PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. 1. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (L.L.T.M.C)

CASE NUMBER : 1
CASE TITLE: Lim v Lazaro
Doctrine:
Writ of preliminary attachment subsists until judgment is satisfied. It is an ancillary remedy applied not for its own sake
but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal
action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.
CASE NUMBER : 2
CASE TITLE: Ligon v RTC of Makati
Doctrine:
Attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is
had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in some manner provided by law.
CASE NUMBER : 3
CASE TITLE: Torres v Satsatin
Doctrine:

The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the
defendant.

CASE NUMBER : 4
CASE TITLE: Manguila vs Court of Appeals

Doctrine and Rationale:

For implementation for the writ of attachment to commence, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power to act in any authority against the defendant.
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the person through proper and valid service of summons or other coercive
process or his voluntary submission to court’s authority. Section 14 of the RC provides that “whereabouts of unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation”.

Lastly, parties may agree in writing on the venue on which an action should be brought. However, mere stipulation,
unless exclusive, does not preclude parties from bringing case in other venues. As a general rule, venue for personal
actions is where the defendant resides or may be found, or where plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

CASE NUMBER : 5
CASE TITLE : Vicente Chuidan vs Sandiganbayan – GR No. 139941 dated January 19, 2011

Doctrine and Rationale:

Remedies of the defendant whose property or assets has been attached under the RC are: 1) Rule 57 Section 12 file
a counter bond; 2) Rule 57 Section 13 which is to quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or
improvidently issued. The ground must be in relation to issuance of the writ of attachments.
The defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the writ on preliminary attachment which would result to trial
on merits of action.
 1. 2. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

CASE NUMBER : 6
CASE TITLE: Teresita Idolor vs Court of Appeals GR No. 141853 dated February 7, 2001

Doctrine:

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The essential requisites must
be present: 1) There must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the
injunction is to directed is a violation of such right.

If the right of redemption has already expired, the party seeking injunction no longer has sufficient interest or title in
the property sought to be protected. A party seeking injunction who has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no
claim to be ultimate relief sought, shows no equity.

CASE NUMBER: 7
CASE TITLE: GUSTILO V. REAL

Doctrine:

Before an injunctive relief be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:
1. There must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected
2. The act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right

The onus probandi is on the movant to show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by
the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.

Here, the above are not present because the complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for
punong brgy. He is entitled to all the rights.

CASE NUMBER: 8
CASE TITLE: LAGROSAS V. BRISTOL-MYERS
Doctrine:

The injunction bond is intended to protect against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only.
It is is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.

CASE NUMBER: 9
CASE TITLE: JENOSA V. DELARIARTE
Doctrine:
Injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must come to court with clean hands. This is so because among the
maxims of equity are:
1. He who seeks equity must do equity
2. He who comes into equity is must come with clean hands.

CASE NUMBER: 10
CASE TITLE: Solid Builders, Inc v. China Banking Corporation
Doctrine:

Foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the
extraordinary provisional remedy of Preliminiary Injunction
Rationale:

All is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed. The respondents will not be deprived
outrightly of their property, under the right of redemption. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the
right to receive any surplus in the selling price

CASE NUMBER: 11
CASE TITLE: Plaza v. Lustiva

Doctrine:
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected
during the pendency of the principal action.

Rationale:

When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of an injunctive relief is not proper

CASE NUMBER: 12
CASE TITLE:Office of the Ombudsman v. De Chavez
Doctrine:

Penalty of dismissal from the service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executory.

Rationale:

Government employee or official’s dismissal, therefore lacks the requisite that the right is clear and unmistakable,
thus, the writ cannot be issued

In relation to Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison (612 SCRA)

1. 3. RECEIVERSHIP (LaTaKo)

CASE NUMBER: 13
CASE TITLE: Larrobis Jr. vs. Phil Veterans Bank
Doctrine:

While the respondent bank was banned from pursuing its business and was placed under receivership, “foreclosure”
should not be considered included in the acts prohibited whenever banks are “prohibited from doing business during
receivership and liquidation proceedings.”

Rationale:

This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles and preserve the assets of
the bank in substitution of its former management and prevent the dissipation of its assets o the detriment of the
creditors of the bank.

CASE NUMBER: 14
CASE TITLE: Tantano vs Espina- Caboverde
Doctrine:
Alleged need for income to defray one’s medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment
of a receiver.

Rationale:

Such is not found in Section 1 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for
granting receivership.

Doctrine:
There must be a clear showing that disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired.

Rationale:
Placing properties under receivership is the most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer, or dispose
of them. But when there’s no grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage, receivership is not proper.

CASE NUMBER: 15
CASE TITLE: Koruga vs. Arcenas

Doctrine:
The Monetary Board and not the RTC, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks.

Rationale:

It is crystal clear in Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act that “the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board.” The term “exclusively” connotes that only the Monetary Board
can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and upon an affirmative finding, it also has
authority to appoint a receiver.

1. 4. REPLEVIN (OSHAN)

CASE NUMBER : 16
CASE TITLE: Orosa v CA

Doctrine:
The trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that
petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. To sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust
enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself,
but only the amount equivalent to installments actually paid with interest.

CASE NUMBER: 17
CASE TITLE: Smart v Astorga

Doctrine:
Replevin is outside the competence of a labor tribunal and labor arbiter. Smart's demand for payment of the market
value of the car or the return of rhe car in alternative is not a labor, but a civil dispute.

CASE NUMBER: 18
CASE TITLE: Hao v Andres

Doctrine:
There are well-defined steps with regard to implementation of a writ of replevin. The property seized must not be
delivered immediately to the plaintiff and the sheriff must maintain custody of the property for at least 5 days.

CASE NUMBER : 19
CASE TITLE: AGNER VS BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK

Doctrine:
As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of
the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court,
therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.

CASE NUMBER : 20
CASE TITLE: NAVARRO VS ESCOBIDO

Doctrine:
In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-
owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule
60 of the Rules. We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the
possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition
precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

1. 5. SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE (DePeLiGoLim)

CASE NUMBER : 21
CASE TITLE:DE ASIS VS CA

Doctrine:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to
renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life
cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. It appears that the former dismissal was
predicated upon a compromise.Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support,
cannot be the subject of compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force
and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.
(emphasis supplied)

Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-935 and the lower courts pronouncement that such
dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.

CASE NUMBER: 22
CASE TITLE: People vs Manahan

Doctrine:

The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should
there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate

CASE NUMBER: 23
CASE TITLE: Lim vs Lim

Doctrine:

Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to
the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.

CASE NUMBER: 24
CASE TITLE: Gotardo vs Buling

Doctrine:

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws

CASE NUMBER: 25
CASE TITLE: LIM LUA vs LUA

Doctrine:

The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
Those given voluntarily cannot be deducted determining total support arrears.
Rationale:
it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his
children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover
those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

1. 1. INTERPLEADER (WEPB)

CASE NUMBER: 26
CASE TITLE: WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs WON

Doctrine:
An interpleader is a compulsory counter claim. (R9 S2)
Application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case.

Rationale:
A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to
prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
judgment.

CASE NUMBER: 27
CASE TITLE: ETERNAL GARDENS vs. IAC

Doctrine:
The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the
petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court.

CASE NUMBER: 28
CASE TITLE: Pasricha Vs Don Luiz

Doctrine:
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due
to conflicting claims on the property.

CASE NUMBER: 29
CASE TITLE: Bank of Commerce vs Planters Development Bank

Doctrine:
Interpleader is a form of counter-claim/cross claim, thus the same may be iniated through answer instead of
original complaint.
 1. 2. DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER SIMILAR REMEDIES

CASE NUMBER: 30
CASE TITLE: Almeda vs Bathala
Doctrine:

Declaratory relief will not lie when the document or contract subject thereof was already violated.

Declaratory relief may prosper notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/recission case before the trial court.

CASE NUMBER: 31
CASE TITLE: Rep vs. Orbecido
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law? [YES]
Doctrines:
A petition to apply a judgment of divorce to the status of the husband is an issue ripe for judicial determination.
Claims regarding the status of Citizens such as judgment pertaining to them rendered by foreign court may be a
ground for a petition for declaratory relief.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

CASE NUMBER: 32
CASE TITLE: Malana Vs. Tappa
Doctrine:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action

CASE NUMBER: 33
CASE TITLE: Chavez vs judicial bar and council

Doctrine:
Being a nominee for a government position or even as a taxpayer, is sufficient locus standi for an action for
declaratory relief.
Chavez who was a nominee to the position of Chief Justice, who petitioned the court for declaratory relief which also
enjoined Congress from allowing two members of congress to sit in the judicial bar and council as representatives
thereof.

His initial locus standi as a taxpayer, citizen and previous nominee as Chief Justice was just.
The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the
JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land.
CASE NUMBER: 34
CASE TITLE: Sabitsana v Muertegui (Quieting of title)
Garcia executed an unnotarized DOAS of land in favor of Muertegui. Garcia sold the lot to Sabitsana, Muetegui’s
lawyer, through a notarized DOAS.

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition
to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a
title, respondent filed a case to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief,
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

CASE NUMBER: 34
CASE TITLE: Republic v Roque
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding

CASE NUMBER: 35
CASE TITLE: Southern Hemisphere Case

1. 3. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC AND COA

CASE NUMBER: 36
CASE TITLE: Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v COMELEC
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power
due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross”

We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC,
as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC – created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself – on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound
by the rules of evidence

1. 4. CERTIORARI PROHIBITION MANDAMUS

4.A. Certiorari (AAMPUT)

CASE NUMBER: 37
CASE TITLE: Ampil v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 192685/G.R. No. 199115)
Doctrine:
The Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the existence of
probable cause or the lack thereof.
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.

Rationale:
The Court has consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers.

CASE NUMBER: 38
CASE TITLE: A.L. Ang Network Inc. v. Mondejar (G.R. No. 200804)
Doctrine:
The proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Rationale:
The Court considers the final nature of small claims cases where the remedy of appeal not allowed.

CASE NUMBER: 39
CASE TITLE: Maglalang v. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 190566)

Doctrine:
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

Rationale:
One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed
of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Doctrine: Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. One of the exceptions is when no
administrative review is available. Appeal to CSC is available for administrative disciplinary actions with a penalty of
suspension of more than 30 days. Suspension of not more than 30 days decided by heads of departments, agencies
and instrumentalities are final and unappealable – certiorari is the proper remedy

CASE NUMBER: 40
CASE TITLE: People v Castaneda
Doctrine: Filing for petition for certiorari is not extendible to avoid unreasonable delay that violates the right of parties
to speedy disposition of cases. There is no compelling reason provided by lawyers of BOC to extend the
reglementary period.

CASE NUMBER: 41
CASE TITLE: UP Board of Regents v Ligot-Telan
Doctrine: It is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed
by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued on doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner being required. If there is no clear and certain right, mandamus is no avail against an official or government
agency whose duty requires the exercise of judgment. More importantly, the court has completely disregarded the
overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction upon erring student on an institution of higher learning.

CASE NUMBER: 42
CASE TITLE: Tuason v Register of Deeds
Doctrine: It is true that writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify judicial or quasi-judicial acts unlike in prohibition
which is directed against judicial or ministerial functions. But the petition will be shown upon analysis to been in reality
an exercise of judicial function. Mr. Marcos exercised a judicial function – he determined the facts, applied the law to
the facts and declared the legal rights of the parties – certiorari is the proper remedy.

4.B. Prohibition (VCT)

CASE NUMBER: 43
CASE TITLE: Vivas v. Monetary Board of the BSP
Doctrine: A writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers or
persons from usurping or exercising jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and to confine them to
exercise those powers legally conferred. The proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act
which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide remedy for acts already accomplished – Vivas availed of the
wrong remedy.

Additional note: Under RA 7653, any act of the monetary board in placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership
or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari – 10 days from receipt by the BOD
of the order.

CASE NUMBER: 44
CASE TITLE: Corales v. Republic
Mayor Corales appointed Angeles as Municipal Administrator during his first term and reappointed the latter on his
second and third term despite the disapproval of Sangguniang Bayan on the ground of nepotism. Andal, the
provincial auditor issued an audit observation memo stating the propriety of appointment of Angeles and asked
Corales to comment/reply. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against Andal
and the Sanggunian.
Doctrine: Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing
with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is no plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Under the revised rules of procedures of COA, an appeal may be
made to COA and to the Court.

Note: an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order therefore not appealable– petition for certiorari is
the remedy for GADALEJ

CASE NUMBER: 45
CASE TITLE: Tan v Court of Appeals
King extended a loan to the petitioners and the PDCs subsequently bounced. King filed for violation of BP22 and
estafa. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary injunction and prayer for TRO
before the CA. CA dismissed the petition.

Doctrine: As long as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are correctible by timely appeal. In determining
whether a tribunal acted in GAD, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. There must be GAD that the tribunal
exercised its power in a whimsical, capricious, arbitrary or despotic manner and it must be so patent or gross. Also,
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is not a substitute for lost appeal.

4.C. Mandamus(HSSF)
CASE NUMBER: 46
CASE TITLE: Hippos v Bay
Crime of rape and acts of lasciviousness were filed (initial finding of probable cause) against the petitioners in the
family court. During the reinvestigation of the prosecutor’s office, the petitioners filed their joint memorandum to
dismiss the case being there no probable cause which was granted by the prosecutor. The Prosecutor filed a motion
to withdraw information before Judge Bay – denied. Petitioners filed for petition for mandamus.
Doctrine: The extraordinary writ of mandamus lies only to compel the officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one – mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise hid judgment. Mandamus is never availing to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of discretion. While a judge
refusing to act on a motion to withdraw may be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled
to act in a certain way.

CASE NUMBER: 47
CASE TITLE: Sanchez v Lastimoso
Petitioners are constables in the Philippines Constabulary which were discharged from service but subsequently they
were cleared of charges. Their reinstatements were not acted upon until the PC was integrated into PNP. Napolcom
issued a resolution considering the discharged but later acquitted to have been absorbed to PNP. A subsequent
resolution was sent to the PNP chief for the issuance of absorption of the constables. No absorption order was
issued. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.
Doctrine: The writ of mandamus is employed only to compel the exercise of power already possessed or a duty
already imposed. The writ can only be issued when the applicant’s legal right to the performance of the act sought to
be compelled is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted by law or inferable as a matter of law. The
power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer, the only condition being that the appointee
should have the necessary qualifications required by law.

CASE NUMBER: 48
CASE TITLE: SJS v Atienza (911 Twin tower attack)
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted an ordinance reclassifying a portion of Pandacan from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the ordinance to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within 6 months from effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses are the so
called “Pandacan terminals” operated by Caltex, Petron and Shell. The City of Manila and the DOE entered into an
MOA with these oil companies and they agreed to scale down the Pandacan terminals. The Sanggunian ratified the
MOA but to be effective only for 6 months but later extended and the Sanggunian authorized the grant of special
permits to the oil companies.
Doctrine: For mandamus to lie, the petitioner should have a clear and complete right to the performance of the act
and it must be the clear and imperative duty of the respondent to do the act required to be done. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. The mayor,
as the local chief executive, has the duty to enforce ordinances as long as they have not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts – it is his ministerial duty to do so.

CASE NUMBER: 49
CASE TITLE: Funa v Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO)
MECO is a non-stock non-profit corporation under Corporation Code organized to develop the commercial and
industrial interest of Filipino nationals here and abroad and to promote and maintain the trade relations of the country
with the citizens of other foreign nationals. Funa sent a letter to COA requesting for the lates audit report of MECO.
COA responded that MECO is not among the agencies audited by COA.

Doctrine: MECO is not a GOCC which COA is required to audit. However, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to the
fees it was authorized to collect (verification fees for overseas employment) are subject to the audit jurisdiction of
COA.

1. 5. QUO WARRANTO (MCLAD)

CASE NUMBER: 50
CASE TITLE: Mendoza v Allas

Petitioner became a Director of BoC. He was temporarily assigned as Acting District Collector. In his place,
respondent was appointed as Acting Director. Mendoza received a letter stating the he was terminated from BoC and
Allas is the new Director as appointed by FVR. Petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He won so Allas appealed in the CA
but the CA dismissed it and the order of dismissal became executory. Mendoza filed a motion for execution but it was
denied because the contested position was vacated by Allas and is now occupied by Olores.

Doctrine: A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment if hid claim is not well-founded, or he has forfeited his
right to enjoy the privilege. The rule that a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his
successor in office is not applicable in quo warranto cases; The writ of quo warranto is never directed to an officer as
such, but always against the person – to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform
any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.

Notes: If found that the respondent is a usurper:

- Ouster and exclusion of defendant from office

- Recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator
- Determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires.

CASE NUMBER: 51
CASE TITLE: Calleja v Panday
Respondents filed a quo warranto proceedings against the petitioners before RTC of San Jose Camarines Sur
alleging that the petitioners forcibly usurped the powers as BOD of the corporation which supposedly belonged to the
respondents. RTC ordered the transfer to RTC Naga since it has no jurisdiction since the petitioners (respondents
here) being residents of Naga City. RTC Naga refused to receve it stating that improper venue is not a ground for
transferring quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction. RTC San Jose proceeded with the case and
ordered the case to be remanded to RTC Naga being a special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies.
Doctrine: While actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
cognizable by the SEC, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction, this does not change the fact that
Rule 66 does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. It is the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under RA No. 8799 which applies to the
petitions for quo warranto filed before trial courts questioning the authority of persons to assume office and act as a
BOD of a private corporation.

Notes: The RTC Jose should have dismissed the case instead of transferring it to another court.

CASE NUMBER: 52
CASE TITLE: Lokin v COMELEC

CIBAC is one of the party lists for the 2007 elections. One of its nominees is Lokin. Villanueva, CIBAC’s president,
submitted a substitution removing Lokin. CIBAC won and was entitled to 2 seats. Lokin sought to be proclaimed but
the COMELEC proclaimed the substitute. Lokin filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. COMELEC contended
that Lokin should have filed an election protest or a secial civil action for quo warranto and not certiorari.

Doctrine: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
winning and losing candidates based on the electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold office. This can only be filed by a person
who filed a COC and has been voted in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the state, or of ineligibility of the winning
candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office but not to install the petitioner
in his place. Any voter may initiate the action.
Lokin’s case is neither of the two. Certiorari is the proper remedy.

CASE NUMBER: 53
CASE TITLE: Aratea v COMELEC
Lonzanida and Antipolo were candidates for mayor in Zambales. Antipolo filed a disqualification case against
Lonzanida but this was not acted upon by COMELEC until elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest
number of votes as mayor and vice mayor. Lonzanida was thereafter disqualified. Aratea filed a motion to proclaimed
mayor. Denied by COMELEC and SC.

Doctrine: In quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines (Sec 253 of OEC) and governed by RoC as to procedures. While quo warranto and
cancellation of CoC share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A
cancellation case is brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a
CoC cancellation was not filed before elections.

CASE NUMBER: 54
CASE TITLE: De Castro v Carlos
De Castro was appointed as Assistant General manager for Operations (AGMO) of the MMDA. He was He was
reassigned to another Legal and Legislative Affairs Office and thereafter he was stricken out in the payroll of MMDA.
Petitioner made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO but Pres. Aquino appointed the respondent to the
position.
Doctrine: A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise
or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the
privilege has been forfeited. Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
 1. 6. EXPROPRIATION (CRANAN)

CASE NUMBER: 55
CASE TITLE: City of Manila v Serrano

The City of Manila, by virtue of an ordinance, filed a complaint for expropriation. The respondents opposed the
expropriation contending that their lot is exempt from expropriation not exceeding 300 square meters. (RA 7279), if
divided among themselves (343 square meters/7).
Doctrine: A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal. It could not have been resorted by the respondents
inasmuch as the order of the trial court granting a writ of possession is a mere interlocutory order – unappealable.
Certiorari is the proper remedy.
A writ of execution may be issued by the court upon filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form an
substance and upon deposit made by the government of an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject of expropriation. Upon compliance, issuance of writ of possession becomes ministerial
Two stages of expropriation:

a. a. Condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for public purpose or public
use
b. b. Determination of just compensation for the taking of the private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

CASE NUMBER: 56
CASE TITLE: Republic v Andaya (right of way)

Doctrine:

Republic is liable for just compensation because in enforcing the legal easement of right of way, the remaining area
would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable

Rationale:

“taking”, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or
dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or
material impairment of the value of his property.

CASE NUMBER: 57
CASE TITLE: NAPOCOR vs. CA

Pobre owned a property he developed as resort subdivision. NPC, found that there is thermanl mineral water in
Pobre’s lot. Pobre leased to NPC portions of his property. The NPC filed an expropriation proceedings on certain
parts of his property. The RTC ordered the expropriation. Pending the first expropriation, NPC dumped waste
materials on other areas of Pobre’s property despite his opposition. NPC filed its second expropriation case to acquire
additional parts in Pobre’s lot. Pobre filed a motion to dismiss and demanded just compensation for his whole
property. NPC fileda motion to dismiss alleging that it found another property.

Doctrine:

The motion to dismiss took place of the answer (Rule 67, section 3) where the respondent present all his objections
and defenses to the taking of his property.

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as a matter of right to dismiss the complaint because the landowner
may have already suffered damages from the start.

When possession of land is neither convenient nor feasible anymore, the aggrieved landowner may demand payment
of just compensation.
CASE NUMBER: 58
CASE TITLE: Asia's Emerging Dragon v.s. DOTC

2 precedent cases in connection with NAIA 3:

1. Agan v. PIATCO (null and void)
2. Republic v. Guingoyon (same decision)Propriety of PIATCO in entering the contracted- wants to replace
PIATCO, bidders in the construction of NAIA 3 (government property)

Rationale:
(Dealt more on issues of mandamus)

Doctrine:
A deposit of 100% market value of Infrastructure projects of the government pursuant to RA 8974, is required before
LGU can take possession of property expropriated. This is an exception to Rule 67, regarding 15% deposit before
LGU can take possession of property expropriated

CASE NUMBER: 59
CASE TITLE: Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty

Rationale:
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use upon payment
of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the
constitutional provisions on social justice.

Doctrine:
Filing of Expropriation Proceedings shall suspend ejectment proceedings (which are summary in nature) over the
property in question for maximum period of one year.

(To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as
they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.)

CASE NUMBER: 60
CASE TITLE: NPC v YCLA Sugar Dev't Corp.

Rationale:

A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the determination of the amount of just
compensation. Thus, it becomes imperative that the such report be supported by pertinent documents, which
impelled the commissioners to arrive at the recommended amount for the condemned properties, to aid the court in
its determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, it becomes hearsay and should thus not be
considered by the court.

Doctrine:
Just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered but before these factors can be
considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence.

1. 7. FORECLOSURE OF REM (GLAMR)

CASE NUMBER: 61
CASE TITLE: Goldenway Merchandising Corp v Equitable PCI Bank

Goldenway executed a REM in favor of EPCI Bank for a loan. The petitioner failed to pay so the respondent
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were foreclosed and a certificate of sale was
issued. Subsequently, the petitioner offered to redeem the properties but it was told that redemption is no longer
possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered.

Doctrine: Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118 covers extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, The one year period of
redemption is counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. However the General Banking Law
provides for an exception in case of juridical persons which are allowed to exercise right of redemption only “until, but
not after the registration of the certificate of sale” and in no case more than 3 months from foreclosure, whichever
comes first.

The difference in the treatment of natural and juridical persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed,
whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal 1 year period of redemption is retained, or used ofr
industrial or commercial purposes, for which case a short term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of
uncertainty in the ownership and enable mortgagee banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets.

CASE NUMBER: 62
CASE TITLE: LZK Holdings v Planters Development Bank
Doctrine:

The purchaser in foreclosure sale may take possession of the property even before the expiration of the redemption
period by filing an ex parte motion for such purpose and upon posting of the necessary bond.

LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s right to a writ of possession over the subject property because
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue. The proceeding in a petition
for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one
party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. No hearing is required prior to the
issuance of a writ of possession.
CASE NUMBER: 63
CASE TITLE: Allied Bank v Mateo
Mateo executed a REM in favor of Allied bank for a loan. He failed to pay, the bank caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the property. Respondent sent letters signifying his desire to redeem the foreclosed property. On the
last day of redemption, the respondent filed a case for legal redemption with TRO in the RTC.

Doctrine: It is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem the property manifests his desire to do so. It must be
accompanied by actual and simultaneous tender of payment. Otherwise, the offer to redeem is ineffectual. Bona fide
redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the
redemption period fixed by law can easily be circumvented.

CASE NUMBER: 64
CASE TITLE: Marquez v Alindog

Gutierrez executed a REM in favor of Marquez. The mortgage was annotated on the title. Gutierrez defaulted and
Marquez sought for extrajudicial foreclosure. After the lapse of redemption, title was consolidated but it bore an
adverse claim from Alindog spouses. Alindog spouses filed a complaint for annulment of REM contending that the lot
was sold to them earlier than the REM but they were defrauded in getting the title to the property.

Doctrine:
The possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure unless a
third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right.

—The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that the possession of
the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually
holding the property by adverse title or right. The third person must therefore claim a right superior to the original
mortgagor.

However in this case, the general rule should apply.

CASE NUMBER: 65
CASE TITLE: Ramirez v manila banking corporation
Ramirez executed a REM in favor of Manila Banking Corp for a loan. He defaulted despite demands, respondent
sought the extrajudicial foreclosure. Ramirez sought the annulment of the foreclosure contending that he was not
notified of the foreclosure and auction sale, in violation of their agreement in the REM.

Doctrine:
Unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary
because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the
publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.

1. 8. PARTITION (VBaMaF)

CASE NUMBER 66.

CASE TITLE: Vda de Figuracion vs figuracion

Doctrine:
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of
Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to
effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaim executed
by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or
that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership
thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as
correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent
a clear repudiation of the co ownership.43 The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject
to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by
law.

CASE NUMBER: 67
CASE TITLE: Balus vs balus
Petitioner and respondents are heirs of Rufo who executed a REM in favor of the bank which was foreclosed due to
Rufo’s default. The petitioners and respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate including the subject
property and they agreed to redeem the property foreclose. The respondents bought the property back from the bank.
The respondents filed a recovery of possession and damages against the petitioners. The RTC held that the
petitioners can purchase his share from the respondents by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement of estate. The CA
reversed the decision and held that the petitioner should return possession to the respondents. The property, being
owned by the bank, extinguishes their co-ownership.

Doctrine:
Petitioner and respondents, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue
arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in
the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of
Rufo at any given point in time.

CASE NUMBER 68.

CASE TITLE: Mangahas v Brobio
An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs had already
executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no
longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged
in one person

CASE NUMBER 69.

CASE TITLE: Feliciano vs Canoza
Doctrine:
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent
to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. An action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted, however,

such action must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud
in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio
v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on
June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement
constitute constructive notice to the whole world.

1. 9. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (FASCAT)

CASE NUMBER 70.

CASE TITLE: Ferrer v Rabaca
Complainants are officers of YWCA. They won an ejectmen suit under Judge Rabaca. They filed a motion for
execution but Rabaca denied the motion stating that an appeal was seasonably filed.

Doctrine: The perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment
case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents,
damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent
before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial
and imperative.
Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendant’s appeal, was
unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal
by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. The execution of
the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond
and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the
appeal, could stay the execution.

CASE NUMBER 71.

CASE TITLE: Alconera v Pallanan
Complainant was the counsel of Rafols, the defendant in unlawful detainer case. The unlawful detainer case was
ordered against them and an order for execution was issued. Complainant filed a complaint for misconduct against
Pallanan, the sheriff.

Doctrine:
In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry
and detainer action is made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in
such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c)
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during
the pendency of the appeal.9 The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the
outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative.

CASE NUMBER 72.

CASE TITLE: Suarez v Emboy
The petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case and she alleged to have bought the subject lot occupied by the
respondents. The respondents alleged that they inherited the lot and they have been occupying the lot for decades.
They also alleged that the petitioner is a buyer in bad faith.

“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply
wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort
to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.”
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can
abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer. Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the
proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The
respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil
Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs
of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house,
which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances,
thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

CASE NUMBER 73.

CASE TITLE: CGR Corp v Treyes
Petitioners are lessees of the subject properties. Respondent allegedly forcible entered the leased properties,
barricaded the entrance of the fish ponds and harvested several tons of fish owned by petitioners.

Doctrine: The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorney’s fees
and costs. Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.
Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession
or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of
a cause of action.

CASE NUMBER 74.

CASE TITLE: Abad v Filhomes
Doctrine: Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of "tolerance". Tolerance of the occupation of the property
must be present right from the start of the defendants’ possession. The phrase "from the start of defendants’
possession" is significant. When there is no "tolerance" right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered,
the case of unlawful detainer will not prosper.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in
abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53810 enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging
to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be
automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one
year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they
become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.

CASE NUMBER 75.

CASE TITLE: Teodoro v Espino
Doctrine: The subject parcel is a part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of
an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over which the legal heirs of
Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to exercise the right of dominion
including the right of possession.
Neither party can exclude the other from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the respondents in
fact possess specific areas. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed
by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor
but also because of his own right of possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. As the RTC
concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro

1. 10. CONTEMPT (YESMCB)

CASE NUMBER 76.

CASE TITLE: Yasay v Recto
Yasay directed respondents to submit to SEC the list of its stockholders and the SEC issued a TRO to refrain the
company from conducting the annual stockholders’ meeting. The meeting proceeded so the SEC held the
respondents in contempt. The respondents questioned the TRO of SEC contending that the CA issued a TRO
restraining the SEC from enforcing its TRO.
Doctrine: We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The
exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a
court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity
of the court.
The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant
purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when
the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive
principle, 19 and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment

CASE NUMBER 77.

CASE TITLE: Espanol v Formoso
(Judge rendering decision based on evidence in the sala of another judge)

Doctrine: The early case of In re Jones defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to interfere
with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the
dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus
lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described as "a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of the court.
In Narcida v. Bowen, this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so near the court or
judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished
summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment
or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes
indirect contempt not direct contempt.
In Gener v. De Leon, we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other
cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took
judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents
used falsified documents (such as land title and tax declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily,
the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.
CASE NUMBER 78.
CASE TITLE: Sison v Caoibes Jr (Judge Caoibes – terminated from service)
Doctrine: the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power
lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the
proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and
contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or
judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with the court’s orderly process by
exacting summary punishment. And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it may
seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.

CASE NUMBER 79.

CASE TITLE: Marantan v Diokno
(Ortigas massacre case and Diokno on television ranting)
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may
render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with
and embarrass the administration of justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the
court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should
be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.

CASE NUMBER 80.

CASE TITLE: Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club v Sanchez
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party
as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with,
the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent
of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing
or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court
under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the
court; or (2) by a verified petition.

CASE NUMBER 81.

CASE TITLE: BPI v Calanza
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity.
It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses
during litigation. Still, the erroneous issuance of the writ of execution by LA Calanza can only be deemed grave abuse
of discretion which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari and not a petition for indirect contempt. To
be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A
person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is
clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is
forbidden or required.SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
 1. 1. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE (SiSaASuL-HUGaPiS)

CASE NUMBER 82.

CASE TITLE: Silverio v Silverio
(flip flop decision on who is the administrator)
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator.
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed
of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy
vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is
not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
However in this case, the intestate court allowed the sale. Therefore, the sale is valid.

CASE NUMBER 83.

CASE TITLE: San Luis v San Luis
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

CASE NUMBER 84.

CASE TITLE: Agtarap v Agtarap
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

a. a. The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination
of ownership in a separate action.
b. b. If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
CASE NUMBER 85.
CASE TITLE: Suntay III v Cojuangco-Suntay
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator.
This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the
appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have
upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to
have different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires
to have another competent person associated with him in the office.

CASE NUMBER 86.

CASE TITLE: Lee v RTC

CASE NUMBER 87.

CASE TITLE: Heirs of Hilario Ruiz v Edmond Ruiz

CASE NUMBER 88.

CASE TITLE: Unionbank v Santibanez

CASE NUMBER 89.

CASE TITLE: Garcia Quiazon v Belen

CASE NUMBER 90.

CASE TITLE: Pilapil v Heirs of M Briones

CASE NUMBER 91.

CASE TITLE: Sabidong v Solas
ESCHEATS
CASE NUMBER 92.
CASE TITLE: Alvarico v Sola

CASE NUMBER 93.

CASE TITLE: Caro v Sukaldito

1. 2. GUARDIANSHIP

CASE NUMBER 94.

CASE TITLE: Goyena v Ledesma Gustilo
Respondent filed for a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over her sister Julieta who is of old age, bed ridden and not
in a position to take care of herself. Petitioner opposed the petition saying that Julieta is competent and sane and
there is no need to appoint a guardian and respondent is not competent to be a guardian because of their interests
are antagonistic (based on letters presented by petitioner)
I: W/N the respondent is suitable to be appointed as a guardian of the person and properties of Julieta. YES
When it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due
consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not
be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo with respect to the existence of antagonistic interests between
respondent and Julieta. In that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minor-wards'
properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the interest of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment
as guardian was erroneous. For while he sought to foreclose the wards' properties as creditor and mortgagee on one
hand, he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian. Added to that was
Gabriel's appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the
properties. None of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.
Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed a rift between the two
which amounts to antagonistic interests. The first letter merely shows Julieta's lack of interest in future investments,
not necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting to antagonistic interests between her
and respondent to render the latter unsuitable for appointment as guardian.
Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the
appointment of respondent as guardian before the RTC because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by
respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.

CASE NUMBER 95.

CASE TITLE: Cañiza v Court of Appeals
Cañiza, being then 94 y.o. and with physical infirmities, was declared incompetent and appointed Amparo
Evangelista, her niece as her guardian. Amparo filed an ejectment case against respondents alleging that Cañiza
allowed them to stay in her house and lot by tolerance and now in need of the property to sustain her medical needs.
The respondents contended that their stay in the subject property is due to Caniza’s treatment to them as family and
in fact Caniza executed a holographic will which she bequeathed the property to the respondents. Also, they alleged
that Caniza’s incompetency did not vest in her guardian the right to eject the respondents.

WON the legal guardian had authority to bring ejectment suits on behalf of the incompetent. YES
Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward (Rule
96, section 4).
The holographic will did not give the respondents a real right over the property since it was not yet probated.

CASE NUMBER 96.

CASE TITLE: Neri v Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy

Anunciacion Neri has 7 children during her lifetime (2 from first, 5 from second). She and her second husband
acquired several properties in Samal, Davao. She died intestate. Enriques (2nd husband) including his 5 children
where 2 are minors (Rosa and Douglas) executed an Extrajudicial settlement of estate adjudicating among
themselves the estate of Anunciacion. The properties were subsequently conveyed to spouses Uy.
The children of Enrique filed an annulment of sale of the subject properties assailing that the sale of properties
deprived the legitimes of the children of the first marriage. The respondents interposed the defense of laches and
prescription (they held the properties for 17 years).

WON the extrajudicial settlement with Deed of Sale to spouses Uy is valid against the children of the first marriage
and the minors of the second marriage.
Children of the first marriage: No. No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Minors of the second marriage. During the time of settlement, they were represented by Enrique as guardian.
However, during this time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and cannot dispose the shares
of the minor children.
Administration includes all acts of preservation of the property and receipt of the fruits of the thing. Any act of
diposition or alienation exceeds the limit of administration.
Rosa – valid since upon reaching the age of majority, she ratified the extrajudicial settlement with DOAS.
Douglas – no ratification upon reaching the age of majority.
The first 2 children and Douglas are entitled to 3/16 of the subject property.

Prescription? – none – does not prescribe. 1410 of the NCC – action or defense for the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe.

CASE NUMBER 97.

CASE TITLE: Oropesa v Oropesa
Petitioner Nilo filed for petition for guardianship for his father Cirilo alleging that the respondent has been sickly for
more than 10 years and cannot manage his own affairs and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by
people around him (father’s G.F).
Respondent denied the allegations and cited petitioner’s lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to
respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the
veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is
indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. (“General Oropesa spoke fluently in
English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his
responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible.)

WON the respondent can be considered incompetent. NO

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for
another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed
to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to
render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate
care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason
of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the
occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice

CASE NUMBER 98.

CASE TITLE: Abad v Biason
Abad filed a petition for guardianship over his aunt who is over 90 y.o. and in need of a guardian to manager her
properties. Abad resides in QC while his aunt resides in Pangasinan. Biason opposed the petition alleging that Abad
cannot perform his duties because he resides in QC and prayed that he be appointed guardian. Biason was
appointed guardian.

WON a guardian cannot be appointed because of difference in guardianship.

CA: The petitioner-appellant may have been correct in arguing that there is no legal requirement that the guardian
must be residing in the same dwelling place or municipality as that of the ward or incompetent, and that the Vancil vs.
Belmes case cited by the court a quo which held that "courts should not appoint as guardians persons who are not
within the jurisdiction of our courts" pertains to persons who are not residents of the country. Anent the claim of the
petitioner-appellant that he has been expressly chosen by her aunt to be her guardian as evidenced by her testimony,
although it could be given weight, the same could not be heavily relied upon, especially considering the alleged
mental state of the incompetent due to her advanced age.
Abad emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a guardian to be a resident of the same locality as the ward to qualify
for the appointment. The more significant considerations are that the person to be appointed must be of good moral
character and must have the capability and sound judgment in order that he may be able to take care of the ward and
prudently manage his assets.
Case became moot – Biason died. . It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.

1. 3. TRUSTEES

CASE NUMBER 99.

CASE TITLE: LBP v Perez
LBP extended a credit accommodation to Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC). ACDC officers
executed trust receipts in connection with the construction materials (total Php52M). The trust receipts matured but
ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects. LBP filed a complaint for estafa. ACDC
officers alleged that they signed the trust receipt documents as these required for the release of their loan. The trust
receipts do not contain 1. Description of the goods placed in trust; 2. Their invoice values; 3. Maturity dates. They
also alleged that they acted as subcontractor for the government and they have not been paid yet. As there were no
proceeds received from these clients, no misappropriation thereof could have taken place.

WON the disputed transaction is a trust receipt

Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner:

Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning of this Decree,
is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to
in this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain
specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's
execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document called a "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee binds
himself to hold the designated goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise
dispose of the goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof
to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or
instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions
specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any of the following:
1. In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods or procure their sale; or (b) to manufacture or process the
goods with the purpose of ultimate sale: Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under trust receipt for the
purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the entruster shall retain its title over the goods
whether in its original or processed form until the entrustee has complied fully with his obligation under the trust
receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship or tranship or otherwise deal with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to
their sale[.]
There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered by the provision that refers to money
under the obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The second is covered by the
provision referring to merchandise received under the obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the
Trust Receipts Law,22 intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if
they are not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.23
In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the alternative – the return of the
proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.24 When both parties enter into
an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault
on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only
obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan,25 where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the
purchase of the goods.

1. 4. ADOPTION

CASE NUMBER 100.

CASE TITLE: Castro v Gregorio (Atty. Saguisag!!)
Petitioner is married to Atty. Jose Castro and they had one daughter. The petitioner and her husband were separated
in fact. Atty. Castro filed for a petition for adoption for the respondents alleging that the 2 are his illegitimate children
and also alleged that he and petitioner had no child. The court approved the adoption. Subsequently Atty. Castro
died.

The petitioner and their daughter filed a petition to annul the decision of the trial court granting the adoption of the
respondents alleging that they found out about the adoption sometime in 2005 , the petitioners affidavit of consent
was forged, and the respondents are not illegitimate children of Atty. Castro.

WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction and WON there is extrinsic fraud

There was lack of jurisdiction over the action of the proceedings. As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1,
2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children. The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her
own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite
their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the
adoption.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III,
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552. The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony
among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their
parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.

There was extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving
him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. An
action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from discovery.61 Petitioners alleged
that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the
period allowed by the rules.
CASE NUMBER 101.
CASE TITLE: Cang v CA and Sps Clavano
Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot 3 children. Anna Marie obtained legal separation.
Herbert Cang went to the US and obtained a divorce decree which was granted, and the custody of the children was
given to Anna Marie.
The Sps. Clavano filed a petition for adoption for the 3 children of Herbert and Anna Marie. Anna Marie filed an
affidavit of consent for adoption because she is going to the US. Upon learning this, Herbert returned to the PH and
opposed the adoption case contending that his parental authority over the children will be lost and he has no consent
over the adoption. He prayed for actual custody of the children. The trial court granted the adoption which was
affirmed by the CA.

WON the adoption requires the written consent of the natural parent to be valid – YES
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or, over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed
child placement agency under whose care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Child and Youth Welfare Code, Article 31 read:
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling and appropriate social services
from the Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed child-placement agency under whose care
and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the
petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and
Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the
child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if the child is in the
custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of
such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for
the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of
whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the
oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the
oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries
trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a
thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to
resume or claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, 53 there was no factual finding
in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of
his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to
petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano
family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a
contempt charge against them. 54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason
was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner
had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's
abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on
record.
CASE NUMBER 102.
CASE TITLE: Vda de Jacob v CA and Pedro Pilapil
Petitioner was the alleged wife of Dr. Jacob and the respondent was the alleged adopted son of Dr. Jacob. Dr. Jacob
died intestate. To prove adoption, Pedro Pilapil presented the order of the Trial Court granting the petition for adoption
by the deceased. The judge who granted the adoption was interviewed but he said he cannot remember the
proceeding. The signature of the Judge therein was examined by two experts with opposing opinions.

WON Pedro Pilapil is a legally adopted son of Dr. Jacob

No. Upon reviewing the deposition of the Judge who allegedly issued the order, Judge Moya could not recall having
ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared
that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could
with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown
to him. Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge
Moya.
Also, the alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that
he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in
which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information.
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.

CASE NUMBER 103.

CASE TITLE: Republic v CA, Jaime Caranto and Zenaida Caranto
The respondents filed a petition for adoption of Midael Mazon. One of the prayers sought is the change of surname of
Midael Mazon to Caranto and change of first name from “Midael” to “Michael”. The SG opposed the petition arguing
that although the correction sought is only clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition
was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies
only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons.
According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of
actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.

WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption since the publication stated the wrong
name of the child (Michael)

Yes. It only involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction
involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name
would read "Michael." Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly
cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme." The purpose of the
publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their
objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.

WON the granting of correction of name is proper.

No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, §2 plainly states:
§2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name."
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this Rule provides:
§3 Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. 7 As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice
of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108, §4 which reads:
§4. Notice and publication. — Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance
with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in
addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus
deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice
by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

CASE NUMBER 104.

CASE TITLE: Reyes v Mauricio (DARAB case?)

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v.
Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the
testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral
attack.27 Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for
annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.

CASE NUMBER 105.

CASE TITLE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B.
CATINDIG
Petitioner filed a petition for adoption of her illegitimate daughter and prayed that the surname of her mother be used
by Stephanie as her middle name. The trial court granted the adoption but denied the petitioner’s prayer holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.

WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted
by her natural father.
Yes. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The
given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.9
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity
of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely
provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to
use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that
drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to
a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above.

CASE NUMBER 106.

CASE TITLE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM
The petitioner is married to Primo Lim. Two minor children, were brought to them and made it appear as if they were
their parents. When Primo died, the petitioner remarried. The petitioner also decided to adopt the children by virtue of
Amnesty given to those individuals who simulated births of children. In the petition for adoption, there were written
consent made by the children and her husband. The TC denied the petition holding that petitioner should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.

WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

No. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents
and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in
keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights
of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists.

1. 5. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CASE NUMBER 107.
CASE TITLE: ILUSORIO V. BILDNER
Erlinda and Potenciano are married with six children. They separated from bed and board and Potenciano went to the
US. Upon arrival in the PH, Potenciano stayed with Erlinda where he was allegedly overdosed by an antidepressant
drug causing Potenciano’s health to deteriorate. Potenciano left Erlinda and lived with his children (respondents).
Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see Potenciano – Denied

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? – No

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and
receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." It is a high prerogative,
common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without

sufficient cause. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody
over another person.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

CASE NUMBER 108.

CASE TITLE: SERRAPIO v SANDIGANBAYAN (ESTRADA PLUNDER CASE)

Petitioner is one of the accused together with Josepha and Jinggoy Estrada and several others in a plunder case.
Petitioner is the president of the Erap Muslim Youth foundation and on its behalf, received Php200M from Gov
Singson which was later on deposited to Equitable PCI Bank. Gov. Singson publicly accused Estrada of engaging in
illegal activities including jueteng which triggered the filing of several complaints against the Estradas and others
including the petitioner. They were charged by the ombudsman for plunder. The ombudsman filed information against
Estrada and several co-accused involving petitioner for plunder, no bail. Upon issuance of warrant of arrest, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered. Upon petitioner’s filed a petition for bail, the Sandiganbayan granted. Four days prior to his
hearing for bail, the ombudsman filed for an early arraignment of Estradas and him and a motion for joint bail
hearings for all of them. The petitioner questioned the propriety of including the Estradas in his petition for bail. The
petition for bail was again rescheduled for the Sandiganbayan to resolve the issues. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the SC claiming that he was denied of his right to due process and prayed for issuance of habeas
corpus.

WON petitioner was deprived of his right to due process and should be released from detention via a writ of habeas
corpus.

No. He contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the prosecution's refusal to
present evidence and by the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of
proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the
prosecution launched "a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct of bail
hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner's arraignment before the commencement of bail hearings
and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only
petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the
evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire
case upon the accused. He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions
postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law.
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings which it
had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said
orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioner's right to bail. He argues further that the fact that he was
arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas
corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile, where the Court held that habeas
corpus extends to instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional circumstances,
habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest
or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes. Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid
under the law, had later become invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that
habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile finds no application in the present case because the hearing on petitioner's
application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail
cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be
blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail. It
cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the
latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper
recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's
resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the
hearing on his application for bail.

CASE NUMBER 109.

CASE TITLE: LACSON v PEREZ

President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation
No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on
May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro
Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the
proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion."
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful
restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

Separate Opinion (Vitug)

The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit
a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.

x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise,
the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the "calling out" power because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by Congress and, in appropriate cases, review by this Court.

Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law authorizes the
President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does
not by itself authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And even then, the Constitution in Section 18,
Article VII makes the following qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A
declaration of a "state of rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

CASE NUMBER 110.

CASE TITLE: SANGCA v CITY PRESECUTOR of CEBU
Sangca filed the instant petition for the issuance f writ of habeas corpus and the release of Adam who was detained
in Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Adam was caught during the PDEA’s entrapment
operation against her.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and
purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal.
The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007.
Therefore, the petition has become moot.
CASE NUMBER 111.
CASE TITLE: MANGILA v PANGILINAN

Mangila and 4 others were charged with syndicated estafa for recruiting and promising employment of complainants
in Toronto Canada. Finding probable cause during the P.I., warrants of arrest were issued and Mangila was arrested.
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary
investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the
Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the
remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to
recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to
the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.

WON Petition for issuance of habeas corpus is the proper remedy. No.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It
seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint
is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a
prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The
writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances
are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the
trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is
not illegal.

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of
having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into
and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the
petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether
the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show
facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities
being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the
right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The
primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint
under which a person is held.
CASE NUMBER 112.
CASE TITLE: TUHAN MILITANTE v CADA DEAPERA
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus directing petitioner to produce and return the custody of her child
Criselda. The RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering the petitioner to bring the child in court. The copies of the
writ were left unserved despite diligent efforts and attempts by the sheriff. Petitioner subsequently filed for petition for
guardianship, but dismissed due to the pending petition for habeas corpus case.Petitioner subsequently moved for
the petition for habeas corpus contending that she was not served with summons. Therefore, court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her and Criselda’s person.

At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the
habeascorpus petition filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ
issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20
of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns
to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts. The writ
issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court
or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits.