San Beda College of Law

Mendiola, Manila

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rules of Construction of Doubts in the Constitution

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it
is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Concept of Self-Executing Provisions

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing
certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people
in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved
into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003]

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

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 We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought
to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision

under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of
the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,
in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v.
De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a

provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of

the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45
(Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the
same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

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 While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer
to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution

De Leon vs. Esguerra [G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987]

1987 CONSTITUTION; DATE OF RATIFICATION; RETROACTS ON THE DAY OF THE PLEBISCITE. — The
main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987,
the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date
its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification
shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view
was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent in
the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the
plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the
Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of
its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on
March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date February
2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the
Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace
petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of
petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer
produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring
on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the
ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the
Constitution been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided
for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term
of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of
elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of the
first Congress, etc.

The Power to Amend the Constitution is not included in the General Legislative Power

Gonzales vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967]

NATURE OF POWER TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. — The power to amend the Constitution or to
propose, amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Sec. 1, Art,
VI, Const.) It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state,
such as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.) — to make and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power (Sec. 1, Art. XV,
Const.). Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very
source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

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POWER OF THE COURT TO REVIEW THE EXERCISE OF THIS POWER BY THE CONGRESS. In short, the
issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution, is
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may
be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified
accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.

THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY MAY DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO

THE CONSTITUTION, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CALL A CONSITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO PROPOSE
THE NEEDED AMMENDMENTS. Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae maintains that Congress may either
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it cannot do both, at the
same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by
the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and none has
been brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or"
has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.

It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provisions on
Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a
convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words, the
subject- matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments
proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be
proposed by the constitutional convention called in R.B.H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions
were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other
words, they were not passed at the same time.

In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof, anything that would negate
the contested of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the
same in different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible
reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.

Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not
let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments,
to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded,
but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming
purpose thereof is to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional
convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or
nothing should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION MAY BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A GENERAL ELECTION.

There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification
in general elections.

It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be
submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the
fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general
elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations
are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officers. They do
not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without
qualification, in the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent
when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution concerning the grant of
suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."

Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be
construed as meaning a special election Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers
to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such importance, if not transcendental and vital nature as to
demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes
thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed
amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan
political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.

This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
conditions, are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals
for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those who
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concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in
effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from
the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]

THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS A PURELY JUSTICEABLE

CONTROVERSY. - The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying
outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After
that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to
constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments
and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without
the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not
only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized
in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with
that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex
of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume
the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation
of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the
judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for
submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy
of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore,
that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the
people themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom
the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people

SINCE THE PRESIDENT, UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE POWER, HE
MAY LIKEWISE THEREFORE, PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. - As earlier pointed
out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition
period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that
body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (Sec.
15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not
to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the
President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
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assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not
convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render
it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose
amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline
to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the
crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete
forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people.

Imbong vs. Ferrer, COMELEC [G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970]

THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, AND EXERCISING ITS GENERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER, PROVIDE FOR THE DETAILS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. — The constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 by
Congress must be upheld for the following reasons: 1) Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly pursuant to
Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the
purpose by 3/4 votes of each house in joint session assembled but voting separately; 2) Such grant includes all
other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary implication; 3)
Implementing details are within the authority of Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in the
exercise of its comprehensive legislative power so long as it does not contravene any provision of the
Constitution; and 4) Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in
the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly omitted.

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a
three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the
expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as
well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively
pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such statutory details do not clash with
any specific provision of the Constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body,
can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly
recognized in Sec. 8 of Res. No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no
argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for
it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

Occena vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981]

TO APPROVE PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

ONLY NEEDS MAJORITY VOTE, SUBJECT TO THE RATIFICATION BY THE PEOPLE. - The Interim
Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority
vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments
could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a
requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments.

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AMNEDMENT INCLUDES REVISION - Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments
proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the
Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to
revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in
Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system,
is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one . . . is no argument against the validity of the law
because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether
the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment
the same is ratified by the sovereign people." There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in
American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude
nothing. We are not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also
advantageous in practice.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971]

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE PEOPLE FOR

RATIFICATION IN ONE ELECTION, PIECE-MEAL RATIFICATION IS NOT ALLOWED. - The ultimate
question, therefore, boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that
all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite
is only the first amendment the Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section
1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. It says distinctly that
either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose
amendments to this Constitution, "thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress
or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments
proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably
says "an election" which means only one.

2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision.
As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution
making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it, if only
because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the
framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as
the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national
and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. It is inconceivable how a
constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.

A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they
can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and
determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts
and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of
the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation
to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its
acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to
what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations
which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be
observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under
7
conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor
is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future
action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of
the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of
foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later
on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may
divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the
verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing
social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the
Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where
the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend
the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article
XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their
judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the
simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to
enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by
the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez,
speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".

Santiago vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997]

PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, NOT SELF-EXECUTORY. — Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without
implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on
congressional action. Bluntly stated the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND DOES NOT COVER INITIATIVE ON THE
CONSTITUTION. - First, Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does
not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein
was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates
to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent
as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions."' . . . Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5 paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, a statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approve or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. . . . The use of the clause "proposed laws
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section
2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Third. While the Act provides
subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle, II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. . . . The foregoing brings us to the conclusion
that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and. cannot
8
be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of [the] Act."

THE CONGRESS CANNOT DELEGATE TO OTHER AGENCIES THE POWER TO PROVIDE FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION. - The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

Lambino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006]

PETITION FOR INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION MUST CONTAIN THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. - Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text
of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that
the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must
first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that
the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition . . . as signatories."

9
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why
the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people . . . in a petition" —
meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so
vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments
cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This
Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who
sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

INTIATIVE CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND NOT
REVISION. - This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from
its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution — that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution?
If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being
outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it
rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On
the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines
of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The
court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is
a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in
its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances."

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles — Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive — affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers
in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in
the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of

10
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as
set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission,
writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of
the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to
a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be
because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.

Republic Act No. 6735

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda [G.R. No. L-13250, Oct 29, 1971]

FOREIGN COUNTRY IS DIFFERENT FROM A STATE; A FOREIGN COUNTRY DOES NOT NEED TO
POSSESS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A STATE. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to
be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within
its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under
a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-
politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare.
Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in
the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals
within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial
society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other
institutions. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its
territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite
satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.

Bacani vs. NACOCO [G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956]

FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT; CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT. - To begin with, we state that the
term "Government" may be defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent
society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has
reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These
functions are twofold: constituent and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the
general interests of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as
follows:

(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and
robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination
of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
11
 (7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or
encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government
of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.)

The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and
safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles determining whether or not a
government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is
any private individual or group of individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)

From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our government is required to
exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute
of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the
government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut
Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form
of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporations under
the Corporation Law.

GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS ARE NOT GOVERNMENT ENTITIES. - The

question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporations perform certain functions of government
make them a part of the Government of the Philippines?

The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it
was organized with the purpose of "adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the
proper utilization of coconut by-products", a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote
the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for
it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in
the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government. As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority
stockholder does not make it a public corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46
Phil., 586-587). "By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government divested itself of
its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. . . . Unlike the Government, the
corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company
remains an agency or instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50
Phil., 288.)

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" used in section
2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.
These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a
corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation
Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate
charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our
Rules of Court.

"Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the
State." (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law).

"'The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include organized
cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative powers for the local, civil
government and police regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district included in the
boundaries of the corporation.' Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 312."

"In its more general sense the phrase 'municipal corporation' may include both towns and
counties, and other public corporations created by government for political purposes. In its
more common and limited signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and
cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661." (McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)

"We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to be the
incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or
12
 district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified
powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power
of local government is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal
corporation proper." (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. CIR [G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975]

THE PROMOTION OF GENERAL WELFARE IS A GOVERNMENT FUNCTION, REPUDIATION OF THE

CONCEPT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE. - The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice."
Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian
classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the
laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into the governmental sphere, as
noted in a textbook on political science, the first edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the
then Professor, later American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was
categorized by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the
"strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the very bonds of society." The other functions he
would minimize as ministrant or optional.

It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the authoritative
position which at one time it held in the United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial
Board, could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of government activity." The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued
that approach. As noted in Edu v. Ericta: "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention
saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of
coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." Nor did the
opinion in Edu stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there
might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear when he
disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the 'vast extensions in the sphere of
governmental functions' and the 'almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture
as well as to compete with existing business' as 'reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current
tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: 'My answer is that this constitution has a definite and well
defined philosophy, not only political but social and economic. . . . If in this Constitution the gentlemen will
find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and
welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may
provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop
national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a
constitutional provision automatically imposes."

It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration decision
about which the observation was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is
even more in consonance with the expanded role of government accorded recognition in the present Charter if
the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function were not heeded. That path this Court is not
prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer
than that there is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for
private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh
contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. It is a response to
a trend noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the
interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously
termed by the First Lady as "a compassionate society" be attained.

Gov. of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad [G.R. No. 9959, December 13, 1916]

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE - In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 How., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean,
delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

13
 "When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the
people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so far as they have delegated
a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative
enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens partiae."

Chancelor Kent says:

"In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens partiae, has the right to
enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the
public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it." (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the
last quotations, said:

"This prerogative of parens partiae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether
that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function,
and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury
to those who cannot protect themselves."

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein
the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize
the sale of the estates of infants, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act
for themselves, said:

"These remarks in reference to infants, insane persons and persons not known, or not in being,
apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and
justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens partiae. They show that
this beneficent function has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a
monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called
into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is as clearly capable of
being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever."

In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that
the Attorney-General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a
distinct right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be
brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held
that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to
charities, and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Young & C. C., 417):
"Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that
trust, it is the privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the
purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally, the public interest and the public right, which,
probably, no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it." (2
Kent's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 665; 1 Daniell's Chancery Practice, sec. 13; Perry on
Trusts, sec. 732.)

It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damages by this payment to
the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donor or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or
the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The
beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would
be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the
$80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to against assume control of
the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the
Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in
a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be
devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public resources for
promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To
deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to
discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolences in like instances in the
future.

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh [G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945]
14
DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE INVADER
CONTINUE ITS FORCE AND EFFECT EVEN AFTER THE CESSATION OF INVASION. Suffice it to say that
the provisions of the Hague Conventions which imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the
courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish
and insure "I'ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial
life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the
people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the
ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.

This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among them Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and
Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944,
and the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow vs.
Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary consequence of such occupation and
domination, the political relations of its people to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But
for their protection and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits and
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights
of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in force,
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They are
considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson,
100 U. S., 158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.], 632).

The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore, exempt him
from complying with said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of
the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts would
benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible to the
inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the
conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in
penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of
treachery and aggression.

We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur
of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons
therein set forth, we did not deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be
construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in sustaining a contrary
interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say that the term as used in the proclamation should
be construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis."
According to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meaning, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found.
(Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Commission,
Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution
itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the world
"processes" is associated.

As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights or persons and
property and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after occupation has ceased,
although it is true that no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the restored
or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless true and evident that by
such abrogation national wrong would be caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government.
According to the law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the
occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. As there are vested rights which have
been acquired by the parties by virtue of such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot
reverse or abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal
would deprive them of their properties without due process of law.

People vs. Gozo [G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973]

SOVEREIGNTY IS COMPREHENSIVE, BUT ITS EXERCISE MAY BE RESTRICTED. - Much less is a reversal
indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part
of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war
with controlling and authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign
country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such
thinking to the juristic concept of sovereignty, People v. Acierto, and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agree it should be noted, the
Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not
15
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of
such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its
sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted
that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may
thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain
from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." The opinion was at pains to point out though
that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not in appearance. The words employed
follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end
there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may
be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."

Laurel vs. Misa [G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947]

LAW ON TREASON, THOUGH POLITICAL IN NATURE, IS NOT SUSPENDED DURING BELLIGERENT

OCCUPATION. Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham v~. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily
remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the
supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from
the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied
by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is
in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our
times'; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23,
44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic
theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests

Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,' repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward
the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides
in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign;
that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of
the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it
would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto
acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to obey, with certain exceptions, the laws of that country which
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and
would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws
of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is
entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate
16
power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in
abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as
treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well
as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which
are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant,
because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta 1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while
the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses
against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative as against the
ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still
bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial
life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that
is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army,
subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military
occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound
to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which,
though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen
or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive
attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason,
essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded
by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and
protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory
were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and
comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a
traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk
of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation
against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus
deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders
in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party i n the nefarious task of depriving themselves
of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other
words, to commit a political suicide.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]

THE SUSPENSION OF POLITICAL LAWS DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION DOES NOT APPLY TO
THE ENEMIES IN ARMS. The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting
political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the
governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies
in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should readily
manifest itself. Under the petitioners' theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied territory would
have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the very lifeblood of an army,
the right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the organization and to try the men guilty of
breach thereof.

17
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Republic vs. Sandoval [G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993]

CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. - Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from
suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty,
and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and
the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen
and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration
of the government.

INSTANCES OF SUITS AGAINST THE STATE. - Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.
Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions
when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority.
Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act
under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political
subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the
military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification
from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief
demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative
discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or
agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and
servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a
license to persecute or recklessly injure another."

THE STATE IMMUNITY IS NOT WAIVED ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT THE PRESIDENT CREATED A
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT, OR BY THE PRESIDENT’S ACT OF JOINING A RALLY
OF THE COMPLAINANTS. In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only
serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the
Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever
recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having
become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days
after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the
words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover,
petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of
the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be
inferred that it has consented to the suit.

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given
considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

Sanders vs. Veridiano [G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988]

ACTS COMMITTED BY THE OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY ARE COVERED BY STATE
IMMUNITY. - It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued
in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and,
if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will
not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed
without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the

18
local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the
present case.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is
not disputed that the letter written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for
more information regarding the case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such
request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism — in effect a direct attack
against him — that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."

As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with
the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even
commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature,
performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in
matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and
budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a
right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY APPLIES TO FOREIGN STATES SUED IN THIS JURISDICTION. -
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be
held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other
decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but
also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet
imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept
is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters
that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

par in parem non habet imperium (meaning, an equal has no authority over an equal)

Festejo vs. Fernando [G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954]

ACTS COMMITTED BY OFFICIALS OUTSIDE THEIR AUTHORITY WILL NOT GIVE RISE TO THE
CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable
therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from
his tortious act." — 49 Am. Jur. 289. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the
power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent." — 43 Am.
Jur. 86.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts
outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to
personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by
the plea that he is a public agent acting under color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his
acts then are wholly without authority." — 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.

United States vs. Guinto [G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]

CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. - The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed
in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international
law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our
resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.

19
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international
law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to
comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends." There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state
sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A
contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it
grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair,
at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its
citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly
imports that it may be sued if it consents.

WAIVER OF STATE IMMUNITY. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the
state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.

The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the
Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the
government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to
the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature
through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have held that not all contracts entered into by the
government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.

RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF STATE IMMUNITY. - There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that
no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction
in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a
clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is
now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

xxx xxx xxx

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
20
 thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

SUABILITY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH LIABILITY. - The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is
premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United States government
should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two
terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule
only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.

Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in
the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state
with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.

Veterans Manpower & Protective Services, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992]

WAIVER OF STATE IS CONSTRUED STRICTISSIMI JURIS. - Waiver of the State's immunity from suit, being
a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic vs.
Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence,
from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the public respondents.

We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986
does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued:

"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC Chief in
relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in nature. The correct test for the application of
state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.
This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of America vs. Ruiz where the Hon.
Supreme Court held:

"'The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business
contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.' (136 SCRA
487, 492.)

"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO
was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as
well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of
the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate
the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies.
(Emphasis Ours.)" (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)

The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which
would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the
government" (Siren vs. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in
Republic vs. Purisima (78 SCRA 470, 473) rationalized:

"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not to be deplored for as

against the inconvenience that may be cause [by] private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such
a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
21
 restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of
such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could very well be imagined."
(citing Providence Washington Insurance Co. vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 598.)

Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands [G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]

SPECIAL LAW WAIVING STATE IMMUNITY. - Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.

"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E.
Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;

"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the
amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and

"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be
passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the
Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled
on account of said collision, and the attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defend said Government at the same.

"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede
its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It
is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be
sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the
consent, and render judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for
the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount
of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two
questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the
time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as
a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount?
If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.

SUABILITY VS. LIABILITY. - As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:

"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense."

22
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:

"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit,

Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as
he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may
now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the
mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark
River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative
to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha,
Wisconsin."

In determining the scope of this act, the court said;

"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of
the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between
private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove
the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of
settling plaintiff's controversies with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or
suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled.
The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of
liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit.
If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to
declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere
inference but would have done so in express terms. (Murdoc Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152
Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:

"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed,
in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."

Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY CANNOT BE USED TO PERPETRATE INJUSTICE. - In the case of
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land
used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. We there said:

". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public
use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily
dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by
the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment
of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment
of the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable
then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government
would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms
on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment
of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could
still be appropriately invoked."

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991]

STATE IMPLIEDLY WAIVES ITS IMMUNITY WHEN IT COMMENCES LITIGATION. - So, too, the PCGG's
postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial . . .
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it has
23
itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving
evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions,
including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded,
that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their
knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.

The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But
it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from
suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to
the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.

The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it
acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a
distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary —

"The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may
be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the
State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract."

"The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its
own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private
litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defenses he might have against the state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-
37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L.ed. 899)'" 51

It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where
private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.

Republic vs. Feliciano [G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987]

We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be
usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in
personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such
party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No.
3844.

By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly
or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a
fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.

THE STATE IMMUNITY MAY BE INVOKED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. - The failure of the
petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged
by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte
at any stage of the proceedings."

EXPRESS WAIVER OF IMMUNITY MUST BE THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACT. - Private respondent contends
that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation
"subject to private rights, if any there be." We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of
the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No.
90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a
derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover,
the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Neither is there merit in respondent's submission. which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the basis
of our decision in the Begosa case, that the present action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State
immunity from suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its funds. It
is contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the
plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved
24
in this argument, since the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the
plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and
possession of the property. In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the land in
question based, incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim
of ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an action in personam.

United States vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985]

RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF STATE IMMUNITY. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts
jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law,
pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government
of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the
legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three
apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to
recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, They also asked for
increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.

The Holy See vs. Rosario [G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994]

PROCEDURE IN INVOKING STATE IMMUNITY BY FOREIGN STATES. - In Public International Law, when
a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests
the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.

In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination
as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit,
he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to
immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that
effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from
Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office
conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the
United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

TWO CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. - There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v.
Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).

In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as
constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
25
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in
the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade,
the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

REMEDY OF THE COMPLAINANTS WHEN THE STATE IMMUNITY IS INVOKED. - Private respondent is
not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the
validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal
on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants
Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919
[1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice:

"By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights — its
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law (The
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).

Republic vs. Villasor [G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973]

FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT. – It is a fundamental postulate of

constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it
was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with
its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against
the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned
and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of
our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is
therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by
logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in
the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated in
the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action `only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law." Such a principle applies even to an attempted
garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion, speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule,
which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be
due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One
reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may
be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that
every consideration of public policy forbids it."

26
 Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993]

FORMS OF WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. - The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may
not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State
and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is
based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the
doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the
state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot
be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such
fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly
restricted.

The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued
without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In
this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where
the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied
upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between
one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity.

PROCEDURE IN ENFORCING THE LIABILITY OF THE STATE. - But, be that as it may, the claims of private
respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from
the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent
of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . .
." Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs.
Agricultural Productivity Commission, we ruled:

"(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under
Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the
State's immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that
'no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of
the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money
claims against the Government must be strictly observed.' "

We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor
Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the
legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued
in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.

When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained
execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other
party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor, this Court, in
nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus —

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.

PNB vs. Pabalan [G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978]

27
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATION HAS DISTINCT PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN; FUNDS OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY MAY
BE PROCEEDED AGAINST. — The doctrine of non-suability cannot be legally set forth as a bar or impediment
to a notice of garnishment. In National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, 118
Phil. 782 (1963), it was explicitly stated: "That allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public
funds of the government, and that, as such the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is
untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has — pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356,
dated October 23, 1950 . . ., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — "all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law . . . " Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as amended.)

Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan [G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981]

GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION HAS A SEPARATE PERSONALITY

INDEPENDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND THUS, THE QUESTION OF SUABILITY MAY BE
DETERMINED FROM ITS CHARTER. - It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not
the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam.
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed
it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d].) As a government owned and
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See
National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the
charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of
action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by petitioners.

Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass. [G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961]

GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, THOUGH INCEDENTALLY PERFORMING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS,

ARE ENTITLED TO STATE IMMUNITY. - The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by
the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under
the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of
all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government
and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)
Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the
printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit.

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce
any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled
that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes,
45 Off. Gaz., 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
10943-44, December 28, 1957).

It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many
of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not
justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of
Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the
head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that
the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for
private persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only
"as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by
the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1665, id.). As shown by the
uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during
Christmas from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those
greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed,
and on the bank checks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary
stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-
half of 1 percent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include
profit, because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake
private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed
proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
28
 Mobil Phils. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service [G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966]

PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS NECESSARY TO THE GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENT

ENTITY ARE COVERED BY THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY. - The situation here is not materially different.
The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality
of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said
revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or
consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs
authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this
checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation.

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary
and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said
Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself
to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA [G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988]

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO GOVERNMENT OWNED AND
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS. - This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v.
Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the
Philippine National Railways, although owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as
it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was
created to undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it
cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental
functions.

Mun. of San Fernando vs. Firme [G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]

THE SUABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IS DETERMINED THROUGH THEIR CHARTER. -

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged
in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and
be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)

A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does
not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant
is liable." (United States of America v. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660).

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla (G.R. No.
L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.

Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez [G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984]

FUNDS OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION. - In Tantoco vs.
Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the
public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution
against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of
such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute.

Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San
Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as
such they are exempt from execution. Besides, there must be, pursuant to Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree
No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration," a corresponding appropriation in the form of
an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In
the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect.
Furthermore, the procedure outlined by Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court has not been followed.

29
 Mun. of Makati vs. CA [G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990]

REMEDY TO ENFORCE THE LIABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - There is merit in this
contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the
municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties
of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco
v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926); The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86
Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA
56]. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of
Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance
due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-
537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor
[See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960);
Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)].

City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde [G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003]

GOVERNMENT FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR A PURPOSE MAY BE GARNISHED TO SATISFY THAT

PURPOSE. - However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds
from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already
allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case,
the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.

Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City Government, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, Br. X, et al., where petitioners
challenged the trial court's order garnishing its funds in payment of the contract price for the construction of
the City Hall, we ruled that, while government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from execution or
garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for the payment of the City's
obligations —

Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner-appellants moved for its quashal
alleging among other things the exemption of the government from execution. This move on the
part of petitioner-appellants is at first glance laudable for 'all government funds deposited with
the Philippine National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by
way of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy.' But inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly
appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 as payment to the respondent-appellee, then the
herein case is covered by the exception to the general rule

ARTICLE II – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1

Villavicencio vs. Lukban [G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919]

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY LAW, GOOD INTENTIONS CANNOT JUSTIFY THE CURTAILMENT OF
FREEDOM. - Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other
wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta,
9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 Eng. Stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts
are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law,"
said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is all
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice
Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
30
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
[1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear
why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of
Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from
society and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law,
order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force
citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ
of habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily responsible
for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to comply with the order of the court.

These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.

Section 2

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]

PENALIZING WAR CRIMES IS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. - In

accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto,
in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law
which are part of our Constitution.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed
in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and
Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law
of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of
rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.

Agustin vs. Edu [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]

The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration.
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization
(U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; . .
." It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance:
"The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,
. . ." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for
this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda
stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW. — The law does not
violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp.
29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not
31
discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all Prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).

Gonzales vs. Hechanova [G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963]

PRESIDENT MAY NOT, BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, ENTER INTO A TRANSACTION WHICH IS

PROHIBITED BY STATUTES ENACTED PRIOR THERETO. — It is lastly contended that the Government of
the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of
Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof
by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on
the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and
a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American jurisprudence —
in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the
executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and that the
aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already
paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sellers of said
commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements.
But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but,
also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not
authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

In Re: Garcia [2 SCRA 984, August 15, 1961]

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides:

"The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or diplomas to practice the
liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities,
shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to
the laws and regulations of the latter. . . ."

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly
subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of
law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully
pass the required bar examinations; and

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not
have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See
Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Phil. Constitution).

At any rate, the Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own

32
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines.

Section 4

People vs. Lagman [G.R. No. 45892, July 13, 1938]

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. The National Defense Law, in so far as it

establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted
by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it
is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so
because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to
defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case
of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests,
and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it
was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there
is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted
by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis,
what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation
to make it more effective, in case of need.

Section 6

Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]

THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND NOT MERE RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.
- The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to
say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is
prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a
weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this
principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted
in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President
McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme
expression of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and
civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support
and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed
by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that
shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious
purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended
thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional
religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution
of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their
33
observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy;
and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state
(see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

Taruc vs. De la Cruz [G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005]

INTRAMURAL RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES. The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution.

We rule that the courts do not.

Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to
Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to God what is God's." We have, however, observed as early as 1928 that:

upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases involving questions
relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the profoundest attention from the courts,
not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the
decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in
dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must
not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. 4 (italics ours)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance
of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations
to conform to just church regulations. In the words of Justice Samuel F. Miller 5:

. . . all who unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an implied consent to submit to
the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.

In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving
religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and
disciplinary differences. Thus,

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of

faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of
excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. (emphasis ours)

Section 10

Calalang vs. Williams [G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940]

SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion
of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must
be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Almeda vs. CA [G.R. No. L-43800, July 29, 1977]

34
IN THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, THE STATE MAY REGULATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP. - It is
to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social function. Property
use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social
justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." 7 One governmental policy of recent date projects the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they
till. This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers "of private
agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as
landed estates or not" shall be deemed "owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if
not irrigated and there (3) hectares if irrigated."

Ondoy vs. Ignacio [G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980]

SOCIAL JUSTICE IS NOT EQUALITY, BUT PROTECTION. - Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein
rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A
realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has
reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but
protection."

Salonga vs. Farrales [G.R. No. L-47088, July 10, 1981]

SOCIAL JUSTICE CANNOT NULLIFY THE LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS. — Social Justice
provided for in Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners who under the Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The Social justice consecrated in
our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not
entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is,
therefore, beyond the power of the Courts to grant.

Section 11

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in
response to the particular needs of each country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a
protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for
several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus
writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion
for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for
the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights
derived from the agrarian reform process.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and
liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person -
houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a
person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, viz:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of
security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."
35
In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of
his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which
are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual."123

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person
(as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The
right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect
for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted
by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While
the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee
has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other
words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In
Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in
Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee
held, viz:

Section 12

Virtouso vs. Municipal Judge [G.R. No. L-47841, March 21, 1978]

THE STATE SAFEGUARDS THE RIGHTS OF THE YOUTH. - This Court should, whenever appropriate, give
vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional
mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical,
intellectual, and social well-being."

Section 16

Oposa vs. Factoran [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]

THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, THOUGH NOT INCLUDED IN THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, IS A SOURCE OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. — The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right unites with the
right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall
protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." While the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
36
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA [G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994]

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to
the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution.
Article II, Section 16 which provides:

"The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is
but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health
as a fundamental human right.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory
laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

Section 19

Garcia vs. Board of Investments [G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990]

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown
to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely
choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least.

And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

"The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human
and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices."
xxx xxx xxx

Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of
national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the development and
utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance
with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a garment or
embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips,
where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the
national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the
industry by controlling the upstream or cracker facility.

Section 21

Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. vs. Sec. of DAR [G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989]

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack
from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure,
these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that
they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start
somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught
with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the
contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we
37
venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should
strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that
have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are
removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released
not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of
inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will
be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy
of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a
more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark
resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

Section 25

Basco vs PAGCOR [G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991]

LOCAL AUTONOMY SIMPLY MEANS DECENTRALIZATION. - The power of local government to "impose
taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains
an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 436-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or
an "imperium in imperio." "Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such
as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system
can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied) As to what
state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter
of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539). What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing
or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain
it or delegate it to local governments.

Limbona vs. Mangelin [G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989]

DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION DISTINGUISHED FROM DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER.

— Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The
territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy . . . Sec. 15. There shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. An autonomous
government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the
other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).

38
Section 26

Pamatong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]

THE STATE’S PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES IS NOT JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE.

- Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to opportunities
for public office” is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly
in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such
a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of
Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-
executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, “The State shall broaden
opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties.” Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario
Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word “broaden” to the phrase “ensure
equal access,” and the substitution of the word “office” to “service.” He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word “broaden” to “ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO” because what is important
would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the
government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as
many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public
service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number
one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal
opportunities to access to it, I change the word “broaden.” (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the “Davide amendment” indicates
the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this
rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and
“public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it
was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Section 28

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]

AGENCIES CAN ONLY REGULATE THE MANNER OF INSPECTION, BUT MAY NOT PROHIBIT ACCESS. -
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the
Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy

39
records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are
confined to:

. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books
and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled
to make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the
manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his
alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the
Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We
absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the
manner of examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate
the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the
authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the
availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987
Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be
avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the
exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford
access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot
be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right
may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]

GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS ARE LIKEWISE SUBJECT TO THE

PRINCIPLE OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. - Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions
are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the
end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records
may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT THE
RIGHT TO DEMAND COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INSPECTED. - However, the same
cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names
of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern.

Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato [G.R. No. 92541, November 13, 1991]

RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS SELF-EXECUTORY.

— As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), the constitutional provision "The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern" is self-executory and supplies "the rules by
means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167
[1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
40
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent
with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution,
Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256
[1989]).

Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and
reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television
program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the
member concerned.

The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest";
whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large"
(People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members
concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the
decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public
in character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim
to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged
is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be
to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official
acts.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

In re: Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]

IN DEFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, JUDICIAL OFFICERS ARE NOT

ALLOWED TO BE APPOINTED TO POSITIONS PERFORMING NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. - Under the
Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39
SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

"While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from
its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception
to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can
be satisfied with nothing less."

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of
the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help
promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]

CONCEPTS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES - The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
41
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in
the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the
sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our Constitution.

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY - The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then,
this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the
less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes
must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In
the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be
tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO JUDGE ALL CONTROVERSIES RELATING TO THE

ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CARRIES
WITH IT THE POWER TO ISSUE REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS
EXPRESSLY CONFERRED. - The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
42
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective
a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of
the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose
of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated,
but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious
that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

Casibang vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979]

POLITICAL QUESTION - The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure" (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962): "Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate
Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies
clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject
to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference
must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756;
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It has likewise been employed
loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch
thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with
accuracy; 'political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or
Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. . . ." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA
448, 504-505 [1971])

JUSTICEABLE QUESTION - A purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and after the ratification and
effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its
resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.

43
DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TERM” OF OFFICE AND “RIGHT” TO OFFICE. - That "there is a difference
between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during which an
elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during
which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence,
although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not
foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents
to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is
the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-
extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the
New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their
respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the
term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Paredes, Sunga and Valley cases,
supra).

Tañada vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957]

THE COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS A JUSTICEABLE QUESTION - Respondents assail

our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate,
despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties
the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original
Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial
forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion."

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the
cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192) — relied upon by the
respondents — this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly
or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the
Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.,
139; Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who
shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put
it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised,
and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers thus possessed have been validly
exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a
coordinate branch of the government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the
same thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon
whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to
determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attempted by either
an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224,
244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied.)

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two
Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of
said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
Thus, in the exercise of the so- called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct
National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the
original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3
as incompatible with the fundamental law.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]

POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY. -

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex
of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume
the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation
44
of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the
judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for
submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy
of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore,
that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the
people themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom
the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court on prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the
Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political
impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of
Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and
appropriating funds therefor, "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue
as justiciable in nature. Subsequently, in the Ratification Cases involving the issue of whether or not the
validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, "announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question,
the affirmative stand of the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is
justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, "(T)hus, in the aforementioned
plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question-whether Presidential
Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed
new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it
partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical
unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this
Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view
We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly
modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question thereby adopted in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General,
was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support
thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support of the political question theory advanced
in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be
legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas
corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual
reiteration."

Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IS A JUSTICIEABLE ISSUE - Ruling first

on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence
to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tañada v.
Cuenco:

. . . the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, . . . it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the petition
was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what
was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in
light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the
Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a
political question, thus:

45
 Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias — a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate — on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination . . . of the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise
of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory
in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.

'. . . whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a
given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in
conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to
deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights . . . .' (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."

DELEGATION OF POWER

People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWER. - Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated
with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a
principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It
has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social
Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can
transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on
Civil Government, sec 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot
be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has
located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until
the Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative
has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power
shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to
which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine
"on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and
not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)

EXCEPTION OF NON-DELEGATION, PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. The rule,

however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs
shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authority; and hence while the rule is
also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising
local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a
transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity."
On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the
territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a
municipality or city to the state government. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to
the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done. However, the question of whether or
not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has
been held not to be a judicial but a political question, and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked
upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has
been pretty well drawn. Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section
14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may
by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the
same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
46
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of
this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the
President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever
doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.

TESTS TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF DELEGATION. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil.,
1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to
authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make
the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to
a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)

For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the
agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to
administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here
adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that
the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence
or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the statute, to aid the delegate in
exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that it is
insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and
hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to
guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the
Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find
any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion.
By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation
Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In
other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA [G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988]

TESTS IN DETERMINING VALIDITY OF DELEGATION. There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

REASON FOR PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding
its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
47
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in"
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

SUFFICIENT STANDARDS. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model
contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the
employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "public interest" in People v.
Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang
v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few
cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.

United States vs. Ang Tang Ho (43 PHIL 1 [1922])

Ynot vs. IAC [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]

DELEGATION MUST SET UP STANDARDS AND MUST BE CANALIZED WITHIN THE BANKS AND
PREVENT IT FROM OVERFLOWING. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized
that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named
can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

STANDARDS SET FOR SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION NECESSARILY BROAD AND HIGHLY ABSTRACT. —
The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more
fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of
government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959,
deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our
present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc.
vs. The Public Service Commission: "One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of
separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non
potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18,3)
has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." The standards set for
subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of

48
Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in
Edu v. Ericta —

"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
'safe transit upon the roads.'"

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle.

Pelaez vs. Auditor General [G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965]

INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of
the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
— it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the
first sentence of Section 68, the President:

". . . may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require."

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require"
qualifies, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government
may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally
Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided, that "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the
public welfare requires, he may, by executive order", effect the changes enumerated therein (as well as in said
Section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to such place . . . as the public interest
requires". The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers
therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred
exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that
the phrase "as the public welfare may require", in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true
that in Calalang vs. William (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld
"public welfare" and "public interest", respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the
authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all judicial pronouncements —
must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not
constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power
to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the
Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel
certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers
of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of
fact.

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992]

TARIFF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT - Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24,
Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
49
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government."(Emphasis supplied)

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other
duties or imposts . . . ."

The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401,
the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in
promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
relevant part:

"Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import
duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued
under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.

There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty indicated in
the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code:
Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem.

The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four Hundred One
of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be
revised by the President upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject
to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered:
(1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any
necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no
case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad
valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred
(100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as
may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per
cent ad valorem whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff
Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of
protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including those
subsequently granted pursuant to this section.

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the
provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10)
per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they
shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to
be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and
recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The
Commission shall submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30)
days after the termination of the public hearings.

c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits
fixed in subsection `a' shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the
form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with respect to
imports from the principal competing foreign country for the most recent representative period
shall be used as bases.
50
 d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all
customs import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly
authorized representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs
import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on
Audit.

e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions
of this section.

f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take
effect thirty (30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not
exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the President."
(Underscoring supplied)

THE GRANT OF TARIFF POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT IS NOT ONLY INTENDED TO PROTECT LOCAL
INDUSTRIES, BUT ALSO TO RAISE REVENUE. - The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is
nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a
sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2)
words, one found in Section 401 (a) (1): "existing protective rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso
found at the end of Section 401 (a): " protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . ." We believe that
the words "protective" and "protection" are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing
limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.

In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court may take
judicial notice — that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two
(2) principal traditional generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates lower but still
comparable levels of revenue for the government — The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation
[PAGCOR].)

In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes
which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that
"customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or
tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." The levying of customs
duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries — where such
local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same
customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal
revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties,
which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds — have either or
both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and
frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the
instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed
here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products
may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the effective price of
imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial
revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.

In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a
stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the
exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be
exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however,
insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the
exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the
alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely
difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up
in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great
bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare
and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even
removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and
inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the
community.

Araneta vs. Dinglasan [G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]

THE GRANT OF EMERGENCY POWERS IS INTENDED TO BE LIMITED AND DOES NOT NEED A LAW
FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. - It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to
51
the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The
assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.
If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been
correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet
a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not
enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while
Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third
vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:

"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies
at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view of the scope
that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be
maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of
the delegate; . . ."

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the
face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former.
It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National
Assembly failed to make a provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the
effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and
regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President
could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the
legislature.

As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is
enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the
law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of
the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted
with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain
period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law
upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive
(not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one,
had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography
furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it
became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Italics ours.) It can
easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided
upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this
inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National
Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of
democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption
and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the
act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we
have indicated, the period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the
general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its
enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the
convening of that body.

THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE EMERGENCY POWER WHEN THE
CONGRESS HAS ALREADY CONVENED SHALL CREATE AN ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF TWO
LEGISLATIVE BODIES. - More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when
Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's
actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in
session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a two-third
vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President
in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a
fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best
interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house
rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an
executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
52
Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3
provides:

"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted."

The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President
was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have
said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in section
3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would
lapse, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of
subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the form of rules,
regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as unimportant, as the initial one.

EMERGENCY POWERS CEASE WHEN THE CONGRESS MEET IN REGULAR SESSION. - It is our
considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met
in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the purpose and intention of
the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such
subjects as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress
on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-
liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600
and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the minds
of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not later than the rules and
regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was
predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the
case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending
or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into
force and to issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore
adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos.
600 and 620.

Rodriguez vs. Gella [G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953]

WITHDRAWAL OF THE EMERGENCY POWERS DOES NOT NEED THE CONSENT OF THE DELEGATE. -
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National
Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly
repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the
result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever
attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President
disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress
and the President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of
legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be
for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will
of either the Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it
may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the
emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to
the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its powers by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."

Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be
forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.

53
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted only during the emergency
resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on
December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war could
prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following statement of President
Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942,
the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the
Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the
President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in
time of war." 3 When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant such factual war as that
then raging.

OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, MEANING. - Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution, in

virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war
or (2) other national emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is
one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war
or from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons
that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but were and could
not have been contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special
sessions, and it cannot let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.

EMERGENCY DOES NOT CREATE POWER. - The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and
were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or
other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping
with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in
itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the
wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1

R.A. No. 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum)

Section 5

Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

THE INCREASE OF DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE BY CONVERTING A MUNICIPALITY TO A HIGHLY

URBANIZED CITY IS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF ART VI, SEC. 5 (1). As to the contention that the
assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250
members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No.
7675 is not unconstitutional.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]

REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS MAY BE MADE THROUGH A SPECIAL LAW.

Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law.
This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create
an unequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Montejo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995]

54
REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BELONGS TO THE CONGRESS.— It may well be that
the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at
bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and
petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress
the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." In Macias vs.
COMELEC, (No. L-18684, September 14, 1961, 3 SCRA 1) we ruled that the validity of a legislative
apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing
respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of
the province of Leyte.

COMELEC HAS NO POWER TO REAPPORTION LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS. Our first inquiry relate to the
constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and
administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution. Respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the
power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
Manila Area." The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa.
She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. The Ordinance was the principal
handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court. The
records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing
the first congressional elections under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the
members of the House of Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be made. Commissioner Davide,
Jr., offered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the
apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission
exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The different dimensions of the
options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. On the basis of their
extensive debate, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the phrase "minor
adjustments" was again clarified in the debates of the Commission. That consistent with the limits of its power
to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any
authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by
section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned
to the province out of which such new province was created...." Prescinding from these premises, we hold that
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010]

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose
a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.

55
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to
be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.1

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that
converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854
created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in
that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000,
considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the
Constitutional phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,” to wit:

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to
at least one congressional representative. (Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to
its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city,
should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should
such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an
initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the
words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of “at least two hundred fifty thousand” may
be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5
of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is
captioned “APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA.” Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was
used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan
Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
1[27]
312 Phil. 259 (1995).
56
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be
the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum
for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district
within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been
apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC2[39] that:

x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality
as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an
additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by
the Constitution.

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support.
And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself,
refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an
additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative
districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be
considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and
the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by
this petition.

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000]

FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. To determine the winners in a

Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four
inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under
the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

FORMULA IN COMPUTING THE ALLOCATING SEATS TO THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES. Clearly,

the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

———————————— x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law,
will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering

2[39]
G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309-310.
57
that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208
—— x .20 = 52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question,
however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is "No."

ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES. Having determined that the twenty percent seat
allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the
three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list
seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step — there is no dispute
on this — is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to
as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two
percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
"those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the
three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the
ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two -percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the
number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to
two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is
equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party
shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following
complex fraction:

No. of votes of
concerned party
——————
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
——————
Total no. of votes
for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
58
THE 20% ALLOCATION IS ONLY THE CEILING AND DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILLED UP. The
Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list."

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared
therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order
to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order
to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should have been the Comelec's, is not to find fault in the
wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election
process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the
law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient
or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

TWO PERCENT RATIO. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.

We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:

"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was
raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political party must have obtained at
least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the
party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the house of Representatives, as the following
shows:

"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving
at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different
sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of
the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of
which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod
explained:

"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are
59
 about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean
500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that
there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What
we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is
our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We
think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that
system."

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law,
but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups
which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability
of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 22 to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When
the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.

THE THREE-SEAT LIMIT. An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:

"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double
or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to
be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. . . ."

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for
each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote
threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus,
no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three seat limit is not seriously challenged in these
consolidated cases.

BANAT vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 179171, APRIL 21, 2009]

FORMULA FOR COMPUTING PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES. We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
60
 In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-
list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we
apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered
Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
over Applying
Seat Seats (C), in
Votes Total the three
Rank Party (First (Second whole
Garnered Votes for seat cap
Round) Round) integers
Party (E)
(B) (C) (D)
List, in %
(A)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
COOP-
9 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
61
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives
from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats
allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001]

POLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENTING THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS MAY

PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections
does not mean, however, that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so.
The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in
Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people
in the legislature."

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases
like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the
lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

62
 "SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and
shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack
[of] well-defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the
party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed
group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and
truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently,
the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group,
like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010]

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada
v. Escritor:

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of
Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the
63
 resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs
or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion
might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a
moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and
spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be
religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos
and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a
strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

Palparan v. HRET [G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010]

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act,
vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek
party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since
petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations
under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her
qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is so
inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo
warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies
who the "members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected
from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the
Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or
organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the
Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the
organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner.
They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws
that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of
three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as
"members of the House of Representatives," thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
64
 registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and
shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list
representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in
a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of
party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim
that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent."

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or
her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to
examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to
the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization
had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and
enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it
resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to
approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not
raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

R.A. No. 7941 (Party List System)

Section 6

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995]

65
RESIDENCE IS SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE IN ELECTION LAWS. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees
that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is
their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court, took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is
the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health.
If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction
quite clearly:

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact
that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

MODE OF LOSING DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile,
once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born
in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established
only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with
one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use
of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two
concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.

Article 110 of the Civil Code provide:

ARTICLE 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

66
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses
her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales,
sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to
domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from
one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen
and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different
domiciles (of origin). This difference could for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the
husband a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

ARTICLE 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has
to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they
may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to domicile" and not to "residence."
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile. — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate
decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one
another.

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by
living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing
for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.

Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995]

WHILE RESIDENCE IS EQUIVALENT TO DOMICILE FOR ELECTION PURPOSES, DOMICILE IS NOT

SYNONYMOUS WITH RESIDENCE. We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he
has established not just residence but domicile of choice."

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident
of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (I) year prior to the elections.
Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives this Court held that the term "residence" has always
been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court there held:

67
 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-
vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections. So my question
is: What is the Committee's concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others,
and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (underscoring ours)
Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that 'resident' has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to
go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that the provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence"
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest
purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs Vera is "to
exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing
wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either
had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin
or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to
whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the
Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.

BEFORE PROCLAMATION AND BEFORE TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF
CANDIDATES IN CONGRESS SHALL BE WITHIN THE JURISIDICTION OF THE COMELEC. Under the
above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter
become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning
candidate in an election is ministerial, B .P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of
proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of
the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of
election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds
no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to
Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.
Section 6 states:

68
 SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue
after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of
votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt
is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of
Section. 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification
based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B .P. 881. Section 7 states:

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on Sec 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.

Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991]

Section 7

Dimaporo vs. Mitra [G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991]

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be
shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of
the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for
another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a
mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the
expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily
exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so
enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office
shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be
preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.

Section 11

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang [G.R. No. 15905, August 3, 1966]

THE SPEECH OR EXPRESSION MUST BE MADE WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION AND IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE MEMBER’S OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Said expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or
votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of
the acts in question.
69
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was
an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was
not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published,
he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

Osmeña vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ENJOY ABSOLUTE PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF PRIVILEGED SPEECH,

BUT THEY MAY BE HELD ANSWERABLE BY THE CONGRESS ITSELF. Section 15, Article VI of our
Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause
1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members
of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in
any other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall.
But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States
Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous
Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing
insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-
124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision
amply attests to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of
legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.

And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of
the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago, [A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to
the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of
the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its
citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
70
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of
the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or
correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,3[15] a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.4[16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice,
attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or,
worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente
Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in
Tacordan v. Ang5[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The
factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.6[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or
against any public institution.”7[19] But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee
for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.8[20] The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing
their own rules on her.

Section 13

Zandueta vs. De la Costa [G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938]

The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an
appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, — which new office is incompatible with the one
formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath,
and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was
occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;
id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may
affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).

71
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by
the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing
or nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of public interest, being one of the
means employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes, which is the administration of justice,
considering the organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of
judges-at-large or substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without
detriment to the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to
believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment
offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience
to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination
of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and
legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into the performance of the duties
inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily
accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the validity of said
appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He
likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were to disapprove the
same, it would become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.

Section 14

Puyat vs. De Guzman [G.R. No. 51122, March 25, 1982]

THE DISQUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY

INTERVENING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY. In an election for the eleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), the Puyat Group won six seats to gain control of the Board and of the
management of the company. The Acero Group which won only five seats, questioned the said election in a quo
warranto proceeding filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) wherein they claimed that the
stockholders' votes were not properly counted. In the said case, Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, then
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to
which the Puyat Group objected on constitutional grounds, thus discouraging Assemblyman Fernandez from
further appearing therein as counsel. Subsequently, however, Assemblyman Fernandez acquired P200.00
worth of stock in the subject company representing ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares, on the
basis of which he filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case alleging legal interest therein. The
respondent Associate Commissioner of the SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez
ownership of the said ten shares.

The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances, there had been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before any administrative body" which is a circumvention of the prohibition under Section 11, Article
VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, held that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the Securities and
Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said constitutional prohibition.

Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez in the
quo warranto case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in the subject company, representing ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on
May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing perhaps, the validity of the objection,
he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be
noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body"
and in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or implied prohibited. (Am. Digest, 2d
Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P1046.)

Section 16

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. [G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]

DEFINITION OF MAJORITY AND MINORITY. Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They
contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all
its members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority", as well as
72
who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers
to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships
comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners
assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan
as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader,
because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.

We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.

The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
"majority", much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

The Comment of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in
petitioner's Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the
minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara
assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all
senators, including those belonging to the minority. This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where
even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. History would also show that the "majority" in
either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged,
while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.

Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority". Majority may also refer to "the group,
party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes
referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are
more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

Avelino vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAJORITY OF THE HOUSE AND MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE. If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate?
Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minutes say so, secondly, because at
the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
"each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all
the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a
difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo
believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of
73
one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one
against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amendable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about
quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia [G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997]

RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY CONGRESS MAY BE DISREGARDED BY THE CONGRESS ITSELF

WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION. First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to
have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not
claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the
House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference
by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has
been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting
on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to
this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question
in a case where private rights are involved.

Osmeña vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]

WHAT CONSTITUTES DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR IS A PURELY POLITICAL QUESTION. On the question

whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña
may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best
but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one
thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed
by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

74
 "SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the
courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the
judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the
powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . ."

"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the state Senate is given the power to expel a member, the courts
will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 200,
p. 902.) [Italics Ours.]

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French. 7 In 1905,
several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed
mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance
to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere,
explaining in orthodox juristic language:

"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It had
been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the
power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the
implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss vs. Barlett.
3 Gray 473. 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is
inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the body 'to perform its high
functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and
that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or
forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions
of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power thus committed to it, the
senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house
thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which
it is expressly forbidden to do."

We have underscored in the above quotation these lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles
controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary
action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001]

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —

"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the
order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the
encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:

"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with
the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,'
and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the
qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives."

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three
co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

75
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers
the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by
any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to
judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to
imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive,
the Court subscribes to the view 19 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription
thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two
branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or
ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the
manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 118364, August 8, 1995] 252 SCRA 541

U.S. vs. Pons [G.R. No. 11530, August 12, 1916]

THE CONTENTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS OF JUSTICE,
AND THE LATTER MAY NOT GO BEYOND THESE JOURNALS IN VERIFYING THE FACTS CONTAINED
THEREIN. Passing over the question whether the printed Act (no. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the
legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and
explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science
which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did
not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation
or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the
contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to
understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus
involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to influence
the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of
conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq. ) Counsel for the appellant, in order
to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the
legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the
records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that
the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the
discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the
Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the
expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in
fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the
probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon
entertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of
memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving
verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must
be taken for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable
than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling
matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex
rel. Heron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:

"Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question;
and, out of multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond
the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journal a law has been adopted. And if
reasons for this limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated,
it doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy
require that the authentic of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent
character. They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals."
76
In the case from which this last quotation is taken the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in
the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a
later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the
point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and
the various states we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The
journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and
the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963]

THE TERMS OF THE ENROLLED BILL ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS ON THE TENOR
THEREOF. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as
"urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended
to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements
made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615;
Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 27, 1960]. Furthermore, it is well settled that the
enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President
(Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections,
L-18684, September 14, 1961 ). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by
the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]

CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE ENROLLED BILL AND THE CERTIFICATION OF THE CONGRESS. It is a

matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason
thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by
which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.

Section 17

Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POWERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. Where the court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction,
and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987,
77
148 SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:

"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as `intended to be complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature' [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete'
[Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete
as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R.
No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, 'judicial review of
decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the
tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."

Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO JUDGE ALL CONTROVERSIES RELATING TO THE

ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CARRIES
WITH IT THE POWER TO ISSUE REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS
EXPRESSLY CONFERRED. - The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective
a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of
the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose
of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated,
but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious
that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [8 SCRA 391 (1988)]

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE ON ALL CONTESTS RELATING
TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATION OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO THE
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ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec.
250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the
COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city
official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the
COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec.
2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no provision
for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa
having been vested in the COMELEC.

That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987
Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative
power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and
city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec.
2(2)].

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its
jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through
Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:

. . . [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should
be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p.
177; emphasis supplied.]

A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been
exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to
an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission
under the 1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions].

Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states it in this wise:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally
in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as " full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)].
Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as
that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379,

79
September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of
government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially
created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between
the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the
jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an
agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective national and local officials.

That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, consonant with
the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is
too evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's purely
administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to
file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of
election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to
these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where
specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution.
Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of
municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate
and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. LLpr

The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the
period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.

Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal [G.R. No. L-83767, October 27, 1988]

THE MEMBERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL REPRESENTING THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE

DISQUALIFIED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL MERELY BECAUSE THEY
ARE PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN THE PETITION. The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules
(Section 24) — requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature — is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority
vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would
remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the
Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative"
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it
80
held that said provision ". . . is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests . . . shall be resolved by a
panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course,
is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of
a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the
prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an unmistakable indication that the
"legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence,
the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced
by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators—elect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we
are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

Bondoc vs. Pineda [G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991]

MEMBERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE. The independence of the
House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth
and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the
interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole
judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal
would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate
may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence — even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
"conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional
81
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled
by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

Chavez vs. COMELEC [211 SCRA 315 (1992)]

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES ARE NOT ALLOWED IN THE ELECTION OF THE MEMBERS OF

THE CONGRESS. It is clear from the above-quoted provision of the law that "pre-proclamation cases (are) not
allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives." What
is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest,
the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected
and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the
minutes of their respective proceedings.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order enjoining "the proclamation of the
24th highest ranking senatorial candidate without first acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14,
1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered requiring the Comelec
to re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated (Petition, p. 9) including
Metro Manila, scan the ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said
scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner.

It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest error's in the certificates
of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation
of the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the
certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioner's proper
recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code,
exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Thus, Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that "(t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The word "sole" underscores the
exclusivity of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective Members (Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 [1991]; Lazatin v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 [1988]; Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). It is therefore
crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral
Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest
relating to the election of a member of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed.

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that a recount before the Senate Electoral Tribunal where he would be
forced to shell out the expenses imposes not only a property requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be
voted upon but also a price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will.

The argument, however, is beside the point. The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right for petitioner
to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and
alter the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases like the one
at bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not
this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial measures.

Section 18

Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

Coseteng vs. Mitra [G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990]

APPOINTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS SHOULD BE MADE BY

THE HOUSE CONCERNED. The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments
was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the
LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty
percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be
rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent
Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the

82
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member
also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an
opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House
membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be
able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent
at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the
Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical
indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments
should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they
were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their
party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission
on Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.

Guingona vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992]

RULE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. It is also a fact

accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on
proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with the
fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with
its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation
of one political party — either the LAKAS — NUCD or the NPC.

On the claim of Senator Tañada that under the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo Tañada, and the case of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments
because of: (a) the physical impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must be
rounded up into one senator, (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his party is entitled to be
represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c) having been elected senator, rounding up into one full
senator his fractional membership is consistent with the provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be
in full accord, with the principle of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.

The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked as a precedent in support of incumbent
Senator Tañada's claim to a membership in the present Commission on Appointments. In the time of his
illustrious father, out of 24 elected senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista
Party, while Senator Lorenzo Tañada, who belonged to the Citizens' Party, was the lone opposition. By force of
circumstance, he became a member of the Commission on Appointments because he alone represented the
minority party. Had there been another senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this
problem of who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition party would have arisen. In the case of
Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the opposition party, namely, he and Senator
Estrada. Applying the rule of proportional representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the opposition was
entitled to one full member (not a fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally nominated and
elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the present case, if there were a political party other
than the present four political parties is the Senate. and We follow Senator Tañada's claim that he is entitled to
full membership as lone representative of his party, We would have the anomaly of having 13 senators, where
the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Commission on Appointments.

We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that
twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented
therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on
Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.

83
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation;
otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer
force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and
helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To
allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in
the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who
by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.

Section 18 also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any political party who succeeds
in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a
representative in the Commission on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra,
Jr., 12 a political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a representative in the
Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the
Commission on Appointments. This applies to the respondent Senator Tañada.

We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:

1) In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for every seat in
the Commission on Appointments.

2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition
with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily
include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall
rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such powers and functions
herein conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution, Section 10, Chapter 3 of the
Rules of the Commission on Appointments, provides as follows:

SECTION 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall meet at either the session
hall of the Senate or the House of Representatives upon call of the Chairman or as the
Commission may designate. The presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to
constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the
quorum should come from either house . . ."

It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Other
instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if not fully
constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution. Among these are the
Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Election, Commission on Audit. They perform their
functions so long as there is the required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on
Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) senators are elected
thereto as long as a quorum exists.

Section 21

Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991]

THE POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IS NOT

ABSOLUTE. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
vprocess and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

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As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such
as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or
resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In
order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212, because, firstly,
Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are
connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T . Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held:

" . . . . The power of congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic, or
political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But
broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the
private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was
freely conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a
legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of
the investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible." (emphasis supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of
that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein,
is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in
said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioners' respective answers thereto, the issue sought to
be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility
of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's
judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to
bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.

In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before
the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:

"Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire
into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters
that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive. . . . ."

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES.

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including 'the relevant limitations of
the Bill of Rights'."

In another case —

" . . . the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill
of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of
the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume,
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 however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances
any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the
Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon
an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly."

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination.
This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal
case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. thus
—

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas
an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions."

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents administrative investigations but only if they
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran,
the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to
invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.

It was held that:

"We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case,
Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against
self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate
him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature
of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon
a witness, whether a party or not."

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, If pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

Arnault vs. Nazareno [G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950]

POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO ISSUE CONTEMPT ORDER. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to
enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information —
which is not frequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs.
Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A. L. R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to
congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude
the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton. 204; 5 L ed., 242.)

But no person can punish for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Killbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)

Since, as we noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the congress
of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may
enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded. It is necessary for us to do so in this case. Suffice it to say it must be coextensive with the range of the
legislative power.

EXTENT OF THE POWER OF INQUIRY OF THE CONGRESS. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to
be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel
a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
86
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every
question that may be pounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other
words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and
not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of
the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited
from a single question.

Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]

POWER TO CONDUCT INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION IS AN INHERENT POWER OF CONGRESS. The

Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it
vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein — the Batasang Pambansa — and its
committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno, a case decided
in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power
to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in
the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of
the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the
Senate's power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the
same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation
are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a
proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which
Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to
hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of
their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to
that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF INQUIRY. As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called
"McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less
87
susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Court's certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid
of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to
indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The
provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House's duly published rules of
procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published
rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected,
even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none
appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be
established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department
under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive
Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the
challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion
of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used
even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in
light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive
branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.
Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more
accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by
any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in
the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning
with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of the Government
not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

Tribe's comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to
resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state
secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of
government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information
related to pending investigations. . . ." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black's Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the
doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary
to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental
operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an
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appropriate exercise of the executive' domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those
documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative
communications. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that
must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but
also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in
this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts,
or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive
officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed,
the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND QUESTION HOUR. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim
of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight
function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of
legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack
of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a
co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the
oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.

Gudani vs. Senga [G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]

THE PRESIDENT MAY VALIDLY PREVENT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM ATTENDING
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL. Preliminarily, we must discuss the
effect of E.O. 464 and the Court's ruling in Senate on the present petition. Notably, it is not alleged that
petitioners were in any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for violating the
direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands independent of the
executive order. Distinctions are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed "generals and flag officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege," as among those public officials required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 "to secure
prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress." The Court in Senate
declared both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void, and the impression may have been left following Senate that it

89
settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from requiring military personnel from attending
congressional hearings without having first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong.

Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is encumbered by
significant limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential
approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration.
However, the ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing
before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority — the
commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers
of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive
privilege or executive control.

During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency of this petition as well as the
issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was rendered with the comfort that the nullification of portions of
E.O. 464 would bear no impact on the present petition since petitioners herein were not called to task for
violating the executive order. Moreover, the Court was then cognizant that Senate and this case would
ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues. Relevantly, Senate purposely did not touch upon or rule on the
faculty of the President, under the aegis of the commander-in-chief powers to require military officials from
securing prior consent before appearing before Congress. The pertinent factors in considering that question are
markedly outside of those which did become relevant in adjudicating the issues raised in Senate. It is in this
petition that those factors come into play.

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins
with the simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines . . ." Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons
and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict
the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under
civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under
"house arrest" by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a
condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during
his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

[T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It
cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom
of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree,
individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties
under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks.
Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied
with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the
restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.

Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life circumscribes
several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot
abide by these limitations normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other fields;
and in fact many of those discharged from the service are inspired in their later careers precisely by their
rebellion against the regimentation of military life. Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is
not a stain on character, for the military mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally
conscripted into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those who do make the choice to be a soldier,
significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need be, the men and women of the
armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal inclinations.

Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by
virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies
under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Explication of these principles is in order.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
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recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power as commander-in-
chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President's prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval
before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces
in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President
that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining
to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
President's ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature's functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President's power
as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to
conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or
actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the
military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality
which does not offend the Chief Executive's prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the
courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a
wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable
interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their
various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort
that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate
branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches.
Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation,
such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its
rulings by the other branches of government.

In re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio [G.R. No. 174340, October 17,
2006]

THE POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION CANNOT BE

RESTRICTED BY MERE LEGISLATIVE FIAT. Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of
inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973
Constitution. Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was
therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of
its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,
is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and

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officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this
class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of
any constitutional basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives."

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and
charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for
the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention
of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other
words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It
places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.
Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and
non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of
E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to
make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and
constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No. 1. If Section 4 (a)
were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability
"for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so
viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of
members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the
1987 Constitution. . . . .

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG
could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted
from complying with orders of this Court.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, [G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008]

Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to
protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the
nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and
arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The
confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and
more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental
powers.

Section 22

Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]

QUESTION HOUR. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a
prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through
the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of
department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads' possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1
is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
92
 Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI.
Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the
power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions
involved distinct functions of Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. . . . When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour]
yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to
appear before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular
problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular
Batasang Pambansa — as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim
Batasang Pambansa — one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our
committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations, is
the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and
it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that

the fact that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or
the Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come
when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to
inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner
Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the
gentleman confirm this, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in
aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. 83 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The
reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the
appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style,
precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original
position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of
legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go,
Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of
the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour.
I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we
reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of
Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a
power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of
legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will
consider this.

MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely
as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the

93
 members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of
Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31
would now become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded
from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both
Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power
to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide's only concern was that the two
provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other.
Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress.

The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners' alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner
Maambong's committee — the Committee on Style — shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct
functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of
the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his
Committee.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a
period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable
for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question
period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution 86 which made the
appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by
that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the
program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly.
The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. 88 To that
extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of
the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not,
however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances.
In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress' right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is
that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source — even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the
Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The
absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the
Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to
perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power
devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex gratia by the executive. 89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 24

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]

WHAT IS NEEDED TO ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS ONLY THE BILL AND
NOT THE LAW. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that
94
although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the
verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on
other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having
originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required
by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may
be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed
later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to
the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order
to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and
those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with
the legislative power, which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress
of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." The exercise of the treaty-ratifying
power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is,
therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of
the possession of such non-legislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S.
Senate has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected
at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The
Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that
the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that
the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of
H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the
question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H.
No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House
before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Alvarez vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996]

INTRODUCTION OF A BILL OF LOCAL APPLICATION IN THE SENATE IN ANTICIPATION OF THE BILL

TO BE PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their
own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The
filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB
No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No.
7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending the instant controversy.

Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading
and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public
hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and
transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter or on February 23, 1994,
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate
held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third
Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local

95
application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.

Section 25

Garcia vs. Mata [G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975]

RIDER IN AN APPROPRIATION BILL. A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its
relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very
first clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads,

"After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during
any period of five consecutive years:"

the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of
the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental
policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP.
The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation
measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against 'riders' to the general appropriation act." It was
indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines
which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any
provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was
not germane to or properly connected with that subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly connected
therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every fair intendment
and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislative enactment. But when an act
contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus, in Sumulong
vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject." The
constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision
not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the
government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or
any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not
fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty
and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.

Demetria vs. Alba [G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987]

REALLIGNMENT OF BUDGET MAY ONLY BE DONE WHEN THERE ARE SAVINGS FROM THE
APPROPRIATIONS OF A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT AND THE SAME IS TO BE DONE TO AUGMENT
OTHER ITEMS IN THEIR OWN APPROPRIATIONS. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly
overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the
tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: . . ." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds,
provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in
the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation
and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of
public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another
96
[Sec. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to
forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to
naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the
President, ". . . Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfounded appropriations,
results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of
development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents that
paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.

Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of
responsibility.

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. I, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, explained:

". . . The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity;
each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly,
while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the
other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution,
is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust
committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in
some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative.
Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must
enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in
conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the
legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do
what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges
assume to act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. 'In exercising this high
authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public
will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the
legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of
the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in
any law.' [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v.
Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825]" (pp. 332-334).

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary
cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutional and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

NECESSITY OF REALLIGNMENT MAY BE MADE BY A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, BUT THE RE-

ALLIGNMENT ITSELF MUST BE MADE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The appropriation for operating expenditures for
each House is further divided into expenditures for salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits,
maintenance expenses and other operating expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his own
operating expenditure a proportionate share of the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does
not spend for one item of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item to
another item of expense.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section
25(5) Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:

"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations: however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations."
97
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives the power to augment items in an appropriation act for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of Congress is authorized by
Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:

"Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no change or

modification shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in this Act and other
appropriation laws unless in cases of augmentations from savings in appropriations as
authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution." (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).

Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the
individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.

Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only
determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They
are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are deficiencies in other
items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their
stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:

(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken; and

(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to be made.

Section 26

Philconsa vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965]

RULE ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE TITLE. Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the
requirement that the subject of an act should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by
petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 162; See also
Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965] p. 119)

With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:

"The Constitutional requirements with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their
contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not
necessary that the title be a complete index of the content." (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)

"The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary
legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject." (Sumulong v. The Commission on
Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)

The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained in
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784,
known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its
provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was
limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The
Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title, is
not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to
declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164 5 ; See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)

In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act
3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1,
section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.

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In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding
increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition
that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987]

THE IMPOSITION OF A REGULATORY FEE IS GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW CREATING
THE AGENCY. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end
that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and
are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a
bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a
practical rather than technical construction.

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without
merit. That section reads, inter alia:

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any

provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty
percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty
percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory
Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and
title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate
and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5,
supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the
DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]

PURPOSE OF THE ONE-SUBJECT ONE-BILL RULE. We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec.
26(1), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desire.

THE SUBJECT OF THE LAW NOT THE EFFECT THEREOF IS REQUIRED TO BE STATED IN THE TITLE.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. As has
been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to
the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view,
may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by
99
 which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove
obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as
expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title
(Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given
subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a
repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be
difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the
repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As
observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that
every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such
rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]

THE CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT DISPENSES WITH THE PRINTING OF THE COPIES OF THE
BILL AS WELL AS THE THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS. Enough has been said to show that it was
within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We not pass to the next argument of petitioners that S.
No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second
and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9
and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.
VI, § 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second
requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not
only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency.
For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so
negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away
with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would
insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for
President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of
the convening of Congress in emergency session.

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example,
the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became
Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same
day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the
requirement of three readings on separate days, also.

Tan vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994]

Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation
intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in the support of the
whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fruad upon the legislature , and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above
objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require
a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.

Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

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 ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON “NO AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST READING OF THE BILL”
APPLIES ONLY TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF EACH HOUSE AND NOT TO THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE. Petitioners' argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to
add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a
circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the
Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case that:

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .

Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first
time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. 32 (Emphasis
supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each
house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted
to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe
any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said
bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have
been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.

Section 27

Gonzales vs. Macaraig [G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990]

VETO POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if
exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the
item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an
Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.

Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and first came into being in the
former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. This was followed by the 1935 Constitution, which
contained a similar provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto power was made more
expansive by the inclusion of this sentence:

". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the
President can not veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or
items to which it relates . . ."

The 1935 Constitution further broadened the President's veto power to include the veto of item or items of
revenue and tariff bills.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and compact form, thus:

"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object."

It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a
verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any
reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a
disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill
refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is
an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125,
etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S.
410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an 'item' of an appropriation bill obviously means an item

101
which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put
into an appropriation bill."

It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987
Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces
the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section
25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.

Petitioners' further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the President partakes of the nature
of legislative powers it should be strictly construed, is negative by the following dictum in Bengzon, supra,
reading:

"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power
by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that
the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority
he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of
the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto
the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature" (Commonwealth v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L.R.A., 882; People v. Board of
Councilmen [1892], 20 N.Y.S., 52; Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State
[1927], 53 A.L.R., 258 [at 917]).

INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should
relate specifically to some " particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They
apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the
disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have
to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners
themselves, i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office" (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition).
Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90)
although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the President's veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)

"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power
to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing 'items' of expenditure essential to the
operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by
artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on
an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the
legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to
veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the
constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the
legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must
be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation
bills.

". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general
appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling measure,' special interest provisions which could
102
 not succeed if separately enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a
bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]

THE PRESIDENT CANNOT EXERCISE HER VETO POWER TO AMEND AN EXISTING LAW. We need no
lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the provisions of a law
enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a
final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.

A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.

Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was extended
to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595.

On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic Acts 1797
and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was
surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.

It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and Constitutional
Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990.
When her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions is the 1992
General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now
challenged in this petition.

It turns out, however, that P. D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P. D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that
Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it was
enforced from 1957 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.

House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The
veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-
existent premises.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992
General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her
power to accomplish.

Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1797 never achieved that purpose
because it was not properly published. It never became a law.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION. In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that
sentence of Section 16 (2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean
the disallowance of the power of the President to veto a "provision."

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must
"relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision"
which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions"
are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these
kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately
dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress
cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the
Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.

The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:

"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power
to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing `items' of expenditures essential to
the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by
103
 artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on
an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal responsibilities and functions of a co-
equal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's
constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor
to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold
that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such
provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over
general appropriation bills.

". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general
appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling measures,' special interest provisions which could
not succeed if separately enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a
bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

Section 28

Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan [G.R. No. L-81311, June 30, 1988]

As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. The Court, in City of
Baguio vs. De Leon, said:

". . . In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco (69 Phil. 420), Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court,
stated: 'A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject may be found.'

"There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a constitutional
requirement where there is a classification. The opportunity came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v.
Alfonso (83 Phil. 852, 862). Thus: 'Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; . . .'
About two years later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses Trainers
Assn. v. de la Fuente (88 Phil. 60, 65) incorporated the above excerpt in his opinion and
continued; 'Taking everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs
complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory
within the meaning of the Constitution.'

"To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another case decided two years
later, (Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300) is that the statute or ordinance in question
'applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.' This Court is
on record as accepting the view in a leading American case (Carmichael v. Southern Coal and
Coke Co., 301 US 495) that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class
for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.' (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148,
153)."

The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not
exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in
business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are
consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products,
so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are
expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

Province of Abra vs. Hernando [G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981]

THE USE OF THE PROPERTY AND NOT THE OWNERSHIP IS THE CONTROLLING FACTOR IN
DETERMINING THE EXEMPTION. Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he
merely compared the provisions of the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax
exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under the 1935
Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation." The present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and
required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively"
but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded
differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past
decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There must be proof
104
therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable
purposes to be exempt from taxation. According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero: "From
1906, in Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of
Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is
never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law
frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris." In
Manila Electric Company v. Vera, a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated, reference being made to
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 15 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine
Acetylene Co. & CTA; 16 and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs.

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]

Section 29

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960]

Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]

Guingona vs. Carague [G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991]

AUTOMATIC BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR DEBT SERVICING IS ALLOWED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be 'made by law,' such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in
the present."

Osmeña vs. Orbos [G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993]

THE RULE ON SECTION 29 (3) APPLIES ONLY TO MONIES COLLECTED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF TAXATION AND NOT THOSE LEVIED FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES. Also of relevance is this
Court's ruling in relation to the sugar stabilization fund the nature of which is not far different from the OPSF.
In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained
their nature and character, viz.:

"The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the State
to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). The tax
collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to
provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise
of the police power of the State (Lutz v. Araneta, supra).

"The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and
producers for a special purpose — that of 'financing the growth and development of the sugar
industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign
market.' The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to
constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v.
American Surety Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having
been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be,
in the language of the statute, 'administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the purpose
has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of
the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI,
Sec. 29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). 17

The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are
deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid
out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3), lifted from
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1)." (emphasis supplied.)

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise
of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment
given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a
"trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court
105
is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the
practice is not without precedent.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

Section 30

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]
Diaz vs. CA [G.R. No. 109698, December 5, 1994]

Section 32

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. Prescinding from these definitions, we gather
that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or
refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify
one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the
proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through
their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof
to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed
conformities with the period granted by said statute, the Commission Elections "shall then set a date for the
initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned . . .".

On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial
jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such
law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the
Commission on Elections.

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by
the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation
and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the
voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will
simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.

[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as "powers" or "legal
processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the
case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.]

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more
closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it
that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood
and voted by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated,
and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately.
Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative".

It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition."

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to
its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its
authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for
the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

ARTICLE VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1

Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]

[G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989]
Soliven vs. Makasiar [G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988]

Section 4

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 Brillantes vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004]

THE COMELEC CANNOT MAKE “UNOFFICIAL COUNT” FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of
election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass
the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in
part:

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of
the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.

As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed to Chairman Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent COMELEC could not and should not conduct any
"quick count" of the votes cast for the positions of President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2,
2004 addressed to Chairman Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position emphasizing that "any
quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress,
but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the COMELEC proceeded to
promulgate the assailed resolution. Such resolution directly infringes the authority of Congress, considering
that Section 4 thereof allows the use of the third copy of the Election Returns (ERs) for the positions of
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, intended for the
COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the process,
canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.

Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436 confirms the constitutional undertaking of Congress
as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President. Section 24 thereof provides:

SEC. 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-President.
— The Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint public session, shall compose the
national board of canvassers for president and vice-president. The returns of every election for
president and vice-president duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the president of the Senate shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress upon determination of the authenticity
and the due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass all the results for
president and vice-president by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices
submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of canvassers and thereafter, proclaim the
winning candidates for president and vice-president.

The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act
No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed
from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is,
with more reason, prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes.

The COMELEC realized its folly and the merits of the objection of the Senate President on the constitutionality
of the resolution that it decided not to conduct an "unofficial" quick count of the results of the elections for
President and Vice-President. Commissioner Sadain so declared during the hearing:

JUSTICE PUNO:
The word you are saying that within 36 hours after election, more or less, you will be able
to tell the people on the basis of your quick count, who won the election, is that it?

COMM. SADAIN:
Well, it's not exactly like that, Your Honor. Because the fact of winning the election
would really depend on the canvassed results, but probably, it would already give a certain
degree of comfort to certain politicians to people rather, as to who are leading in the elections, as
far as Senator down are concerned, but not to President and Vice-President.

JUSTICE PUNO:

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 So as far as the Senatorial candidates involved are concerned, but you don't give this
assurance with respect to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections which are more
important?

COMM. SADAIN:
In deference to the request of the Senate President and the House Speaker, Your Honor.
According to them, they will be the ones canvassing and proclaiming the winner, so it is their
view that we will be pre-empting their canvassing work and the proclamation of the winners and
we gave in to their request.
xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:

Perhaps what you are saying is that the system will minimize "dagdag-bawas" but not
totally eradicate "dagdag-bawas"?

COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:

Now, I heard either Atty. Bernas or Atty. Brillantes say (sic) that there was a conference
between the Speaker and the Senate President and the Chairman during which the Senate
President and the Speaker voice[d] their objections to the electronic transmission results
system, can you share with us the objections of the two gentlemen?

COMM. SADAIN:
These was relayed to us Your Honor and their objection or request rather was for us to
refrain from consolidating and publishing the results for presidential and vice-presidential
candidates which we have already granted Your Honors. So, there is going to be no
consolidation and no publication of the . . .

COMM. SADAIN:
Reason behind being that it is actually Congress that canvass that the official canvass for
this and proclaims the winner.

Section 13

Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 85468, September 7, 1989]

DISQUALIFICATION OF THE OFFICIAL FAMILY OF THE PRESIDENT. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants shall not . . . during (their) tenure, . . . directly or indirectly . . . participate in any business." The
constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that
"pursuit of private business . . . without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall
be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.

On the suspension of the petitioner from office, Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
3019) provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him."

Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable
under the Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807), the law's command that he "shall be suspended
from office" pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive
suspension for as indicated by the Solicitor General, an approved leave, whether it be for a fixed or indefinite
period, may be cancelled or shortened at will by the incumbent.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY CANNOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OTHER OFFICE IN THE
GOVERNMENT EXCEPT IN THOSE INSTANCES ALLOWED BY THE CONSITUTION AND IN THOSE
PROVIDED BY LAW IN AN EX OFFICIO CAPACITY WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AND
REQUIRED BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION. Going further into Section 13, Article VII,
108
the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on
other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general
and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his
official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was
also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted
during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department.
Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of the
Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article
VII cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section
13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the
Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other
office or position in the government during their tenure.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences,
among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized
under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary,
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this
Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited.

Section 15

Aytona vs. Castillo [G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962]

MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS. Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier
than at noon at December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the
election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to
prepare of the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he
ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the
electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use his powers as incumbent President to continue the political
warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filing up
of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a
few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an
abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

109
Normally, when the President makes appointments with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he
has the benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and
is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of
the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection. Where, however, as in this
case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the
time of the appointment and where the names are to be submitted by his successor, who may not wholly
approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is
hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care"
which was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these
appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive
authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it must
decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute"
appointments.

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it
cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim
appointments (three hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting
similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justify
revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee
has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the
present situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings
detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to
equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to
beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public service.
Needless to say, there are instances of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only
strict legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.

In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta [A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC.
November 9, 1998.]

THE PRESIDENT CANNOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY DURING THE TWO-MONTH
PERIOD DESPITE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE JUDICIARY WITHIN
NINETY DAYS FROM SUBMISSION OF THE NOMINEES. The Court's view is that during the period stated
in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his terms" — the President is neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15
of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years.

Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made
within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or
anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or
private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to
induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote
in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate
in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary
increases. — During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The
Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be
filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the
position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.

110
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight"
appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly
elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than
a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
President." Said the Court:

"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments
in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration
of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments."

As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to
be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several
appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were upheld.

Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only "midnight" appointments — those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their
number and the time of their making — but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing
the outcome of the Presidential election.

On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII — allowing appointments to be made
during the period of the ban therein provided — is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The
exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing
power of the President during the period of the ban.

Section 16

Binamira vs. Garucho [G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990]

DISTTINCTION BETWEEN APPOINTMENT AND DESIGNATION. It is not disputed that the petitioner was
not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a
clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.

MAY THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT BE EXERCISED BY ANY OFFICER OTHER THAN THE ONE TO
WHOM IT IS VESTED. Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that
the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of
the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its
nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise
of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a
merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as
in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption

being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
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 and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he
cannot delegate his duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the
exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was
deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

Indeed, even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be validly exercised by the
Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter, as an extension or "projection" of the personality of
the President, made irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in question. The petitioner's conclusion
that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is based only on half the doctrine he
vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel stated that doctrine clearly in the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior, where he described the relationship of the President of the Philippines and the members of the
Cabinet as follows:

. . . all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when
"performed and promulgated in the regular course of business," which was true of the designation made by
Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also happened in the case at bar.

Sarmiento vs. Mison [G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987]

APPOINTMENTS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by
the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes
others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on
this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President,
under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is
apropos:

"In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be
presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing
laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its
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 provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption."
(Barry vs. Truax, 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.) "

Bautista vs. Salonga [G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989]

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS MAY BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT
WITHOUT THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Since the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is
to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is
not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly
vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment.

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the
second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It provides:

"(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by
the President for a term of seven years without re-appointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor."

THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT CANNOT EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO

CONFIRM OR DENY APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICES WHICE ARE EXCLUDED BY THE CONSTITUTION
EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT VOLUNTARILY SUBMITS SUCH APPOINTMENT FOR ITS CONFIRMATION.
Respondent Commission vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the
Mison case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit
such appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the
Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing) may, from time to time
move power boundaries, in the Constitution differently from where they are placed by the Constitution.

The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is
concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive
nor the Legislative (Commission on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The
evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter of appointments to public
office, between the President and Congress (the latter acting through the Commission on Appointments). To
tilt one side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent
that the Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no
power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for
her by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be
sustained.

Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to
the President alone. Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the
President to make without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the executive's voluntary act
of submitting such appointment to the Commission on Appointments and the latter's act of confirming or
rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.

EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN

APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO
VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. Under this heading,
we will assume, ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily allow the Commission on
Appointments to exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution
in the President. Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988
to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of such
appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the
performance of her duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject
position which, under the Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by
Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed
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her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for a term of
seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an appointment
could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to this day.

To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding oneself that day is night just because the drapes are drawn and
the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive questions of constitutional law raised by petitioner, the
records clearly show that petitioner came to this Court in timely manner and has not shown any indication of
abandoning her petition.

THE CONCEPT OF AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS APPLIES ONLY TO APPOINTMENTS SUBJECT TO THE

CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Nor can respondents impressively contend
that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad interim appointment, because,
under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review
of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments
that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
can not be ad interim appointments.

Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Appointments [G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989]

SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO BE APPOINTED BY THE

PRESIDENT SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Since the
seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by
the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of
the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption
from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.

The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article
XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas" clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus,
appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the
point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art.
VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the
confirmation process.

AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS ARE VALID ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS OR AFTER THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS. Implicit in the invocation of
paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the
President as appointing authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant thereto
"shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the President need not
make any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of
fact, the President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without
respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner's appointment, said
appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission."

Calderon vs. Carale [G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992]

THE CONGRESS CANNOT BY LEGISLATIVE FIAT EXPAND THE LIST OF OFFICERS SUBJECT TO THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMNETS – APPOINTMENTS OF NLRC CHAIRMAN
AND COMMISSIONERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to
in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and
Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715

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requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
with the President.

Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial
function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional
infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of
the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.

It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously,
intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935
Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all
presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation. Subsection 3, Section
10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:

"3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureau, officers of the Army from the
rank of the colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . ."

The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential
appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure
and disapproval of members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not
judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent
(constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the
adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of
the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the
legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.

Tarrosa vs. Singson [G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994]

THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANKO SENTRAL IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. However for the information of all
concerned, we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani
A. Cruz dissenting, where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Flores vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993]

THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT INVOLVES THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, AND ONCE CONFERRED,
SUCH MAY NOT BE RESTRICTED BY THE CONGRESS TO A POINT THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY
LOSES ANY DISCRETION ON WHO TO APPOINT. As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation
of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust,"
or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an
office or public function and discharge the duties of the same." In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior
Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office."

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
According to Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment,"
and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]pointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court we held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative
of the appointing power . . . ."

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Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion
of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words,
the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the
same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred
on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of
prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion
of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing
authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the
posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such
supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the
very nature itself of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his
choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Matibag vs. Benipayo [G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002]

AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT IS A PERMANENT APPOINTMENT. An ad interim appointment is a

permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides
as follows:

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that
it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke
at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim appointment is permanent in
character. In Summers vs. Ozaeta, 25 decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:

". . . . an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section 10, Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides that the 'President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.' It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An
ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional
period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an 'acting' appointment
which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued." (Emphasis
supplied)

The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim
appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure
officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, this
Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows:

"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in
recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on
Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad
interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and
116
 perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of
the Constitution, the appointment is effective 'until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.'"

Petitioner cites Black's Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the meantime" or "for
the time being." Hence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in
character. This argument is not new and was answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 27 where we explained that:

". . . . From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in
understanding the situation. Private respondent had been extended several 'ad interim'
appointments which petitioner mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature.
Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word 'ad interim' which creates such belief. The term
is defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being". Thus, an officer ad
interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black's Law Dictionary, Revised
Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of
Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban's appointments, the term is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said
appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime,
while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the power
of appointment, is unable to act. . . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text
of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again
occasion to explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court
of Appeals, 28 where the Court stated:

"We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of
the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an
acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant
case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was
issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private
respondent's appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner's submission that private respondent's ad
interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly
terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but their
terms are only until the Board disapproves them." (Emphasis supplied)

Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]

NATURE OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine
the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:

"It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the
official vested by law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service Commission. The
Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in this case,
the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Under the Civil
Service Law, Presidential Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the
discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of the appointment to be extended."

Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is
qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required
of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide.
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It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of another officer or
body, like the Commission on Appointments under 1935 Constitution. Appointments made by the President of
the Philippines had to be confirmed by that body and could not be issued or were invalidated without such
confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was then considered part of the
appointing process, which was held complete only after such confirmation.

Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of the appointment and had the power
to refuse to concur with it even if the President's choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No
similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission
is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all
the required conditions laid down by the law.

Pobre vs. Mendieta [G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993]

THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE POINT THAT THE OFFICER LOSES
THE DISCRETION. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the
position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that
would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners —
"all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for
the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate
Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he
deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the
selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that
agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to avoid it.

"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning where the language of a statute is
of doubtful meaning, or where an adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity,
or contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction may arise when the
consequence of a literal interpretation of the language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable, or
mischievous result, or one at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole; and the real
meaning of the statute is to be ascertained and declared, even though it seems to conflict with
the words of the statute." (82 CJS 589-590; Emphasis supplied.)

Section 17

Drilon vs. Lim [G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTROL AND SUPERVISION. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both
of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute
his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set
aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He
did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in
his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely
this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Villena vs. Secretary of Interior [G.R. No. 46570, April 21, 1939]

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY. After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the
contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the
presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization
established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
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and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and
is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not
plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in
an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-
General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads
of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated
otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.
S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but
the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As
a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President,
then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a
department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at
pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be
answerable for the acts of administration of the entire executive Department before his own conscience no less
than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last
repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of
government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system
unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of judicial
interpretation or construction.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño [G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967]

THE PRESIDENT CAN REVOKE THE ACTS OF DEPARTMENT HEADS. Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The
President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive
departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them;
his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then
is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department
secretary.

Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the
President. This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as
approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's on appeal. In other cases,
failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of
the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.

Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of
control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."

This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary.

2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power.
The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control
may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act
personally upon the matter.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person.10 Not as
correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person.11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The President
is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of
the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained
recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.12
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3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads,
no higher than anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department head, on the
pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another
department secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the
Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision
is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be
accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so.
Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act
of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or reprobation is even
intimated in the record of this case.

City of Iligan vs. Director of Lands [G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988]

POWERS CONFERRED TO HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS MAY BE EXERCISED DIRECTLY BY

THE PRESIDENT. Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive control among others in the lease,
sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate control
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the
President of the Philippines has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., the
President of the Philippines has therefore the same authority to dispose of portions of the public domain as his
subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Such power of the President is recognized under Section 69 aforecited of the Public Land Act as it provides:

"Sec. 69. Whenever any province, municipality, or other branch or subdivision of the
Government shall need any portion of the land of the public domain open to concession for
educational, charitable, or others similar purposes, the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may execute contracts in favor of the same, in
the form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form, under terms, and conditions to be
inserted in the contract; but land to be granted shall in no case be encumbered or alienated,
except when the public service requires their being leased or exchanged, with the approval of the
President, for other lands belonging to private parties, or if the Congress disposes otherwise."

From the foregoing provision it is clear that the President of the Philippines may execute contracts in favor of
any province, municipality or other branch or subdivision of the government who shall need any portion of the
land of the public domain open to concession for educational, charitable or other similar purposes, in the form
of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form.

Gascon vs. Arroyo [G.R. No. 78389, October 16, 1989]

ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (also known as
the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the
parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the
Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of
Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. In other words, the
Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the heads of such departments, performed in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the "Agreement to
Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he
signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party
thereto.

Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez [G.R. No. 85439, January 13, 1992]

CONTROL AND SUPERVISION. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to
him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c)
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities
in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1)
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generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and
cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with
policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-
administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to
them.

Ang-Angco vs. Castillo [G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963]

POWER OF CONTROL APPLIES ONLY TO THE ACT AND NOT TO THE ACTOR. The extent of the power of
control given to the President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive department
was interpreted by this Court in the case of Hebron vs. Reyes 104 Phil., 175 to mean "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter", to distinguish it from the power of general
supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to
remove an officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely applies to the exercise of control
over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act.

National Marketing Corp. vs. Arca [G.R. No. L-25743, September 30, 1969]

PRESIDENT’S CONTROL POWER COVERS GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS. Petitioners, however, disagree, and contend that the word "offices," interpreted in the light
of the preceding words "executive departments," and "bureaus," refers to offices performing governmental
functions which have no juridical personality, and, therefore, does not include government-owned and
controlled corporations. They claim that the above-quoted constitutional provision is not applicable and that
what should apply is Section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345, (NAMARCO Charter) which vests in the General
Manager the power and/or duty, with the approval of the Board of Directors, to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline for cause any subordinate employee of the NAMARCO. They contend that in reversing the order of
the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from the service, and in ordering his
reinstatement, the President of the Philippines arrogated unto himself a power not authorized either by the
Constitution or by law, hence his actuations were legally ineffective and certainly could not be a basis for
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

We hold that the President of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO
Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement
falls within the constitutional power of the President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Under our governmental setup, corporations owned or controlled by the government, such as the NAMARCO,
partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are administratively supervised by the
Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of
an Executive Department" and who "shall be responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose
control his functions . . . shall be exercised." (Executive Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950; section 1, issued
under the Reorganization Act of 1950).

Take Care Power

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by
P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President
to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark
case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution
among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

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 It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers
inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above,
the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In
said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to
be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE,
PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no
changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent
just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

Section 18

Guazon vs. De Villa [G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990]

AREAL ZONING OR SATURATION DRIVES MAY BE ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS
MILITARY POWERS. There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill
of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal
elements, such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected
by such actions.

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by
the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming
communist activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties
are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible
methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of
influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the
least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing
features.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]

COURT MARTIAL PERTAINS TO THE PRESIDENT IN EXERCISE OF HIS MILITARY POWERS. Courts
martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has
been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently
122
of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a
portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution
authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil
jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: 'These provisions show that
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner
then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection
between it and the 3d Article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed that
the two powers are entirely independent of each other.'

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the
executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.'
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents; 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these
courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to
aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.).

Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 [G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987]

COURT MARTIALS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS. Due process of law demands that in
all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be
entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in
relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system. As explained by Justice Teehankee in his separate dissenting opinion —

". . . Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled
to trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process.

"Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which
have 'exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or
property of a citizen.'

"Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on
the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by
the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning. . . .

"And in Toth v. Quarles, the U.S. Supreme Court further stressed that 'the assertion of military
authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any
theory of martial law.'

"The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out . . ., in ruling that discharged army veterans
(estimated to number more than 22.5 million) could not be rendered 'helpless before some
latter-day revival of old military charges' and subjected to military trials for offenses committed
while they were in the military service prior to their discharge, that 'the presiding officer at a
court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and
undiminished salary and nurture by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer.
Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these
differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by
the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides and who usually
has direct command authority over its members is a pervasive one in military law, despite
strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.'

"The late Justice Black . . . added that '(A) Court-Martial is not yet an independent instrument of
justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the over-all mechanism by which
military discipline is preserved,' and that ex servicemen should be given 'the benefits of a civilian
court trial when they are actually civilians . . . Free countries of the world have tried to restrict
military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among troops in active service.' "

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief
to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his
orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers
underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the
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duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily
a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as
they do so today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by
the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the
civilian concerned.

Quiloña vs. General Court Martial [G.R. No. 96607, March 4, 1992]

COURT MARTIALS DO NOT APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE. Republic Act
No. 6975, creating the Philippine National Police (PNP), which took effect on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC.
46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the
courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who
have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178,
otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP
members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."

Gudani vs. Senga [G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]

SANLAKAS vs. Reyes [G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004]

CALLING OUT POWER. The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power.
The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"

Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief
powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President. . . ." As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: "He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed." The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.

The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad
enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the
presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the
means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of
the State.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is
an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the
perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Court's mandate is to probe only into the
legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is
with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At
any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to
constitutional rights."

For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests
are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing
the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'" In other words, a
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person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has
declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.

It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine
the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised
within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore,
is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals
have replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have taken over the functions of
civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the
President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has
attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.

Section 19

Torres vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987]

A CONDITION IN THE GRANT OF PARDON THAT THE PARDONEE SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY OTHER
LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE CONVICTION BEFORE THE PARDON MAY BE WITHDRAWN. It may be
emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent
offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment
of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a
pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the
criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be
made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.

Monsanto vs. Factoran [G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989]

PARDON EXTENDED AND ACCEPTED WHILE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS ON APPEAL

RESULTS IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE APPEAL. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from
the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance.

At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973
Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:

"The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardon, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant
amnesty."

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction,
implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was
granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in
the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal
and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

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EFFECTS OF PARDON. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the
disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say,
however, that the offender is a `new man', and `as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;' is to
ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted
criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may
regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints
upon him following his conviction."

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

People vs. Salle, Jr. [G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995]

INSTANCES WHEN A CONVICTION BECOMES FINAL. Where the pardoning power is subject to the
limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is,
of course, entirely different where the requirement is '"final conviction," as was mandated in the original
provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently
prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before
a judgment of conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (C) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving
his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained
finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

THE GRANT OF PARDON WHILE THE APPEAL IS PENDING DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A WITHDRAWAL
OF THE APPEAL. It must, nevertheless, be noted that the constitutional provision quoted is that of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, which authorized the exercise of the pardoning power at anytime, either before or
after conviction. Also, in Monsanto vs. Factoran, this Court stated that the acceptance of a pardon amounts to
an abandonment of an appeal, rendering the conviction final; thus:

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon
final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus,
petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High
Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final
conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not
material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would
still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her
appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

This statement should not be taken as a guiding rule for it is nothing but an obiter dictum. Moreover, the
pardon involved therein was extended on 17 December 1984 or under the regime of Section 11, Article VII of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which allowed the grant of pardon either before or after conviction.

The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement, reviving in
effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by
Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the
judicial power.

Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court. A becoming
regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be
fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by
final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court,
extend executive clemency to any one whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential
mercy. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power which did no require conviction, the President had unimpeded power to grant pardon even
before the criminal case could be heard. And under the 1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the
power could be exercised at any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either
case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of
administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the
President is not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a

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presidential folly. Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in the imposition of
"conviction by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. The new Constitution did it.

Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal,
i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.

Garcia vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993]

THE GRANT OF PARDON ON THE GROUND THAT THE PARDONEE IS INNOCENT OF THE CHARGE
RESULTS IN THE OBLITERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. Time and again this Court has
unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual to whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have
firmly established the general rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence
of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it
does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees
the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited
by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and
makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a
person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all
punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from
the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very
same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of
proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him.
Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of
executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This
can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and
thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that
petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to
afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a
result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the
executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those who
have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges
against them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him
to back wages.

Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any criminal conviction that
carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct consequence of an administrative
decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of
control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter." In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief
Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative
liability. The separation of the petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.

Sabello vs. DECS [G.R. No. 87687, December 26, 1989]

THE GRANT OF PARDON, AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF THE PARDONEE TO THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE SHOULD ENTITLE THE PARDONEE TO HIS FORMER POSITION. As a general
rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position is a matter of
discretion of the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been
unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the
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petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered
with fairness and justice.

As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be sued, the only answer is
that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by
considering this a suit against the officials of this government agency.

In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the service as a classroom teacher by
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he
be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom
teacher.

However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since
in Monsanto this Court said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated
from the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had been
duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.

In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made continuous from September 10,
1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get
the appropriate retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom teacher.

Llamas vs. Orbos [G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991]

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY MAY BE EXTENDED TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES. Moreover, applying the

doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other
words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII,
Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of executive clemency in
administrative cases.

Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, . . ., the President may commute or remove administrative
penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and
conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service."

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of deliberations was the proposed
amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows: "However, the power to grant executive clemency for
violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation." The Constitutional Commission, however,
voted to remove the amendment, since it was in derogation of the powers of the President. As Mr. Natividad
stated:

"I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the President. In case
of other criminals convicted in our society we extend probation to them while in this case, they
have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is
through this executive clemency extended to them by the President. If we still close this avenue
to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious killers in
our society. . . ."

The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however,
the Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents and refrained from putting additional
limitations on his clemency powers. (II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-525)

It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive
clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that
is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C,
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Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged
guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt,
but the Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the
process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility
of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in
criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if
the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a
decision to subserve the interest of the public. (p. 34, Comment of public respondent)

We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.

Section 21

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading [G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS DO NOT NEED THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE. The Court of Tax
Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to be implemented by Executive
Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement.
The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties"
(Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however, distinct and different from
"executive agreements", which may be validly entered into without such concurrence.

"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress.

". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of
these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.

"Agreements with respect to the registration of trade-marks have been concluded by the
Executive with various countries under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502).
Postal conventions regulating the reciprocal treatment of mail matters, money orders, parcel
post, etc., have been concluded by the Post-master General with various countries under
authorization by Congress beginning with the Act of February 20, 1792 (I Stat. 232, 239). Ten
executive agreements were concluded by the President pursuant to the McKinley Tariff Act of
1890 (26 Stat. 567, 612), and nine such agreements were entered into under the Dingley Tariff
Act of 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203, 214). A very much larger number of agreements, along the lines of
the one with Rumania previously referred to, providing for most-favored-nation treatment in
customs and related matters have been entered into since the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922,
not by direction of the Act but in harmony with it.

"International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature usually take the form of executive agreements.

"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval." (39 Columbia
Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304,
81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L.
ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 1905-1906; California Law
Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405,
1416-1418; Willoukhby on the U.S. Constitutional Law, Vol. I [2d. ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore,
International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp.
390-407). (Emphasis supplied.)

In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work on
"The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts":
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 "Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated 'agreements' or
'protocols'. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from
time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-
agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in
character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to
refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the
approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues,
income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter,
such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims
against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation." (39 Columbia
Law Review, pp. 651, 755.)

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005]

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority
in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the
President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. 13 In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to
the treaties entered into by the executive.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a
check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the
treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance
necessary in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the
power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.

We disagree.

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration
and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the
agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task
to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as
full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It
is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which,
together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even
"collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under
consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for
signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for
the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate
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 the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document
is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is
allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable
the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to
refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that
most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government
other than that which negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification,
which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed
upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in
the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature. [emphasis supplied]

Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It
should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in
the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the
state's authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by
which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held
to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No.
459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of
international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the
Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department
of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the
President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall
submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department
of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section 7 of Executive
Order No. 459 reads:

Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement.
— The domestic requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or
any amendment thereto, shall be as follows:

A. Executive Agreements.

i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs after
their signing for the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall include
the highlights of the agreements and the benefits which will accrue to the Philippines
arising from them.

ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned
agency, shall transmit the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his
ratification. The original signed instrument of ratification shall then be returned to the
Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action.

B. Treaties.

i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements provided
in sub-paragraph[s] 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition,
the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the
Philippines for concurrence in the ratification by the President. A certified true copy of
the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate, together with a certified
true copy of the ratification instrument, shall accompany the submission of the treaties
to the Senate.

ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall
comply with the provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.

Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty
which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It
is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the
signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory
states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a
State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of
such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state's representative, the President, being accountable to the
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people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure
that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even
after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of
states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held
that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries.
There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on
substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified
in taking offense.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the
signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1

Santiago vs. Bautista [G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970]

NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER. The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really
the said committee of teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal board, or officer exercising
judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer
be necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:

"In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed
by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the
nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari
may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must
be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought
before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and
obligations.

'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are
brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or
judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims,
and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand — for the tribunal must decide according to
law and the rights of the parties — or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must
exercise its own judgment under the laws and not act under a mandate from another power . . .
The character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial,
ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the country or State,
as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100
Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)

'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is,
and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W.
772-773.)

(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the
power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy
construing and applying the laws to that end.

'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to
all cases. The term has been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons
or property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party
thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the
declaration of what the law is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or
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 power vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or
persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing
an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as
such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of
persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the
mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and determining
cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the
power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and
protects the right and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the
law. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has
judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and
determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.' (34 C.J.
1183-1184.)

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which
belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department.

". . . the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult
to point out What is a judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by
which it is performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be
had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of government. In the discharge of
executive and legislative duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is
necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to
make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must
be the exercise of discretion and judgment within the subdivision of the sovereign power which
belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-
named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is not seems
to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove
Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of Philadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.), pp. 321, 328-329.) [Emphasis
supplied] 1

" 'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely
to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the
decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. It is
clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or
body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically
judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is
sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their
decision, whatever may be their public character . . .'

"In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were
made:

'The precise line of demarcation between what are judicial and what are administrative or
ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may
involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the
law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.' "

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor
whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the
performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decisions cited, it will be gleaned that
before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed
With power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that
provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them
for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been
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appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools
appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the
performance of that committee's duties.

Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. Nos. 86540-41, November 6, 1989]

THE CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO DEFINE THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF
JUSTICE. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not
impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the
legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued Proclamation
No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the
purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality
of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out "the expeditious disposition and
privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof" (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being
inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained
operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).

While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation of powers
set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of the
Government is limited only to the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
(by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in the performance
of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgment for that
of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when
it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or
without jurisdiction.

Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr. [G.R. No. 86695, September 3, 1992]

LAWS WHICH PREVENT COURTS FROM ISSUING RESTRAINING ORDERS OR INJUNCTIONS ARE
VALID BUT MAY ONLY APPLY TO CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING FACTS OR THE EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION IN TECHNICAL CASES. In the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, this Court interpreted a
similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court
observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of
this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising
their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies
such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by
the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex
Q of the private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been "100%
completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction moot and academic.

PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955]

PROPER PARTY. "It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has
sustained or his interest common to all members of the public." (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)

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"Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law" upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs.
Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)

"The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use
of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being
insufficient." (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)

"Bona fide suit. — Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to
pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
litigants." (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)

JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins
vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)

An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. (Salonga vs.
Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest therein however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the
issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid
decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv.
Rep., May 23, 1955, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. We cannot

entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge
the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would
be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority [G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993]

REQUISITIES OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY. It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful
judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be
raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the
resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. A proper party is one
who has sustained or is in danger or sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of.

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no
actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is
filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections
of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."

Joya vs. PCGG [G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993]

LEGAL STANDING. The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case
or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on
135
the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most
important are the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that
all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who
has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a
public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]

Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]

Bugnay Construction & Devt. Corp. vs. Laron [G.R. No. 79983, August 10, 1989]

Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994]

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. [G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995]

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]

Kilosbayan vs. Morato [G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995]

Lozada vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-59068, January 27, 1983]

Section 3

Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]

THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT CANNOT BE EXERCISED TO DEPRIVE THE SUPREME COURT
OF ITS FISCAL AUTONOMY. There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt
to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by
Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

Sec. 3 Art. VIII mandates that:

"SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may
not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released."

We cannot overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on various
past occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA
294 [1982], it ruled:

"It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed
with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials,
it has to grant them either expressly or implicitly certain powers. These they exercise not for
their own benefit but for the body politic . . .
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 "A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative.
The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently . . . It is an added guarantee that justices
and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence.
Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law
and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance
transcending that of a purely personal right." (At pp. 338-339).

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and play plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but
DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us,
the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution
but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The
freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary
must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

Section 4

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996]

THE COMPOSITION OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IS AN INTERNAL MATTER WHICH
COULD NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY CAUSE OF ACTION. What petitioner bewails the most is the present
composition of the Third Division which deliberated on private respondents' motions for reconsideration and
by a majority vote reversed the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner
questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly
rams its idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief
Justice Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the Third Division by
Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to state that the change in the membership of the three
divisions of the Court with inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is
purely an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In fact, the current
"staggered" set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar to that adopted in 1988. In the year, the
Court's Third Division was likewise chaired by then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions
were headed by the next senior Justices — Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.

Section 5

Drilon vs. Lim [G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994]

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANY LAW,
BUT TRIAL COURTS ARE ADVISED TO BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT IN NULLIFYING LAWS. We stress at the
outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
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jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even
as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of
Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in
mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the
doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the
executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to
the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated
in its discussion.

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the requipped majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty
it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

Larranaga vs. CA [G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998]

THE POWER TO CHANGE VENUE AND PLACE OF TRIAL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION. As regards petitioner's motion to change the venue and the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation, we are constrained to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a
preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive Department and not of the Judiciary. Petitioner should
therefore address their plea to the Department of Justice that has control and supervision over the conduct of
preliminary investigations.

Bustos vs. Lucero [G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948]

Separate Opinion

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT

WHICH CANNOT BE WITHHELD BY THE SUPREME COURT BY VIRTUE OF ITS RULE MAKING POWER.
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights." The Constitution added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in
order to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or promulgate
substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are
substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be
confronted with and cross- examine the witnesses for the prosecution in preliminary investigation as well as in
the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a person is not
prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict him,
and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-
examination. It is a substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no
evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that
there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is
entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the
trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a
criminal prosecution always entails.

This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused outside of the City of Manila
because of the usual delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such
right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of
the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the Court of First
Instance of said city. But this right, though not a constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or
diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the
Constitution.

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases, (in which the question
of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right
138
under discussion, it follows that said section diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case,
and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

THE RULES OF COURT WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER LAWS REGULATING PROCEDURES OF
COURTS. The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the
former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased
by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent
correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter
portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its
constitutional rule-making powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those arising from
procedural law:

"Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes
those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations
(60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their
invasion."

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought
pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In
other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and
continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to
respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did
not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of
Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or
decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to
appeal from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by
statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is
preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . .," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial
agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly,
BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final
decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National
Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by
statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of
Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground
that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91,
which is but implementary of said law.

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the
BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be
brought to the Court of Appeals.

Aruelo vs. CA [G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993]

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION CANNOT PROMULGATE RULES GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE COURTS OF JUSTICE. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not
applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to
proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

"SEC. 2. Applicability. — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and
proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo
warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction."

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the
regular courts.

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Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is
vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of
particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least
five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private
respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-
Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.

Javellana vs. DILG [G.R. No. 102549, August 10, 1992]

REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRING THE ELECTIVE

OFFICERS TO SEEK AUTHORITY FIRST BEFORE EXERCISING A PROFESSION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT. Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's
power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those
instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly
provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is
because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of
public service.

Section 6

Maceda vs. Vasquez [G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993]

COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES MUST BE REFERRED FIRST TO THE SUPREME COURT BY VIRTUE OF
THE COURTS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER THEM. Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap
that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies
his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code
for his felonious act.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution,
for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has
the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
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The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us
is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him,
report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved
by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution
of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Raquiza vs. Castañeda, Jr. [A.M. No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]

IN ADMISNISTRATIVE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IS

PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the
respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented
against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent
belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and
based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule
where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

Section 7

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007]

Section 10

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]

SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ARE SUBJECT TO TAX. Besides, construing Section 10,
Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased." (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction
to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon
the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed
in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of
the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations
of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining
the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

Section 11

De la Llana vs. Alba [G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982]

DISSOLUTION OF OFFICE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE DICIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OVER JUDGES. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
There was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this
Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. "Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with
141
such power. Removal is, of course, to be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the stand-point of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the Judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted
and that its view be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been
put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be
in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The
principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must
be applied.

People vs. Gacott, Jr. [G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995]

NOT ALL DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROCEEDINGS NEED TO BE HEARD EN BANC. At any rate, the very
text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged
therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will
hereafter be explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated
from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the
full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February
9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the
Amendment and/or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:

For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of
the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.

This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision was
maintained.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty
of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for
the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court of the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in
divisions of three, five or seven members.

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically
required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation
of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be
decided in division.

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It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89
which clarifies that:

2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the
Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).

That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the
same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations
like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.

Section 12

In re Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]

Section 13

Prudential Bank vs. Castro [A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION THAT

THE CASE HAS BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION DOES NOT APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES.
The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of
certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification
requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal
certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very
nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in
AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an
oversight.

But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision
were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in
the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a
whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases,
a formal certification is obviously not required.

Section 14

Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST STATE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY
THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED IS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE
PROCESS. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it
was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.

In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife with irrelevant details,
castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance must
be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual
findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and, having done so, ends.

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. It is important to observe at this point that the
constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for
postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of
the trial court resolving incidental matters." As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already
observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that —

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 The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as
final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual
in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in
accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always
gives the legal basis.

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.

DISMISSAL ON LACK OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE
LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED, BUT WHEN DISMISSAL IS COUPLED WITH OTHER GROUNDS LIKE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, THE COURT MUST COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTHS. It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a
judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this
established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of
lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is invoked.

A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of
jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale.
Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced
by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It
did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had
been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should
not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a
judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.

Mendoza vs. CFI [G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973]

MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL

REQUIREMENT OF STATEMENT OF FACTS AND LAW. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for
reconsideration objecting to our dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that
there should be an extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision
requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, what is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision
rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is
there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness.
The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no
sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what
the Constitution directs." What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early case of
Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous
presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its
disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, the above decision was cited with
approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as
another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it
is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions of
the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."

It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is subjected to
a searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution
of petitioner. Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisional liberty. Under the circumstances, as
the facts of the case clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt that a minute
resolution which certainly would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely,
the leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion
that the decision arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they
are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way,
foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the
constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a minute resolution certainly
cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional command.

Borromeo vs. CA [G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990]

MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. The Court reminds all lower courts,
lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final
and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where
144
the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing
the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382, 417
[1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of
a case" (Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly,
discharge its constitutional functions. The Court ordinarily acts on the incidents or basic merits of three
hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases through its three Divisions every Monday and Wednesday when
the Divisions meet and on one hundred (100) to one hundred twenty (120) cases every Tuesday and Thursday
that it meets en banc or around one thousand (1,000) cases a week. It is only on Fridays and week-ends that
the members of the Court work in their separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in
session — either in Divisions or En Banc.

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the
Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on
their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the
deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix
Gravante, et al.", where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court
denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is
denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions."

In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court
clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional
provision which states that, "No petition for review . . . shall be refused due course . . . without stating the legal
basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any
subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or
for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.

MINUTE RESOLUTION DOES NOT NEED TO BE SIGNED BY THE JUSTICES NOR TO CONTAIN A
CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 13, ART VIII. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the
members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the
Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay
the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly
performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the
formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the
Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing
number of cases coming to it. Remedial legislation to meet this problem is also pending in Congress.

In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and attention of its Clerks of Court and
other key officials. Its officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants
questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the
Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its subordinate
personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be
made to answer for acts of the Court.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998]

MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, it has been stressed that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and
the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' decision.

This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission on Audit, et al. that
the constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after
the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with
145
the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised "are
factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA [G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998]

MEMORANDUM DECISION IS ALLOWED UNDER THIS JURISDICTION. The constitutional mandate that
no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v.
Permskul, this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati did
not transgress the requirements of Section 14 Article VIII of the Constitution:

"MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts
reference the findings conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the
same.

"WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto." (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of Romero v. Court of Appeals,
where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of
Agrarian Relations in this wise:

"We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and
We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings
and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We
hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a spread in
its decision, as integral part of this Our decision." (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome
reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is
particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts
and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced
pages.

THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION APPLY ONLY TO PHILIPPINE COURTS, BUT NOT
TO FOREIGN COURTS. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily
affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that matters of
remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the
procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the
arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign
court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary
docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because
our rules provide otherwise.

Francisco vs. Permskul [G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989]

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF MEMORANDUM DECISIONS. It is clear that where the decision
of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is
not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum
decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of
fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose
is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower court
may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body
of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted
anyway.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a condition for the
proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate
the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that
the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum
146
decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the
law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower
court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which
it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply
with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it
become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as
ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed
to dismiss it.

Valdez vs. CA [G.R. No. 85082, February 25, 1991]

THE DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY MAKE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, BUT SHOULD STATE THE FACTS
AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW. This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the
Rules as a clear and distinct statement of the facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing
one-paragraph statement constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court without
stating the facts which serve as the basis thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not
registered the sale to them is traversed by the records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered
the sale to them. The court statement in the decision that a party has proven his case while the other has not, is
not the findings of facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.

Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed decision. It merely adopted the
alleged findings of facts of the trial court. Although it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in
favor of respondent Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance with the
mandate aforestated.

As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts on
which it is predicated. This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the
factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the
Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the
disposition of the case by remanding the records for further proceedings.

ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 6

Aruelo vs. CA [G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993]

THE COMELEC CANNOT ADOPT RULES THAT MAY BE APPLIED TO PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
COURTS OF LAW. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the Regional Trial
Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the
regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the
COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

"SEC. 2. Applicability. — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and
proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo
warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction."

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the
regular courts.
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Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is
vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Section 7

Cua vs. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. L-80519-21, December 17, 1987]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE PROVIDING DECISION BY MAJORITY OF EACH COMMISSION APPLIES

TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND IN DIVISION DESPITE ANY RULE OF THE
COMMISSION TO THE CONTRARY. After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the
Court holds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section
7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a
majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under
the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited
decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of Representatives.

It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seemingly interminable debates on this
matter that have been festering for quite some time now not only in this case but also in other cases still
pending in the COMELEC. The indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and application of
its own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our people who remain unrepresented to date
in the House of Representatives despite the fact that the congressional elections were held more than seven
months ago.

Acena vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 90780, February 6, 1991]

DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
THROUGH PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT. The
proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the resolution of public respondent Civil Service
Commission is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of said rules. Although Rule 65 does not provide for a period, the petition for certiorari
assailing the resolution of the Civil Service Commission should be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the resolution as provided under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. (Pacis v. Secretary of Science
and Technology, G.R. No. 89165, August 10, 1989). Error in the title of the petition is a defect in form that may
be disregarded as it does not affect the merits of the case. Considering the jurisdictional issue raised in this
petition, we consider the same as a special civil action under Rule 65.

DECISIONS OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD MAY BE APPEALED TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE DECISION OR RESOLUTION. Based on the
above provisions of law, the decision of the MSPB is appealable to the Civil Service Commission within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the copy thereof. Perfection of the appeal within the prescribed period is jurisdictional
so that the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory (De Los Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83927, June 28, 1989; Andaya et al. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
73726-28, August 2, 1990). Moreover, the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail
himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost
(Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83281, December 4, 1989).

Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service Commission has the jurisdiction to review the decision of the
MSPB. However, said authority to review can only be exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of
the MSPB has filed an appeal with the Commission within the reglementary period.

Here, it is admitted by public respondent Commission and not disputed by private respondent Estolas that the
petition for review which can be considered as an appeal from the decision of the MSPB dated March 23, 1988
was filed outside the reglementary period. This being so, the public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction when
it entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with the Office of the President. Having exceeded its
jurisdiction public respondent committed a reversible error when it set aside the order dated March 23, 1988 of
the MSPB which had long become final and executory. Final decision or orders of the MSPB is an adjudication
on the merits conclusive on the parties, hence, it can no longer be subject to review (San Luis, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989).

Vital-Gozon vs. CA [G.R. No. 101428, August 5, 1992]

THE COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COERCIVE WRITS FOR THE EXECUTION OF ITS
DECISIONS. Now, final and executory judgments are enforced by writ of execution and not by another,
separate action, whether of mandamus or otherwise. Hence, execution of the Civil Service Commission's
decision of August 9, 1988 should have been ordered and effected by the Commission itself, when de la Fuente
filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so, however, on the alleged ground, as de la Fuente claims he was told,
148
that it "had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to enforce its final decisions/resolutions." That
proposition, communicated to de la Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its
final judgments, is incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous acts of the Commission of actually directing
execution of its decisions and resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several cases; and it is not in
truth a correct assessment of its powers under the Constitution and the relevant laws.

In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938 entitled "Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service Commission, et al.," this Court declared that in light of the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and relevant statutes —

" . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to
enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it
has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried
out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to
enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this
Court in several cases."

Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal to execute its final and
executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended proceedings have taken place in the Court of Appeals and
certain issues have been expressly raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issues appear to the Court to be
important enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead of simply being given short shrift by a
terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court of Appeals were totally unnecessary because the Civil Service
Commission actually had the power to execute its final and executory Resolution.

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer [G.R. No. L-31455, February 28, 1985]

FINAL ORDERS AND DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS WHICH ARE REVIEWABLE BY
THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI ARE THOSE RENDERED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-
JUDIACIAL POWER. We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract
to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid
comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on
certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections
may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are
inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.

We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an
order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and
presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was
issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC
resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-
judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Mateo vs. CA [G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995]

APPEAL OF THE DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SHALL BE FILED WITH THE COURT
OF APPEALS. Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, 10 and Rule II, section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of
private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the
Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. So we held
in Mancita v. Barcinas, viz:

"[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Civil Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved
thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

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 within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. We quote.

'SECTION 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.'

The Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil
service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment."

Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the
present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
employees covered y the Civil Service Law.

Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95

1. Scope. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government
Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments and Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission.

2. Cases Not Covered. — These rules shall not apply to judgments and final orders or resolutions
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3. Where to Appeal. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.

4. Period of Appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for
its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance
with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which
to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and
in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.

B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 2

Trade Union of the Phils. and Allied Services vs. National Housing Corp. [G.R. No. 49677, May 4, 1989]

ONLY GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL OR LEGISLATIVE

CHARTERS ARE COVERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE. The rule, however, was modified in the 1987
Constitution, the corresponding provision whereof declares that "(t)he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."

Consequently, the civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original or
legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated
under and pursuant to a general legislation. As We recently held —

". . . , the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by this Court in
the National Housing Corporation case . . . appear relegated to relative insignificance by the
1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not
include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law."

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GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS FOR PURPOSES
ALLOWED BY LAW, BUT MAY NOT ENGAGE IN STRIKE. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly
have the right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is
now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill
of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."

This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human
Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. . . ."

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section
2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees." The rationale of and justification for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid
provision was explained by its proponents, as follows:

". . . The government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that respect,
it must be held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does
perform a mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word except that terms
and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the
biggest employer in the Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship and we all
know that the accumulated grievances of several decades are now beginning to explode in our
faces among government workers who feel that the rights afforded by the Labor Code, for
example, to workers in the private sector have been effectively denied to workers in government
in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the equal protection of the laws. For example,
. . . there were many occasions under the old government when wages and cost of living
allowances were granted to workers in the private sector but denied to workers in the
government for some reason or another, and the government did not even state the reasons
why. The government employees were being discriminated against. As a general rule, the
majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions. What they really add up to
is that the employees of the government form their own association. Generally, they do not
bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where,
among other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted and encouraged. They
also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed,
generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization
that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it.

De los Santos vs. Mallare [G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950]

“FOR CAUSE” AS A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF SERVICES OF A CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL
MUST BE ONE RECOGNIZED BY LAW AND NOT DEPENDENT ON THE WILL OF THE OFFICER. The
Constitution leaves it to the Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that the
President's pleasure is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers has
acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as
sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of
those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the cause must relate to and affect the
administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public.

POSITIONS EXEMPTED FROM THE MERIT SYSTEM. As has been seen, three specified classes of positions
— policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and
dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These
positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other
positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the
service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer
that makes them.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of
a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor
is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for
the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to
the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him by section 2557 of the
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Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is
technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe,
employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose
technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer
are eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non- technical men possessing
executive ability.

Salazar vs. Mathay [G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976]

TWO MODES OF DETERMINING WHETHER A POSITION IS PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL. The crux of the
problem in this appeal hinges on the nature of the position held by the petitioner in the Office of the Auditor,
GSIS — whether it is primarily confidential or not. If it is, then her services as confidential agent can be
terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power. There are two instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the
absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists "close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." In the case before Us,
the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ". . . confidential agents in the several departments and
offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential" brings
within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential. Since the position of the petitioner
falls under the first category of primarily confidential positions, it is no longer necessary to inquire into the
nature of the functions attached to the office in order to determine whether her position is primarily
confidential or not. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination
of her services as confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS is in violation of her security of tenure. In
the case of Delos Santos vs. Mallari, supra, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system,
and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution, although in Ingles vs.
Mutuc, this assumption was held to be inaccurate. According to the Court, the proper expression to be used is
that the term of the incumbent merely expires. Thus in said case, the Court held:

"This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however,
that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed"
from office — his "term" merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right
thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is
not and cannot be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom upon the expiration of said
term. The main difference between the former — the primarily confidential officer — and the
latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but
indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when
the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this even takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office — his term has
merely "expired."

Corpus vs. Cuaderno [G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965]

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF SERVICES OF PERSONNEL

WHO ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as
private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only
as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is
different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution
clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence
rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental
charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or
engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an
economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be removable at
any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical man worthy of the name would
be willing to accept work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that
highly technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at the humor of their
superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical positions will have to be filled by incompetents
and yes- men, who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to carry favor with the
powerful. The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of
merit, would be thus negated.

Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]

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APPROVAL OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IS MERELY AN ATTESTATION
OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE APPOINTEE. Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an
attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we
have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to
assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide.

THE COMMISSION CANNOT REVOKE THE APPOINTMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THERE ARE
BETTER QUALIFIED THAN THE APPOINTEE. Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged
that both the petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That
recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to
affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA [G.R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995]

SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION OF THE REQUIRED SERVICE ELIGIBILITY DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY

CONVERT THE APPOINTMENT TO A PERMANENT. Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the
time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an
appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his
appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of
the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment
as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary
appointment into a permanent one. In cases such as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment
since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority.

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE THE APPOINTMENT ITSELF. The foregoing is a clear
arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing authority. Time and again, the Court has defined the
parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service
Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled that CSC has the power to approve or
disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct
the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the
eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the
appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after that function is
discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. In the case at bench, CSC should have ended its
participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary
status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication
on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion
vested solely upon the latter.

SSS Employees Association vs. CA [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MAY FORM UNIONS, BUT MAY NOT STRIKE. The 1987 Constitution, in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the
public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-
Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[t]he right of
the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution

153
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to
strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to
form associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now
then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising
government functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the
union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic
Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the government-owned and
controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our
honorable Vice-President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this
resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that
subject is now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a
solution to this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we allow anybody
in the government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go
on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of
discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization
does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p.
569].

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D.
442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising
governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:

Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof,
are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall
not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary
functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of employees of
government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and
those in the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its
amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment of all government employees, including employees of government owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276].
Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for such are
excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the
matter.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize,
the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may
be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employees . . . enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus
cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be
stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].

The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No.
60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers
in the private sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:
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The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions of employment in the
Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11,
the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the
terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment.
And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public employer and the
peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private
industry as not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service, and
that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the
relations between government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees,
while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:

SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that
are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in
the public sector, to wit:

SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees.
In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under
existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector
Labor-Management] Council for appropriate action.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for
the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If
there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the
Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

Section 7

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]

THE EXCEPTIONS IN SECTION 7, PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE IX-B OF THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT
APPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND THEIR
DEPUTIES AND ASSISTANTS. The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of
the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for
easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries."

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We rule in the negative.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing
bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of
newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by
presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have
remained up to the present time.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous
public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of
multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. This
condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary
Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and
Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision,
Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences,
among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized
under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary,
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this
Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited.

Flores vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993]

ELECTIVE OFFICERS CANNOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE OR POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT

UNLESS THEY RESIGN FIRST. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off
the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The
deliberation in the Constitutional Commission is enlightening:

"MR. DAVIDE.
On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term" with TENURE.
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"MR. FOZ.
The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign from his position.

"MR. DAVIDE.
Yes, we should allow that prerogative.

"MR. FOZ.
Resign from his position to accept an executive position.

"MR. DAVIDE.
Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say, incapacity, he may leave the service, but if
he is prohibited from being appointed within the term for which he was elected, we may be depriving
the government of the needed expertise of an individual."

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another
public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his
ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor
remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not
eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his
disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the
Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference between the
two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after
they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first
resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not
being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of
office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office
shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting
or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal,
130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v
Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 P
388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitution or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be
ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has
been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the
second is void (Ala. — State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445)."

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act
that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his
acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose
acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as
they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was
a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or
appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs.
Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass,
445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).

Section 8

Quimson vs. Ozaeta [G.R. No. L-8321, March 26, 1956]

WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION IS DOUBLE COMPENSATION, BUT NOT DOUBLE

APPOINTMENT. In our opinion, the present appeal can be resolved without much difficulty. Section 691 of
the Administrative Code above reproduced refers and applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful
compensation. The appointment or employment of plaintiff-appellant Quimson as agent-collector was not in
itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment and his employment as deputy
provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office,
being a municipal treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government
offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. Clerks of court are
sometimes appointed or designated as provincial sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers like plaintiff are often
appointed and designated as deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often designated to
act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations. The objection or prohibition

157
refers to double compensation and not to double appointments and performance of functions of more than one
office.

According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in some
cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government examining boards
like the bar examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government
corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not observed. This
undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had to be coursed through different offices like
the Department of Finance, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor General to the
President for approval. If the President approves the double compensation, well and good. The appointee
whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning could receive extra compensation. If it is
disapproved, then the appointment will have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was
willing to serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection. This is another proof
that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was only the double compensation that was
subject to objection. The trouble was that plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the
action to be taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the
appointment had to go through.

C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 1

Cayetano vs. Monsod [G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991]

DEFINITION OF “PRACTICE OF LAW”. The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW
312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept
of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod ‘ past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
— verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.

Brillantes vs. Yorac [G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990]

NO MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MAY BE APPOINTED IN AN ACTING CAPACITY.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That
discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No
cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any
time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation,
will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.

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It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her
permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting
Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to
fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of
laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections
themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have
been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and
the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of
motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her
act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista
case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost
among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

Section 2

Gallardo vs. Tabamo [G.R. No. 104848, January 29, 1993]

THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ELECTION LAWS AND
REGULATIONS. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue
above posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this
Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the Constitution with
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the
assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over cases involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at
war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope
afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions."

Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180, otherwise known as the
Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947. The present Constitution and extant election laws
have further strengthened the foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present
COMELEC has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections." exercised "all
other functions . . . conferred upon it by law" and had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. and under
the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may
be provided by law," it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. That power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the
necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform such
other functions as may be provided by law."

The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and
regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:

"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." (Emphasis supplied)

The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation
into the present Constitution took into account the Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:

"Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which
the Commission lies required to enforce and administer, . . . ."

159
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant
the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further
from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may
withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on
Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest. peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the
guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following
powers:

"1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or
employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its
deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph
from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law
or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute.
Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or
remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found
guilty of such violation or failure.

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful,
libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing."

Relampagos vs. Cumba [G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995]

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS OF

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS ONLY IN AID OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION. This
being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus
Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter. It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and
Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases remains in full force and effect but only in such cases
where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion
for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner
and the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days from 1 July 1994 or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be
filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of Interim Rules Implementing
B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to
Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, or on
6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July
1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the
COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the case.
Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the
appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed
before the perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged
order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

Edding vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995]

TRIAL COURTS MAY ISSUE WRITS OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE ELECTORAL PROTEST
WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL. But notwithstanding the
aforementioned pronouncements, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when
it enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's motion for immediate execution.
Private respondent's petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction before the
COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and

160
with grave abuse of discretion in granting execution despite the filing of a notice of appeal by private
respondent within the reglementary period.

It appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent filed his notice of appeal with
the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for immediate execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably
filed within the five-day reglementary period for filing an appeal since the decision of the RTC was
promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993.

The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over
a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion for execution pending appeal was filed within the
reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the
opposing party is of no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for
immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because the court must hear and resolve it for it would
become part of the records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the
time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent
action of the opposing party.

Galido vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991]

DECISIONS OF THE COMELEC ON ELECTORAL PROTEST DECIDED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ARE FINAL, BUT THE SAME MAY BE ELEVATED TO THE SUPREME COURT THROUGH PETITION ON
CERTIORARI. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a
recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission on this matter are enlightening. Thus —

"MR. FOZ. So, the amendment is to delete the word 'inappealable.'

MR. REGALADO. Before that, on page 26, line 26, we should have a transposition because
decisions are always final, as distinguished from interlocutory orders. So, it should read:
'However, decisions, final orders or rulings,' to distinguish them from interlocutory
orders, '. . . of the Commission on Elections on municipal and barangay officials shall be
final and IMMEDIATELY executory.'

That would be my proposed amendment.

MR. FOZ. Accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. It is understood, however, that while these decisions with respect to barangay
and municipal officials are final and immediately executory and, therefore, not
appealable, that does not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

MR. FOZ. That is understood, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. At least it is on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer."

We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of
certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

People vs. Inting [G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990]

THE COMELEC HAS AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE

PROBABLE CAUSE IN A VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS, AND DOES NOT NEED THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR FOR THIS PURPOSE. In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to
investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC.

"The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute
election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in
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 bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in
relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.

From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We
perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of
the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said
authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Section 182
and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the
clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation
to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality
of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the
same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct
of elections." (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).

Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or
Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is
because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office.
(People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is no averment or
allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants
the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.

It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President
issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:

"Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in
the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant
may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

People vs. Basilla [G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989]

THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS MAY BE DEPUTIZED BY THE COMELEC TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION LAWS. The contention of private
respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be
warranted only before the elections and only to ensure free, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections,
that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Section 2 (4)
of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched and niggardly interpretation of the authority
of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the
government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an
indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The
investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the
maintenance of physical order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and
their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and
fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide
elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than
what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become deputies or agents
of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the Comelec in respect of the
particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their
delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the
Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such
authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions — e.g., suspension or removal — may be
recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly
imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department
of the Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.
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 People vs. Delgado [G.R. No. 93419-32, September 18, 1990]

WHEN THE COMELEC PROSECUTES A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS, IT IS
SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT. From the foregoing provisions of the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power
of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a
public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of
election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through
its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima
facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the
approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the
court or unless so ordered by the court.

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the
COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same
token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation,
in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary
investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.

The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct
a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the
ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.

COMELEC vs. Silva [G.R. No. 129417, February 10, 1998]

THE PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMELEC AND NOT BY
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. The ultimate question concerns the authority of the COMELEC prosecutor.
More precisely, the question is, who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal — the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor? The trial courts held the view that the Chief State
Prosecutor's decision not to appeal the dismissal of the cases, consistent with his earlier decision to leave the
determination of the existence of probable cause to the trial courts, was binding on them.

We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to
the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, §2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has held:

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to
prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is
exclusive with COMELEC.

Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the
1971 Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in Court.
The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority
from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to
oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of
the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC
after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause
for proceeding against private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and
awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to
withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in
advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of
the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the
manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the notices of appeal filed by
the COMELEC.

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Section 3

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 105628, August 6, 1992]

ALL ELECTION CONTROVERSIES MUST BE HEARD AND DECIDED FIRST BY THE DIVISION
COMMISSION ON ELECTION. It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that
election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Case and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions
of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. Rule 27 thereof
governs Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of
Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the Commission en
banc. Said Section reads:

"SEC. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A party aggrieved by an oral
ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling shall,
within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of canvassers, file
with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a copy thereof to the board of canvassers and
the adverse party.

(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the Clerk of Court concerned.

(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.

(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for hearing."
(Emphasis supplied)

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed within five (5) days
from its promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing
thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the
Commission en banc. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall calendar the motion for
reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification.

Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of
its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are
deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.

Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro [G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995]

ONLY DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT ON
CERTIORARI. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC, raises a fundamental question. He contends
that the filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the Constitution because under this provision only decisions of the
COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC "may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65. Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first file a
motion for reconsideration, it follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action.

Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition
is a question of law. This is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore,
not pure questions of law.

Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a
petition for certiorari is clear from the following provisions of the Constitution:

Art. IX, C, §2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
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 over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

Id. §3. The Commission on Elections may be sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Conformably to those provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision,
he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari."

Section 4

National Press Club vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992]

AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE MEDIA OF

COMMUNICATION. The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform
and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information
campaigns and forums among candidates."

It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction
with the Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited
period — i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity
and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have
governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status in our
constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are
not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality
of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one
may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional
rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."

The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity
arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose
of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation
may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the
operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the
applicable rule is the general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the
party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that
assertion.

Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic principles relating to
the police power of the State and the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The essential
question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise
of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The
Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.

In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of the
limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the
press are essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech
and freedom of the press Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations.

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Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation
of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods.
By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority
by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the
relevant election period.

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b)
shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a
donation, of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not
purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-
worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and
programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements
for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or
commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. We
read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.

The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that it does not restrict either the reporting of
or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any
and all candidates for office — constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case
and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. In Sanidad, the Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as follows:

"Sec. 19 Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers — During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues."

Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite mandated by R.A.
No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court
held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The Court, through Medialdea,
J., said:

". . . [N] either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be
construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2476 has no statutory basis."
(Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied).

There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11 (b). exempts from its
prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time
Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual
candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television
station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time"
or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions
materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will
have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the
Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out.
It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the
possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for there is no
power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the
Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much the same considerations
should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to bur or "procure" "Comelec
time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory
command. There is no indication, so far as the record here would show, that Comelec would not in fact carry
out its statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who
feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.

The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media
reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises.
Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal
information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any intervention and much less
control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the
content of political advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their
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respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive
government" dictating what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write
about or display on TV screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11
(b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to fora other than modern
mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media.

Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates
themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective
set out in Article IX (C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase
of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to
make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with
deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution and
Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is
designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for
political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. vs. GMA Network, Inc. [G.R. No. 132922, April
21, 1998]

RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED TO GIVE AIR TIME TO THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS FREE OF CHARGE. Petitioners' argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or
by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that
"any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress
when the common good so requires."

The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of charge is not new. It goes
back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388), which provided:

SEC. 49. Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. — (a) The franchises of
all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to require each such
station to furnish free of charge, upon request of the Commission [on Elections], during the
period of sixty days before the election not more than fifteen minutes of prime time once a week
which shall be known as "Comelec Time" and which shall be used exclusively by the Commission
to disseminate vital election information. Said "Comelec Time" shall be considered as part of the
public service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of
public information and education under their respective franchises or permits.

This provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296), which
provided:

SEC. 46. COMELEC Time. — The Commission [on Elections] shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "COMELEC Time" which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of said radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to require such stations to furnish the Commission radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign, at least once but not oftener than every
other day.

Substantially the same provision is now embodied in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and
television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of
as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for
free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that
they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."

Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air
time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on
broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to
further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time
to candidates in an election. 12 Thus, Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law School, in
urging reforms in regulations affecting the broadcast industry, writes:

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 Elections. We could do a lot to improve coverage of electoral campaigns. Most important,
government should ensure free media time for candidates. Almost all European nations make
such provision; the United States does not. Perhaps government should pay for such time on its
own. Perhaps broadcasters should have to offer it as a condition for receiving a license. Perhaps
a commitment to provide free time would count in favor of the grant of a license in the first
instance. Steps of this sort would simultaneously promote attention to public affairs and greater
diversity of view. They would also help overcome the distorting effects of "soundbites" and the
corrosive financial pressures faced by candidates in seeking time on the media.

Adiong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992]

PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF POSTERS AND DECALS DURING ELECTION PERIOD CURTAILS
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by
such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under
the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to
be stilled:

"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what standard governs the choice . . .

For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened
not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy
provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due
process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public
danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]." (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the question prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate
but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful
to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or
columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason
can sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an
individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990]

THE SUPERVISION OR REGULATION OF MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE
OF PLEBESCITE. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders
nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of
certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the
denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in
that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political
matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.

Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against the organic act because
he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his
choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such
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abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able
to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the
issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of
information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.

D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Section 2

Guevarra vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17115, November 30, 1962]

EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL. Under our Constitution, the authority of the
Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures
of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities
thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a determination of whether there
is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; Whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been
entered into in conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract
have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and
whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If
these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in
audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said
payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon
is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by the
Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures
of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty
implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if
he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons
for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence render the imposition of said duty
unnecessary.

Orocio vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992]

THE COA IS NOT BOUND BY THE OPINION OF LEGAL COUNSEL OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS.
In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion
of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned
disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a
meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its
rules and regulations.

IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COA, DUE PROCESS SHOULD BE OBSERVED. Respondent Agustin then
cannot be faulted when in his Certificate of Settlement and Balances No. 01-04-83, he disallowed NPC's
questioned disbursement. However, in his notation as to the persons to be liable therefor, he mentions only Mr.
M.V. Villafuerte (the Approving Authority) whose liabilities are primary; E. Gamama and P. Gajasan
(Management's Examiners) whose liabilities are secondary and joint"; and H.L. Hermosura (Chief Accountant)
whose liability is primary. Petitioner was not found to be liable. He was made jointly and severally liable with
Villafuerte, Gajasan and Hermosura only in the Memorandum of respondent Agustin dated 30 June 1986. It
may be noted that in his Memorandum he excluded Gamama. Considering that what was sustained up to the
level of the General Counsel of the COA was the disallowance made in the aforementioned Certificate of
Settlement and Balances and necessarily, his ruling thereon as to who are the parties liable therefor, Agustin
acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion when, without prior notice to petitioner, he made the latter
liable for the disallowance and worse, he directed, in the guise of a request, the Chief Accountant of the NPC,
Metro Manila Regional Center, to book the disallowance in the name of petitioner. Petitioner was not made a
party to the motion for reconsideration which the General Counsel of the COA acted upon. Respondent Agustin
effectively denied petitioner of his right to due process.

Osmeña vs. Commissionner on Audit [G.R. No. 98355, March 2, 1994]

Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela [G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992]

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 Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit [G.R. No. 103309, November 27, 1992]

We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by
the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the NPC, Board of Directors for it leads to the absurd
conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a
resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino
people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts
pertaining to this particular expenditure or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body
which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately, the people's property.

Saligumba vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. L-61676, October 18, 1982]

DECISIONS OF THE COA THAT MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT ARE LIMITED ONLY TO
THOSE WHICH INVOLVE MONEY MATTERS. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters
and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel.
Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above,
We can not do so on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to legal issues.

Section 3

Philippine Airlines vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 91890, June 9, 1995]

Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization [G.R. No. 112399, July 14, 1995]

ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 8

Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998]

FOR THE THREE-TERM LIMIT TO APPLY, THE LOCAL OFFICIAL SHOULD BE ELECTED TO THE OFFICE
AND COMPLETES THE FULL TERMS. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This
point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the
incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can
he run again for mayor in the next election?

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently
resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all
for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office
is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the
term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for
which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term.
His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for
misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term
in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the
disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three
consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official
is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term,

170
the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure
of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, §8. Suppose he is twice
elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued
the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time
for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the
situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good
mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for
reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional
Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

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