MINDORO LUMBER VS.

BACAY the execution of a compromise settlement is a

basic requirement; without it, there can be no
FACTS: The private respondents executed a
valid compromise settlement. In this case, the
Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal
petitioner admits that the purported
(Joint Affidavit of Withdrawal of Complaint),
compromise settlement was executed by the
declaring therein that by virtue of the amount
private respondents without such required
each of them received (which amount was either
assistance. The closest form of assistance
P3,000.00 or P6,000.00 per employee), they
adverted to by the petitioner in this case was
were withdrawing their claim against Mindoro
that of Bacay’s counsel when the latter appeared
Lumber. Their counsel then filed a motion to
before the Office of the Regional Director to file
dismiss. The private respondents said that Bacay
the following: the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-
persuaded them to execute the JAWC. They
uurong ng Sakdal executed by the private
were then withdrawing the said JAWC for the
respondents; a Sinumpaang Salaysay executed
amount was grossly disproportionate to their
by Bacay withdrawing the complaint; and the
entitlement under the law, and were authorizing
Motion to Dismiss. Such assistance, however, is
Lanot, the new president, to pursue their claim.
not the “assistance” required by Article 227. As
Lanot then filed a motion before the DOLE-RO,
such, the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong
praying that the employees be paid the amounts
ng Sakdal executed by the respondents cannot
due to each of them, and that the said JAWC be
qualify as a valid compromise settlement.
declared null and void. The RD dismissed the
case while the DOLE-Sec granted it and 2.) No. The petitioner is correct in saying that
remanded the case to the DOLE-RO which issued there are legitimate waivers that represent a
writ of execution. voluntary and reasonable settlement of a
worker’s claim which should be respected by the
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the Sama-samang
courts as the law between the parties. Indeed,
Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal constitutes a
not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against
valid compromise agreement considering it was
public policy, except (1)where there is clear
not assisted by the BLR or the Regional Office of
proof that the waiver was wangled from an
DOLE; and 2.) Whether or not the
unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the
acknowledgment of the respondents that they
terms of settlement are unconscionable on their
each received the amount of either P3,000.00 or
faces; in these cases, the law will step in to annul
P6,000.00 embodied in the said Salaysay
the questionable transactions. Such quitclaims
constitutes a valid quitclaim considering that the
are regarded as ineffective to bar the workers
individual claims are ranging from P6,744.20 to
from claiming the full measure of their legal
P242,626.90.
rights.
RULING: 1.) No. The petitioner points out that
In the case at bar, the private respondents’
while the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong
individual claims, ranging from P6,744.20 to
ng Sakdal was executed without the assistance
P242,626.90, are grossly disproportionate to
of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) or the
what each of them actually received under the
DOLE Regional Office, the November 4, 1999
Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal.
Order of the Regional Director in Case No. LSED-
The amount of the settlement is indubitably
RO400-9807-CI-001 nonetheless shows that
unconscionable; hence, ineffective to bar the
when Eduardo Bacay appeared before the said
workers from claiming the full measure of their
office, he was assisted by counsel. The assistance
legal rights.
of the BLR or the regional office of the DOLE in

CALDERON V. CARALE
FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law
amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any
vacancy shall come from the nominees of the
sector which nominated the predecessor.
Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as
the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was
not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.
Calderon questioned the appointment saying
that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on
the appointing power of the executive contained
in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress
may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers
appointed by the President additional to those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law,
require confirmation by the CoA of
appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the CoA.
RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by
the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of
executive departments, ambassadors, public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution, such as the
members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required.
Jurisprudence established the following in
interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the
President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights).
ROBOSA V. NLRC
FACTS: The NLRC issued a TRO and directed
CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company
executives to cease and desist from dismissing
any member of the union and from
implementing memorandum terminating the
services of the sales drivers, and to immediately
reinstate them if the dismissals have been
effected.
Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with
the NLRC’s resolution. They instead moved to
dissolve the TRO and opposed the union’s
petition for preliminary injunction. Then, the
NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary
injunction.The respondents moved for
reconsideration. The union opposed the motion
and urgently moved to cite the responsible CTMI
officers in contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt
charge and issued a resolution dismissing the
charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to proceed
hearing the main case on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has contempt
powers.
HELD: Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code,
the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any
offending party in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in
accordance with law. The penalty for direct
contempt consists of either imprisonment or
fine, the degree or amount depends on whether
the contempt is against the Commission or the
labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires
the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with
indirect contempt in the manner prescribed
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court does not require the labor
arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings before the trial court. This mode is
to be observed only when there is no law
granting them contempt powers. As is clear
under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor
arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has
jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties
in direct or indirect contempt. Robosa, et al.,
therefore, have not improperly brought the
indirect contempt charges against the
respondents before the NLRC.
AGABON V. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners were employed by Riviera
Home as gypsum board and cornice installers
from January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when
they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and was decided in their favor by the Labor
Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending
just cause for the dismissal because of
petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled
there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The
CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal
because they have abandoned their work but
ordered the payment of money claims.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally
dismissed.
RULING: To dismiss an employee, the law
required not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the
employee the right to be heard and to defend
himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. For a valid finding or
abandonment, two factors are considered:
failure to report for work without a valid reason;
and, a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested
by overt acts from which it may be deduced that
the employees has no more intention to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due
process requirement, the dismissal may be
upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay
an indemnity to the employee. This became
known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated
Due process Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it
is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by
law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the
lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal but the employer should indemnify
the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to
discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss
now, pay later” which we sought to deter in
Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights
warrants the payment of nominal damages.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL VS. NLRC
FACTS: Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. There
being no employer-employee relationship
between the two, petition was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Arcayos appealed to NLRC
cotending errors of the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over NLRC appeals?
RULING: First established in 1972, decisions of
NLRC were declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of labor and, ultimately to the
President. But under the present state law, there
is no provision for appeals from NLRC decisions.
The court held that there is an underlying power
of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though not right of review is given by
statute, that the purpose of jurisdiction review is
to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of
the parties; and that is part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
jurisdictions.
Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March
1995, the mode for judicial review over NLRC
decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. The same confuses by declaring that the
CA has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of SC,
including the NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section
9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from NLRC to SC
are interpreted and hereby declared to mean
and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule
65. All such petitions should henceforth be
initially filed in the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as appropriate forum for the relief
desired.
Case remanded to CA.
GARCIA V. PAL
FACTS: The case stemmed from the
administrative charge filed by Philippine Airlines
(PAL) against its employees-herein petitioners
after they were allegedly caught in the act of
sniffing shabu when a team of company security
personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL
Technical Center’s Toolroom Section on July 24,
1995.
After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for
transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline,
prompting them to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages which was resolved by
the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering
PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision.
Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of
Execution respecting the reinstatement decision
and issued a Notice of Garnishment.
Respondent elevated the matter to the appellate
court which issued the herein challenged
Decision and Resolution nullifying the NLRC
Resolutions on two grounds, essentially
espousing that:
(1) a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal
removes the basis for implementing the
reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiter’s
decision; and
(2) the impossibility to comply with the
reinstatement order due to corporate
rehabilitation provides a reasonable justification
for the failure to exercise the options under
Article 223 of the Labor Code (the second
ground).
RULING:
Amplification of the First Ground:
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that
even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on
the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court.
It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter’s order
of reinstatement is immediately executory and
the employer has to either re-admit them to
work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate
them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise
the options in the alternative, employer must
pay the employee’s salaries.
Amplification of the Second Ground
The Court sustains the appellate court’s finding
that the peculiar predicament of a corporate
rehabilitation rendered it impossible for
respondent to exercise its option under the
circumstances.
The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual
delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement
pending appeal was not executed prior to its
reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the
employer’s unjustified act or omission. If the
delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal,
the employer may still be required to pay the
salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the
Labor Arbiter’s decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY DENIED.
Insofar as the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution annulling the NLRC Resolutions
affirming the validity of the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment are concerned,
the Court finds no reversible error.
EQUITABLE BANK V. SADAC
FACTS: Respondent Sadac was appointed as the
General Counsel of Equitable Bank. Later on,
lawyers of the bank accused Sadac of abusive
conduct which resulted to the termination of his
services. Sadac then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with damages. The dismissal was finally
declared as illegal. Sadac filed with the Labor
Arbiter a motion for execution of the decision
and argued that in the computation of
backwages, salary increases should be deemed
included.
ISSUE: Should periodic general increases in basic
salary be included in computing full backwages
for illegally dismissed employees?
HELD: No. Backwages are granted on grounds of
equity for earnings which a worker or employee
has lost due to his illegal dismissal; it is not
private compensation or damages but is
awarded in furtherance and effectuation of the
public objective of the Code. Backwages to be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee
should not as a general rule be diminished or
reduced by the earnings derived by him
elsewhere during the period of his illegal
dismissal. Article 279 of the Labor Code
mandates that an employee’s full backwages
shall be inclusive of allowance and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent. The salary increase
cannot be interpreted as either as an allowance
or a benefit. Salary increases are not akin to
allowances or benefits and cannot be confused
with either. Allowances and benefits are granted
to the employee apart or separate from the
wage or salary. In contrast, salary increases are
amounts which are added to the employee’s
salary as an increment thereto for varied reasons
deemed appropriate by the employer. An
unqualified award of backwages means that the
employee is paid at the wage rate at the time of
his dismissal. And the court has declared that the
base figure to be used in the computation of
backwages due to the employee should include
not just the basic salary, but also the regular
allowances that he had been receiving, such as
the emergency living allowances and the 13th
month pay mandated under the law The term
“backwages without qualification and
deduction” means that the workers are to be
paid their backwages fixed as of the time of the
dismissal or strike without deduction for their
earnings elsewhere during their layoff and
without qualification of their wages as thus
fixed; unqualified by any wage increases or other
benefits that may have been received by their
co-workers who are not dismissed or did not go
on strike. Awards including salary differentials
are not allowed. The salary base properly used
should, however, included not only the basic
salary but also the emergency cost of living
allowance and also transportation allowances if
the workers are entitled thereto.
GABRIEL V. SECRETARY
FACTS: Petitioners compromise the Executive
Board of Solidbank union, the collective
bargaining agent for the Solidbank Corporation.
Private respondents are members of said union.
The union’s EB decided to retain the services of
their counsel in connection with negotiations for
a new CBA. A general membership meeting was
called where majority of union members
approved a resolution confirming the decision to
engage the services of the union’s counsel, Atty.
Lacsina. The resolution provided that 10% of the
total economic benefits that may be secured be
given to the counsel at attorney’s fees. Also it
contained an authorization for Solidbank
Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees the
first lump sum of payment of benefits under the
new CBA. Private respondents issued a
complaint for illegal deduction.
ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorney’s
fees.
HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the
validity of the special assessment for union’s
incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and
representation expenses. They are:
1. authorization by a written resolution of
majority of all the members at the general
membership meeting called for the purpose.
2. secretary’s record of the minutes of the
meeting
3. individual written authorization for check-off
duly signed by the employees concerned.
Such requirements were not complied with as
there were no individual written check-off
authorizations; thus, the employer cannot legally
deduct thus the assessment. The union should
be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for
the services of a lawyers and accordingly,
reimbursement should be charged to the union’s
general fund or account. No deduction can be
made from the salaries of the concerned
employees other than those mandated by law.
COASTAL SUBIC vs. DOLE
FACTS: CSBTI Rank-and-File Union (CSBTI-RFU)
and CSBTI Supervisory Union (CSBTI-SU) filed
separate petitions for certification election
before Med-Arbiter de Jesus. The rank-and-file
union insists that it is a legitimate labor
organization having been issued a charter
certificate by the Associated Labor Union (ALU),
and the supervisory union by the Associated
Professional, Supervisory, Office and Technical
Employees Union (APSOTEU). Private
respondents also alleged that the establishment
in which they sought to operate was
unorganized. CSBTI opposed both petitions for
certification election alleging that the rank-and-
file union and supervisory union were not
legitimate labor organizations. Without ruling on
the legitimacy of the respondent unions, the
Med-Arbiter dismissed both petitions. Med-
Arbiter held that the ALU and APSOTEU are one
and the same federation having a common set of
officers. Thus, both unions were in effect
affiliated with only one federation. On appeal to
the SOLE: Reversed the decision of the Med-
Arbiter. SOLE ruled that CSBTI-SU and CSBTI-RFU
have separate legal personalities to file their
separate petitions for certification election. SOLE
held that APSOTEU is a legitimate labor
organization because it was properly registered
pursuant to the 1989 Revised Rules and
Regulations implementing Republic Act No.
6715, the rule applicable at the time of its
registration. It further ruled that ALU and
APSOTEU are separate and distinct labor unions
having separate certificates of registration from
the DOLE. They also have different sets of locals.
The Secretary declared CSBTI-RFU and CSBTI-SU
as legitimate labor organizations having been
chartered respectively by ALU and APSOTEU
after submitting all the requirements with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). SOLE ordered
the holding of separate certification election.
MFR of parties denied. Appeal to CA. Denied,
Hence, SC Petition.
ISSUE: Can the supervisory and the rank-and-file
unions file separate petitions for certification
election? CSBTI argues that APSOTEU improperly
secured its registration from the DOLE Regional
Director and not from the BLR; that it is the BLR
that is authorized to process applications and
issue certificates of registration, that the
certificates of registration issued by the DOLE
Regional Director pursuant to the rules are
questionable, and possibly even void ab initio for
being ultra vires. CSBTI insists that APSOTEU
lacks legal personality, and its chartered affiliate
CSBTI-SU cannot attain the status of a legitimate
labor organization to file a petition for
certification election.
RULING: Pertinent is Article 235 of the Labor
Code which provides that applications for
registration shall be acted upon by the Bureau.
"Bureau" as defined under the Labor Code
means the BLR and/or the Labor Relations
Division in the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor. Further, Section 2, Rule II,
Book V of the 1989 Revised Implementing Rules
of the Labor Code (Implementing Rules) provides
that: Section 2. Where to file application;
procedure – Any national labor organization or
labor federation or local union may file an
application for registration with the Bureau or
the Regional Office where the applicant’s
principal offices is located. The Bureau or the
Regional Office shall immediately process and
approve or deny the application. In case of
approval, the Bureau or the Regional Office shall
issue the registration certificate within thirty (30)
calendar days from receipt of the application,
together with all the requirements for
registration as hereinafter provided. The
Implementing Rules specifically Section 1, Rule III
of Book V, as amended by Department Order No.
9, thus:
SECTION 1. Where to file applications. – The
application for registration of any federation,
national or industry union or trade union center
shall be filed with the Bureau. Where the
application is filed with the Regional Office, the
same shall be immediately forwarded to the
Bureau within forty-eight (48) hours from filing
thereof, together with all the documents
supporting the registration. The applications for
registration of an independent union shall be
filed with and acted upon by the Regional Office
where the applicant’s principal office is located
…. The DOLE issued Department Order No. 40-
03, which took effect on March 15, 2003, further
amending Book V of the above implementing
rules. The new implementing rules explicitly
provide that applications for registration of labor
organizations shall be filed either with the
Regional Office or with the BLR. Even after the
amendments, the rules did not divest the
Regional Office and the BLR of their jurisdiction
over applications for registration by labor
organizations. The amendments to the
implementing rules merely specified that when
the application was filed with the Regional
Office, the application would be acted upon by
the BLR. The records in this case showed that
APSOTEU was registered on March 1, 1991.
Accordingly, the law applicable at that time was
Section 2, Rule II, Book V of the Implementing
Rules, and not Department Order No. 9 which
took effect only on June 21, 1997. Thus,
considering further that APSOTEU’s principal
office is located in Diliman, Quezon City, and its
registration was filed with the NCR Regional
Office, the certificate of registration is valid.
Thus, APSOTEU is a legitimate labor organization
and has authority to issue charter to its affiliates.
It may issue a local charter certificate to CSBTI-
SU and correspondingly, CSBTI-SU is legitimate.
Under the rules implementing the Labor Code, a
chartered local union acquires legal personality
through the charter certificate issued by a duly
registered federation or national union, and
reported to the Regional Office in accordance
with the rules implementing the Labor Code. A
local union does not owe its existence to the
federation with which it is affiliated. It is a
separate and distinct voluntary association
owing its creation to the will of its members.
Mere affiliation does not divest the local union
of its own personality, neither does it give the
mother federation the license to act
independently of the local union. It only gives
rise to a contract of agency, where the former
acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local
unions are considered principals while the
federation is deemed to be merely their agent.
As such principals, the unions are entitled to
exercise the rights and privileges of a legitimate
labor organization, including the right to seek
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent in the appropriate employer unit.
AIR PHIL. CORP VS. BLR
Topic: Cancellation of Union Certificate of
Registration
FACTS: Respondent Air Philippines Flight
Attendants Association (APFLAA) was issued a
Certificate of Registration by the DOLE
APFLAA filed a petition for certification election
as the collective bargaining representative of the
flight attendants of APC
After the Med-Arbiter rendered a ruling ordering
the holding of a certification election, such
election was held, with majority of votes cast in
favor of AFPLAA
APC filed a petition for De-Certification and
Cancellation of Union Registration against
APFLAA with DOLE
- APFLAA could not be registered as a labor
organization, as its composition consisted of “a
mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file flight
attendants
- Flight attendants holding the position of
“Lead Cabin Attendant,” which according to it is
supervisory in character, were among those who
comprised APFLAA
DOLE: dismissed petition, holding that Article
245 of the Labor Code does not provide a ground
for cancellation of union registration, which is
instead governed by Article 239 of the LC
ISSUE: Whether or not APFLAA’s union
registration may be cancelled considering that
the union is allegedly composed of a mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees
RULING: NO. For the purpose of de-certifying a
union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-
and-file union includes ineligible employees in its
membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c)
of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there
was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
in connection with the adoption or ratification of
the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in
connection with the election of officers, minutes
of the election of officers, the list of voters, or
failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers
the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
and their postal addresses to the BLR.

In its Petition for De-certification and

Cancellation of Union Registration, APC did not
impute on APFLAA such misrepresentation of
the character necessitated under Article 239 (a)
and (c) of the Labor Code. APC merely argued
that APFLAA was not qualified to become a
legitimate labor organization by reason of its
mixed composition of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees; and that APFLAA
committed misrepresentation by making it
appear that its composition was composed
purely of rank-and-file employees. Such
misrepresentation (if it can be called as such) as
alleged by APC, is not conformable to Article 239
(a) and (c) of the Labor Code. Indeed, it appears
from the record that APC instead devoted the
bulk of its arguments in establishing that
supervisory employees comprised part of the
membership of APFLAA, a ground which is not
sufficient to cause the cancellation of union
registration. And this is of course all under the
assumption that Lead Cabin Attendants are
indeed supervisory employees, a claim
consistently denied by APFLAA and which was
not confirmed by either the DOLE-NCR or the
BLR.

DISPOSITIVE: APFLAA won.

DOCTRINE: For the purpose of de-certifying a

union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-
and-file union includes ineligible employees in its
membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c)
of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there
was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
in connection with the adoption or ratification of
the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in
connection with the election of officers, minutes
of the election of officers, the list of voters, or
failure to submit these documents together with