[G.R. No. 105938.

September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A.

VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the
contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary duty in
the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law
profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." [1]
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law
Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members
acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e.,
stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed
of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of
the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings.[2]
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to
as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint"
which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.[3] Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.[4]
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the
 coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other
coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and
its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks
ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB
which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the
name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.[5]
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock
in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said
shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the
expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the shares appearing in his name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint are his
assets.[6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.[7]
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8,
1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as
parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.[8] The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from
the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings.[9]
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case
No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating
a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989
executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco,
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG
against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.[10]
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he
undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.[11]
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying
the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by
respondent PCGG. It held:
x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted,
i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the
PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure
in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The
ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the same
vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty.
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit.[12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
105938, invoking the following grounds:
I

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the
classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal protection clause.
III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-
defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the
constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds
averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants
him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving
him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further
argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are
prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as
lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client
relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the
identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents
it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. [13]
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as
party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case
No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,'"[14] and he has undertaken to
identify his principal.[15]
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish as they
say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -- the
names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its
questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted,
i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario
Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA
that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A of the Third Amended Complaint;
that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular
persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-
called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these
lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds
are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President
Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank
assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for
Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say
that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and
even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no
address on records. These are some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders,
as they called themselves.[16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the
course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is
merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to
nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and
should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
 The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire,[17] and mandato(contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom
reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the
person who requested him.[18]But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and
lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. [19] A lawyer
is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to
those of an ordinary agent.[20] Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial
office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court[21] and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action
to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe
life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,[22] that is required by reason of necessity and
public interest[23] based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice.[24]
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable
tradition.[25] In Stockton v. Ford,[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and
client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by
the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to
administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus
reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.[27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel, without authority of his
client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment.[28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorneys
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.[29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and
to accept no compensation in connection with his clients business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain
him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed
within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand
of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal
representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets
revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or
to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the
flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this
represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-
evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum
of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of
disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the
lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. [30] Under this premise,
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.[31]
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. [32] He cannot be obliged to grope in
the dark against unknown forces.[33]
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor,[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue
of the clients identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election
official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he
had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to
count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact,
bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his clients identity before a grand
jury. Reversing the lower courts contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances
of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client
in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the Sandino Gang,
a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners,
represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
 In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig,
requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of
any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would
implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d
at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal
law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege. In
order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure
from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the clients
consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the clients identity and the nature
of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. [36]
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, [37] prompted the New
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action
both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John
Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the
fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a
man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that
he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the
second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional
capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to defend its
policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when
the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim
against him.[38]
x x x xxx xxx.
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance,
are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such
advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client,
then it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this case as
a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed
on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the summons on him has not been
effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained.[39]
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, [40] the lawyer involved was required by a lower court
to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the courts request
was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of
properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme
Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented certain
persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their
version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not
only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course
of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure
that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.[41]
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
In Baird vs Korner,[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal
charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
 It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought
advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by
the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85,
which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the
advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining
the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants,
and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name
the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil
contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of
clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined
income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that clients income tax liability
pending. The court emphasized the exception that a clients name is privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the clients identity exposes him to possible
investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in
income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but
one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that
more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any.It indicates a feeling of guilt for
nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done.[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant
to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. [44] Moreover, where
the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.[45]
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then
reveal client confidences.[46]
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that
the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's
name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid
down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-
up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners
legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as
lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
 Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words
of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a... crime."[47]
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney
for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal
activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults
his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked
for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet
in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for
an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second
example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the
first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a
crime.[48] The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same
policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no
case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose
not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be
made the basis of a suit against his client.[49]"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any
personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in
consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and
entitled to protection as privileged communications." [50] Where the communicated information, which clearly
falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the
client would open up other privileged information which would substantiate the prosecutions suspicions, then
the clients identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the
protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind
the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been
sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings[51] and Tillotson v. Boughner.[52] What these cases unanimously seek
to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a
case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists
in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we
cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an
attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege.[53] It follows that petitioner attorneys
in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn
requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not
be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be
difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and
distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of
violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence,
diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make decisions have
been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,[54] the US Second District Court
rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's
former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship
in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation
and damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller [55] requiring
strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the
end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found
that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum,
events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary
duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon[56] famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court
found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.[57]
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes,[58] "xxx is an exacting goddess, demanding
of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents
position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous energy
of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life - so share its passions its battles, its
despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x x x But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are
united - this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives,
but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak
of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and
lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of
the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them
in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others
and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription
payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others,
to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts
constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment,
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG
documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed
in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that
would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also
because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which
includes... the identity of the principal."[59]
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement
made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made
the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint,
signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering. [60] Being
"similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in the
case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain
the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the
clients in question. However, respondents failed to show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records of
the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the
undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an
undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent
from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial
than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested
by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-
investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves
willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services
while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the
alleged questioned transactions.[61]
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent
court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart
from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based
on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of
the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application
of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. [62] Those who
fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities
imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding the rest.[63]

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The
condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution
without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the
question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in
violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to
testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But
petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they
cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that
their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing
them to disclose the identities of their clients.To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which
we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles
over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction
acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, *Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja
G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al.".
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5280. March 30, 2004]

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation
of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the
lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to
be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed,
respondent went to his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from
him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.
Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition
for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for Falsification of Public Documents. [1] The
letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the
subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint
read:

The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of 132-A
Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors
and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of
Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as
follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for the
amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN
C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in the said date,
William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register
of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land
Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy,
wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales,
Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them
as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified documents
which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug,
Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named
children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-
Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said
date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still accepted
the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606,
and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time
the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the name of his
children;

That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by the said check
which was encashed by him;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse to
deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the undersigned.[2]
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded
his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against him just because he
refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation
and social standing.[3]
In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,[4] respondent filed his Comment narrating
his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy.
Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from his
(respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and
demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request,
he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to deliver the same and execute
the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to complainants office and demanded the delivery of
the title and the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No.
T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the property,
covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and
cannot be located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his
desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a
petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for
transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant
agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for signing and
notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him that the petition is ready for
filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom
where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without leaving any
instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which prompted him
to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that
complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated
when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship
between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts
and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured
from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the
IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There was no showing that respondent
received the notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.[8]
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam
dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filed
against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed. [9]
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation, portions of
which read as follows:

The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the Verified Petition
for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the
circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
expressly provides that A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated. Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between
them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three
(3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship
between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but
permanent. It is in effect perpetual for it outlasts the lawyers employment (Canon 37, Code of Professional
Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients
confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the
client with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who
claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing
this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of
Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that any person may bring to this Courts
attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of
interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar. [10]

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No.
XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.[11]

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy

expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no persuasive
bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.

This is because:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. [12]

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as
legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. [13] While it is true
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,[14] complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that the
relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between
them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he
redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the
Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the
bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely
transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a
new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with
the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of
obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as
long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. [15]
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently,
the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent
against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent
volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had
earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.

The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts
alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but
as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the
complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the
affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold
otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or
proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104600 July 2, 1999

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, petitioner,

vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover
attorney's fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine
Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for its client Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were
terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the adverse party.

The Facts

In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to the case. On August 28, 1987,
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales
and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares
against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm
appeared for ETPI.

After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). On
September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution granting ETPI's application for preliminary restrictive
and mandatory injunctions. During this period, SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the
law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. The
latter signed a retainer agreement with counsel dated October 1, 1987. 1

Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the traffic revenue shares which
ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with the contract between them. Second, ETPI sought
preventive injunctive relief against the PLDT's threats to deny ETPI access to the Philippines international
gateway switch. Third, ETPI called this the "foreign correspondentships aspect" where ETPI sought preventive
injunctive relief against PLDT's incursions and inducements directed at ETPI's foreign correspondents in
Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to break their correspondentship contracts with PLDT, using the threat of
denying them access to the international gateway as leverage.

In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining order, one on October 30,
1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the applications were not acted upon, ETPI brought the case up to
the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari.

On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva, President and Chief
Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was terminating the retainer contract dated October
1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.

On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorney's lien, furnishing copies to
the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT. On the same date, petitioner additionally
sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there
were negotiations towards a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.

In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and that the same
was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for the enforcement of attorney's lien
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by manifestation. 2 We
noted the manifestation in a resolution dated July 23, 1990.

On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party to nor in any manner
involved in the attorney's lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for and in behalf of the law firm, 3 while ETPI
filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.

The Lower Court's Ruling

The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for enforcement of attorney's lien.
Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of Attorney's Lien filed by
the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa has no basis in fact and in law, and
therefore denies the Motion for Enforcement of Attorney's Lien.

SO ORDERED.

Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.

(s/t)
ZEUS C,
ABROG
AR

Judge 4

On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the above-mentioned order to
the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal contending that the case could
be brought to the Supreme Court only via a petition for review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of appeal. In
an order dated January 16, 1991, the trial court dismissed RADA's appeal.
The trial court said:

There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. Under
the amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and judgments of the
Regional Trial Court may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition for review
on certiorari.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is hereby reconsidered
and set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati, Metro Manila.

(s/t)
ZEUS C,
ABROG
AR

Judge 5

Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which we
remanded to the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition in a decision promulgated on November
14, 1991, 6 ruling that the judge committed no abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:

We therefore rule that respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave
one, in denying petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien.

Assuming that respondent judge committed an error in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien, it cannot be corrected by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with
cost against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

(s/t) REGINA G.
ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(s/t) JOSE A. R. MELO (s/t) EMETERIO C, CUI

Associate Justice Associate Justice 7

DISCUSSION

A. The Procedural Aspect

There is nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which are liberally construed in order to promote their
objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. 8 In analogous case, 9 we ruled that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate
substantial justice 10, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.

In A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said —

 Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very claims. As has been the constant
ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 11

A basic legal principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. 12 This principle is
one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries and which the Civil Code echoes:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him. 13

The Code Commission, its report, emphasized that:

It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in the
proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly
benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar provision (Art.
812). 14

With this in mind, one could easily understand why, despite technical deficiencies, we resolved to give due
course to this petition. More importantly, the case on its face appears to be impressed with merit.

B. The Attorney's Fees

We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI terminated the law
firm's services in 1988. Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty.
Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA; and second, the retainer agreement
dated October 1, 1987.

We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys' fees. We, however, are not convinced with the petitioner's
arguments that the services RADA rendered merit the amount they are claiming.

First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the complaint. When a client employs the
services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the
case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the
firm is bound to provide a replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated the filing of the complaint
considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is more, on September 17, 1987, ETPI paid SAGA the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,00.00) 15 representing services performed prior to September 17, 1987. SAGA
assigned one of its associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza, to handle the case for the firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza
handled the case personally, he did so for and in behalf of SAGA.

Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which provides:

6.2 B.Court Cases:

Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or judicial action be taken
by adverse party, our attorney's fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts collected
or the value of the property acquired or liability saved. 16

the firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon.

However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza played a vital role during the
inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We cannot also ignore the fact that an attorney-client
relationship between petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable
agreement. To award the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five Million Six
Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too unconscionable.1âwphi1.nêt

"In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which
lawyers may receive for their professional services. " 17 "A lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal services
he has extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable." 18 A lawyer would be entitled to receive
what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional
fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client. 19 Recovery of attorney's fees on the
basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees
agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney's fees,
the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the contract for
attorney's fee's is void due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause,
was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's
fees, 20

In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent
of services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors would
indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondents can adduce evidence to
establish the right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same. 21 The trial court
has the principal task of fixing the amount of attorney's fees. 22 Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

C. Charging Lien

Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is entitled to a charging lien. The
rule provides:

Sec. 37. Attorney's liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his
claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment
of his just fees and disbursements." (Emphasis supplied).

We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees requires as a
condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client 23. A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a
favorable money judgment for his client. 24 From the facts of the case it would seem that petitioner had no hand
in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a favorable judgment for ETPI.

ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner and through the effort of
ETPI's new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles. Whether there
was bad faith in the substitution of the lawyers to avoid compliance with the retainer agreement could only be
determined after a trial of the case on the merits.

This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon petitioner any additional burden in
collecting its attorney's fees. The petitioner must avail itself of the proper remedy in order to forestall the
possibility of any injustice on or unjust enrichment of any of the parties.

The Judgment (Fallo)

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 24463 and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorney's fees
to which petitioner is entitled.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, petitioner submits for the Court's adjudication the twin issues of whether or not the Solicitor General
neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases he had filed in court and whether or not the PCGG acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as a result of such withdrawal of appearance.

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the petition as a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of common and general interest to all
Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to the enforcement of a public duty and the prevention of
unlawful expenditure of public funds.

According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three
(33) cases before this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in the National
Labor Relations Commission and another case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one hundred forty-four
(144) cases. 1 In December 1990, the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading
entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."2 The pleading states:

The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully withdraws as counsel
for plaintiff Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in the above-captioned
case, with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the
provisions of Executive Order No. 292 as well as the decisional law of "Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission, et al.," (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990), to submit his
comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this Honorable Court, if called for
by circumstances in the interest of the government or if he is so required by the court.

Makati, Metro Manila, December 3, 1990.

(Sgd.)
FRANCI
SCO I.
CHAVEZ
IBP O.R.
No.
289417
-2.06.90

The Solicitor General filed a substantially similar pleading in the cases where the Republic is a party.

As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom
are trial lawyers. They would receive a monthly compensation of at least P10,000.00 plus appearance fee of
P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or P500.00 if trial is postponed. 3

Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance was made without any reason,
it implied that it was "within the absolute discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily require the Solicitor General to
stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG in court. Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no
discretion to reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.

Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal in Sta. Rosa Mining Co. v. Zabala, 4 the petitioner further
states that: "Similarly, it is the duty of the Solicitor General to appear for the Republic and the PCGG, hence
regardless of his personal convictions or opinions, he must proceed to discharge his duty (not withdraw, which
is equivalent to refusal to prosecute), and let the court decide the merits of the case." 5
Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General cannot withdraw his appearance "with reservation" nor
can he file his "comment/observation on the incident/matters" after such withdrawal because by ceasing to
appear as counsel, he loses his standing in court. Unless a case involves the constitutionality of a treaty, law,
ordinance or executive order for which Rule 3 Section 23 of the Rules of Court 6 mandates his appearance, the
Solicitor General is not authorized to appear therein after his withdrawal as counsel inasmuch as he himself is
not a party-litigant.

Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138,7 the Solicitor General may not unilaterally withdraw his
appearance without the consent of the Republic or the PCGG unless the court authorizes his withdrawal. Since
there was no such court authority, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance in said several cases is null
and void, as it constitutes an act against a mandatory law and hence, it may be attacked collaterally. Neither
may the Solicitor General withdraw on the authority of Orbos v. Civil Service Commission 8 wherein this Court
held:

In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the
government is upheld within the limits set by law. . .

xxx xxx xxx

There are cases where a government agency declines the services of the Solicitor General or
otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate action. . .

The Court finds and so holds that this practice should be stopped. To repeat, the Solicitor General
is the lawyer of the government, any of its agents and officials in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. The exception is when such officials
or agents are being charged criminally or are being civilly sued for damages arising from a
felony. His services cannot be lightly rejected, much less ignored by the officer or officials
concerned.

Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the parties. He should
be given full support and cooperation by any agency or official involved in litigation. He should
be enabled to faithfully discharge his duties and responsibilities as the government advocate.
And he should do no less for his clients. His burden of assisting in the fair and just
administration of justice is clear.

This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his duty. As a
matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many
proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from
appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be advised of his
position just as well. (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner adds the following observations: 9

Therefore, this case militates more against the Solicitor General than in his favor. For if the
government and its officials cannot reject the services of the Solicitor General, neither may the
latter select the case he would represent by withdrawing in some and retaining others. For
unlike private lawyers who are bound to their clients by contract and, therefore, can reject
cases offered to them, the Solicitor General and PCGG are wedded to each other by statute for
better and for worse. And only a divorce, through the abolition of PCGG or resignation of the
Solicitor General, can untie the marital knot. Otherwise, the relationship should continue sans
PCGG demurring, and the Solicitor General withdrawing. Absent such resignation or abolition,
the Solicitor General has to prosecute or defend the said cases to the best of his ability.

Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as
substitutes for the Solicitor General. Nowhere in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14 does it appear that the PCGG
is authorized to hire said lawyers. Since the Solicitor General is named by law as the lawyer for all government
agencies, the hiring of private lawyers by such agencies is impliedly excluded. Thus, by employing private
lawyers, the PCGG is creating a public office and naming a public officer. However, in the absence of a law
providing for the creation of the office of PCGG counsel, said hired lawyers are usurpers or intruders whose
acts may be challenged in a collateral proceeding such as an action for prohibition.

Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the Commission on Audit considering that any payment
for the services of the PCGG-hired lawyers would result in an unlawful expenditure of public funds. Stressing
the need to preserve the status quo until the determination of his rights as a citizen and taxpayer, petitioner
prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order.

Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the respondent to file their respective comments on the
petition without granting the prayer for a temporary restraining order. 10

In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it has not allowed the disbursement of funds to
pay for the services of PCGG-hired private lawyers. It points out the fact that under COA Circular No. 89-299
dated March 21, 1989, the COA has withdrawn the pre-audit of transactions entered into by national
government agencies pursuant to the constitutional provision that the COA has the exclusive authority to
"define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods required
therefor." 11 Neither has the COA allowed in post-audit the disbursements of funds in payment of the services
of the hired private lawyers. Moreover, under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, the hiring of private
lawyers by government agencies and instrumentalities is prohibited unless there is prior written conformity
of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written
concurrence of COA.

For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren and lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay, asserts in its
comment that the scope of its authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 is broad enough to include the
authority to engage the services of private lawyers, if necessary, for the fulfillment of its mandate. While such
authority is not expressly stated in said executive orders, "it must be deemed necessarily implied in and
subsumed under the expressly enumerated powers of the Commission." 12

The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it" includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in determining the manner of filing and
prosecuting its cases including the matter of who, in particular, will control and supervise the prosecution of
said cases." The phrase "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government
agencies" simply means that the Solicitor General is called upon to render assistance to the PCGG and whether
or not such discretion is required by the Commission is a matter of discretion on its part. Such provision does
not preclude the PCGG from engaging the services of private lawyers in the same way that it is "clearly
authorized to hire accountants, appraisers, researchers and other professionals as it performs its functions."
Since, upon the dictates of legal and practical necessity, it has hired lawyers in the United States and in
Switzerland, "it may similarly hire Filipino lawyers in prosecuting its Philippine cases." 13

The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private lawyers is "not an ultra vires" act but a "means by which (it)
can effectively exercise its powers." It emphasizes the fact that it hired private lawyers "only after the Officer of
the Solicitor General had unilaterally withdrawn its appearance" for the PCGG in the various pending PCGG-
instituted cases. Its own Litigation Division, which was constituted after the Solicitor General's withdrawal, is
"sorely undermanned" but it has to contend with "affluent and influential individuals and entities" who can
"afford to hire skilled lawyers and organize vast litigation networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance of
the Department of Justice and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel but only the former sent two
additional prosecutors to handle its cases. 14

The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed not only by the executive orders aforementioned but also
by the inherent police power of the State. By hiring private lawyers, it was merely trying to assist the President
of the Philippines in protecting the interest of the State. As such, it was acting as an alter ego of the President
and therefore, it was the Executive which determined the necessity of engaging the services of private
prosecutors. Contending that "overwhelming necessity" impelled it to hire private lawyers, the PCGG avers that
inasmuch as the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Philippine National Bank may engage the services of
private lawyers, with more reason may it be allowed to hire private prosecutors after it was abandoned by the
Solicitor General in the prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth cases. Consequently, "the Solicitor General's
withdrawal of assistance is tantamount to his tacit approval of the PCGG's hiring of private prosecutors in
replacement of the solicitors handling the said civil cases." 15

The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the compensation for its hired lawyers can hardly be
questioned considering the expertise of said lawyers and the complexity of the cases they would be handling
for the PCGG. Thus, the prayer for a preliminary injunction must be denied otherwise "the harm that would be
done would be far greater than the perceived mischief petitioner seeks to prevent." 16

Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself from appearing in this case "considering that as far as the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) is concerned, the subject is a closed matter among the OSG, the
PCGG and the Courts." 17 In the comment filed by Assistant Solicitor General Edgardo L. Kilayko and Solicitor
Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG sets out at length the history of the PCGG from its creation until the filing in the
Sandiganbayan of thirty-nine (39) " prima facie cases" for ill-gotten wealth against former President Marcos
and his cronies. As suits and countersuits stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the OSG had
been put to a tremendous task and thus invariably in urgent need of being consulted or informed by the PCGG
of the facts and circumstances material to the prosecution and progress not only of the original 39 civil cases,
but also of all kinds of "incidents."

Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge and the odds if only to live up to their task as "the best lawyers
there are in the country." The OSG further explains: 18

On many a time, however a time, however, the lack of the above-mentioned consultation or
information resulted in situations that rendered the OSG unavoidably incapable of performing
its functions and duties as Lawyer of the Government, not only as mandated upon it by law
and as spelled out in Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, but also in consonance
with its office motto: "Integrity In Advocacy."

Once the OSG argued before the Sandiganbayan that an asset was under sequestration, only
to be informed by the adverse party waving a document before the Sandiganbayan Justices that
the sequestration had earlier been lifted, with a PCGG resolution, the document, to boot
(Razon case). Then, again, OSG argued, even before this Honorable Court, that an ill-gotten
asset had "mysteriously" disappeared, only to be informed by the Honorable Court, that a
PCGG Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the disposition of the asset
(COCOFED case). All the instances need not be enumerated here, as they are not meat and
substance, even as OSG is rendered thereby a laughing stock in its professionalism.

As to matters that are of great pith and moment, suffice it to say that the recent Benedicto
"compromise" agreement, not to mention the SMC-UCPB Compromise settlement, is sub
judice or under advisement not only of the Sandiganbayan but also of this Honorable Court in
separate "incidents," and suffice it to state that the relationship, obtaining between the
Government offices/agencies and the Office of the Solicitor General as counsel, is not at all like
one that simply would obtain between private client and private lawyer in private practice,
although constant consultation and advice are sine qua non in both types of relationship. The
relationship is rather one, created as it is by law, where imposed upon OSG is the responsibility
to present to the courts the position that will uphold the best interests of the People, the
Government and the State, albeit the same may run counter to its client's position or route of
action. At any rate, the PCGG through nationwide TV broadcast and print media, publicly
announced that PCGG had disposed with or otherwise did not need the legal services of the
Lawyer of the Government, and thus OSG descended, not the unmerited remark of having
"abandoned" the ill-gotten wealth cases, but the time-honored principle of impossibilium nulla
obligatio est, i.e., there is no obligation to do impossible things (Lim Co Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil.
463), without in any way casting any aspersion on the moral integrity of any Commissioner or
PCGG official, as made clear by the Solicitor General to the President in a meeting with PCGG.

Hence, in the light of all the foregoing circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so as not to
prejudice "the interest of the Government" (Orbos), the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel
for PCGG in all said cases by filing a notice of "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."

In arguing that the instant petition should be dismissed, the OSG contends that this case has become moot and
academic as this very Court had resolved to allow the withdrawal of appearance of the Solicitor General in all
the cases pending before it "with reservation, conformably with PD No. 478, Executive Order No. 292, as well
as the doctrine laid down in 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, . .
." 19 For its part, the Sandiganbayan had also resolved that "the appearance of the Solicitor General is deemed
withdrawn to be substituted by the PCGG's legal panel." 20

The OSG maintains further that the instant petition does not present a case and controversy as the petitioner
himself does not even have a "court standing" and a "litigable interest." All the petitioner seeks is an "advisory
opinion." The OSG asserts that the "incident" (referring to the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance)
should be distinguished from that in JPC Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 21 wherein the Assets
Privatization Trust (APT) decided to appear for itself because the law names the Minister of Justice only as
its ex oficio legal adviser while by itself it can file suits and institute proceedings and engage external expertise
in the fulfillment of its tasks. However, since the APT has no personality of its own, it should have appeared
through the Solicitor General. The OSG argues that said "adversarial incident" is not present in this case.

In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the OSG, the petitioner insists that although as between the
Solicitor General and the PCGG, this case may have been rendered moot and academic, as between him on the
one hand and the Solicitor General and the PCGG on the other hand, a "real controversy" still exists and the
issues raised herein have not ceased to exist either. Moreover, a judgment of prohibition and mandamus would
have a "practical legal effect and can be enforced." 22
Citing Miguel v. Zulueta, 23 and Tañada v. Tuvera, 24 petitioner asserts that he has a standing in court because
where a question of public right is involved and the object of the mandamus is the enforcement of a public duty,
the relator need not show any legal or special interest in the result of the proceeding. It is sufficient that, as a
citizen, he is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.

The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its power to hire private lawyers may be implied from its
expressly enumerated powers. He asserts that since P.D. No. 478 mandates that "the Solicitor General as law
office of the government with the duty to appear for the PCGG," no implication from the express powers of (the)
PCGG can stand against the language of P.D. No. 478. On the other hand, the law regarding the PCGG and that
regarding the Solicitor General should be harmonized. 25

The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases for resolving this petition and, on account of the
importance and imperativeness of the issues raised herein, the filing of memoranda by the parties is dispensed
with.

We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue interposed by the OSG — whether or not this case has been
rendered moot and academic by this Court's resolution granting the Solicitor General's motion to withdraw
appearance as counsel in the several cases pending herein. It should be clarified that the resolution had to be
issued with the national interest in mind. Time was of the essence and any hedging on the part of the PCGG
and/or its counsel could, not merely set back but prejudice, the government's all-out efforts to recover ill-gotten
wealth.

Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the issues raised in a case, this Court has never shirked from its
symbolic function of educating bench and bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts,
doctrines and rules. 26 More so, if the case is of such magnitude that certain legal ambiguities must be unravelled
for the protection of the national interest. 27

To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG may withdraw its appearance in a cluster of cases of
national import to pass into legal limbo simply because it has been "mooted" would be a clear case of misguided
judicial self-restraint. This Court has assiduously taken every opportunity to lay down brick by brick the
doctrinal infrastructure of our legal system. Certainly, this is no time for a display of judicial timorousness of
the kind which the Solicitor General is untimely exhibiting now.

Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their far-reaching implications, not alone on the instant case
but on future ones as well, which the OSG will surely be called upon to handle again and again.

The resolution of the first issue laid down at the beginning of this ponencia hinges on whether or not the
Solicitor General may be compelled by mandamus to appear for the Republic and the PCGG. This issue is best
resolved by a close scrutiny of the nature and extent of the power and authority lodged by law on the Solicitor
General.

At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of the Office of the Solicitor General is in order.
Incorporated in Act No. 136 dated June 11,
1901 28 providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands was Chapter III entitled "The Attorney
General." Section 40 states:

There shall be an Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands, to be appointed by the

Philippine Commission . . .

The catalog of his duties includes the following:

He shall prosecute or defend therein all causes, civil and criminal, to which the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a party . . . 29

Section 41 further provides:

There shall be an officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney-General in the performance
of all his duties, called the Solicitor-General who shall be appointed by the Commission . . . In
case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney-General, or of his absence or disability, the Solicitor-
General shall have power to exercise the duties of that office. Under the supervision of the
Attorney-General, it shall be the especial duty of the Solicitor-General to conduct and argue suits
and appeals in the Supreme Court, in which the Philippine Government is interested, and the
Attorney-General may, whenever he deems it for the interest of the Philippine Government,
either in person conduct and argue any case in any court of the Philippine Islands in which the
 Philippine Government is interested or may direct the Solicitor General to do so. (Emphasis
supplied)

Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the Office of the Attorney-General and providing for the
appointment of the said official and the Solicitor General by the Civil Governor and for an increase in their
salaries. Their duties remained basically the same. 30

In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on September 5, 1901 providing for the organization of, among others,
the Department of Finance and Justice which embraced within its executive control the Bureau of Justice. 31

Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1917, the Bureau of Justice is specifically
constituted "the law office of the Government of the Philippine Islands and by it shall be performed duties
requiring the services of a law officer." 32 Its chief officials are the Attorney-General and his assistant, the
Solicitor General. 33

As principal law officer of the Government, the Attorney-General shall have authority to act
for and represent the Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers, and agents in any
official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. 34

In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was phased out and his functions were assumed by the Secretary of
Justice. 35 Subsequently, the Bureau of Justice came to be known as the Office of the Solicitor General, 36 headed
by the Solicitor General. 37

Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after the Office of Attorney-General, created by the First U.S.
Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which called for a "meet person, learned in the law, to act as Attorney-
General for the U.S." 38 When the Department of Justice was established in 1870, the position of Solicitor-
General was created as an assistant to the Attorney-General. 39 Over a century later, their respective positions
and functions remain the same. The Attorney-General of the United States, appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, is now the head of the Department of Justice. 40 In the same manner, a Solicitor
General, learned in the law, is appointed to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his duties. 41

In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines, emerging from the shadow of the Attorney-General and
later, of the Secretary of Justice, has come to his own. On July 20, 1948, Republic Act. No. 335, amending Section
1659 of the Administrative Code, bestowed on him the rank of Undersecretary of a Department. Subsequently,
a series of amendatory laws designed to enlarge the complement of the Office of the Solicitor General was
enacted 42 until on June 4, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, its pivotal role in the government
became clearly defined and delineated.

During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. Marcos leaned heavily on his Solicitor General to provide
legal underpinnings of his official acts. Reflective of the tremendously enhanced power of the official and the
position was Executive Order No. 454 enacted on September 23, 1975, conferring upon the Solicitor General the
rank of a member of the Cabinet "with all the rights, honors and privileges pertaining to the position." Said
executive order was superseded by Executive Order No. 473 dated August 12, 1976 "making the Solicitor
General a member of the Cabinet." These executive orders were capped by Executive Order No. 552 dated
August 14, 1979 elevating the OSG into a Ministry with the same powers and functions defined in P.D. Nos. 478
and 1347.

P.D. 478 became, as it were, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor General. After the change of
administration, or on July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 292
instituting the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, the Office of the
Solicitor General is described as an "independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice."
Headed by the Solicitor General, "who is the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government," the
Office shall have a Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15) Assistant Solicitors General and such number of
Solicitors and Trial Attorneys "as may be necessary to operate the Office which shall divided into fifteen (15)
divisions. 43 Among its powers and functions are the following which are relevant to the issues:

Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. — The office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government, and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a
lawyer. (Emphasis supplied.) It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
 (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

(2) Investigate, initiate court action, or in any manner proceed against any
person, corporation or firm for the enforcement of any contract, bond,
guarantee, mortgage, pledge or other collateral executed in favor of the
Government. Where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the
Philippines, the Solicitor General may employ counsel to assist in the
discharge of the aforementioned responsibilities.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies

and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the
courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal Officers with
respect to such cases.

(9) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the

Government for such service, assistance and cooperation as may be
necessary in fulfilling its function and responsibilities and for this purpose
enlist the services of any government official or employees in the pursuit of
his tasks.

Departments, bureaus, agencies, offices, instrumentalities and corporations

to whom the Office of the Solicitor General renders legal services are
authorized to disburse funds from their sundry operating and other funds for
the latter Office. For this purpose, the Solicitor General and his staff are
specifically authorized to receive allowances as may be provided by the
Government offices, instrumentalities and corporations concerned, in
addition to their regular compensation.

(10) Represent, upon the instructions of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in international litigations, negotiations or conferences where
the legal position of the Republic must be defended or presented.

(11) Act for the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body
or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion ,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require; and

(12) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 44

In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to gain a clear understanding of the nature of the
functions and extent of the powers of the Solicitor General himself, it is evident that a policy decision was made
in the early beginnings to consolidate in one official the discharge of legal functions and services in the
government. These took the form mostly of representing the Government in various legal proceedings.

The rationale behind this step is not difficult to comprehend. Sound government operations require
consistency in legal policies and practices among the instrumentalities of the State. Moreover, an official
learned in the law and skilled in advocacy could best plan and coordinate the strategies and moves of the legal
battles of the different arms of the government. Surely, the economy factor, too, must have weighed heavily in
arriving at such a decision.

It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case,
the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating
the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term "shall," which is invariably employed,
from Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive Order No. 292 (1987).

Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law students, the term "shall" is nothing if
not mandatory.
 In common or ordinary parlance and in its ordinary significance, the term "shall" is a word of
command, and one which has always and which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it
is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of operating to impose
a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or when
public interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be
exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears. 45

The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a
directory, sense. If a different interpretations if sought, it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning. 46

Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the OSG "to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigations or matter
requiring the services of the lawyer?"

To "represent" is standing in place, supplying the place, or performing the duties or exercising
the rights, of the party represented; to speak or act with authority on behalf of another; to
conduct and control proceedings in court on behalf of another.47

The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with respect to the duties of Attorney-General well applies to the
Solicitor General under the facts of the present case. The Court then declared:

In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Attorney General "to perform the duties imposed upon
him by law" and "he shall prosecute all causes, civil and criminal, to which the Government of
the Philippines Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a party . . ." 48

Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is "invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public." 49 Another role of the Solicitor General is an
officer of the Court, in which case he is called upon "to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was sought
enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade
the administration of justice." 50

In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial court that he would not prosecute the case in court for
insufficiency of evidence after his motion to dismiss had been denied, this Court granted a petition
for mandamus to compel him to prosecute the case. We declared:

Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty
of presenting evidence to the Court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his
responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor
. . . In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State . . . This is so because
"the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of
a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligations to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. 51

Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well to the Solicitor General who is sought to be compelled to
appear before the different courts to ensure that the case of the Republic of the Philippines against those who
illegally amassed wealth at the expense the people maybe made to account for their misdeeds and return said
wealth.

Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute
or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, 52 our own Solicitor General may even dismiss,
abandon, discontinue or compromise suit either with or without stipulations with other party. 53 Abandonment
of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reason
for the discretion given him is not unlimited. 54 Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law
but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal. Such are reflected in its policies, thus:

The discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining whether a
prosecution shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of policy
wholly apart from any question of probable cause. Although as member of the bar, the
 Attorney for the United States is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless an executive official
of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive department that he exercises a
discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. . . . 55

The first executive order ever issued by President Aquino on February 28, 1986, created the PCGG. It
announced the government's policy of recovering all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives and close associates. It charged the PCGG with the "task of assisting the
President" in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth, investigation of "such cases of graft and corruption
as the President may assign" to it, and the adoption of safeguards to ensure that corruption may not be again
committed with impunity.

This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986 freezing all assets and properties
of Marcos, his family and cronies; prohibiting their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance or concealment, and
requiring all persons in and outside of the Philippines who are in possession of said properties to make full
disclosure of the same to the PCGG.

On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules and Regulations. A pertinent provision states:

Sec. 10. Findings of the Commission. — Based on the evidence adduced, the Commission shall
determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the asset, property or business
enterprise in question constitute ill-gotten wealth as described in Executive Orders Nos. 1 and
2. In the event of an affirmative finding, the Commission shall certify the case to the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance with law. Business, properties, funds, and other
assets found to be lawfully acquired shall be immediately released and the writ of
sequestration, hold or freeze orders lifted accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)

Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No. 14 defining the jurisdiction over cases involving such ill-
gotten wealth was issued, it contains the following provisions:

Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, with the assistance of the Solicitor General and other government
agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under
Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12,
1986, as may be warranted by its finding.

Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether
civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof.

Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential
damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with Executive Order No. 2
dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any
criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied).

All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but that under the law of its creation and the
complementary Rules, the law office of the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the Government, is the Office of the
Solicitor General. Although the PCGG is "empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it" under
Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, it does not thereby oust the Office of the Solicitor General from its lawful mandate
to represent the Government and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of power to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate
such power and turn over the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide to employ. In
those instances where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the Philippines, the Solicitor General,
continuing to discharge his duties, may employ counsel to assist him, 56 particularly because he may not be
licensed to appear before the courts in a foreign jurisdiction.

Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the provision aforequoted, the PCGG certifies to the Solicitor
General the cases for which it had found reasonable ground to believe that certain assets and properties are ill-
gotten under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2. The Solicitor General shall then proceed "in accordance with law."

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the
case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file
the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national
interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.
After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the event that, along the way, he realizes that
prosecuting the case would not serve the government's purposes. In other words, because he was appointed to
the position on account of his qualification as a man "learned in the law," the Solicitor General is obligated to
perform his functions and to perform them well. He may not, however, abdicate his function through an
arbitrary exercise of his discretion. We find that a withdrawal of appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is
tantamount to withdrawing on no grounds at all and to a dereliction of duty.

The Office of the Solicitor General repeatedly invoked the ruling in Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, 57 which
hardly constitutes authority to uphold its position with respect to the withdrawal of the Solicitor General in the
instant case. On the contrary, in said case, this Court struck down private respondent's motion to disqualify the
OSG from appearing for petitioner Department of Transportation and Communications Secretary Orbos. At the
risk of being repetitious, the parties were reminded that under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 —

The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse
position against another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from
performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he
considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's
position. In such an instance, the government office adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor
General, if it still believes in the merit of its case may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or
representative."

The Court further pointed out that it is not entirely impossible that the Office of the Solicitor General may take
a position adverse to his clients like the Civil Service Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission,
among others, and even the People of the Philippines. In such instances, however, it is not proper for the
Solicitor General to simply decline to handle the case or arbitrarily withdraw therefrom. The Court enjoins him
to "nevertheless manifest his opinion and recommendations to the Court which is an invaluable aid in the
disposition of the case." 58

However, in those cases where a government agency declines the services of the Solicitor General or otherwise
fails or refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate action, the Court categorically held that
". . . this practice should be estopped." 59 By the same token, the Solicitor General should not decline to appear
in court to represent a government agency without just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which is under
the Office of the President, he being a part of the Executive Department.

In the case at bar, the reason advanced by the Solicitor General for his motion to withdraw his appearance as
lawyer for the PCGG is that he has been, more than once embarrassed in court and thereby made "a laughing
stock in its (his) professionalism." Examples are when the OSG lawyers betrayed ignorance in open court of
certain moves taken by the PCGG, such as the lifting of a sequestration of an asset or when it was under the
impression that an asset had mysteriously disappeared only to be informed that "a PCGG Commissioner had
earlier by resolution authorized the disposition of said asset."

The last straw, as it were, was the public announcement through media made by the PCGG that it had
"dispensed with or otherwise did not need the legal services of the lawyer of the government." 60 It is evident
that the withdrawal of the Solicitor General was precipitated by institutional pique, the lawyers concerned
having allowed their collective pride to prevail over their sense of duty in protecting and upholding the public
interest.

One wistfully wishes that the OSG could have been as zealous in representing the PCGG as it was in appearing
for the head of their office, the Solicitor General, in a civil suit for damages filed against him in a Regional Trial
Court arising from allegedly defamatory remarks uttered by him.

Such enthusiasm, according to this Court, was misplaced. For Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 which
authorizes the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, admits of an exception, and that it is, it stops short of representing "a public
official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony." 61

In instances such as the above, the OSG can, with reason, withdraw its representation even if it has already
entered its appearance. But the Solicitor General, as the officially-mandated lawyer of the government, is not
empowered to take a similar step on the basis of a petty reason like embarrassment, as that to which the
individual lawyers assigned to appear for their office were subjected. Had they not been too preoccupied with
their personal feelings, they could have checked themselves in time. For a sense of professional responsibility
and proper decorum would dictate that they distinguish between the institution which, from the very
beginning, had been constituted as the law office of the Government and the individuals through whom its
powers and duties are exercised. No emotions, of whatever kind and degree, should be allowed to becloud their
high sense of duty and commitment to country and people.

The OSG itself admitted refraining from citing other incidents as additional bases for the Solicitor General's
withdrawal "as they are not of meat and substance" but apparently, their overwhelming sense of shame
overcame them as the OSG was "rendered thereby a laughing stock in its professionalism." 62

Now a word on the incidents that allegedly caused humiliation to the OSG lawyers, thus provoking the Solicitor
General into withdrawing his appearance as counsel for the PCGG. No litigation can be assured of success if
counsel does not enjoy the confidence of his client. This is manifested by, among other things, holding regular,
constant and untrammeled consultation with each other. Who can say but that if the communication lines had
been kept open between the OSG and PCGG, no surprises would have been sprung on the former by the latter
in open court?

Petitioner's claim that the Solicitor General could not withdraw his appearance as lawyer of PCGG inasmuch as
he had neither the consent of his client nor the authority from the court, applying the pertinent provision of the
Rules of Court, is not well-taken. Here is no ordinary lawyer-client relationship. Let it be remembered that the
client is no less than the Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides. Whether
regarded as an abstract entity or an ideal person, it is to state the obvious that it can only act through the
instrumentality of the government which, according to the Administrative Code of 1987, refers to the
"corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines . . ." 63 And the OSG is, by law, constituted the law office of the Government whose specific powers
and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.

Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes the Republic of the
Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the people themselves of which the individual lawyers
in said office are a part.

In order to cushion the impact of his untimely withdrawal of appearance which might adversely affect the case,
the Solicitor General has offered "to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this
Honorable Court, if called for by circumstances in the interest of the government or if he is so required by the
court." However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, while the Solicitor General may be free to express
his views and comments before the Court in connection with a case he is handling, he may not do so anymore
after he has formally expressed his refusal to appear therein. For by then, he has lost his standing in court.
Unless his views are sought by the court, the Solicitor General may not voluntarily appear in behalf of his client
after his withdrawal from the case; otherwise, such reappearance would constitute a blatant disregard for court
rules and procedure, and that, on the part of one who is presumed to be "learned in the law."

In the face of such express refusal on the part of the Solicitor General to continue his appearance as counsel of
the PCGG in the cases to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Filipino people from the Marcoses and their cronies,
the PCGG has had to employ the service of a group of private attorneys lest the national interest be prejudiced.
Were this Court to allow such action to remain unchallenged, this could well signal the laying down of the novel
and unprecedented doctrine that the representation by the Solicitor General of the Government enunciated by
law is, after all, not mandatory but merely directory. Worse, that this option may be exercised on less than
meritorious grounds; not on substance but on whimsy, depending on the all too human frailties of the lawyers
in the OSG assigned to a particular case. Under such circumstances, it were better to repeal the law than leave
the various government agencies, all dependent on the OSG for legal representation, in a condition of
suspenseful uncertainty. With every looming legal battle, they will be speculating whether they can rely on the
Solicitor General to defend the Government's interest or whether they shall have to depend on their own "in-
house" resources for legal assistance.

The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical
interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to
"represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer."

Sound management policies require that the government's approach to legal problems and policies formulated
on legal issues be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The government owes it to its officials and
their respective offices, the political units at different levels, the public and the various sectors, local and
international, that have dealings with it, to assure them of a degree of certitude and predictability in matters of
legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives detailed earlier in this ponencia, it is beyond cavil that it is the
Solicitor General who has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of being the "principal law officer
and legal defender of the Government." One would be hard put to name a single legal group or law firm that
can match the expertise, experience, resources, staff and prestige of the OSG which were painstakingly built up
for almost a century.

Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire government
officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and
instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking,
the panoply that is the forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory
circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the
sovereign which it is committed to serve.

In light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of his appearance on behalf of the PCGG was beyond
the scope of his authority in the management of a case. As a public official, it is his sworn duty to provide legal
services to the Government, particularly to represent it in litigations. And such duty may be enjoined upon him
by the writ of mandamus. And such duty may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus. Such order,
however, should not be construed to mean that his discretion in the handling of his cases may be interfered
with. The Court is not compelling him to act in a particular way. 64 Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent
a failure of justice 65resulting from his abandonment in midstream of the cause of the PCGG and the Republic
and ultimately, of the Filipino people.

In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that the petitioner has a personal interest in the case,
as his petition is anchored on the right of the people, through the PCGG and the Republic, to be represented in
court by the public officer duly authorized by law. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere
fact that the petitioner is a citizen and hence, part of the public which possesses the right. 66

The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and granted in this petition. The said writ, being
intended to prevent the doing of some act that is about to be done, it may not provide a remedy for acts which
are already fait accompli. 67 Having been placed in a situation where it was constrained to hire private lawyers
if the Republic's campaign to legally recover the wealth amassed by the Marcoses, their friends and relatives
was to prosper, the PCGG's action is justified. However, it was not entirely blameless. Its failure to coordinate
closely with the Solicitor General has spawned the incidents which culminated in the withdrawal of the latter
from appearing as counsel in its cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED to
immediately re-enter his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion to withdraw appearance and
the PCGG shall terminate the services of the lawyers it had employed but not before paying them the reasonable
fees due them in accordance with rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915

UY CHICO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Beaumont and Tenney for appellant.

Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block for appellees.

TRENT, J.:

An appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint upon the merits, with costs.

The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by
fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a business under
his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same
name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the
business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was
heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course
of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the
estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was
paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the
policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is
not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.

The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of
the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered
the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The
plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning
the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose.
Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and
objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal, base
their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before
acted upon, and cite in support thereof Ross vs. Great Northern Ry. Co., (101 Minn., 122; 111 N. W., 951). The
case of Natlee Draft Horse Co. vs. Cripe and Co. (142 Ky., 810), also appears to sustain their contention. But a
preliminary question suggest itself, Was the testimony in question privileged?

Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets
of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court, without the consent of his client, given in open court, to
testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining
advice upon legal matters." (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)

A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question
concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy
which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not
intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the
client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose
of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the
attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for
whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication,
after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third
person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent. We quote from but one case
among the many which may be found upon the point:

The proposition advanced by the respondent and adopted by the trial court, that one, after fully
authorizing his attorney, as his agent, to enter into contract with a third party, and after such authority
has been executed and relied on, may effectively nullify his own and his duly authorized agent's act by
closing the attorney's mouth as to the giving of such authority, is most startling. A perilous facility of
fraud and wrong, both upon the attorney and the third party, would result. The attorney who, on his
client's authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his reputation and integrity that he binds his client.
The third party may well rely on the assurance of a reputable lawyer that he has authority in fact,
though such assurance be given only by implication from the doing of the act itself. It is with
gratification, therefore, that we find overwhelming weight of authority, against the position assumed
by the court below, both in states where the privilege protecting communications with attorneys is
still regulated by the common law and in those where it is controlled by statute, as in Wisconsin.
(Koeber vs. Sommers, 108 Wis., 497; 52 L. R. A., 512.)

Other cases wherein the objection to such evidence on the ground of privilege has been overruled are:
Henderson vs. Terry (62 Tex., 281); Shove vs. Martin (85 Minn., 29); In re Elliott (73 Kan., 151); Collins vs.
Hoffman (62 Wash., 278); Gerhardt vs. Tucker (187 Mo., 46). These cases cover a variety of communications
made by an authority in behalf of his client to third persons. And cases wherein evidence of the attorney as to
compromises entered into by him on behalf of his client were allowed to be proved by the attorney's testimony
are not wanting. (Williams vs. Blumenthal, 27 Wash., 24; Koeber vs. Sommers, supra.)

It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to compromise
was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the policies to the
administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the
plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence
is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed
to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
 [A.C. No. 4426. February 17, 2000]

RAMON SAURA, Jr., complainant, vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA, respondent.

[A.C. No. 4429. February 17, 2000]

HELEN BALDORIA and RAYMUNDO SAURA, complainants, vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH
AGDEPPA, respondent. Sd-aad-sc

RESOLUTION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Two (2) petitions, one by Ramon Saura, Jr.[1] and the other by Helen S. Baldoria and Raymundo Y. Saura[2], were
filed before this Court charging Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa for violation of her lawyers oath and disregard
of Sections 15, 22, 25, 29, 31 and 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. [3]

The two (2) complaints are related and arose from the handling of the respondent of a settlement case involving
a piece of property owned in common by the petitioners with their other siblings, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita,
all surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of the said property of the late Ramon E. Saura who died
intestate on May 15, 1992. xl-aw

The pertinent facts, as delineated in the report of the National Grievance Investigation Office of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, are as follows:

"It appears that negotiations for the settlement of the property (referring to the intestate
estate of Ramon E. Saura) dragged on for three (3) years until on April 27, 1995, petitioners
learned that the administrators of the property, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, had, with the
assistance of the respondent, who in fact notarized the Deed of Sale, sold the property to
Sandalwood Real Estate and Development Corporation without the knowledge and
participation of petitioners. To compound matters, petitioners alledge [sic] that despite
repeated demands, the vendors or their counsel, respondent herein, have refused to
disclose the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. The petitioners have thus
been constrained to institute criminal and civil actions to enforce and protect their rights.

"This case was refered [sic] to the Integrated Bar by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated
November 20, 1995, after its earlier resolution dated June 19, 1995, was returned unserved
with the Postmasters notation that the same was "unclaimed".

"At the scheduled hearing of this case on February 5, 1998, the petitioners counsel, Atty.
Carolina Esguerra-Ochoa filed a written entry of appearance. There was no appearance for
the respondent but this office, noting the new address of the respondent as furnished by Atty.
Ochoa, suggested that the latter furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent at the latters
new address. In a Compliance dated February 10, 1998, Atty. Ochoa informed this Office that
she had furnished the respondent with a copy of the petition dated May 24, 1995, plus the
Supreme Courts resolution dated June 19, and November 20, 1995, plus our Order dated
December 8, 1997, and Notice of Appearance dated February 5, 1998. x-sc

"On March 10, 1998, the petitioners counsel submitted a Manifestation attached to which were
photocopies of the front and dorsal portion of the return card evidencing receipt by herein
respondent of the documents enumerated by Atty. Ochoa in her Compliance dated February
10, 1998. The return card is dated March 2, 1998.

"To date, no response has been forth coming from Atty. Agdeppa."[4]

For her continued defiance of orders of this Court for her to answer the administrative charges leveled against
her, respondent was recommended to be penalized with a fine of P10,000.00 and suspension from practice for
one (1) year in each of the two (2) cases pending against her.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the petitions should be dismissed because she was
not accorded her right to due process and that she could not answer the administrative charges against her
without divulging certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client privilege. Sc

Respondent does not convince.

First. The respondent was given notice on various occasions but she chose to ignore them and failed to exercise
her right to be heard.

Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:

"Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witness in his behalf, and to be heard by
himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusations, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte."

Since respondent repeatedly ignored the notices sent to her by this Court, we cannot be expected to wait
indefinitely for her answer. While respondent may have changed her address and did not, thus, receive the
previous notices, still, on March 2, 1998, she came to know of the Supreme Court Resolution dated June 19,
1995.[5] The prudent thing for her to do was to file an answer immediately and not to delay the matter any
further. Sadly, the respondent ignored the Resolution[6] of the Supreme Court ordering her to file an answer.

Second. The request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to account for the proceeds is
not a violation of the attorney-client privilege. Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules of Court provides: Scmis

"Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with
a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity." Missc

The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking for the disclosure
of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the right to ask for such
information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of the
property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such information to them and hide behind the cloak of
the attorney-client relationship.

WHEREFORE, for the refusal of Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa to comply with our Resolutions dated June 7
and 19, 1995 directing her to file an answer to the petitions, the Court hereby penalizes her with a FINE of two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) which should be paid within ten (10) days from receipt hereof; otherwise, a
penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days shall be imposed. This resolution shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. Misspped

[A.C. No. 4078. July 14, 2003]

WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan,
complainant alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainants
building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin
Dacanay, complainants retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle
some of complainants cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship between complainant and respondent.
 The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In
return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the
six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but
did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City
Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the document
of sale of the car was issued in complainants name and financed through City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise
wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction,
respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay
respondents arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand
letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it
was dishonored as respondents account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainants repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:
xxxxxxxxx

4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of
deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases pending in court;

xxxxxxxxx
Complainant denied respondents charges and claimed that respondents allegation is libelous and not
privilege as it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph 12 of
respondents Answer, thus:

12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January 30, 1993, defendant
Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but
the latter said that he will only do so after the termination of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he (complainant) wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former
counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of the review committee of the Department
of Justice where a petition for review of the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor was pending at
the time, x x x or, in the event that the said petition for review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to
offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned Court, and even to the presiding
Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant Essex L. Silapan all refused to do not only because
such acts are immoral and illegal, but also because the complainant confided to him that he was really
involved in the commission of the crime that was charged of in the above-mentioned case. (emphasis
supplied)

Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of
breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable
therefor. Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be
meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained [1] that it was complainant who offered
him an office space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he
handled a B.P. 22 case[2] filed against complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his
imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his revelation of complainants desire to bribe
government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these statements in the
course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainants credibility by establishing his
criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his
confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and
reputation.
Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant without
consideration and only as a formal requirement so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason,
he did not surrender his title over the mortgaged property to complainant.
 Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a)
to serve as some kind of acknowledgment that he already received in advance a portion of his attorneys fees
from the complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon
the cases he was handling for complainant.
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romeros loan which he
allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorneys fees, the latter
being his client. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before
paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership
of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the
termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently,
respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case
against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating
commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases pending
between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the
allegations made therein. For this reason, it is not for us to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing
check. His liability has yet to be determined by the trial court where his case is pending.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of trust and
confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe
government officials in connection with a pending case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an
attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client,
unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the
inception of their relationship.[3] The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.[4]
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a
fraud.[5] If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainants alleged intention to bribe
government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does
not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he
may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there
being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondents explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his
pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondents professional competence
and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondents allegations and
disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him. However, the recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension of
respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his breach of duty considering that a
review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first administrative complaint against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to
circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 211917

NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of
the Decision2 dated November 25, 2013, and Resolution3 dated February 21, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
32, San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 15407 finding petitioner Norma C. Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, while exonerating petitioner Josephine G. Umali from the crime
charged. The RTC also adjudged the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in favor
of private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised
Penal Code before Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following Information:

That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, defraud one JOAN FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following manner, to wit: That
Norma C. Gamaro, pretending that she is knowledgeable in the business of buy and sell of jewelry, other
merchandise and financing, assuring complainant of a sure market and big profit lure and entice complainant
Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and the latter purchased and delivered to her the jewelry
amounting to ₱2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage the business for private complainant and remit the
proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from complying, with her obligation, managed the business as her
own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and pledging jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused
Josephine Umali work while the checks issued by respondent Rowena Gamaro to guarantee their payment were
all dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
party in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while accused Rowena
C. Gamaro remained at-large.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence disclosed the following facts:

Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business venture with
petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G. Umali (Umali) and accused Rowena
Gamaro Fineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by
Umali who was then the manager of the said pawnshop located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces
of jewelry would then be sold for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the Social Security System
(SSS) in San Pablo City. The proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following manner:
fifty percent (50%) would go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be divided among Umali,
Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were placed in the possession
of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from their
joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry. 6

The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma Gamaro, together
with her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar business with other suppliers of pieces
of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. To wind up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro
and Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when
Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored
because the account of the Gamaros had been closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about
the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the
checks. Fineza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several pawnshops and private
individuals contrary to what they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of
the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It
appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who
pledged the pieces of jewelry.7

To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her possession
but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for the pieces of jewelry. Fineza,
however, did not accept the said offer.8

A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated February 16,
2004, asking for the return of the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of jewelry which were
not returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand letter was
left unanswered.9

For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters.
Umali likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro and with Fineza. While
admitting that there were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin, Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where
she was the manager, Umali denied that she knew where those pieces of jewelry came from.10

On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment, as follows:

a. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and
penalized under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences her to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to
Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;

b. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal liability;

c. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine Umali to pay the private complainant jointly and
solidarily the following amounts:

1. ₱1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on February 16, 2004, until fully paid;

2. ₱50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;

3. ₱25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;

4. ₱50,000.00, for and by way of attorney's fees; and

5. To pay the costs.

Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau of Immigration is likewise directed to issue
a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal circumstances are as follows:

Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO

Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority (NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San Pablo City

SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated November 25, 2013, the CA affirmed
the Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the CA on February 21,
2014.

Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:

A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RTC
DECISION FINDING NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER SECTION l(B), ARTICLE 315
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE INFORMATION ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA
UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(A) ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;

B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC) RELIED
ON THE FINDINGS ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WITH SSS AGAINST NORMA
GAMARO;

C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC)
CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY. BALDEO DESPITE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
IN THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA GAMARO ADVISE REGARDING HER CASE; AND

D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE RTC THAT NORMA GAMARO RECEIVED
THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE INCOMPETENT AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION ITSELF.13

The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from
the one charged is legally permissible.

The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime, among
them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.14

The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him" is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required,
however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. It is hornbook
doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual
recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law.15

The controlling words of the information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine
in Flores v. Hon. Layosa16as follows:

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states,
among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense,
by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what
actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the
information. The Court's ruling in US. v. Lim San is instructive:

x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say
and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and
purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the
defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of
plain justice x x x.17

In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case maybe.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if such
amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the
four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

x x xx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. 18

The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent
means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.19

However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of
the Revised Penal Code:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa).

x x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

x x xx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.

x x x20

The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other
personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof;
(3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.21

The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which petitioner
Norma Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her of estafa under Article
315, paragraph l(b) instead of paragraph 2(a)?
What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of a crime
charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of the Information
yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or
conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,5l 9.00
on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro was under obligation to turn
over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the
pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the
proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.

Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of
another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property. This, at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the
Information.22

There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently inform
petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa by
misappropriation. Petitioners are fully apprised of the charge against them and for them to suitably prepare
their defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right. She was
sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa, because the RTC has the
discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. In the case of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,23 We
explained the rationale behind this discretion in this manner:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose
may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting
up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the
crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is
of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from
the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need
not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights ... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of
the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is
or what it is named x x x. 24

Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1 (b). As held by the CA, Fineza
positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her and petitioners and
accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to account for,
upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the
properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal
use.25 As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own money.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate connote the
act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused
fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.26

Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them,
petitioner Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense, the same having been proved.

Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of prosecution
witness Atty. Baldeo violated the rule on "privileged communication between attorney and client" for the
reason that Atty. Baldeo allegedly gave petitioner Norma Gamaro "advise" regarding her case.
The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason
of this relationship that the client made the communication;

(2) The client made the communication in confidence;

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. 27

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend
the communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by
voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client
is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission
of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. The communication made by
a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice
from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to
his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.28

Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate petitioner's
allegation. The testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that petitioner Norma Gamaro was
indeed engaged in the business of selling jewelry supplied by private complainant Fineza. We note that the
testimony is merely corroborative to the testimony of private complainant Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate
of petitioner Norma Gamaro. Atty. Baldeo testified primarily on the fact that she personally saw petitioner
Gamaro, on several occasions, showing the jewelry for sale to their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was
offered to buy the pieces of jewelry on some instances, and she was told by petitioner Norma Gamaro that the
pieces of jewelry came from Fineza.29

The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC to dispute the defense of petitioner Norma
Gamaro that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:

Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the aforementioned administrative case,
accused Norma Gamaro's defense of denial of her participation in the business transaction involving the sale of
jewelry supplied by private complainant, fall flat on its face. 30

Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the one who
received the pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are
considered conclusive between the parties. Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions,
none of them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. 31

We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro received
some pieces of jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned the jewelry entrusted to them by
Fineza which is a clear act of misappropriation, thus:

x x x x. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and Josephine through the testimony of Frederick San
Diego is understandable.1âwphi1 The argument, however, that it was Frederick San Diego, upon instructions
of RowenaGamaro who pledged the jewelry, without the knowledge of Norma or Josephine is unavailing. The
records show that Frederick San Diego is not only a mere nephew of Norma, and cousin to Rowena and
Josephine, but also the messenger and collector of Rowena, who had knowledge of the fact that Rowena's
partner was the private complainant, Frederick San Diego also knew that the private complainant went to the
house of Norma asking the missing jewelry.

As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the private complainant to Norma Gamaro, not
Rowena Gamaro. Yet the defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the same pieces of jewelry to M.
Lhuillier Pawnshop, Cebuana Lhuillier, and the owner of Collette's upon instructions of Rowena
Gamaro. Clearly then, Norma turned over the said jewelry to Rowena with knowledge that they will be pledged
to the pawnshops and to the owner of Collette's. To hold otherwise would run counter to human nature and
experience.32

It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the eighteen (18) index cards given by accused
Rowena Gamaro to Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by Fineza, with the
corresponding appraised values. The due dates of the checks issued in favor of Fineza (Exhibits "F" to "F-7"and
"F-11""F-27") were also indicated on the index cards.33 The pieces of jewelry were pawned to various
pawnshops and individuals, instead of offering them for sale. Hence, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to return
the jewelry to the damage and prejudice of Fineza. She even offered her house and lot to Fineza as payment for
the jewelry.

We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that Fineza entrusted the possession of
the jewelry to petitioner. The CA observed that the prosecution duly proved petitioner's misappropriation by
showing that she failed to return the diamond ring upon demand. That misappropriation took place was
strengthened when petitioner Norma Gamaro informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran
counter to the terms of their business agreement.

Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We note the declaration of the RTC that Umali
had knowledge as to who owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. The RTC further pointed out
that Umali was part of the business transaction between Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro with Fineza, as
she too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino to enable them to open a checking
account. It was against this account that Norma and Rowena Gamaro drew the checks that they issued to
guarantee the share of Fineza from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry. These findings support the
conclusion of the CA that Umali's acquittal was based on reasonable doubt. Hence, Umali's civil liability was not
extinguished by her discharge.34 We, therefore, concur with the findings of the CA:

On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to private complainant Fineza. As may be
recalled, appellant Umali was exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding, she is not entirely free
from any liability towards private complainant Fineza. It has been held that an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt her from civil liability where
a mere preponderance of evidence is required.35 There is no question that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is preponderant enough to sustain appellant Umali's civil liability. Accordingly, We agree with the
court a quo’s ratiocination in this wise:

"What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by Frederick that it was Rowena Gamaro who
instructed him to pledge the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were true, then, with more reason
Josephine had knowledge as to who owns the jewelry. It may well be pointed out, as earlier stated, that
Josephine is part of the business transaction between Norma and Rowena with the private complainant, as she
too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino purposely to enable them to open a
checking account, and it was against this account that Norma and Rowena drew the checks that they issued to
guarantee the share of Joan from the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry. It follows then that Josephine also
knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged with her (sic) M. Lhuillier Pawnshop Branch. x x x"

With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a quo’s ruling that herein appellants be held
jointly and solidarily liable to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from
the ruling of the court a quo.36

There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on
the facts.37 We, therefore, adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence
lent to their appreciation of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 2013, and its
Resolution dated February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5804. July 1, 2003]

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO S.
SALUNAT, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative
complaint[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against respondent
Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that respondent
is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board
which approved respondents engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the
Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman,
docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the
PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said
cases.Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the
PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where
complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest,
respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06[2] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its members that he will win
the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,[3] respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board
Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said law firm, he only filed a
Manifestation of Extreme Urgency in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.[4] On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657
was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant
Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the
PPSTA and its Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when he
entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in
representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he
was handling. He merely assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the
Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not public
officials, but private employees.Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the
law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was
himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross misconduct, malpractice and unethical
conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint
against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-
230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client.[5]This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.[6] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection.[7] Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[8]
In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises all
powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the corporation; and (3) controls
and holds all property of the corporation.[9] Its members have been characterized as trustees or directors
clothed with a fiduciary character.[10] It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate entity itself.
 Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may
sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress
of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. [11] This is what is known as a
derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest
while the stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be
included as a party in the suit.[12]
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come
now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of
the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening:

The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint
representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual
representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the
defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation from the
outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on
dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be
presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.[13] (underscoring ours)

In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the
corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the
corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate
officials.[14] The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us.After due deliberation on the wisdom of
this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent
members of the same corporations board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would
be tantamount to representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled Philippine Public School
Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA),
et al., was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of
which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for
the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when
he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-
0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered
his appearance therein.[15] Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the
Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect
the interest of the corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is his
first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June
29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in
the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests
and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY ADM. CASE NO. 6876
FALAME, namely: MELBA
FALAME, LEO FALAME and Present:
JERRY FALAME,
Complainants, CARPIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 7, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

On Petition for Review[1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors

dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame (complainants) against Atty.

Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.

In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio

Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry

docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia

Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does, in

which Lydio was one of the defendants.[3]

Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in

the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their respective

position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney

dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his

attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in

which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the first civil case. [4]

Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the

defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for

his businesses until Lydios death on 8 September 1996.[5]

However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case

against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case, entitled Spouses Rally F.

Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and

Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and persons acting in their behalf and docketed as Civil

Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint

sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate

of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage

on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption

and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order.[6]

Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case

wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney.

Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.[7]

Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in

the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20[8] of

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[9] complainants asserted further.

Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a

baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for complainants uncle

against the heirs of respondents deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for

the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the

possession of the subject property from complainants who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that

respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 20[10] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[11]

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[12] respondent controverted complainants allegations. He emphasizes

that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on Lydios behalf and

that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorneys fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleighs

affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to the best of his knowledge that

there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as

the latters counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he

acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he had never

even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not
knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and

neither did he employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case. [13]

Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing

the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the

second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather

between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of

property was at stake. Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the

spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame,

and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful

acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydios death.[14]

Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP had no

jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this administrative case

when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year earlier. [15]

In their Position Paper[16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against respondent,

complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 [17] of the Code of Professional Responsibility when

he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.[18]

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving

Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report and recommendation for the dismissal of this

administrative case, thus:[19]

x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was violated by the
respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the
prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is no
specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under Civil
Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In
administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the complainant
must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential information
disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422;
431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.

In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against representation
of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants position
paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be countenanced. The reason being that it is
an elementary principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled that only those
charged in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge not specified in the
complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)

x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
 xxx

Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the
complainants became owners of Lydio Falames properties, is a suit against the complainants,
not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective aliquot interests in
the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The complainants are sued
not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material
possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even
on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and supplemental
complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.

While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or
confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit any violation of
such duties or obligations of an attorney.

It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his and
Lydio Falames defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.

xxx

The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d), Section
20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyers oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust and
confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by
Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one time his present clients
categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio
Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of both cases equally lacks
evidentiary basis.

xxx

It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case
No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint
against the respondent.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this

complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years
after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]

Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court reiterating

their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.[21] They likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding

that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or

three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil case was filed on 23 October

2000.[22] In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated Reply), [23]complainants invoke

the Courts ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[24] to support their contention that administrative complaints

against members of the bar do not prescribe.[25]

In his Comment,[26] respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been proven

by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases

against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the

presumption of innocence.[27] Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position paper and in the instant petition, complainants

infringed his right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. [28]

There is merit in the petition.

At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As early as

1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,[29] to wit:

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does
the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding x x x (5 AM. JUR. 434)[30]

This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada[31] where the Court held

that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for

the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for

being ultra vires.[32]

Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the Investigating

Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint are

unsubstantiated.

There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in

complainants position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent

proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his comment before

the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he denied

having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his defense

to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.

 The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard

on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial

proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a need to

propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the

parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.[33]

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest

conflicts with that of his present or former client.[34] The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers

duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such

situation will develop.[35] The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been

confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[36] In addition, the rule holds

even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no

intention to represent conflicting interests.[37]

The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will

be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to

represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former

client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation

of loyalty.[38] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the

clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one

of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [39]

The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest

adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed should not be

divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer

should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously

represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous

relation.[40]

In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to

the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most

unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. [41] The protection given to

the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even

survives the death of the client.[42]

In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first

civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the

fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David[43] tells us that it is immaterial whether

such employment was paid, promised or charged for.[44]

As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the

property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for

Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in

common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase

respondents rights as a co-owner.

The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through the completion of the

specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed

to that of Lydio.[45] Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an attorney may not

act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he

acquired no knowledge which could operate to his clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse

employment.[46] And while complainants have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the

property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.

For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former client Raleighs supposed co-ownership

of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken

joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated

thepotential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted. [47] Heretofore, respondent is

enjoined to look at any representation situation from the point of view that there are possible conflicts; and

further, to think in terms of impaired loyalty that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair

loyalty to a client.[48]Considering, however, that this is respondents first offense, the Court resolves to

reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his

profession.[49]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and meted

out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice

of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more

severely. SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA,

MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR
RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos
(respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn),
and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad),
married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw virtualaw library

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L.
Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio.3cralaw
virtualaw library

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC)
and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M.
Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs
of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the
other heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty.
Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidad’s
estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal
of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the
RTC granted in an Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007,
respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for
the reconsideration of the RTC Order.6cralaw virtualaw library

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook
to represent conflicting interests in the subject case; 7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he
breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.8Complainants further
claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the
withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had
already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007. 9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose
such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under
the Rules.10cralaw virtualaw library

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel
for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case readily show
that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively
represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily
appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006
hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge. 12 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for
him to withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he
consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case. 13 He added that he had no
knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was
disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his
representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator, 15 and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In
support of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar 17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his
limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner
Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other
complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who
was already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code. 20cralaw
virtualaw library

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of
the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential information from
his former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment.”21 Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the
imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for
his act with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22cralaw
virtualaw library

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same
to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed against
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725 dated January 3,
2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the
recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 26 It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the
Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an
act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. 29 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and
not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent represented
conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for
all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their
interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement
as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio –
particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for
the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer
cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s
previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot
equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely
probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.31cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator
and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even
on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04, 32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires
the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or
arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that
respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel
to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express written consent before
consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute
cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules,
disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from severe
reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of the
IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which
specifically mandates that “[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.” 34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end, the Court is wont to
remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal
reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the
reasons on which the same is based is akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The
reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35cralaw
virtualaw library

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent is a first
time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis
to temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer’s
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any
other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants
admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against
them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any
manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,36 the
Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months to the
counsel therein who represented parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from the practice of
law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.

Antecedents

Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O. Era with
violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client,
in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.

Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS
Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose
corporate officers were led by Sison. The other officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H.
Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.

Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and
her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding
the return or refund of the money subject of their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that
Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the
other corporate officials of ICS Corporation with several counts of estafa 1was presented to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged Sison and
the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2

In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable
settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that undergoing a trial of the cases would
just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group,
with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS
Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he
prepared, and in turn they received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3

Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of absolute sale to
enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period of negotiations between them
and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on November 27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale
involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title of the property had been
encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far
as he was concerned he had already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the
amicable settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation. 4

When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds and the
Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not liquidate the property
because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation but was already under the name of Bank
Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their counsel with ICS Corporation.

Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him on September 8,
2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with Sison and her cohorts. But
they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.6

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. This forced them
to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however, that Atty. Era had already been
entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in
Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated. 7 In this
regard, they established Atty. Era’s legal representation of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the
minutes of the proceedings in the criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and
Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of Sison in the cases
for estafa pending and being tried in said courts.8 They also submitted a certification issued on November 3,
2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City as borne out by the blotter logbook of that unit.9

On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and praying for Atty.
Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed in him as their
counsel.10

Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10 days from notice, Atty.
Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to supposedly enable him to collate
documents relevant to his comment.11 The Court granted his request and allowed him an extension totaling 40
days. But despite the lapse of the extended period, he did not file his comment.

On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era.12

By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to submit his comment.

In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar Confidant, 14 Atty. Era alleged
that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement between Samson and his group, on one
hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between
him and Samson and his group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for
Sison by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.

On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.15

In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007,16 the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients’
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim that his legal
services as counsel for Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the execution of the
compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he even admitted during the mandatory conference that
there was no formal termination of his legal services; 17 that his professional obligation towards Samson and
his group as his clients did not end upon execution of the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-
bound to see to it that the settlement was duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the
criminal cases until their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in behalf of Sison
invited suspicion of his double-dealing and unfaithfulness.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for six
months, viz:

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests,
failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence and diligence and champion the latter’s cause
with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
would merit a more severe penalty.18

In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD, with the
modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for two years.

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180,20 denying Atty. Era’s motion
for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.

The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.21

On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of Court). 22 However, on
November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the manifestation, and denied the motion for its lack of merit. 23

Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.

In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting the responsibility of representing Sison in the
cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He
had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa
charges against Sison and the others in the RTC in Quezon City.

Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group entered into the
compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The lawyer-client relationship did not
terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement
as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial
court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not
ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court
was still required, but also because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded
the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty.
Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve the
clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice. 26

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is
conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.28

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:

x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A client
is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective
important in itself. x x x.

Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal representation.
To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the lawyer’s professional judgment or
inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective
representation x x x could be compromised.

Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests of the client, either to
benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose is
facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse.

Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a
gift to the lawyer xxx.

Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations
to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation,
complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary argumentation x x x. 29

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way,
a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is
materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.30 The rule is
grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded
with care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.32 The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.33

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination
of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired
in the previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares
that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him."

The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.35The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.36

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them of the conflict of
interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly decline
representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage another lawyer for
herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and entered m his file
in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well
as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989

DONALD DEE petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO MUTUC, respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for petitioner.

Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated February 12,1987, reinstating its decision
promulgated on May 9, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of the that court holding
that the services rendered by private respondent was on a professional, and not on a gratis et amore basis and
ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as the balance of the latter's legal fee
therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and his father went to the residence of private
respondent, accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged
indebtedness of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las
Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a
link between the mafia and Caesar's Palace and the possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of
the latter. 1

Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his
services were reportedly contracted for P100,000. 00. From his residence, private respondent called up
Caesar's Palace and, thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited
the information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations,
however, revealed that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee merely signing
for the chits. Private respondent communicated said information to petitioner's a father and also assured him
that Caesar's Palace was not in any way linked to the mafia.2

In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada.
He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon
Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the
obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to
Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August,
1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a
discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him. 3

Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private respondent sent several demand letters to
petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters.
On October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch CXXXVI, for the collection of attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses.4

Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the
services he rendered were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client. Petitioner, however, denied
the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him and private respondent. He
admits that he and his father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling
account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal one and that private respondent had not
been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly
volunteered his services "as a friend of defendant's family" to see what he could do about the situation. As for
the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of
attomey's fees but merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount
of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly voluntary services.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of
P50,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1982 and to
pay the costs. All other claims therein of private respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were
dismissed. 5 On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. 6

Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two
important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was ostensibly rendering services to
petitioner and his father, he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's Palace of
which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the casino and private respondent were united
in their objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming that he
rendered legal services to petitioner and his father in view of the conflicting interests involved.

In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision and held that the sum of
P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the services he rendered,
considering that at the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he was also acting as the collecting agent
and consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar's Palace. 7 However, upon a motion for
reconsideration thereafter filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals issued another
resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986. 8

Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn the latter resolution.

It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions arising from the change of stand of the First Civil
Cases Division of the former Intermediate Appellate Court when, acting on the representations in petitioner's
undated motion for reconsideration supposedly filed on May 28,1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986
resolution reconsidering the decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242. Said resolution was, as earlier
noted, set aside by the Twelfth Division of the reorganized Court of Appeals which, at the same time, reinstated
the aforesaid decision.

Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues belatedly raised by petitioner, which issues should have
been disregarded 9 but were nevertheless auspiciously discussed therein, at the risk of seeming prolixity we
quote hereunder the salient portions of the assailed resolution which demonstrate that it was not conceived in
error.

The reason for then IAC's action is that it deemed the P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had
previously received from defendant-appellant as adequate compensation for the services
rendered by am for defendant-appellant, considering that at the time plaintiff-appellee was
acting as counsel for defendant-appellant, he was also acting as the collecting agent and
consultant of, and receiving compensation from Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas, Nevada, the
entity with whom defendant-appellant was having a problem and for which he had engaged
the services of plaintiff-appellee. The crux of the matter, therefore, is whether or not the
evidence on record justifies this finding of the IAC.

Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional services to defendant-appellant were

rendered between the months of July and September of 1981, while his employment as
collection agent and consultant of Caesar's Palace covered the period from December 1981 to
October 1982. This positive testimony of plaintiff-appellee, however, was disregarded by the
IAC for the following reasons:

1. In August l983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he was a representative of Caesar's Palace in

the Philippines 'about two or three years ago.' From this the IAC concluded that the period
covers the time plaintiff-appellee rendered professional services to defendant-appellant.

We do not think that IAC's conclusion is necessarily correct. When plaintiff-appellee gave the
period 'about two or three years ago,' he was merely stating an approximation. Considering
that plaintiff-appellee was testifying in August 1983, and his employment with Caesar's Palace
began in December 1981, the stated difference of two years is relatively correct. . . .

2. The plaintiff appellee had testified that he was working for the sake,' 'in the interest,' and
'to the advantage' of Caesar's Palace. x x x "We detect nothing from the above which would
support IAC's conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was then in the employ of Caesar's Palace.
What is gathered is that plaintiff-appellee was simply fulfilling a condition which plaintiff-
appellee had proposed to, and was accepted by, Caesar's Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee
from his obligation to Caesar's Palace.

3. Caesar's Palace would not have listened to, and acted upon, the advice of plaintiff-appellee
if he were no longer its consultant and alter ego.

Why not? We are witnesses to many successful negotiations between contending parties
whose representing lawyers were not and were never in the employ of the opposite party. The
art of negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools of a good practitioner, and mastery of
the art takes into account the circumstance that one may be negotiating, among others, with a
person who may not only be a complete stranger but antagonistic as well. The fact that
plaintiff-appellee was able to secure a favorable concession from Caesar's Palace for
defendant-appellant does not justify the conclusion that it could have been secured only
because of plaintiff-appellee's professional relationship with Caesar's Palace. It could have
been attributable more to plaintiff-appellee's stature as a former ambassador of the
Philippines to the United States, his personality, and his negotiating technique.

Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellee was employed by Caesar's Palace during the time
that he was rendering professional services for defendant-appellant, this would not
automatically mean the denial of additional attorney's fees to plaintiff appellee. The main
reason why the IAC denied plaintiff-appellee additional compensation was because the latter
was allegedly receiving compensation from Caesar's Palace, and, therefore, the amount of
P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously received from defendant-appellant is
'reasonable and commensurate. This conclusion, however, can only be justified if the fact and
amount of remuneration had been established. These were not proven at all. No proof was
presented as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee's remuneration, and the mode or manner in
which it was paid.. . .10
Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship
between petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. We find no reason to interfere with this factual finding.
There may be instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been created.
The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that
there was such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, 11 absent cogent reasons
therefor.

The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client relationship between petitioner and private
respondent for lack of a written contract to that effect. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the
finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services
rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract
may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney
is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the
part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter.12

There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent to petitioner and
his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesar's Palace was
assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey
might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably
entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by petitioner's pretension
that at the time private respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the
Philippine consultant of Caesar's Palace.

On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the
petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totalling P50,000.00 made
by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters sent by said private respondent to
petitioner, the receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that
petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the amount
of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance due and payable on said fees. The
duplicate original copy of the initial receipt issued and signed in this connection by private respondent reads:

RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional services rendered, the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as partial payment, leaving a balance of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), payable on demand.

Makati, Metro Manila, July 25,1981.13

Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated August 6, 1981, December 2, 1981, January
29, 1982, March 7, 1982, and September 7, 1982 were sent by private respondent to petitioner, 14 all to no avail.

On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the aforequoted resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals, it is also not completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by petitioner's assumption
that the interests of Caesar's Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but
that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as verifications revealed, was not the
debtor. Hence, private respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the
casino's claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor,
Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly exacted. 15

Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private respondent's role therein was not
ethically or legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending
positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent
conflicting interests with the consent of the parties.16 A common representation may work to the advantage of
said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate
positions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of
partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties.

Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was during the period in question an
agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot now
decry the dual representation that he postulates. This knowledge he admits, thus:

It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the land, it was the private respondent who
was singled out by the petitioner's father for consultation in regard to an apparent problem,
then pending in Caesar's Palace. The testimony of Arthur Alejandrino, cousin to private
respondent, and the admission of the private respondent himself supply the answer.
Alejandrino testified that private respondent was the representative of Caesar's Palace in the
 Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov. 29, 1983).lâwphî1.ñèt Private respondent testified that he was such
representative tasked by the casino to collect the gambling losses incurred by Filipinos in Las
Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1983). 17

A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the
special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and
represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees. 18

WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating its original
decision of May 9, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against l petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5280. March 30, 2004]

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation
of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the
lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to
be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed,
respondent went to his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from
him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.
Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition
for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for Falsification of Public Documents. [1] The
letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the
subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint
read:

The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of 132-A
Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors
and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of
Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as
follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for the
amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN
C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in the said date,
William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register
of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land
Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy,
wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales,
Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them
as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified documents
which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug,
Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named
children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-
Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said
date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still accepted
the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606,
and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time
the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the name of his
children;

That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by the said check
which was encashed by him;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse to
deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the undersigned.[2]

With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded
his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against him just because he
refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation
and social standing.[3]
In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,[4] respondent filed his Comment narrating
his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy.
Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from his
(respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and
demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request,
he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to deliver the same and execute
the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to complainants office and demanded the delivery of
the title and the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No.
T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the property,
covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and
cannot be located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his
desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a
petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for
transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant
agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for signing and
notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him that the petition is ready for
filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom
where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without leaving any
instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which prompted him
to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that
complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated
when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship
between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts
and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured
from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the
IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There was no showing that respondent
received the notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.[8]
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam
dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filed
against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed. [9]
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation, portions of
which read as follows:
The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the Verified Petition
for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the
circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
expressly provides that A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated. Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between
them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three
(3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship
between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but
permanent. It is in effect perpetual for it outlasts the lawyers employment (Canon 37, Code of Professional
Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients
confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the
client with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who
claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing
this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of
Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that any person may bring to this Courts
attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of
interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar. [10]

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No.
XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.[11]

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy

expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no persuasive
bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.

This is because:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. [12]

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as
legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. [13] While it is true
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,[14] complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that the
relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings between
them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he
redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the
Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the
bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely
transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a
new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with
the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of
obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as
long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. [15]
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently,
the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent
against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent
volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had
earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.

The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts
alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but
as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the
complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the
affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold
otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or
proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced; it is also
essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental rights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274,
Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint, which read:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, of the crime of
Rape, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a knife and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the undersigned complainant against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW

Paraaque, Metro Manila

August 8, 1994

(SGD) MANUEL P. BERMAS

Complainant

Assisted by:

(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS

Mother[1]

Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower court, presided over by
Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way of automatic review
pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7659 (otherwise known as An Act To Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For
That Purpose The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes,
which took effect on 31 December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account, rather briefly, of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.

"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own father, appellant Rufino
Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8,
Paraaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts
and panty, placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-
8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with death if she reports the
incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)

"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded the following findings:
"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at
the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any
hymenal laceration."[2]

The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and that of his married
daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere resentment
by the latter. The trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the accused and his daughter
Luzviminda; viz:

The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her daughter, the
complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because he loves so much his daughter and his
other children. In fact, he said that he even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children
since the time of his separation from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the
crime of rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous
scoldings that she has received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night. The accused
stressed that he knew of no other reason as to why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him of
the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she comes home late
in the night.

The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the complainant was raped by the
accused. She said that the complainant did not come home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a
liar. She told the Court that the concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the
resentment by the latter of the frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She further
added that she was told by the previous household employer of the complainant that the latter is a liar. She
went on to testify further that she does not believe that the accused, who is her father, raped the complainant,
who is her younger sister.[3]

The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the prosecution against the accused as
having been duly established and so ruled out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of
private complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against her father. The court
adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P75,000.00,
Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."[4]

In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:

I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL

1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing the accused's counsel
de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;

a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;

b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing of the information;

c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;

d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;

e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;

f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.

3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio

a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

b. His work was shoddy;

4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio

5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the accused.

B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO
BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.

C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY
IN HIS BEHALF.

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.

E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE,
MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."[5]

The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal enough to warrant a remand
of the case for new trial.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age, assisted by her mother
Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Paraaque Police Station,
stating, in sum, that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father, in 1991 and
1993, as well as on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly
signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor,
issued a certification to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was brought before the trial
court without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the Public Attorney's
Office to be the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution placed complainant
Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by
defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved
of her duty as counsel de officio.
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my paero besides me, would accede to my
request that I be relieved as counsel de officio because I could not also give justice to the accused
because as a lady lawyer . . . if my paero here and if this Honorable Court will accede to my request.
"COURT:
It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de
Officio. Are you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court."[6]
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty.
Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he
barely had time, to prepare therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the
instant appeal would later point out:

To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be appointed as defense
counsel de oficio. And so the trial court appointed him.

Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination, presumably to prepare. But
a ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on
the accused who stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could not
possibly have familiarized himself with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the
complaint, the statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and
other relevant documents and confer with the accused and his witnesses, all in ten minutes. [7]

The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994; it was later reset to 09
January 1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the following transpired:
COURT:
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT:
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the defense to present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the accused is under detention ... it
seems he cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS:
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view of the fact that the defense
counsel is not interested anymore in defending the accused because last time he moved for the
continuance of the hearing of this case and since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the
proceedings of this case and considering the accused here is under detention, I think it would be better
if the Court appoints another lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this Court to defend his client-
accused, the Court is hereby constrained to appoint another counsel de officio to handle the defense of
the accused. For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de officio for
accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas.[8]
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of Atty. Lonzame. On even
date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted;
thus:
COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be allowed to give her my
responsibility as counsel de officio considering that the lawyer from the PAO ...
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will allow us to be relieved from our
responsibility as appointed counsel de officio of the accused ...
COURT:
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio? As an officer of the Court you
don't want to handle the defense of the accused in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility as counsel de officio.
COURT:
 So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME:
Yes, Your Honor.[9]
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand. He denied the accusation against
him. The next witness to be presented was his married daughter who corroborated her fathers claim of
innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one reason or
another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively
been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our
fundamental law and its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to
counsel of an accused has already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating
that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, [10] and that
if he is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him.[11] The 1935 Constitution has no less
been expressive in declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that -

(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution, essentially, has
remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the
provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of
custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution, states -

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 14. x x x x x x x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in Section
1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal proceedings should
never be taken lightly.[12] Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado,[13]explained:

"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It
is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." [14]

In William vs. Kaiser,[15] the United States Supreme Court, through the late Justice Douglas, has rightly
observed that the accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the laws
complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by
counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. [16] The right to counsel
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard
before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case,
and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused
to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely
put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. [17]
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked whether
he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires
or that one can be provided to him at his request.[18] Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of
the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing
who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such
members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good
repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.

A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost.[19] A mere pro-forma appointment of de oficio counsel who fails
to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation.[20]The exacting demands expected of a
lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden
but as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this
responsibility except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[21]
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29 March 1999, this Court has
said:

We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the manner by which the
PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of
their client.

xxxxxxxxx

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in this regard renders him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense
lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however
guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas
and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility;
otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a quo for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint,
aforequoted, under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force
is hereby appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Paranaque, Roberto Gomez and Nicanor
Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the
court and as members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-34091 January 30, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE DAENG, CONRADO BAUTISTA, GERARDO ABUHIN, and ROLANDO CASTILLO, defendants-
appellants.

L.M. Cabasal as Counsel de Oficio for defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

The defendants-appellants George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, Gerardo Abubin and Rolando Castillo were
indicted for the crime of murder (Criminal Case C.C.C. VII 847-Rizal) before the Circuit Criminal Court holding
sessions in Pasig, Rizal. The information reads:

That on or about December 13, 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while then confined at
the said institution, conspiring, confederating and acting together and each armed with
improvised deadly weapons did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and wound therewith one Basilio Beltran, No. 71495-P, another convicted prisoner serving
final sentence in the same institution, then in the process of serving the accused breakfast,
inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, while then unarmed and unable to defend himself
from the attack launched by the accused, as a result of which the said Basilio Beltran died
instantly.

That the offense when committed by the accused was attended by the qualifying circumstance
of evident premeditation and obvious ungratefulness.

On June 28, 1971, all the four defendants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Shortly before the trial was adjourned
for another date, the trial judge addressed the following words to the defendants:

I understand that you are confused and you are not ready to plead guilty to the crime charged
but the court is, however, giving you today and tonight up to 8:00 o'clock in the morning
tomorrow to make a soul search, concentrate and ask your heart, mind and body as to the
consequence of your act because under Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, by virtue of the
crime that you have committed, the Court has no alternative except to impose the death
penalty which is the maximum penalty provided for by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. So,
I repeat again that you make a thorough soul searching as to the consequence of your act and
the life you will face in the future that is death. You have to understand that the duty of this
Court is merely to interpret and apply the law and it has no power to assume the executive
authority to pardon you or parole you or lower the penalty. This Court has the duty alone
which is to apply the law. That is his primary duty. It is up for the executive department to give
you the necessary clemency if they deem it necessary, so I am giving you up to tomorrow at
8:00 o'clock, June 29, to make up your minds.

On the following day, June 29, 1971, the defendants, assisted by counsel de oficio, withdrew their former plea
of "not guilty" and substituted that of "guilty." Allowing the change of pleas, the trial judge forthwith dictated
and promulgated his decision in open court. All the four defendants were sentenced to death.

We are now called upon to review this case on automatic appeal.

1. In the brief filed by the defendants, their counsel de oficio, Atty. L.M. Cabasal, avers that the circumstances
attending their change of plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" generate serious doubt regarding the said
defendants' ability, at the time, to appreciate fully the import and consequences of their turn-about. The
Solicitor General, as counsel for the People of the Philippines, joins this view, pointing out that "the records do
not show that the trial court explained to the four appellants the full import and meaning of their plea of guilty,
nor did it conduct any inquiry to remove all reasonable possibility that said appellants might have entered their
plea of guilty improvidently or without a clear and precise understanding of the exact nature of the charge
preferred against them and the import of an inevitable conviction thereof."
We have examined the manner by which the trial court allowed the defendants to change their plea, and we
ourselves are convinced that the defendants were not at all made to understand and appreciate the real nature
and consequences of their decision to enter another plea. The defendants, at the time they were arraigned,
pleaded not guilty. The record does not show that they needed, nay, wanted additional time within which to
consider or reconsider their initial plea. The subsequent remark of the trial judge, to wit: "I understand that you
are confused and you are not ready to plead guilty to take crime charged ...," on the basis of which the judge gave
the defendants twenty-four hours within which to ponder their situation, is susceptible of being interpreted as
an outright solicitation by the court itself of a change of plea by the accused. The further remark that "... because
under Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, by virtue of the crime that you have committed (emphasis ours) the
Court has no alternative except to impose the death penalty ...," while perhaps intended differently by the trial
judge, could mean, to an unschooled prisoner, that the judge had already assumed his guilt and that the death
sentence was inescapable. It is not farfetched that one, some, or all of the four defendants changed his or their
pleas simply out of resignation to what appeared to him or to them as a pre-ordained fate.

The judge's curt speech to the defendants, instructing them "to make a soul search, concentrate and ask (their)
heart, mind and body as to the consequence of (their) act," falls far below the exacting standard of care with
which a plea of guilty must be regarded by a trial court, as spelled out in a line of decisions starting with People
vs. Apduhan.1 In the latter case, we explicitly said that all trial judges "must refrain from accepting with alacrity
an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be
extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea
and the import of an inevitable conviction."

2. The counsel de oficio and the Solicitor General are one in observing that the trial court should not have
rendered the decision appealed from without requiring the presentation of evidence despite the accused's plea
of guilty. Indeed, as correctly pointed out by both counsels, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
and advisability of taking evidence, in capital cases, notwithstanding the affirmative plea of the accused, for the
purpose of determining his guilt and the degree of his culpability, to the end that such evidence will dispel all
doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects of his plea.2 The record of the present case does
not show that the trial court directed any question to any of the accused regarding the circumstances attending
the commission of the grave crime of which he is charged. And because of the nature of the present case which
was an offshoot of the gang war that plagued the various prisons in the country during the second half of 1970,
it is not a remote possibility, as suggested by both the counsel de oficio and the Solicitor General, that one or
some of the four defendants may have acted only as an accomplice or as accomplices, or that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery may not at all have been present, thus making the crime only that of homicide which
does not warrant imposition of the extreme penalty of death.

One last note. In at least three criminal cases appealed to us, including the present, 3 from the Circuit Criminal
Court holding sessions in Pasig, Rizal, involving prisoners charged with and convicted for participation in
prison gang wars, Atty. Jose O. Galvan has been appointed by the court a quo to act as counsel de oficio for the
defendants. In every case, the defendants either pleaded guilty on initial arraignment or later changed their
plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The appointment of Atty. Galvan as counsel de oficio in all three cases might
just have been a coincidence since there is no evidence before us that would show that he had applied for and
been granted such appointment. We would, nevertheless, caution all courts against the frequent appointment
of the same attorney as counsel de oficio, for two basic reasons: first, it is unfair to the attorney concerned,
considering the burden of his regular practice that he should be saddled with too many de officio cases;
and, second, the compensation provided for by section 32 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (a fixed fee of P500
in capital offense) might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income, something which the
Rule does not envision. In every case, the accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would
have too little time to spare for his de officio cases, and also would be inordinately eager to finish such cases in
order to collect his fees within the earliest possible time.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision a quo is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for a new
arraignment of the defendants George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, Gerardo Abuhin and Rolando Castillo, and for
further proceedings in accordance with law and consistently with the views herein expressed. No costs.
 G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch
I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by
petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds for such a motion was his
allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a
position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It
was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte,
his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing
the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could
ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the
overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In
appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even
on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present.
There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain
in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As
he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require
full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de
oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962,
with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge
spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing
in this case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the
prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest,
the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on
October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order
not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for
the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964
at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight
(8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was
noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the
court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends
of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the
prosecution has already rested its case."6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de
oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and
of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to
duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is
need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the
bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a
craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without
remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore
that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either
to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the
opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those
duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v.
Estebia11reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf
of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him
due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused
could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in
addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this
new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a
consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did
betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point
though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed
now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently
to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness
to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

 G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba," respondents.

Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p

I. Statement of the Case

Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes
any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member"
of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman
conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 27, recites:

That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse
Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of
the said Communist Party of the Philippines.

That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are
present, to wit:

(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;

(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.

(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent
Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed,
which, as amended, reads:

The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order
dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO,
BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still
unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion
Law, committed as follows:

That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province
of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the
 above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or
remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as
a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of
the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of
the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders
of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive
and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly
and tumultuously and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious
conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by
force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:

1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or
seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to
unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused
organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz,
Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive
and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to
discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to established
in the Philippines a Communist regime.

2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO
PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious
activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by
instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid
of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was
employed.

On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill
of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denied him the equal protection of the laws.

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the
statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special
civil action for certiorari.

II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be
enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective,
bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this
evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden
on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it
"tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security
of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of
the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to
the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary
member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt
which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of
the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of
the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct. 10

This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore
unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:

(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist

Party ... shall serve —

(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body,
business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....

(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members. Membership
in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the
governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:

Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power
under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes.
In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution.
The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in
Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and
leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts
or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the
persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357,

lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control
Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization," under
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed).
The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in
sec. 3 of the Act:

[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world
Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782
(1958 ed.)

A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning
that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the
Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has
determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the
Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would
always come within it:

In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion,
that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages, comes within
the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it
 is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87,
6 L ed 2d at 683)

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists
in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is
that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by
force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of
proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has
been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The
contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must
be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must
be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the
latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.

2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons
mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society
having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was
shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17

In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with
the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist
Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion
against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their
profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the
basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of
attainder.

But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
determination. 25

In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-
bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or
remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in
its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it
discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic
societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the
nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:

The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the
conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of
associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency
on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak
for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of
such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts
said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of
common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised
by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;"
 and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known,
many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and
secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering
with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge
that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises
activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the
legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have
a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law
have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the
legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court,
after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger
of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said:
"Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and,
while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."

We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available
including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the
Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside controverted evidence — that the order
was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from
the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited
to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United
States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;"
and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous
ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and
stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs;
and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members
conceived to be crimes. 27

In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court.
In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found
that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to
establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red
China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we
said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen
in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines.

3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice
Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post
facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder
it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31

Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the
City of Los Angeles which provided:

... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the
service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or
appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of
or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught
the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the
State of California.

In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein,
thus:
 ... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it
purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume that
under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from
the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate,
or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any
group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to
protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the
State and the United States.

... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed,
the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of
qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any
further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.

Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it
mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the
penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:

Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which
it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come
within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as
harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons
or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the
regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of
their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat
the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist
Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the
enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to
exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.

III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process

1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the
Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis
for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in
section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some
to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their
exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the
statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:

... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only
by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;

... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;

... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but
international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country.

In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in
enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper
account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe
crucial distinction, thus:

... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would
raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable relationto public
health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would
raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within
the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution.
Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on
underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.

A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant to the
legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found according to the
ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36

The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders
a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.

With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof
1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world
Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:

It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over
morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly
cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we
mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist
organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United
States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress to
regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.

That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value,
"forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be
protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41

Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion
against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government
provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental
helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its logical
conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of
Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.

2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof),
Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive
organization. 43 For, as has been stated:

Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan
unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes
himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of
the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires
that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is
"overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence
of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.

Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a
metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak
in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien
power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant
clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and
obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which
the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on
the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute
to the language." 45

IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression

As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence
orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and
the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.

The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provision
ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of persons

who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby
force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or
assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both, and
shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or agencythereof, for
the five years next following his conviction.... 46

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47

It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally
protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy,
albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is
protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why membership, whenit
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that
Amendment.

Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-
preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how
that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely
because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth,
legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween
the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case
isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through
law." 49

V. The Act and its Title

The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50

What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:

And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing
such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power,
shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory penalties
provided therefor in the same code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any
local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic
regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien
democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain,
Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the
subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign
totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It
is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand
its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and
reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these
requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution
under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish
the following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive
association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the
purpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in this
country a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such
organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the control of a foreign power; (b)
that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.

We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines or of any other subversive association: we leave this matter to future determination.

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby
remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
 [A.C. No. 5174. February 28, 2002]

ERNESTO M. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, JR., respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. for negligence in failing
to appeal a ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission,[1] which affirmed the dismissal by the Labor
Arbiter of a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by complainant against DCCD Engineering Corporation. In a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice, dated November 15, 1999, complainant stated:

As a result of the dismissal by the NLRC of my complaint, I have been physically and emotionally
affected. Considering my status in the community of the respondents and where I live as a Civil Engineer, now
73 1/2 years of age, the illegal termination of my employment continuously caused me sleepless nights, mental
anguish and torture, social humiliation and besmirch[ed] reputation. These have been compounded by the
failure of my lawyer, Atty. MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, Jr. to file on time the petition for certiorari, which [the]
Honorable Supreme Court dismissed with finality . . . To lessen the impact of my sufferings and mental torture,
which I could no longer bear for nearly six years since I received the notice of termination of my services in
December 1993, I finally decided to report my lawyers failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period
which constitutes negligence and malpractice . . .

This fact arose out of case G.R. 125244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD
Engineering Corp., et al.) Our motion for last extension of time within which to file [a] petition for review on
certiorari [was] DENIED, petitioner having been previously warned in the resolution of July 24, 1996 that no
further extension will be given per resolution of the First Division of [the] Honorable Court dated August 26,
1996. Our petition for certiorari filed on August 14, 1996 was dismissed per resolution of the First Division of
[the] Honorable Court dated December 2, 1996 for having [been] filed out of time. Our motion for
reconsideration [of] the resolution [dated] December 2, 1996, which dismissed the petition for certiorari, was
likewise denied with finality per resolution dated February 19, 1997of the First Division of [the] Honorable
Court. Machine [copies] of the above-mentioned resolutions [are] attached hereto.

Because it was not my fault or shortcoming but that of my lawyer, Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr., for his failure
[in] his devotion to his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his clients rights, it is requested that said erring
lawyer be duly sanctioned and my petition for certiorari be reconsidered and accepted. Or through another
counsel, I be allowed to file another petition for certiorari with [an] important addendum, which my said former
lawyer failed to mention due to time constraint in filing [the] petition for certiorari. [2]

Respondent denied the allegations against him. Commenting on the complaint, he said:
1. The records will show that complainant filed a complaint against DCCD Engineering Corp. on May
1994 before the National Labor Relations Commission docketed under NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-
05-03667-94 for illegal lay-off, illegal deduction, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, and
related claims;
2. Complainant approached me being a kababayan from our hometown of Calaca, Batangas. He said
that he was a friend of my late father, Atty. Mariano Dajoyag, Sr., and knew also my mother, Atty.
Aurora Ampil Dajoyag, who is still living but in her middle eighties. After appealing to our
common regional origin, complainant urged me to accept his case;
3. Being a kabayan, I was hesitant to secure a contract for legal services and that as it usually goes
with such situation, it was bahala na lang pag natapos ang kaso,;
...
5. That before the Labor Arbiter, I filed the following:

a) Amended Complaint to implead proper parties and to include changes in the causes of action for
a more plausible plea;

b) Position Paper consisting of 15 pages with annexes consisting of 11 pages;

c) Reply to Respondents Position Paper consisting of 16 pages and annexes consisting of 24 pages;
 d) Memorandum for Complainant consisting of 22 pages and annexes consisting of 4 pages;

6. That after the case was submitted for resolution, the Honorable Labor Arbiter dismissed
the complaint in a decision dated April 3, 1995. Said decision in a nutshell concluded that:
Complainant was a managerial employee with a field assignment for which he was not entitled to
overtime pay and service incentive leave pursuant to the Labor Code, and that complainants term
of employment was [for] a fixed duration which already expired. . . .
To this decision, I prepared a Memorandum of Appeal in behalf of Complainant consisting
of 18 pages which I also filed within the reglementary period at my own expense except the appeal
fee and legal research fee which complainant had to pay being the party-litigant;
7. After the filing of this Memorandum of Appeal, and the respondent Company had filed its
opposition, the NLRC ruled to affirm the Labor Arbiters decision. The NLRC found that
complainant was engaged as a consultant for a fixed period of time for which the termination of
employment depended upon the termination of the agreement; and that complainant had also
waived his right to file the complaint because he had executed a waiver and release wherein he
expressly declared that his separation was legally valid. And there was no evidence that
complainant was forced to sign this release which was held to be valid.
8. That in the face of this adverse ruling, I still filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was duly
verified by complainant. This Motion for Reconsideration was thereafter denied in a Resolution,
to wit:
After due consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant on
February 9, 1996, from the Decision of January 22, 1996 of the Commission (Second Division)
[the Court] RESOLVED to deny the same for lack of merit.
9. That despite another adverse ruling and even as I have to attend to daily hearings of my other cases
or attend to other paper work, I still prepare[d] a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
10. Thus on June 25th, 1996, I filed a Motion for Extension of time to file a Petition for Certiorari asking
for 30 days which was up to July 25, 1996. Note: This Motion for Extension was granted through
a Resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 24th 1996 - but which I only received on August
28, 1996. However, as July 25th 1996 was fast approaching, and I was still saddled with heavy
workload aside from the fact that I needed numerous xerox copies of documents as well as
[c]ertified [t]rue [c]opies also of certain crucial documents which had to be secured from the
NLRC, I was really constrained to ask for a second extension of time FOR ONLY 20 DAYS OR UP
TO AUGUST 14th, 1996 to file the aforesaid Petition;

....

12. That to my utter surprise and sadness, the Resolution of the Honorable Court granting my first
Motion for Extension from June 25th to July 25th contained a warning that it should be the last but
which I ONLY received on August 28th after I have already filed the second Motion for Extension
for only 20 days and also the basic Petition for Certiorari.
To summarize:
A) Motion for First Extension 30 days from June 25th, 1996 to July 25th - filed on June 25th;
B) Motion for Second Extension for 20 days or from July 25, 1996 to August 14th - filed July 25th;
C) Resolution dated July 24th granting First Motion for Extension from June 25th to July 25th with
warning that no further extension shall be given-received ONLY on August 28th;
D) Petition for Certiorari filed on August 14th - exactly within the period of the request [for]
second extension had this second extension for only 20 days been granted.
13. That as mentioned above, the July 24th, 1996 Resolution reads as follows:

G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.). The
motion of petitioner for extension of thirty (30) days from June 25, 1996 within which to file petition for
certiorari is GRANTED WITH WARNING THAT THE SAME SHALL BE THE LAST AND THAT NO FURTHER
EXTENSION will be given.

14. That on August 26th 1996, a resolution was promulgated by the Honorable Court which was
received by respondent counsel on October 5, 1996, to wit:

G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.,). The
motion of petitioner for a second extension of twenty (20) days from July 25, 1996 within which to file petition
for review on certiorari is DENIED, petitioner having been previously warned in the resolution of July 25,
1996 that no further extension will be given.

15. That to this denial I filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 1996 of this August
26th 1996 denial order.
16. That prior to the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the second Motion for
Extension of Time to file petition, the Honorable Court issued a Resolution dated October 9,
1996directing respondents to file Comment - which was received on Nov. 5, 1996;
17. That pursuant to this Resolution, private respondent filed its Comment and the Solicitor General
requested for extension of time to file his Comment. But after the Comment of private respondent,
the Honorable Court issued a Resolution dated December 2, 1996, to wit:

G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos v. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.). -
Considering the private respondents Comment/Opposition to the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petition for having been filed out of time.

The motion of the Solicitor General for an extension of thirty (30) days from November 8, 1996 within which
to file Comment on the petition for Certiorari is further NOTED in view of the dismissal of the petition.

18. That from the said Resolution dated December 2, 1996, the undersigned respondent counsel in
behalf of complainant still filed a Motion for Reconsideration pleading for the reinstatement of
the Petition[.] But inspite of my earnest and sincere efforts, the Honorable Court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration with finality;
19. That complainant was properly informed of this adverse ruling. He insisted that I file another
Motion for Reconsideration. I did not accede to his desire and I told him that the dismissal was
with finality and we might be cited for contempt for filing such pleading. He was unhappy about
it and that was the last time we saw each other.

....

It appears that the Resolution granting my request for 1st extension contained a warning that no further
extension would be given. BUT I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS BECAUSE WHEN I FILED MY MOTION FOR LAST
EXTENSION FOR ONLY 20 DAYS, I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE COPY OF SAID RESOLUTION. And in fact,
even at the time I filed the basic Petition for Certiorari, I HAVE NOT YET STILL received said July 24, 1996
Resolution.

I RELIED IN GOOD FAITH AND IN THE HONEST BELIEF THAT THE FIRST MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR 30
DAYS WOULD BE GRANTED - WITHOUT THE WARNING - SINCE IT WAS MERELY A FIRST EXTENSION. Then
even as I was terribly saddled with heavy load and at times had some difficulty in getting in touch with
complainant, I dropped everything to be able to beat the supposed deadline of August 14th, 1996.

I am sorry if I had to rely in good faith that my Motion for 1 st Extension of 30 days would be granted without
the warning - as this was a first extension only; and also that I request for a second and last extension of 20
days for which I complied with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari on the last day of the supposed extended
period.

....

And even assuming there could be a charge of negligence, still this is excusable under existing
jurisprudence. The Honorable Court declared in a case:

Negligence is excusable where it is caused by failure to receive notice of the action or the trial, x x x Fernandez
vs Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138; underscoring supplied).

In this case, there was failure on my part to receive notice of the action of the Honorable Court on my first
motion for extension before I filed the second and last motion for extension of time to file petition as well as
the basic petition for certiorari itself.[3]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation. On October 27, 2001, the IBP approved the report and recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for
breach of his professional duties would be dealt with more severely.
 Acknowledging respondents efforts in prosecuting complainants case before the Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission, the investigating commissioner found that respondent was not guilty of
willful breach of professional duty but only of simple neglect of duty and accordingly recommended that he be
given a mere reprimand. Thus, the investigating commissioner reasoned:

Respondent has failed to show that he exercised that degree of competence and diligence required of him in
prosecuting complainants petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court. His reliance on good
faith cannot be credited fully in his favor. Lawyers should not presume that the courts would grant their motion
for extension of time to file the required pleading or brief nor expect that the extension that may be granted
shall be counted from notice. They should file their brief or pleadings within the extended period
requested. Failing in this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed (Roxas vs.
Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 252). Neither would the fact that he has not been paid his fees exonerate him from
liability. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence regardless of
its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. (Santiago, et al. vs. Atty. Amado R. Fojas, A.C. No.
4103, September 7, 1995).[4]

We find the investigating commissioners report and recommendation well taken.

First. Respondent pleads good faith and excusable neglect of duty. He stresses the fact that he filed the
petition for certiorari within the 20-day period of extension that he sought in his second motion for extension
and claims that he learned that the period of extension granted in his first motion for extension was
inextendible only after the expiration of the two periods of extension that he prayed for.
Respondents contentions have no merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
affirming the Labor Arbiters dismissal of complainants claims against his former employers was promulgated
on January 22, 1996. Respondent was notified of the decision on February 8, 1996 and he filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. His motion was denied on March 12, 1996 and respondent
was notified thereof on March 25, 1996. On June 25, 1996, the last day of the 90-day period allowed at that time
for filing a special civil action for certiorari,[5] he filed with this Court a motion seeking an extension of thirty
(30) days for filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground that because of pressure of work he
was prevented him from filing the same earlier. On July 25, 1996, the last day of the period he asked for in his
first motion for extension, respondent filed a motion praying for another extension of twenty (20) days for
filing the petition for certiorari. On the last day of the second period of extension that he asked for, August 14,
1996, respondent finally filed the petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, on July 24, 1996, this Court issued a resolution granting respondents first motion for
extension, with a warning that no further extension would be granted. Respondent received a copy of the
resolution on August 28, 1996. On August 26, 1996, the Court denied the petition for certiorari for being filed
out of time. Respondent received a copy of the resolution, dated August 26, 1996, denying his petition
on October 5, 1996. On October 18, 1996, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the Court in its resolution of December 2, 1996.
To begin with, motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the
court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or
that they will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due diligence requires that they should conduct a
timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of the action on their motions and the lack of notice thereof will
not make them any less accountable for their omission.[6] Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:

A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda of briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Regardless of the agreement he had with complainant with respect to the payment of his fees, respondent
owed it to complainant to do his utmost to ensure that every remedy allowed by law is availed of.[7] Rule 14.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins every lawyer to devote his full attention, diligence, skills, and
competence to every case that he accepts.Pressure and large volume of legal work do not excuse respondent
for filing the petition for certiorari out of time.[8]
Respondent cites the ruling in Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick,[9] in support of his claim that his negligence is
excusable. Such reliance is misplaced. In Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, the appellant cited in support of his
petition for the reopening of his case the failure of his former counsel to inform him of the status of his case. He
argued that his own failure to inquire from his former counsel the status of his case was excusable. This Court
rejected the contention:

Negligence is excusable where it is caused by failure to receive notice of the action or the trial, by a genuine and
excusable mistake or miscalculation, by reliance upon assurances given by those upon whom the party had a
right to depend, as the adverse party or counsel retained in the case, or a competent adviser, that it would not
be necessary for him to take an active part in the case, or that the suit would not be prosecuted, by relying on
another person to attend to the case for him, when such other person promised to do so, or was chargeable
with that duty or by a well-founded belief that the case would not be reached for trial as it was in fact reached,
or by other circumstances not involving fault of the moving party. . . .

The Court pointed out that appellants counsel was duly notified of the proceedings in the case, and appellant
was bound by his counsels conduct and handling of his case.
In the case at bar, respondent was ill-informed about the disposition of his first motion for extension not
by reason of genuine and excusable mistake or miscalculation but by his sheer negligence. It is noteworthy that
the motions for extension, and even the petition for certiorari, were all filed at the last moment. Respondent
had 120 days within which he could have filed the petition for certiorari. However, because of his cavalier
attitude toward deadlines for the filing of pleadings, including the one set by himself in his first motion for
extension, respondent lost the opportunity for filing the petition for review.
Nevertheless, having said this, it ought to be remembered, on the other hand, that respondent exerted
efforts to protect the rights and interests of complainant, including trying to secure a reconsideration of the
denial of his petition for certiorari in this Court. For this reason, we are inclined to adopt the investigating
commissioners recommendation that respondent be merely reprimanded for his simple neglect of duty.
Second. Complainant prays that we admit and consider the merits of the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent, or that he be allowed to file anew a separate petition for certiorari. We understand the plight of
the complainant, but we cannot grant his plea. This is an administrative case, separate from G.R. No. 125244 in
which the dismissal of the petition for certiorari was made. The resolution of the Court in that case operated as
a judgment on the merits and is now final.[10] Indeed, public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk
of occasional errors, the judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law, [11] and that
every party be bound by his counsels decision regarding the conduct of the case, including his mistakes, save
only when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable as to amount to a deprivation of the
clients day in court.[12] This is not the situation in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. is REPRIMANDED. He is admonished henceforth to exercise
greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the courts and warned that
repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with.
Complainants prayer that the petition for certiorari filed by respondent be considered and given due
course despite its denial for having been filed out of time is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch
I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by
petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds for such a motion was his
allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a
position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It
was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte,
his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing
the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could
ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the
overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In
appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even
on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present.
There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain
in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As
he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require
full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de
oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962,
with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge
spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing
in this case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the
prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest,
the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on
October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order
not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for
the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964
at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight
(8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was
noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the
court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends
of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the
prosecution has already rested its case."6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de
oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and
of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to
duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is
need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the
bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a
craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without
remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore
that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either
to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the
opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those
duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v.
Estebia11reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf
of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him
due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused
could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in
addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this
new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a
consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did
betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point
though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed
now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently
to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness
to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

[A.C. No. 6424. March 4, 2005]

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, complainant, vs. Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money or other property coming into the formers
possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with
the lawyers own; much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional
misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The Affidavit [1] submitted by
complainant alleges the following:

Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie
Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6,
Davao City entitled Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for
Attachment;
After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my
lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial
service fee, which amount was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached
as Annex A to form part hereof;

As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make
follow-up on said case. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act
on my case because the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still
there was no action done on our case;

Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the
latters failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case;

My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naravals office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to
withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite
our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in
their house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no
money;

Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President
of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;

x x x x x x x x x.

In an Order dated March 12, 2002,[2] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor
C. Fernandez, directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in
the CBDs May 31, 2002 Order[3] issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any
answer despite his receipt of the Orders.[4]
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the investigation ex parte.
Its Order[5] dated November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit
her position paper within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The CBD received complainants Position Paper[6] on December 10, 2002.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C.
Pacheco recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of
duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part
as follows:

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in this regard renders him administratively liable x x x.

In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will
render legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for filing fee and
service fee did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect
of the community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished.

xxxxxxxxx

In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly
appraised her of the status of her case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently,
the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which
judgment has long become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of such
finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information and did not
properly appraise the complainant. Thus, respondent violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x.[7]

IBP Board of Governors Resolution

 On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the
above-quoted Report. The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two
(2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of
complainants P8,000.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish
to become their client.[8] They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in
a position to carry it out effectively or competently.[9] But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are
required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.[10]
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause.[11] Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of importance.[12] The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.

Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. [13] Otherwise, their
clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with
dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath. [14]
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and
partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His
continuous inaction despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling
indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her
repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to
him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion
on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had
been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld
such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee and thereby
gave her hope that her case would be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best
opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their
evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but
also an obligation on the part of lawyers.[15] If they find that their clients cause is defenseless, then it is their
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible. [16] The
failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.[17]
Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant
despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he
was clinging to something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use. [18]
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and property that may come into their
possession.[19] As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as
evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her
money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed
the trust she had reposed in him.[20] His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and
a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[21]
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts,[22] but also
mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant
to their fiduciary relationship.[23] Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of
the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also
to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public.[24] Given the crucial importance of his role in the
administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of
the profession.[25]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at
the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005]

ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal
case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained
from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco, for
annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been
dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent
entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. [3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,[4] informing the RTC of Pasig
City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and
docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the
Revised Penal Code.[5] Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth
of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage
took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than
Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G.
Mercado.
 In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or
decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;[6] (2)
administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption;[7] (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;[8] and, (4) the Information for violation of Section
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S. No.
PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled
by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their
privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the
complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against
him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not
grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. [10] He also states that
the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of
suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty,
only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents
and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According
to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment
case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters.
The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone. [12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondents motion to file his memorandum, and
the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles,
finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client,
and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now
found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and administrative
cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the
guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the
complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is
inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-
client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence.
Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate,
exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. [15] Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The
hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.[16] Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of
justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. [18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,[19] and continues
even after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended
on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any
litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.[21] With full disclosure
of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the
ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish
the existence of the privilege, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.[22]

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment.[23] The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with
the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer
to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client. [24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than
on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca,[25] where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period
of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals
would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed
creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in
violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the
client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties,
he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered
the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on
account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery
of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer
to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. [26] The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to
no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by
a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, [29] an offer and counter-
offer for settlement,[30] or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, [31] are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present. [32]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.[33]
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for
the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must
have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. [34]
If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal assistance,[36] and not legal advice, the
privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She
contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action
against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the
civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will
determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of
facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant
as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult,
if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The burden of
proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. [38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD

NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be
disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation
of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No.
38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal
of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas
tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to
defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why
and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act
accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge
Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had
already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a
copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all
because according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision
dated August 17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge
Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas
be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was
unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the
complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University
Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus,
"[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable
to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein)
illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case
he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit,
since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure
amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law
profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case
for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the
affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the
President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the
union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and
directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction,
since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion
to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the
case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days
from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This
motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later
referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still
did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the
complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of
evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or
corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel
for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica
Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason
the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's
evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with
competence and diligence,3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.5 This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure
to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru
honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he
again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was
"deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice"
for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume
and pressure of legal work."9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent
has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large
volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two
distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness
of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had
committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order
of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground
is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty
to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that
the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever
that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he
alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his
appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the
impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that
order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing
cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-
Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere
afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense
therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of
the case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the
trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of
questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals,
unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the
complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the
plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a
reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the
complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989

MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.

Eduardo Cabreros, Jr. for complainant.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM

Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because
the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public
concern for the maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards
his client. 1

Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the
Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with
gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court.

The essential facts are as follows: 2

Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment" docketed as Civil
Case No. 6046 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 54117 for "reconveyance with
damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by complainant and her sister.
When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. Civil Case No. 54117 for
reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987 while Civil Case No. 6046 for
ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court against her.

On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment, complainant
and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice.

Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in
turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that
respondent would handle their case. Forthwith, a petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale
and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by
respondent to forestall the execution of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.

In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a
"[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for annulment of judgment.
Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if
only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend).

Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed
as Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent demanded from the complainant one thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as
attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon.

However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked respondent to
withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship.

On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be ready with two
thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment
case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her sister were only able to raise the amount of one thousand pesos
which they immediately gave to respondent.

Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he could not locate the judge who would issue
the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where respondent ordered some
food - including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining
order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining balance of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00)
which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.

Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and Peregrina that there
was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain possession of the
apartment. For this purpose, respondent told complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P
10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment
and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the
complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint.

Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and relatives. On
October 26,1987, the money was handed over to the respondent.

On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment of Simulated or Spurious Sale with
Damages," later docketed as Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by respondent with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
165, Pasig, Metro Manila.

At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary
to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant.
Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary
injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced
and executed.

Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a deposit of
ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry, she found out that in
fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to
respondent asking for the return of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former
earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence,
complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein respondent.
Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, dismissed Civil Case No. 55118 for
failure to state a cause of action.4 On January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521 0 was likewise dismissed for being
identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5

Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith
and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of
one's imagination and only intended to harrass him. 6

This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and
written. having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of
complainant respondent should have carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his
representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was
to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most
out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned
in one case and talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P 10,000.00
as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the
complainant dry is obvious.

When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until
its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate
the most elementary principles of professional ethics . 7

The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent
had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw
his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no
steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.

Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is
quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118
respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel interposing as reason
therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent failed to find a
replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. 8

His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client
and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. 9 More so in this case, where by reason of his
gross negligence complainant thereby suffered by losing all her cases.

The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had already filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good faith as an advocate. He
also failed to appear for the complainant in said case. It was all a show to get more money from her. This
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with this evident irregularity, he lamely
stated that while he did not physically appear for complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted the
pleadings.

His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property subject of the ejectment proceeding would
be returned to her. In fact, it was respondent who persuaded complainant that the filing of these two cases
simultaneously were the means by which this objective can be achieved. His duty was not only to prepare the
pleadings but to represent complainant until the termination of the cases. This he failed to do.

His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he already knew that
he could no longer physically handle the same is an act of deception of his client. 10 It shows lack of fidelity to
his oath of office as a member of the Philippine bar.

The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was given to him as fee for his services,
is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually
rendered. 11 And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more
bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court.

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when
strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of
office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients.
The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.
WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case, this Court finds Atty.
Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve
to resume the practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven thousand pesos
(P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice
and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law.

Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case
No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section
22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to
the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).

The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.

On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No.
11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice
and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his
mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action
for annulment.

On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records
remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to
be remanded to the court a quo.

On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or
Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in
accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment
or novation explaining that —

. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no
other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set
aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no
allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were
secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for
Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested
the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.

In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated
October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the
decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we
denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality.

Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 11690.

On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844.
Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review
by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988,
the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was
issued on October 18, 1988.

On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued,
Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and
complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil
Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was
still pending with the CA.

On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of
execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624
respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.

From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal
and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040).

II

We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within
the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or
rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense
that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or
institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional
rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are
the following rules:

Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions,
repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a
judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069
[1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).

The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were
properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to
devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his
client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to
file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment
of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory.
According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was
denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."

As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):

A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at
p. 534).

Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the
decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.

This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:

. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the
function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming
modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to
reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).

(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250
[1993]).

Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment
in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the
Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation
or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;

(4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;

(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court
of Appeals; and,

(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary
Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment,
respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.

In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of
an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In
the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:

Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct
that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his
 duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).

By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which
efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which
are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco,
220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings,
actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of
professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was
rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation,
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).

WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996]

ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint have been properly joined with the filing of the
respondents comment as required in the 1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis,
Deputy Court Administrator. No further pleadings need be required from the parties.
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the complainant and verified by the
latter, the respondent is charged with grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa.
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the complainants wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through
the filing of a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This complaint arose from
the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainants Petition for Naturalization dated 30 March
1989 which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.
In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by
the Office of the Prosecutor, charging the complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly made untruthful statements of [sic] falsehoods upon material matters required by the Revised
Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified Petition for Naturalization dated April 13, 1989, subscribed
and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath[s], which petition
bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29; Book No. XXIII; and Series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary
Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:

5. 1 am married to a Filipino. My wifes name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina
Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2) children, whose names, dates and places of birth, and residences are as
follows:

NAME DATE OF PLACE RESIDENCE

BIRTH OF BIRTH
ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,
ONG CUQA 1981 City Bacolod City
CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,
ONG CHOA 1983 City Bacolod City
xxx xxx xxx
10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have
conducted myself in a proper and irreprQachable manner during the entire period of my residence in
the Philippines in my relations with the constituted government as well as with

the community in which 1 am living.

xxx xxx xxx

When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not
then residing at the said address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid
residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City,
that contrary to his aforesaid allegations in his verified Petition for Naturalization, accused while residing at
211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship
with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children with her
as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been separated from bed and
boards [sic] since 1984; which falsehoods and/ or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for
disqualifications [sic] of [sic] becoming a citizen of the Philippines.

Act contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Branch III thereof where the
respondent is the presiding Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February 1995 and found the complainant
herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment alleging that: (1) there is no basis for the
conviction since his petition for naturalization had been withdrawn and therefore had become functus
officio; (2) the petition for naturalization is a pleading, hence its allegations are privileged; and (3) his
prosecution violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The last ground is founded on an admission
made by a representative of the Office of the Solicitor General of her lack of knowledge of any perjury case filed
based on a withdrawn or dismissed petition for naturalization.
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an order dated 31 March
1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July. 1995 and prayed for the removal of the respondent
fudge from office. As grounds therefor, he alleges that:
(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias and Partiality, and Knowingly
Rendering An Unjust Judgment when he intentionally failed to divulge the next-door-neighbor
relationship between him and the family of Leni Ong Choa and to disqualify himself from sitting
in the criminal case on such ground as part of the grand design and preconceived intention to
unjustly convict the complainant of the crime charged without due process.
(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute the offense of perjury.
(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it has become functus oficio and it is as if the
Petition was not filed at all so that whatever false statemeuts were contained therein were no
longer requiredby law and had ceased to be on a material matter.
(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution Exhibit P (handwritten list of properties) even if
this was self-serving as it was undated and unsigned; and Exhibit Q (letter of Leni Ong Choas
counsel to the complainant) even if it was also self-serving as there was no showing that he
received the letter.
(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the complainant to suffer a penalty higher than that
provided by law, without applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12 September 1995, thus:

He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there being a house, belonging to the Sia family,
separating his house and that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his family are not acquainted
with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had not exchanged greetings nor is he even a nodding
acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.

He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense, the complainant should have
filed a Motion to Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the complainant stated in the Petition that he
together with his wife and children lived at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood under
oath because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition, his wife and two (2) children were not
living with him anymore, making him liable for perjury.

Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral character contrary to what he stated in the
Petition for Naturalization since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship with Stella Flores Saludar, his
former employee, with whom he has begotten two (2) children. As a matter of fact, a case for concubinage
against complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.

According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show
that the Prosecutor representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion to Withdraw the
Petition for the reason that the complainant had abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is not giving them
support and is now living with his paramour.

On the claim of the complainant that his petition for naturalization has became functus officio in view of its
withdrawal, hence no longer existent, the respondent Judge maintains that the withdrawal reduced the petition
to functus officio only for the purpose of the Special Proceedings. but not when it is used as evidence in other
cases.

On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P. Q and R, the respondent Judge contends that Exhibits P. Q
and R were duly identified by Leni Ong Choa and her testimonies on these were found to be credible by the
Court.

Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in the perjury case as
the penalty imposed by the court did not exceed one (1) year.

The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for being patently without merit and
for the censure and reprimand of the complainants counsel with a warning to refrain from filing similar
harassment suits.
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995 and duly approved by the Court
Mministrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao, Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following findings and
conclusions:

EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of the complainant are devoid of any
merit.

The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are neighbors [sic] appears to be petty under the
circumstances. Granting that they are indeed next-door neighbors does not necessarily mean that respondent
Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere in said Rule is it
ordained that being the neighbor of a party-litigant is reason enough for the Judge to disqualify himself from
hearing the formers case.

With respect to the complainants claim that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense of
perjury, an administrative proceeding is not the forum to decide whether the judge has erred or not, especially
as complainant has appealed his conviction.

Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in the Courts decision.

The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Bautista (C.A., 40 O.G.
2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements in his affidavit before a competent officer
authorized to administer oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.

It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso C. Choa was made under oath and before
a competent officer authorized to administer oath as shown by the records (p. 4, APPENDIX A). This petition
for naturalization is required by law as a condition precedent for the grant of Philippine citizenship (Section 7
Corn. Act No. 473).

The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
As shown by the records (p. 1, APPENDIX A), Alfonso C. Choa declared in his petition dated 30 March 1989 that
his wife Leni Ong Choa resides at 46 Ma!aspina St. Bacolod City while in the administrative complaint he filed
against respondent Judge, he stated that his wife Leni Ong Choa left their family residence (46 Malaspina St.,
Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6, par. 2 of Adrn. Complaint). This simply means that when he filed
his petition for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the abovementioned address anymore.

It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman not his wife and he himself signed the birth
certificate as the father of that child (p. 4, APPENDIX E). This is contrary to what he declared in his petition that
he is of good moral character which is required under the Naturalization Law (par. 3, Sec. 2 Corn. Act No. 473).

There wa therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso C.. Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as
found by Judge Chiongson.

As to the complainants claim that the withdrawal of the petitiorr makes it functus officio, we sustain the
respondent Judges view that the Petition can be used as evidence in another case. In the case of People of
the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held that every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very
administration of the laws (Jay vs. State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the policy of the law that
judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair and free from fraud, Sand that litigants and parties be
encouraged to tell the truth and that they be punished if they do not (People vs. Niles, 300 III., 458, 133 N.E.
252,37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289).

On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the case, we cite Section 2 of
R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) which provides in part that This Act shall not apply to x x x those
whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, x x x Since the penalty for perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its maximum period which is one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months toprision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months, the respondent Judge was correct in not applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final appreciation of the Courts decision which is on
appeal, but is made only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel for the complainant must be
reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this complaint.

Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo then recommends:

Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson
be DISMISSED for lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz be REPRIMANDED
for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious complaint.

We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo that the allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid
of merit. Good faith and good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel honestly believed
that the allegations in the Information in the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they should have filed
a motion to quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on this ground.
The complainant never did; he was arraigned and entered intp trial. Although his failure to do so did not
operate as a waiver of the said ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his
admission of the weakness of the ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an
opportunity to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been
invoked by him, as shown in the order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainants motion for the
reconsideration.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned
untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of
such untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the complainants wife - the complainant in the
perjury case - it must be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under
the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this
matter at any time before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for
reconsideration in the respondents order denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the
complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate
pleading before the trial court.
 Finally, the nature and character of the complainants grievances relative to the respondents judgment
finding the former guilty of perjury. May only be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such
as an appeal from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof,
if none had been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time
which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of their dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of
the charges against the respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to,
wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings
only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent
upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the complainants case
(Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the
law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his apparent failure to comply
with his duties and responsibilities above stated.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975

COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.

Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.

FERNANDO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. It is
taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit which was correctly
dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the
execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy, one moreover already passed upon and
sustained by this Court. Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor
dispute which unfortunately had dragged on since 1961, all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered
illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting, now deceased, and the private respondent Lo Bu. The
lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. It is about time
that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner labor union, so long set at naught and
disregarded, by the employment of techniques, which certainly deserve no encouragement, much less approval.
There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal, reinstating it in its
resolution of December 19, 1974. Certiorari and prohibition lie.

The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain
from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of
the judgment in its favor.1 Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to
serve the writ, did so on January 17 and 18, 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry
Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.2 It was then that
respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations, a point stressed in another motion dated February 2, 1973, on the further ground that
petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. The Court of Industrial
Relations in its order dated February 23, 1973 denied his motions. So likewise was the motion for
reconsideration, as shown in its order dated March 23, 1973. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such
order to this Court. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-36636.3This Court, in its resolution dated July 17, 1973, denied
the petition for certiorari of private respondent.4 In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by private
respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties. Upon receipt of the order
from this Court denying certiorari, petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It was
therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings
of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22, 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its
resolution dated July 17, 1973. The lower court dismissed the complaint. 5 That is the decision elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition
is filed.

Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.

1. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June 27, 19706 for the
satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioner labor
union starts with the following: "This concerns complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, dated March 12, 1970, "allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the
said writ should be directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d) by
the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos Foundry Shop ... The original writ of execution had been returned wholly
unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in their names, and the foundry shop where Mrs.
Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, is the "New Century Foundry Shop" (return of
the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, dated March 11, 1970). Consequently, in its Order of March 19, 1970,
the Court directed the examination of Mrs. Ong Ting and the Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and
Ong Ting's property and income. Extensive hearings were conducted." 7

Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records, the Court finds that after the Cosmos
Foundry Shop was burned, Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. He and his family resided in
the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan. After his proposals to settle the present case
for P5,000.00 in September 1968, for P25,000.00 in October 1968, and for P40,000.00 on December 22, 1968,
were successively rejected by complainant's counsel, Ong Ting, after hinting of taking measures to avoid
liability, soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31, 1968, selling all his business, including
equipment, machineries, improvements, materials, supplies and rights, in the New Century Foundry Shop, to
his compadre Lo Bu, for P20,000.00, which he acknowledged so fully paid ... The deed does not bear the
conformity of Mrs. Ong Ting. On January 7, 1969, when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm
name, he gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30,000.00 ... Notwithstanding such
sale to Lo Bu, Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the case on January 25, 1969, and a verified
motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May 12, 1969. In the latter motion, it was alleged that as a result
of the fire, "Ong Ting lost everything; we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing ... " This allegation was made
despite the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu, from which he realized P20,000.00." 8 The absence of good faith on the
part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There was no actual turn over of the
business to Lo Bu, the alleged manager in absentia. At the time Ong Ting died, he was still residing in the
premises of the shop ... His family continued to reside therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. His young 19-
year-old son Delfin Ong became in-charge of the shop and the workers. His daughter Gloria Ong became the
cashier. Mrs. Ong Ting became the manager and she supervised the work. .. The alleged sale was no doubt
intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable to respondents. It is clearly
fictitious. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is being sought is the
enforcement or implementation of its order. Having acquired jurisdiction, the Court may employ means to carry
it into effect (Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court)." 9

That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order, an alias writ of execution was issued against the
properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan Road, Valenzuela, Bulacan for the
satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor practice proceeding. As noted, there was a replevin suit by the
same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because
in the meanwhile the finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court issued its
resolution of July 17, 1973. 10 It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent, Lo Bu, for the
purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the dispositive portion of the order
of the Court of June 22, 1970.

2. To all intents and purposes then, that is the law of the case. What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly
cannot plead ignorance, as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceeding before this Court. He
failed, and ii was not surprising, for on the facts as found, he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate
the award in favor of petitioner labor union. There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his
pretension of being the alleged vendee. In Cruz v. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it was shown
that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice, there was a fictitious sale resorted to, as in this
case. Under the circumstances, the bad faith being evident, the ostensible vendee was precluded from taking
advantage of the situation. So it must be here. Moreover, that is merely, as stated earlier, to accord deference
to the fundamental principle of the law of the case, his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this
Court. There is this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v. De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as
of the time the order complained of was issued is Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, a 1962 decision. As
emphasized by the ponente, the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the
Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before
it and that its decision in any give case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes
final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. If
petitioner had any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 12276 should
further be reviewed his remedy was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. In fact he did file two motions for that
purpose, both of which were denied. A new petition before an inferior court on the same grounds was
unjustified. As much, indeed, was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3, 1959, herein above
reproduced in its entirety. The import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood.' So it has been from
1919, when in Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, this Court,
through Justice Street, categorically declared that a decision that has become the law of the case "is not subject
to review or reversal in any court." What is more, in 1967, there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this
Tribunal in People v. Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the
case, "even if erroneous, ... may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final ... " Then, in Sanchez
v. Court of Industrial Relations, promulgated in 1969, there is the pronouncement that the law of the case 'does
not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but likewise to its implementation carried out in
fealty to what has been ... decreed.'" 13

3. Private respondent, in his special and affirmative defenses, alleged that petitioners have a plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending case in the Court of Appeals sought to
be dismissed in this suit for certiorari. As a general rule, such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. That
is the ordinary course of judicial procedure. There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of
petitioners. It is not so however in this case. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted.
It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable
efforts to defeat labor's just claim. It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of
protection to labor 15 if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced
years ago.

4. One last point. It was set forth in the Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court
of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop, followed by another motion praying for the
return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond
and then a third, this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were
denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by
this Court for lack of merit. 17 Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this petition, filed on February 20,
1975, had the temerity to deny such allegations. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo
Bu, petitioner in L-36636, he did specifically maintain: "On January 26, 1973, in order to vindicate his rights
over the levied properties, in an expeditious or less expensive manner, herein appellant voluntarily submitted
himself, as a forced intervenor, to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR, by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ
of Execution,' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the
sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him, without the latter being made a party to the case, as well as the
jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. 3021-ULP, by
means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry Shop;' ... ;
Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5, 1973, and inasmuch as the
auction sale of his properties was set for January 31, 1973, the CIR issued an order on January 30, 1973, one
day before the schedule sale, ordering the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the auction sale; ... ; On February
3, 1973, herein petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2, 1973, praying for
the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an
indemnity bond, pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; ... On February 10, 1973
respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein petitioner-
appellant's urgent motions dated January 26, 1973 and February 2, 1973, ... ; On February 27, 1973, herein
petitioner-appellant received an order from respondent CIR, dated February 25, 1973, denying his urgent
motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties "in accordance
with law;" ... " 18 Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic
and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather
poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard
to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his
special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. That is the most that can be said of
his performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated
himself. He was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth
and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of
the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the
beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind,
then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19, 1974 of respondent Court of
Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent
Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of
dismissing it. Triple costs.

A.C. No. 3695 February 24, 1992

DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM, respondents.

R E SO L U T I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:

In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge
Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa
kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and
bringing about the loss of his land.

The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them.

The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the
charges filed against him in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were dismissed by this Court in its resolution
of September 8, 1988 for having become moot and academic. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on
July 22, 1987, or five (5) months after the respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987.
No motion for reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has become final
and executory. It serves as a bar to a relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge. 2 That those
charges are now being brought against respondent judge in his capacity as an attorney does not help the cause
of complainant, for the change in the form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of the rule
of res judicata. 3

On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as counsel for the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of. 4

In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had
sued the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of
the cadastral survey of Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of
title of Apolinario Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary
injunction against the "defendants, their agents, representatives or other persons acting in their behalf,
ordering them to desist from threshing and carting away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral
Survey of Victoria, . . . until further order of this Court. . . ." 6 This injunction was made permanent in the decision
of the lower court rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.

Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a portion of the area in dispute, in the belief
that the whole of Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Quitclaim 7executed in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at
that time title to Lot No. 3217 was still in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano Tiburcio,
Protacio Cabatino and Maximo Mateo, tenants of Salud Balot, entered the portion being cultivated by
complainant, the latter reported the incident to the police.

From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying therefore on the
injunction issued by the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare complainant
Gamalinda in contempt of court.

Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case No. 3827 was different from the area
occupied by him. To resolve the issue, the lower court with his agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217.
The result of the resurvey showed that contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very
same land involved in Civil Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower court declared complainant in contempt in
an order dated July 24, 1986 which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on
March 21, 1998. 8
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot and complainant is the successor-in-
interest of the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for
complainant to claim that neither he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case.
Being privies to the parties, they are necessarily bound by the orders rendered in said case.

On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming in toto the judgment of the lower court
in Civil Case No. 3827. 9 After the appellate court's decision had become final, Atty. Lim moved for the execution
of the affirmed judgment, 10 and when the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion
to Require Domingo Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of Court and to Authorize the Latter to
Execute Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A in Favor of Plaintiffs." 11 That motion was granted by the lower court, but
complainant refused to surrender the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty. Lim to file the
questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT 186299 Null and Void," 12 which the lower court granted
on July 31, 1989.

It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty to prosecute
his clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over
the property in dispute while the second motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3827.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. 13He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, 14 and his duty of entire devotion to his client's
cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly
due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15 An attorney's
duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until the effective release from the
case 16 or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is expected
to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may require.

This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He should be commended,
not condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney;

With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land relied upon by the
lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a
matter that should have been litigated in said case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings.
In any case, there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception
against him will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the preparation of
the criminal information, and for the same reason he cannot be called to account for it.

ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118655. April 12, 2000]

HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA, Namely: FE, ELIAS, JR. and SERVANDO, ALL SURNAMED LORILLA, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, HON. FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA and
SHERIFF HONORIO P. SANTOS, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 29, 1994,
which dismissed the petition for annulment of the judgment rendered on April 5, 1989, by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58, of Makati in Civil Case No. 5262. [2] The motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of
Appeals was denied by said Court in a Resolution promulgated on January 11, 1995. [3] Jj sc

The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"(1) On September 10, 1983, private respondent Commercial Credit Corporation (now
known as Pentacapital Finance Corporation and hereinafter referred to as PENCAPITAL) filed
a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, (hereinafter referred to as
the Makati Court) for a sum of money against Sanyu Machineries Agencies, Inc., Sanyu
Chemical Corporation, and several other defendants, among whom was Elias Lorilla, (now
deceased) who had acted as sureties for the two corporate debtors. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 5262 and was assigned by raffle to Branch 58 of said court.

(2) PENCAPITAL sought for, and obtained from the Makati Court, a writ of attachment on the
real property of defendant Elias L. Lorilla covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 298986,
and which levy was duly annotated on the certificate of title concerned.

(3) Defendant Elias Lorilla, together with four other individual defendants, was initially
represented by one Atty. Danny Tablizo, but who later on withdrew his appearance and was
substituted by another lawyer, Atty. Alfredo Concepcion.

(4) During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5262, Elias L. Lorilla executed a dacion en pago over
the property attached in favor of the Joint Resources Management Development Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as JRMDC) by reason of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 298986
in the name of Elias L. Lorilla was cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
114067 in the name of JRMDC. But the levy caused to be made by PENCAPITAL over the
property was carried over to the new certificate of title.

(5) On June 9, 1986, JRMDC filed suit against PENCAPITAL for the cancellation of the latters
levy on the property in question with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
(hereinafter referred to as the Pasig Court), which was docketed therein as Civil Case No.
63757 and assigned by raffle to its Branch 153.

(6) On April 5, 1989, the Makati Court, after due hearing, rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
5262 in favor of PENCAPITAL and against the defendants therein, including Elias L. Lorilla.
The dispositive portion of said judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff

and against defendants who are hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, jointly and
severally, and solidarily the total principal amount of P421,596.28 plus
interest at 12% per annum and a penalty of 3% per month of default from
the time it became due on July 1, 1981 until fully paid, and 20% of the entire
amount due as attorneys fees, plus the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(7) Despite receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision by Alfredo Concepcion, then counsel of
record of defendant Elias L. Lorilla, no appeal whatsoever was interposed from said judgment
by said lawyer in behalf of defendant Lorilla. Sc jj

(8) On March 3, 1993, upon motion of PENCAPITAL, the Makati Court issued a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 5262 and PENCAPITAL thereafter proceeded against the property
covered by TCT No. 298986 in the name of defendant Lorilla.

(9) On May 26, 1993 the Pasig Court rendered decision in its Civil Case No. 53757 dismissing
JRMDCs complaint for the cancellation of the levy on attachment on the Lorilla property, ruling
that the dacion en pago executed by defendant Lorilla in favor of JRMDC cannot prevail over
the prior writ of attachment duly annotated on the property in favor of PENCAPITAL. No
appeal from the decision in Civil Case No. 53757 having been made by JRMDC, the same
became final and executory (Annex "15", Reply Memorandum of PENCAPITAL).

(10) On September 15, 1993, petitioners herein as heirs of Elias L. Lorilla, filed a motion in
Civil Case No. 5262 to quash the writ of execution issued by the Makati Court, arguing that
since defendant Elias L. Lorilla passed away on January 15, 1988, or one year and three
months before the Makati Court rendered decision in Civil Case No. 5262 on April 5, 1989, the
case should have been dismissed insofar as Elias L. Lorilla is concerned, in keeping with
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. - When the action is for recovery of
money, debt, or interest therein, and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be presented
in the manner especially provided in these rules.

(11) On February 8, 1994, the Makati Court, through its Acting Presiding Judge, the
Honorable Francisco Donato Villanueva, denied the motion to quash said writ of execution,
 ruling that the judgment in Civil Case No. 5256 having become final, it is now beyond its
authority to amend it by dismissing the same insofar as defendant Elias L. Lorilla is concerned,
and that the suggested remedy, if at all, is a petition for its annulment. Petitioners moved to
reconsider the denial of their motion to quash the writ of execution, but the Makati Court stood
pat on its ruling, hence, petitioners recourse to this Court for annulment of judgment." [4]

Petitioners, thus, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Writ of Execution,
and/or Levy on Execution with Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order to annul or enjoin enforcement
of the judgment dated April 5, 1989 of the Makati Court in Civil Case No. 5262. In its decision promulgated on
November 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the petition, hence petitioners present recourse to
this Court. They assign the following errors:

"I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT ANNULLING

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, DATED 5 APRIL 1989, INSOFAR AS DECEASED
DEFENDANT ELIAS LORILLA IS CONCERNED, THEREBY VIOLATION (sic) PETITIONERS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN VIOLATING

SECTION 21, RULE 3, AND SECTIONS 5 AND 7, RULE 86 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. Sj
cj

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING

PETITIONERS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW." [5]

In our view, the main issue for resolution now is whether the respondent appellate court erred and gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioners action for annulment of judgment of the RTC of Makati, Branch 58,
concerning the deceased defendant Elias Lorilla. Pertinently, we have to consider whether Section 21 of Rule 3
and Sections 5 and 7of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable in the present case. Similarly, we
have to inquire whether petitioners, heirs of Elias Lorilla, were deprived of their right to due process of law.

Petitioners argue that the cause of action of private respondent Commercial Credit Corp. (now known as
Pentacapital Finance Corp. and hereinafter referred to as PENTACAPITAL) did not survive for being in violation
of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. They claim that under this rule, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the person of Elias Lorilla when he died, and consequently the action against him should have
been dismissed.

Section 21 of Rule 3 states:

"SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. Where the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance,
it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules."

Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that upon the defendants death, the action "shall be dismissed to be presented in
the manner especially provided in these rules." Petitioners argue that this manner is provided for in Sections
5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.[6] As contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, the action has to be
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter presenting his claim as a money claim in the settlement
of the estate of the deceased defendant.[7] The claim becomes a mere incident in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings of the deceased where the whole matter may be fully terminated jointly with the settlement and
distribution of the estate.[8] Supreme

In the present case, however, the records do not show if any notice of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo
Concepcion, counsel of record of Elias Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262 before the Makati Court. Thus, neither the
Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be
expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such notice. Neither could the petitioners
have been made aware of the trial courts judgment adverse to their father, for all notices and orders of the
court were sent to Lorillas counsel of record, who did not bother to inform the parties concerned of Elias
Lorillas death. Apparently, Lorillas counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of the death of his
client, as the Rules require.[9]
As far as the Makati Court was concerned, until the Writ of Execution was issued and the levy thereof on August
5, 1993, Lorilla continued to be represented by counsel of record, Atty. Concepcion; and that upon service of a
copy of the decision on said counsel at the latters address, Lorilla was deemed to have been validly served
notice of the judgment.[10] The failure of Atty. Concepcion to serve notice on the court and the adverse parties
regarding his clients death binds herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of
his counsel.[11]

In this case, petitioners claim that their right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals did not
annul the decision of the Makati Court dated April 5, 1989. They claim that as heirs of Elias Lorilla, they would
be deprived of their lawful inheritance without due process, as they were not parties to the case where the
adverse decision against their father was rendered. Said judgment, they posit, cannot be enforced against them
because the court had not acquired jurisdiction over them, nor over the estate of Elias Lorilla.

True, a judgment may be annulled for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law.[12] But while petitioners
were not properly substituted for Elias Lorilla as defendants, absent any notice of his death, it could not be said
that petitioners were deprived of due process of law, for as far as the trial court was concerned, they were not
parties to the case. To rule otherwise would be, in fact, a more obvious and grievous transgression of due
process.

Moreover in this case, we find that the property which petitioners claim as their lawful inheritance, was no
longer part of the estate of Elias Lorilla at the time of his death. For Elias Lorilla had earlier executed a dacion
en pago over this property in favor of the Joint Resources Management Development Corporation (JRMDC). By
reason thereof, Lorillas transfer certificate of title was cancelled, and a new one was issued in favor of
JRMDC.[13] The levy of PENTACAPITAL annotated on Lorillas certificate of title was carried over onto the title
of JRMDC. Elias Lorillas payment of his obligation to JRMDC being one of dation in payment, it is governed by
the law on sales.[14] The subject property was validly transferred to JRMDC already. Hence petitioners could not
claim that they were deprived of their lawful inheritance without due process of law. Court

Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court sets out the procedure that should be followed after the death
of the defendant in a case. If he died "before final judgment in the Court of First Instance," the action should be
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting his claim in the settlement of the estate of the deceased
in accordance with and as required by Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. [15] Here, however, the
property in question had already been taken out of the estate of Elias Lorilla, even before judgment in Civil Case
No. 5262 was rendered, and it was transferred to JRMDC by virtue of the dacion en pago executed by Elias
Lorilla. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 86 loses its pertinence to the case at bar.

Likewise, Section 7 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court [16] will not apply to the present case. For it speaks
of a situation where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order of the court. It does not cover a
situation where the court was reportedly informed of the death of a party only after final judgment.

Since there was no timely appeal taken from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated April 5,
1989, in Civil Case No. 5262, that judgment had properly become final and executory. As well said by
respondent appellate court, to adopt a view contrary would "open the floodgates to protracted and endless
litigations, because all that counsel for defendant has to do, in an action for recovery of money, in case said
defendant dies before final judgment in a regional trial court, is to conceal such death from the court and
thereafter pretend to go through the motions of trial, and, after judgment is rendered against his client, to
question such judgment for being violative of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Thus, counsel for such
defendant could unduly delay the rendering of a judgment against his client. It is a fundamental concept in any
jural system, that even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
time fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litim."[17]

We see no reason, in the interest of justice, to disturb, much less annul, the aforesaid judgment.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 29, 1994 and its
Resolution promulgated on January 11, 1995 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998]

CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and FLORINA DIMAN, petitioners,
vs. HON, FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS,
BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO LACALLE, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO
LACALLE, respondents.

DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially dismissed by Resolution dated January 14,
1998; but after deliberating on petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1998, the private
respondents' comment thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the Court was
convinced that the order of dismissal should be reconsidered and the petition reinstated. It accordingly
promulgated a resolution to that effect on October 12, 1998, and required "respondents to file their Comment
on the petition within ten (10) days from notice **."
Notice of the Resolution was duly served on private respondents' attorney on October 21, 1998. The latter
filed a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days to file comment, counted from October 31. The Court
granted the extension sought, but only for fifteen (15) days.
The comment was filed late, on November 20, 1998, Counsel's explanation is that he had sought an
extension of 30 days "due to the other volume of legal works similarly situated and school work of the undersigned
as professor of law and dean of the University of Manila," and had entertained "the honest belief" that it would
be granted. However, he learned belatedly that only a 15-day extension had been conceded. He forthwith
completed the comment and filed it, albeit five days late.
The Court admits the late comment, but takes this occasion to reiterate the familiar doctrine that no party
has a right to an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions
for extension are not granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court
exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not justified in assuming that the
extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus
incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the
Court's action on his motion, by time inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk
of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.
Now, the petition for review on certiorari appends practically all the material pleadings, motions, orders
and judgments in the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The respondents' comment on the petition
has been filed, as just mentioned, and opposes its material averments. There is now no impediment to the
adjudication of petitioners' appeal on the merits on the basis of the record as it stands at this time. This, the
Court will now proceed to do.
In 1991, more than fifty years after the effectivity of the Rules of Court [1] -- containing provisions
relative inter alia to the modes of discovery[2] -- this Court had occasion to observe that "among far too many
lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the
nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to them -- which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-
discovery procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrate, effectively
shorten the period of litigation and speed up adjudication."[3]
The case at bar deals with one of such modes of discovery -- a request for admission under Rule 26 of the
Rules of 1964; more particularly, the legal consequences of the failure to respond thereto in the manner
indicated by law. It also treats of other adjective devices to expedite litigation: a summary judgment under Rule
34,[4] and a judgment on demurrer to evidence under Rule 35.[5] Had the principles involved been better
understood and more faithfully observed, the case might have been more quickly decided.
Actually, there are several adjective tools incorporated in the Rules of Court explicitly designed, like those
just mentioned, to abbreviate litigation or abort it at certain stages. Their obvious purpose is to unmask as
quickly as may be feasible, and give short shrift to, untenable causes of action or defenses and thus avoid waste
of time, effort and money.[6] For reasons yet to be fathomed, these devices seem to be of scant familiarity and
of infrequent availment, as above observed, with the result that the salutary objective of the Rules of bringing
about a simple, inexpensive and expeditious system of litigation has not been fully achieved.
Now, to come to grips with the case. There is no disagreement about the antecedents. The case began in
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias (Branch 255), where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was
filed by the Heirs of Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina Diman,
Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman.[7] In their complaint, the Lacalle heirs claimed
that:
a) their mother, the late Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (who died in 1992), was the owner of a "parcel
of land situated at Brgy. Pulang Lupa Uno, Las Pias, ** covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
273301 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal;"
b) Veronica Lacalle had acquired the land in 1959 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, and retained
as caretakers the persons she found in occupancy of the lot at the time of the sale, namely: Julian
Nario and his wife, Adelaida Legaspi, "with arrangement to share the agricultural fruits" until the
former would have need of the property;
c) the caretakers of the lot were served with a notice for them to vacate the land (dated November
22, 1994) and an alias writ of demolition (dated June 7, 1994) issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 2619 -- a case for "ejectment with damages" filed by the Dimans against the Narios,
judgment in which, commanding the Narios' ouster, had supposedly been affirmed by the Makati
Regional Trial Court (Branch 137);
d) neither the deceased Veronica nor any of her heirs had been made parties to said ejectment action;
e) the complaint for ejectment contains false assertions, and had caused them injury for which the
Dimans should be made to pay damages.
In their answer with counterclaim dated February 2, 1995,[8] the Dimans alleged that:
a) they are the registered and absolute owners of the land registered in their names under TCT Nos.
90628, 90629 and 58676 (Pasay City), and have no knowledge of the land claimed by the Lacalle
Heirs;
b) they are entitled to eject from their land the Nario Spouses, who were falsely claiming to be their
lessees;
c) if the Heirs' theory is that the land in their title, No. 273301, is the same as that covered by the
Dimans' titles, then said title No. 2733101 is spurious because:
(1) no less than three official agencies -- (i) the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for Rizal and
Regional Registrar for Region IV, (ii) the Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City, and (iii)
the Pangasiwaan Pangtalaan ng Lupain (Land Registration Authority) -- have certified to
the absence of any entry in their records concerning TCT No. 273301 covering land with an
area of 22,379 square meters in the name of Veronica Vda. De Moreno Lacalle;
(2) Decree No. N-11601 explicitly cited as basis by TCT No. 273301 refers to land in
Mauban, Quezon Province, according to the records of the Land Registration Authority; and
GLRO Record No. 14978 also expressly mentioned as basis for TCT No. 273301, refers to a
registration case heard in Pangasinan;

and

d) they are entitled to damages on their counterclaim.

After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the Heirs on February 2, 1995, a REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION (dated February 2, 1995) of the truth of the following specified matters of fact, to wit: [9]
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of Pasay City, or of
Paraaque, or of Las Pias;
b) the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly registered in their names in Pasay City, as
alleged in their answer;
c) in the Index Records of Registered Property Owners under Act No. 496 in the Office of the land
Registration Authority, there is no record of any property situated in Las Pias in the name of Veronica
Lacalle, more particularly described in TCT 273301;
4) the Heirs cannot produce a certified true copy of TCT 273301;
5) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the property under TCT 273301 for
taxation purposes since its alleged acquisition on February 24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title
on August 7, 1959;
6) not a single centavo has been paid by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and
7) no steps have been taken by the Heirs to ascertain the genuineness and authenticity of the
conflicting titles.
 The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose Lacalle himself through registered mail on February
6, 1995, and copy thereof, by the latter's lawyer (Atty. Cesar T. Ching) on February 4, 1995.However, no
response whatever was made to the request by Lacalle, his lawyer, or anyone else, despite the lapse of the
period therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26 (not less than ten days after service). The Dimans thereupon filed
with the Court a "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR
ADMISSION," dated March 28, 1995,[10] giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their answer to the request
for admission, a copy of which was personally delivered to the latter's lawyer; but again, no response whatever
was made.
The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARRY JUDGMENT" dated April 17, 1995. [11] In that
motion they drew attention to the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the several instances when the
Heirs failed to appear at scheduled hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was however
later reinstated. They argued that because the heirs had failed to respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION,
each of the matters of which an admission was requested, was deemed admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule
26. On this basis, and on the basis of the joint affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los Reyes and Florina Diman Tan -
- attached to the motion and substantiating the facts recited in the request for admission -- the Dimans asserted
that no genuine issue existed and prayed that "a summary judgment be entered dismissing the case for lack of
merit."
The Heirs' counsel filed a two-page opposition dated May 15, 1995[12] in which, betraying an unfortunate
unfamiliarity with the concept of summary judgments, he asserted inter alia that:
"In order for defendants (Dimans) to successfully pray for judgment on the pleadings, they have to
clearly alleged in their permissive counterclaim their cause of action and if the answer of the plaintiffs
(Heirs) to such kind of counterclaim admit (sic) it or the answer to the counterclaim is a sham, that
is the time for the defendants to move for a judgment summarily. ** ** (D)efendants have no cause of
action for praying for summary judgment. It is the plaintiffs who will pray for that and not the
defendants."
Subsequently, the Dimans submitted a reply dated May 23, 1995; [13] the Heirs, a rejoinder dated June 1,
1995;[14] and the Dimans, a pleading entitled "Exceptions and Comment to Plaintiffs' Rejoinder" dated June 8,
1995.[15]
The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment. In its Order of June 14, 1995,[16] the
Court declared that a "perusal of the Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that material issue is raised
in that both plaintiffs and defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting their respective
titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the land." It stressed, citing jurisprudence, that
a summary judgment "is not proper where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which
call for the presentation of evidence."
The case proceeded to trial in due course. At its start, the Heirs' counsel, Atty. Michael Moralde, responding
to questions of the Court, admitted that his clients did not have the original copy of the title which was the basis
for their cause of action, but asserted that they were "still searching" for it since "(i)n every municipality there
are several Registry of Deeds." He theorized that the word "'title' ** is a relative term ** (and) does not only
refer to a document but refers to ownership."[17]
Only Jose Moreno Lacalle gave evidence for the plaintiff Heirs. Like Atty. Moralde, he admitted that he had
no copy "of the document which says ** (his) mother is the registered owner;" that the deed of sale was not the
only basis for his and his co-heirs' claim to the land, but also "a xerox copy of the ** title ** except that ** (he)
cannot find the original;" that "maybe" the original was in possession of the person who was his mother's agent
in all her transactions, a certain Mr. Lopez, whom he could no longer locate; that he had tried to verify the
existence of the title "from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and Pasay" without success; that he had not, however,
gone to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias.[18]
The Heirs' documentary evidence consisted of (1) Veronica Lacalle's death certificate, (2) the special
power of attorney authorizing Jose Lacalle to act for his brothers and sisters; and (3) the deed of absolute sale
purportedly executed by Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica, Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and
Teodora Aranda which deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the "Land 'known as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'" but which
made no reference to any Torrens title over it
Shortly after the Heirs rested their case, the Dimans filed a "Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to
Evidence," dated June 25, 1996.[19] They summarized the Heirs' evidence -- focusing attention on the Heirs
failure to present "even an unauthenticated photocopy of the title," and the absence of any proof that any
proceedings for registration of the land under the Torrens Act had been instituted -- and emphasized anew said
Heirs' implied admissions resulting from their failure to answer their (the Dimans') request therefor as a mode
of discovery. On these premises, the Dimans contended that a judgment on demurrer should be rendered, there
being no genuine issue between the parties notwithstanding the ostensible conflict of averments in their basic
pleadings.
The Heirs presented a three-page opposition, dated July 7, 1996.[20] In it their counsel set out the startling
contention that "(d)emurrer to evidence is violative to due process as the judgment be rendered without giving
the plaintiff the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant," and petulantly inquired, "How could the truth
come out without cross-examination of the defendants by plaintiff?" particularly, as regards "whether their
(the Dimans') title is not fake." Said counsel also posited the amazing notion that "Demurrer to evidence may be
correct only in criminal cases as it is the right of the accused to remain silent, and that includes his right to file
demurrer for fear of cross-examination. But not in Civil Cases." Once more counsel regrettably exposed his
ignorance of quite elementary legal principles.
Again, the Dimans' efforts at expediting disposition of the litigation were unsuccessful. By Order dated
December 2, 1996,[21] the Trial Court denied their motion to dismiss. Respecting the Heirs' omission to present
in evidence any copy (even a photocopy) of TCT No. 273301, the Court remarked that "Not being able to prove
the genuineness and authenticity of TCT No. 273301, it being only a mere xerox copy ** (the Heirs) did not
formally offer the same in evidence." However, the Court said, the deed of sale of the land in Veronica Lacalle's
favor that was submitted instead -- the "genuineness and authenticity ** (of which had) been fully established"
by the certification of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC -- was adequate for the purpose. According to the
Court, "(e)xecution of a deed of conveyance in a certain prescribed form gave to the transfer of a title to the
land conveyed ** (and) without being controverted by any convincing evidence to the contrary can be sufficient
basis in granting the plaintiffs' relief for quieting of their title." The Order passed sub silentio on the quaint
contentions in the Heirs' opposition.
The Dimans moved for reconsideration under date of January 2, 1997, [22] inter alia (1) alleging that
although the photocopy of TCT 2773301 annexed to the Heirs' complaint states that the "certificate is a transfer
from T.C.T. No. 259150" (and this, presumably, would be the vendors' [the Mojicas'] title), no effort whatever
was made to submit proof thereof, and (2) reiterating the proposition that the Heirs were bound by their
implied admissions under Rule 26.
The Dimans also submitted a "SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated January 7,
1997[23] in which they invited attention to the identity of the technical description of the land contained in the
deed of sale to Veronica Lacalle and that set out in TCT No. 273301. It must therefore have been Veronica
Lacalle, they reasoned, who had instituted the registration proceedings leading to the supposed issuance of
said TCT No. 273301. Yet the heirs failed to present evidence of the record of any such registration proceedings,
just as they failed to present evidence of any authentic copy of the title itself.
The Heirs filed a one-page "Vehement Opposition ** " dated February 15, 1997. [24] Once again they
reiterated the astounding argument that the Dimans' "insistence ** (on the demurrer to evidence) is tantamount
to suppression of their evidence as they are afraid of cross-examination"!
Again the Trial Court rebuffed the Dimans. In its Order of February 28, 1997,[25] the Court ruled that the
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration and its supplement had already been passed upon in the Order
of December 2, 1996. It then set the case "for the reception of defendants' evidence on April 22, 1997 **."
What the Dimans did was to commence a special civil action of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in
the Court of Appeals praying (a) that it set aside the Orders of June 14, 1995 (denying summary judgment), of
December 2, 1996 (denying demurrer to evidence), and of February 28, 1997 (denying reconsideration); (b)
that the Trial Judge be commanded to dismiss the case before it; and (c) that said judge be prohibited from
conducting further proceedings in the case.
But once again their efforts met with failure. The Appellate Tribunal (Seventh Division) promulgated
judgment on September 9, 1997 decreeing that their petition be "DENIED due course and DISMISSED." The
Court of Appeals held that insofar as concerned the Order of June 14, 1995, the petition for its invalidation had
not been filed within a reasonable time; and that as regards the Order of December 2, 1996, the remedy
of certiorari was improper because : (1) said order was merely interlocutory, (2) any error therein constituted
only an error of judgment correctible by appeal, and (3) there was no capriciousness or whimsicality attendant
upon the order. The Dimans' motion for reconsideration was later denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution
dated November 5, 1997.[26]
The Dimans thereupon filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Tribunal's
Decision of September 9, 1997. But seemingly consistent with the pattern of judicial misfortune which they had
theretofore been traversing, their petition for review was dismissed, by Resolution dated January 14,
1998. Their appeal was however subsequently reinstated, as earlier recounted.
Now, what first strikes the Court about the case at bar is the regrettable absence of familiarity, therein laid
bare, with the rules of discovery and with the underlying philosophy and principles of the cognate remedy of
summary judgment. That resulted in the undue protraction of the present action despite ample demonstration
of the absence of any genuine issue -- that is to say, that the issues ostensibly arising from the pleadings were
sham or fictitious.
A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make
discovery should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the
Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly as regards
request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a
written request that he admit : (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request,
said party is bound within the period designated in the request,[27] to file and serve on the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
(2) setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the party
served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall
be deemed admitted.[28]
In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly served by registered mail on Jose Lacalle on
February 6, 1995, and a copy thereof on his lawyers on February 4, 1995. Neither made any response whatever
within the reglementary period. Nor did either of them do so even after receiving copy of the Dimans'
"MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION." dated
March 28, 1995. On account thereof, in legal contemplation, the Heirs impliedly admitted all the facts listed in
the request for admission. These plain and simple legal propositions were disregarded by His Honor.
It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that although the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations
-- if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine,
or, in the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entiled to a judgment as a matter of law,[29] the Court shall render a
summary judgment for the plaintiff[30] or the defendant[31] as the case may be.[32]
Parenthetically, the existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and
their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for a summary
judgment[33] from one for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19 of the 1964 Rules. [34] In the latter case,
there is no ostensible issue at all, but the absence of any because of the failure of the defending party's answer
to raise an issue. Rule 19 expresses the principle as follows:
"Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading **." [35]
On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist -- i.e., facts are asserted in
the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham,
fictitious, not genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or admissions. In other words, as a noted authority
remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded while a summary judgment is a
judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions.[36] Another distinction is
that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant (one seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a summary judgment may
be applied for by either a claimant or a defending party.
These basic distinctions escaped His Honor. He denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment in his
Order of June 14, 1995, opining that a "perusal of the Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that material
issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting
their respective titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the land." He added, citing
cases, that a summary judgment "is not proper where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual
issues which call for the presentation of evidence." Such a ratiocination is grossly erroneous. Clearly, the
grounds relied on by the Judge are proper for the denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings -- as to which
the essential question, as already remarked, is: are there issues arising from or generated by the pleadings? --
but not as regards a motion for summary judgment -- as to which the crucial question is: issues having been
raised by the pleadings, are those issues genuine, or sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions accompanying the application therefor?
Errors on principles so clear and fundamental as those herein involved cannot but be deemed so egregious
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, being tantamount to whimsical or capricious exercise of judicial
prerogative.
When the Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs, and the Dimans moved to dismiss on ground of
insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence, the Trial Judge was charged with the duty to assess the evidence to
ascertain whether or not "upon the facts and the law the plaintiff(s) ** (have) shown no right to relief." It was
in the first place incumbent on His Honor to hold the Heirs bound to their admissions appearing in the record,
express and implied. In accordance with Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were impliedly,
but no less indubitably, deemed to have admitted the facts on which admissions had been duly requested by
reason of their failure to reply thereto. Said Section 2 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. Implied admissions. -- Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than twn (10) days
after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn
statement either denying specifically the matters on which an admission is requested or setting forth
in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
 Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested shall be promptly
submitted to the court for resolution."[37]
In determining the chief issue in the case, the Trial Judge should have taken due account of the following
circumstances on record and obvious legal propositions:

1) the Heirs' admissions of the following facts, viz.:

a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of
Las Pias;

b) on the other hand, the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly registered in their names in Pasay
City;

c) there is no record of any property situated in Las Pias in the name of Veronica Lacalle -- more particularly
described in TCT 273301 -- in the Index Records of Registered Property Owners under Act No. 496 in the Office
of the Land Registration Authority;

d) the Heirs do not have and cannot produce even a certified true copy of TCT 273301;

e) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the property under TCT 273301 for taxation
purposes since its alleged acquisition on February 24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title on August 7, 1959;

f) not a single centavo was ever paid by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and

g) no steps were ever taken by the Heirs to ascertain the genuineness and authenticity of the conflicting titles.

2) the statement in open Court of the Heirs' own counsel that his clients did not have original copy of
the title, that they were fact "still searching" for the title;[38]
3) the testimony of Jose Moreno Lacalle that he had no copy "of the document which says ** (his)
mother is the registered owner" of the land in question; that he "cannot find the original" which
"maybe" was in possession of his mother's agent, a certain Mr. Lopez, who, he could no longer locate;
that he had tried to verify the existence of the title "from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and Pasay"
without success; that he had not, however, gone to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias; [39]
4) that the only document bearing on the issue submitted by the heirs, the deed of absolute sale
purportedly executed by Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica, Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica
and Teodora Aranda -- which deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the "land 'known as Lot 1 PSU-
151453,'" but which made no reference to any Torrens title over it -- was not accompanied by proof
of the vendors' ownership of the land in question;
5) that the land subject of the Heirs' action for quieting of title being registered land (being in fact
registered in the Dimans' favor), the unregistered deed of sale relied upon by the Heirs cannot and
does not affect said land, or bind any third party (including the Dimans) for the reason that, as a matter
of law:
" ** (N)o deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration;" and it is the "act of registration (that) shall be the operative act
to convey or effect the land in so far as third persons are concerned," which "registration shall
be made in the ** Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies." [40]

and

6) that there is no proof whatever of the ownership or character of the rights of the vendors (the
Mojicas) over the property purportedly conveyed.
In fine, the Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a judgment in their favor. They had not presented
any copy whatever of the title they wished to be quieted. They had not adduced any proof worthy of the name
to establish their precedessors' ownership of the land. On the contrary, their own evidence, from whatever
aspect viewed, more than persuasively indicated their lack of title over the land, or the spuriousness of their
claim of ownership thereof. The evidence on record could not be interpreted in any other way, and no other
conclusion could be drawn therefrom except the unmeritoriousness of the complaint. The case at bar is a classic
example of the eminent propriety of a summary judgment, or a judgment on demurrer to evidence.
 Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition advanced by the Heirs
against the Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviously
mistaken grounds cited by the Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring
that it was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Court to have refused to render a summary
judgment or one on demurrer to evidence. In no sense may the Trial Court's errors be considered, as the Court
of Appeals did in its judgment of September 9, 1997, as mere errors of judgment correctible by appeal,
untarnished by any capriciousness or whimsicality.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 9, 1997 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE: the Orders dated July 14, 1996 and December 2, 1996 rendered in the action for
"Quieting of Title and Damages" -- docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3085 of the Regional Trial Court at Las Pias
(Branch 255) and entitled "Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle, represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle versus
Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman" -- are annuled; and said Civil
Case No. 94-3085 is DISMISSED. Costs against private respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERT CASIMIRO y SERILLO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated October 17, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio
City, finding accused-appellant Albert Casimiro guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, 4, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
and/or deliver to SPO2 DOROTHEO SUPA of the 14th Regional Field Office, Narcotics Unit, posing as buyer,
about nine hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form, without any authority of law to
do so and knowing fully well that the article is a prohibited drug, in violation of the aforecited provision of
law.[2]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon the trial of the
case followed.[3]
Three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo Supa, [4] Alma Margarita D. Villaseor, and
PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. Their testimonies established the following:
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the office of Police Chief Inspector
Benson Dagiw-a Leleng at the 14th Regional Narcotics Office, DPS Compound in Baguio City. She informed Chief
Inspector Leleng and PO3 Juan Piggangay that a certain Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant herein, was engaged
in the distribution or sale of marijuana. As proof, Rose told the police officers to wait and accused-appellant
would call them up on that day. Accused-appellant, however, did not call up. Nonetheless, Police Chief Inspector
Leleng formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Edgar Afalla as team leader, PO2 Dorotheo Supa as poseur-
buyer, and SPO2 Marquez Madlon and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. as back-up men.[5]
The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics agents to wait for a call from accused-
appellant. True enough, at around 4:00 p.m., the telephone rang. When PO2 Supa answered the telephone, he
found that it was accused-appellant who was calling. Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa to accused-
appellant as someone who wanted to buy marijuana. Accused-appellant allegedly agreed to meet PO2 Supa at
around 1:00 p.m. the following day outside Anthonys Wine and Grocery at the YMCA Building, Post Office Loop,
Upper Session Road. PO2 Supa said he wanted to buy one kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said it
would cost P1,500.00. Accused-appellant said he would wear white pants and a black leather jacket to their
meeting the following day.[6]
On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went to the grocery store. SPO2 Madlon and
PO3 Piggangay waited secretly inside the Post Office building, around 12 meters across the street, where they
could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At around 1:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived. Rose greeted him, O Bert, heto
na yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na kayong mag-usap. Aalis na ako. (Bert, here is the buyer I told you
about. Ill leave you two alone to talk.) Rose then left the two men alone. [7]
PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the marijuana. Accused-appellant gave
the poseur-buyer a paper bag, which contained an object wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After determining
from its appearance and smell that the object inside was marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up
team to make an arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no longer gave the marked money to accused-
appellant because he placed the latter under arrest, reciting to him his rights, while the back-up team ran from
across the street.[8]
After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the 14th Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa,
SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence
custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the
laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana.[9] They also prepared a receipt of property seized, dated
August 18, 1999, (Exh. L) which states:

18 August 1999

RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the undersigned seizing Officer have seized and taken
possession of the property described hereunder from the

a. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs.-old, single, waiter, native of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila and resident of #2 Happy Homes, Old Lucban, Baguio City.
b. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this office on or about 181330H August
1999, in front of Anthonys Grocery along the vicinity of Post Office Loop, Baguio City.
c. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659.
EXHIBIT QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION REMARKS
A One (1) Bricks Marijuana Dried Leaves wrapped in a newspaper Delivered by the
page placed inside a black plastic bag with markings Prime wear suspect to a poseur
shirt haus place[d] inside a dark gray paper bag with markings buyer.
Spencer & SM City

WITNESSES:
(signed) (signed)
1. PO3 Juan A. Piggangay ALBERT CASIMIRO Y CERILLO
PNP (Suspect/ Owner)

(signed) (signed)
2. PO2 Dorotheo T. Supa SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon
PNP PNP (Seizing Officer)

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. [10] The dried leaves were then
examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Cordillera Administrative Region.[11] Police officer and forensic
chemist Alma Margarita Villaseor found the specimen to weigh 904.6 grams. The chemistry report dated
August 20, 1999, signed by Villaseor, stated that the leaves were positive for marijuana.[12]
The defense then presented evidence showing the following: Accused-appellant, then 25 years old,
residing at No. 1 Old Lucban Street, Happy Homes, Baguio City,[13] said that at around 8:00 a.m. of August 16,
1999, he took the child of his neighbor to the Christian Mission Center School near the Baguio General
Hospital. He then went home and stayed there during the day, as he usually did, except when he needed to fetch
the boy from school. At around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., he reported for work at the Perutz Bar [14] on Magsaysay
Avenue, where he worked as a waiter, until 3:00 a.m. of the next day.[15]
On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call from Rose, an acquaintance who worked as
a guest relations officer at a club on Magsaysay Avenue. Rose offered to help him find a better job and asked
that they meet at Anthonys Wine and Grocery. In the past, Rose had offered to sell him shabu or marijuana, but
he refused to buy from her as he had no money.[16] At around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant met Rose in
front of the grocery store. While she talked to him about a job opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3 Piggangay
grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted I-handcuff, i-handcuff! (Handcuff him, handcuff
him!) Accused-appellant was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the policemen, accompanied by
Rose.[17]
At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accused-appellant about the marijuana allegedly seized
from him. Accused-appellant said he denied having carried the bag of marijuana which he had seen Rose
carrying earlier.[18] After taking pictures of him pointing at the bag, the policemen threatened to shoot him in a
secluded place if he did not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make him admit ownership of the
marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release accused-appellant if he gave them money. When accused-
appellant replied that he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, If you have no money, then we will work on your
papers so that you will go to Muntinlupa. The policemen then took accused-appellant to a hospital for a physical
examination and afterwards asked him to sign a receipt of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report
without explaining their contents or allowing him to read them.[19]
On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of its decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Albert Casimiro guilty beyond doubt of Violation of Section 4 of
Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended by Sections 13 and 17 of RA 7659 (Sale or delivery of 904.6 grams
of marijuana brick) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a Fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.

The marijuana brick weighing 904.6 grams (Exhs. J to J-4) being the subject of the crime and a prohibited drug
is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance
with law.

The accused Albert Casimiro, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be credited in the service of his sentence
4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that the evidence against him is insufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[21]
We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, the rule does not apply where
it is shown that any fact of weight and substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the
trial court.[22] In this case, several such circumstances stand out as having been overlooked or misapprehended
by the lower court which entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the lower court declared:

The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does
not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance with
their standard operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was seized. The receipt
should not be treated as an admission or confession.[23]

Indeed, the receipt (Exh. L) could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was
signed by him without the assistance of counsel.[24] Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer
and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as suspect/ owner. In effect, accused-appellant admitted that
he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the
assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in
evidence.[25]
In People v. Obrero,[26] this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed by the Constitution to
be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures
typical of the atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while he was being arrested
outside the grocery:
Q: What happened after you brought out your comb and started combing your hair?
A: Sir, my two companions went to our place and effected the arrest of the suspect.
Q: What else happened after the two members of the team rushed to your place?
 A: We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and brought him to our Narcotics office.
Q: How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?
A: Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, You are under arrest for violation of 6425. You
have the right to remain silent. You have the rights to call for a lawyer of your own choice. Anything
you say may be used as evidence in favor or against you. And we brought him to the office, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: Sir, we investigated him and the suspect identified himself as Albert Casimiro. [27]
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford
counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he
understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the
suspect.[28] We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant acted willingly,
intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-
appellant to say whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or
whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.
Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-appellant. As he points out, he could not have
been so careless as to call the telephone number of the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and offer marijuana to
the policemen there. Nor can we believe that when accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed place,
Rose could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one who wanted to buy marijuana as if the latter were buying
something not prohibited or illegal. While drugs may indeed be sold to police officers,[29] these transactions are
usually done face-to face. It is improbable that a drug dealer would discuss the details of an illegal sale over the
telephone with someone he has never seen before.
Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related case.[30]
In People v. Mapa,[31] accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after the prosecution failed to clarify
whether the specimen submitted to the NBI for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from
the accused. In People v. Dismuke,[32] this Court ruled that the failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist was that seized from the accused was fatal to the prosecutions case. In People
v. Laxa,[33] the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately
after the alleged apprehension of accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he marked the seized items
only after seeing them for the first time in the police headquarters. It was held:

This deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the origins of
the marijuana. Were the bags which the policemen allegedly recovered from the scene of the buy-bust
operation the same ones which PO2 Espadera marked in the police headquarters? This question gives rise only
to surmises and speculations, and cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody. The prosecution
witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of
marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it from accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did
so in their headquarters.[34] The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was
likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. [35] There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked
by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.
According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw accused-appellant give PO2 Supa was colored gray or
blue, the same color as that of the bag sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for laboratory
examination.[36] PO2 Supa stated, however, that the bag of marijuana which accused-appellant was carrying in
the grocery was colored brown.[37] The discrepancy in the testimony of these two police officers casts additional
doubt on the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti.
Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating procedure for a buy-bust operation. The
governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it is precisely when the
government’s purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice
Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well meaning but without understanding.[38] Our desire to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the
expense of constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City is REVERSED and accused-
appellant Albert Casimiro is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.Consequently, he is ordered
forthwith released from custody, unless he is being lawfully held for another crime. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is hereby ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof. SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. Nos. 131384-87. February 2, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases are before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, finding accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. guilty of four counts of rape of his minor
daughters, Oleby and Maricris Nadera, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one
count of rape and death for each of the remaining three counts. Accused-appellant was also ordered to
indemnify complainants Oleby Nadera in the amount of P150,000.00 and Maricris Nadera in the amount of
P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. MENDOZAJ

Reversal of the decision is sought on the sole ground that -

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S IMPROVIDENT

PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE AND IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING
INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE
CONSEQUENCE OF HIS PLEA.[1]

The facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby, born on October 2,
1982; Maricris, born on March 16, 1984; March Anthony, born on January 8, 1986; and Sherilyn, born on
September 27, 1987.[2]

On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain, and came home to the Philippines for vacation only in
July 1993. She then left again for Bahrain in September 1993 and did not return until September 12, 1995. [3]

On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had
been raped by their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan
and filed a complaint against accused-appellant.[4]

After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on
various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.

In Criminal Case No. C-4982, the information[5] alleged-

That on or about the 17th day of May, 1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust
and lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, nine (9)
years of age at that time against the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4983, the information[6] charged -

That on or about the 17th day of April, 1995 at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at that time against
the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4984, the information[7] stated-

That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, sometime in the evening, at Barangay Bayani,
Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by
means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at that
time against the latter's will and consent.
In Criminal Case No. C-4985, the information[8] recited -

That on or about the 3rd day of March 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his daughter, MARICRIS NADERA, eleven (11)
years of age against the latter's will and consent.

The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A.
Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. [9] However, on
August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty
to the crime charged in all the informations.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon, Oleby Nadera, Maricris Nadera, and
Daisy Nadera.

Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, Medical Officer IV of the Oriental Mindoro Provincial Hospital, who conducted the
medical examination of both complainants, submitted a report on the result of Oleby Nadera's examination as
follows:[10]

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.

- Breast developed
- Abdomen: flat, soft non-tender.

EXTERNAL GENITALIA

- Minimal pubic hair

- Healed incomplete hymenal lacerations at 5, 7, 12 o'clock positions.
- No bleeding.

INTERNAL SPECULUM EXAMINATION

- Vagina admits 2 fingers with ease.

- Cervix small, firm, close non-tender (-) bleeding.
- Uterus not enlarged.
- Adnexae negative

LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

- Smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed positive result.

She testified that the hymenal lacerations may have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, the patient's
history of genitalic insertions, a straddle injury, or sitting on hard wood. She could not determine when these
lacerations were sustained because they had healed over a period beyond seven days. [11]

Dr. Fesalbon likewise rendered a report[12] on the medical examination of Maricris Nadera, the pertinent parts
of which state:

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.

- Abdomen, flat, soft.

EXTERNAL GENITALIA:

- Absence of pubic hair healed hymenal lacerations, incomplete at 1, 5, 8, 11

o'clock positions.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION:
 - Vagina admits 1 finger with ease.
- Cervix small (-) bleeding
- Uterus not enlarged.
-Adnexae (-).

LABORATORY EXAMINATION

- Smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed Negative result.

In the case of Maricris Nadera, Dr. Fesalbon explained that the hymenal lacerations could have been caused by
penetration such as through instrumentation or insertion of an object inside the vagina. They could also have
been caused by the penetration of the penis. Upon inquiry from the court, Dr. Fesalbon stated that the fact that
Maricris had more hymenal lacerations than Oleby could be due to the difference in the impact of penetration.
She added that the number of times each of the girls had sexual intercourse could not be ascertained merely
from the hymenal lacerations, although it could be concluded that an object had been inserted in the vagina.[13]

Oleby Nadera testified about the rapes committed by her father against her as follows:

On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while Daisy was away working as a domestic helper in
Bahrain, accused- appellant pulled Oleby, then nine years of age, towards a bed, removed her panties and shorts
and ordered her to keep quiet. He then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He
proceeded to make an up and down motion while on top of his daughter. All the while, Oleby was crying,
pleading with her father, "Huwag po!", "Huwag po!" Accused-appellant again ordered Oleby to keep quiet lest
her brother and sisters were awakened. Afterwards, accused-appellant told Oleby to put on her panties and
shorts and to go to sleep. Oleby went to the bed where her brother and sisters were sleeping and cried.

On another occasion, on April 17, 1995, accused-appellant sent Sherilyn and Maricris to the sari-sari store while
he asked March Anthony to gather firewood. While Oleby was left alone inside their house in Barangay Bayani,
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, accused-appellant again raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at that time. Accused-
appellant closed the door and windows, removed Oleby's panties and shorts and sat down. While sitting down,
accused-appellant placed Oleby's legs on his thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Later on, he told
Oleby to put on her panties and shorts and told her to fetch her brother and sisters.

Oleby was raped by her father for the third time on April 24, 1995. That evening, she woke up to find her father
on top of her, taking off her shorts and panties and inserting his penis into her vagina. As her father was taking
off her clothes, Oleby cried and pleaded, "Huwag po! Huwag po!" Instead of desisting, accused-appellant told
her to keep quiet so as not to awaken her brother and sisters, and threatened her with harm if she made any
noise. Accused-appellant then made a pumping motion, consummating the sexual act with his daughter. [14]

After Oleby's direct examination had been finished, Atty. Brotonel, accused-appellant's counsel, did not conduct
any cross examination on the ground that he was convinced Oleby was telling the truth. [15]

On that same day, Maricris also testified. She related how she was raped by her father on March 3, 1996, the
year before, when she was 11 years old. At about eight o'clock in the evening of said date, while her brother
and sisters were sleeping, she was pulled by her father towards his bed and told to lie down. Accused-appellant
then placed himself on top of Maricris and inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricris pleaded "Papa, huwag
po, maawa naman kayo sa amin." Ignoring his daughter's pleas, accused-appellant continued raping her by
making a pumping motion and threatened to kill all of them if she cried. Accused-appellant afterwards asked
Maricris to put on her shorts and panties and return to bed. He told Maricris not to cry so as not to awaken her
siblings. She did not tell anyone what befell her because she was afraid. A neighbor, named Lita Macalalad,
asked her if Oleby had been raped by their father. It turned out Oleby had told her ordeal to Lita Macalalad
while they were washing clothes and talking about Oleby's parents. Oleby also told Lita Macalalad that Maricris
had been raped by their father as well, a fact related to Oleby by Maricris. [16]

Daisy Nadera, accused-appellant's wife, also testified for the prosecution. Her testimony focused on the dates
of births of her children and the fact that she was out of the country when the alleged rapes occurred. She
testified that she and her daughters filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant after discovering his
hideous acts. Thereafter, her children were subjected to a medical examination. [17]

On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter.

Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense.

On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape
against his daughters. The dispositive portion of its decision[18] reads:
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds accused Elegio Nadera, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Rape [4 counts] with the qualifying circumstance that the victims are
under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years for the rape committed
on May 17, 1992 and three DEATH PENALTIES for the rape committed on April 17 and 24,
1995 and March 3, 1996, together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He is also
ordered to indemnify victim Oleby Nadera the total amount of P150,000.00 in Criminal Case
Nos. C-4982, C-4983 and C-4984 and Maricris Nadera, the amount of P50,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. C-4985, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

S OO R D E R E D.

As already stated, accused-appellant's lone assignment of error is that the trial court accepted his plea of guilty
to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences
of his plea. In support of his contention, accused-appellant invokes the ruling in the case of People v. Dayot[19] in
which this Court ruled that, in criminal cases, the judge must be convinced that the accused, in pleading guilty,
is truly guilty. This could be done by requiring him to narrate the events leading to the crime, making him
reenact it, or asking him to supply missing details. The judge must satisfy himself that: (1) the accused is
voluntarily pleading guilty, and (2) he is truly guilty and there is a rational basis for a finding of guilt based on
his testimony.

We find merit in accused-appellant's allegations. In addition, we find that there was inadequate representation
of his case in court, thus necessitating the remand of this case for further proceedings.

I.

Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.- When the

accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full
comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused
if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. [20]

What constitutes a searching inquiry, as explained in People v. Alicando,[21] is that the plea of guilt must be based
on a free and informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea,
and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.

In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of accused-appellant,
for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully understood the
consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication in the record that accused-appellant changed his plea to
guilty is the Certificates of Re- Arraignment, dated August 5, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982 to C-
4985.[22] On what exactly accused-appellant said in entering his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been told
by the trial judge, the records shed no light. There is thus no evidence to show that accused-appellant's guilty
plea was voluntarily made or that he had fully understood the consequences of such plea.

In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused pleaded guilty, thus:

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's
Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, on August 5, 1997, when these cases
were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accused manifested that the accused,
realizing the futility of entering into trial and considering that he actually committed the acts
complained of, intimated his intention to enter a plea of guilty to the above- mentioned
charges. The accused was then asked by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a
plea of guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May 17, 1992 against his
daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed on April 17 and 24, 1995 [both
against Oleby Nadera] and on March 3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old at the
time], he would be sentenced to death by lethal injection. After having been informed of this,
 he insisted that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is ready to face
the consequences thereof.[23]

The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching
inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been
said, a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient.[24] For more often than
not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
The trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions.[25] He must be completely convinced that the guilty plea
made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the
manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred with
the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore,
since the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper
verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them.[26] In this case, absent any showing that
these questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken by
the trial court.

What the trial court did in this case, as described in its decision, is similar to what happened in People v.
Sevilleno.[27] In that case, the accused was charged with the rape and homicide of a nine-year old girl. The
accused pleaded guilty whereupon the judge asked him questions: (1) Do you understand your plea of guilt?
and (2) Do you know that your plea of guilt could bring the death penalty? This Court held that these questions
did not constitute a searching inquiry.

. . . In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where
he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow
is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations
of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to
satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the
accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea.[28]

Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently.

II.

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be
sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving
his commission of the offense charged.[29]

As already stated, the prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Oleby and Maricris Nadera, the
results of their medical examinations, and the testimonies of their mother, Daisy, and the physician who
conducted the medical examination of the two girls, Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this
case, however, persuade us that a remand of this case is necessary.

First. A perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons
on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of the prosecution's evidence and
a bare recital of R.A. No.7659, amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate the
reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found the
testimonies of the witnesses credible. Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment.- The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which
the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b) participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after
the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused
by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there be any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
 In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused
in favor of the offended party.

In People v. Bugarin,[30] we stated:

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It
is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision
so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the
rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty
or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in
this case disrespects the judicial function.

Second. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's
Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in
which he conducted Maricris Nadera's cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for
the accused but also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires.

Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the
accused's right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty,
especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor
at his command to protect and safeguard the accused's fundamental rights.

In the case of People vs. Bermas,[31] no less than three PAO lawyers were found by the Court to have failed in
performing their duties to their client, an accused charged with raping his daughter. The first lawyer
inexplicably waived the cross examination of the private complainant and later asked to be relieved of her
duties as counsel de oficio. A second lawyer appointed by the court missed several hearings during the trial and
could no longer be located. The third PAO lawyer appointed by the trial court accepted his duties reluctantly
and later ceased to appear for the accused. This Court held that:

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind
of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.

Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this case falls short of the quality of advocacy
demanded of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty. A glaring
example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby
Nadera, as revealed in the following portion of the records:

COURT:

.......Any cross?

ATTY. BROTONEL:

.......If Your Honor please, we are not conducting any cross-examination, because this
representation, from the demeanor of the witness, I am convinced that she is telling the
truth.[32]

It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the
bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the accused's constitutional right to
confront and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the complainant against that of the accused, the
two being the only persons present during the commission of the offense. While the lone testimony of the victim
is sufficient to convict the accused, such testimony must be clear, positive, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate
credulity without denying the accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. [33] This is where cross
examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover
the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus to
give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. For unless
proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed to be innocent. [34]

Indeed, cross examining Oleby Nadera becomes indispensable if her testimony is viewed together with the
results of her medical examination. Oleby Nadera claimed that she was last raped by her father on April 24,
1995.[35] Yet, the medical examination conducted on her on April 30, 1996 [36] revealed the presence of
spermatozoa in the vaginal canal on that date. This was a year after the last rape allegedly committed by her
father. This evident discrepancy leads to only one natural conclusion: Oleby engaged in sexual intercourse a
few days before she was examined. This raises a number of questions that bear upon the credibility of Oleby as
a witness and upon the guilt of accused- appellant. This may not necessarily mean that she was lying when she
said that on April 24, 1995 she had been raped by accused-appellant, but it does indicate a necessity-that of
cross examining her in order to ferret out the truth.

The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris' testimony. While she was cross examined by
defense counsel, the examination was at best a half-hearted attempt to comply with a lawyer's obligation,
lacking the rigor and zeal required considering that a man's life is at stake. The cross examination centered on
what Maricris did or did not do while she witnessed her sister being raped, and on her failure to report the
allegedly incestuous rapes against them. Said cross examination did not even touch upon the specific details
concerning the rape committed against her. Containing lurid details as it may be, it was nonetheless important
to probe Maricris' testimony, especially since it was substantially similar to the first incident of rape narrated
by her sister, and thus raised the possibility that it was a rehearsed, if not concocted, story.

Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution,
according to the trial court's decision, he even expressed his conformity to the admission of the same. Neither
did he present any evidence on behalf of accused-appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the records is it shown that
accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so
desires.

Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty
or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the more imperative because
the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio.

In view of the foregoing, we find it necessary to remand the case for the proper arraignment and trial of the
accused, considering not only the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in
representing his cause. A new trial has been ordered in criminal cases on the ground of retraction of witnesses,
negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to
represent the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered
into by both the prosecution and the defense.[38]

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated April 27, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983, C-4984 and C-4985 are REMANDED to
it for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. The trial court is enjoined to conduct the proper
trial of accused-appellant with all deliberate speed upon receipt of the records of the cases.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000]

Judge ADORACION G. ANGELES, complainant, vs. Atty. THOMAS C. UY JR., respondent. Spped jo

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers must promptly account for money or property they receive on behalf of their clients. Failure to do so
constitutes professional Misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

The Case and the Facts

In a letter dated February 11, 1999 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 121) charged Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. with violation of Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant states that respondent's acts, which had earlier been
held contemptible in her February 10, 1999 Order,[1] also rendered him administratively liable. In the said
Order, she narrated the following facts:

"When the case was called for the second time at 11 :25 o'clock in the morning, the private
prosecutor Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. appeared. In open court, accused Norma Trajano manifested
that she had already settled in full the civil aspect in Crim. Case No. C-54177 (98) in the total
amount of [t]hirty [s]ix [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P36,500.00) [p]esos. She further alleged
that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the private complainant and the balance of P16,500.00
was delivered to Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the private complainant and accordingly
produced in open court the receipt for such payment signed by no less than the aforesaid
lawyer. Indeed, the civil liability of the accused had already been satisfied in full. Miso

"However, the private complainant, Primitiva Malansing [Del Rosario] manifested that she did
not receive the amount of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos which
was paid to his lawyer Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., thereby constraining this court to direct Atty.
Thomas C. Uy to turn over the money to the private complainant which he received in trust
for his client. Atty. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money but the
assertion of the lawyer was belied by his own client, the herein private complainant, who
manifested in open court x x x her willingness to accept the money. The Court again directed
Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter argued that he kept it in his office. Consequently,
the Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money from his law office
which is located only at the second floor of the same building where this court is located.

"Unfortunately, it is already 12: 15 o'clock past noon but Atty. Uy did not show up anymore
and not even his shadow appeared in Court.

"It cannot be denied that the act of Atty. Thomas Uy in deliberately failing to return to the
Court [the] proceedings [of which] were suspended just because of his representations,
mirrors not only an undisguised disobedience of a court order but also manifests his
propensity to mock the dignity of the Court. Disgustingly, he deliberately ignored his solemn
oath to conduct himself as befitting the status of an officer of the court.

"Indeed, this gross misbehavior of Atty. Uy cannot simply be ignored for it is a raw challenge
to the authority of the Court.

"It must also be pointedly emphasized that Atty. Thomas Uy committed a brazen violation of
the provisions of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Nex old

"x x x x x x x x x

"Obviously, Atty. Thomas Uy fell short of the duties expected from him as a member of the
bar."

In compliance with this Court's March 24, 1999 Resolution, Respondent Uy[2] filed his Comment on June 7,
1999. Denying that he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he explained:

"1). In a criminal case, then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan
City, Metro Manila, presided by the complainant Honorable Adoracion G. Angeles, entitled
'People of the Philippines vs. Norma Trajano, et., al', Criminal Case No. C-54176-77 (98), Atty.
Thomas C. Uy Jr., herein referred to as [r]espondent, was engaged as [p]rivate [p]rosecutor of
the complainant therein, Mrs. Primitiva Malansin Del Rosario. At the outset Norma Trajano,
accused in said criminal case, expressed her desire and offered to settle the civil aspect of the
criminal case against her to which Primitiva Del Rosario acceded. On separate hearings,
Norma Trajano made installment payments to Primitiva Del Rosario some of which payments
were duly acknowledged by the latter in the presence of [r]espondent;

"2). On a previously cancelled date of hearing of the aforesaid criminal case x x x on December
14, 1998, Norma Trajano went to the office of the [r]espondent at about 8:45 o'clock in the
morning, x x x and met Mr. Romeo C. Jamisola Jr., who is acting as [r]espondent's personal
secretary and at the same time the liason officer of the law firm De Veyra, Uy and Associates x
x x. Mr[.] Romeo Jamisola Jr., is the lone staff of the law firm x x x. Respondent was at that time
not in the office as he was attending a hearing before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122,
Kalookan City, Metro Manila. x x xMani kx

"3). On the aforesaid date and time (December 14, 1998) at the office of the [r]espondent,
Norma Trajano told Mr. Romeo Jamisola Jr. that she will make another partial payment to
Primitiva M. Del Rosario because she cannot attend the hearing the following day (8[:]30
o'clock a.m. of December 15, 1999) before Judge Adoracion G. Angeles due to a conflict of
schedule with her [other] case in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, where
she is likewise the accused for [e]stafa[.] Mr. Romeo Jamisola told Norma Trajano to wait for
a while as he will fetch [r]espondent at the ground floor in the sala of the Honorable Remigio
E. Zari. Respondent, upon being informed of the presence of Norma Trajano in the office of the
[r]espondent by Romeo Jamisola Jr. went to his office and Norma Trajano immediately told
[r]espondent that she knew that the setting for that day (December 14, 1998) was previously
cancelled and that she cannot attend the hearing the following day (8[:]30 o'clock a.m.
December 15, 1998) and further told the [r]espondent that she (Norma Trajano) will make
another partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario and that she will just leave her payment
in the sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [five hundred] [p]esos (P16,500.00), Philippine [c]urrency,
in the office of the [r]espondent. Respondent then told Norma Trajano to inform Primitiva M.
Del Rosario first but Norma Trajano replied that she will just call Primitiva [Del Rosario].
Nonetheless, [r]espondent told Romeo Jamisola Jr. to call Primitiva Del Rosario, using the
office phone, and let her talk with Norma Trajano, and, if Primitiva Del Rosario agreed
[r]espondent instructed Romeo Jamisola Jr., to just prepare a receipt. Respondent, fearing that
his case (People vs. Rommel Senadrin et al. above-stated) might have been called in the
calendar, immediately left the office and proceeded [at] the sala of the Honorable Remigio E.
Zari. Respondent, after the hearing x x x, returned to his office and upon learning that his
signature was affixed by Romeo Jamisola Jr. upon the insistence of Norma Trajano scolded
Romeo Jamisola Jr. and for his unsuccessful attempt to contact first Primitiva Del Rosario
before receiving the sum of money left by Norma Trajano; Maniks

"4). The following day [o]n the morning of December 15, 1998 [r]espondent arrived at his
office and met Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario and immediately
the trio appeared before the sala of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles in the hearing of the Norma
Trajano case. Returning [to] the office of the [r]espondent after the hearing, Primitiva Del
Rosario and Aurora Del Rosario, being earlier informed that on December 14, 1998 Norma
Trajano went [to] his office and made partial payment in the sum of P16,500 thru Mr. Romeo
Jamisola Jr., the [r]espondent told Mr. Romeo Jamisola to get the money from the filing cabinet
and while the money in the envelope [was] being handed over to Primitiva Del Rosario, [the
latter] and her daughter x x x, however, told [r]espondent to just let the money in the sum of
P16,500.00 be kept at the office of the [r]espondent so that future payments of Norma Trajano
will be save[d] in whole and for them to avoid spending the same as what had happened to
the past installment payments of Norma Trajano. Respondent then acceded to the request of
Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter and told them that they can get the money anytime
they want from the [r]espondent's office. Hence, the money was kept locked [in] the filing
cabinet of the [r]espondent where he used to keep all his personal file[s]. Manikan

"5). On December 23, 1998, early before noon, Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora
Del Rosario, on a prior invitation, attended the Christmas Party of the office of [r]espondent
and undersigned counsel. x x x Respondent, after the x x x lunch, instructed Mr. Romeo
Jamisola Jr., to give the sum of money (P16,500.00) and for Primitiva Del Rosario to receive
the same for fear of a repetition of a burglary incident before, where some cash and minor
office appliances of undersigned were lost. Primitiva Del Rosario, however, insisted that said
sum of money be kept at the office of the [r]espondent to save in whole the installment
payments of Norma Trajano and that [was] the wish of her son Fernando 'Bong' Del Rosario,
who is a long time friend and a compadre of the [r]espondent. Respondent, respecting the
trust reposed upon him by Primitiva Del Rosario, her daughter Aurora Del Rosario, and son
Fernando Del Rosario, acceded to hold in trust the said sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive
[h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos, Philippine [c]urrency, which [was] locked and safely kept [in]
the filing cabinet of the [r]espondent until February 12, 1999; x x x;

"6). On February 10, 1999 [during] the hearing of the Norma Trajano case before the Hon.
Adoracion G. Angeles, [r]espondent appeared shortly before 10:30 o'clock in the morning,
pursuant to a 'Motion to Call Case at 10:30 o'clock in the Morning x x x.

"7). When the said Norma Trajano [case] x x x was called on second call at 11[:]25 a.m., [i]n
said February 10, 1999 hearing, respondent was first scolded by the Honorable Court (Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles) x x x [for] giving more preference to the Metropolitan Trial Court than
her Court. Resp[o]ndent, however, beg[ged the] indulgence of the Honorable Court (Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles) and explained why [he] first attend[ed] the Mandaluyong hearing of
Manny Chua's case, to wit; x x x. Oldmis o

"8). That it was during the course of [the] litany of sermon, [i]n that hour, made by the
Honorable Court addressed to the [r]espondent that Norma Trajano x x x butted in and
informed the Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) that she will be tendering another
partial payment; it was at that moment that Judge Adoracion G. Angeles asked Norma Trajano
how much had she paid Primitiva Del Rosario, and, Norma [T]rajano answered that she had
already paid P36,500.00 as full payment for one case, and that of the P36,500, P20,000.00 was
paid to Primitiva Del Rosario and HESITANTLY said that the P16,500 was paid to the
[r]espondent. Judge Angeles then took the receipt from Norma Trajano and had it xeroxed by
a personnel of the Court. The carbon duplicate original of the Receipt, dated [D]ecember 14,
1998, showing the receipt by the office of the [r]espondent, through Romeo Jamisola Jr., whose
printed [name] was pre[ceded] by the word 'By', indicating that he received the sum of money
on behalf of or in representation of the [r]espondent, is hereto [attached] and marked as
ANNEX '5', to form part hereof;

"9). That it was perhaps due to the belief [in] and the immediate impression of Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles [of the] answer of Norma Traiano that prompted Judge Angeles to ask,
instantaneously in a loud manner, Primitiva Del Rosario IN TAGALOG', the question,
'NATANGGAP MO BA KAY ATTY. UY ANG PERA NA P16,500.00?'. Primitiva Del Rosario, a
seventy-year-old, who was shocked by the tone and the manner she was asked by Judge
Angeles simply just answered 'HINDI PO, KASI GUSTO [KO] PO NA MABUO ANG PERA'.
Primitiva Del Rosario, however, tried to explain her answer 'HINDI PO' and why she did not
yet [receive] the money from the [r]espondent by raising her hand but was prevented by Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles from further answering by telling Primitiva Del Rosario to stop. With
that answer of Primitiva Del Rosario, [r]espondent butted in to explain Primitiva Del Rosario's
answer of 'HINDI PO' and her having not yet received the sum of money, subject of the
inquisition of Judge Angeles by manifesting to wit; x x x that Primitiva Del Rosario did not get
the money when x x x handed the same on December 15, 1998 because she wanted [it] to be
save[d] in whole together with the future installment payments of Norma Trajano and to be
kept in the office of the [r]espondent as wished by her son Bong Del Rosario; and, that the said
sum of money [was] kept in the filing cabinet in the office of the [r]espondent. All
explanation[s] of the [r]espondent went to x x x naught as the [r]espondent was cut short by
x x x Judge Angeles, [who] in a loud and angry voice orally directed the [r]espondent to get the
money from [r]espondent's office and give the same to Primitiva Del Rosario. It was already
11 :45 o'clock in the morning, more or less, an the [r]espondent was given fifteen (15) minutes
to comply; [r]espondent requested Judge Angeles to be accompanied by Primitiva Del Rosario
and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario but both were ordered to stay in court by Judge
Angeles; Ncm

"10). Respondent in compliance with the oral order of Judge Angeles immediately proceeded
[to] his office but only to find out that Romeo Jamisola Jr., who [held] the only key [to
r]esponddnt's filing cabinet, was on errand x x x that morning of February 10, 1999 [for] Atty.
Angel B. De Veyra (the Undersigned Counsel) [who had sent him] to the offices of the solicitor
general in Makati City, and, the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila to [furnish copies to] both
offices; x x x;

"11). Respondent, expecting that Romeo Jamisola Jr. would [arrive] before 12[:]00 noon, x x x
waited for Romeo Jamisola Jr. while at the same time called up [his] wife to immediately
[come] to his office to spare the sum of P16,500.00 as Romeo Ja[mi]sola may not [arrive]
[within] the time allotted by Judge Angeles. The wife of respondent, however, arrived at about
 12:25 P .M., more or less, ahead of Romeo Jamisola Jr. and spared [r]espondent the sum of
P16,500.00 and [r]espondent immediately went [to] the fourth floor, where the sala of Judge
Angeles [was] located but unfortunately the session was already adjourned. Respondent then
talked to 'Armand', one 'of the court personnel and is known as the door keeper of the chamber
of Judge Angeles, and [requested that he be allowed to go inside the chamber to show [his]
compliance, though late. Respondent, however, was told by 'Armand' that Judge Angeles was
on her lunch break an that it [was] better for [r]espondent to take his lunch too and return a
little later;Ncmmis

"12). At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that day (February 10, 1999) [r]espondent
returned [to] the sala of Judge Angeles together with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter
Aurora Del Rosario, who likewise returned to the court, to seek an audience in [the] chamber
[of] Judge Angeles. Said audience with Judge Angeles was desired by Primitiva Del Rosario to
let Judge Angeles [witness] the giving of the money to Primitiva Del Rosario. But request[s]
for the same, through 'Armand', were twice denied by Judge Angeles because at that time
Judge Angeles was being interviewed by several media personnel of some TV stations. The Del
[Rosarios], however, left earlier upon knowing that Judge Angeles denied their request for an
audience. [They] told [r]espondent that they will be back the following day. It was only when
Romeo Jamisola arrived at about 3:00 o'clock, more or less, in the afternoon and went at the
fourth floor at the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles and informed the [r]espondent that
he carried with him the key to [r]espondent's cabinet and the presence of some [squatter]
families of Batasan Hills, Quezon City at the office of the [r]espondent, who has an
appointment with the [r]espondent, that the [r]espondent left the premises of the sala of Judge
Angeles. [sic] Respondent, at his office ordered Romeo Jamisola Jr. to open the filing cabinet
and returned to the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles alone at about 4:00 o'clock P .M. after
his meeting with the squatter families. But again, his request to 'Armand' to talk with Judge
Angeles, after the media interview, was denied. At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon,
'Armand', the court personnel, served the Order, of said date, February 10, 1999 at the office
of the [r]espondent;

"13). In the early afternoon of the following day, February 11, 1999, [r]espondent together
with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario went again [to] the sala of
Judge Angeles x x x to seek an audience with Judge Angeles. Their request x x x w[as] likewise
in vain. Primitiva Del Rosario, after the last attempt to seek audience with Judge Angeles and
already tired of going [to] and [from] the sala of Judge Angeles, decided on February 12, 1999,
to receive the sum of money in the amount of P16,500.00 from the office of the [r]espondent,
through, Romeo Jamisola Jr. and executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. x x x;

"14). The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Primitiva Del Rosario, dated February 16, 1999 as well as
the Acknowledgment Receipt, dated February 12, 199[9] was attached to a Manifestation
caused to be filed by the [r]espondent on March 3, 1999 when the respondent was confined
in Fatima Hospital in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila on March 2, 1999; Scnc m

"15). Learning of the instant administrative case against the [r]espondent, Bong Del Rosario,
the son of Primitiva Del Rosario, upon whose wish the subject sum of money was kept at the
office of the [r]espondent to save the same in whole as well as the future in[s]tallment
payments of Norma Trajano executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, attesting [to] and confirming
the statement of [his] mother Primitiva Del Rosario. x x x"[3]

Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the Comment contends that the respondent kept the money in his office
because that was the alleged wish of both his client and her son. He allegedly informed them of such money and
tried to give it to them, but they insisted that he retain it. He further maintained that it was only after Judge
Angeles issue the February 10, 1999 Order that his client relented and accepted the money on February 12,
1999.

After the judge filed her Reply on June 30, 1999, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
for report and recommendation. The Court dispensed with the normal referral to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines because the records were complete and the question raised was simple. No further factual
investigation was necessary in the premises.

Bar Confidant's Report and Recommendation

Recommending that Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .be suspended from the practice of law for one month, the Office of
the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1999 said: Sdaa miso
 "x x x [I]t is clear that it is the sworn duty of a member of the bar to be accountable, at all times,
for anything which he receives for and in behalf of his client.

"In the case at bar, this Office is more inclined to believe the story of the complainant.

"First, it cannot be disputed that the transcript of stenographic notes is the most reliable
record of what indeed transpired (and what words were uttered by the parties involved) on
February 10, 1999 at the hearing of Crim. Case No. C-54176-77 (98). Records clearly show
that the private complainant in the criminal case, when asked by Judge Angeles as to the
whereabouts of the P16,500.00, spontaneously replied that she had no knowledge of the same;
in effect saying that Atty. Uy has not given her the subject 16,500.00. If, indeed, Primitiva Del
Rosario requested Atty. Uy to keep the money as far back as December 1998, then she should
have told the same to Judge Angeles.

"Atty. Uy's allegation that Judge Angeles prevented Primitiva Del Rosario from saying in open
court the words 'HINDI PO KASI GUSTO KO PO NA MABUO ANG PERA' does not have any proof
as nothing of that sort appears in the transcript of stenographic notes. Atty. Uy has not even
bothered to refute the truth of the contents of the stenographic notes, all the more bolstering
this Office's opinion that the said notes are accurate and truthful. Sdaad

"Second, the affidavits executed by Primitiva Del Rosario and her son, Fernando Del Rosario,
dated February 16, 1999 and June 7, 1999, respectively, attesting to Atty. Uy's averment that
his act of personally keeping the subject P16,500.00 was with and at their request cannot be
given much credence to outweigh the arguments of Judge Angeles. The said affidavits, both
executed after February 10, 1999, are suspect. Caught by surprise when Judge Angeles
inquired of the whereabouts of his client's money, Atty. Uy x x x resorted to seeking the help
of his client to corroborate his defense. Being the clients of Atty. Uy, Primitiva Del Rosario and
her son could have been persuaded to help extricate their counsel from the latter's
predicament.

"In the absence of any contradicting evidence to dispute the allegation that Atty. Uy failed to
immediately remit to his client the money due the latter, it is safe to conclude that Atty. Uy has
violated his sworn duty to uphold, at all times, the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
client(s).

xxxxxxxxx

"In the instant case, Atty. Uy, upon receipt of the P16,500.00 from the accused in the criminal
case, should have promptly remitted the same to his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Had Judge
Angeles not inquired of the whereabouts of the money, the same would have remained with
Atty. Uy, to the prejudice of the latter's client."[4]

This Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. Scs daad

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good
faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for
the protection of the client."[5]

Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states
that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." The Canons
of Professional Ethics is even more explicit:

"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses
or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Sup rema

"Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."[6]
In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he had
received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Although the amount had been
entrusted to respondent on December 14, 1998, his client revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that
she had not yet received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was.

Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs. Del Rosario about the payment. He further
avers that he kept the money up n her instruction, as she had allegedly wanted "future payments x x [to] be
saved in whole and for them to avoid spending the same as what had happened to the past installment
payments x x x."[7] This assertion allegedly finds support in her answer to the question of Judge Angeles, who
had asked her whether she had received the disputed payment: "Hindi po, kasi gusto [ko] po na mabuo ang
pera."

The Court is not persuaded. Respondent's assertions are contradicted by the following transcript of
stenographic notes:

"Court: This P16,500, did you turn it over to the private complainant?

Atty. Uy: No your Honor, because she wanted the full amount of the settlement.

Court: Private complainant, is it true that you did not want to accept the money?

Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po, sila po ang nagbigayan. Juris

Court: Hindi po ibinibigay sa inyo ni Atty. Uy?

Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po.

xxxxxxxxx

Court: Nasaan iyong P16,500? Huwag kayong matakot.

Mrs. Del Rosario: Aywan ko po sa kanilang dalawa."[8]

If it were true that Mrs. Del Rosario was informed about the payment and that she entrusted it to respondent,
she would have known its whereabouts. That she did not know it showed the falsity of his claim.

It is noteworthy that respondent did not dispute the foregoing transcript although it belied his allegation that
Mrs. Del Rosario's express wish was to have the payments in full. Sc juris

Neither are we convinced by the affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and her son, both of whom affirmed their
intention to have their money in the safekeeping of respondent. It should be stressed that he was her counsel
and the compadre of her son. Moreover, the affidavits were executed after the filing of this Complaint. As the
Office of the Bar Confidant observed, these considerations militate against the credibility of the affiants. In any
event, their affidavits fail to explain adequately why Mrs. Del Rosario, during the hearing on February 10, 1999,
did not know where her money was.

The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs,
Del Rosario acknowledge that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that
respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional
responsibility. Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia,[9] the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of his
clients must be immediately turned over to them. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[10] the Court held that "lawyers are bound
to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct."

Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the
lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.[11] In this case, respondent has not done so. Indeed, we
agree with the following observation of the Office of the Bar Confidant:

"Keeping the money in his possession without his client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy
the tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This
situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not
only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system
would remain undisturbed."[12]Juris sc
In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings between attorneys and their clients
and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand
unequal.[13] The present situation calls for the exercise of this duty.

For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money they received on behalf of their clients,
some lawyers have been disbarred[14] and others have been suspended for six months.[15] In the present case,
the records merely show that respondent did not promptly report that he received money on behalf of his
client. There is no clear evidence of misappropriation. Under the circumstances, we rule that he should be
suspended for one month.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .is hereby SUSPENDED for one month. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. at his given address or any other known one.
Copies of this Decision shall also be entered in his record as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as the Court
Administrator who shall circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s during their
schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and
respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio
City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that
respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to
their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondents
name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973,
respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9,
1976, respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses
estate. Complainant was appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that
respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent
transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent and his
corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was
created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar
the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he prepared for a
client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to
the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and
auditor.[2]
 On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as lawyer and
auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition for settlement of the estate of
the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the estates inventory. Instead, respondent
transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name.
Complainant accused respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not
belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the
late Nakpil in his correspondences[3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and Co., CPAs)
excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included in the claims against the
estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husbands loans
applied probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates)
filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes
& Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent
represented conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. against her husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant
averred that there is no distinction between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior
and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent initially
asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the result of the pending
action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that he did
not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the
Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was
rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which included
his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran property. In charging his
loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans
in respondents name were applied probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably
for the purchase did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of his
accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of
the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran property
for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said property, and;
(2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not
mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in the
settlement of her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law and accounting
firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes &
Associates) who filed the inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm represented
the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant
of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered
the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant
ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel
Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These
two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second,
his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as
administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had
forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full payment of the principal
bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks claims.
Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes
and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate
amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15,
1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the SECs certification of the
filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa,
from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in
the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such misconduct not as
a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should
be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.[7] She maintained that the pendency of the
reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against respondent for
the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondents
conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & Liability of
the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim ownership of
the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed
with the intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes
were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to remove
the property from the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the
documents because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was
required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects
in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims against the
estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran property) which were prepared by
his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to
him. She averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations
and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to several
years later. She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his resignation from his
law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the
interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He urged
that it is not per se anomalous for respondents accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its
creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as
accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He
averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were
prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent
or excessive and that the failure of respondents law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after
resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI
of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with the
CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of
respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent
held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent was the
absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted its
Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then
pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over
the property. It opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was
the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also
found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-
lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his
client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good faith which an attorney is required
to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where
the parties trade at arms length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored
and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no
advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office,
an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no
presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings were based
mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court
in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the aforementioned
reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law
and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her
complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband.
Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust
for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property
and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the
reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of
the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family corporation is well
discussed in this Courts Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose
Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he)
excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate
court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be bolstered by
Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his
brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein
respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the application of the proceeds
of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the
two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was
already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh.
J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of
the interests due on the notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in
the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular maintenance
expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner
(Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically
assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and
Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or
the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence (Exhibits H, J
and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent from claiming that he
bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his law firm
was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said
property belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not
agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings
instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge
in the estate proceedings. Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property
is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase and
renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this
charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes
that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that
the information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as
the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondents
loans against the estate could not have been committed without respondents participation. Respondent wanted
to have his cake and eat it too and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent
violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his
clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is
generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly
improper to represent both sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter [20] and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good faith. [21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be
allowed where the parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not
enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his
clients the nature and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his
clients.[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors are adverse
to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the
same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest
of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact,
at one instance, respondents law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate proceedings. He
points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the
intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside
the point. As established in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as
counsel and accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned
from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is
unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any documentary
proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and
1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of
1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been terminated. It does not
escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the
intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could
not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal
counsel of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and
the two claimants against it.[26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-
up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm
explained the legal situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement
does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest.
When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed
out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed
in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his
loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest
the claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the
claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether
there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents
duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged
before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior
partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging
respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is
charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing
his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach
of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firm’s loyalty under a cloud of doubt.
Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court
from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred
for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite
to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to
the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and
his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar,
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings
and transactions with his clients. [29]
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a
warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

[Adm. Case No. 275. April 29, 1960.]

GERVACIO L. LIWAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. GILBERTO NERI, Respondent.

Assistant Solicitor General Esmeralda Umali and Solicitor Antonio M. Consing for the complainant.

Gilberto Neri in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CIVIL LIABILITY IN RAPE; NOT DETERMINABLE IN CRIMINAL ACTION ONLY. —
Contrary to the provisions of Article 135 of the Civil Code of Spain, to the effect that in cases of rape the
provisions of the Penal Code regarding the acknowledgment of the issue is to be observed, Article 283 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, does not make the civil liability of the offender in a case of rape determinable in a
criminal action only. Article 30 of the same code also implies the right of an offended party to bring a separate
civil action for the criminal act without instituting the criminal proceedings for the prosecution of the offense.

2. ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION UNNECESSARY; RULE 107 OF THE RULES OF COURT
REPEALED. — The provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court are no longer in force because a civil action may
now be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment without waiting the institution and termination of a
criminal action (Arts. 30 and 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). These new provisions are inconsistent
with the provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court and the latter must give way thereto. In consequence, it is
not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and presented to final judgment
before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman and recognition of the offspring can
be instituted and presented to final judgment. The provisions of Rule 107 of the present Rules promulgated in
1940, are, therefore, considered repealed or modified pro tanto by Articles 30 and 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

The complainant, Gervacio L. Liwag, seeks to disbar the respondent, Atty. Gilberto Neri.

Prior to October 21, 1952, the spouses Enrique and Ursula Pineda requested the complainant to act as counter-
indemnitor with the Manila Surety & Fidelity Company in a bond posted for said spouses in favor of the National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC). When the Pinedas had failed to liquidate their obligation, the NARIC
enforced the bond against the Manila Surety and Fidelity Company and the latter in turn collected from the
complainant the sum of P2,951.35. Having failed to recover extra-judicially said amount from the Pinedas, the
complainant engaged the services of the respondent who agreed to handle the matter on a contingent fee of
forty per cent.

As they were his neighbors, the respondent, acting slowly, tried to talk to the Pinedas, who admitted their
indebtedness and pleaded for time to pay the same. On or about July 17, 1956, when no payment had been
made, the respondent wrote a letter of demand, threatening to take judicial action if the Pinedas would still not
meet their obligation. On the same date, the complainant delivered to the respondent the amount of P30.00 as
the filing fee for the necessary complaint. The respondent did not actually file any complaint, for the alleged
reason that debtor spouses had given assurances to pay, although he informed the complainant that he had
already done so. It did not take long before the truth was discovered and before the complainant was provoked
into commencing this administrative case.

It is an established fact that the respondent had received from the complainant P30.00 as filing fee. The
respondent argues that his services were not engaged solely "for the purpose of filing the corresponding
collection complaint", but to collect from the Pinedas the amount owed; or, in other words, that the respondent
was given full discretion as to the means for accomplishing the assignment. Assuming that this was so, the
respondent has committed a breach of professional ethics when, contrary to the fact, he made the complainant
believe that the Pineda spouses had already been sued in court and did not return the amount intended for the
filing fee.

Considering however, that the respondent has not yet received anything for his services and that the
complainant has subsequently been paid, disbarment or even suspension of the respondent from the practice
of his profession would be too harsh and unkind. We only hereby reprimand him for the offense, with the
warning that a repetition of similar misconduct or, for that matter, any violation of his oath will be dealt with
more drastically.

So ordered.

G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than not, in
the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure questions of
procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is
corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased into a simple business
dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to
procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits as well.

We turn to the facts.

The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land
located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a
financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage
in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans,
the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his failure to pay, as a consequence of which,
the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public auction, and in which
L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.

Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation, to
enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He
was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private respondent
another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at
one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of
P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court 3 approved the compromise.

The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits — a fact the petitioner himself concede 4 —
for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00
in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution
insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does not appear that the sum was
actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with respect
to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the other. The
petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the
private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the money," 7 provided
that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor. Who
implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private
respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the private
respondent's increasing desperation.

The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer
of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels
in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently
filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises
to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He
likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with
the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:

WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer,
assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real
properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the
above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9

whereas it originally reads:

WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby
transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights
of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and
subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10

As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the respective
certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both motions.
The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall
the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court
against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of
trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance
and reformation of document, 13praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be
cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated
May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a
mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would
lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet
market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for
dismissal.

The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained of did
not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and
insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner
himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the
compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39,
of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the
private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R
Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban
against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question
took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was
consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of finality.

Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the
respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion
of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order directed against the execution: and
(3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December 8,
1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion
to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20

Hence the instant petition.

As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure. Specifically, he
assigns the following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT
BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON
THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA

III.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS
MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE
FILING OF THIS SUIT.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE
ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21

The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal
impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and
(2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of judgment were
proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of
interlocutory issuances.

On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had
occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained
in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23

xxx xxx xxx

It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can
serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or
collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party
from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was
procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24

A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court reveals
no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points
out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no
showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge
Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents
he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under
the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the former's
collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed
execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to
redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of
execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This
was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this
purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge
to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it
does not amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.

Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an
appeal 26 and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular
execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case,
respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions for temporary
restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent
court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29)
in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular execution. The orders impugned are
conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the parties'compromise agreement.

The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands
and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the
judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case,
Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:

Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ...

in relation to Article 1330 thereof:

Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable.

in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose, gone to
the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.

We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure — for the enlightenment solely of the
bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook
the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural
law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their
object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." 31If procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the
Court held:

... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in
the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest
in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then,
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won
by the a rapier's thrust ... 33

It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.

By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was
willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and
petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should
have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his
client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The
Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The
petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do
not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial
enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of
another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards
for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of
freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney... A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.

So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:

Art. 2208 ...

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe
that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No.
30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount.
The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial
effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject
thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-
importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.

All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.

It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that vested
upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of
judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the
right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him
a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we
reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent
of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the
subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever
right he had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.

Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40 due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.

The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and
subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the issuance of
the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing
given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible
explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private respondent that led finally, to the
conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same
from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he had actually done the private respondent a
favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that
"[t]itles to the properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic]
petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner
for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the circumstances.

We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent sign the
"Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared document
apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all
intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by reason
of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to
believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid
the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now
complains of, apart from the fact that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded
to above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended
merely to forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall
acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms
and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order
that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise
Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in their
entirety.

The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture of
magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the
fact that he did resell the properties. 44

But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance
document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted, provided
for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in
his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my
rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He admits having entered the intercalations in
question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the questioned deed with the Register of
Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any
falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration.
Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his
client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the
party who prepared it.

But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this is not the proper occasion for it — we
condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49

This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to the
ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:

Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
action, either in person or through the mediation of another:

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them,
unless the consent of the principal have been given;

(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;

(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or
of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of
which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government
experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;

(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation
or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**

In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil
Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does
not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can
no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."

In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption
and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the compromise agreement.
It is actually a new contract — not one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise — in which,
as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality,
acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be
properties which are "the object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is
improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding;
(2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided
that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale
between him and the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a
writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ
does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.

At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all
voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in
turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54

For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While
the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for
annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to third
persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be
held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.

We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas
monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability for payment of
the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the actual
amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno
Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in
addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the
respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he
shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.

Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition
below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest
interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior
courts.

Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of general
policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have
made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the
resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real
meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed
the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially
so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time
that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar,
let go unpunished what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the sum
of P326,000.00, as and for damages;

2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for violation
of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be consolidated with AC No.
2625;

3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and

4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 7418 October 9, 2007

ANDREA BALCE CELAJE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO C. SORIANO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Santiago C. Soriano (respondent) for gross misconduct.

In the Complaint dated June 1, 2005 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Andrea Balce Celaje
(complainant) alleged that respondent asked for money to be put up as an injunction bond, which complainant
found out later, however, to be unnecessary as the application for the writ was denied by the trial court.
Respondent also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to spend for or to be given to the judge
handling their case, Judge Milagros Quijano, of the Regional Trial Court, Iriga City, Branch 36. When
complainant approached Judge Quijano and asked whether what respondent was saying was true, Judge
Quijano outrightly denied the allegations and advised her to file an administrative case against respondent. 1

In his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that the same were merely concocted
by complainant to destroy his character. He also contended that it was complainant who boasted that she is a
professional fixer in administrative agencies as well as in the judiciary; and that complainant promised to pay
him large amounts of attorney's fees which complainant however did not keep. 2

Both parties appeared in the Mandatory Conference and Hearing on January 18, 2006. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision.3

In the Report and Recommendation dated January 24, 2006, IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline Commissioner
Dennis A.B. Funa found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct in his relations with his client and recommended
that respondent be suspended for three years from the practice of law.4

In the Report, Commissioner Funa found that:

During the hearing conducted, Complainant alleged that she has remitted to Respondent, on various
dates, amounts of money totaling to more or less P270,000.00.

According to Complainant the amounts given in several instances were all undocumented and not
acknowledged in writing.

However, for the alleged amount of P14,000.00 intended for an injunction bond, some documents
in writing were made.

xxxx

While the amounts remitted by Complainant to Respondent were never acknowledged in writing and
were not documented, due credence must be given to Complainant's allegations especially over the
amount of P14,800.00 intended for the injunction. Indeed, there is no ill-motive at all on the part of
Complainant to fabricate charges against Respondent. Unfortunately, none of the P270,000.00 given
by Complainant to Respondent was ever documented and therefore accuracy of the amounts could not
be established and substantiated.

What has been documented only pertains to the unpaid P5,800.00 intended for the injunction bond.
However, it has been established that indeed an accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been remitted
by Respondent to Valentina Ramos and only the unpaid P5,800.00 remains unaccounted for by the
Respondent.

During the hearing conducted, Complainant reiterated her accusations against the Respondent and
expressed that she has been aggrieved and misled by Respondent. According to Complainant, this was
made possible because she was not aware of or knowledgeable on legal matters and practices.
Respondent has only offered denials to the charges. However, the circumstances gives credibility to
herein Complainant in the absence of any evil motive on her part.
 Accordingly, Respondent is clearly guilty of misappropriating his client's funds in the amount
of P5,800.00. While other amounts may have been misappropriated, Complainant
alleges P270,000.00, the exactness of the amounts could not be established.

Respondent is also guilty of deceiving his client and abusing his client's confidence in requesting for
several amounts of money on the pretense that he had to spend for and pay the trial judge.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the unaccounted for amount of Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Pesos (P5,800.00) to Complainant, submitting a Compliance Report thereon.5

On September 8, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and Approve, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A-; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
for misappropriating his client's funds, Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) years and likewise Ordered to immediately deliver that unaccounted amount
of P5,800.00 to complainant.6

The IBP transmitted the Notice of Resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors as well as the records of the
case, pursuant to Rule 139-B.7 Then in compliance with the Court's Resolution dated February 20, 2007, the
IBP through Director for Discipline Rogelio Vinluan informed the Court that per records of the IBP, no Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Court agrees with the IBP Resolution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16 thereof, mandates that a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. He shall account for all money
or property collected or received from his client8 and shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand.9

As found by Commissioner Funa, it was established that respondent could not account for P5,800.00 which was
part of the sum given by complainant to him for the purpose of filing an injunctive bond. Respondent admitted
having received from complainant P17,800.00 on April 19, 2002 for the preliminary injunction10 and admitted
to having a balance of P9,000.00 in his promissory note to the Manila Insurance Co., Inc. dated April 23, 2002,
which was reduced to P5,800.00 by reason of an additional payment of P4,000.00,11 leaving an amount
of P5,800.00 unaccounted for. The affidavit of the insurance agent, Valentina Ramos, dated December 8, 2005
also states that even up to said date, respondent had not yet paid the balance of P5,800.00.12

Respondent's failure to return the money to complainant upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.13 It is a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics and impairs public confidence in
the legal profession which deserves punishment.14

As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer
is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And
if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.15

The Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar who
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Indeed, membership in the legal profession is a privilege. 16 The attorney-client
relationship is highly fiduciary in nature. As such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and
disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer.17

In Small v. Banares18 the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the CPR,
particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by his client, and for
failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this
case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is found GUILTY of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his clients through Andrea Balce Celaje, within 30 days from
notice, the amount of P5,800.00. Respondent is directed to submit to the Court proof of payment within fifteen
days from payment of the full amount.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's record
in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. CBD No. 167. March 9, 1999]

ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAEZ, respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes (herein
complainant) was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was docketed as I.S. 89-353 and
assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibaez (herein respondent) for preliminary investigation. In the course of
the investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security System
(SSS) contribution in arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the system. The fact of non-
payment was certified to by the SSS on October 2, 1989.
On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a
complaint for professional misconduct against Ibaez due to the latters failure to remit the SSS contributions of
his sister-in-law. The complaint alleged that respondents misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascuals SSS
contributions amounted to a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Seven days later, or on November 23, 1990,
respondent paid P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual.
In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Tarlac Chapter, the court
observing that it had no competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the case, the Tarlac
Chapter forwarded the same to IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion Pascuals request to make
payment to the SSS did not amount to professional misconduct but was rather an act of Christian
charity. Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and academic, the amount of P1,804.00 having
already been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts complained were
not done by him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor.
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent be reprimanded, with a
warning that the commission of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely in the future. On
November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved its
Commissions recommendation.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty of professional
misconduct. While there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had been effected to the SSS on
November 23, 1990, it is clear however, that the same was made only after a complaint had been filed against
respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons
with official transactions with his office.
This Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from
Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated payment of the
same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of
respondent, the rules relating to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this
court held that (t)he relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers
are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to
do so constitutes professional misconduct. The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the
SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of
general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.[2]
Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a
private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations
upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional
obligations because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye. [3] Want of
moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. [4]
ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the
similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future.
LET copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished the Department of Justice and
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and AGRIPINO LEGASPI, complainants,

vs.
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino Legaspi of Iligan City, in a verified complaint dated
March 10, 1970, charged Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City with malpractice for having
misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos which he had collected for them. They prayed that the
respondent be disbarred.1 (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of
75.75%).

The evidence shows that the complainants hired the respondent in May, 1962 to represent them in the intestate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz Velez-Gonzaga. The
complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who was abroad, were adjudged as one of the six groups
of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother, Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a daughter of the
spouses. The heirs in a joint petition dated April 11, 1969, which the respondent signed as counsel for the
complainants, agreed that the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the
administrator be authorized to sell the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of the estate, the net
proceeds would be distributed among the six groups of heirs. The probate court approved that agreement in
its order of April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc. Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental CFI, Exh. A).

The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of the sale only when the respondent wrote a note
dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the money we have deposited
may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". The respondent advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on
that date so that the money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).

The complainants were not able to get the money on December 8 because the respondent on December 7 sent
to Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior advice and directing here to go to Cagayan de Oro City on
December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money (Exh. C). On December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a
handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to Cagayan de Oro City on December 10 because
according to the respondent "his postdated checks can be paid and/or collected either Thursday or Friday yet"
(Exh. D).

In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs. Daroy received another note, this time from the respondent
himself, "Cousin Ramon". The note contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs. Daroy's "Cousin Ramon" had
withdrawn the money amounting to P4,000 and had spent it. The letter, a sort of extrajudicial confession or mea
culpa on respondent's part, reads as follows (Exh. E):

Dear Fermina,

I wrote this letter with the hope that you will understand me. I have received P4,000.00 our
share in the case filed and is now in my custody.

Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I was forced to use our money to solve my problem.

Now to pay the amount I have used, I sold my jeep to Mr. Ricarte Gorospe, an Employee of the
BIR here in Cag. But I am not paid as yet. So, I am waiting as he will pay at 3:00 p.m. today and
it's close as I have promised to give it on the 10th, I mean our money.

Kindly help me, defer the giving you of the sum or at least until Thursday or Friday, I bring it
to you.

I know, my responsibility on this matter.

Thanks

Cousin
Ramon

It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent, as to "counsel for Fermina Daroy et al.", received from
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay the said sum of P4,000 as "one (1) share in participation of my clients
Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of Judge B. K. Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate
proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that amount (Exh. L-1). The sheriff paid to Attorneys Angel
Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and Teogenes Velez, Jr. the respective shares of the other groups of heirs also in
the sum of P4,000 for each group. Those lawyers turned over the amounts withdrawn to their respective clients
(Exh. L).

It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November 28, 1969 to Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited
could be withdrawn on December 8, 1969, acted in bad faith. He had already withdrawn the money before that
date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.

Before the disbarment complaint was filed several demands were made upon the respondent to pay to the
complainants the amount which he had misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to make payment.
As complainants' patience was already exhausted, they filed their complaint for disbarment on March 13,
1970.2

Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants, in a letter to this Court's Clerk of Court dated May 26,
1970, expressed the hope that preferential attention would be given to the case. He said that he had "reliable
information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the respondent "has been bragging that nothing will happen to this
case" (p. 20, Rollo).1äwphï1.ñët

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In 1973 he
requested the City Fiscal of Iligan City to conduct the investigation. 3 After the investigation was finished, the
case was set for hearing. The respondent did not appear at the hearing.

Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he received the said sum of P4,000 as shown in the receipt,
Exhibit D dated October 20, 1969. He said that after receiving it he immediately wired Teofilo Legaspi at Iligan
City to see him (the respondent) in his office at Cagayan de Oro City so that Teofilo Legaspi could tell him "the
proper disposal" of that amount.

Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and at their conference they supposedly
agreed that the sum of P700 would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses which he (Legaspi)
described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants, expenses seeking evidence and other expenses
relevant to the case" and "major expenses" in the case (sic); that his attorney's fees would be equivalent "to a
share of the petitioners", an agreement which was later placed in formal form (referring to 1968 extrajudicial
settlement attached to his answer); that the balance of P3,300 would be divided into six equal parts (six because
of the four Legaspi children, the father Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that under such
division each participant would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not P412),
and that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. The respondent did not present any receipt to prove that alleged
payment.

He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the share of Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad, but at the
end of October or the first week of November, 1969 Teofilo got from him (the respondent) Vivencio's share.
Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a receipt for Vivencio's share. After paying the shares of Teofilo
and Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in respondent's possession amounted to P2,476.

According to respondent's version, the complainants "refused consistently to receive" the said balance from
him because they wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid to them the sum of P2,000
and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He did not present any receipt to prove the alleged
payment of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of P476 to the complainants.

Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo Legaspi, received the sum of P412 from the respondent.
She said that her father never went to Cagayan de Oro City to confer with the respondent. She said that there
was no agreement that the respondent would participate like an heir in the partition of the sum of P4,000. She
denied that the respondent offered to pay her and her brother and sister the sum of P2,746. She denied that
the respondent paid to the complainants P2,000.

After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that respondent's testimony cannot be given any credence.
In his memorandum he stated that after he received from the sheriff "on October 29, 1969" the sum of P4,000,
he "immediately wired" his kinsman, Teofilo Legaspi, to come to Cagayan de Oro City and that Teofilo "came
on October 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20, 1969, the date of the receipt, Exhibit L-1.

The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The statement of the sheriff and respondent's office clerk in
their affidavits of March 18, 1975 that such a wire was sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo Legaspi was a
handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B) wherein the respondent made it appear that the said sum
of P4,000 was going to be withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine o'clock". That the respondent in his
testimony and memorandum forgot that note, which is Annex C of the complaint for disbarment and which he
admitted in paragraph 4 of his answer, is an indication that he does not know the facts of his own case and that
he had no scruples in trying to mislead and deceive this Court.

That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram and his letter (already quoted) to Mrs. Daroy dated
December 7 and 9, 1969, respectively (Exh. B, C and E) overwhelmingly belie his fabricated theory that he
conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted
to concoct a story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the latter is dead and could not refute
him. However, complainants' documentary evidence refutes his prevarications, distortions and fabrications.

He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not furnish complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a supposed
typewritten claim against him which totalled P10,406.05. Exhibit 2 does not bear any signature. The
respondent wants to imply that the complainants were trying to blackmail him. No probative value can be given
to Exhibit 2.

The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's defense are discernible in his Exhibit 1, which he
attached to his answer to the original complaint.

Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968 by the four children of
Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the six
being described in the document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of Consuelo Gonzaga, who died on
March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga was not explained.

In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and month when it was signed and acknowledged before a
notary, the spaces for the description of the fourth parcel of land, the spaces for the shares adjudicated to the
heirs, the spaces for the instrumental witnesses and the spaces for the numbers of the residence certificates
and the dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the instrument was signed by the above six persons and
duly notarized by a notary whose signature is illegible.

In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was alleged to have left four parcels of land located at Barrio
Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental which she inherited from her father Aquilino Gonzaga. However, in the order
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental dated April 29, 1969 Consuelo Gonzaga inherited only a one-
sixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental.

How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument, was a resident of Alameda, California, was able to sign
it and to appear before a notary was not explained.
The incomplete document, far from being of any help to respondent Legaspi, casts a reflection on his
competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the competency and integrity of the notary before whom it was
acknowledged. As already noted, it was made to appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an heir of Consuelo
Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. The document does not even mention whether the
deceased died intestate.

That document has no connection with the P4,000 and does not justify the misappropriation or breach of trust
committed by the respondent.

A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has
come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal
purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust
(Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).1äwphï1.ñët

Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money
of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal prosecution.

A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for
any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).

"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of
that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on
behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien
for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).

The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe punishment" (Sturr vs. State Bar
of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d 897).1äwphï1.ñët

A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit through false pretenses is guilty
of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of office,
betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and practices deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law
practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of
an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case
No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See Cabigao and Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).

We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct for having
misappropriated the funds of his clients. His manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his repeated failure
to appear at the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Iligan and at the hearings scheduled by this Court,
thus causing this proceeding to drag on for a long time, demonstrate his unworthiness to remain as a member
of the noble profession of law. (See Capulong vs. Aliño, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 491).

Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we hold that the proper disciplinary action
against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary purpose is to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on the assumption that a member of the bar should be
competent, honorable and reliable, a person in whom courts and clients may repose confidence (In
re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).

Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney (6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 242).1äwphï1.ñët

The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be ordered to pay them the said amount of P4,000 plus
attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case amounting to more than
P1,000 cannot be granted in this disbarment proceeding. That amount should be recovered in an ordinary
action. WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from
the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.
 [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a disbarment[1] case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty. Elpidio
D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found Atty.
Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law or,
at the very least, a severe reprimand against him.[2]
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a demand-letter
from the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian. The full text of
respondents letter[3] reads:

Dear Mr. Ong:

This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you for your only
child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which Miss Garganian is
demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to
support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given said
financial support.

I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that you will not be
dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and moral obligations to your son
with Miss Garganian.

May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to her house her
television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and without her knowledge and
consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be constrained to file the proper action in
court against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the above address
or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the preliminary matters in
connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.

I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your intentional failure
or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed as your absolute refusal really.

Expecting you then.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City

WITH MY CONSENT:

NEMESIA GARGANIAN

A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of
the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms.
Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the
complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The
relevant portion of the respondents second letter reads: [4]

These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):
1. P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of P1,500.00 should be
up to the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is subject to adjustment when the son
is already in the secondary course or up to his college course).

2. P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her planned business
venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher in any government position
because of her status, having a child without being lawfully wedded. x x x.

3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian, without the
presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.

4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow before noon in my
Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.

Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong will be
withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.

Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong is too long a
time.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that the
complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue
them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint[5] with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutors
Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation
of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and
Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the Bureau
of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor
General.[6] According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by
the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the
complainant alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases against him to
blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that
could be used against him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a certain
percentage of whatever amounts they could get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as
highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming
of a lawyer.
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the afore-quoted
letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2)Nemesia Garganians affidavit where
she denied any knowledge regarding the demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned
affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that
he sired Ms. Ganganians son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for
alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of
Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of the respondent had asked
him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer to give any informer 20% and
witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong. To further bolster the disbarment case against the
respondent, the complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit, [7] citing several cases previously filed
against the respondent by other parties.[8]
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint lodged
against him.[9] He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal
Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement. After denying the
respondents third request for postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainants
evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When
it was the respondents turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home
address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon
City. The return cards showed that he could not be located, although his wife received some of the notices sent
to his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of them
inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino
Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondents absence as waiver of his right to present his evidence. Finding merit
in the complainants cause, the investigator recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one month, or, at the very least, be severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General. [10] Thereafter, the OSG
transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, for proper disposition, conformably
with adopted policies and procedures.[11] The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report
and recommendation in toto.[12]
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the importance of the
legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in Noriega vs. Sison.[13] We then held:

In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability
attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long
and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for
himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession
but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by
reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of
the United States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the
other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its
harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought
to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but
is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function
should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence
in them.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [14] It mandates
lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.Rule 19.01 further commands that
a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a
lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the
complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When
the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and
administrative cases against the complainant. We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he
instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms.
Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is
inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any
information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic
is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding[15] and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. [16] In the case
of Choa vs. Chiongson,[17] we held:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he
must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his clients case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and
counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same;Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must
not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds
of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.

(emphases ours)

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and
comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.[19]
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced
by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the
proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect
towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his
conduct.[20] The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath [21] he took before this Court when he sought
admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word
aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month
suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the misconduct of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 3773. September 24, 1997]

ANGELITA C. ORCINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

On June 14, 1992, complainant Angelita C. Orcino filed with this Court a letter-complaint dated December
10, 1991 against respondent Atty. Josue Gaspar, her former counsel.Complainant prayed that this Court impose
disciplinary sanctions on respondent for abandoning his duties and for failing to return the legal fees she fully
paid for his services.
The complaint arose from the following facts: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to
prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. In
consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay respondent legal fees of P20,000.00 -- P10,000.00 to
be paid upon signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or before the conclusion of the
case. Complainant was also to pay P500.00 per appearance of respondent before the court and fiscal. This
agreement was embodied in a contract executed on February 22, 1991. [1]
In accordance with the contract, complainant paid respondent the sum of P5,000.00 on February 25,
1991,[2] another P5,000.00 on March 31, 1991,[3] and P10,000.00 on May 21, 1991,[4] for a total of P20,000.00.
 Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties. He interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to build
a case against the suspects. He drew up the necessary sworn statements and dutifully attended the preliminary
investigation. The case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Baloc, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija.[5]
As private prosecutor, respondent religiously attended the bail hearings for the accused although these
hearings were postponed on motion of the accused's counsel. Respondent however failed to attend the hearing
scheduled in August 1991. It was at this hearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to
all the accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted
him with his absence.[6] Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the
hearing.[7] Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his
absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her
relatives.[8]Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case
saying that she could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records. [9]
Complainant never returned the records nor did she see respondent. On September 18, 1991, respondent
filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel." [10] The motion did not bear the consent of
complainant.
On October 23, 1991, the court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to
the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent." [11]
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal. [12] Meanwhile, the hearings in
the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact
complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, the letter-
complaint.
We referred the letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation
at any time with or without cause.[13] The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than
for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.[14] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.[15] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[16] A lawyer's right to withdraw from
a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause. [17]
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client
and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution,
the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
x x x."
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his
client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent,
the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall
determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good
cause.[18]
In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court
thus ordered respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had
become hostile and refused to sign his motion.[19] He, however, did not file an application with the court for it
to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.
Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an application for withdrawal with
the court, we find that this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's
withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that
there had been "serious diffferences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution."[20]
Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases."

A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists
upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and
the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the
lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the
attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered
analogous to the grounds enumerated. As found by the Commission on Bar Discipline, this case arose from a
simple misunderstanding between complainant and respondent. Complainant was upset by respondent's
absence at the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected killers of her husband. She vehemently opposed
the grant of bail. It was thus a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront respondent with his
absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness, nothing more. Complainant's words and actions
may have hurt respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her words were uttered
in a burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's
services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just
do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for
withdrawal will be granted by the court.[21] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client
require.[22] He must still appear on the date of hearing[23] for the attorney-client relation does not terminate
formally until there is a withdrawal of record.[24]
Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to bring the criminal case to its termination. He
was in fact paid in full for his services. Respondent failed to comply with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair
that he return to complainant half of the amount paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the case have
rendered it impossible for respondent and complainant to continue their relation under the contract.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing
with his clients. He is also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) representing a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a warning
that failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-37844. June 30, 1975.]

PATRICIO ALCANTARA, JR., Petitioner, v. HONORABLE CASTRENCE C. VELOSO, Presiding Judge of

Branch III, Court of First Instance of Iloilo and ROMAN ALCANTARA, Respondents, ATTORNEYS JONAS
A. ABELLAR and AGUSTIN T. DIOQUINO, Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

For their failure to file a rejoinder to petitioner’s Reply, Attorneys Jonas A. Abellar and Agustin T. Dioquino
were asked to explain what appeared to be plain inattention in the performance of their professional duty. Atty.
Abellar in trying to justify himself, explained with apology, that he did not receive copy of the reply and he
searched in vain his records but could not find any copy nor could his secretary remember having received
such copy of the reply. He further noted that it was possible that his copy might have been sent to the other
counsel and received by the latter’s clerk, or to the other respondents. On the other hand, Atty. Agustin
Dioquino admitted having received his copy but did not file his comments on the ground that Atty. Jonas Abellar
was hired by his client to relieve him and since his services with respondent had been terminated, the new
counsel assumed all the responsibilities relative to the case of his client, He further stated that the Supreme
Court must have been aware of the fact that he no longer represented Respondent. Besides, he said, all the
documents in his possession were withdrawn by his client’s wife and were never returned to him.

For their laxity and inattentiveness, Atty. Agustin Dioquino was severely censured while Atty. Jonas A. Abellar,
whose explanation was accepted, was admonished to be more attentive in his duties.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; USE OF ARROGANT LANGUAGE IN PLEADINGS SUBJECTS A LAWYER TO

DISCIPLINARY ACTION. — A lawyer who incurs delay in filing a rejoinder and when asked to explain the delay
does so in haughty tone and arrogant language, instead of being man enough to acknowledge a patent neglect
of duty, is subject to severe censure.

2. ID; ID; HUMILITY IS LAUDABLE COURSE FOR LAWYERS IN DEALING WITH COURT. — The temerity of a
lawyer in asserting that the Supreme Court could have been aware of the termination of his service by the client,
absent any pleading to that effect is indicative of an excessive estimate of his reputation and standing in the bar
or excessive regard to the importance of his person. Even members of the bar who have rendered distinguished
service to the law are not oblivious of how persuasive a plea could be if impressed with humility.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

The immediate antecedent of respondent members of the bar Jonas A. Abellar and Agustin T. Dioquino being
cited to explain what appeared to be plain inattention to duty was the delay on their part as counsel for
respondents in the filing of a rejoinder to a reply of petitioner. The justification offered was that they were not
furnished a copy of such pleading. That was an assertion that proved to be contrary to fact. The offense was
thus compounded. Respondent Abellar had this explanation: "That with due respect, counsel hereby reiterates
and hereby most respectfully manifests that he did not receive the Reply of Petitioner dated February 9, 1974.
Counsel painfully searched and re-searched the records of the case in his possession, but most regretfully
informs this Honorable Tribunal that the result of his search was in the negative. Counsel likewise examined
and cross-examined his office clerk, Miss Gemema Pagadal, as to whether she had received the questioned
pleading or just might have misplaced the same, but Miss Pagadal answered that she did not receive the same.
Miss Pagadal had been employed with this office for more than four (4) years and counsel had no reason to
doubt her sincerity. . . ." 1 After noting that there were two attorneys of record, he added: "It could be possible
that counsel for petitioner might have sent that pleading to Atty. Agustin Dioquino, [was] received by Atty.
Dioquino or his Office clerk, or to the other respondent the Honorable Castrence C. Veloso or his deputies." 2
Further: "In this instant case, there is no reason why counsel should hide from the Honorable Tribunal such
petty matter as to whether counsel received or not the opposite party’s pleading. If counsel received the same,
it would have hastened the disposition of the case now pending before this august court, for the benefit of
respondent, which counsel humbly represents, and also for the benefit of counsel. The only thing is — counsel,
with his deepest apology in conscience and in good faith, did not receive the aforementioned pleading." 3

The above surmise, if correct, would call into question the actuation of respondent Dioquino. He would seek to
exculpate himself in this manner: "1. That the explanation of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar was in effect washing his
hands by explaining that he did not receive petitioner’s reply and that it might have been received by the
undersigned; 2. That in truth and in fact the undersigned received a copy of the Reply of Attorneys Aguadera
and Demaisip on May 20, 1974, thru his clerk-secretary, Miss Ninfa E. Jaruda; the date of receipt is indicated on
the upper left hand margin of the reply . . . with Annotation that she received that copy pertaining to Atty.
Dioquino excluding that copy of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar, wherein his clerk-secretary signed that copy for Atty.
Agustin Dioquino and not for Atty. Jonas A. Abellar; 3. That what is stated in the Petition is that copy is furnished
Jonas A. Abellar [and] A. Dioquino, and the clerk of the undersigned only signed for the copy of A. Dioquino, the
undersigned; 4. That this representation failed to comment on the reply of Attorneys Aguadera and Demaisip
and failed to comply too to comment on the explanation of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar for the reason that it is the
belief of the undersigned that Atty. Jonas A. Abellar also received a copy of the Reply of Attorneys Aguadera and
Demaisip; 5. That the undersigned failed to comment on the explanation of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar for reasons
that he is of the belief that his services or his relation with Roman Alcantara as counsel for the latter has already
been terminated for reasons that Roman Alcantara employed the services of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar and it is
presumed by the undersigned that the services of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar was already known to the Honorable
Supreme Court as the attorney of record of Roman Alcantara; 6. That before the Petition for Certiorari was filed
by the petitioner, Atty. Jonas A. Abellar was already appearing as counsel of record for Roman Alcantara in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and appearing on incidents or motions pending therein, and the undersigned
counsel was already relieved of his duties with Roman Alcantara. In fact the Resolution of this Honorable
Tribunal dated December 8, 1973, requiring the Respondents to Comment on the Petition of the Petitioners as
addressed to the Honorable Castrence C. Veloso, Mr. Roman Alcantara and Messrs. Santos B. Aguadera and Sixto
Demaisip, counsels for the petitioners. The resolution did not particularize or mention the name of the
undersigned as counsel for Roman Alcantara, hence, he is of the belief that even the Honorable Supreme Court
has knowledge that he is relieved of his duties as counsel for Roman Alcantara, coupled by the act of Noemi
Alcantara, the wife of Roman Alcantara, who withdrew all papers relative to this case from the undersigned
informing the latter that her husband has engaged the services of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar for reasons that the
brother-in-law of Atty. Jonas A. Abellar will be the one to shoulder the expenses of the case including the
expenses in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court, and those papers withdrawn by the wife of Roman
Alcantara was not returned to the undersigned although there was a promise on her part to return the same
on or before the last working day of January, 1974. . . .; 7. That the undersigned is of the belief that Atty. Jonas
A. Abellar as the new counsel of Roman Alcantara assumed all the responsibilities as counsel for Roman
Alcantara: . . ." 4

What immediately calls attention in this explanation of respondent Dioquino is his temerity in stating not once
but twice that the alleged termination of his services by respondent Roman Alcantara was known to this Court.
It is indicative of an excessive estimate of one’s reputation as to his standing in the bar or excessive regard of
the importance of one’s person for any lawyer to make the assertion that this Court could have been aware of
his no longer representing a client in the absence of any pleading to that effect. Nor is this the only objectionable
feature of the attempted explanation by respondent Dioquino. For him to make such an assertion considering
that the record does not contain any notice of withdrawal of his appearance is to ignore or to be ignorant of the
most rudimentary principle as to when a lawyer-client relationship terminates. That in itself is enough of a
reflection of his good standing in the bar. It deserves a reproof from this Tribunal. What aggravates his failing
is the rather haughty tone in which his explanation was couched. Instead of being man enough to acknowledge
a patent neglect of duty, he would not try to escape responsibility elsewhere but also resort to the use of
language in which the element of arrogance is discernible. Even members of the bar who have rendered
distinguished service to the law are not oblivious of how persuasive a plea could be if impressed with the
necessary element of humility. It may not be out of place to note that under the circumstances as narrated by
him the interest of his client would be better served if there be a formal withdrawal of his appearance.

WHEREFORE, respondent Agustin T. Dioquino is severely censured. The explanation of Attorney Jonas A.
Abellar is accepted but he is admonished to be more attentive in the future as to the current stage of the
pleadings bearing on the cases wherein he has entered his appearance. Let copies of this resolution be entered
into the records of respondents Jonas A. Abellar and Agustin T. Dioquino.

[ G.R. No. L-39124, Nov 15, 1974 ]

DON LINO GUTIERREZ v. CA +

DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
In 1963 a judgment based on a compromise was rendered by the City Court of Manila in a case instituted by
Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. against Jesus Alvendia. In 1968 the said corporation again sued Alvendia in the
City Court of Manila for the revival of the judgment. The City Court rendered a judgment in favor of Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. Alvendia appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which, after a trial de
novo (there being no stenographic notes of the hearing in the City Court), affirmed the judgment of the City
Court with some modifications in its decision dated June 5, 1973.

In all those proceedings, Alvendia's counsel of record was Escolastico Viola. The law firm of Baizas, Alberto &
Associates, through Rodolfo A. Espiritu, collaborated with Attorney Viola. The copy of the decision was served
on Viola and not on Baizas, Alberto & Associates.

Alvendia, through Viola, appealed by record on appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. Viola and Rosendo J. Tansinsin, the lawyer of Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc., were
advised by the Clerk of Court of the lower court in a notice dated February 20, 1974 that the record on appeal
had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
In a letter dated February 26, 1974 the Court of Appeals notified Viola that the docket fee of forty-eight pesos
and the legal research fee of five pesos should be paid within fifteen days from notice and that forty copies of
the printed record on appeal should be filed within sixty days, with the warning that failure to do so would
constitute an abandonment of the appeal and cause the dismissal thereof. Viola received that notice on
February 28, 1974.

In view of Alvendia's failure to comply with that notice, the Court of Appeals in its resolution of May 3, 1974
dismissed his appeal. A copy of that resolution was served upon Viola on May 8, 1974.

On June 26, 1974 or forty-nine days after the order of dismissal was served on Attorney Viola, Alvendia, through
Rodolfo A. Espiritu of the Baizas law office, filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order on the ground
that Viola had ceased to be Alvendia's counsel since September, 1973 and that Attorney Crispin D. Baizas had
taken his place and it was allegedly agreed that the latter would handle Alvendia's appeal. The motion was
verified by Alvendia and Viola and was supported by their affidavits, the gist of which is that, due to the death
of Attorney Baizas on January 16, 1974, Alvendia failed to follow up his appeal.

Viola in his affidavit admitted that he received on February 28, 1974 the notice to pay the docket fee and to file
forty copies of the record on appeal but he allegedly "did not give any importance to it" because he was then no
longer Alvendia's counsel and his impression was that the Baizas law office was also given a copy of that
notification.

Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. opposed the motion for reconsideration. It insisted that Viola was AIvendia's
counsel of record for purposes of the appeal and that Baizas had never entered his formal appearance as
Alvendia's counsel. It claimed that the resolution had already become final and that the Court of Appeals had
no more jurisdiction over the case.

Furthermore, it argued that Alvendia had admitted in all his pleadings that he was indebted to Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. in the amount stated in the judgment, which was originally rendered in 1963, and that
Alvendia only claimed that he was not bound to pay that obligation.

The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of July 15, 1974, granted the motion and reinstated Alvendia's appeal. At
that time the docket fee had already been paid. Later, the printed record on appeal was filed. The motion of
Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. for the reconsideration of the resolution of July 15, 1974 was denied.

On August 19, 1974 the said corporation filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the resolution reinstating Alvendia's appeal and to compel the Court of Appeals to remand the record to the
lower court for the execution of its final judgment.

We are of the opinion that the petition is meritorious.

The Rules of Court provides:

"SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee on the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Failure of the appellant to pay the docketing fee as provided in section 5 of Rule 46;

xxx xxx xxx" (Rule 50).

"SEC. 5. Duty of appeallant upon receipt of notice. It shall be the duty of the appellant within fifteen (15) days
from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding section, to pay to the clerk of the Court of Appeals the
fee for the docketing of the appeal, and within sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to the court forty (40)
printed copies of the record on appeal, together with proof of service of fifteen (15) printed copies thereof upon
the appellee.

xxx xxx xxx." (Rule 46).

"SEC. 2. Effect of dismissal. Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall return to the court
below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the court showing that the appeal has been
dismissed.x x x" (Rule 50).
The Court of Appeals did not err in motu proprio dismissing Alvendia's appeal for failure to pay on time the
docket fee and to submit forty copies of his printed record on appeal (Alvero vs. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428,
434; Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39 Phil. 922; Dorego vs. Perez, L-24922, January 2, 1968, 22 SCRA 8).

Attorney Viola was negligent in not apprising Alvendia of the notice to pay the docket and legal research fees
and to file forty copies of the printed record on appeal. Alvendia is bound by his lawyer's negligence (Robles
vs. San Jose, 99 Phil. 658).

Viola was also negligent in not making a formal withdrawal as Alvendia's counsel and in not apprising the Court
of Appeals that Baizas was supposedly appellant's new counsel. In the absence of a formal withdrawal, he
continued to be Alvendia's counsel of record (Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA
476; Domingo, Jr. vs. Aquino, L-28078, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 472, 477). His alibi that it was his honest
impression that the Baizas law office was also notified by the Court of Appeals to pay the docket and legal
research fees is flimsy because he could have easily ascertained from the notice itself that Baizas' name did not
appear therein.

Moreover, "where a party is represented by two attorneys, the rule is that the notice may be made either upon
both attorneys or upon one of them, regardless of whether they belong to the same law firm or are practising
one independently of the other" (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 423, citing Ortega vs.
Pacho, 98 Phil. 618).

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's
appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the
Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in
handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.

Under the environmental circumstances of this eleven-year-old litigation, it was a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Court of Appeals to reinstate Alvendia's appeal and to relax the rule regarding dismissal of an
appeal for appellant's failure to pay on time the docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of his
record on appeal within the sixty-day period (Cf. Chavez and Celeste vs. Ganzon and the Court of Appeals, 108
Phil. 6, 10, and Urdaneta Rural Bank vs. San Juan, L-28346, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1390).

It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of a strict compliance with the periods
for performing certain acts incident to the appeal and that transgressions thereof, as a rule, would not be
tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would
ultimately become inutile.

Whether Alvendia's appeal by record on appeal is warranted under section 45 of the Judiciary Law as amended
by Republic Act No. 6031, in relation to section 29 of the same law as amended by Republic Act No. 5433, is a
point which we do not decide in this case. It was not raised by the petitioner. It suffices to note that, according
to section 45, generally, the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, which are appealed to it, "shall be final".

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1974, reinstating the appeal of respondent
Jesus Alvendia, is set aside and its resolution of May 3, 1974, dismissing his appeal for failure to pay the docket
and legal research fees within the reglementary period, is affirmed with costs against him.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]

IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against
her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the
standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members of the bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then 85 years old to
withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping.Respondent told her that if she
withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his
other heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits with the Philippine
National Bank on January 18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he was working. He
also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from tracing the
same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent deposited the amount
of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries, including his
son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22, 1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return the P588,000.00 plus
interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit for another month and promised to return the
whole amount including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent, however, failed to return the money on June
25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only return P400,000.00 to be paid
on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of
money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement stating:

"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to (respondent) the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum of money was withdrawn by the
parties from the Philippine National Bank on said date.

WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of (complainant) with the UNION
BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.

WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby agree on the following terms
for the purpose of disposing of the above sum, to wit:

1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum of P400,000.00 to
(complainant) in the following manner:

a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;

b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;

c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated check.

2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid postdated checks fall due, the
same should be backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.

3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges the same as his
indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the former when able or at his option.(Complainant) however
assures (respondent) that she will not institute any collection suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she
transmit the same by way of testamentary succession to her heirs, neither are (respondent's) heirs liable.

4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their previous cordial filial
relationship."[2]

In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to complainant the following
checks:

1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;

2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;

3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00.

Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored due to insufficient
funds.
 Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check because under paragraph
2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only guaranteed that the checks shall be "backed up with sufficient
funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in
the brewing dispute between the two. They begged respondent to pay his obligation to complainant. Heeding
their plea, respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and another
for P35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first check but not the second because it was dishonored
by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No. 487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were
likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and a corresponding
information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable settlement. To pay his debt,
respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting to P40,000.00. Complainant
refused the offer because she needed cash to provide for her daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against complainant. It appears that
respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of land owned by complainant that she had promised to
sell them the land and that she had authorized him to negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants
advance payment for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then prepared a special power of
attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the land and asked complainant to sign it. Complainant, however, refused to
sign because she did not intend to make respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent
for estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her promise to sell the
land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of Administratrix as a
Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings No. 5544 for the settlement of the
estate of complainant's husband, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.[4] Respondent filed the pleading although he was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private individuals and use
of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for allegedly making untruthful statements
in her petition for appointment as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent on two
grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud complainant, and (2) that respondent filed
frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's counsel, Atty. Abelardo
Viray. The complaint cited four causes of action: (1) assisting client to commit tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox
collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and (4) subornation of perjury.[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition
pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also recommended the dismissal of the complaint to disbar
Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-96-22 stating:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled case, hereinmade part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to be supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]

On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to Administrative Case No.
2884.[9] The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied the motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for Two Years,
alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for disbarment.[11]
We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
 "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:

"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause."

Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an attorney when he
deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the same despite
demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against
complainant to compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed, respondent's
deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of a
lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in
the profession.[12]
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be too
mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent's privilege to practice law not only for two years, but
for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any
way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack
of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. [13] This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[14] Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges. In the instant case, it has been sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct,
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all our courts.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a verified letter-complaint[1] for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers
oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was discovered that
Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996. [2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as
counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given
the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by
TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the proper
measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his
family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by
the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were
 there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay and
narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it and continued with the
construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over the
construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about the people of
respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares
in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated
December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant, however,
averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor received any money therefor, and
he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed
of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainants father
allegedly gave the subject property to him (respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale
purportedly signed by complainant.
In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn,
he alleged that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and
for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of
Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery business
without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by Jose Ducat,
Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent Villalon with the name of
respondent Canares included therein as protection because of the improvements to be introduced in
the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering the subject property, it was discovered that
the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told
respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because the land was actually owned by him and that
he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject
property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got
the title and guaranteed that he would return the document already signed and notarized, which he
did the following day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came
to his office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject property
by the caretaker of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed the
Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo
Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be
disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature
and selling the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained
that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high
standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the Deed of
Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was
orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was
reduced in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the
person who signed the said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent
and knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon
guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise
directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to
the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of
the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely
against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commissions full faith
and credence.

Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself
the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face
of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property
unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such
authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject property
to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not
the owner of said property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider
himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat,
Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant) allegedly
executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering
the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious
character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale
of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature
over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is tantamount
to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap
of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given
to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said
document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property
(which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable
character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims that he
has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before
Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00
representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of
P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for
a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act
and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same
to substantiate his defense.[8]

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts
and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were
all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence
adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the profession.[10]
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located
in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose
Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by
complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the
subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or
transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by
his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent
Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer
was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, [11] purportedly in
favor of Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr., respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose
Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the
registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria
Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres
Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and
that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was
for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial
that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that
he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent
Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are
expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.[12]
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed
upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar
V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,[13] this Court suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for
a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his clients
property merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio
Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who
prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already confined
at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds date of execution; (4) respondent
knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that
Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy
of the questioned deed of sale.[14]
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that
respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public
Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, [15] which
was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed
the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of October 1991, allegedly
signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent Arsenio S.
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number
of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latters
TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalons personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.