
641), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed against
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP
Resolution No. XX-2013-1725 dated January 3, 2013.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated
Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of
suspension to three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited
from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the
same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded
on the principles of public policy and good taste. 26 It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.27 In
Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is" whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a
former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only
on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not
for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.30
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s
finding that respondent represented conflicting interests and,
perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not
only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in
Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of
Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as
administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their interests.
Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the
purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same
case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information was
relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him
since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with
respect to opposing parties in the same case.1âwphi1 In other
words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to
the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s previous
appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a
friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since
the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely
probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.31
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by
Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of
forging a settlement among the family members render the rule
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
33
inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise
improper since Rule 15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires
the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he
may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show
that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of
his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of
Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express
written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be
pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute
cannot represent any of the parties to it.33Accordingly, for
respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction
is warranted.
In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner was increased from severe reprimand to a
suspension of six(6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that
the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of
the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it contravened
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates
that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based."34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change
in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor.
To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors
of the importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its
legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary
proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same
is based is akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their
decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser
station than any other portion of the ratio.35
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) months to be more
appropriate taking into consideration the following factors:
first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that
respondent merely accommodated Maricar's request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006
hearings due to her lawyer's unavailability; third, it is likewise
undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio
had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually
acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and
in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith;
and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use
against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in
Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lakin, Jr., 36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months to
the counsel therein who represented parties whose interests are
hostile to his other clients in another case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held
GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03,Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013
FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests
may be suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred when
circumstances so warrant.
 34

Antecedents November 3, 2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an
inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village,
Quezon City as borne out by the blotter logbook of that unit.9
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment
charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust
and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C. On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the
Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his foregoing antecedents, and praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the
interest. ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed
in him as their counsel.10
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to
the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint
Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a against him within 10 days from notice, Atty. Era several times
corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other sought the extension of his period to file the comment to supposedly
officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment. 11 The
Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison. Court granted his request and allowed him an extension totaling 40
days. But despite the lapse of the extended period, he did not file his
comment.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his
relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and her group.
Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for
dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money disbarment against Atty. Era.12
subject of their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit
that Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently,
By its resolution dated March 1, 2006, 13 the Court required Atty. Era
the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held
officials of ICS Corporation with several counts of estafa 1was
in contempt for such failure to submit his comment.
presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally
charged Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2 Office of the Bar Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on
April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement between Samson and
his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his
other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and
relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable settlement with
Samson and his group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had been
Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
appointed as counsel de officio for Sison by Branch 102 of the RTC
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money
in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.
and effort for them, and that they could settle the cases with Sison
and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a
certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They acceded and of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they recommendation.15
received a deed of assignment covering land registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf
In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007, 16 the
of ICS Corporation.3
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with
given instead a deed of absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’
property among themselves. It took some period of negotiations cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on
November 27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale involving
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not
the property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title
sustain Atty. Era’s claim that his legal services as counsel for
of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect
Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the
would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far
execution of the compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that
as he was concerned he had already accomplished his professional
he even admitted during the mandatory conference that there was
responsibility towards them upon the amicable settlement of the
no formal termination of his legal services;17 that his professional
cases between them and ICS Corporation.4
obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not end
upon execution of the settlement agreement, because he remained
When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the duty-bound to see to it that the settlement was duly implemented;
property at the Registry of Deeds and the Assessor’s Office of that he also had the obligation to appear in the criminal cases until
Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to
liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the appear in behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and
name of ICS Corporation but was already under the name of Bank unfaithfulness.
Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their counsel
with ICS Corporation.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be
suspended from the practice of law for six months, viz:
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and
his group wrote to him on September 8, 2004 to remind him about
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct
his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with Sison and
for representing conflicting interests, failing to serve his client,
her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.6
complainant herein, with competence and diligence and champion
the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from
Samson and his group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and WARNED that a
They were shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in penalty.18
her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon
City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007, 19 the
Corporation had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty.
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
Era’s legal representation of Sison by submitting several certified
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD,
copies of the minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases
with the modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of
involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and Branch 220
law for two years.
of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as
the counsel of Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried
in said courts.8 They also submitted a certification issued on
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XX-2012-180,20 denying Atty. Era’s motion for reconsideration
and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court
pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.21
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion
(With Leave of Court).22 However, on November 26, 2012, the Court
merely noted the manifestation, and denied the motion for its lack of
merit.23
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with
violating Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests by accepting the responsibility of
representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had
undertaken to represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group had
accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the
demand letters and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for
the filing of the estafa charges against Sison and the others in the
RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when
Samson and his group entered into the compromise settlement with
Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The lawyer-client
relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that
he still needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as
well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were dismissed
or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to
indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the
criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases
not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court
was still required, but also because the compromise would have
applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect
pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his
group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights. 25 He was expected to exert
his best efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the
unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends
of justice.26
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of
conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.28
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales,
rendered as follows:
x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will
represent them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
35
represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance
the effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict
of interest undermines the independence of the lawyer’s professional
judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in
the client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective representation
x x x could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the
client’s confidential information xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of
confidential client information against the interests of the client,
either to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other
client, or to foster an assumed public purpose is facilitated through
conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit
clients, such as by inducing a client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal
system in obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the
absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both
sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and
compromise adversary argumentation x x x.29
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent
situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose
interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In
the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it
after consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred
and guarded with care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice. 32 The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.33
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty
to Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-client
relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse
to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this
rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped
by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after
the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that
will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the
lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the
previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the
client at all hazards and costs even to himself. 35The protection given
to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of
the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation
between them. It even survives the death of the client.36
In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group
after full disclosure to them of the conflict of interest, therefore, the
most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly
decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for
Sison, or to advice Sison to engage another lawyer for herself.
Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper
sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty.
EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective
upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission
of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty.
EDGARDO 0. ERA and entered m his file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the
Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989
DONALD DEE petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO MUTUC, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated February
12,1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9, 1986 in AC-
G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of the that court
holding that the services rendered by private respondent was on a
professional, and not on a gratis et amore basis and ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as the
balance of the latter's legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and his
father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by
the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the
alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's
Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.
Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son,
Dewey, having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar's
Palace and the possibility that his son may be harmed at the
instance of the latter. 1
Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would
inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly
contracted for P100,000. 00. From his residence, private respondent
called up Caesar's Palace and, thereafter, several long distance
telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited the
information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around
$1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that said
account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee
merely signing for the chits. Private respondent communicated said
information to petitioner's a father and also assured him that
Caesar's Palace was not in any way linked to the mafia.2
In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the
president of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the
president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would
be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The
president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to
acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from
liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to Manila,
he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to
acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private respondent
brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt
and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee
was cleared and the casino never bothered him. 3
Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private
respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the
balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however,
ignored said letters. On October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
36
complaint against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch CXXXVI, for the collection of attorney's fees and refund of
transport fare and other expenses.4
Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his
services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered
were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client.
Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional
relationship of attorney and client between him and private
respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private
respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling
account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal
one and that private respondent had not been specifically contracted
to handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had
allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of defendant's family"
to see what he could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00
inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was
not in the nature of attomey's fees but merely "pocket money"
solicited by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount
of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly
voluntary services.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on
October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs. All other claims therein of
private respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were
dismissed. 5 On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. 6
Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive
factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was ostensibly
rendering services to petitioner and his father, he was actually
working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's Palace
of which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of
the casino and private respondent were united in their objective to
collect from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in
claiming that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father
in view of the conflicting interests involved.
In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its
decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by
petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the services
he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel
for petitioner he was also acting as the collecting agent and
consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar's
Palace.7 However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed
by private respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals
issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the
aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986.8
Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn the
latter resolution.
It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions arising
from the change of stand of the First Civil Cases Division of the
former Intermediate Appellate Court when, acting on the
representations in petitioner's undated motion for reconsideration
supposedly filed on May 28,1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986
resolution reconsidering the decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV
No. 04242. Said resolution was, as earlier noted, set aside by the
Twelfth Division of the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the
same time, reinstated the aforesaid decision.
Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues belatedly raised
by petitioner, which issues should have been disregarded 9 but were
nevertheless auspiciously discussed therein, at the risk of seeming
prolixity we quote hereunder the salient portions of the assailed
resolution which demonstrate that it was not conceived in error.
The reason for then IAC's action is that it
deemed the P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had
previously received from defendant-appellant as
adequate compensation for the services
rendered by am for defendant-appellant,
considering that at the time plaintiff-appellee
was acting as counsel for defendant-appellant,
he was also acting as the collecting agent and
 37

consultant of, and receiving compensation from
Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas, Nevada, the
entity with whom defendant-appellant was
having a problem and for which he had engaged
the services of plaintiff-appellee. The crux of the
matter, therefore, is whether or not the evidence
on record justifies this finding of the IAC.
Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional
services to defendant-appellant were rendered
between the months of July and September of
1981, while his employment as collection agent
and consultant of Caesar's Palace covered the
period from December 1981 to October 1982.
This positive testimony of plaintiff-appellee,
however, was disregarded by the IAC for the
following reasons:
1. In August l983, plaintiff-appellee testified that
he was a representative of Caesar's Palace in
the Philippines 'about two or three years ago.'
From this the IAC concluded that the period
covers the time plaintiff-appellee rendered
professional services to defendant-appellant.
We do not think that IAC's conclusion is
necessarily correct. When plaintiff-appellee
gave the period 'about two or three years ago,'
he was merely stating an approximation.
Considering that plaintiff-appellee was testifying
in August 1983, and his employment with
Caesar's Palace began in December 1981, the
stated difference of two years is relatively
correct. . . .
additional compensation was because the latter
was allegedly receiving compensation from
Caesar's Palace, and, therefore, the amount of
P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously
received from defendant-appellant is
'reasonable and commensurate. This
conclusion, however, can only be justified if the
fact and amount of remuneration had been
established. These were not proven at all. No
proof was presented as to the nature of plaintiff-
appellee's remuneration, and the mode or
manner in which it was paid.. . .10
Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings
that there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and
private respondent Mutuc. We find no reason to interfere with this
factual finding. There may be instances when there is doubt as to
whether an attorney-client relationship has been created. The issue
may be raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court
of Appeals have found that there was such a relationship the
Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, 11 absent cogent
reasons therefor.
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client
relationship between petitioner and private respondent for lack of a
written contract to that effect. The absence of a written contract will
not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship
which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request from the latter.12

2. The plaintiff appellee had testified that he was

There is no question that professional services were actually
working for the sake,' 'in the interest,' and 'to the
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through
advantage' of Caesar's Palace. x x x "We detect
his efforts, the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with
nothing from the above which would support
Caesar's Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his
IAC's conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was then
family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be
in the employ of Caesar's Palace. What is
harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For such services,
gathered is that plaintiff-appellee was simply
respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable
fulfilling a condition which plaintiff-appellee had
compensation and this right cannot be concluded by petitioner's
proposed to, and was accepted by, Caesar's
pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such
Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee from his
services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the
obligation to Caesar's Palace.
Philippine consultant of Caesar's Palace.

3. Caesar's Palace would not have listened to,

On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of
and acted upon, the advice of plaintiff-appellee if
respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes
he were no longer its consultant and alter ego.
hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totalling
P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of
Why not? We are witnesses to many successful the demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the
negotiations between contending parties whose receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove
representing lawyers were not and were never three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of private
in the employ of the opposite party. The art of respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the
negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools amount of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still
of a good practitioner, and mastery of the art a balance due and payable on said fees. The duplicate original copy
takes into account the circumstance that one of the initial receipt issued and signed in this connection by private
may be negotiating, among others, with a respondent reads:
person who may not only be a complete
stranger but antagonistic as well. The fact that
RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for
plaintiff-appellee was able to secure a favorable
professional services rendered, the sum of
concession from Caesar's Palace for defendant-
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as
appellant does not justify the conclusion that it
partial payment, leaving a balance of SEVENTY
could have been secured only because of
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), payable on
plaintiff-appellee's professional relationship with
demand.
Caesar's Palace. It could have been attributable
more to plaintiff-appellee's stature as a former
ambassador of the Philippines to the United Makati, Metro Manila, July 25,1981.13
States, his personality, and his negotiating
technique.
Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated
August 6, 1981, December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982, March 7,
Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee was 1982, and September 7, 1982 were sent by private respondent to
employed by Caesar's Palace during the time petitioner, 14 all to no avail.
that he was rendering professional services for
defendant-appellant, this would not
On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the
automatically mean the denial of additional
aforequoted resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not
attorney's fees to plaintiff appellee. The main
completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by
reason why the IAC denied plaintiff-appellee
petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11

adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but
that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the
latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private
respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in
resistance to the casino's claim but were actually geared toward
proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor,
Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly
exacted. 15
Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained,
private respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally
indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing
parties with contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the
controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent
conflicting interests with the consent of the parties.16 A common
representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a
mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of
the parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work
out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of
partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence
of said parties.
Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent
was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace,
petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to
and cannot now decry the dual representation that he postulates.
This knowledge he admits, thus:
It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers
in the land, it was the private respondent who
was singled out by the petitioner's father for
consultation in regard to an apparent problem,
then pending in Caesar's Palace. The testimony
of Arthur Alejandrino, cousin to private
respondent, and the admission of the private
respondent himself supply the answer.
Alejandrino testified that private respondent was
the representative of Caesar's Palace in the
Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov. 29,
1983).lâwphî1.ñèt Private respondent testified
that he was such representative tasked by the
casino to collect the gambling losses incurred
by Filipinos in Las Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1983). 17
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and
request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith
trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is
bound to pay his just fees.18
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated
February 12,1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against l petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Uy v. Atty. Gonzales, AC 5280, March 30, 2004
[G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO
MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond
reasonable doubt has been adduced; it is also essential that the
accused has been duly afforded his fundamental rights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to
the crime of rape under a criminal complaint, which read:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
38
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother
accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, while armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Paraaque, Metro Manila
August 8, 1994
(SGD) MANUEL P. BERMAS
Complainant
Assisted by:
(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
Mother[1]
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the
conclusion of which the lower court, presided over by Hon.
Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995,
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and
sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached
this Court by way of automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act To Impose Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That
Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special
Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took effect on 31
December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
gave an account, rather briefly, of the evidence submitted by
the prosecution.
"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old,
was raped by her own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while
she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house at
Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Paraaque, Metro Manila
(pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant
removed the victim's shorts and panty, placed himself above
her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital
movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his
lustful desire, he threatened the victim with death if she reports
the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the
NBI, which yielded the following findings:
"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital
physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice
wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration by
an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any hymenal laceration."[2]
The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who
denied the charge, and that of his married daughter, Luzviminda
Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her younger
sister to a mere resentment by the latter. The trial court gave a

summary of the testimony given by the accused and his
daughter Luzviminda; viz:
The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the
crime of rape on her daughter, the complainant. He told the
Court that he could not do such a thing because he loves so
much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said that
he even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his
children since the time of his separation from his wife. The
accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime
of rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will
or revenge in view of the numerous scoldings that she has
received from him on account of her frequent coming home late
at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason
as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him
of the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for being
admonished by him whenever she comes home late in the
night.
The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his
behalf, denied that the complainant was raped by the accused.
She said that the complainant did not come home in the night
of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told the Court that
the concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably
due to the resentment by the latter of the frequent scoldings
that she has been receiving from the accused. She further
added that she was told by the previous household employer of
the complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify
further that she does not believe that the accused, who is her
father, raped the complainant, who is her younger sister.[3]
The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of
the prosecution against the accused as having been duly
established and so ruled out the defense theory of denial and
supposed ill-will on the part of private complainant that
allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against her
father. The court adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency,
and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED."[4]
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-
Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court
a quo; thus:
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL
1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process
in appointing the accused's counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the
ground of illegal arrest;
b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the
ground of invalid filing of the information;
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the
case number;
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
39
f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;
b. His work was shoddy;
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was
ineffective and prejudicial to the accused.
B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT.
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE HEARD AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS
BEHALF.
D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME
CAUTION THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED
THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT."[5]
The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit
in the appeal enough to warrant a remand of the case for new
trial.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas,
then 15 years of age, assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas,
executed a sworn statement before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr.,
of the Paraaque Police Station, stating, in sum, that she had
been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own
father, in 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03 August 1994,
particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore
quoted, duly signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule
112, of the Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor,
issued a certification to the effect that the accused had waived
his right to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994,
the accused was brought before the trial court without counsel.
The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of
the Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel de officio.
Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994.
The prosecution placed complainant Manuela Bermas at the
witness stand. She testified on direct examination with hardly
any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later
waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be
relieved of her duty as counsel de officio.
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and
my paero besides me, would accede to my request that I be
relieved as counsel de officio because I could not also give
justice to the accused because as a lady lawyer . . . if my paero
here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my request.
"COURT:

It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the
defenseless. That is your sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio.
Are you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court."[6]
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was
appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was
ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should
be quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to prepare
therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-
Villanueva in the instant appeal would later point out:
To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty.
Roberto Gomez to be appointed as defense counsel de oficio.
And so the trial court appointed him.
Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his
cross examination, presumably to prepare. But a ten minute
preparation to cross examine the complainant upon whose
testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who stands
to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too
inadequate. He could not possibly have familiarized himself
with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case,
read the complaint, the statement of the complainant, the
medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and other
relevant documents and confer with the accused and his
witnesses, all in ten minutes.[7]
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal
officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12
December 1994; it was later reset to 09 January 1995. When the
case was called on 09 January 1995, the following transpired:
COURT:
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT:
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the
turn of the defense to present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and
considering that the accused is under detention ... it seems he
cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS:
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in
this case. In view of the fact that the defense counsel is not
interested anymore in defending the accused because last time
he moved for the continuance of the hearing of this case and
since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
40
proceedings of this case and considering the accused here is
under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints
another lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not
interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly
failed to appear in this Court to defend his client-accused, the
Court is hereby constrained to appoint another counsel de
officio to handle the defense of the accused. For this purpose,
Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de
officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas.[8]
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January
1995 upon the request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty.
Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but
later, albeit reluctantly, retracted; thus:
COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is
here, may I be allowed to give her my responsibility as counsel
de officio considering that the lawyer from the PAO ...
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the
Court will allow us to be relieved from our responsibility as
appointed counsel de officio of the accused ...
COURT:
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed
counsel de officio? As an officer of the Court you don't want to
handle the defense of the accused in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be
relieved of my responsibility as counsel de officio.
COURT:
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME:
Yes, Your Honor.[9]
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the
witness stand. He denied the accusation against him. The next
witness to be presented was his married daughter who
corroborated her fathers claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty.
Lonzame who himself, for one reason or another, had ceased to
appear for and in behalf of accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-
appellant has not properly and effectively been accorded the
right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has
been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws.
Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the
right to counsel of an accused has already been recognized
under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a

defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at
every stage of the proceedings,[10] and that if he is unable to
employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him.[11]
The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring,
in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that -
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to
counsel under the 1973 Constitution, essentially, has remained
unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile
innovation that has been introduced is the provision from
which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to
counsel as early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be
deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states -
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 14. x x x x x x x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule 115,
thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present
in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings
from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an
accused in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly.
[12] Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado,[13] explained:
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed
so important that it has become a constitutional right and it so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough
for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid
of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."[14]
In William vs. Kaiser,[15] the United States Supreme Court,
through the late Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that the
accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
41
overzealous prosecutors, of the laws complexity or of his own
ignorance or bewilderment. An accused must be given the right
to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there
is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be
as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills
needed in the court proceedings.[16] The right to counsel
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
persons basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and
acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the
case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds
substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty
of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation.[17]
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right
to counsel; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail
himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of
his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to
him at his request.[18] Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The court,
considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio
only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason
of their experience and ability may adequately defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are
not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the
province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend
the accused.
A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost.[19] A mere
pro-forma appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to
genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits
disapprobation.[20] The exacting demands expected of a lawyer
should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de
officio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an
opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No
lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for
the most compelling and cogent reasons.[21]
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058,
promulgated on 29 March 1999, this Court has said:
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known
our displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers
dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed
manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the
aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold,
the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they
haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficio to
the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however
guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this
Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to
adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code

of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any
similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.
The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the
case to the court a quo for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo
for trial on the basis of the complaint, aforequoted, under which
he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force is hereby appointed counsel de
officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office,
Paraaque, Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby
ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their
responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the
Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt
with most severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34091 January 30, 1973
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GEORGE DAENG, CONRADO BAUTISTA, GERARDO ABUHIN,
and ROLANDO CASTILLO, defendants-appellants.
L.M. Cabasal as Counsel de Oficio for defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
The defendants-appellants George Daeng, Conrado Bautista,
Gerardo Abubin and Rolando Castillo were indicted for the crime of
murder (Criminal Case C.C.C. VII 847-Rizal) before the Circuit
Criminal Court holding sessions in Pasig, Rizal. The information
reads:
That on or about December 13, 1970, in the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused while then
confined at the said institution, conspiring,
confederating and acting together and each
armed with improvised deadly weapons did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and wound therewith one Basilio
Beltran, No. 71495-P, another convicted
prisoner serving final sentence in the same
institution, then in the process of serving the
accused breakfast, inflicting upon him multiple
stab wounds, while then unarmed and unable to
defend himself from the attack launched by the
accused, as a result of which the said Basilio
Beltran died instantly.
That the offense when committed by the
accused was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation and
obvious ungratefulness.
On June 28, 1971, all the four defendants pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Shortly before the trial was adjourned for another date, the
trial judge addressed the following words to the defendants:
I understand that you are confused and you are
not ready to plead guilty to the crime charged
but the court is, however, giving you today and
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
42
tonight up to 8:00 o'clock in the morning
tomorrow to make a soul search, concentrate
and ask your heart, mind and body as to the
consequence of your act because under Art.
160 of the Revised Penal Code, by virtue of the
crime that you have committed, the Court has
no alternative except to impose the death
penalty which is the maximum penalty provided
for by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. So, I
repeat again that you make a thorough soul
searching as to the consequence of your act
and the life you will face in the future that is
death. You have to understand that the duty of
this Court is merely to interpret and apply the
law and it has no power to assume the
executive authority to pardon you or parole you
or lower the penalty. This Court has the duty
alone which is to apply the law. That is his
primary duty. It is up for the executive
department to give you the necessary clemency
if they deem it necessary, so I am giving you up
to tomorrow at 8:00 o'clock, June 29, to make
up your minds.
On the following day, June 29, 1971, the defendants, assisted by
counsel de oficio, withdrew their former plea of "not guilty" and
substituted that of "guilty." Allowing the change of pleas, the trial
judge forthwith dictated and promulgated his decision in open court.
All the four defendants were sentenced to death.
We are now called upon to review this case on automatic appeal.
1. In the brief filed by the defendants, their counsel de oficio, Atty.
L.M. Cabasal, avers that the circumstances attending their change of
plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" generate serious doubt regarding the
said defendants' ability, at the time, to appreciate fully the import and
consequences of their turn-about. The Solicitor General, as counsel
for the People of the Philippines, joins this view, pointing out that "the
records do not show that the trial court explained to the four
appellants the full import and meaning of their plea of guilty, nor did it
conduct any inquiry to remove all reasonable possibility that said
appellants might have entered their plea of guilty improvidently or
without a clear and precise understanding of the exact nature of the
charge preferred against them and the import of an inevitable
conviction thereof."
We have examined the manner by which the trial court allowed the
defendants to change their plea, and we ourselves are convinced
that the defendants were not at all made to understand and
appreciate the real nature and consequences of their decision to
enter another plea. The defendants, at the time they were arraigned,
pleaded not guilty. The record does not show that they needed, nay,
wanted additional time within which to consider or reconsider their
initial plea. The subsequent remark of the trial judge, to wit: "I
understand that you are confused and you are not ready to plead
guilty to take crime charged ...," on the basis of which the judge gave
the defendants twenty-four hours within which to ponder their
situation, is susceptible of being interpreted as an outright solicitation
by the court itself of a change of plea by the accused. The further
remark that "... because under Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code,
by virtue of the crime that you have committed (emphasis ours) the
Court has no alternative except to impose the death penalty ...,"
while perhaps intended differently by the trial judge, could mean, to
an unschooled prisoner, that the judge had already assumed his guilt
and that the death sentence was inescapable. It is not farfetched
that one, some, or all of the four defendants changed his or their
pleas simply out of resignation to what appeared to him or to them
as a pre-ordained fate.
The judge's curt speech to the defendants, instructing them "to make
a soul search, concentrate and ask (their) heart, mind and body as
to the consequence of (their) act," falls far below the exacting
standard of care with which a plea of guilty must be regarded by a
trial court, as spelled out in a line of decisions starting with People
vs. Apduhan.1 In the latter case, we explicitly said that all trial judges
"must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty,
for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the
import of an inevitable conviction."

2. The counsel de oficio and the Solicitor General are one in
observing that the trial court should not have rendered the decision
appealed from without requiring the presentation of evidence despite
the accused's plea of guilty. Indeed, as correctly pointed out by both
counsels, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance and
advisability of taking evidence, in capital cases, notwithstanding the
affirmative plea of the accused, for the purpose of determining his
guilt and the degree of his culpability, to the end that such evidence
will dispel all doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and
effects of his plea.2 The record of the present case does not show
that the trial court directed any question to any of the accused
regarding the circumstances attending the commission of the grave
crime of which he is charged. And because of the nature of the
present case which was an offshoot of the gang war that plagued the
various prisons in the country during the second half of 1970, it is not
a remote possibility, as suggested by both the counsel de oficio and
the Solicitor General, that one or some of the four defendants may
have acted only as an accomplice or as accomplices, or that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery may not at all have been
present, thus making the crime only that of homicide which does not
warrant imposition of the extreme penalty of death.
One last note. In at least three criminal cases appealed to us,
including the present,3 from the Circuit Criminal Court holding
sessions in Pasig, Rizal, involving prisoners charged with and
convicted for participation in prison gang wars, Atty. Jose O. Galvan
has been appointed by the court a quo to act as counsel de oficio for
the defendants. In every case, the defendants either pleaded guilty
on initial arraignment or later changed their plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty." The appointment of Atty. Galvan as counsel de oficio in all
three cases might just have been a coincidence since there is no
evidence before us that would show that he had applied for and
been granted such appointment. We would, nevertheless, caution all
courts against the frequent appointment of the same attorney as
counsel de oficio, for two basic reasons: first, it is unfair to the
attorney concerned, considering the burden of his regular practice
that he should be saddled with too many de officio cases;
and, second, the compensation provided for by section 32 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court (a fixed fee of P500 in capital offense)
might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income,
something which the Rule does not envision. In every case, the
accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would
have too little time to spare for his de officio cases, and also would
be inordinately eager to finish such cases in order to collect his fees
within the earliest possible time.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision a quo is set aside, and this case is
hereby remanded to the court of origin for a new arraignment of the
defendants George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, Gerardo Abuhin and
Rolando Castillo, and for further proceedings in accordance with law
and consistently with the views herein expressed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974 (see cases in VII. Duties
and responsibilities of a lawyer)
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay
City, respondent.
G.R. No. 148821 July 18, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JERRY FERRER, appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review1 is the decision2 of 28 November
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, Marawi
City, in Criminal Case No. 2969-98, finding appellant Jerry Ferrer
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against Mary Grace Belonio and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death and to pay the sum of P100,000 as moral damages and
P30,000 as attorneys fees, as well as the costs.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
43
Appellant was tried under an information 3 for rape which was filed on
17 February 1998. Its accusatory portion reads:
That on or sometime in October 1995 and continuously
thereafter in the Municipality of Wao, Province of Lanao
del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, did
then and there willfully and feloniously and by means of
force, violence and intimidation and taking advantage of
his ascendancy as stepfather of an eleven (11) years [sic]
old and studying Grade V [sic] at the Katutungan
Elementary School by the name of Mary Grace Pataksil
Belonio by pointing [to] her a scythe (garab) and ordering
her to remove her clothes and then to lay down, remove
her panty and successfully have [sic] sexual intercourse
with her against her will and consent and continuously
repeated the same thereafter when she is alone at home
and while her mother is out.
CONTRARY to and in violation of Article 335, par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code.
When arraigned on 16 June 1998, appellant pleaded not guilty.4
Subsequently, appellant, through counsel Atty. Moh'd Hassan
Macabanding of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed an undated
Urgent Motion for Medical Treatment. He alleged that he was
suffering from an unknown internal sickness which had already
claimed the life of another detention prisoner. Afraid that he would
suffer the same fate, appellant prayed for his immediate medical
treatment at the Provincial or City Hospital.5
On 22 June 1998, the trial court granted appellant's Urgent Motion
for Medical Treatment and ordered his temporary release to the
custody of Ustadj Sinoding Langcoa, a trusted member of the
society, who has the responsibility of bringing the former to any
government physician or to the clinic of Dr. Saprola Dipatuan. The
court also ordered appellant to submit to the court the findings and
record of his treatment by Dr. Dipatuan. It likewise set the pre-trial
and the trial of the case on 21 and 22 July 1998,6 respectively.
On the scheduled 21 July 1998 pre-trial hearing, appellant and his
PAO counsel, Atty. Moh'd Hassan Macabanding, failed to appear in
court. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Abubakar Barambangan
vigorously opposed the motion for postponement7 which was filed by
Atty. Macabanding the previous day, 20 July 1998. In denying the
motion for postponement, the trial court took into consideration of the
fact that Prosecutor Barambangan was not notified of the motion, the
failure of appellant and Atty. Macabanding to appear at the pre-trial
despite due notice and appellant's blatant disregard of its order
dated 22 June 1998, requiring him to submit the medical findings of
Dr. Dipatuan. The trial court then ordered the immediate issuance of
a warrant to arrest appellant and allowed the prosecution to present
evidence in absentia.8
Trial in absentia followed. The prosecution presented as witnesses
Glorita Tugade, Mary Grace Belonio, Felipa Pataksil Belonio and Dr.
Benjamin B. Bajarla. Their testimonies tended to establish the facts
we now narrate.
Mary Grace was born on 6 July 1984 to spouses Felix Belonio and
Felipa Pataksil Belonio at Banisilan, North Cotabato. 9 The Belonio
spouses were lawfully married sometime in 1978 10 and out of such
union, four (4) children were born, one of whom is Mary Grace. The
couple, however, separated. When Mary Grace was barely one (1)
year and six (6) months old, Felipa Belonio started to live-in with
appellant at Mother Catutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur. 11She brought
her children with her.
From then on, life for Felipa Belonio started at 3:00 a.m. to peddle
her sari-sari items and ended at 7:00 p.m. when she returned home.
In contrast, appellant was a freelance blacksmith who usually stayed
home.12
Sometime in October 1995, a Monday, when Mary Grace was
already 11 years old, she was to experience the first of a series of
sexual abuses from appellant. Around 2:00 p.m., appellant called
Mary Grace to go upstairs at their house. With appellant's previous

lascivious acts etched in her mind, Mary Grace hesitated but she
had no choice except to obey because appellant had placed a
scythe on her neck. Against Mary Grace's pleas of "don't kill me
daddy," appellant ordered her to undress. Mary Grace did not
remove her clothes. Furious by her disobedience, appellant pulled
down her shorts and panty. She resisted and covered her private
parts with her hands. Her efforts, however, proved futile. Still
threatening her with the scythe, appellant pushed her to lie down,
pulled out his penis, placed himself on top of her and then inserted
his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, he released her. She felt pain
in her vagina when she was dressing up.13
Friday night of the same week, while Felipa Belonio was visiting her
sister Glorita Tugade, appellant again had carnal knowledge of Mary
Grace. She felt excruciating pain in her vagina.
Thus, from October 1995 to 11 December 1997, appellant sexually
abused Mary Grace, repeatedly and continuously. He imposed his
lechery on her three to four times a week whenever her mother was
out of the house.14
Mary Grace initially kept to herself the sexual abuses as she was
afraid that appellant might make good his threat to kill her
mother.15 But Mary Grace finally found the courage to reveal to her
Aunt Glorita Tugade what appellant had done to her. It was on 14
December 1997 when Glorita Tugade and her brother-in-law Pablito
Malagamba confronted Felipa Belonio about Mary Grace's
revelation. Thereafter, they reported the incident to the Wao Police
Headquarters as a result of which appellant was immediately
arrested.16
On 17 December 1997, Dr. Benjamin Bajarla, Medical Officer IV of
the Wao District Hospital, Lanao del Sur, physically examined Mary
Grace He found in Mary Grace's hymen old and healed lacerations
at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions 17 which he opined could have been
caused by sexual intercourse. He said that Mary Grace told him that
the last sexual abuse took place on 11 December 1997.18
On 23 August 1999, the prosecution made its formal offer of
evidence.19 Thereafter, the trial court set the dates for the
presentation by the defense of its evidence. Notices were sent for
the following scheduled hearing dates: 23 September 1999,20 21
October 1999,21 29 November 1999,22 31 January 2000,23 7 April
2000,24 24 April 2000,2523 May 2000,26 26 June 2000,27 and 24 July
2000.28 However, neither appellant nor his counsel appeared on said
dates. Thus, at the hearing of 24 July 2000, the trial court granted
the prosecution's motion to submit the case for decision, since the
prosecution had long rested its case and the defense had no
witnesses to present. The trial court also considered appellant as
having jumped bail since he did not show up in court.29
Thus, the trial court rendered on 28 November 2000, a decision
which consisted of a five-page summary of the testimonial and
documentary evidence and which abruptly concluded, that based on
said evidence, the prosecution proved the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt requiring the imposition of the death penalty.
In his Appellant's Brief,30 appellant assails the decision of the trial
court as res ipsa loquitor violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. He argues that the decision failed to distinctly point out
the applicable law on which it is based and that there is nothing in
the decision that would show how the trial court arrived at its
conclusion convicting him of the crime charged.
Appellant also asserts that granting without admitting that he
committed the alleged rape, the trial court erred in imposing the
death penalty. He claims that while the prosecution may have proved
that Mary Grace was 11 years old at the time of the rape, it failed to
prove that he was her stepfather as alleged in the information.
In the Appellee's Brief,31 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that the evidence on record support appellant's conviction
for statutory rape. It maintains that the prosecution successfully
proved that in October 1995, appellant had carnal knowledge of
Mary Grace who was then 11 years old.
The OSG submits, however, that the trial court erred in imposing the
death penalty. While the information alleged that appellant was Mary
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
44
Grace's stepfather, the evidence adduced however showed that he
was merely the common-law spouse of Mary Grace's mother. Under
these circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the
death penalty should be imposed upon him.
Similarly, the OSG asserts that the trial court failed to award civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000. The OSG insists that exemplary damages
should be awarded considering that the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence is present as seen in the
relation of trust and confidence between Mary Grace and appellant.
While abuse of confidence could not have been properly appreciated
in the determination of the appropriate penalty, it was nonetheless
proven at the trial. As such, it should be the basis of the award for
exemplary damages. As to the award of P100,000 as moral
damages, the OSG proposes its reduction to P50,000.
Upon careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the
decision of the trial court failed to comply with the rudimentary
requirements of due process and the constitutional provisions that
vouchsafe the same.
Let us first quote in full the trial court's decision.
Accused Jerry Ferrer is charged of the commission of the
crime of Rape committed as follows:
xxx [Information is quoted] xxx
On arraignment, the accused assisted by his counsel
pleaded not guilty.
In the trial after the termination of the pre-trial, the
prosecution presented both testimonial and documentary
evidences consisting of the testimonies of Mrs. Glorieta
Tugade, Mary Grace Belonio, Felipa Belonio and Dr.
Benjamin Bajarla as well as Exhibits "A" (Certificate of
Live Birth of the victim; "B" (Baptismal Certificate); "C"
(Medical Certificate showing laceration of hymen; "D"
(Microbiological result of such examination; and "E"
(Sketch of the Female External Genetalia).
Trial was conducted in absentia in view of the escape from
confinement of the accused.
From the evidence, it appears that Mary Grace Belonio
was born on July 6, 1984, at Banisilan, North Cotabato.
Her father is Felix Belonio while her mother is Felipa
Pataksil Belonio. Said spouses were lawfully married to
each other in 1978 and out of such union, four (4) children
were born one of whom is Mary Grace (the victim in this
case). The couple were however separated and when
Mary Grace was barely one (1) year and six (6) months
old, Felipa started living as a common law wife of the
accused Jerry Ferrer together with Mary Grace and her
other children in one house at Mother Catutungan, Wao,
Lanao del Sur. Felipa was a "sari-sari" item vendor and
normally left home as early as 3:00 o'clock in the morning
for said business and return home at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening. Jerry Ferrer (common law husband) is a
blacksmith and stay home with the child victim Mary
Grace.
In October of 1995 while the mother (Felipa) was away
attending to her business, the accused Jerry started his
criminal design to have carnal knowledge by committing
rape on Mary Grace. It was Monday afternoon at 2:00
o'clock in October 1995 that Jerry called his step-daughter
Mary Grace [to] go upstairs of their house at Catutungan,
Wao, Lanao del Sur. With the use of his scythe in
intimidating the girl, Jerry started touching the girl who was
resisting but was no match to the strength of her step-
father who was at the same time placing his scythe at the
neck of the girl to prevent resistance. The accused
undressed the girl by pulling the latter's short pant[s] down
and her panty. The accused pushed the girl to lie down.
The accused, then pulled down his short pant[s] and took
out his penis into the girl's vagina. The girl felt the pain that

day. On Friday of that same week in the evening while his
common law wife Felipa (mother of the victim) was away,
the accused succeeded in consummating the crime of
rape upon Mary Grace. The accused repeatedly did the
sexual assault upon Mary Grace until in 1977, the victim
got the courage to reveal the said rape to her mother that
resulted in the filing of this case. The Medical Certificate
issued by Dr. Benjamin Bajarla following [the] medical and
physical examination on the victim on December 17, 1997
showed laceration of the girl's hymen at 3:00 o'clock; 6
o'clock and 9 o'clock positions.
It further appears from the evidence that Mary Grace was
born on July 6, 1984 and [that] the crime of rape was
committed upon her by the accused in 1995 and [the]
subsequent year. The victim was therefore 11 years old at
the time of the commission of rape upon her.
This Court was constrained to decide this case after
trial in absentia for reason of the accused escaping from
imprisonment after arraignment. From all the foregoing
evidences, the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Convicting the accused JERRY FERRER of
the crime of Rape committed upon the person of
his stepdaughter Mary Grace Belonio who was
only 11 years old at the time of the commission
of said crime.
2. Sentencing the said accused JERRY
FERRER of the supreme penalty of death under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. Ordering the accused JERRY FERRER to
pay to the victim the sum of One hundred
thousand (P100,000) Pesos in moral damages;
and the further sum of Thirty thousand
(P30,000) Pesos as Attorney's fee and the
costs.32
Violating the Constitutional requirements, the five-page decision
failed to express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. After a summation of the evidence presented,
which consisted only of the prosecution's considering that the
defense failed to adduce evidence in its behalf, the trial court
immediately declared, in a most sweeping manner, the guilt of
appellant.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,33 we had occasion to caution
magistrates to be more circumspect and diligent in
heeding the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution which states:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
and its statutory expression in Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Section 1. Judgment; definition and form. — Judgment is
the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or
not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him
of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be
written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law
upon which it is based.
We reiterate our ruling in Yao v. Court of Appeals,34 thus:
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having
substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
45
injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in
which they were written and even if "there (was left) much
to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out
the facts and the law on which they were based, as when
they stated the legal qualifications of the offense
constituted by the facts proved, the modifying
circumstances, the participation of the accused, the
penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the
facts comprising the elements of the offense that was
charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a
verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted
the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but
made their own findings and assessment of evidence,
before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of
the case.
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in that while we conceded
that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait,
it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and
again in Francisco v. Permskul, where we cautioned that
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot
excuse non-compliance with the constitutional
requirements.
xxx
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write
abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the
expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of
justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice
Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals come
true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal
the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the
appellant of due process since he was not accorded a fair
opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in
criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property
rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a
human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution.
The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court
cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X
and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party,
who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court
for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life,
liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must
ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained
public confidence in the justness of his decision.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of
lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose
careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed
their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their
magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed
fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision,

resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a
summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties; convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any
legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the
letter in question was libelous; consisted merely of one (1)
paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed
to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5)
pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the
labor arbiter's decision including the dispositive portion
and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2]
sentences each) of its own discussion or reasoning; was
merely based on the findings of another court sans
transcript of stenographic notes; or failed to explain the
factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages.
Tested against these standards, we withhold approbation on the trial
court's decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply with the
constitutional and legal mandates. Except for the narration of the
prosecution's evidence, there is nothing to indicate the reason for
the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason
given why it concluded that said evidence proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court's decision is brief,
starkly hallow, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved
nothing and attempted at nothing. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.
Inevitably, we agree with the appellant that the trial court
decision res ipsa loquitor violates both Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
While this transgression by itself justifies the remand of the case to
the trial court, there is another and equally important reason why we
are bent on taking that course of action. Appellant was deprived of
his constitutional right to counsel as enshrined in Section 14, Article
III, of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
This constitutional requirement is also reflected in the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure35 particularly in Section 1(c), Rule 115 thereof,
which provides that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be
present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment.
We find and must hold, most regrettably, that appellant Jerry Ferrer
was not properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel. The
records reveal that appellant's counsel of record was PAO's Atty.
Moh'd Hassan Macabanding. The earliest pleading he filed and
signed as counsel was a Motion for Re-investigation for which he
requested the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City to set the hearing
thereof on 12 March 1998 at 9:00 p.m.36 The hearing did take place
on 13 April 1998 with notices to the provincial prosecutor and Atty.
Macabanding. A notation was made on the back of the notice by the
process server that Atty. Macabanding was served on 13 April 1998
and that return was made on the same day.37 He did not appear at
the scheduled hearing; hence, the trial court denied the motion in its
order of 13 April 1998. The trial court thereafter sent Atty.
Macabanding a notice for the arraignment of appellant. 38Again, Atty.
Macabanding did not appear, but appellant was assisted by another
PAO lawyer, Atty. Wenida Papandayan.39
Atty. Macabanding then filed an "Urgent Motion for the Medical
Treatment of the Accused."40 As already narrated, the motion was
granted by the trial court in its order of 22 June 1998 which also set
the pre-trial on 21 July 1998. But, Atty. Macabanding filed a motion
to postpone the pre-trial because allegedly he was subpoenaed to
appear on the same date before the COMELEC. 41 This was the last
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
46
act and appearance of Atty. Macabanding. He did not appear at the
hearing he requested for the motion for reinvestigation, on the
arraignment, on the pre-trial and all the subsequent hearings of the
case against appellant. He did not inform the court of his
whereabouts. For all intents, purposes and appearances, Atty.
Macabanding abandoned his client, an accused who stands to face
the death penalty.
True, Atty. Macabanding was substituted by Atty. Avecina Alonto at
the hearings when the prosecution presented its witnesses. But Atty.
Alonto professed that she was merely representing Atty.
Macabanding. She even claimed that she has to consult Atty.
Macabanding when she reserved her right to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses Mary Grace Belonio, Felipa Belonio and
Glorita Tugade.42 But neither Atty. Alonto nor Atty. Macabanding
cross-examined these witnesses upon whose testimonies hinged the
determination of whether the incidents of rape were indeed
committed. While Atty. Alonto cross-examined the physician who
conducted the medical examination on Mary Grace, said testimony
was at best corroborative. Further, a reading of the transcript of
stenographic notes revealed her overall lackadaisical performance
as defense counsel.
Indeed, the right to confrontation, of cross-examination and
presentation of evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of such right; 43 the
circumstances of the case at bar, however, highlight a transgression
of the more fundamental right to counsel.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an
accused in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. Chief
Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado,44 explained:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed
so important that it has become a constitutional right and it
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure
an attorney of his own.
In the oft-cited William v. Kaiser,45 the United States Supreme Court,
through Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused
needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous
prosecutors, of the law's complexity or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment. An accused must be given the right to be represented
by counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that any
defense presented in his behalf would be inadequate considering the
legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. The
right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.46
In the end, even Atty. Alonto followed Atty. Macabanding in his
uncaring, insensitive and cavalier attitude towards an accused who
had placed his life in their hands and whose protection and defense
they have sworn to do. The notices sent to both Atty. Alonto and Atty.
Macabanding on the succeeding hearings during which it should
have been their turn as defense counsels to present evidence were
received by the PAO as shown by the notations made by the
process server on the back of the return of service. But, the records
glaringly show that they neither move for postponement of these
hearings nor explained to the court their inability to present
evidence.

It may be stressed that the right to counsel must be more than just
the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding
of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means
that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer
in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his
sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient
and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation.47
No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for
the most compelling and cogent reasons. While Atty. Alonto and Atty.
Macabanding faced the daunting task of defending an accused who
had jumped bail, this unfortunate development is not a justification to
excuse themselves from giving their hearts and souls to the latter's
defense. The exercise of their duties as counsel de oficio meant
rendering full meaning and reality to the constitutional precepts
protecting the rights of the accused. A counsel de oficio is expected
to do his utmost. A mere pro forma appointment of a counsel de
oficio who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused
merits disapprobation. The exacting demands expected of a lawyer
should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de oficio. He
must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in
the proper dispensation of justice.48
In People v. Sevilleno,49 we have made known our displeasure over
the manner by which three PAO lawyers discharged their duties. All
three displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client. We
stressed that Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders
him administratively liable. In said case, the defense lawyers did not
protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused.
Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de
oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused, however guilty
he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, we advised
them to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in
the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of
any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.
We are making a similar advice to Atty. Alonto and Atty.
Macabanding. Their deportment evinces an apparent disregard of
their fidelity to their oaths as lawyers and responsibility as officers of
the court to aid in the administration and dispensation of
justice.50 After all, the constitutional right of the accused to be heard
in his defense is inviolable. If no court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right, then neither
can lawyers appointed to defend him.51
As we have stressed in a number of decisions, we are not espousing
a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes. Our unyielding stance
is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the
license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal
whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an
erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened
policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends
all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal
interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not
be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law
enforcement. Neither should we be moved alone by the outrage of
the public in the multiplication of heinous crimes for our decisions
should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather.
Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to
have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in
our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, even if he
belongs to a minority of one has the right to be right, while the
majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.52
The requirement that we pass upon on automatic review a case in
which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the
trial court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection
of the accused. Having received the supreme penalty which the law
imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all
the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
47
the Highest Tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality
may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the
accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks
no interference and tolerates no evasion.53
Ultimately, we see no other choice but to order the remand of the
case to the court a quo for continuation of the trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 28 November 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, Marawi City, in
Criminal Case No. 2969-98, finding accused-appellant JERRY
FERRER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is
hereby SET ASIDE. The records are hereby REMANDED to said
court for further proceedings and for the proper rendition of judgment
in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Abdulhakim Amer R. Ibrahim is hereby ADMONISHED to
observe faithfully the provisions of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution and Rule 120, Section 1 of the Rules of Court (Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended).
Atty. Moh'd Hassan Macabanding and Atty. Avecina Alonto of the
Public Attorney's Office of Marawi City are hereby ADMONISHED for
having fallen short of their responsibility as officers of the court and
as members of the Bar and WARNED that any similar infraction shall
be dealt with most severely.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5174 February 28, 2002
ERNESTO M. RAMOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, JR., respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty. Mariano
A. Dajoyag, Jr. for negligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission,1 which affirmed the dismissal
by the Labor Arbiter of a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
complainant against DCCD Engineering Corporation. In a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice, dated November 15, 1999,
complainant stated:
As a result of the dismissal by the NLRC of my complaint, I have
been physically and emotionally affected. Considering my status in
the community of the respondents and where I live as a Civil
Engineer, now 73 1/2 years of age, the illegal termination of my
employment continuously caused me sleepless nights, mental
anguish and torture, social humiliation and besmirch[ed] reputation.
These have been compounded by the failure of my lawyer, Atty.
MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, Jr. to file on time the petition for certiorari,
which [the] Honorable Supreme Court dismissed with finality . . . To
lessen the impact of my sufferings and mental torture, which I could
no longer bear for nearly six years since I received the notice of
termination of my services in December 1993, I finally decided to
report my lawyer’s failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
period which constitutes negligence and malpractice . . .
This fact arose out of case G.R. 125244 (Ernesto Ramos vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et
al.) Our motion for last extension of time within which to file [a]
petition for review on certiorari [was] DENIED, "petitioner having
been previously warned in the resolution of July 24, 1996 that no
further extension will be given" per resolution of the First Division of
[the] Honorable Court dated August 26, 1996. Our petition for
certiorari filed on August 14, 1996 was dismissed per resolution of
the First Division of [the] Honorable Court dated December 2, 1996
for having [been] filed out of time. Our motion for reconsideration [of]

the resolution [dated] December 2, 1996, which dismissed the
petition for certiorari, was likewise denied with finality per resolution
dated February 19, 1997 of the First Division of [the] Honorable
Court. Machine [copies] of the above-mentioned resolutions [are]
attached hereto.
Because it was not my fault or shortcoming but that of my lawyer,
Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr., for his failure [in] his devotion to his
client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his client’s rights, it is
requested that said erring lawyer be duly sanctioned and my petition
for certiorari be reconsidered and accepted. Or through another
counsel, I be allowed to file another petition for certiorari with [an]
important addendum, which my said former lawyer failed to mention
due to time constraint in filing [the] petition for certiorari.2
Respondent denied the allegations against him. Commenting on the
complaint, he said:
1. The records will show that complainant filed a complaint
against DCCD Engineering Corp. on May 1994 before the
National Labor Relations Commission docketed under
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03667-94 for illegal lay-off,
illegal deduction, overtime pay, service incentive leave
pay, and related claims;
2. Complainant approached me being a "kababayan" from
our hometown of Calaca, Batangas. He said that he was a
friend of my late father, Atty. Mariano Dajoyag, Sr., and
knew also my mother, Atty. Aurora Ampil Dajoyag, who is
still living but in her middle eighties. After appealing to our
common regional origin, complainant urged me to accept
his case;
3. Being a kabayan, I was hesitant to secure a contract for
legal services and that as it usually goes with such
situation, it was "bahala na lang pag natapos ang kaso,";
...
5. That before the Labor Arbiter, I filed the following:
a) Amended Complaint to implead proper
parties and to include changes in the causes of
action for a more plausible plea;
b) Position Paper consisting of 15 pages with
annexes consisting of 11 pages;
c) Reply to Respondent’s Position Paper
consisting of 16 pages and annexes consisting
of 24 pages;
d) Memorandum for Complainant consisting of
22 pages and annexes consisting of 4 pages;
6. That after the case was submitted for resolution, the
Honorable Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint in a
decision dated April 3, 1995. Said decision in a nutshell
concluded that: Complainant was a managerial employee
with a field assignment for which he was not entitled to
overtime pay and service incentive leave pursuant to the
Labor Code, and that complainant’s term of employment
was [for] a fixed duration which already expired. . . .
To this decision, I prepared a Memorandum of Appeal in
behalf of Complainant consisting of 18 pages which I also
filed within the reglementary period at my own expense
except the appeal fee and legal research fee which
complainant had to pay being the party-litigant;
7. After the filing of this Memorandum of Appeal, and the
respondent Company had filed its opposition, the NLRC
ruled to affirm the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC
found that complainant was engaged as a consultant for a
fixed period of time for which the termination of
employment depended upon the termination of the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
48
agreement; and that complainant had also waived his right
to file the complaint because he had executed a waiver
and release wherein he expressly declared that his
separation was legally valid. And there was no evidence
that complainant was forced to sign this release which was
held to be valid.
8. That in the face of this adverse ruling, I still filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was duly verified by
complainant. This Motion for Reconsideration was
thereafter denied in a Resolution, to wit:
"After due consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the complainant on February 9, 1996, from the
Decision of January 22, 1996 of the Commission (Second
Division) [the Court] RESOLVED to deny the same for lack
of merit."
9. That despite another adverse ruling and even as I have
to attend to daily hearings of my other cases or attend to
other paper work, I still prepare[d] a Petition for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
10. Thus on June 25th, 1996, I filed a Motion for Extension
of time to file a Petition for Certiorari asking for 30 days
which was up to July 25, 1996. Note: This Motion for
Extension was granted through a Resolution of this
Honorable Court dated July 24th 1996 - but which I only
received on August 28, 1996. However, as July 25th 1996
was fast approaching, and I was still saddled with heavy
workload aside from the fact that I needed numerous
xerox copies of documents as well as [c]ertified [t]rue
[c]opies also of certain crucial documents which had to be
secured from the NLRC, I was really constrained to ask for
a second extension of time FOR ONLY 20 DAYS OR UP
TO AUGUST 14th, 1996 to file the aforesaid Petition;
....
12. That to my utter surprise and sadness, the Resolution
of the Honorable Court granting my first Motion for
Extension from June 25th to July 25th contained a warning
that it should be the last but which I ONLY received on
August 28th after I have already filed the second Motion
for Extension for only 20 days and also the basic Petition
for Certiorari.
To summarize:
A) Motion for First Extension 30 days from June
25th, 1996 to July 25th - filed on June 25th;
B) Motion for Second Extension for 20 days or
from July 25, 1996 to August 14th - filed July
25th;
C) Resolution dated July 24th granting First
Motion for Extension from June 25th to July 25th
with warning that no further extension shall be
given-received ONLY on August 28th;
D) Petition for Certiorari filed on August 14th -
exactly within the period of the request [for]
second extension had this second extension for
only 20 days been granted.
13. That as mentioned above, the July 24th, 1996
Resolution reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.).
The motion of petitioner for extension of thirty (30) days
from June 25, 1996 within which to file petition for
certiorari is GRANTED WITH WARNING THAT THE
SAME SHALL BE THE LAST AND THAT NO FURTHER
EXTENSION will be given."

14. That on August 26th 1996, a resolution was
promulgated by the Honorable Court which was received
by respondent counsel on October 5, 1996, to wit:
"G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.,).
The motion of petitioner for a second extension of twenty
(20) days from July 25, 1996 within which to file petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED, petitioner having been
previously warned in the resolution of July 25, 1996 that
no further extension will be given."
15. That to this denial I filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on October 18, 1996 of this August 26th 1996 denial order.
16. That prior to the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial of the second Motion for
Extension of Time to file petition, the Honorable Court
issued a Resolution dated October 9, 1996 directing
respondents to file Comment - which was received on
Nov. 5, 1996;
17. That pursuant to this Resolution, private respondent
filed its Comment and the Solicitor General requested for
extension of time to file his Comment. But after the
Comment of private respondent, the Honorable Court
issued a Resolution dated December 2, 1996, to wit:
"G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos v. National Labor
Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.). -
Considering the private respondent’s Comment/Opposition
to the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petition for having been filed out of time.
The motion of the Solicitor General for an extension of
thirty (30) days from November 8, 1996 within which to file
Comment on the petition for Certiorari is further NOTED in
view of the dismissal of the petition."
18. That from the said Resolution dated December 2,
1996, the undersigned respondent counsel in behalf of
complainant still filed a Motion for Reconsideration
pleading for the reinstatement of the Petition[.] But inspite
of my earnest and sincere efforts, the Honorable Court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration with finality;
19. That complainant was properly informed of this
adverse ruling. He insisted that I file another Motion for
Reconsideration. I did not accede to his desire and I told
him that the dismissal was with finality and we might be
cited for contempt for filing such pleading. He was
unhappy about it and that was the last time we saw each
other.
....
It appears that the Resolution granting my request for 1st extension
contained a warning that no further extension would be given. BUT I
WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS BECAUSE WHEN I FILED MY
MOTION FOR LAST EXTENSION FOR ONLY 20 DAYS, I HAVE
NOT YET RECEIVED THE COPY OF SAID RESOLUTION. And in
fact, even at the time I filed the basic Petition for Certiorari, I HAVE
NOT YET STILL received said July 24, 1996 Resolution.
I RELIED IN GOOD FAITH AND IN THE HONEST BELIEF THAT
THE FIRST MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR 30 DAYS WOULD BE
GRANTED - WITHOUT THE WARNING - SINCE IT WAS MERELY
A FIRST EXTENSION. Then even as I was terribly saddled with
heavy load and at times had some difficulty in getting in touch with
complainant, I dropped everything to be able to beat the supposed
deadline of August 14th, 1996.
I am sorry if I had to rely in good faith that my Motion for 1st
Extension of 30 days would be granted without the warning - as this
was a first extension only; and also that I request for a second and
last extension of 20 days for which I complied with the filing of the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
49
Petition for Certiorari on the last day of the supposed extended
period.
....
And even assuming there could be a charge of negligence, still this
is excusable under existing jurisprudence. The Honorable Court
declared in a case:
"Negligence is excusable where it is caused by failure to receive
notice of the action or the trial, x x x" Fernandez vs Tan Tiong Tick, 1
SCRA 1138; underscoring supplied).
In this case, there was failure on my part to receive notice of the
action of the Honorable Court on my first motion for extension before
I filed the second and last motion for extension of time to file petition
as well as the basic petition for certiorari itself.3
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation. On October 27, 2001,
the IBP approved the report and recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach of his
professional duties would be dealt with more severely.
Acknowledging respondent’s efforts in prosecuting complainant’s
case before the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission, the investigating commissioner found that respondent
was not guilty of willful breach of professional duty but only of simple
neglect of duty and accordingly recommended that he be given a
mere reprimand. Thus, the investigating commissioner reasoned:
Respondent has failed to show that he exercised that degree of
competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting
complainant’s petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme
Court. His reliance on good faith cannot be credited fully in his favor.
Lawyers should not presume that the courts would grant their motion
for extension of time to file the required pleading or brief nor expect
that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from notice.
They should file their brief or pleadings within the extended period
requested. Failing in this, they have only themselves to blame if their
appeal or case is dismissed (Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA
252). Neither would the fact that he has not been paid his fees
exonerate him from liability. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill and competence regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. (Santiago,
et al. vs. Atty. Amado R. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, September 7, 1995).4
We find the investigating commissioner’s report and
recommendation well taken.
First. Respondent pleads good faith and excusable neglect of duty.
He stresses the fact that he filed the petition for certiorari within the
20-day period of extension that he sought in his second motion for
extension and claims that he learned that the period of extension
granted in his first motion for extension was inextendible only after
the expiration of the two periods of extension that he prayed for.
Respondent’s contentions have no merit. The decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission affirming the Labor Arbiter’s
dismissal of complainant’s claims against his former employers was
promulgated on January 22, 1996. Respondent was notified of the
decision on February 8, 1996 and he filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. His motion was
denied on March 12, 1996 and respondent was notified thereof on
March 25, 1996. On June 25, 1996, the last day of the 90-day period
allowed at that time for filing a special civil action for certiorari,5 he
filed with this Court a motion seeking an extension of thirty (30) days
for filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground that
because of pressure of work he was prevented him from filing the
same earlier. On July 25, 1996, the last day of the period he asked
for in his first motion for extension, respondent filed a motion praying
for another extension of twenty (20) days for filing the petition
for certiorari. On the last day of the second period of extension that
he asked for, August 14, 1996, respondent finally filed the petition for
certiorari.

Meanwhile, on July 24, 1996, this Court issued a resolution granting
respondent’s first motion for extension, with a warning that no further
extension would be granted. Respondent received a copy of the
resolution on August 28, 1996. On August 26, 1996, the Court
denied the petition for certiorari for being filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the resolution, dated August 26,
1996, denying his petition on October 5, 1996. On October 18, 1996,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the Court in its resolution of December 2, 1996.
To begin with, motions for extension are not granted as a matter of
right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should
never presume that their motions for extension or postponement will
be granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray
for. Due diligence requires that they should conduct a timely inquiry
with the division clerks of court of the action on their motions and the
lack of notice thereof will not make them any less accountable for
their omission.6 Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda of briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Regardless of the agreement he had with complainant with respect
to the payment of his fees, respondent owed it to complainant to do
his utmost to ensure that every remedy allowed by law is availed
of.7 Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
every lawyer to devote his full attention, diligence, skills, and
competence to every case that he accepts. Pressure and large
volume of legal work do not excuse respondent for filing the petition
for certiorari out of time.8
Respondent cites the ruling in Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick,9 in
support of his claim that his negligence is excusable. Such reliance
is misplaced. In Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, the appellant cited in
support of his petition for the reopening of his case the failure of his
former counsel to inform him of the status of his case. He argued
that his own failure to inquire from his former counsel the status of
his case was excusable. This Court rejected the contention:
Negligence is excusable where it is caused by failure to receive
notice of the action or the trial, by a genuine and excusable mistake
or miscalculation, by reliance upon assurances given by those upon
whom the party had a right to depend, as the adverse party or
counsel retained in the case, or a competent adviser, that it would
not be necessary for him to take an active part in the case, or that
the suit would not be prosecuted, by relying on another person to
attend to the case for him, when such other person promised to do
so, or was chargeable with that duty or by a well-founded belief that
the case would not be reached for trial as it was in fact reached, or
by other circumstances not involving fault of the moving party. . . .
The Court pointed out that appellant’s counsel was duly notified of
the proceedings in the case, and appellant was bound by his
counsel’s conduct and handling of his case.
In the case at bar, respondent was ill-informed about the disposition
of his first motion for extension not by reason of genuine and
excusable mistake or miscalculation but by his sheer negligence. It
is noteworthy that the motions for extension, and even the petition
for certiorari, were all filed at the last moment. Respondent had 120
days within which he could have filed the petition for certiorari.
However, because of his cavalier attitude toward deadlines for the
filing of pleadings, including the one set by himself in his first motion
for extension, respondent lost the opportunity for filing the petition for
review.
Nevertheless, having said this, it ought to be remembered, on the
other hand, that respondent exerted efforts to protect the rights and
interests of complainant, including trying to secure a reconsideration
of the denial of his petition for certiorari in this Court. For this reason,
we are inclined to adopt the investigating commissioner’s
recommendation that respondent be merely reprimanded for his
simple neglect of duty.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
50
Second. Complainant prays that we admit and consider the merits of
the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, or that he be allowed to
file anew a separate petition for certiorari.1âwphi1 We understand
the plight of the complainant, but we cannot grant his plea. This is an
administrative case, separate from G.R. No. 125244 in which the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari was made. The resolution of
the Court in that case operated as a judgment on the merits and is
now final.10 Indeed, public policy and sound practice demand that, at
the risk of occasional errors, the judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law, 11 and that every party be
bound by his counsel’s decision regarding the conduct of the case,
including his mistakes, save only when the negligence of counsel is
so gross, reckless, and inexcusable as to amount to a deprivation of
the client’s day in court.12 This is not the situation in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. is REPRIMANDED. He
is admonished henceforth to exercise greater care and diligence in
the performance of his duties towards his clients and the courts and
warned that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more
severely dealt with.
Complainant’s prayer that the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent be considered and given due course despite its denial
for having been filed out of time is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ledesma v. Climaco, GR L-23815, June 28, 1974 (see cases in
chapter 7)
A.C. No. 6424 March 4, 2005
CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latter’s money or other
property coming into the former’s possession should be deemed to
be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be
commingled with the lawyers’ own; much less, used by them. Failure
to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional
misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by
Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The
Affidavit1 submitted by complainant alleges the following:
"Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty.
Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to
seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City
entitled ‘Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon’ for
Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment;
"After going over the documents I brought with me
pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my
lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight
Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial
service fee, which amount was paid by me on October 18,
2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as
Annex ‘A’ to form part hereof;
"As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie,
returned to his office the following week to make follow-up
on said case. However, I was informed later by my son
Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case
because the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-

ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action
done on our case;
"Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw
the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latter’s
failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will
assist me in the above-mentioned case;
"My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naraval’s office that
same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to
withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my
documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite
our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he
cannot return the documents because they were in their
house, and that he could not give us back the amount we
paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money;
"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer
the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President
of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the
Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;
xxx xxx x x x."
In an Order dated March 12, 2002, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed
respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same
directive was reiterated in the CBD’s May 31, 2002 Order 3 issued
through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any
answer despite his receipt of the Orders.4
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD
proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order5dated November
11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required
complainant to submit her position paper within ten days from receipt
thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The CBD received complainant’s Position Paper 6 on December 10,
2002.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003,
Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year
for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows:
"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in this regard renders him administratively liable x x x.
"In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the
respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he
will render legal services to her, and after receiving certain
amount from the latter as payment for ‘filing fee and
service fee’ did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary
dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the
community to the legal profession, of which he swore to
protect, has been tarnished.
xxx xxx xxx
"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged
by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised
her of the status of her case which she later on found to
have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit
between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been
decided against the latter and which judgment has long
become final and executory. However, despite full
knowledge by the respondent of such finality based on the
documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such
vital information and did not properly appraise the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
51
complainant. Thus, respondent violated the mandate in
Canon 15 x x x."7
IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted Report.
The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of
complainant’s P8,000.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as
advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. 8 They
may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they
are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently.9 But
once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the
Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with
zeal, care and utmost devotion.10
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
cause.11 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. 12 The
Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.
Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they
can efficiently handle.13 Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced.
Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the
task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their
lawyer’s oath.14
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving
the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent
failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of
complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated followups
from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference
toward his client’s cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a
lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also
unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been
entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise
entrusted to him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should
have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status
of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and
complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the
judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such
vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as
"filing and service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her case
would be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that
lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the

merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor
understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would
have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an
obligation on the part of lawyers. 15 If they find that their client’s cause
is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse
incontrovertible.16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic
undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients."17
Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to
return the money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His
conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral
soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to him,
and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use.18
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client’s money and
property that may come into their possession.19 As respondent
obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she
had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office --
was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money
upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it
to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in
him.20 His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional
ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.21
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal
processes and the courts, 22 but also mandates the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.23 Respondent clearly fell short
of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability
to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable
not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to
the general public.24 Given the crucial importance of his role in the
administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence
of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession. 25
WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating
Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainant’s eight
thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six
percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against
Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of
law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a
criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a
former client, based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards
while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED).1
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
52
Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben
G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment
case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal
became final and executory on July 15, 1992.2
the
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant,
died. On February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance
before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. 3
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been
appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de
Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal
action against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F.
Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of
Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised
Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and
Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in
said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on
April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.
Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She
denied using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also
insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to
Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against
respondent that are pending before or decided upon by other
tribunals – (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and
violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the
then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3)
complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service before the Office of the
Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted
out the penalty of one month suspension without pay; 8 and, (4) the
Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the
Sandiganbayan.9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for
falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed
confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for
annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This
prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for
falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3,
1999 where he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all
hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations
leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies.
Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not
grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until
proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the
Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon
him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on
appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty,
only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.11
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant
does not violate the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are
two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no
way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of
respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant

confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the
annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of
the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth
certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are
accessible to anyone.12
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but
complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner
Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's motion to file his
memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on
the pleadings submitted by the parties.14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report
of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty
of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP
report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.,
a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many
years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged
her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of
the various criminal and administrative cases filed against
respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are
pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of
the complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of
complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon
respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal
case for falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney
and client and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to
protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him
special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly
personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such
delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by
necessity and public interest.15 Only by such confidentiality and
protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in
an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration
of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will
encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which
is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. 17 One
rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an
attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not
to abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client
relationship,19 and continues even after the client's death.20 It is the
glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation
with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever
disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the
client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the
ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or
defense of the client's cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore
cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the
privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
53
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.22
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected
by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective
client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment.23 The reason for this is to make the prospective client
free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for
the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a
lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective)
attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case
of Pfleider v. Palanca,25 where the client and his wife leased to their
attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In
their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified
portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and
the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed
creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had
"confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the
terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by
counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose
interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself,
however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease
contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the
"confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that
client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of
the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence
that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a
private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a
lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality.26 The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.27
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by
voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence
and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.28
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a
compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the
instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, 29 an offer
and counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a client to
his counsel not in his professional capacity,31 are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.32
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.33
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be
intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal
advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.34
If the client seeks an accounting service, 35 or business or personal
assistance,36 and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a
communication disclosed for such purpose.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence
on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note
that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent
violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a
criminal action against her for falsification of public documents
because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil
case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not,
however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to
the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without
any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it
is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of
the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information
is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege. 37 The burden of proving
that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
privilege.38
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito
D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR.
SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients
of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice,
neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the
actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an
Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in
the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No.
38153 of which to our surprise lost
unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A
close perusal of the case reveals the serious
misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty.
Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and
negligence in the performance of his duty
obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid
case. That the said attorney without informing
us the reason why and riding high on the trust
and confidence we repose on him either
abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or
seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint
against us in the sala of Judge Teresita
Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro
Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas
assured us that everything was in order. That he
had already answered the complaint so that in
spite of the incessant demand for him to give us
a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to
disclose later that he never answered it after all
because according to him he was a very busy
man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision
dated August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect
and malpractice of law we lost the Judge
Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
54
Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas
be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of
his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file
the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he
alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration,
which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants
because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from
the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was
declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050.
Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not
imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the
case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to
share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for
them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint
for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured
and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure
amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us
whether they were willing to submit this case for decision on the
basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance,
both manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro
Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President,
Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly
expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then
commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion
from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin
declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all
its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members
with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution
was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against
the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the
final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2)
lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue
cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the
motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's
motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of
dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein
to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from
notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been
denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration
were both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants'
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's

motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador
was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default
and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of
Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador
the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as
attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said
decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the
complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent
committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action,
in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and
judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's
evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He
has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take
up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and
champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of
law, legally applied.5 This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense.6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial
Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru
honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the
Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983.
...
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No.
100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again
"inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest
mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated
earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an
answer was not an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious
and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their
damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set
aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume
and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to
impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent
reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
55
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of
the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the
required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a
large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in
this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect
due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial
court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and
pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate
causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and
continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court
had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in
issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of
Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the
said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness
because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that
the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his
erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave
abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in
the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further
assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it
shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the
complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from
the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of
the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the
court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that
order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the
respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of
his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients,
the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule
18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the
complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on
the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act
of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a
mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the
respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein,
he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule
15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither
overstating nor understanding the prospects of
the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are
unable to understand why he took all the trouble of filing a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack
of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling
thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of
Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply
delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the
complainants were not entirely without any valid or
justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was
not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he
were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts
thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free
from any blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for
inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED
and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989
MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.
Eduardo Cabreros, Jr. for complainant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM
Public interest requires that an attorney exert his
best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interests of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar
and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so
because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar or to
the public. That circumstance explains the
public concern for the maintenance of an
untarnished standard of conduct by every
attorney towards his client. 1
Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a
practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No.
21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and
also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of
an officer of the court.
The essential facts are as follows: 2
Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in
an action for "ejectment" docketed as Civil Case No. 6046 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff,
was then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168,
Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 54117 for
"reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment
unit being rented by complainant and her sister.
When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing
party. Civil Case No. 54117 for reconveyance was ordered dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987 while Civil Case No.
6046 for ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court
against her.
On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 6046 for ejectment, complainant and Peregrina were
served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days
from receipt of notice.
Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain
Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced
them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties
"impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
56
Forthwith, a petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of
Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by respondent to forestall the
execution of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.
In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to
sign by respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared,
poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for
annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent
promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured
if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his
"katsukaran" (close friend).
Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed as Civil Case No.
55118. Respondent demanded from the complainant one thousand
pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same
afternoon.
However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153,
the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the
case on the ground of their friendship.
On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant
and asked her to be ready with two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to
be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the
ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her sister
were only able to raise the amount of one thousand pesos which
they immediately gave to respondent.
Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he
could not locate the judge who would issue the restraining order. The
parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where
respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags of food
allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining
order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining balance
of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) which he earlier demanded.
Complainant gave her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent
informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file
another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain
possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told
complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P
10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of
Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another one thousand
pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent
stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new
complaint.
Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the
kindness of some friends and relatives. On October 26,1987, the
money was handed over to the respondent.
On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment
of Simulated or Spurious Sale with Damages," later docketed as
Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by respondent with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro Manila.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118
on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his promise that he
would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as
counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another
lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary
injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in
Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there
was really no need to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P
l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry, she
found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on
December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to respondent
asking for the return of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P
11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this
letter was never answered and the money was never returned.
Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against
herein respondent.

Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, dismissed Civil Case No. 55118 for failure to state a cause of
action.4 On January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521 0 was likewise
dismissed for being identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5
Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases
Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the
allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge
against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only
intended to harrass him. 6
This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and
55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. having represented
himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost
cause of complainant respondent should have carefully prepared the
pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The
little time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in
him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability.
Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most out
of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged
about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked
about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still
he got P 10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never
deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the
complainant dry is obvious.
When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he
will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The
failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's
cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had
reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most
elementary principles of professional ethics . 7
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in
protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge
beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil
Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of
their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no
steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this
fact.
Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he
would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4)
days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 55118 respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as
complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent
attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent
failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire
another lawyer in his stead. 8
His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with
utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust
and confidence which he owes his client. 9 More so in this case,
where by reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby
suffered by losing all her cases.
The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same
day that he had already filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good faith
as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the complainant in said
case. It was all a show to get more money from her. This adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with this
evident irregularity, he lamely stated that while he did not physically
appear for complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted the
pleadings.
His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property
subject of the ejectment proceeding would be returned to her. In fact,
it was respondent who persuaded complainant that the filing of these
two cases simultaneously were the means by which this objective
can be achieved. His duty was not only to prepare the pleadings but
to represent complainant until the termination of the cases. This he
failed to do.
His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil
Case No. 55210 when he already knew that he could no longer
physically handle the same is an act of deception of his client. 10 It
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
57
shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the
Philippine bar.
The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P
10,000.00) was given to him as fee for his services, is simply
incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the
service he actually rendered. 11 And his failure to return even a
portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more
bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent does not
deserve to remain as an officer of the court.
Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering
justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing
criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance
with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an
imperative.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and
beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not
synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of
public interest.
WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances
present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to
be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to
resume the practice of law.
Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein
the sum of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest
from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to
refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision,
finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he
be suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable
judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC)
which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the
ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as
counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor
paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision
of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and
Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No.
11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for
review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November
19, 1986.
 58

On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by
respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing
that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for
being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to
increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent,
admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition
for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's
Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it.
However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records
in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for
Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions
of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the
decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On
December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or
novation explaining that —
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two
sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no
other means whereby the defeated party may
procure final and executory judgment to be set
aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation,
unless (a) the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it
has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no
allegation in the present complaint to the effect
that the judgments in the former cases were
secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35;
Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for
Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion.
Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral
Arguments on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion
for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988,
denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.
SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and
Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624
denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an
Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP
No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The
Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him
not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case
(Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use
any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to
his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim
or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot
prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility
310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and
hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said
Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple
actions arising from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a

Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated
January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and
paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was
likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or
Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial
process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and
frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions
Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976];
Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir.
1971]).

On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for

The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC
Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed
were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when
an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the
he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent
case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690
thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the
and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August
execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his
23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond
The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution.
and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his
Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.
petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which
he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts
No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."
Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ
of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of
execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. A judgment can be annulled only on two
SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA. grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or
(b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes,
534).
deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition
filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be
remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC
was already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of
Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is
remanded to the trial court for execution, the
function of the trial court is ministerial only; the
trial court is merely obliged with becoming
modesty to enforce that judgment and has no
jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to
reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and
Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to
frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844,
to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the
Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the
Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the
Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or
Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of
Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review
On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or
Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the
Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition
For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall
the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of
forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that
forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in
one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable
resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72
SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes
abuse of the Court's processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and
degrade the administration of justice and will be
punished as contempt of court. Needless to
add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or
repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment)
subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for
willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act
with all good fidelity to the courts and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to
be just and are consistent with truth and honor
(at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his
efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed,
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
59
respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute
actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he
perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v.
Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the
Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions
and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial
processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in
intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a
judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules
to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation,
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996]
ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S.
CHIONGSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint
have been properly joined with the filing of the respondents
comment as required in the 1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of
Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Deputy Court Administrator. No further
pleadings need be required from the parties.
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as
counsel for the complainant and verified by the latter, the respondent
is charged with grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and
having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No.
50322 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa.
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the
complainants wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through the filing of a letter-
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This
complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods
in the complainants Petition for Naturalization dated 30 March
1989 which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.
In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the Office of the
Prosecutor, charging the complainant herein with perjury allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements of [sic]
falsehoods upon material matters required by the Revised
Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified Petition for
Naturalization dated April 13, 1989, subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer
oath[s], which petition bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29; Book No.
XXIII; and Series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary
Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:
5. 1 am married to a Filipino. My wifes name is Leni Ong Choa and
now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2)
children, whose names, dates and places of birth, and residences
are as follows:
NAME DATE OF PLACE RESIDENCE
BIRTH OF BIRTH
ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina
St.,
ONG CUQA 1981 City Bacolod City

CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46
Malaspina St.,
ONG CHOA 1983 City Bacolod City
xxx xxx xxx
10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a
proper and irreprQachable manner during the entire period of my
residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted
government as well as with
the community in which 1 am living.
xxx xxx xxx
When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong
Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at the said
address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having
left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier
and were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City, that
contrary to his aforesaid allegations in his verified Petition for
Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street,
Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an
immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a
woman not his wife since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children
with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended
party herein, have long been separated from bed and boards [sic]
since 1984; which falsehoods and/ or immoral and improper conduct
are grounds for disqualifications [sic] of [sic] becoming a citizen of
the Philippines.
Act contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was
assigned to Branch III thereof where the respondent is the presiding
Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21
February 1995 and found the complainant herein guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge
accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six months and
one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment
alleging that: (1) there is no basis for the conviction since his petition
for naturalization had been withdrawn and therefore had
become functus officio; (2) the petition for naturalization is a
pleading, hence its allegations are privileged; and (3) his prosecution
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The last
ground is founded on an admission made by a representative of the
Office of the Solicitor General of her lack of knowledge of any perjury
case filed based on a withdrawn or dismissed petition for
naturalization.
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit in an order dated 31 March 1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July. 1995
and prayed for the removal of the respondent fudge from office. As
grounds therefor, he alleges that:
(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct,
Gross Bias and Partiality, and Knowingly Rendering
An Unjust Judgment when he intentionally failed to
divulge the next-door-neighbor relationship between
him and the family of Leni Ong Choa and to
disqualify himself from sitting in the criminal case on
such ground as part of the grand design and
preconceived intention to unjustly convict the
complainant of the crime charged without due
process.
(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute
the offense of perjury.
(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it
has become functus oficio and it is as if the Petition
was not filed at all so that whatever false statemeuts
were contained therein were no longer requiredby
law and had ceased to be on a material matter.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
60
(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution
Exhibit P (handwritten list of properties) even if this
was self-serving as it was undated and unsigned;
and Exhibit Q (letter of Leni Ong Choas counsel to
the complainant) even if it was also self-serving as
there was no showing that he received the letter.
(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the
complainant to suffer a penalty higher than that
provided by law, without applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment
dated 12 September 1995, thus:
He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there
being a house, belonging to the Sia family, separating his house and
that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his family are
not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had
not exchanged greetings nor is he even a nodding acquaintance of
Leni Choa or any member of her family.
He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not constitute
an offense, the complainant should have filed a Motion to Quash but
he did not. Just the same, when the complainant stated in the
Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46
Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood under oath
because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition, his
wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore, making
him liable for perjury.
Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral
character contrary to what he stated in the Petition for Naturalization
since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship with Stella Flores
Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has begotten two (2)
children. As a matter of fact, a case for concubinage against
complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.
According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the
Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show that the Prosecutor
representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion
to Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had
abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is not giving them support
and is now living with his paramour.
On the claim of the complainant that his petition for naturalization
has became functus officio in view of its withdrawal, hence no longer
existent, the respondent Judge maintains that the withdrawal
reduced the petition to functus officio only for the purpose of the
Special Proceedings. but not when it is used as evidence in other
cases.
On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P. Q and R, the
respondent Judge contends that Exhibits P. Q and R were duly
identified by Leni Ong Choa and her testimonies on these were
found to be credible by the Court.
Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable in the perjury case as the penalty imposed by
the court did not exceed one (1) year.
The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for being patently without merit and for the censure and
reprimand of the complainants counsel with a warning to refrain from
filing similar harassment suits.
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17
November 1995 and duly approved by the Court Mministrator, Hon.
Zenaida N. Elepao, Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following
findings and conclusions:
EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the
allegations of the complainant are devoid of any merit.
The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are neighbors
[sic] appears to be petty under the circumstances. Granting that they
are indeed next-door neighbors does not necessarily mean that
respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for

Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere in said Rule is it ordained that
being the neighbor of a party-litigant is reason enough for the Judge
to disqualify himself from hearing the formers case.
With respect to the complainants claim that the allegations in the
information do not constitute the offense of perjury, an administrative
proceeding is not the forum to decide whether the judge has erred or
not, especially as complainant has appealed his conviction.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in the
Courts decision.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People
of the Philippines vs. Bautista (C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made
under oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the
statements in his affidavit before a competent officer
authorized to administer oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by
law.
It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso
C. Choa was made under oath and before a competent officer
authorized to administer oath as shown by the records (p. 4,
APPENDIX A). This petition for naturalization is required by law as a
condition precedent for the grant of Philippine citizenship (Section 7
Corn. Act No. 473).
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.
As shown by the records (p. 1, APPENDIX A), Alfonso C. Choa
declared in his petition dated 30 March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong
Choa resides at 46 Ma!aspina St. Bacolod City while in the
administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he
stated that his wife Leni Ong Choa left their family residence (46
Malaspina St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6, par. 2 of
Adrn. Complaint). This simply means that when he filed his petition
for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the
abovementioned address anymore.
It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman
not his wife and he himself signed the birth certificate as the father of
that child (p. 4, APPENDIX E). This is contrary to what he declared
in his petition that he is of good moral character which is required
under the Naturalization Law (par. 3, Sec. 2 Corn. Act No. 473).
There wa therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso C..
Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as found by Judge Chiongson.
As to the complainants claim that the withdrawal of the petitiorr
makes it functus officio, we sustain the respondent Judges view that
the Petition can be used as evidence in another case. In the case of
People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held
that every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not
shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For
perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws (Jay vs. State,
[1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the policy of the law that
judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair and free from fraud,
Sand that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth and
that they be punished if they do not (People vs. Niles, 300 III., 458,
133 N.E. 252,37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289).
On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to the case, we cite Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law) which provides in part that This Act
shall not apply to x x x those whose maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year, x x x Since the penalty for perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its
maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months toprision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6)
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
61
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, the
respondent Judge was correct in not applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final
appreciation of the Courts decision which is on appeal, but is made
only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel for the
complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this
complaint.
Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo then recommends:
Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for
lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A.
Quiroz be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently
unmeritorious complaint.
We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo that the
allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith
and good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the
complaint.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the
complainant and his counsel honestly believed that the allegations in
the Information in the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they
should have filed a motion to quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on this ground.
The complainant never did; he was arraigned and entered intp
trial. Although his failure to do so did not operate as a waiver of the
said ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed,
nevertheless, his admission of the weakness of the ground. If he had
perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an opportunity
to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides,
this ground had not at all been invoked by him, as shown in the
order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainants motion for the
reconsideration.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and
cannot amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements.
Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have been
committed by reason of such untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the
complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury case - it must be
stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory
disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary
disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to
disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time
before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the
grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondents order
denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the
complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he
would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court.
Finally, the nature and character of the complainants
grievances relative to the respondents judgment finding the former
guilty of perjury. May only be properly ventilated in an appropriate
judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular
appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been made,
is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs
Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to the
cases in their courts or to the unclogging of their dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must
have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the
respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by
his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless,
false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by
Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain
such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3)
to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent
upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the complainants case
(Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility) with the
end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes
(Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why

no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his apparent
failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is
DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is
hereby directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from
notice hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his
apparent failure to comply with his duties and responsibilities above
stated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975
COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G.
ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.
Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.
FERNANDO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. It is taken to task for
entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin
suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a
subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the
execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy, one
moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court.
Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing
party in that labor dispute which unfortunately had dragged on since
1961, all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered illusory
through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting, now deceased, and
the private respondent Lo Bu. The lack of competence of respondent
Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. It is about
time that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner
labor union, so long set at naught and disregarded, by the
employment of techniques, which certainly deserve no
encouragement, much less approval. There was a grave infirmity
then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal, reinstating
it in its resolution of December 19, 1974. Certiorari and prohibition
lie.
The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos
Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of
Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the
satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. 1 Thereafter,
Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized
to serve the writ, did so on January 17 and 18, 1973 levying on the
personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New
Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public
auction sale.2 It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent
motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations, a point stressed in another motion
dated February 2, 1973, on the further ground that petitioner
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity
bond. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February
23, 1973 denied his motions. So likewise was the motion for
reconsideration, as shown in its order dated March 23, 1973. Private
respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. It was
docketed as G.R. No. L-36636.3This Court, in its resolution dated
July 17, 1973, denied the petition for certiorari of private
respondent.4 In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by private
respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the
same properties. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying
certiorari, petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the
complaint. It was therein alleged that private respondent has no
cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of
the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22, 1970 and
affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17, 1973.
The lower court dismissed the complaint.5 That is the decision
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and it is precisely because of its
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
62
obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is
filed.
Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and
prohibition.
1. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor
practice case dated June 27, 1970 6 for the satisfaction and
enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was issued in
favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This
concerns complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, dated March 12, 1970, "allowing the Sheriff to serve the
Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should be
directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is
the firm name use(d) by the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos
Foundry Shop ... The original writ of execution had been returned
wholly unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in
their names, and the foundry shop where Mrs. Ong Ting and her
family reside at Maisan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, is the "New Century
Foundry Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan,
dated March 11, 1970). Consequently, in its Order of March 19,
1970, the Court directed the examination of Mrs. Ong Ting and the
Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and Ong Ting's
property and income. Extensive hearings were conducted."7
Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the
records, the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was
burned, Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. He
and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan
Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan. After his proposals to settle the present
case for P5,000.00 in September 1968, for P25,000.00 in October
1968, and for P40,000.00 on December 22, 1968, were successively
rejected by complainant's counsel, Ong Ting, after hinting of taking
measures to avoid liability, soon executed a deed of absolute sale on
December 31, 1968, selling all his business, including equipment,
machineries, improvements, materials, supplies and rights, in the
New Century Foundry Shop, to his compadre Lo Bu, for P20,000.00,
which he acknowledged so fully paid ... The deed does not bear the
conformity of Mrs. Ong Ting. On January 7, 1969, when Lo Bu
applied for the original registration of the firm name, he gave his
name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30,000.00
... Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu, Ong Ting filed a verified
urgent motion to reopen the case on January 25, 1969, and a
verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May 12, 1969.
In the latter motion, it was alleged that as a result of the fire, "Ong
Ting lost everything; we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing ... "
This allegation was made despite the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu,
from which he realized P20,000.00."8 The absence of good faith on
the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear
thus: "There was no actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu, the
alleged manager in absentia. At the time Ong Ting died, he was still
residing in the premises of the shop ... His family continued to reside
therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. His young 19-year-old
son Delfin Ong became in-charge of the shop and the workers. His
daughter Gloria Ong became the cashier. Mrs. Ong Ting became the
manager and she supervised the work. .. The alleged sale was no
doubt intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render
unfavorable to respondents. It is clearly fictitious. And such a
declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is
being sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order.
Having acquired jurisdiction, the Court may employ means to carry it
into effect (Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court)." 9
That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order, an
alias writ of execution was issued against the properties held in the
name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan Road,
Valenzuela, Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair
labor practice proceeding. As noted, there was a replevin suit by the
same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the Court
of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the meanwhile the
finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this
Court issued its resolution of July 17, 1973. 10 It denied the petition
for certiorari filed by the private respondent, Lo Bu, for the purpose
of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the
dispositive portion of the order of the Court of June 22, 1970.
2. To all intents and purposes then, that is the law of the case. What
is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance,
as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceeding before
this Court. He failed, and ii was not surprising, for on the facts as

found, he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the
award in favor of petitioner labor union. There was thus a ruling as to
the bad faith that characterized his pretension of being the alleged
vendee. In Cruz v. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it
was shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor
practice, there was a fictitious sale resorted to, as in this case. Under
the circumstances, the bad faith being evident, the ostensible
vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation. So it
must be here. Moreover, that is merely, as stated earlier, to accord
deference to the fundamental principle of the law of the case, his
petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court. There is
this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v. De
Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as of the time the order
complained of was issued is Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons,
a 1962 decision. As emphasized by the ponente, the then Justice,
now Chief Justice, Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the
Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all
legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any
give case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its
judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence
beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. If petitioner had
any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special
Proceeding No. 12276 should further be reviewed his remedy was to
ask for a reconsideration thereof. In fact he did file two motions for
that purpose, both of which were denied. A new petition before an
inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified. As much, indeed,
was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3, 1959,
herein above reproduced in its entirety. The import of the resolution
is too plain to be misunderstood.' So it has been from 1919, when in
Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. Deutsche-Australische
Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, this Court, through Justice Street,
categorically declared that a decision that has become the law of the
case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court." What is more,
in 1967, there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal
in People v. Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
that a ruling constituting the law of the case, "even if erroneous, ...
may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final ... "
Then, in Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, promulgated in
1969, there is the pronouncement that the law of the case 'does not
apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but
likewise to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has
been ... decreed.'" 13
3. Private respondent, in his special and affirmative defenses,
alleged that petitioners have a plain and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending case in the
Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari. As
a general rule, such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy.
That is the ordinary course of judicial procedure. There would be no
basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. It is not so
however in this case. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had
been previously noted. It is about time that a halt be called to the
schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable
efforts to defeat labor's just claim. It would be repugnant to the
principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of protection to
labor 15 if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that
ought to have been enforced years ago.
16
4. One last point. It was set forth in the Petition that respondent Lo
Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to
recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century
Foundry Shop, followed by another motion praying for the return of
the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union
failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow
the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which
were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973,
assailed in the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court for lack
of merit. 17 Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this
petition, filed on February 20, 1975, had the temerity to deny such
allegations. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for
respondent Lo Bu, petitioner in L-36636, he did specifically maintain:
"On January 26, 1973, in order to vindicate his rights over the levied
properties, in an expeditious or less expensive manner, herein
appellant voluntarily submitted himself, as a forced intervenor, to the
jurisdiction of respondent CIR, by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution,' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court
to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century
Foundry Shop' to him, without the latter being made a party to the
case, as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision
rendered against the respondents in Case No. 3021-ULP, by means
of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
63
Century Foundry Shop;' ... ; Petitioner appellant's urgent motion
aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5, 1973, and inasmuch as
the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31, 1973, the
CIR issued an order on January 30, 1973, one day before the
schedule sale, ordering the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the
auction sale; ... ; On February 3, 1973, herein petitioner-appellant
[Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2, 1973, praying
for the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment
creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an indemnity bond,
pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court; ... On February 10, 1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos
Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein
petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January 26, 1973 and
February 2, 1973, ... ; On February 27, 1973, herein petitioner-
appellant received an order from respondent CIR, dated February
25, 1973, denying his urgent motions and ordering the Sheriff of
Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties "in
accordance with law;" ... " 18 Such conduct on the part of counsel is
far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic and take
refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied,
was, in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also
prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due
regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add
that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where
he concentrated on points not previously admitted. That is the most
that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if
such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself.
He was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but
not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose
of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an
officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession,
requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and
call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails
to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question
his good standing in the bar.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
December 19, 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the
appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted, respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained
from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of
dismissing it. Triple costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Aquino, J., is on leave.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment enjoining the Court of Appeal from
entertaining the appeal of private respondent in CA-G.R. No. 56485-
R entitled Lo Bu, etc. vs. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union & F.
Alvarez.
After petitioners had secured a judgment in the Court of Industrial
Relations against Cosmos Foundry Shop and by virtue thereof
obtained a writ of execution against said Shop and the Sheriff had
levied on properties found therein, herein private respondent
appeared and asserting his rights over the levied properties by virtue
of a sale made to him by the Shop, impugned the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court to carry out the purported execution. The Industrial
Court sustained its authority and on certiorari to the Supreme Court
by respondent the petition was dismissed (G.R. No. L-36636). In the
meanwhile, respondent sued for replevin of the same properties in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Case No. 89994. In its answer
to the replevin action, petitioners invoked the resolution of this Court
in G.R. No. L-36636 and moved to dismiss the complaint, which
motion was granted. When respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals, petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition.
No doubt, as things stand now, the remedy pursued by petitioners is
not the appropriate one. The ground of dismissal upheld by the trial
court was in essence res adjudicata. Ordinarily, against such
dismissal, the remedy is appeal and, of course, such an appeal
cannot be stopped by prohibition. And if only because the Court of
Appeals has not been given any opportunity at all to pass on its own
alleged lack of jurisdiction, the present action would seem to be
premature.

From another point of view, however, it is quite obvious that to allow
the respondent Court of Appeals to entertain respondent's appeal
would be sanctioning, as the main opinion finds, the apparently
endless ingenious schemes, if judicial, of respondent to further delay
the execution of the subject judgment which became final and
executory almost two years ago after a protracted litigation that
started way back in 1961, since thirteen yesteryears from now. Law
and justice demand that petitioners should not be further denied the
fruit of their legal efforts, to secure redress, particularly because in
the order of the Industrial Court denying respondent's motion to
recall the writ of execution against Cosmos Foundry Shop, the court
found said Shop and respondent to have indulged in a simulated
transaction covering the properties in question purposely to avoid
satisfaction of the judgment in favor of petitioners.
To reiterate, the ground of dismissal of respondent's replevin suit is a
legal one, res adjudicata, termed in the main opinion as "law of the
case". Indeed, the Court of Industrial Relations had already found
the sale to respondent of the Cosmos Foundry Shop to be
fraudulent, and that decision was sustained by this Court. In that
proceeding, even the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court was
questioned. Thus, both the merits of the respective claims of the
parties as well as the validity of the action of the Industrial Court is
now beyond question. And that was the basis of petitioners' motion
to dismiss the replevin action. Under these circumstances, any
appeal from the order of dismissal should have come directly to this
Court, the issue passed upon by the trial court being purely legal,
premised as it is on conclusions of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations no longer assailable as a matter of law by respondent.
In other words, the Court of Appeals would have no alternative
anyway than to certify that appeal to Us, and, accordingly, We can
already decide the present action as if certification had in fact been
made. The pleadings and the issues before Us now could not be
substantially different, if We took the roundabout way of directing
such certification to be made before We render Our decision. It is,
but proper, therefore, that in the interest of a faster, more effective
and less technically cumbersome administration of justice, We
should here and now put an end to the controversy between the
parties herein.
Contrary to the claim of respondent regarding the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court to pass on the question of the alleged fictiousness of
the sale to respondent, there is at least the decision of this Court
in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. De los
Angeles, 36 SCRA 142, holding that the power of control over the
Sheriff in relation to the implementation of writ of execution issued by
the Industrial Court belongs to that court and not to any Court of First
Instance. (at pp. 155-6.) But even assuming there could be in truth
some doubt on the matter, the fact is that issue was actually included
in the previous proceeding in that court sustained by this Court in
G.R. No. L-36636. If that ruling is in anyway erroneous, We cannot
change it anymore. As far as the parties are concerned that is the
law of the case. Even a ruling on jurisdiction has the effect of res
adjudicata. Much less then could any other court disregard it. And
inasmuch as the trial court simply adhered to this view, its order of
dismissal can hardly be assailed as erroneous.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is my considered view that for
want of appellate jurisdiction, the impugned appeal in the Court of
Appeals may be considered as non-existing and that court should be
enjoined from taking any further action thereon, even as We decide
the case now as if it had been duly appealed to us without the need
of any further proceeding, since, as already observed, the necessary
pleadings are in effect already before Us.
[ ADM. CASE NO. 3695, February 24, 1992 ]
DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS.
FERNANDO ALCANTARA AND JOSELITO LIM, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, [1] complainant
Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and
Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang
pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats, dishonoring
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
64
and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about
the loss of his land.
The court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly
dismisses them.
The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando
Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the charges filed against him
in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were dismissed by this Court
in its resolution of September 8, 1988 for having become moot and
academic Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22,
1987, or five (5) months after the respondent judge's retirement from
the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for reconsideration
having been seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has
become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a relitigation of the
same charges against respondent judge.[2] That those charges are
now being brought against respondent judge in his capacity as an
attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in
the form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of
the rule of res judicata.[3]
On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely
performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3827 when he did what is now complained of.[4]
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch
LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs of
Apolinario Gamalinda[5] for reconveyance, with damages, of the
eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria,
Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original
certificate of title of Apolinario Gamalinda. In the course of the trial,
plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction against
the "defendants, their agents, representatives or other persons
acting in their behalf, ordering them to desist from threshing and
carting away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral
Survey of Victoria, * * * until further order of this Court. * * *" [6]This
injunction was made permanent in the decision of the lower court
rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.
Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered
a portion of the area in dispute, in the belief that the whole of Lot No.
3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Quitclaim[7] executed in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time title to
Lot No. 3217 was still in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus,
when Maximiano Tiburcio, Protacio Cabatino and Maxima Mateo,
tenants of Salud Balot, entered the portion being cultivated by
complainant, the latter reported the incident to the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into
her land. Relying therefore on the injunction issued by the lower
court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare
complainant Gamalinda in contempt of court.
Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil
Case No. 3827 was different from the area occupied by him. To
resolve the issue, the lower court with his agreement, ordered a
resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The result of the resurvey showed that
contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very
same land involved in Civil Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower
court declared complainant in contempt in an order dated July 24,
1986 which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in a
decision rendered on March 21, 1998.[8]
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud
Balot and complainant is the successor-in-interest of the heirs of
Apolinario Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is
clearly erroneous for complainant to claim that neither he nor
Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case.
Being privies to the parties, they are necessarily bound by the orders
rendered in said case.
On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
affirming intoto the judgment of the lower court in Civil Case No.
3287.[9] After the appellate court's decision had become final, Atty.
Lim moved for the execution of the affirmed judgment, [10] and when
the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Require Domingo Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to
the Clerk of Court and to Authorize the Latter to Execute s
Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A in Favor of Plaintiffs." [11] That motion
was granted by the lower court, but complainant refused to
surrender the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty. Lim
to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT

186299 Null and Void,"[12] which the lower court granted on July 31,
1989.
It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim
were all done in line with his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in
Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients'
possessory rights over the property in dispute while the second
motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. [13] He shall serve his
client with competence and diligence,[14] and his duty of entire
devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him to
employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly
due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the
latter's cause to succeed.[15] An attorney's duty to safeguard the
client's interests commences from his retainer until his effective
release from the case[16] or the final disposition of the whole subject
matter of the litigation. [17] During that period, he is expected to take
such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's
interests may require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions
complained of. He should be commended, not condemned, for
diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney.
With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower and appellate courts in
Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say
that this is a matter that should have been litigated in said case
instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any
case, there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect
in that deed, the charge of deception against him will not lie. Absent,
too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the
preparation of the criminal information, and for the same reason he
cannot be called to account for it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge
Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118655 April 12, 2000G.R. No.
HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA, Namely: FE, ELIAS, JR. and
SERVANDO, ALL SURNAMED LORILLA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION,
HON. FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA and SHERIFF HONORIO P.
SANTOS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 29, 1994, which dismissed the petition for
annulment of the judgment rendered on April 5, 1989, by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, of Makati in Civil Case No.
5262. 2 The motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals
was denied by said Court in a Resolution promulgated on January
11, 1995. 3
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:
(1) On September 10, 1983, private respondent
Commercial Credit Corporation (now known as
Pentacapital Finance Corporation and hereinafter referred
to as PENCAPITAL) filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, (hereinafter referred to
as the Makati Court) for a sum of money against Sanyu
Machineries Agencies, Inc., Sanyu Chemical Corporation,
and several other defendants, among whom was Elias
Lorilla, (now deceased) who had acted as sureties for the
two corporate debtors. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5262 and was assigned by raffle to Branch
58 of said court.
(2) PENCAPITAL sought for, and obtained from the Makati
Court, a writ of attachment on the real property of
defendant Elias L. Lorilla covered by Transfer Certificate of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
65
Title No. 298986, and which levy was duly annotated on
the certificate of title concerned.
(3) Defendant Elias Lorilla, together with four other
individual defendants, was initially represented by one
Atty. Danny Tablizo, but who later on withdrew his
appearance and was substituted by another lawyer, Atty.
Alfredo Concepcion.
(4) During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5262, Elias L.
Lorilla executed a dacion en pago over the property
attached in favor of the Joint Resources Management
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
JRMDC) by reason of which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 298986 in the name of Elias L. Lorilla was cancelled
and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 114067 in
the name of JRMDC. But the levy caused to be made by
PENCAPITAL over the property was carried over to the
new certificate of title.
(5) On June 9, 1986, JRMDC filed suit against
PENCAPITAL for the cancellation of the latter's levy on the
property in question with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila (hereinafter referred to as the Pasig Court),
which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 63757 and
assigned by raffle to its Branch 153.
(6) On April 5, 1989, the Makati Court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 5262 in favor of
PENCAPITAL and against the defendants therein,
including Elias L. Lorilla. The dispositive portion of said
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants who are hereby ordered to pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, and solidarily the
total principal amount of P421,596.28 plus
interest at 12% per annum and a penalty of 3%
per month of default from the time it became
due on July 1, 1981 until fully paid, and 20% of
the entire amount due as attorney's fees, plus
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(7) Despite receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision by
Alfredo Concepcion, then counsel of record of defendant
Elias L. Lorilla, no appeal whatsoever was interposed from
said judgment by said lawyer in behalf of defendant Lorilla.
(8) On March 3, 1993, upon motion of PENCAPITAL, the
Makati Court issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
5262 and PENCAPITAL thereafter proceeded against the
property covered by TCT No. 298986 in the name of
defendant Lorilla.
(9) On May 26, 1993 the Pasig Court rendered decision in
its Civil Case No. 53757 dismissing JRMDC's complaint
for the cancellation of the levy on attachment on the Lorilla
property, ruling that the dacion en pagoexecuted by
defendant Lorilla in favor of JRMDC cannot prevail over
the prior writ of attachment duly annotated on the property
in favor of PENCAPITAL. No appeal from the decision in
Civil Case No. 53757 having been made by JRMDC, the
same became final and executory (Annex "15", Reply
Memorandum of PENCAPITAL).
(10) On September 15, 1993 petitioners herein as heirs of
Elias L. Lorilla, filed a motion in Civil Case No. 5262 to
quash the writ of execution issued by the Makati Court,
arguing that since defendant Elias L. Lorilla passed away
on January 15, 1988, or one year and three months before
the Makati Court rendered decision in Civil Case No. 5262
on April 5, 1989, the case should have been dismissed
insofar as Elias L. Lorilla is concerned, in keeping with
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. —
When the action is for recovery of money, debt,
or interest therein, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be presented
in the manner especially provided in these rules.
(11) On February 8, 1994, the Makati Court, through its
Acting Presiding Judge, the Honorable Francisco Donato
Villanueva, denied the motion to quash said writ of
execution, ruling that the judgment in Civil Case No. 5256
having become final, it is now beyond its authority to
amend it by dismissing the same insofar as defendant
Elias L. Lorilla is concerned, and that the suggested
remedy, if at all, is a petition for its annulment. Petitioners
moved to reconsider the denial of their motion to quash
the writ of execution, but the Makati Court stood pat on its
ruling, hence, petitioners' recourse to this Court for
annulment of judgment. 4
Petitioners, thus, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment, Writ of Execution, and/or Levy on
Execution with Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order to annul
or enjoin enforcement of the judgment dated April 5, 1989 of the
Makati Court in Civil Case No. 5262. In its decision promulgated on
November 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the
petition, hence petitioners' present recourse to this Court. They
assign the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN NOT ANNULLING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT, DATED 5 APRIL 1989, INSOFAR
AS DECEASED DEFENDANT ELIAS LORILLA IS
CONCERNED, THEREBY VIOLATION (sic)
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN VIOLATING SECTION 21, RULE 3,
AND SECTIONS 5 AND 7, RULE 86 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW. 5
In our view, the main issue for resolution now is whether the
respondent appellate court erred and gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioners' action for annulment of judgment of the RTC of
Makati, Branch 58, concerning the deceased defendant Elias Lorilla.
Pertinently, we have to consider whether Section 21 of Rule 3 and
Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court are
applicable in the present case. Similarly, we have to inquire whether
petitioners, heirs of Elias Lorilla, were deprived of their right to due
process of law.
Petitioners argue that the cause of action of private respondent
Commercial Credit Corp. (now known as Pentacapital Finance Corp.
and hereinafter referred to as PENTACAPITAL) did not survive for
being in violation of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. They claim that under this rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the person of Elias Lorilla when he died, and consequently the
action against him should have been dismissed.
Sec. 21 of Rule 3 states:
Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — Where the
action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,
and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court
of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in
the manner especially provided in these rules.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
66
Sec. 21 of Rule 3 provides that upon the defendant's death, the
action "shall be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially
provided in these rules." Petitioners argue that this manner is
provided for in Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 6 As contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, the action has to
be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter presenting
his claim as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased defendant. 7 The claim becomes a mere incident in the
testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased where the
whole matter may be fully terminated jointly with the settlement and
distribution of the estate. 8
In the present case, however, the records do not show if any notice
of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion, counsel of record of
Elias Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262 before the Makati Court. Thus,
neither the Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of
the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to
know or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such
notice. Neither could the petitioners have been made aware of the
trial court's judgment adverse to their father, for all notices and
orders of the court were sent to Lorilla's counsel of record, who did
not bother to inform the parties concerned of Elias Lorilla's death.
Apparently, Lorilla's counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the
court of the death of his client, as the Rules require. 9
As far as the Makati Court was concerned, until the Writ of Execution
was issued and the levy thereof on August 5, 1993, Lorilla continued
to be represented by counsel of record, Atty. Concepcion; and that
upon service of a copy of the decision on said counsel at the latter's
address, Lorilla was deemed to have been validly served notice of
the judgment. 10 The failure of Atty. Concepcion to serve notice on
the court and the adverse parties regarding his client's death binds
herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound by
the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel. 11
In this case, petitioners claim that their right to due process was
violated when the Court of Appeals did not annul the decision of the
Makati Court dated April 5, 1989. They claim that as heirs of Elias
Lorilla, they would be deprived of their lawful inheritance without due
process, as they were not parties to the case where the adverse
decision against their father was rendered. Said judgment, they
posit, cannot be enforced against them because the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over them, nor over the estate of Elias Lorilla.
True, a judgment may be annulled for want of jurisdiction or lack of
due process of law. 12 But while petitioners were not properly
substituted for Elias Lorilla as defendants, absent any notice of his
death, it could not be said that petitioners were deprived of due
process of law, for as far as the trial court was concerned, they were
not parties to the case. To rule otherwise would be, in fact, a more
obvious and grievous transgression of due process.
Moreover in this case, we find that the property which petitioners
claim as their lawful inheritance, was no longer part of the estate of
Elias Lorilla at the time of his death. For Elias Lorilla had earlier
executed a dacion en pago over this property in favor of the Joint
Resources Management Development Corporation (JRMDC). By
reason thereof, Lorilla's transfer certificate of title was cancelled, and
a new one was issued in favor of JRMDC. 13 The levy of
PENTACAPITAL annotated on Lorilla's certificate of title was carried
over onto the title of JRMDC. Elias Lorilla's payment of his obligation
to JRMDC being one of dation in payment, it is governed by the law
on sales. 14 The subject property was validly transferred to JRMDC
already. Hence petitioners could not claim that they were deprived of
their lawful inheritance without due process of law.1âwphi1
Sec. 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court sets out the
procedure that should be followed after the death of the defendant in
a case. If he died "before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance," the action should be dismissed without prejudice to the
plaintiff presenting his claim in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased in accordance with and as required by Section 5 of Rule
86 of the Revised Rules of Court. 15 Here, however, the property in
question had already been taken out of the estate of Elias Lorilla,
even before judgment in Civil Case No. 5262 was rendered, and it
was transferred to JRMDC by virtue of the dacion en pago executed
by Elias Lorilla. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 86 loses its
pertinence to the case at bar.

Likewise, Section 7 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court 16 will
not apply to the present case. For it speaks of a situation where a
party dies after the entry of the judgment or order of the court. It
does not cover a situation where the court was reportedly informed
of the death of a party only after final judgment.
Since there was no timely appeal taken from the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati dated April 5, 1989, in Civil Case No.
5262, that judgment had properly become final and executory. As
well said by respondent appellate court, to adopt a view contrary
would ". . . open the floodgates to protracted and endless litigations,
because all that counsel for defendant has to do, in an action for
recovery of money, in case said defendant dies before final judgment
in a regional trial court, is to conceal such death from the court and
thereafter pretend to go through the motions of trial, and, after
judgment is rendered against his client, to question such judgment
for being violative of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
counsel for such defendant could unduly delay the rendering of a
judgment against his client. It is a fundamental concept in any jural
system, that even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law.
Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litim." 17
We see no reason, in the interest of justice, to disturb, much less
annul, the aforesaid judgment.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 29, 1994 and its Resolution promulgated
on January 11, 1995 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998]
CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE
DIMAN and FLORINA DIMAN, petitioners, vs. HON,
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS, BRANCH 255;
HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO LACALLE,
REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO
LACALLE, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially
dismissed by Resolution dated January 14, 1998; but after
deliberating on petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated
February 23, 1998, the private respondents' comment thereon, the
reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the
Court was convinced that the order of dismissal should be
reconsidered and the petition reinstated. It accordingly promulgated
a resolution to that effect on October 12, 1998, and required
"respondents to file their Comment on the petition within ten (10)
days from notice **."
Notice of the Resolution was duly served on private
respondents' attorney on October 21, 1998. The latter filed a motion
for extension of time of thirty (30) days to file comment, counted from
October 31. The Court granted the extension sought, but only for
fifteen (15) days.
The comment was filed late, on November 20, 1998,
Counsel's explanation is that he had sought an extension of 30 days
"due to the other volume of legal works similarly situated and school
work of the undersigned as professor of law and dean of the
University of Manila," and had entertained "the honest belief" that it
would be granted. However, he learned belatedly that only a 15-day
extension had been conceded. He forthwith completed the comment
and filed it, albeit five days late.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
67
The Court admits the late comment, but takes this occasion to
reiterate the familiar doctrine that no party has a right to an
extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set
therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted as a matter of
course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court
exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the
movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will be
granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time suggested by
him. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise
due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's
action on his motion, by time inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he
neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for
which he will have nobody but himself to blame.
Now, the petition for review on certiorari appends practically all
the material pleadings, motions, orders and judgments in the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The respondents'
comment on the petition has been filed, as just mentioned, and
opposes its material averments. There is now no impediment to the
adjudication of petitioners' appeal on the merits on the basis of the
record as it stands at this time. This, the Court will now proceed to
do.
In 1991, more than fifty years after the effectivity of the Rules
of Court[1] -- containing provisions relative inter alia to the modes of
discovery[2] -- this Court had occasion to observe that "among far too
many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not regrettable
unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes
and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet
unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them --
which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery procedure, could, as the experience of other
jurisdictions convincingly demonstrate, effectively shorten the period
of litigation and speed up adjudication."[3]
The case at bar deals with one of such modes of discovery --
a request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of 1964; more
particularly, the legal consequences of the failure to respond thereto
in the manner indicated by law. It also treats of other adjective
devices to expedite litigation: a summary judgment under Rule 34,
[4]
and a judgment on demurrer to evidence under Rule 35. [5] Had the
principles involved been better understood and more faithfully
observed, the case might have been more quickly decided.
Actually, there are several adjective tools incorporated in the
Rules of Court explicitly designed, like those just mentioned, to
abbreviate litigation or abort it at certain stages.Their obvious
purpose is to unmask as quickly as may be feasible, and give short
shrift to, untenable causes of action or defenses and thus avoid
waste of time, effort and money. [6]For reasons yet to be fathomed,
these devices seem to be of scant familiarity and of infrequent
availment, as above observed, with the result that the salutary
objective of the Rules of bringing about a simple, inexpensive and
expeditious system of litigation has not been fully achieved.
Now, to come to grips with the case. There is no disagreement
about the antecedents.The case began in the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pias (Branch 255), where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and
Damages" was filed by the Heirs of Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle
(represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina Diman,
Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman.
[7]
In their complaint, the Lacalle heirs claimed that:
a) their mother, the late Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (who
died in 1992), was the owner of a "parcel of land situated
at Brgy. Pulang Lupa Uno, Las Pias, ** covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 273301 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal;"
b) Veronica Lacalle had acquired the land in 1959 by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale, and retained as
caretakers the persons she found in occupancy of the lot
at the time of the sale, namely: Julian Nario and his wife,
Adelaida Legaspi, "with arrangement to share the
agricultural fruits" until the former would have need of
the property;
c) the caretakers of the lot were served with a notice for
them to vacate the land (dated November 22, 1994) and
an alias writ of demolition (dated June 7, 1994) issued
by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2619 --
a case for "ejectment with damages" filed by the Dimans
against the Narios, judgment in which, commanding the
Narios' ouster, had supposedly been affirmed by the
Makati Regional Trial Court (Branch 137);

d) neither the deceased Veronica nor any of her heirs
had been made parties to said ejectment action;
e) the complaint for ejectment contains false assertions,
and had caused them injury for which the Dimans should
be made to pay damages.
In their answer with counterclaim dated February 2, 1995,
[8]
the Dimans alleged that:
a) they are the registered and absolute owners of the
land registered in their names under TCT Nos. 90628,
90629 and 58676 (Pasay City), and have no knowledge
of the land claimed by the Lacalle Heirs;
b) they are entitled to eject from their land the Nario
Spouses, who were falsely claiming to be their lessees;
c) if the Heirs' theory is that the land in their title, No.
273301, is the same as that covered by the Dimans'
titles, then said title No. 2733101 is spurious because:
(1) no less than three official agencies -- (i)
the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for Rizal
and Regional Registrar for Region IV, (ii) the
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City, and (iii)
the Pangasiwaan Pangtalaan ng
Lupain(Land Registration Authority) -- have
certified to the absence of any entry in their
records concerning TCT No. 273301
covering land with an area of 22,379 square
meters in the name of Veronica Vda. De
Moreno Lacalle;
(2) Decree No. N-11601 explicitly cited as
basis by TCT No. 273301 refers to land in
Mauban, Quezon Province, according to the
records of the Land Registration Authority;
and GLRO Record No. 14978 also expressly
mentioned as basis for TCT No. 273301,
refers to a registration case heard in
Pangasinan;
and
d) they are entitled to damages on their counterclaim.
After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the Heirs on
February 2, 1995, a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION (dated February
2, 1995) of the truth of the following specified matters of fact, to wit: [9]
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the
Registry of Rizal, or of Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of
Las Pias;
b) the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly
registered in their names in Pasay City, as alleged in
their answer;
c) in the Index Records of Registered Property Owners
under Act No. 496 in the Office of the land Registration
Authority, there is no record of any property situated in
Las Pias in the name of Veronica Lacalle, more
particularly described in TCT 273301;
4) the Heirs cannot produce a certified true copy of TCT
273301;
5) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever
declared the property under TCT 273301 for taxation
purposes since its alleged acquisition on February 24,
1959 or since the issuance of said title on August 7,
1959;
6) not a single centavo has been paid by the Heirs as
real estate taxes; and
7) no steps have been taken by the Heirs to ascertain
the genuineness and authenticity of the conflicting titles.
The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose
Lacalle himself through registered mail on February 6, 1995, and
copy thereof, by the latter's lawyer (Atty. Cesar T. Ching) on
February 4, 1995. However, no response whatever was made to the
request by Lacalle, his lawyer, or anyone else, despite the lapse of
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
68
the period therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26 (not less than ten
days after service). The Dimans thereupon filed with the Court a
"MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO
ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION," dated March 28, 1995,
[10]
giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their answer to the
request for admission, a copy of which was personally delivered to
the latter's lawyer; but again, no response whatever was made.
The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARRY
JUDGMENT" dated April 17, 1995.[11] In that motion they drew
attention to the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the
several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled
hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was
however later reinstated. They argued that because the heirs had
failed to respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of the
matters of which an admission was requested, was deemed
admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26. On this basis, and on the
basis of the joint affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los Reyes and Florina
Diman Tan -- attached to the motion and substantiating the facts
recited in the request for admission -- the Dimans asserted that no
genuine issue existed and prayed that "a summary judgment be
entered dismissing the case for lack of merit."
The Heirs' counsel filed a two-page opposition dated May 15,
1995[12] in which, betraying an unfortunate unfamiliarity with the
concept of summary judgments, he asserted inter alia that:
"In order for defendants (Dimans) to successfully pray
for judgment on the pleadings, they have to clearly
alleged in their permissive counterclaim their cause of
action and if the answer of the plaintiffs (Heirs) to such
kind of counterclaim admit (sic) it or the answer to the
counterclaim is a sham, that is the time for the
defendants to move for a judgment summarily. ** **
(D)efendants have no cause of action for praying for
summary judgment. It is the plaintiffs who will pray for
that and not the defendants."
Subsequently, the Dimans submitted a reply dated May 23,
1995;[13] the Heirs, a rejoinder dated June 1, 1995; [14] and the
Dimans, a pleading entitled "Exceptions and Comment to Plaintiffs'
Rejoinder" dated June 8, 1995.[15]
The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary
judgment. In its Order of June 14, 1995, [16] the Court declared that a
"perusal of the Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that
material issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and defendants claimed
ownership over the land in dispute, presenting their respective titles
thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the
land." It stressed, citing jurisprudence, that a summary judgment "is
not proper where the defendant presented defenses tendering
factual issues which call for the presentation of evidence."
The case proceeded to trial in due course. At its start, the
Heirs' counsel, Atty. Michael Moralde, responding to questions of the
Court, admitted that his clients did not have the original copy of the
title which was the basis for their cause of action, but asserted that
they were "still searching" for it since "(i)n every municipality there
are several Registry of Deeds." He theorized that the word "'title' ** is
a relative term ** (and) does not only refer to a document but refers
to ownership."[17]
Only Jose Moreno Lacalle gave evidence for the plaintiff
Heirs. Like Atty. Moralde, he admitted that he had no copy "of the
document which says ** (his) mother is the registered owner;" that
the deed of sale was not the only basis for his and his co-heirs' claim
to the land, but also "a xerox copy of the ** title ** except that ** (he)
cannot find the original;" that "maybe" the original was in possession
of the person who was his mother's agent in all her transactions, a
certain Mr. Lopez, whom he could no longer locate; that he had tried
to verify the existence of the title "from the Register of Deeds of
Pasig and Pasay" without success; that he had not, however, gone
to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias.[18]
The Heirs' documentary evidence consisted of (1) Veronica
Lacalle's death certificate, (2) the special power of attorney
authorizing Jose Lacalle to act for his brothers and sisters; and (3)
the deed of absolute sale purportedly executed by Eusebio Mojica,
Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica, Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and
Teodora Aranda which deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the "Land
'known as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'" but which made no reference to any
Torrens title over it
Shortly after the Heirs rested their case, the Dimans filed a
"Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence," dated June 25,

1996.[19] They summarized the Heirs' evidence -- focusing attention
on the Heirs failure to present "even an unauthenticated photocopy
of the title," and the absence of any proof that any proceedings for
registration of the land under the Torrens Act had been instituted --
and emphasized anew said Heirs' implied admissions resulting from
their failure to answer their (the Dimans') request therefor as a mode
of discovery. On these premises, the Dimans contended that a
judgment on demurrer should be rendered, there being no genuine
issue between the parties notwithstanding the ostensible conflict of
averments in their basic pleadings.
The Heirs presented a three-page opposition, dated July 7,
1996.[20] In it their counsel set out the startling contention
that "(d)emurrer to evidence is violative to due process as the
judgment be rendered without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to
cross-examine the defendant," and petulantly inquired, "How could
the truth come out without cross-examination of the defendants by
plaintiff?" particularly, as regards "whether their (the Dimans') title is
not fake." Said counsel also posited the amazing notion
that "Demurrer to evidence may be correct only in criminal cases as
it is the right of the accused to remain silent, and that includes his
right to file demurrer for fear of cross-examination. But not in Civil
Cases." Once more counsel regrettably exposed his ignorance of
quite elementary legal principles.
Again, the Dimans' efforts at expediting disposition of the
litigation were unsuccessful. By Order dated December 2, 1996,
[21]
the Trial Court denied their motion to dismiss. Respecting the
Heirs' omission to present in evidence any copy (even a photocopy)
of TCT No. 273301, the Court remarked that "Not being able to
prove the genuineness and authenticity of TCT No. 273301, it being
only a mere xerox copy ** (the Heirs) did not formally offer the same
in evidence." However, the Court said, the deed of sale of the land in
Veronica Lacalle's favor that was submitted instead -- the
"genuineness and authenticity ** (of which had) been fully
established" by the certification of the Clerk of Court of the Manila
RTC -- was adequate for the purpose. According to the Court,
"(e)xecution of a deed of conveyance in a certain prescribed form
gave to the transfer of a title to the land conveyed ** (and) without
being controverted by any convincing evidence to the contrary can
be sufficient basis in granting the plaintiffs' relief for quieting of their
title." The Order passed sub silentio on the quaint contentions in the
Heirs' opposition.
The Dimans moved for reconsideration under date of January
2, 1997,[22] inter alia(1) alleging that although the photocopy of TCT
2773301 annexed to the Heirs' complaint states that the "certificate
is a transfer from T.C.T. No. 259150" (and this, presumably, would be
the vendors' [the Mojicas'] title), no effort whatever was made to
submit proof thereof, and (2) reiterating the proposition that the Heirs
were bound by their implied admissions under Rule 26.
The Dimans also submitted a "SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated January 7, 1997 [23] in which they
invited attention to the identity of the technical description of the land
contained in the deed of sale to Veronica Lacalle and that set out in
TCT No. 273301. It must therefore have been Veronica Lacalle, they
reasoned, who had instituted the registration proceedings leading to
the supposed issuance of said TCT No. 273301. Yet the heirs failed
to present evidence of the record of any such registration
proceedings, just as they failed to present evidence of any authentic
copy of the title itself.
The Heirs filed a one-page "Vehement Opposition ** " dated
February 15, 1997.[24]Once again they reiterated the astounding
argument that the Dimans' "insistence ** (on the demurrer to
evidence) is tantamount to suppression of their evidence as they are
afraid of cross-examination"!
Again the Trial Court rebuffed the Dimans. In its Order of
February 28, 1997,[25] the Court ruled that the issues raised in the
motion for reconsideration and its supplement had already been
passed upon in the Order of December 2, 1996. It then set the case
"for the reception of defendants' evidence on April 22, 1997 **."
What the Dimans did was to commence a special civil action
of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals
praying (a) that it set aside the Orders of June 14, 1995 (denying
summary judgment), of December 2, 1996 (denying demurrer to
evidence), and of February 28, 1997 (denying reconsideration); (b)
that the Trial Judge be commanded to dismiss the case before it;
and (c) that said judge be prohibited from conducting further
proceedings in the case.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
69
But once again their efforts met with failure. The Appellate
Tribunal (Seventh Division) promulgated judgment on September 9,
1997 decreeing that their petition be "DENIED due course and
DISMISSED." The Court of Appeals held that insofar as concerned
the Order of June 14, 1995, the petition for its invalidation had not
been filed within a reasonable time; and that as regards the Order of
December 2, 1996, the remedy of certiorari was improper because :
(1) said order was merely interlocutory, (2) any error therein
constituted only an error of judgment correctible by appeal, and (3)
there was no capriciousness or whimsicality attendant upon the
order. The Dimans' motion for reconsideration was later denied by
the Court of Appeals by Resolution dated November 5, 1997.[26]
The Dimans thereupon filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari of the Appellate Tribunal's Decision of
September 9, 1997. But seemingly consistent with the pattern of
judicial misfortune which they had theretofore been traversing, their
petition for review was dismissed, by Resolution dated January 14,
1998. Their appeal was however subsequently reinstated, as earlier
recounted.
Now, what first strikes the Court about the case at bar is the
regrettable absence of familiarity, therein laid bare, with the rules of
discovery and with the underlying philosophy and principles of the
cognate remedy of summary judgment. That resulted in the undue
protraction of the present action despite ample demonstration of the
absence of any genuine issue -- that is to say, that the issues
ostensibly arising from the pleadings were sham or fictitious.
A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the
consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make discovery should
be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is grave
abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and observe
the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly as
regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,
the law ordains that when a party is served with a written request
that he admit : (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the
truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request, said party is bound within the period designated in the
request,[27] to file and serve on the party requesting the admission
a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn
statement, each of the matters of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted.[28]
In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly
served by registered mail on Jose Lacalle on February 6, 1995, and
a copy thereof on his lawyers on February 4, 1995.Neither made any
response whatever within the reglementary period. Nor did either of
them do so even after receiving copy of the Dimans'
"MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO
ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION." dated March 28, 1995. On
account thereof, in legal contemplation, the Heirs impliedly admitted
all the facts listed in the request for admission. These plain and
simple legal propositions were disregarded by His Honor.
It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment
is proper. It declares that although the pleadings on their face appear
to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in,
factual allegations -- if it is shown by admissions, depositions or
affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in
the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entiled to a judgment as a matter of law,[29] the
Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff [30] or the
defendant[31] as the case may be.[32]
Parenthetically, the existence or appearance of ostensible
issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for a
summary judgment[33] from one for a judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 19 of the 1964 Rules.[34] In the latter case, there is no
ostensible issue at all, but the absence of any because of the failure
of the defending party's answer to raise an issue.Rule 19 expresses
the principle as follows:
"Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading **."[35]

On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues
apparently exist -- i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or
specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the
answer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham,
fictitious, not genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or
admissions. In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a
judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded
while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily
proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions.[36] Another distinction
is that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings may be
sought only by a claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, supra),
a summary judgment may be applied for by either a claimant or a
defending party.
These basic distinctions escaped His Honor. He denied the
Dimans' motion for summary judgment in his Order of June 14,
1995, opining that a "perusal of the Complaint and the Answer will
clearly show that material issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and
defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting
their respective titles thereto and accused each other of possessing
false title to the land." He added, citing cases, that a summary
judgment "is not proper where the defendant presented defenses
tendering factual issues which call for the presentation of
evidence." Such a ratiocination is grossly erroneous. Clearly, the
grounds relied on by the Judge are proper for the denial of a motion
for judgment on the pleadings -- as to which the essential question,
as already remarked, is: are there issues arising from or generated
by the pleadings? -- but not as regards a motion for summary
judgment -- as to which the crucial question is: issues having been
raised by the pleadings, are those issues genuine, or sham or
fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the application therefor?
Errors on principles so clear and fundamental as those herein
involved cannot but be deemed so egregious as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion, being tantamount to whimsical or capricious
exercise of judicial prerogative.
When the Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs, and
the Dimans moved to dismiss on ground of insufficiency of the Heirs'
evidence, the Trial Judge was charged with the duty to assess the
evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff(s) ** (have) shown no right to relief." It was in the first place
incumbent on His Honor to hold the Heirs bound to their admissions
appearing in the record, express and implied. In accordance with
Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were
impliedly, but no less indubitably, deemed to have admitted the facts
on which admissions had been duly requested by reason of their
failure to reply thereto. Said Section 2 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. Implied admissions. -- Each of the matters of
which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period designated in the
request, which shall not be less than twn (10) days after
service thereof, or within such further time as the court
may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically
the matters on which an admission is requested or setting
forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of
the matter requested shall be promptly submitted to the
court for resolution."[37]
In determining the chief issue in the case, the Trial Judge
should have taken due account of the following circumstances on
record and obvious legal propositions:
1) the Heirs' admissions of the following facts, viz.:
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of
Rizal, or of Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of Las Pias;
b) on the other hand, the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all
duly registered in their names in Pasay City;
c) there is no record of any property situated in Las Pias in the name
of Veronica Lacalle -- more particularly described in TCT 273301 --
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
70
in the Index Records of Registered Property Owners under Act No.
496 in the Office of the Land Registration Authority;
d) the Heirs do not have and cannot produce even a certified true
copy of TCT 273301;
e) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the
property under TCT 273301 for taxation purposes since its alleged
acquisition on February 24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title
on August 7, 1959;
f) not a single centavo was ever paid by the Heirs as real estate
taxes; and
g) no steps were ever taken by the Heirs to ascertain the
genuineness and authenticity of the conflicting titles.
2) the statement in open Court of the Heirs' own counsel
that his clients did not have original copy of the title, that
they were fact "still searching" for the title;[38]
3) the testimony of Jose Moreno Lacalle that he had no
copy "of the document which says ** (his) mother is the
registered owner" of the land in question; that he "cannot
find the original" which "maybe" was in possession of his
mother's agent, a certain Mr. Lopez, who, he could no
longer locate; that he had tried to verify the existence of
the title "from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and Pasay"
without success; that he had not, however, gone to the
Register of Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias;[39]
4) that the only document bearing on the issue submitted
by the heirs, the deed of absolute sale purportedly
executed by Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica,
Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and Teodora Aranda --
which deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the "land 'known
as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'" but which made no reference to
any Torrens title over it -- was not accompanied by proof
of the vendors' ownership of the land in question;
5) that the land subject of the Heirs' action for quieting of
title being registered land (being in fact registered in the
Dimans' favor), the unregistered deed of sale relied upon
by the Heirs cannot and does not affect said land, or bind
any third party (including the Dimans) for the reason that,
as a matter of law:
" ** (N)o deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make registration;" and it
is the "act of registration (that) shall be the
operative act to convey or effect the land in so
far as third persons are concerned," which
"registration shall be made in the ** Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies."[40]
and
6) that there is no proof whatever of the ownership or
character of the rights of the vendors (the Mojicas) over
the property purportedly conveyed.
In fine, the Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a
judgment in their favor.They had not presented any copy whatever of
the title they wished to be quieted. They had not adduced any proof
worthy of the name to establish their precedessors' ownership of the
land. On the contrary, their own evidence, from whatever aspect
viewed, more than persuasively indicated their lack of title over the
land, or the spuriousness of their claim of ownership thereof. The
evidence on record could not be interpreted in any other way, and no
other conclusion could be drawn therefrom except the
unmeritoriousness of the complaint. The case at bar is a classic
example of the eminent propriety of a summary judgment, or a
judgment on demurrer to evidence.
 71

Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish
grounds of opposition advanced by the Heirs against the Dimans'
motions for summary judgment and for demurrer to evidence, no
less than the obviously mistaken grounds cited by the Trial Court for
denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring that it
was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Court to
have refused to render a summary judgment or one on demurrer to
evidence. In no sense may the Trial Court's errors be considered, as
the Court of Appeals did in its judgment of September 9, 1997, as
mere errors of judgment correctible by appeal, untarnished by any
capriciousness or whimsicality.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on September 9, 1997 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE: the Orders dated July 14, 1996 and December 2, 1996
rendered in the action for "Quieting of Title and Damages" --
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3085 of the Regional Trial Court at
Las Pias (Branch 255) and entitled "Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno
Lacalle, represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle versus Cristina Diman,
Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman" --
are annuled; and said Civil Case No. 94-3085 is DISMISSED. Costs
against private respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33416 June 29, 1972
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARION CASIMIRO, ET AL., defendants, BENJAMIN ICALLA,
RODOLFO SORIANO and BENJAMIN CINCO, defendants-
appellants, MANUEL N. SANGLAY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
Rodolfo Soriano, I could not have also filed his brief for the reason
that he escaped from jail."4
In the light of the above, the most that can be admitted is that
appellant's failure to file the brief was not a willful act on his part. At
least his good faith cannot be impugned. Nonetheless, the
exculpation he seeks cannot be granted. He knew that the period for
filing the brief was running. He was equally aware that this Court
expected that the matter will be taken care of by him, as he was the
counsel of record. There was no other appearance. Under the
circumstances, the least that was expected of him was that he would
inform this Tribunal of the developments set forth in his explanation
and as that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel. Such a step he
did not take until after the resolution of February 3, 1972 requiring
him to explain the failure to comply with his duty as officer of the
Court. It came too late. It did not wipe out the previous manifestation
of negligence on his part. He cannot therefore escape liability. If this
sad state of affairs came to pass, he had only himself to blame.
WHEREFORE, respondent Manuel N. Sanglay is reprimanded. Let a
copy of this resolution be entered on his record. There being no
objection on the part of appellants Icalla and Soriano for
respondent's withdrawal as their counsel, his prayer that he be
allowed to do so is granted.
[G.R. Nos. 131384-87. February 2, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELEGIO
NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

These cases are before us on automatic review of the decision of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
FERNANDO, J.:p
finding accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. guilty of four counts of
rape of his minor daughters, Oleby and Maricris Nadera, and
This is yet another instance of a member of the Philippine Bar, this sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one
time, respondent Manuel N. Sanglay, being administratively count of rape and death for each of the remaining three counts.
proceeded against for failure to file the brief within the reglementary Accused-appellant was also ordered to indemnify complainants
period for appellants Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Oleby Nadera in the amount of P150,000.00 and Maricris Nadera in
Cinco. He was given the opportunity to explain in our February 3, the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
1972 resolution, which reads thus: "For failure to file brief for of insolvency. MENDOZAJ
appellants Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Cinco
within the period which expired on December 23, 1971, the Court
Reversal of the decision is sought on the sole ground that -
resolved to [require] Atty. Manuel N. Sanglay to explain, within ten
(10) days from notice hereof, why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him."1 It was not until the end of that month that his THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
manifestation and explanation came. He would absolve himself from ACCEPTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
any blame as, in his view, no fault could be attributed to him. IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A
CAPITAL OFFENSE AND IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO
As set forth in such pleading, this is how he would explain matters:
DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED
"Upon receiving the notice from this Honorable Court advising me to
FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCE
file the brief for the appellants, I immediately contacted the parents
OF HIS PLEA.[1]
of the three appellants. Pablo Icalla and the father of Benjamin Cinco
came but the mother of Rodolfo Soriano failed to appear. At that time
Rodolfo Soriano was already at large for he escaped from prison at The facts are as follows:
the La Union Provincial Jail. In our conference, the father of
Benjamin Cinco reiterated his former desire not to appeal the case of
Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife
his son. But later on, Pablo Icalla, father of appellant Benjamin Icalla
Daisy, namely: Oleby, born on October 2, 1982; Maricris, born on
prevailed on the father of Benjamin Cinco that they continue the
March 16, 1984; March Anthony, born on January 8, 1986; and
appeal. According to Pablo Icalla he had already engaged the
Sherilyn, born on September 27, 1987.[2]
services of a good lawyer to prepare their brief. Pablo Icalla further
informed me that he had already taken all the transcript of the case
from the stenographer."2 Mention was then made by him of another On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain, and came
lawyer whose services presumably were hired by the parents of home to the Philippines for vacation only in July 1993. She then left
appellants Icalla and Cinco: "I then reminded them that failure to file again for Bahrain in September 1993 and did not return until
the brief within the period prescribed by law would mean automatic September 12, 1995.[3]
withdrawal of the appeal. They assured me that the lawyer they
contacted will file the brief in the Supreme Court. Moreover, I was
On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita
likewise prevailed upon not to withdraw my appearance as a token
Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father,
of my hard work in the lower court in defending the case of their
herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police
sons.3 He felt justified in concluding then: "My failure therefore to file
authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-
the brief for the appellants is attributable to the fault of the accused
appellant.[4]
themselves represented by their parents. Their parents
disauthorized me to prepare and file the brief for the appellants by
engaging another lawyer to do the same. In so far as the appellant,

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11

 72

After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates were filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
- No sign of external
physical injuries as of time
In Criminal Case No. C-4982, the information[5] alleged- of examination.
- Breast developed
- Abdomen: flat, soft non-
That on or about the 17th day of May, 1992, at
tender.
around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and EXTERNAL GENITALIA
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, motivated by lust
- Minimal pubic hair
and lewd design, and by means of force and
- Healed incomplete
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
hymenal lacerations at 5, 7,
did lie and succeeded in having carnal
12 o'clock positions.
knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA,
- No bleeding.
nine (9) years of age at that time against the
latter's will and consent.
INTERNAL SPECULUM EXAMINATION
[6]
In Criminal Case No. C-4983, the information charged -
- Vagina admits 2 fingers
with ease.
That on or about the 17th day of April, 1995 at
- Cervix small, firm, close
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan,
non-tender (-) bleeding.
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
- Uterus not enlarged.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
- Adnexae negative
the above-named accused, motivated by lust
and lewd design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, and unlawfully and LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
feloniously did lie and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY
- Smear for the presence of
NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at that time
spermatozoa revealed
against the latter's will and consent.
positive result.

In Criminal Case No. C-4984, the information[7] stated-

She testified that the hymenal lacerations may have been caused by
the insertion of a hard object, the patient's history of genitalic
That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, insertions, a straddle injury, or sitting on hard wood. She could not
sometime in the evening, at Barangay Bayani, determine when these lacerations were sustained because they had
Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental healed over a period beyond seven days.[11]
Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Dr. Fesalbon likewise rendered a report[12] on the medical
accused, motivated by lust and lewd design,
examination of Maricris Nadera, the pertinent parts of which state:
and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with his daughter, PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at
that time against the latter's will and consent.
- No sign of external
physical injuries as of time
In Criminal Case No. C-4985, the information[8] recited - of examination.
- Abdomen, flat, soft.
That on or about the 3rd day of March 1996 at
around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay EXTERNAL GENITALIA:
Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- - Absence of pubic hair
named accused, motivated by lust and lewd healed hymenal lacerations,
design, and by means of force and intimidation, incomplete at 1, 5, 8, 11
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and o'clock positions.
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his
daughter, MARICRIS NADERA, eleven (11) INTERNAL EXAMINATION:
years of age against the latter's will and
consent.
- Vagina admits 1 finger
with ease.
The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused- - Cervix small (-) bleeding
appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public - Uterus not enlarged.
Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. -Adnexae (-).
[9]
However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented
Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the
crime charged in all the informations. LABORATORY EXAMINATION

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Dr. Cynthia - Smear for the presence of
Fesalbon, Oleby Nadera, Maricris Nadera, and Daisy Nadera. spermatozoa revealed
Negative result.

Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, Medical Officer IV of the Oriental Mindoro

Provincial Hospital, who conducted the medical examination of both In the case of Maricris Nadera, Dr. Fesalbon explained that the
complainants, submitted a report on the result of Oleby Nadera's hymenal lacerations could have been caused by penetration such as
examination as follows:[10] through instrumentation or insertion of an object inside the vagina.
They could also have been caused by the penetration of the penis.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


Upon inquiry from the court, Dr. Fesalbon stated that the fact that
Maricris had more hymenal lacerations than Oleby could be due to
the difference in the impact of penetration. She added that the
number of times each of the girls had sexual intercourse could not
be ascertained merely from the hymenal lacerations, although it
could be concluded that an object had been inserted in the vagina.[13]
Oleby Nadera testified about the rapes committed by her father
against her as follows:
On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while Daisy
was away working as a domestic helper in Bahrain, accused-
appellant pulled Oleby, then nine years of age, towards a bed,
removed her panties and shorts and ordered her to keep quiet. He
then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. He proceeded to make an up and down motion while on top
of his daughter. All the while, Oleby was crying, pleading with her
father, "Huwag po!", "Huwag po!" Accused-appellant again ordered
Oleby to keep quiet lest her brother and sisters were awakened.
Afterwards, accused-appellant told Oleby to put on her panties and
shorts and to go to sleep. Oleby went to the bed where her brother
and sisters were sleeping and cried.
On another occasion, on April 17, 1995, accused-appellant sent
Sherilyn and Maricris to the sari-sari store while he asked March
Anthony to gather firewood. While Oleby was left alone inside their
house in Barangay Bayani, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, accused-
appellant again raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at that time.
Accused-appellant closed the door and windows, removed Oleby's
panties and shorts and sat down. While sitting down, accused-
appellant placed Oleby's legs on his thighs and inserted his penis
into her vagina. Later on, he told Oleby to put on her panties and
shorts and told her to fetch her brother and sisters.
Oleby was raped by her father for the third time on April 24, 1995.
That evening, she woke up to find her father on top of her, taking off
her shorts and panties and inserting his penis into her vagina. As her
father was taking off her clothes, Oleby cried and pleaded, "Huwag
po! Huwag po!" Instead of desisting, accused-appellant told her to
keep quiet so as not to awaken her brother and sisters, and
threatened her with harm if she made any noise. Accused-appellant
then made a pumping motion, consummating the sexual act with his
daughter.[14]
After Oleby's direct examination had been finished, Atty. Brotonel,
accused-appellant's counsel, did not conduct any cross examination
on the ground that he was convinced Oleby was telling the truth.[15]
On that same day, Maricris also testified. She related how she was
raped by her father on March 3, 1996, the year before, when she
was 11 years old. At about eight o'clock in the evening of said date,
while her brother and sisters were sleeping, she was pulled by her
father towards his bed and told to lie down. Accused-appellant then
placed himself on top of Maricris and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Maricris pleaded "Papa, huwag po, maawa naman kayo sa
amin."Ignoring his daughter's pleas, accused-appellant continued
raping her by making a pumping motion and threatened to kill all of
them if she cried. Accused-appellant afterwards asked Maricris to
put on her shorts and panties and return to bed. He told Maricris not
to cry so as not to awaken her siblings. She did not tell anyone what
befell her because she was afraid. A neighbor, named Lita
Macalalad, asked her if Oleby had been raped by their father. It
turned out Oleby had told her ordeal to Lita Macalalad while they
were washing clothes and talking about Oleby's parents. Oleby also
told Lita Macalalad that Maricris had been raped by their father as
well, a fact related to Oleby by Maricris.[16]
Daisy Nadera, accused-appellant's wife, also testified for the
prosecution. Her testimony focused on the dates of births of her
children and the fact that she was out of the country when the
alleged rapes occurred. She testified that she and her daughters
filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant after discovering
his hideous acts. Thereafter, her children were subjected to a
medical examination.[17]
On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
73
Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense.
On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding
accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape against his
daughters. The dispositive portion of its decision[18] reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds accused Elegio
Nadera, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Rape [4 counts] with
the qualifying circumstance that the victims are
under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua ranging from 20
years and 1 day to 40 years for the rape
committed on May 17, 1992 and three DEATH
PENALTIES for the rape committed on April 17
and 24, 1995 and March 3, 1996, together with
the accessory penalties provided by law. He is
also ordered to indemnify victim Oleby Nadera
the total amount of P150,000.00 in Criminal
Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983 and C-4984 and
Maricris Nadera, the amount of P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. C-4985, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
S OO R D E R E D.
As already stated, accused-appellant's lone assignment of error is
that the trial court accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense
without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he
understood the consequences of his plea. In support of his
contention, accused-appellant invokes the ruling in the case
of People v. Dayot[19] in which this Court ruled that, in criminal cases,
the judge must be convinced that the accused, in pleading guilty, is
truly guilty. This could be done by requiring him to narrate the events
leading to the crime, making him reenact it, or asking him to supply
missing details. The judge must satisfy himself that: (1) the accused
is voluntarily pleading guilty, and (2) he is truly guilty and there is a
rational basis for a finding of guilt based on his testimony.
We find merit in accused-appellant's allegations. In addition, we find
that there was inadequate representation of his case in court, thus
necessitating the remand of this case for further proceedings.
I.
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to
capital offense; reception of
evidence.- When the
accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the
voluntariness and full
comprehension of the
consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution
to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of
culpability. The accused
may also present evidence
on his behalf.
Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when
a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the
accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the
court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3)
the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.[20]
What constitutes a searching inquiry, as explained in People v.
Alicando,[21] is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and
 74

informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) and necessary in support of the material
the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the allegations of the information, including the
consequences of the plea. aggravating circumstances therein enumerated,
not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also
to aid the Supreme Court in determining
In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired
whether the accused really and truly understood
at the re-arraignment of accused-appellant, for what reason he
and comprehended the meaning, full
changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully
significance and consequences of his plea.[28]
understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication
in the record that accused-appellant changed his plea to guilty is the
Certificates of Re- Arraignment, dated August 5, 1997, in Criminal Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was
Case Nos. C-4982 to C-4985.[22] On what exactly accused-appellant made improvidently.
said in entering his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been told
by the trial judge, the records shed no light. There is thus no
II.
evidence to show that accused-appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily
made or that he had fully understood the consequences of such
plea. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only
if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied
on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
accused pleaded guilty, thus:
merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.[29]
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's
As already stated, the prosecution evidence consisted of the
Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
testimonies of Oleby and Maricris Nadera, the results of their
However, on August 5, 1997, when these cases
medical examinations, and the testimonies of their mother, Daisy,
were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the
and the physician who conducted the medical examination of the two
accused manifested that the accused, realizing
girls, Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this
the futility of entering into trial and considering
case, however, persuade us that a remand of this case is necessary.
that he actually committed the acts complained
of, intimated his intention to enter a plea of guilty
to the above- mentioned charges. The accused First. A perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge
was then asked by this Court if he was aware of failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he based
the consequences of a plea of guilty to a capital accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of the
offense: that for the rape he committed on May prosecution's evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No.7659, amending
17, 1992 against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate
who was 9 years old at the time, he would be the reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and for the and no reason given why the court found the testimonies of the
three other counts of rape committed on April 17 witnesses credible. Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and Procedure provides:
on March 3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera, 11
years old at the time], he would be sentenced to
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment.- The
death by lethal injection. After having been
judgment must be written in the official
informed of this, he insisted that he is willing to
language, personally and directly prepared by
enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and
the judge and signed by him and shall contain
is ready to face the consequences thereof.[23]
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law
The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the upon which the judgment is based.
requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine
whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a)
plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused faces the
the legal qualification of the offense constituted
supreme penalty of death is insufficient. [24] For more often than not,
by the acts committed by the accused, and the
an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a
aggravating or mitigating circumstances
lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial judge must erase such
attending the commission thereof, if there be
mistaken impressions.[25] He must be completely convinced that the
any; (b) participation of the accused in the
guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or
commission of the offense, whether as principal,
promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the
latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations. In
civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful
addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he
act to be recovered from the accused by the
conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the
offended party, if there be any, unless the
meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the
action has been reserved or waived.
accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial
court must ask questions concerning them. [26] In this case, absent
any showing that these questions were put to accused-appellant, a In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear
searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken by the showing that the act from which the civil liability
trial court. might arise did not exist, the judgment shall
make a finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended party.
What the trial court did in this case, as described in its decision, is
similar to what happened in People v. Sevilleno.[27] In that case, the
accused was charged with the rape and homicide of a nine-year old In People v. Bugarin,[30] we stated:
girl. The accused pleaded guilty whereupon the judge asked him
questions: (1) Do you understand your plea of guilt? and (2) Do you
know that your plea of guilt could bring the death penalty? This Court The requirement that the decisions of courts
held that these questions did not constitute a searching inquiry. must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which they are based serves many functions. It
. . . In every case where the accused enters a is intended, among other things, to inform the
plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially parties of the reason or reasons for the decision
where he is an ignorant person with little or no so that if any of them appeals, he can point out
education, the proper and prudent course to to the appellate court the finding of facts or the
follow is to take such evidence as are available rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11

More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the
sword nor the purse by the Constitution but
nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life,
liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge
must ultimately depend on the power of reason
for sustained public confidence in the justness
of his decision. The decision of the trial court in
this case disrespects the judicial function.
Second. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go
unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine Oleby
Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera's
cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence
for the accused but also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if
he desires.
Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client
can give meaning and substance to the accused's right to due
process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence,
a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be
taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his
command to protect and safeguard the accused's fundamental
rights.
In the case of People vs. Bermas,[31] no less than three PAO lawyers
were found by the Court to have failed in performing their duties to
their client, an accused charged with raping his daughter. The first
lawyer inexplicably waived the cross examination of the private
complainant and later asked to be relieved of her duties as
counsel de oficio. A second lawyer appointed by the court missed
several hearings during the trial and could no longer be located. The
third PAO lawyer appointed by the trial court accepted his duties
reluctantly and later ceased to appear for the accused. This Court
held that:
The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and
objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.
The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the
basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused
to counsel finds substance in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.
Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this
case falls short of the quality of advocacy demanded of him,
considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the
penalty. A glaring example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his
client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby Nadera, as
revealed in the following portion of the records:
COURT:
.......Any cross?
ATTY. BROTONEL:
.......If Your Honor please, we are not conducting
any cross-examination, because this
representation, from the demeanor of the
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
75
witness, I am convinced that she is telling the
truth.[32]
It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's
testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to
scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the
accused's constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses
against him was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the
complainant against that of the accused, the two being the only
persons present during the commission of the offense. While the
lone testimony of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such
testimony must be clear, positive, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. Complainant's
testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without
denying the accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
[33]
This is where cross examination becomes essential to test the
credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies
may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused and thus to give substance to the constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him. For unless
proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the
accused is presumed to be innocent.[34]
Indeed, cross examining Oleby Nadera becomes indispensable if
her testimony is viewed together with the results of her medical
examination. Oleby Nadera claimed that she was last raped by her
father on April 24, 1995.[35] Yet, the medical examination conducted
on her on April 30, 1996[36] revealed the presence of spermatozoa in
the vaginal canal on that date. This was a year after the last rape
allegedly committed by her father. This evident discrepancy leads to
only one natural conclusion: Oleby engaged in sexual intercourse a
few days before she was examined. This raises a number of
questions that bear upon the credibility of Oleby as a witness and
upon the guilt of accused- appellant. This may not necessarily mean
that she was lying when she said that on April 24, 1995 she had
been raped by accused-appellant, but it does indicate a necessity-
that of cross examining her in order to ferret out the truth.
The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris'
testimony. While she was cross examined by defense counsel, the
examination was at best a half-hearted attempt to comply with a
lawyer's obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required considering
that a man's life is at stake. The cross examination centered on what
Maricris did or did not do while she witnessed her sister being raped,
and on her failure to report the allegedly incestuous rapes against
them. Said cross examination did not even touch upon the specific
details concerning the rape committed against her. Containing lurid
details as it may be, it was nonetheless important to probe Maricris'
testimony, especially since it was substantially similar to the first
incident of rape narrated by her sister, and thus raised the possibility
that it was a rehearsed, if not concocted, story.
Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, according to the trial court's
decision, he even expressed his conformity to the admission of the
same. Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of accused-
appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the records is it shown that accused-
appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his
right to present evidence, if he so desires.
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client
and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he perceives
accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the
more imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the
balance. His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio.
In view of the foregoing, we find it necessary to remand the case for
the proper arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only
the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect
in representing his cause. A new trial has been ordered in criminal
cases on the ground of retraction of witnesses, negligence or
incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification
of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court,
and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered
into by both the prosecution and the defense.[38]

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated April 27, 1997, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 40, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, is hereby SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983, C-4984 and C-
4985 are REMANDED to it for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision. The trial court is enjoined to conduct the proper
trial of accused-appellant with all deliberate speed upon receipt of
the records of the cases.
SO ORDERED
[A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000]
Judge ADORACION G. ANGELES, complainant, vs. Atty.
THOMAS C. UY JR., respondent. Spped jo
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers must promptly account for money or property they receive
on behalf of their clients. Failure to do so constitutes professional
Misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
The Case and the Facts
In a letter dated February 11, 1999 addressed to the Office of the
Chief Justice, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City (Branch 121) charged Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr.
with violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant states that respondent's acts, which had earlier been
held contemptible in her February 10, 1999 Order, [1] also rendered
him administratively liable. In the said Order, she narrated the
following facts:
"When the case was called for the second time
at 11 :25 o'clock in the morning, the private
prosecutor Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. appeared. In
open court, accused Norma Trajano manifested
that she had already settled in full the civil
aspect in Crim. Case No. C-54177 (98) in the
total amount of [t]hirty [s]ix [t]housand [f]ive
[h]undred (P36,500.00) [p]esos. She further
alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the
private complainant and the balance of
P16,500.00 was delivered to Atty. Thomas C.
Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the private complainant
and accordingly produced in open court the
receipt for such payment signed by no less than
the aforesaid lawyer. Indeed, the civil liability of
the accused had already been satisfied in
full. Miso
"However, the private complainant, Primitiva
Malansing [Del Rosario] manifested that she did
not receive the amount of [s]ixteen [t]housand
[f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos which was
paid to his lawyer Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr.,
thereby constraining this court to direct Atty.
Thomas C. Uy to turn over the money to the
private complainant which he received in trust
for his client. Atty. Uy however argued that his
client did not like to accept the money but the
assertion of the lawyer was belied by his own
client, the herein private complainant, who
manifested in open court x x x her willingness to
accept the money. The Court again directed
Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter
argued that he kept it in his office.
Consequently, the Court suspended the
proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money
from his law office which is located only at the
second floor of the same building where this
court is located.
"Unfortunately, it is already 12: 15 o'clock past
noon but Atty. Uy did not show up anymore and
not even his shadow appeared in Court.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
76
"It cannot be denied that the act of Atty. Thomas
Uy in deliberately failing to return to the Court
[the] proceedings [of which] were suspended
just because of his representations, mirrors not
only an undisguised disobedience of a court
order but also manifests his propensity to mock
the dignity of the Court. Disgustingly, he
deliberately ignored his solemn oath to conduct
himself as befitting the status of an officer of the
court.
"Indeed, this gross misbehavior of Atty. Uy
cannot simply be ignored for it is a raw
challenge to the authority of the Court.
"It must also be pointedly emphasized that Atty.
Thomas Uy committed a brazen violation of the
provisions of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit: Nex old
"x x x x x x x x x
"Obviously, Atty. Thomas Uy fell short of the
duties expected from him as a member of the
bar."
In compliance with this Court's March 24, 1999 Resolution,
Respondent Uy[2] filed his Comment on June 7, 1999. Denying that
he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
explained:
"1). In a criminal case, then pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan
City, Metro Manila, presided by the complainant
Honorable Adoracion G. Angeles, entitled
'People of the Philippines vs. Norma Trajano,
et., al', Criminal Case No. C-54176-77 (98), Atty.
Thomas C. Uy Jr., herein referred to as
[r]espondent, was engaged as [p]rivate
[p]rosecutor of the complainant therein, Mrs.
Primitiva Malansin Del Rosario. At the outset
Norma Trajano, accused in said criminal case,
expressed her desire and offered to settle the
civil aspect of the criminal case against her to
which Primitiva Del Rosario acceded. On
separate hearings, Norma Trajano made
installment payments to Primitiva Del Rosario
some of which payments were duly
acknowledged by the latter in the presence of
[r]espondent;
"2). On a previously cancelled date of hearing of
the aforesaid criminal case x x x on December
14, 1998, Norma Trajano went to the office of
the [r]espondent at about 8:45 o'clock in the
morning, x x x and met Mr. Romeo C. Jamisola
Jr., who is acting as [r]espondent's personal
secretary and at the same time the liason officer
of the law firm De Veyra, Uy and Associates x x
x. Mr[.] Romeo Jamisola Jr., is the lone staff of
the law firm x x x. Respondent was at that time
not in the office as he was attending a hearing
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122,
Kalookan City, Metro Manila. x x xMani kx
"3). On the aforesaid date and time (December
14, 1998) at the office of the [r]espondent,
Norma Trajano told Mr. Romeo Jamisola Jr. that
she will make another partial payment to
Primitiva M. Del Rosario because she cannot
attend the hearing the following day (8[:]30
o'clock a.m. of December 15, 1999) before
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles due to a conflict of
schedule with her [other] case in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, where
she is likewise the accused for [e]stafa[.] Mr.
Romeo Jamisola told Norma Trajano to wait for
a while as he will fetch [r]espondent at the
ground floor in the sala of the Honorable

Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, upon being
informed of the presence of Norma Trajano in
the office of the [r]espondent by Romeo
Jamisola Jr. went to his office and Norma
Trajano immediately told [r]espondent that she
knew that the setting for that day (December 14,
1998) was previously cancelled and that she
cannot attend the hearing the following day
(8[:]30 o'clock a.m. December 15, 1998) and
further told the [r]espondent that she (Norma
Trajano) will make another partial payment to
Primitiva M. Del Rosario and that she will just
leave her payment in the sum of [s]ixteen
[t]housand [five hundred] [p]esos (P16,500.00),
Philippine [c]urrency, in the office of the
[r]espondent. Respondent then told Norma
Trajano to inform Primitiva M. Del Rosario first
but Norma Trajano replied that she will just call
Primitiva [Del Rosario]. Nonetheless,
[r]espondent told Romeo Jamisola Jr. to call
Primitiva Del Rosario, using the office phone,
and let her talk with Norma Trajano, and, if
Primitiva Del Rosario agreed [r]espondent
instructed Romeo Jamisola Jr., to just prepare a
receipt. Respondent, fearing that his case
(People vs. Rommel Senadrin et al. above-
stated) might have been called in the calendar,
immediately left the office and proceeded [at]
the sala of the Honorable Remigio E. Zari.
Respondent, after the hearing x x x, returned to
his office and upon learning that his signature
was affixed by Romeo Jamisola Jr. upon the
insistence of Norma Trajano scolded Romeo
Jamisola Jr. and for his unsuccessful attempt to
contact first Primitiva Del Rosario before
receiving the sum of money left by Norma
Trajano; Maniks
"4). The following day [o]n the morning of
December 15, 1998 [r]espondent arrived at his
office and met Primitiva Del Rosario and her
daughter Aurora Del Rosario and immediately
the trio appeared before the sala of Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles in the hearing of the
Norma Trajano case. Returning [to] the office of
the [r]espondent after the hearing, Primitiva Del
Rosario and Aurora Del Rosario, being earlier
informed that on December 14, 1998 Norma
Trajano went [to] his office and made partial
payment in the sum of P16,500 thru Mr. Romeo
Jamisola Jr., the [r]espondent told Mr. Romeo
Jamisola to get the money from the filing cabinet
and while the money in the envelope [was]
being handed over to Primitiva Del Rosario, [the
latter] and her daughter x x x, however, told
[r]espondent to just let the money in the sum of
P16,500.00 be kept at the office of the
[r]espondent so that future payments of Norma
Trajano will be save[d] in whole and for them to
avoid spending the same as what had
happened to the past installment payments of
Norma Trajano. Respondent then acceded to
the request of Primitiva Del Rosario and her
daughter and told them that they can get the
money anytime they want from the
[r]espondent's office. Hence, the money was
kept locked [in] the filing cabinet of the
[r]espondent where he used to keep all his
personal file[s]. Manikan
"5). On December 23, 1998, early before noon,
Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora
Del Rosario, on a prior invitation, attended the
Christmas Party of the office of [r]espondent and
undersigned counsel. x x x Respondent, after
the x x x lunch, instructed Mr. Romeo Jamisola
Jr., to give the sum of money (P16,500.00) and
for Primitiva Del Rosario to receive the same for
fear of a repetition of a burglary incident before,
where some cash and minor office appliances of
undersigned were lost. Primitiva Del Rosario,
however, insisted that said sum of money be
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
77
kept at the office of the [r]espondent to save in
whole the installment payments of Norma
Trajano and that [was] the wish of her son
Fernando 'Bong' Del Rosario, who is a long time
friend and a compadre of the [r]espondent.
Respondent, respecting the trust reposed upon
him by Primitiva Del Rosario, her daughter
Aurora Del Rosario, and son Fernando Del
Rosario, acceded to hold in trust the said sum of
[s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred
(P16,500.00) [p]esos, Philippine [c]urrency,
which [was] locked and safely kept [in] the filing
cabinet of the [r]espondent until February 12,
1999; x x x;
"6). On February 10, 1999 [during] the hearing
of the Norma Trajano case before the Hon.
Adoracion G. Angeles, [r]espondent appeared
shortly before 10:30 o'clock in the morning,
pursuant to a 'Motion to Call Case at 10:30
o'clock in the Morning x x x.
"7). When the said Norma Trajano [case] x x x
was called on second call at 11[:]25 a.m., [i]n
said February 10, 1999 hearing, respondent
was first scolded by the Honorable Court (Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles) x x x [for] giving more
preference to the Metropolitan Trial Court than
her Court. Resp[o]ndent, however, beg[ged the]
indulgence of the Honorable Court (Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles) and explained why [he]
first attend[ed] the Mandaluyong hearing of
Manny Chua's case, to wit; x x x. Oldmis o
"8). That it was during the course of [the] litany
of sermon, [i]n that hour, made by the Honorable
Court addressed to the [r]espondent that Norma
Trajano x x x butted in and informed the
Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles)
that she will be tendering another partial
payment; it was at that moment that Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles asked Norma Trajano
how much had she paid Primitiva Del Rosario,
and, Norma [T]rajano answered that she had
already paid P36,500.00 as full payment for one
case, and that of the P36,500, P20,000.00 was
paid to Primitiva Del Rosario and HESITANTLY
said that the P16,500 was paid to the
[r]espondent. Judge Angeles then took the
receipt from Norma Trajano and had it xeroxed
by a personnel of the Court. The carbon
duplicate original of the Receipt, dated
[D]ecember 14, 1998, showing the receipt by
the office of the [r]espondent, through Romeo
Jamisola Jr., whose printed [name] was
pre[ceded] by the word 'By', indicating that he
received the sum of money on behalf of or in
representation of the [r]espondent, is hereto
[attached] and marked as ANNEX '5', to form
part hereof;
"9). That it was perhaps due to the belief [in] and
the immediate impression of Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles [of the] answer of Norma Traiano
that prompted Judge Angeles to ask,
instantaneously in a loud manner, Primitiva Del
Rosario IN TAGALOG', the question,
'NATANGGAP MO BA KAY ATTY. UY ANG
PERA NA P16,500.00?'. Primitiva Del Rosario, a
seventy-year-old, who was shocked by the tone
and the manner she was asked by Judge
Angeles simply just answered 'HINDI PO, KASI
GUSTO [KO] PO NA MABUO ANG PERA'.
Primitiva Del Rosario, however, tried to explain
her answer 'HINDI PO' and why she did not yet
[receive] the money from the [r]espondent by
raising her hand but was prevented by Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles from further answering by
telling Primitiva Del Rosario to stop. With that
answer of Primitiva Del Rosario, [r]espondent
butted in to explain Primitiva Del Rosario's

answer of 'HINDI PO' and her having not yet
received the sum of money, subject of the
inquisition of Judge Angeles by manifesting to
wit; x x x that Primitiva Del Rosario did not get
the money when x x x handed the same on
December 15, 1998 because she wanted [it] to
be save[d] in whole together with the future
installment payments of Norma Trajano and to
be kept in the office of the [r]espondent as
wished by her son Bong Del Rosario; and, that
the said sum of money [was] kept in the filing
cabinet in the office of the [r]espondent. All
explanation[s] of the [r]espondent went to x x x
naught as the [r]espondent was cut short by x x
x Judge Angeles, [who] in a loud and angry
voice orally directed the [r]espondent to get the
money from [r]espondent's office and give the
same to Primitiva Del Rosario. It was already
11 :45 o'clock in the morning, more or less, an
the [r]espondent was given fifteen (15) minutes
to comply; [r]espondent requested Judge
Angeles to be accompanied by Primitiva Del
Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario
but both were ordered to stay in court by Judge
Angeles; Ncm
"10). Respondent in compliance with the oral
order of Judge Angeles immediately proceeded
[to] his office but only to find out that Romeo
Jamisola Jr., who [held] the only key [to
r]esponddnt's filing cabinet, was on errand x x x
that morning of February 10, 1999 [for] Atty.
Angel B. De Veyra (the Undersigned Counsel)
[who had sent him] to the offices of the solicitor
general in Makati City, and, the City
Prosecutor's Office of Manila to [furnish copies
to] both offices; x x x;
"11). Respondent, expecting that Romeo
Jamisola Jr. would [arrive] before 12[:]00 noon,
x x x waited for Romeo Jamisola Jr. while at the
same time called up [his] wife to immediately
[come] to his office to spare the sum of
P16,500.00 as Romeo Ja[mi]sola may not
[arrive] [within] the time allotted by Judge
Angeles. The wife of respondent, however,
arrived at about 12:25 P .M., more or less,
ahead of Romeo Jamisola Jr. and spared
[r]espondent the sum of P16,500.00 and
[r]espondent immediately went [to] the fourth
floor, where the sala of Judge Angeles [was]
located but unfortunately the session was
already adjourned. Respondent then talked to
'Armand', one 'of the court personnel and is
known as the door keeper of the chamber of
Judge Angeles, and [requested that he be
allowed to go inside the chamber to show [his]
compliance, though late. Respondent, however,
was told by 'Armand' that Judge Angeles was on
her lunch break an that it [was] better for
[r]espondent to take his lunch too and return a
little later; Ncmmis
"12). At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of
that day (February 10, 1999) [r]espondent
returned [to] the sala of Judge Angeles together
with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter
Aurora Del Rosario, who likewise returned to the
court, to seek an audience in [the] chamber [of]
Judge Angeles. Said audience with Judge
Angeles was desired by Primitiva Del Rosario to
let Judge Angeles [witness] the giving of the
money to Primitiva Del Rosario. But request[s]
for the same, through 'Armand', were twice
denied by Judge Angeles because at that time
Judge Angeles was being interviewed by
several media personnel of some TV stations.
The Del [Rosarios], however, left earlier upon
knowing that Judge Angeles denied their
request for an audience. [They] told
[r]espondent that they will be back the following
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
78
day. It was only when Romeo Jamisola arrived
at about 3:00 o'clock, more or less, in the
afternoon and went at the fourth floor at the
premises of the sala of Judge Angeles and
informed the [r]espondent that he carried with
him the key to [r]espondent's cabinet and the
presence of some [squatter] families of Batasan
Hills, Quezon City at the office of the
[r]espondent, who has an appointment with the
[r]espondent, that the [r]espondent left the
premises of the sala of Judge Angeles. [sic]
Respondent, at his office ordered Romeo
Jamisola Jr. to open the filing cabinet and
returned to the premises of the sala of Judge
Angeles alone at about 4:00 o'clock P .M. after
his meeting with the squatter families. But again,
his request to 'Armand' to talk with Judge
Angeles, after the media interview, was denied.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, 'Armand',
the court personnel, served the Order, of said
date, February 10, 1999 at the office of the
[r]espondent;
"13). In the early afternoon of the following day,
February 11, 1999, [r]espondent together with
Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora
Del Rosario went again [to] the sala of Judge
Angeles x x x to seek an audience with Judge
Angeles. Their request x x x w[as] likewise in
vain. Primitiva Del Rosario, after the last attempt
to seek audience with Judge Angeles and
already tired of going [to] and [from] the sala of
Judge Angeles, decided on February 12, 1999,
to receive the sum of money in the amount of
P16,500.00 from the office of the [r]espondent,
through, Romeo Jamisola Jr. and executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay. x x x;
"14). The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Primitiva Del
Rosario, dated February 16, 1999 as well as the
Acknowledgment Receipt, dated February 12,
199[9] was attached to a Manifestation caused
to be filed by the [r]espondent on March 3, 1999
when the respondent was confined in Fatima
Hospital in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila on
March 2, 1999; Scnc m
"15). Learning of the instant administrative case
against the [r]espondent, Bong Del Rosario, the
son of Primitiva Del Rosario, upon whose wish
the subject sum of money was kept at the office
of the [r]espondent to save the same in whole
as well as the future in[s]tallment payments of
Norma Trajano executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay, attesting [to] and confirming the
statement of [his] mother Primitiva Del Rosario.
x x x"[3]
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the Comment contends that the
respondent kept the money in his office because that was the
alleged wish of both his client and her son. He allegedly informed
them of such money and tried to give it to them, but they insisted
that he retain it. He further maintained that it was only after Judge
Angeles issue the February 10, 1999 Order that his client relented
and accepted the money on February 12, 1999.
After the judge filed her Reply on June 30, 1999, this Court referred
the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation. The Court dispensed with the normal referral to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines because the records were
complete and the question raised was simple. No further factual
investigation was necessary in the premises.
Bar Confidant's Report and Recommendation
Recommending that Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .be suspended from the
practice of law for one month, the Office of the Bar Confidant in its
Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1999 said: Sdaa
miso
 79

"x x x [I]t is clear that it is the sworn duty of a The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it
member of the bar to be accountable, at all requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed "to
times, for anything which he receives for and in remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind
behalf of his client. from being done for the protection of the client."[5]

"In the case at bar, this Office is more inclined to Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
believe the story of the complainant. that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule 16.01
of the Code also states that "a lawyer shall account for all money or
"First, it cannot be disputed that the transcript of
property collected or received for or from the client." The Canons of
stenographic notes is the most reliable record of
Professional Ethics is even more explicit:
what indeed transpired (and what words were
uttered by the parties involved) on February 10,
1999 at the hearing of Crim. Case No. C-54176- "The lawyer should refrain from any action
77 (98). Records clearly show that the private whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
complainant in the criminal case, when asked by abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
Judge Angeles as to the whereabouts of the reposed in him by his client. Sup rema
P16,500.00, spontaneously replied that she had
no knowledge of the same; in effect saying that
"Money of the client collected for the client or
Atty. Uy has not given her the subject
other trust property coming into the possession
16,500.00. If, indeed, Primitiva Del Rosario
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
requested Atty. Uy to keep the money as far
for promptly and should not under any
back as December 1998, then she should have
circumstances be commingled with his own or
told the same to Judge Angeles.
be used by him."[6]

"Atty. Uy's allegation that Judge Angeles

In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed
prevented Primitiva Del Rosario from saying in
to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he had received from
open court the words 'HINDI PO KASI GUSTO
Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario.
KO PO NA MABUO ANG PERA' does not have
Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent on
any proof as nothing of that sort appears in the
December 14, 1998, his client revealed during the February 10,
transcript of stenographic notes. Atty. Uy has not
1999 hearing that she had not yet received it. Worse, she did not
even bothered to refute the truth of the contents
even know where it was.
of the stenographic notes, all the more
bolstering this Office's opinion that the said
notes are accurate and truthful. Sdaad Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs.
Del Rosario about the payment. He further avers that he kept the
money up n her instruction, as she had allegedly wanted "future
"Second, the affidavits executed by Primitiva Del
payments x x [to] be saved in whole and for them to avoid spending
Rosario and her son, Fernando Del Rosario,
the same as what had happened to the past installment payments x
dated February 16, 1999 and June 7, 1999,
x x."[7] This assertion allegedly finds support in her answer to the
respectively, attesting to Atty. Uy's averment that
question of Judge Angeles, who had asked her whether she had
his act of personally keeping the subject
received the disputed payment: "Hindi po, kasi gusto [ko] po na
P16,500.00 was with and at their request cannot
mabuo ang pera."
be given much credence to outweigh the
arguments of Judge Angeles. The said
affidavits, both executed after February 10, The Court is not persuaded. Respondent's assertions are
1999, are suspect. Caught by surprise when contradicted by the following transcript of stenographic notes:
Judge Angeles inquired of the whereabouts of
his client's money, Atty. Uy x x x resorted to
"Court: This P16,500, did you turn it over to the
seeking the help of his client to corroborate his
private complainant?
defense. Being the clients of Atty. Uy, Primitiva
Del Rosario and her son could have been
persuaded to help extricate their counsel from Atty. Uy: No your Honor, because she wanted
the latter's predicament. the full amount of the settlement.

"In the absence of any contradicting evidence to Court: Private complainant, is it true that you did
dispute the allegation that Atty. Uy failed to not want to accept the money?
immediately remit to his client the money due
the latter, it is safe to conclude that Atty. Uy has
violated his sworn duty to uphold, at all times, Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po, sila po ang
the trust and confidence reposed in him by his nagbigayan. Juris
client(s).
Court: Hindi po ibinibigay sa inyo ni Atty. Uy?
xxxxxxxxx
Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po.
"In the instant case, Atty. Uy, upon receipt of the
P16,500.00 from the accused in the criminal xxxxxxxxx
case, should have promptly remitted the same
to his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Had Judge
Angeles not inquired of the whereabouts of the Court: Nasaan iyong P16,500? Huwag kayong
money, the same would have remained with matakot.
Atty. Uy, to the prejudice of the latter's client."[4]
Mrs. Del Rosario: Aywan ko po sa kanilang
This Court's Ruling dalawa."[8]

We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the Office of
the Bar Confidant. Scs daad
Administrative Liability of Respondent
If it were true that Mrs. Del Rosario was informed about the payment
and that she entrusted it to respondent, she would have known its
whereabouts. That she did not know it showed the falsity of his
claim.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


It is noteworthy that respondent did not dispute the foregoing
transcript although it belied his allegation that Mrs. Del Rosario's
express wish was to have the payments in full. Sc juris
Neither are we convinced by the affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and
her son, both of whom affirmed their intention to have their money in
the safekeeping of respondent. It should be stressed that he was her
counsel and the compadre of her son. Moreover, the affidavits were
executed after the filing of this Complaint. As the Office of the Bar
Confidant observed, these considerations militate against the
credibility of the affiants. In any event, their affidavits fail to explain
adequately why Mrs. Del Rosario, during the hearing on February
10, 1999, did not know where her money was.
The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact
appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs, Del Rosario acknowledge
that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show,
however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount to
her. This is clearly a violation of his professional responsibility.
Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia,[9] the Court ruled that money collected by
a lawyer in favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to
them. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[10] the Court held that "lawyers are bound
to promptly account for money or property received by them on
behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct."
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients
have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the
ethical standards of the bar.[11] In this case, respondent has not done
so. Indeed, we agree with the following observation of the Office of
the Bar Confidant:
"Keeping the money in his possession without
his client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the
tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself
the money belonging to his client. This situation
should, at all times, be avoided by members of
the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be
clean; they must also appear clean. This way,
the people's faith in the justice system would
remain undisturbed."[12]Juris sc
In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into
dealings between attorneys and their clients and to guard the latter
from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which
they may stand unequal.[13] The present situation calls for the
exercise of this duty.
For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver
money they received on behalf of their clients, some lawyers have
been disbarred[14] and others have been suspended for six months.
[15]
In the present case, the records merely show that respondent did
not promptly report that he received money on behalf of his client.
There is no clear evidence of misappropriation. Under the
circumstances, we rule that he should be suspended for one month.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .is hereby SUSPENDED for
one month. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be served on Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. at his
given address or any other known one. Copies of this Decision shall
also be entered in his record as attorney and served on the IBP, as
well as the Court Administrator who shall circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
80
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J.
VALDES dates back to the '50s during their school days in De La
Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to
their families and respondent became the business consultant,
lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer
residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. 1 For lack of funds, he
requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They
agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their
agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the
amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase
and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent's
name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When
Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal
counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL.
On March 9, 1976, respondent's law firm, Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose's
estate. Complainant was appointed as administratrix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the
intestate proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded the
Moran property from the inventory of Jose's estate. On February 13,
1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran
property by filing with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio
City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent
and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created
over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant
filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged
that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran
property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the
"inventory of real estate properties" he prepared
for a client-estate and, at the same time,
charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all
for the purpose of transferring the title to the
said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims
against the estate that retained him as its
counsel and auditor.2
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted
respondent's offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her
husband's estate. Respondent's law firm then filed a petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include
the Moran property in the estate's inventory. Instead, respondent
transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation,
and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of
maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not
belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly
acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in
his correspondences3 with the Baguio City Treasurer and the
complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent's
auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran
property from the inventory of her husband's estate, yet included in
the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and
P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husband's loans

applied "probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran
Street, Baguio City."
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent's law
firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the
settlement of her husband's estate in court, while respondent's
auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both
the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent
represented conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared
the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against
her husband's estate which was represented by respondent's law
firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction between
respondent's law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and
controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same
building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his
ANSWER, 4 respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the
first and second charges against him depended on the result of the
pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue
of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in
the reconveyance case that he did not hold the Moran property in
trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent
explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property
from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly
excluded from the inventory of Nakpil's estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of
claims against the estate which included his loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran
property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that
the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans
in respondent's name were applied "probably for the purchase of the
house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City." Respondent insisted
that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property
as the phrase "probably for the purchase" did not imply a
consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation
of a letter (Exhibit "H") of his accounting firm to the Baguio City
treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on
behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere
error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that
they did not own the Moran property for: (1) complainant's February
1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said
property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance
Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his
law and accounting firms in the settlement of her husband's
estate.5 However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty.
Percival Cendaña (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates)
who filed the intestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of
interest when his law firm represented the estate in the intestate
proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He
proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants
were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a
family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the
President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who,
upon the latter's death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These
two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even
during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation
of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of
complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of
interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a
modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only
after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks' claims.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
81
Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the
estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common
auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a
true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned
from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.6 He
rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as
proof the SEC's certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an
Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty.
Percival Cendaña, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who
filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the
claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O.
Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he
committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such
"misconduct" not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as
common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be
held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. 7 She
maintained that the pendency of the reconveyance case is not
prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against
respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the
Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondent's conduct
as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent's Annexes to his Reply (such
as the Statement of Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance
Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim
ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C.J. Valdes &
Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the
intestate court by C.J. Valdes & Associates as counsel for the estate.
She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent
owned the Moran property but were part of respondent's scheme to
remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family
corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents
because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that
her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged
respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis
of defects in the documents he himself prepared..
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable
documents (the list of claims against the estate and the letter
regarding Nakpil's payment of realty tax on the Moran property)
which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke
other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to
him. She averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just
for some, but for all the representations and communications of his
firms.
Complainant refuted respondent's claim that he resigned from his
firms from March 9, 1976 to "several years later." She alleged
that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his
resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated
his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot
hold him liable for representing the interests of both the estate and
the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate.
He urged that it is not per seanomalous for respondent's accounting
firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He
reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he
acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its
claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims
of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not
defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He
averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were
legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting
firm. He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims
were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent's law
firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,9 we deferred further action on
the disbarment case until after resolution of the action for
reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of
ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for
reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership
pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which
involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of

respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and
referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. 10
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for
reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent held the
Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The
appellate court held that respondent was the absolute owner of
the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant's
appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted its Report 11 on the
disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision
of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The
OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of
complainant's claim over the property. It opined that there was
no trust agreement created over the property and that
respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld
respondent's right to transfer title to his family corporation. It
also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related
to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of
the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel
situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his
demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but
the business transaction must be characterized with utmost
honesty and good faith. 12 The measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is
a much higher standard than is required in business dealings
where the parties trade at "arms length." 13 Business
transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored
and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts
carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage
is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on
public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy
position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's favor. 14
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the
OSG in its Report. These findings were based mainly on the
decision of the Court
of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed
by this Court in 1993. 15
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings
of this Court in the aforementioned reconveyance case. 16 It is
well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the
services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their
close relationship dating as far back as the '50s. She reposed
her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer,
accountant and business consultant of her late husband.
Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would
purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed
absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the
property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place
the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate
court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially
acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the Moran
property. Respondent's bad faith in transferring the property to
his family corporation is well discussed in this Court's
Decision,17 thus:
. . . Valdes (herein respondent) never
repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the
late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he
expressly recognized it. . . . (H)e repudiated
the trust when (he) excluded Pulong
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
82
Maulap from the list of properties of the late
Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court
in 1973. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of
ownership intended by the parties . . . can be
bolstered by Exh. "I-2," an annex to the claim
filed against the estate proceedings of the
late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil,
which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes &
Co., the accounting firm of herein
respondent. Exhibit "I-2," which is a list of
the application of the proceeds of various
FUB loans contracted as of 31 December
1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, . . . contains the
two (2) loans contracted in the name of
respondent. If ownership of Pulong
Maulap was already transferred or ceded to
Valdes, these loans should not have been
included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties
merely agreed to under the arrangement
outlined in Exh. "J" was that respondent
Valdes would . . . "take over the total loan of
P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due
on the notes" while the heirs of the late Jose
Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed
property for five (5) years without
remuneration save for regular maintenance
expenses. This does not mean, however, that
if at the end of the five-year period petitioner
(Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his
advances, . . . Valdes could already
automatically assume ownership of Pulong
Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents
Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty
Corporation was to proceed against the
estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the
property itself." (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that
complainant's documentary evidence (Exhibits "H", "J" and
"L"), which she also adduced in this administrative case,
should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the
Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose
Nakpil. 18
It ought to follow that respondent's act of excluding the Moran
property from the estate which his law firm was representing
evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent
truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should
have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they
could not agree on its ownership, respondent should have
formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings
instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and
concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate
proceedings. Respondent's misuse of his legal expertise to
deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting
firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as
liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property
which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate
himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in
the preparation of the list of the estate's liabilities. He theorizes
that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or
oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information
as to how these two loans should be treated could have only
come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his
name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in
charging respondent's loans against the estate could not have
been committed without respondent's participation.
Respondent wanted to "have his cake and eat it too" and
subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary
gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes

fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty
of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the rule,
based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent
adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides
of an issue. 19 The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter 20and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It
applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were
honest and he acted in good faith. 21 However, representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent
to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure
alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his
clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible
adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the
estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and
liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the
claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict
between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor,
and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In
fact, at one instance, respondent's law firm questioned the
claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented
complainant in the intestate proceedings. He points out that it
was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law firm Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court.
However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and
appear in court is beside the point. As established in the
records of this case and in the reconveyance
case, 23 respondent acted as counsel and accountant of
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent's
defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as
early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate
case) is unworthy of merit. Respondent's claim of resignation
from his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof.
The documents on record 24 only show respondent's
resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even
these documents reveal that respondent returned to his
accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of Jose's estate had not yet
been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent
transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February
13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court.
Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could
not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the
intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel of the
estate 25 and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was
the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against
it. 26 The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did
not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there is
nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm
explained the legal situation and its consequences to
complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does
not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late
Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. When a creditor
files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to
the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a
claim against her husband's estate, her claim is still adverse
and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly
placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client
could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondent's law firm was to contest the claims of these two
creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent's
accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
83
determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent's duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was
conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court
as his alleged "misconduct" pertains to his accounting
practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively
practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law
and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar,
complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics
for being the common accountant of the estate and the two
creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to
represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time,
allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings
where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of
professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent's
and his law firm's loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting
that respondent's misconduct refers to his accountancy
practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him
as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains
to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. 27Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith. 28 In the case at bar,
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and
transactions with his clients. 29
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS
J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt
of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be
dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 275 April 29, 1960
GERVACIO L. LIWAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GILBERTO NERI, respondent.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Antonio
M. Consing for the complainant.
Gilberto Neri in his own behalf.
PARAS, C. J.:
The complainant, Gervacio L. Liwag, seeks to disbar the respondent,
Atty. Gilberto Neri.
Prior to October 21, 1952, the spouses Enrique and Ursula Pineda
requested the complainant to act as counter-indemnitor with the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Company in a bond posted for said spouses
in favor of the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC). When
the Pinedas had failed to liquidate their obligation, the NARIC

enforced the bond against the Manila Surety and Fidelity Company
and the latter in turn collected from the complainant the sum of
P2,951.35. Having failed to recover extra-judicially said amount from
the Pinedas, the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent who agreed to handle the matter on a contingent fee of
forty per cent.
As they were his neighbors, the respondent, acting slowly, tried to
talk to the Pinedas, who admitted their indebtedness and pleaded for
time to pay the same. On or about July 17, 1956, when no payment
had been made, the respondent wrote a letter of demand,
threatening to take judicial action if the Pinedas would still not meet
their obligation. On the same date, the complainant delivered to the
respondent the amount of P30.00 as the filing fee for the necessary
complaint. The respondent did not actually file any complaint, for the
alleged reason that debtor spouses had given assurances to pay,
although he informed the complainant that he had already done so.
It did not take long before the truth was discovered and before the
complainant was provoked into commencing this administrative
case.
It is an established fact that the respondent had received from the
complainant P30.00 as filing fee. The respondent argues that his
services were not engaged solely "for the purpose of filing the
corresponding collection complaint", but to collect from the Pinedas
the amount owed; or in other words, that the respondent was given
full discretion as to the means for accomplishing the assignment.
Assuming that this was so, the respondent has committed a breach
of professional ethics when, contrary to the fact, he made the
complainant believe that the Pineda spouses had already been sued
in court and did not return the amount intended for the filing fee.
Considering however, that the respondent has not yet received
anything for his services and that the complainant has subsequently
been paid, disbarment or even suspension of the respondent from
the practice of his profession would be too harsh and unkind. We
only here reprimand him for the offense, with the warning that a
repetition of similar misconduct or, for that matter, any violation of his
oath will be dealt with more drastically.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO
HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling
with his own client, more often than not, in the matter of fees. The
lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on
pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass
unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is
corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law
profession, debased into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we
resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the
petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical
implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six,
according to the petitioner) parcels of land located in Quezon
City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the
L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling
P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in
favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
84
28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his failure to pay, as a
consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the
petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public auction, and in
which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for
injunction against L & R Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in
its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive
relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and
with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into
a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the
private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties
subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per
cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be
entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982,
the court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits —
a fact the petitioner himself concede 4 — for which reason he failed
to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the
sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner.
That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as
his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it
does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met
to discuss relief for the latter with respect to his liability to L & R
Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on
the other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent
"earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private
respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered
to advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent,
executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor.
Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see
shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private respondent's
version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over
his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their
agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the
petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to
register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that
he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank
to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find,
according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already
registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that
the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to
Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had
been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the
attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA,
hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any
and all my rights of the real properties and/or to
redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation
my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at
public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and
subject matter of the above Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the
attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA,
hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any
and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or
to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R
Corporation my mortgaged properties
foreclosed and sold at public auction by the
Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the

above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
Q30679. . .10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of
an adverse claim upon the respective certificates of title embracing
the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved for
the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The court granted both motions. The private respondent
countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a
motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he
commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court against the
petitioner 11 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa,
falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice.
On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for
reconveyance and reformation of document, 13praying that the
certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled
and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to
reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R.
Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the
petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the
money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time
to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to
put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for
dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It
held that the alteration complained of did not change the meaning of
the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to
protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the
redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself
had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance
based on the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in
the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment
creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost
all rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from
L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the
petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of
properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite,
since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction
case abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was
consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a
character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a
suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of
Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting
execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the
private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining
order directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to
recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with
a motion to dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying
the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied
reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on
grounds of improper procedure. Specifically, he assigns the following
errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE
GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE
COURSE.
II.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
85
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE
GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT
AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS
SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY
ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE
BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE
PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent
court "is actually a petition for certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading
for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged
legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two
years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not
preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming
annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for
annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of
interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are
impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had occasion to rule,
rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud"
means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that
can serve as a basis for the annulment of
judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic
or collateral, within the meaning of the rule,
"where it is one the effect of which prevents a
party from having a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but of the manner in which it
was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy." In other words,
extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera
pending before the respondent Court reveals no cause of action for
annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner
Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but
rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no
showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed
vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the
contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he
was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered
timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under
the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas
and His Honor to expedite the former's collection of his fees. He
alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent
designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell
the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to
redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty.
Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead
he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the

questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of
respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his
properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty.
Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge
to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no
argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to
extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an appeal 26 and
while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in
case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar,
there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular
execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of
the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's
charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions
for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or
that His Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge
took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a]
[restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make
out a case for irregular execution. The orders impugned are
conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to
in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands and constraints of economic
privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy
about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent
contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of
the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is
mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to
the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court
notes that he had, for this purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court,
a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become
final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure
— for the enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It does not
mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we
cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a
member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to
score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people.
Procedural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto
parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding." 31If procedure were to be an
impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It
was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in
the subtle art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in
which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue and then,
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won
by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds
true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of
respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him
any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
86
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in
the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should have
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed
his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his
oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his]
clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is
not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a
fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded
not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and
certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man
for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact
that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does
not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at
the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital
that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of
Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys,
agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of
the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney... A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in
part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of
P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the
standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will
yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan
amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions
of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to
research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The
fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome
prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or
non-importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the
petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum
meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things
won in litigation similar to that vested upon redemptioners. 38 To
begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in
satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was
decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and
mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties
themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions
for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him
a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in
the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro
Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas'
"legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer
which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the
subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever right he had, it was,
arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to
the lands.

Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in
proportion to the "just fees and disbursements" 40 due him. It is still
subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute
the compromise agreement and subsequently, to force the transfer
of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the
issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the
petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing given
his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the
proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than
to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private respondent that
led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be
sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the
mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he had actually
done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did
not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits
that "[t]itles to the properties have been issued to the new owners
long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for
annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either
this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not
prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded
in having the private respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer
of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-
prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to
exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all intents
and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier
averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had
become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence and
ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private
respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the
redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands
that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now
complains of, apart from the fact that the latter himself had
something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are
of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private
respondent had intended merely to forestall the total loss of the
parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel
shall acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach,
subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and
conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he
agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may already be
paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the
Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees,
there was no point in keeping the properties in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he
acquired the properties as a gesture of magnanimity and altruism He
denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot
dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it
necessary to reword the conveyance document executed by the
private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally
drafted, provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights
of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor,
whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds
purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties
and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He admits having entered the
intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the
registration of the questioned deed with the Register of
Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for
which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification
charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration
could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor
of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform
his client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of
adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who
prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this
is not the proper occasion for it — we condemn him nonetheless for
infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance
in favor of the petitioner is subject to the ban on acquisition by
attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code state as follows:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
87
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of
another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or
persons who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or
sale may have been intrusted to them, unless
the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of
the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property
of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of
any government owned or controlled
corporation, or institution, the administration of
which has been instrusted to them; this
provision shall apply to judges and government
experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take
part in the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks
of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by
force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining
inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we
said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in
which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the
property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was
executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract — not one in
pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise — in
which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption
rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute
ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement, the
lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any
litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession
is improper to eject another from possession unless sought in
connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial
foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession
and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of
the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private
respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we
said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as
we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale
agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the
compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is
specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction
of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is
open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent
purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for
undue influence as earlier detailed. While the respondent Herrera

has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of
his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing,
however, that the properties have been conveyed to third persons
whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the
petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual
damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own
shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot
overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone
liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the
other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to
Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00
representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to
the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty.
Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such
that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in
the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of
Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition below. But as we have
stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and
in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that
has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual
controversies and as a matter of general policy, to leave alone moot
ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the
outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point,
certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the
resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical
rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits
too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases
we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would
establish a barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially
so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit
appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final
say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the
bench and the bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as serious
indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the
private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as
and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary
action may be imposed on him for violation of his oath, as a lawyer,
within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7418 October 9, 2007
ANDREA BALCE CELAJE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO C. SORIANO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Santiago C.
Soriano (respondent) for gross misconduct.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
88
In the Complaint dated June 1, 2005 filed before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), Andrea Balce Celaje (complainant) alleged
that respondent asked for money to be put up as an injunction bond,
which complainant found out later, however, to be unnecessary as
the application for the writ was denied by the trial court. Respondent
also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to spend for or
to be given to the judge handling their case, Judge Milagros Quijano,
of the Regional Trial Court, Iriga City, Branch 36. When complainant
approached Judge Quijano and asked whether what respondent was
saying was true, Judge Quijano outrightly denied the allegations and
advised her to file an administrative case against respondent.1
In his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and
averred that the same were merely concocted by complainant to
destroy his character. He also contended that it was complainant
who boasted that she is a professional fixer in administrative
agencies as well as in the judiciary; and that complainant promised
to pay him large amounts of attorney's fees which complainant
however did not keep.2
Both parties appeared in the Mandatory Conference and Hearing on
January 18, 2006. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.3
In the Report and Recommendation dated January 24, 2006, IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa
found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct in his relations with his
client and recommended that respondent be suspended for three
years from the practice of law.4
In the Report, Commissioner Funa found that:
During the hearing conducted, Complainant alleged that
she has remitted to Respondent, on various dates,
amounts of money totaling to more or less P270,000.00.
According to Complainant the amounts given in several
instances were all undocumented and not acknowledged
in writing.
However, for the alleged amount of P14,000.00 intended
for an injunction bond, some documents in writing were
made.
xxxx
While the amounts remitted by Complainant to
Respondent were never acknowledged in writing and were
not documented, due credence must be given to
Complainant's allegations especially over the amount
of P14,800.00 intended for the injunction. Indeed, there
is no ill-motive at all on the part of Complainant to
fabricate charges against Respondent. Unfortunately,
none of the P270,000.00 given by Complainant to
Respondent was ever documented and therefore accuracy
of the amounts could not be established and
substantiated.
What has been documented only pertains to the
unpaid P5,800.00 intended for the injunction bond.
However, it has been established that indeed an
accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been remitted by
Respondent to Valentina Ramos and only the
unpaid P5,800.00 remains unaccounted for by the
Respondent.
During the hearing conducted, Complainant reiterated her
accusations against the Respondent and expressed that
she has been aggrieved and misled by Respondent.
According to Complainant, this was made possible
because she was not aware of or knowledgeable on
legal matters and practices. Respondent has only
offered denials to the charges. However, the
circumstances gives credibility to herein Complainant in
the absence of any evil motive on her part.
Accordingly, Respondent is clearly guilty
of misappropriating his client's funds in the amount

of P5,800.00. While other amounts may have been
misappropriated, Complainant alleges P270,000.00, the
exactness of the amounts could not be established.
Respondent is also guilty of deceiving his client and
abusing his client's confidence in requesting for several
amounts of money on the pretense that he had to
spend for and pay the trial judge.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver
the unaccounted for amount of Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos (P5,800.00) to Complainant, submitting a
Compliance Report thereon.5
On September 8, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
Resolution thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and Approve, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A-; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
that Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
misappropriating his client's funds, Atty. Santiago C.
Soriano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years and likewise Ordered to immediately
deliver that unaccounted amount of P5,800.00 to
complainant.6
The IBP transmitted the Notice of Resolution issued by the IBP
Board of Governors as well as the records of the case, pursuant to
Rule 139-B.7 Then in compliance with the Court's Resolution dated
February 20, 2007, the IBP through Director for Discipline Rogelio
Vinluan informed the Court that per records of the IBP, no Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by either party.
The Court agrees with the IBP Resolution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon
16 thereof, mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. He shall
account for all money or property collected or received from his
client8 and shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand.9
As found by Commissioner Funa, it was established that respondent
could not account for P5,800.00 which was part of the sum given by
complainant to him for the purpose of filing an injunctive bond.
Respondent admitted having received from complainant P17,800.00
on April 19, 2002 for the preliminary injunction 10 and admitted to
having a balance of P9,000.00 in his promissory note to the Manila
Insurance Co., Inc. dated April 23, 2002, which was reduced
to P5,800.00 by reason of an additional payment
of P4,000.00,11 leaving an amount of P5,800.00 unaccounted for.
The affidavit of the insurance agent, Valentina Ramos, dated
December 8, 2005 also states that even up to said date, respondent
had not yet paid the balance of P5,800.00.12
Respondent's failure to return the money to complainant upon
demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client.13 It is a gross violation of general morality and of
professional ethics and impairs public confidence in the legal
profession which deserves punishment.14
As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from
the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
his client.15
The Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good
moral character of members of the Bar who are expected at all times
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
89
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession. Indeed, membership in the legal profession is
a privilege.16 The attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in
nature. As such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and
disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer.17
In Small v. Banares18 the respondent was suspended for two years
for violating Canon 16 of the CPR, particularly for failing to file a
case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by his
client, and for failing to return the said amount upon demand.
Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case,
the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a
two-year suspension to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is
found GUILTY of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years from notice, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his clients through
Andrea Balce Celaje, within 30 days from notice, the amount
of P5,800.00. Respondent is directed to submit to the Court proof of
payment within fifteen days from payment of the full amount.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 167 March 9, 1999
ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant,
vs.
PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAÑEZ, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty.
Prudencio S. Penticostes (herein complainant) was sued for non-
remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was docketed as I.S.
89-353 and assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibañez (herein
respondent) for preliminary investigation. In the course of the
investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent
as payment of her Social Security System (SSS) contributions in
arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the
system. The fact of non-payment was certified to by the SSS on
October 2, 1989.
On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a complaint for professional
misconduct against Ibañez due to the latter's failure to remit the SSS
contributions of his sister-in-law. The complaint alleged that
respondent's misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascual's SSS
contributions amounted to a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Seven
days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid P1,804.00 to
the SSS on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual.
In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Tarlac Chapter, the court observing that it had no
competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the
case, the Tarlac Chapter forwarded the same to the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating
Encarnacion Pascual's request to make payments to the SSS did not
amount to professional misconduct but was rather an act of Christian
charity. Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and
academic, the amount of P1,804.00 having already been paid by him
to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts
 90

complained of were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing

lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor.
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the
respondent be reprimanded, with a warning that the commission of
the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely in the
future. On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved its
Commission's recommendation.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds
respondent guilty of professional misconduct. While there is no
doubt that payment of the contested amount had been effected to
the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is clear, however, that the same
was made only after a complaint had been filed against respondent.
Furthermore, the duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include
receiving money from persons with official transactions with his
office.
This court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of
morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
It is glaringly clear that respondent's non-remittance for over one
year of the funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes
conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated payment
of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While
Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the
rules relating to a lawyer's handling of funds of a client is applicable.
In Daroy v. Legaspi, 1 this court held that "(t)he relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature... [thus] lawyers
are bound to promptly account for money or property received by
them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct." The failure of respondent to immediately
remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of
general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.2
Respondent's claim that he may not be held liable because he
committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a
prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government services in the discharge of their
official tasks.
As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, "a lawyer
does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public
office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his
professional obligations because a lawyer's disreputable conduct is
more likely to be magnified in the public's eye. 3 Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office. 4
AQUINO, J.:
Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino Legaspi of
Iligan City, in a verified complaint dated March 10, 1970, charged
Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City with
malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of four thousand
pesos which he had collected for them. They prayed that the
respondent be disbarred.1 (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed
the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of 75.75%).
The evidence shows that the complainants hired the respondent in
May, 1962 to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz
Velez-Gonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother,
Vivencio, who was abroad, were adjudged as one of the six groups
of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother,
Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a daughter of the spouses. The
heirs in a joint petition dated April 11, 1969, which the respondent
signed as counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut
land left by the decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that
the administrator be authorized to sell the land, and that, after
payment of the obligations of the estate, the net proceeds would be
distributed among the six groups of heirs. The probate court
approved that agreement in its order of April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc.
Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental CFI, Exh. A).
The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of the sale
only when the respondent wrote a note dated November 28, 1969 to
her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the money we
have deposited may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00
o'clock". The respondent advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on that
date so that the money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).
The complainants were not able to get the money on December 8
because the respondent on December 7 sent to Mrs. Daroy a
telegram countermanding his prior advice and directing here to go to
Cagayan de Oro City on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the
money (Exh. C). On December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a
handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to Cagayan de
Oro City on December 10 because according to the respondent "his
postdated checks can be paid and/or collected either Thursday or
Friday yet" (Exh. D).
In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs. Daroy received
another note, this time from the respondent himself, "Cousin
Ramon". The note contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs.
Daroy's "Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting to
P4,000 and had spent it. The letter, a sort of extrajudicial confession
or mea culpa on respondent's part, reads as follows (Exh. E):
Dear Fermina,
I wrote this letter with the hope that you will
understand me. I have received P4,000.00 our
share in the case filed and is now in my custody.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a

Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I was
STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
forced to use our money to solve my problem.
offense will be dealt with more severely in the future.

Now to pay the amount I have used, I sold my

LET copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be
jeep to Mr. Ricarte Gorospe, an Employee of the
furnished the Department of Justice and the Office of the Bar
BIR here in Cag. But I am not paid as yet. So, I
Confidant.
am waiting as he will pay at 3:00 p.m. today and
it's close as I have promised to give it on the
SO ORDERED. 10th, I mean our money.

Kindly help me, defer the giving you of the sum

or at least until Thursday or Friday, I bring it to
you.
A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

I know, my responsibility on this matter.

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and AGRIPINO
LEGASPI, complainants,
vs. Thanks
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11


Cousin
Ramon
It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent, as to "counsel
for Fermina Daroy et al.", received from Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Jose V. Yasay the said sum of P4,000 as "one (1) share in
participation of my clients Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with
(the) order of Judge B. K. Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate
proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that amount (Exh.
L-1). The sheriff paid to Attorneys Angel Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog,
Jr. and Teogenes Velez, Jr. the respective shares of the other groups
of heirs also in the sum of P4,000 for each group. Those lawyers
turned over the amounts withdrawn to their respective clients (Exh.
L).
It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November 28, 1969 to
Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited could be withdrawn on
December 8, 1969, acted in bad faith. He had already withdrawn the
money before that date. He concealed that fact from the
complainants.
Before the disbarment complaint was filed several demands were
made upon the respondent to pay to the complainants the amount
which he had misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to
make payment. As complainants' patience was already exhausted,
they filed their complaint for disbarment on March 13, 1970.2
Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants, in a letter to
this Court's Clerk of Court dated May 26, 1970, expressed the hope
that preferential attention would be given to the case. He said that he
had "reliable information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the
respondent "has been bragging that nothing will happen to this case"
(p. 20, Rollo).1äwphï1.ñët
The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. In 1973 he requested the City Fiscal of
Iligan City to conduct the investigation. 3 After the investigation was
finished, the case was set for hearing. The respondent did not
appear at the hearing.
Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he received the
said sum of P4,000 as shown in the receipt, Exhibit D dated October
20, 1969. He said that after receiving it he immediately wired Teofilo
Legaspi at Iligan City to see him (the respondent) in his office at
Cagayan de Oro City so that Teofilo Legaspi could tell him "the
proper disposal" of that amount.
Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969
and at their conference they supposedly agreed that the sum of
P700 would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses
which he (Legaspi) described as "expenses involved from the parties
litigants, expenses seeking evidence and other expenses relevant to
the case" and "major expenses" in the case (sic); that his attorney's
fees would be equivalent "to a share of the petitioners", an
agreement which was later placed in formal form (referring
to 1968 extrajudicial settlement attached to his answer); that the
balance of P3,300 would be divided into six equal parts (six because
of the four Legaspi children, the father Teofilo Legaspi and the
lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that under such division each participant
would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by six gives a quotient of
P550 not P412), and that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. The
respondent did not present any receipt to prove that alleged
payment.
He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the share of
Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad, but at the end of October or the
first week of November, 1969 Teofilo got from him (the respondent)
Vivencio's share. Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a
receipt for Vivencio's share. After paying the shares of Teofilo and
Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in respondent's possession
amounted to P2,476.
According to respondent's version, the complainants "refused
consistently to receive" the said balance from him because they
wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid
to them the sum of P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in
his custody. He did not present any receipt to prove the alleged
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
91
payment of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of
P476 to the complainants.
Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo Legaspi,
received the sum of P412 from the respondent. She said that her
father never went to Cagayan de Oro City to confer with the
respondent. She said that there was no agreement that the
respondent would participate like an heir in the partition of the sum
of P4,000. She denied that the respondent offered to pay her and
her brother and sister the sum of P2,746. She denied that the
respondent paid to the complainants P2,000.
After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that
respondent's testimony cannot be given any credence. In his
memorandum he stated that after he received from the sheriff
"on October 29, 1969" the sum of P4,000, he "immediately wired" his
kinsman, Teofilo Legaspi, to come to Cagayan de Oro City and that
Teofilo "came on October 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20,
1969, the date of the receipt, Exhibit L-1.
The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The statement of the
sheriff and respondent's office clerk in their affidavits of March 18,
1975 that such a wire was sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo
Legaspi was a handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B)
wherein the respondent made it appear that the said sum of P4,000
was going to be withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine o'clock".
That the respondent in his testimony and memorandum forgot that
note, which is Annex C of the complaint for disbarment and which he
admitted in paragraph 4 of his answer, is an indication that he does
not know the facts of his own case and that he had no scruples in
trying to mislead and deceive this Court.
That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram and his
letter (already quoted) to Mrs. Daroy dated December 7 and 9, 1969,
respectively (Exh. B, C and E) overwhelmingly belie his fabricated
theory that he conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or
in the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct a
story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the
latter is dead and could not refute him. However, complainants'
documentary evidence refutes his prevarications, distortions and
fabrications.
He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not furnish
complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a supposed typewritten claim
against him which totalled P10,406.05. Exhibit 2 does not bear any
signature. The respondent wants to imply that the complainants
were trying to blackmail him. No probative value can be given to
Exhibit 2.
The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's defense are
discernible in his Exhibit 1, which he attached to his answer to the
original complaint.
Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition
executed in 1968 by the four children of Consuelo Gonzaga, by her
surviving husband, Teofilo Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty.
Legaspi, all the six being described in the document as "the
legitimate children and sole heirs of Consuelo Gonzaga, who died on
March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of Consuelo
Gonzaga was not explained.
In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and month when it
was signed and acknowledged before a notary, the spaces for the
description of the fourth parcel of land, the spaces for the shares
adjudicated to the heirs, the spaces for the instrumental witnesses
and the spaces for the numbers of the residence certificates and the
dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the instrument was
signed by the above six persons and duly notarized by a notary
whose signature is illegible.
In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was alleged to have
left four parcels of land located at Barrio Maputi, Initao, Misamis
Oriental which she inherited from her father Aquilino Gonzaga.
However, in the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental dated April 29, 1969 Consuelo Gonzaga inherited only a
one-sixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao, Misamis
Oriental.

How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument, was a
resident of Alameda, California, was able to sign it and to appear
before a notary was not explained.
The incomplete document, far from being of any help to respondent
Legaspi, casts a reflection on his competency and integrity as a
lawyer and on the competency and integrity of the notary before
whom it was acknowledged. As already noted, it was made to
appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an heir of Consuelo
Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. The
document does not even mention whether the deceased died
intestate.
That document has no connection with the P4,000 and does not
justify the misappropriation or breach of trust committed by the
respondent.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for
money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of
his clients that has come into his possession. He should not
commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal
purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a
reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32,
Canons of Legal Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of
his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to
them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).1äwphï1.ñët
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an
attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has
been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of
the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions and he is
liable to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in his office as attorney or for any violation of the
lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d
105). In view of that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf
of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in
his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty
of promptly accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In
re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).
The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation
of general morality as well as professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe punishment"
(Sturr vs. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d
897).1äwphï1.ñët
A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own
benefit through false pretenses is guilty of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who violates
his oath of office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client
and practices deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law
practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful
lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession
(In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs.
Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See
Cabigao and Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).
We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and
professional misconduct for having misappropriated the funds of his
clients. His manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his
repeated failure to appear at the investigation conducted by the City
Fiscal of Iligan and at the hearings scheduled by this Court, thus
causing this proceeding to drag on for a long time, demonstrate his
unworthiness to remain as a member of the noble profession of law.
(See Capulong vs. Aliño, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22
SCRA 491).
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
92
Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we
hold that the proper disciplinary action against the respondent is
disbarment. Its salutary purpose is to protect the court and the public
from the misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on the
assumption that a member of the bar should be competent,
honorable and reliable, a person in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence (In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly
with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney (6 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 242).1äwphï1.ñët
The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be ordered to
pay them the said amount of P4,000 plus attorney's fees and
miscellaneous expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case
amounting to more than P1,000 cannot be granted in this disbarment
proceeding. That amount should be recovered in an ordinary action.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 2417 February 6, 2002
ALEX ONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a disbarment1 case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from
Dumaguete City, against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice
and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the
practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against him.2
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the
complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent, in the
latter’s capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full
text of respondent’s letter3reads:
"Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia
Garganian (my client) from you for your only child, Anson Garganian,
with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss
Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that
you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support
your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this
moment you have not given said financial support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable
settlement, if you desire so, so that you will not be dragged
unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal
and moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this
letter, you should return to her house her television and betamax
which you got from her house during her absence and without her
knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand,
this office will be constrained to file the proper action in court against
you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may
come to my Law Office at the above address or you may send your
lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the

preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss
Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter
smoothly, otherwise your intentional failure or refusal to discuss
these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your
absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN"
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr.
Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter,
the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands
of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the
courses of action that he would take against the complainant should
the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian
and her son. The relevant portion of the respondent’s second letter
reads: 4
"These are the demands which my client would want to be complied
(with):
1. ₱1,500.00 monthly – For the sustenance of Mr. Ong’s son. x x x
(Note: That this amount of P1,500.00 should be up to the completion
of Mr. Ong’s son in the elementary course and this is subject to
adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to
his college course).
2. ₱50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as
her starting capital for her planned business venture to give her a
source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher in any
government position because of her status, having a child without
being lawfully wedded. x x x.
3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the
house of Miss Garganian, without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x
x.
4. The amount of ₱5,000.00 as my attorney’s fees should be given
or paid to me tomorrow before noon in my Law Office, through my
cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am
contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong will be withheld
pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise
agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time
as grace period for Mr. Ong is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian"
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the
complainant’s brother and that the complainant merely assumed his
brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening
to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands
against him.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
93
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint5 with the Office of the
City Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the
complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged
violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint
against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their
alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against
the complainant before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the
Solicitor General.6According to the complainant, these cases were
subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid
government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for
disbarment. Essentially, the complainant alleged that the respondent
"manufactured" the criminal and administrative cases against him to
blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the
respondent solicited for any information that could be used against
him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-
be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could get
from him. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as
"highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constituting…
malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer."
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the
following documents: (1) the afore-quoted letters of the respondent
addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia
Garganian’s affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the
demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned
affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent for the complainant,
wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganian’s
son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the
complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta,
a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of
the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared
by the respondent, with an offer "to give any informer 20% and
witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong." To
further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the
complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit, 7 citing several
cases previously filed against the respondent by other parties.8
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his
comment on the complaint lodged against him.9 He did not file any.
Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the
OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the
investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the
investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to
answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for
postponement. After denying the respondent’s third request for
postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the
complainant’s evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the
on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the
respondent’s turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary
investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros
Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known
address in Quezon City. The return cards showed that he could not
be located, although his wife received some of the notices sent to his
home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to
another, with some of them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally,
the case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino
Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondent’s absence as waiver of his
right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainant’s
cause, the investigator recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be
severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General.10 Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, "for proper disposition,
conformably with adopted policies and procedures." 11 The IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinili’s report and
recommendation in toto.12
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is
meet to revisit the importance of the legal profession and the
purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs.
Sison.13 We then held:
"In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the
degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession.
There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required
after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and
ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and
his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the
pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige
and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the
same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer
of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been
wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court when
he said:
‘On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an
individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise.
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken
from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony
with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some
controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.’
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment
depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in
them."
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.14 It mandates lawyers to represent their
clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further
commands that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding."
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not
exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal
affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to
coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by
threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the
complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and
filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the
complainant. We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the
cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing
or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the
respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01.
His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to
anyone who could provide him any information against the
complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against
the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a
lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding15and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.16 In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,17 we held:
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
94
probable results of his client’s case with the end view of promoting
respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that "he will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same"; … Needless to state, the lawyer’s
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds
of reason and common sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect
and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a
course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party."
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity.18 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by
the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.
Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner
that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.19
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite
being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for
postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose
not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance
does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect
towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the
case. He should be watchful of his conduct.20 The respondent should
keep in mind the solemn oath 21 he took before this Court when he
sought admission to the bar. The lawyer’s oath should not be
reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to
promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true
officer of the court.1âwphi1
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the
respondent was one (1) month suspension or reprimand. We believe
that the same is too light vis-à-vis the misconduct of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is
hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months
and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Unto’s personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 2417 February 6, 2002
ALEX ONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a disbarment1 case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from
Dumaguete City, against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice
and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the
practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against him.2

First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the
complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent, in the
latter’s capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full
text of respondent’s letter3reads:
"Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia
Garganian (my client) from you for your only child, Anson Garganian,
with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss
Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that
you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support
your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this
moment you have not given said financial support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable
settlement, if you desire so, so that you will not be dragged
unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal
and moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this
letter, you should return to her house her television and betamax
which you got from her house during her absence and without her
knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand,
this office will be constrained to file the proper action in court against
you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may
come to my Law Office at the above address or you may send your
lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the
preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss
Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter
smoothly, otherwise your intentional failure or refusal to discuss
these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your
absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN"
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr.
Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter,
the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands
of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the
courses of action that he would take against the complainant should
the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian
and her son. The relevant portion of the respondent’s second letter
reads: 4
"These are the demands which my client would want to be complied
(with):
1. ₱1,500.00 monthly – For the sustenance of Mr. Ong’s son. x x x
(Note: That this amount of P1,500.00 should be up to the completion
of Mr. Ong’s son in the elementary course and this is subject to
adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to
his college course).
2. ₱50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as
her starting capital for her planned business venture to give her a
source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher in any
government position because of her status, having a child without
being lawfully wedded. x x x.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
95
3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the
house of Miss Garganian, without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x
x.
4. The amount of ₱5,000.00 as my attorney’s fees should be given
or paid to me tomorrow before noon in my Law Office, through my
cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am
contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong will be withheld
pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise
agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time
as grace period for Mr. Ong is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian"
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the
complainant’s brother and that the complainant merely assumed his
brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening
to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands
against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint5 with the Office of the
City Fiscal (now Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the
complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged
violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint
against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their
alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against
the complainant before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the
Solicitor General.6According to the complainant, these cases were
subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid
government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for
disbarment. Essentially, the complainant alleged that the respondent
"manufactured" the criminal and administrative cases against him to
blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the
respondent solicited for any information that could be used against
him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-
be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could get
from him. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as
"highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constituting…
malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer."
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the
following documents: (1) the afore-quoted letters of the respondent
addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia
Garganian’s affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the
demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned
affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent for the complainant,
wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganian’s
son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the
complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta,
a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of
the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared
by the respondent, with an offer "to give any informer 20% and
witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong." To
further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the
complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit, 7 citing several
cases previously filed against the respondent by other parties.8

The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his
comment on the complaint lodged against him.9 He did not file any.
Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the
OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the
investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the
investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to
answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for
postponement. After denying the respondent’s third request for
postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the
complainant’s evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the
on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the
respondent’s turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary
investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros
Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known
address in Quezon City. The return cards showed that he could not
be located, although his wife received some of the notices sent to his
home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to
another, with some of them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally,
the case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino
Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondent’s absence as waiver of his
right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainant’s
cause, the investigator recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be
severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General.10 Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, "for proper disposition,
conformably with adopted policies and procedures." 11 The IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinili’s report and
recommendation in toto.12
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is
meet to revisit the importance of the legal profession and the
purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs.
Sison.13 We then held:
"In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the
degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession.
There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required
after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and
ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and
his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the
pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige
and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the
same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer
of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been
wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court when
he said:
‘On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an
individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise.
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken
from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony
with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some
controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.’
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment
depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in
them."
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.14 It mandates lawyers to represent their
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
96
clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further
commands that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding."
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not
exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal
affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to
coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by
threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the
complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and
filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the
complainant. We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the
cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing
or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the
respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01.
His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to
anyone who could provide him any information against the
complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against
the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a
lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding15and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.16 In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,17 we held:
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his client’s case with the end view of promoting
respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that "he will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same"; … Needless to state, the lawyer’s
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds
of reason and common sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect
and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a
course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party."
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity.18 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by
the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.
Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner
that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.19
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite
being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for
postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose
not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance
does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect
towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the
case. He should be watchful of his conduct.20 The respondent should
keep in mind the solemn oath 21 he took before this Court when he
sought admission to the bar. The lawyer’s oath should not be
reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to
promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true
officer of the court.1âwphi1
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the
respondent was one (1) month suspension or reprimand. We believe
that the same is too light vis-à-vis the misconduct of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is
hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months
and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Unto’s personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 3773. September 24, 1997]
ANGELITA C. ORCINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSUE
GASPAR, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On June 14, 1992, complainant Angelita C. Orcino filed with
this Court a letter-complaint dated December 10, 1991 against
respondent Atty. Josue Gaspar, her former counsel. Complainant
prayed that this Court impose disciplinary sanctions on respondent
for abandoning his duties and for failing to return the legal fees she
fully paid for his services.
The complaint arose from the following facts: Complainant
engaged the services of respondent to prosecute a criminal case
she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her
husband. In consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay
respondent legal fees of P20,000.00 -- P10,000.00 to be paid upon
signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or before the
conclusion of the case. Complainant was also to pay P500.00 per
appearance of respondent before the court and fiscal. This
agreement was embodied in a contract executed on February 22,
1991.[1]
In accordance with the contract, complainant paid respondent
the sum of P5,000.00 on February 25, 1991,[2] another P5,000.00 on
March 31, 1991,[3] and P10,000.00 on May 21, 1991,[4] for a total
of P20,000.00.
Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties. He interviewed
witnesses and gathered evidence to build a case against the
suspects. He drew up the necessary sworn statements and dutifully
attended the preliminary investigation.The case was thereafter filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Baloc, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija.[5]
As private prosecutor, respondent religiously attended the bail
hearings for the accused although these hearings were postponed
on motion of the accused's counsel. Respondent however failed to
attend the hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this hearing
that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the
accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to
respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence.
[6]
Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the
hearing.[7] Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him
of jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent said that her
suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her
relatives.[8] Complainant, however, continued accusing him
belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she
could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent
gave her the records.[9]
Complainant never returned the records nor did she see
respondent. On September 18, 1991, respondent filed before the
trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel." [10] The motion did not
bear the consent of complainant.
On October 23, 1991, the court issued an order directing
respondent to secure complainant's consent to the motion "and his
appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has
secured this consent."[11]
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
97
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's
withdrawal.[12]Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case
continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he
contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage
the services of another lawyer. Hence, the letter-complaint.
We referred the letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute
right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or
without cause.[13] The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate
the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably
restricted.[14] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle
that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.[15] He is not at liberty to
abandon it without reasonable cause.[16] A lawyer's right to withdraw
from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's
written consent or from a good cause.[17]
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
"Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire
at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,
without the consent of his client, should the court, on
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case
of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed
shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of
the former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the adverse party.
x x x."
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and
copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse
to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the
court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall
determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.[18]
In the instant case, complainant did not give her written
consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court thus ordered
respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed
the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign
his motion.[19] He, however, did not file an application with the court
for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.
Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's
consent was an application for withdrawal with the court, we find that
this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the
case. Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there
no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that there
had been "serious diffferences between them relating to the manner
of private prosecution."[20]
Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
"CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES
ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the
following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of
these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the
best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it
difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services
or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases."
A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the
following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or
immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the
lawyer pursue conduct violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers
and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d)
when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him
incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client
deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the
lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar
cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds
mentioned. Neither can this be considered analogous to the grounds
enumerated. As found by the Commission on Bar Discipline, this
case arose from a simple misunderstanding between complainant
and respondent. Complainant was upset by respondent's absence at
the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected killers of her
husband. She vehemently opposed the grant of bail. It was thus a
spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront respondent with
his absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness,
nothing more. Complainant's words and actions may have hurt
respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the
case. But her words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at
that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's
services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his "Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel."
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in
terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave
complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to
presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.
[21]
Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the
court to do what the interests of his client require. [22] He must still
appear on the date of hearing[23] for the attorney-client relation does
not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. [24]
Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to
bring the criminal case to its termination. He was in fact paid in full
for his services. Respondent failed to comply with his undertaking,
hence, it is but fair that he return to complainant half of the amount
paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the case have rendered it
impossible for respondent and complainant to continue their relation
under the contract.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise
more prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is
also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from
notice the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) representing
a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a warning that
failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer
disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37844 June 30, 1975
PATRICIO ALCANTARA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CASTRENCE C. VELOSO, Presiding Judge of
Branch III, Court of First Instance of Iloilo and ROMAN
ALCANTARA, respondents, ATTORNEYS JONAS A. ABELLAR
and AGUSTIN T. DIOQUINO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
98
The immediate antecedent of respondent members of the bar Jonas
A. Abellar and Agustin T. Dioquino being cited to explain what
appeared to be plain inattention to duty was the delay on their part
as counsel for respondents in the filing of a rejoinder to a reply of
petitioner. The justification offered was that they were not furnished a
copy of such pleading. That was an assertion that proved to be
contrary to fact. The offense was thus compounded. Respondent
Abellar had this explanation: "That with due respect, counsel hereby
reiterates and hereby most respectfully manifests that he did not
receive the Reply of Petitioner dated February 9, 1974. Counsel
painfully searched and re-searched the records of the case in his
possession, but most regretfully informs this Honorable Tribunal that
the result of his search was in the negative. Counsel likewise
examined and cross-examined his office clerk, Miss Gemema
Pagadal, as to whether she had received the questioned pleading or
just might have misplaced the same, but Miss Pagadal answered
that she did not receive the same. Miss Pagadal had been employed
with this office for more than four (4) years and counsel had no
reason to doubt her sincerity. ... ." 1 After noting that there were two
attorneys of record, he added: "It could be possible that counsel for
petitioner might have sent that pleading to Atty. Agustin Dioquino,
[was] received by Atty. Dioquino or his Office clerk, or to the other
respondent the Honorable Castrence C. Veloso or his
deputies."2 Further: "In this instant case, there is no reason why
counsel should hide from the Honorable Tribunal such petty matter
as to whether counsel received or not the opposite party's pleading.
If counsel received the same, it would have hastened the disposition
of the case now pending before this august court, for the benefit of
respondent, which counsel humbly represents, and also for the
benefit of counsel. The only thing is - counsel, with hi-s deepest
apology in conscience and in good faith, did not receive the
aforementioned pleading."3
The above surmise, if correct, would call into question the actuation
of respondent Dioquino. He would seek to exculpate himself in this
manner: "1. That the explanation of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar was in
effect washing his hands by explaining that he did not receive
petitioner's reply and that it might have been received by the
undersigned; 2. That in truth and in fact the undersigned received a
copy of the Reply of Attorneys Aguadera and Demaisip on May 20,
1974, thru his clerk-secretary, Miss Ninfa E. Jaruda; the date of
receipt is indicated on the upper left hand margin of the reply ... with
Annotation that she received that copy pertaining to Atty. Dioquino
excluding that copy of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar, wherein his clerk-
secretary signed that copy for Atty. Agustin Dioquino and not for Atty.
Jonas A. Abellar; 3. That what is stated in the Petition is that copy is
furnished Jonas A. Abellar [and] A. Dioquino, and the clerk of the
undersigned only signed for the copy of A. Dioquino, the
undersigned; 4. That this representation failed to comment on the
reply of Attorneys Aguadera and Demaisip and failed to comply too
to comment on the explanation of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar for the
reason that it is the belief of the undersigned that Atty. Jonas A.
Abellar also received a copy of the Reply of Attorneys Aguadera and
Demaisip; 5. That the undersigned failed to comment on the
explanation of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar for reasons that he is of the
belief that his services or his relation with Roman Alcantara as
counsel for the latter has already been terminated for reasons that
Roman Alcantara employed the services of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar
and it is presumed by the undersigned that the services of Atty.
Jonas A. Abellar was already known to the Honorable Supreme
Court as the attorney of record of Roman Alcantara; 6. That before
the Petition for Certiorari was filed by the petitioner, Atty. Jonas A.
Abellar was already appearing as counsel of record for Roman
Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and appearing on
incidents or motions pending therein, and the undersigned counsel
was already relieved of his duties with Roman Alcantara. In fact the
Resolution of this Honorable Tribunal dated December 8, 1973,
requiring the Respondents to Comment on the Petition of the
Petitioners as addressed to the Honorable Castrence C. Veloso, Mr.
Roman Alcantara and Messrs. Santos B. Aguadera and Sixto
Demaisip, counsels for the petitioners. The resolution did not
particularize or mention the name of the undersigned as counsel for
Roman Alcantara, hence, he is of the belief that even the Honorable
Supreme Court has knowledge that he is relieved of his duties as
counsel for Roman Alcantara, coupled by the act of Noemi
Alcantara, the wife of Roman Alcantara, who withdrew all papers
relative to this case from the undersigned informing the latter that
her husband has engaged the services of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar for
reasons that the brother-in-law of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar will be the
one to shoulder the expenses of the case including the expense in
the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court, and those papers
withdrawn by the wife of Roman Alcantara was not returned to the

undersigned although there was a promise on her part to return the
same on or before the last working day of January, 1974. ...; 7. That
the undersigned is of the belief that Atty. Jonas A. Abellar as the new
counsel of Roman Alcantara assumed all the responsibilities as
counsel for Roman Alcantara: ..."4
What immediately calls attention in this explanation of respondent
Dioquino is his temerity in stating not once but twice that the
termination of his services by respondent Roman Alcantara was to
this Court, It is indicative of an excessive estimate of one's
reputation as to his standing in the bar or excessive regard of the
importance of one's person for any lawyer to make the assertion that
this Court could have been aware of his no longer representing a
client in the absence of any pleading to that effect. Nor is this the
only objectionable feature of the attempted explanation by
respondent Dioquino. For him to make such an assertion
considering that the record does not contain any notice of withdrawal
of his appearance is to ignore or to be ignorant of the most
rudimentary principle as to when a lawyer-client relationship
terminates. That in itself is enough of a reflection of his good
standing in the bar. It deserves a reproof from this Tribunal. What
aggravates his failing is the rather haughty tone in which his
explanation was couched. Instead of being man enough to
acknowledge a patent neglect of duty, he would not try to escape
responsibility elsewhere but also resort to the use of language in
which the element of arrogance is discernible. Even members of the
bar who have rendered distinguished service to the law are not
oblivious of how persuasive a plea could be if impressed with the
necessary element of humility. It may not be out of place to note that
under the circumstances as narrated by him the interest of his client
would be better served if there be a formal withdrawal of his
appearance.
WHEREFORE, respondent Agustin T. Dioquino is severely
censured. The explanation of Attorney Jonas A. Abellar is accepted
but he is admonished to be more attentive in the future as to the
current stage of the pleadings, bearing on the cases wherein he has
entered his appearance. Let copies of this resolution be entered into
the records of respondents Jonas A. Abellar and Agustin T. Dioquino.
G.R. No. L-39124 November 15, 1974
DON LINO GUTIERREZ & SONS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS ALVENDIA, respondents.
Rosendo J. Tansinsin for petitioner.
Rodolfo A. Espiritu for private respondent.
AQUINO, J.:p
In 1963 a judgment based on a compromise was rendered by the
City Court of Manila in a case instituted by Don Lino Gutierrez &
Sons, Inc. against Jesus Alvendia. In 1968 the said corporation
again sued Alvendia in the City Court of Manila for the revival of the
judgment. The City Court rendered a judgment in favor of Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. Alvendia appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which, after a trial de novo (there being no
stenographic notes of the hearing in the City Court), affirmed the
judgment of the City Court with some modifications in its decision
dated June 5, 1973.
In all those proceedings, Alvendia's counsel of record was
Escolastico Viola. The law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates,
through Rodolfo A. Espiritu, collaborated with Attorney Viola. The
copy of the decision was served on Viola and not on Baizas, Alberto
& Associates.
Alvendia, through Viola, appealed by record on appeal to the Court
of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Viola and Rosendo J. Tansinsin, the lawyer of Don Lino Gutierrez &
Sons, Inc., were advised by the Clerk of Court of the lower court in a
notice dated February 20, 1974 that the record on appeal had been
forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11
99
In a letter dated February 26, 1974 the Court of Appeals notified
Viola that the docket fee of forty-eight pesos and the legal research
fee of five pesos should be paid within fifteen days from notice and
that forty copies of the printed record on appeal should be filed
within sixty days, with the warning that failure to do so would
constitute an abandonment of the appeal and cause the dismissal
thereof. Viola received that notice on February 28, 1974.
In view of Alvendia's failure to comply with that notice, the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of May 3, 1974 dismissed his appeal. A
copy of that resolution was served upon Viola on May 8, 1974.
On June 26, 1974 or forty-nine days after the order of dismissal was
served on Attorney Viola, Alvendia, through Rodolfo A. Espiritu of the
Baizas law office, filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order
on the ground that Viola had ceased to be Alvendia's counsel since
September, 1973 and that Attorney Crispin D. Baizas had taken his
place and it was allegedly agreed that the latter would handle
Alvendia's appeal. The motion was verified by Alvendia and Viola
and was supported by their affidavits, the gist of which is that, due to
the death of Attorney Baizas on January 16, 1974, Alvendia failed to
follow up his appeal.
Viola in his affidavit admitted that he received on February 28, 1974
the notice to pay the docket fee and to file forty copies of the record
on appeal but he allegedly "did not give any importance to it"
because he was then no longer Alvendia's counsel and his
impression was that the Baizas law office was also given a copy of
that notification.
Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. opposed the motion for
reconsideration. It insisted that Viola was Alvendia's counsel of
record for purposes of the appeal and that Baizas had never entered
his formal appearance as Alvendia's counsel. It claimed that the
resolution had already become final and that the Court of Appeals
had no more jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, it argued that Alvendia had admitted in all his pleadings
that he was indebted to Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. in the
amount stated in the judgment, which was originally rendered in
1963, and that Alvendia only claimed that he was not bound to pay
that obligation.
The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of July 15, 1974, granted the
motion and reinstated Alvendia's appeal. At that time the docket fee
had already been paid. Later, the printed record on appeal was filed.
The motion of Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. for the
reconsideration of the resolution of July 15, 1974 was denied.
On August 19, 1974 the said corporation filed in this Court a petition
for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the resolution reinstating
Alvendia's appeal and to compel the Court of Appeals to remand the
record to the lower court for the execution of its final judgment.
We are of the opinion that the petition is meritorious.
The Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. —
An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Failure of the appellant to pay the docketing
fee as provided in section 5 of Rule 46;
xxx xxx xxx (Rule 50).
SEC. 5. Duty of appellant upon receipt of notice.
— It shall be the duty of the appellant, within
fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice
referred to in the preceding section, to pay to
the clerk of the Court Appeals the fee for the
docketing of the appeal, and within sixty (60)
 100

days from such notice to submit to the court WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 15,
forty (40) printed copies of the record on appeal, 1974, reinstating the appeal of respondent Jesus Alvendia, is set
together with proof of service of fifteen (15) aside and its resolution of May 3, 1974, dismissing his appeal for
printed copies thereof upon the appellee. failure to pay the docket and legal research fees within the
reglementary period, is affirmed with costs against him.
xxx xxx xxx (Rule 46).
SO ORDERED.
SEC. 2. Effect of dismissal. — Fifteen (15) days
after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall CASIMIRO VS PEOPLE 1971
return to the court below the record on appeal
with a certificate under the seal of the court
showing that the appeal has been dismissed. ..."
(Rule 50).

The Court of Appeals did not err in motu proprio dismissing

Alvendia's appeal for failure to pay on time the docket fee and to
submit forty copies of his printed record on appeal (Alvero vs. De la
Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434; Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39 Phil. 922; Dorego
vs. Perez, L-24922, January 2, 1968, 22 SCRA 8).

Attorney Viola was negligent in not apprising Alvendia of the notice

to pay the docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of
the printed record on appeal. Alvendia is bound by his lawyer's
negligence (Robles vs. San Jose, 99 Phil. 658).

Viola was also negligent in not making a formal withdrawal as

Alvendia's counsel and in not apprising the Court of Appeals that
Baizas was supposedly appellant's new counsel. In the absence of a
formal withdrawal, he continued to be Alvendia's counsel of record
(Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 476;
Domingo, Jr. vs. Aquino, L-28078, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 472,
477). His alibi that it was his honest impression that the Baizas' law
office was also notified by the Court of Appeals to pay the docket
and legal research fees is flimsy because he could have easily
ascertained from the notice itself that Baizas' name did not appear
therein.

Moreover, "where a party is represented by two attorneys, the rule is

that the notice may be made either upon both attorneys or upon one
of them, regardless of whether they belong to the same law firm or
are practicing one independently of the other" (1 Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 423, citing Ortega vs. Pacho, 98
Phil. 618).

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of
his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal,
supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task
of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu
(not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in
handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the
Court of Appeals.

Under the environmental circumstances of this eleven-year-old

litigation, it was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals to reinstate Alvendia's appeal and to relax the rule
regarding dismissal of an appeal for appellant's failure to pay on time
the docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of his
record on appeal within the sixty-day period (Cf. Chavez and Celeste
vs. Ganzon and the Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 6, 10, and Urdaneta
Rural Bank vs. San Juan, L-28346, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1390).

It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the

necessity of a strict compliance with the periods for performing
certain acts incident to the appeal and that transgressions thereof,
as a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be
evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would
ultimately become inutile.

Whether Alvendia's appeal by record on appeal is warranted under -

section 45 of the Judiciary Law as amended by Republic Act No.
6031, in relation to section 29 of the same law as amended by
Republic Act No. 5433, is a point which we do not decide in this
case. It was not raised by the petitioner. It suffices to note that,
according to section 45, generally, the decision of the Court of First
Instance in cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, which are appealed to it, "shall be final".

LEGAL ETHICS CASES CHAPTER 11