Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Sean G o r t o n *
I. I n t r o d u c t io n
* J.D. expected 2015, The George Washington University Law School; B.A. 2012,
Villanova University.
1. Hungarian Holocaust Denier Sentenced to Visit Memorial and Journal About Experience,
H u f f in g t o n P o s t (Feb. 2, 2013, 11:17 AM), http://w w w.huffingtonpost.com /2013/02/
02/hungarian-holocuast-denier-sentenced-visit-memorial-journal-experience_n_2602773
.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention],
5. Id. art. 2.
421
422 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
II. Backg ro u n d
35. Prior to the 2008 Fram ework Decision, the E uropean Parliam ent a d o p ted the
A dditional Protocol to the C onvention on Cybercrime in 2002. T he A dditional Protocol
represented the first time the E uropean U nion required m em ber states to criminalize
genocide denial in any context, as it req u ired m em ber states to crim inalize the following:
[D istrib u tin g o r otherwise m aking available, through a com puter system to the
public, m aterial which denies, grossly minimizes, approves, o r justifies acts consti
tuting genocide or crimes against hum anity, as defined by international law and
recognized as such by final and binding decisions o f the In ternational Military
T ribunal, established by the L ondon A greem ent of 8 August 1945, o r o f any o th er
international court established by relevant international instrum ents an d whose
jurisdiction is recognized by th at Party.
See A dditional Protocol to the C onvention on Cybercrime, C oncerning the Crim inalization
of Acts o f a Racist o r X enophobic N ature C om m itted T h rough C om puter Systems art.
6(1), Jan. 28, 2003, E.T.S. No. 189.
36. 2008 Fram ework Decision, supra n o te 31, art. 1 (1 )(a).
37. Id. art. 1 (1 )(c).
38. Id. art. 1(1) (d ).
39. Id. art. 1 (1 )( c ) - ( l) ( d ) .
40. Id. art. 1(2).
426 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
Any member state may, on adoption of this Framework Decision
or later, make a statement that it will make punishable the act of
denying or grossly trivializing the crimes referred to in para
graph 1(c) and/or 1(d) only if the crimes referred to in these
paragraphs have been established by a final decision of a
national court of this Member State and/or an international
court, or by a final decision of an international court only.41
Finally, Article 7(1) reiterates the requirem ent that m em ber
states m ust respect an individual’s freedom of expression, as Article
7(1) explicitly states that this “Framework Decision shall n o t have
the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundam ental
rights and fundam ental legal principles, including freedom of
expression and association.”42 Nevertheless, the 2008 Framework
Decision does n o t define the terms and acts that m em ber states are
required to criminalize as it does not provide any fu rth er explana
tion for terms such as “abusive,” “insulting,” and “grossly
trivializing.”43
56. Id.
57. See Gayssot Act, supra note 15.
58. Id.
59. Switzerland art. 261, supra note 29.
60. Austria Holocaust Denial Law, supra note 18.
61. Belgium Law of Mar. 23, supra note 19.
62. Lechtholz-Zey, supra note 20, pt. III.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Slovak Official: Any Turk Denying Armenian Genocide in Slovakia Will Be Jailed,
PanARMENIAN N et (Apr. 5, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://w w w .panarm enian.net/eng/new s/
101796.
428 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
68. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
69. See Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 279.
70. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 10(1).
71. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1976).
72. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 10(1)—(2).
73. See id. art. 10(2).
2015] Future of Genocide Denial Laws in European Union 429
1. Ar ticle 10 an d th e ECHR
Because P arag rap h 1 o f Article 10 an d th e Handyside decision
provide ro b u st p ro tectio n to th e freed o m o f expression by th eir
own term s a n d th e exceptions in P arag rap h 2 o f Article 10 are
p h rased in g en eral term s, th e ECH R has ad o p ted a th ree-p art test
to d eterm in e w h eth er a m e m b er state has perm issibly lim ited an
individual’s freed o m o f expression.75 T h e test req u ires th e co u rt
to d e term in e w h eth er th e in terferen ce is p rescrib ed by law, p u r
sues a legitim ate aim, an d is necessary in a d em ocratic society.76
74. See generally Tammer, 2001-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 265-66, 279-80 (stating that the
restrictions on freedom of expression laid out in Article 10(2) must be strictly construed
and any such restriction must be established convincingly).
75. See id. at 274.
76. See, e.g., id.
77. See id. at 275.
78. Rekvenyi v. Hungary, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 423, 440-41.
79. See, e.g., Surek v. Turkey, 1999TV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 379-80; Rekvenyi, 1999-III Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 441-43.
80. Supra Part II.
81. Supra Part II; cf. Perincek v. Switzerland, App. No. 27510/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-l39724 (hold
ing that law was passed to protect the reputations and rights of descendants of victims of
the Armenian genocide but rejecting the claim that the law was passed to ensure public
order).
430 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
b. Necessary in a Democratic Society
After determ ining that the infringem ent is prescribed by law and
that the law was enacted in furtherance of a legitimate aim, the
ECHR m ust determ ine w hether the intrusion is necessary in a dem
ocratic society, which has proven to be the m ost contentious part of
the analysis.82 In making this determ ination, the court utilizes a
two-prong inquiry. First, the court looks at w hether there is a press
ing social need in the m em ber state; moreover, the ECHR has held
that m em ber states should be accorded a wide degree of latitude in
deciding what constitutes a pressing social need .83 Second, the
court determ ines w hether the interference with the freedom of
expression is proportional to the pursuit of the legitimate aim.
While the ECHR insinuates otherwise, the nature and severity of
the im posed penalties will almost always be the determ inative fac
tor in deciding w hether an interference is proportional.84 In sum,
the ECHR will hold that there is no infringem ent on the freedom
of expression if the abridgm ent is prescribed by law, the law was
enacted in furtherance of a legitimate aim pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Article 10, and the intrusion is necessary in a dem ocratic soci
ety—which means that there is a pressing social need in the m em
ber state and the interference is proportional to the pursuit of the
legitimate aim.85
82. See generally Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 353 (finding that Turkish government’s
criminal sanctions against the owner and editor of a publication supporting the terror
organization Kurdistan Workers Party satisfied the necessity requirement).
83. Ekin Ass’n v. France, 2001-V1II Eur. Ct. H.R. 323, 344; cf. Perincek, App. No.
27510/08 (holding that Switzerland did not demonstrate a pressing social need that law
was necessary to protect the rights and reputations of descendants of the Armenian
genocide).
84. See, e.g., Ceylan v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 40; Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-1
Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 280.
85. See, e.g., Ceylan, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 36; Tammer, 2001-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 274.
86. Gayssot Act, supra note 15; Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 378-81.
87. Garaudy, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 375.
2015] Future of Genocide Denial Laws in European Union 431
106. Id.
107. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 10; Perincek, App.
No. 27510/08 at 53.
108. Compare Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 397, with Perincek, App. No.
27510/08 at 29.
109. See Garaudy, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 397; Perincek, App. No. 27510/08 HI 51, 54
110. Perincek, App. No. 27510/08 Hit 51-52; see also Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1976) (finding that freedom of expression also covers ideas
that “offend, shock, or disturb the State or any sector of the population”).
111. Perincek, App. No. 27510/08 subsec. 1(B).
112. Compare, e.g., Rekvenyi v. Hungary, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 423, 439-42, with Per
incek, App. No. 27510/08 HH 58-72.
113. Switzerland art. 261, supra note 29.
114. Perincek, App. No. 27510/08 H 71.
434 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
III. A n a ly sis
128. Steven W. Becker, “/ Think Therefore I Am Guilty”: Suppressing Speech and Hijacking
History— The Case Against Criminalizing Hate Speech and Revisionism as Global Policy, 2009
G lobal C omm unity Y.B. I n t ’l L. & J urisprudence 7, 37-38.
129. For a discussion of how “grossly trivializing” has not and cannot be applied con
sistently in the context of historical research, see id.; Luigi Cajani, Historians Under Criminal
Law, EU Legislation Casts a Shadow on Historical Research, L iberty P o u r l ’H istoire [L iberty7
for H istory ] (N ov. 2, 2009), http://www.lph-asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=124.
130. Knechtle, supra note 11, at 56; Laurent Pech, The Law o f Holocaust Denial in Europe:
Towards a (Qualified) EU-Wide Criminal Prohibition 44 (The Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l & Reg’l
Econ. Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 10/09, 2009).
131. 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, art. 1(2).
132. See Pech, supra note 130, at 47; Paolo Lobba, Criminalizing Negationism. Beyond the
Holocaust, L iberte P o u r l ’H isto rie [L iberty fo r history ] (Jan.29, 2013), http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=l 84.
133. See Lobba, supra note 132.
134. 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, art. 1(1)(c)-(l)(d); Pech, supra note
130, at 44.
2015] Future of Genocide. Denial Laws in European Union 437
phobia, form s th a t are com m only referred to as . . . ‘neg atio n ism ,’”
w hich is a n o th e r term for gen o cid e d en ial.135 Providing m ore
explicit definitions o r narrow ing the scope o f p ro h ib ited co n d u ct
w ould facilitate th e goal o f increased h arm o n izatio n by allowing
m e m b er states to h o n e in o n th e type o f behavior th a t the legisla
tion in te n d e d to eradicate.
Finally, the E u ro p ean U n io n released a com pliance re p o rt for
the 2008 Fram ew ork D ecision in Jan u ary 2014,136 providing fu rth e r
su p p o rt for the a rg u m e n t th a t th e legislation req u ires fu rth e r clari
fication. T h e re p o rt outlines w hich m e m b er states have an d have
n o t satisfactorily com plied with th e req u irem en ts o f the 2008
Fram ew ork Decision. T h e re p o rt dem o n strates th a t the least com
plied with provisions are Articles 1(1) (c) an d l ( l ) ( d ) . 137 Specifi
cally, the re p o rt asserts th a t Bulgaria, D enm ark, Estonia, G reece,
Ireland, Spain, C roatia, Italy, Eatvia, Malta, the N eth erlan d s, P o rtu
gal, Finland, Sweden, an d the U n ited K ingdom all lack specific
provisions to im p lem en t these p o rtio ns o f the 2008 Fram ew ork
D ecision.138 W hile th e re are a n u m b e r o f plausible explanations
for this developm ent, in clu d in g an aversion to crim inalizing the
denial o f historical events,139 th e u n certain language o f th e 2008
Fram ew ork D ecision itself m ost likely played a role in a n u m b e r o f
m e m b er states’ failure to com ply with th e req u irem en ts o f the leg
islation, as m any states felt th a t the c u rre n t fo rm u latio n o f th e ir
respective crim inal codes sufficiently com plied with the m inim um
re q u ire m e n ts.140 In sum, the vague language em ployed by the
2008 Fram ew ork D ecision provides o n e reason why th e legislation
m ust be am end ed .
141. 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, art. 1(2) (“For the purpose of paragraph
1, Member States may choose to punish only conduct which is either carried out in a
manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or insulting.”).
142. Id. art. 1(4).
143. Id.; see Lobba, supra note 132, § 3.2.
144. 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, art. 7(1).
145. Switzerland art. 261, supra note 29.
146. Perincek v. Switzerland, App. No. 27510/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).
147. Id.
148. Id.
2015] Future of Genocide Denial Laws in European Union 439
149. Slovak Official: Any Turk Denying Armenian Genocide in Slovakia Will Be Jailed, supra
note 67.
150. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 10; Garaudy v.
France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 397; cf. Perincek, App. No. 27510/08 (holding that laws
criminalizing denial of Armenian genocide did not pursue the legitimate aim of preserving
public order in Switzerland).
151. French Court Overturns Armenian Genocide Denial Law, CNN (Feb. 28, 2012), h ttp ://
www.cnn.com/2012/02/28/ world/europe/france-armenia-genocide/index.html
152. Id.
153. French President Hollande Vows New Armenia ‘Genocide Law’, BBC N ews E ur . (July 7,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18758078.
154. Armenian Population in the World, A rm. D iaspora (N ov. 19, 2014, 6:31 PM), h ttp ://
www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html.
155. See id.
156. See Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 397.
440 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 47
157. Perincek v. Switzerland, App. No. 27510/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013); see FRA, O p in
supra note 135, at 4.
io n ,
158. Supra Part II.
159. 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, arts. 1(4), 7(1).
160. About the ICTR, U nited N a tio n s I n t ’l Crjm. T ribunal for R wanda , http://www
.unictr.org/en/tribunal (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
161. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgm ent (Sept.
2, 1998).
162. See Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 397.
2015] Future of Genocide Denial Laws in European Union 441
169. See 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, art. 1(1) (d) (explicitly requiring
member states to criminalize Holocaust denial).
170. See infra Part III.
171. Sec Robert M. Hayden, “Genocide Denial" Laws as Secular Heresy: A Critical Analysis
with Reference to Bosnia, 67 Slavic Rev. 384, 384 (2008).
172. See 2008 Framework Decision, supra note 31, art. 1(2).
173. Id. art. 1(1)(c)-(l)(d).
174. See Hayden, supra note 171, at 385.
175. Cf. FRA, O pinion , supra note 135, at 4 (explaining that the goal of the Framework
decision is to harmonize E.U. Member States’ penal laws).
176. Supra Part III.
2015] Future of Genocide Denial Laws in European Union 443
The revised article would set the floor and the ceiling for what
actions m em ber states are required to take, and limiting the acts to
those that occurred within the European U nion will ensure that, in
this context, any restriction on an individual’s freedom of expres
sion will survive the ECHR’s Article 10 scrutiny. While an am ended
Article 1 (4) would provide a significant safeguard to an individual’s
freedom of expression, the current iteration of Article 7(1), which
requires m em ber states to respect an individual’s freedom of
expression, would rem ain in the legislation to reiterate the fact
that m em ber states m ust respect this freedom .177 While some may
argue that narrowing the scope in this m an n er indicates that the
E uropean U nion is elevating the H olocaust over other genocides
and crimes against hum anity,178 the revised framework still leaves
open the possibility that m em ber states will be required to punish
the denial of other acts in the future.
The revised framework would allow the European U nion to
address genocide denial through criminal sanctions, and it better
ensures that m em ber states will respect an individual’s freedom of
expression in the process. The revised framework still requires
m em ber states to criminalize Holocaust denial. However, the
revised framework would prevent m em ber states from doing much
beyond this, as the revised framework does no t encompass any of
the following acts: the 1915 Arm enian genocide, the 1932-1933
U krainian famine, the 1845-1852 Irish potato famine, and most
historical events that could theoretically be construed as geno
cide.179 Furtherm ore, the revised framework omits the Rwandan
genocide, as it did n o t occur within the European Union. Never
theless, as discussed above, any m em ber state that passed a law
criminalizing the denial of the Rwandan genocide would have a
difficult time dem onstrating a pressing social need u n d er Article
1 0 . 180
C. Future Developments
IV. C o n c l u s io n
190. Dzenana Halimovic, Genocide Denial Concern in Bosnia, I nst, for War & P eace
R eporting (Oct. 1, 2010), http://iwpr.net/report-news/genocide-denial-concern-bosnia.
191. Ceylan v. Turkey, 1999-1V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 40.
192. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 10(1).
193. See Garaudy, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 371.
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