Lagumbay Vs Comelec

4/7/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 016
VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 175

Lagumbay vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
No. L-25444. January 31, 1966.
WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY, petitioner, vs. THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO,
respondents.
Election Law; Courts or Electoral Tubunals should settle

electoral frauds; Exception.—Frauds in the holding of an election
should be settled by the corresponding courts or Electoral
Tribunals where testimonial or documentary evidence is
necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the return
itself, there is no reason to give it prima facie value.
Same; Comelec should reject false returns.—Where the
returns were obviously false or fabricated, the Commission on
Elections has the power and duty to reject them.
PETITION for review by certiorari of an order of the

Commission on Elections.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Wenceslao R. Lagumbay for the petitioner.
Ambrosio Padilla for the respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the

176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of

certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The
Constitution provides for review by this Court of the
rulings of the said Commission.
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000162a0ce78cacdce3c6b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
The matter being urgent, and having reached the

conclusion that the returns of certain questioned precincts
were “obviously manufactured” within the meaning of1
pertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,
we issued on December 24, 1965, a short resolution
upholding the Commission’s power and duty to reject the
returns of about fifty precincts.
“It appearing therein that—contrary to all statistical probabilities

—in the first set, in each precinct the number of registered voters
equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly
cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party,
the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second set,—again
contrary to all statistical probabilities—all the reported votes
were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were
credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct,
ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct;
whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given
exactly zero in all said precincts.”
We opined that the election result to said precincts as

reported, was utterly improbable and clearly incredible.
For it is not likely, in the ordinary course of things, that all
the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all
the eight candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a
single vote to one of the eight candidates of the
Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was
quite impossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista
Party had and has a nationwide organization, with
branches in every province, and was, in previous years, the
party in power in these islands.
We also know from our experience in examining ballots
in the three Electoral Tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and
House) that a large portion of the electors do not fill all the
blanks for senators in their ballots. Indeed, this
observation is confirmed by the big differences in the votes
received by the eight winning senators in this as
________________
1 23 Kans. 456, 33 Am. Rep. cited in 18 Am. Rep. and Nacionalista

Party vs. Commission on Elections.
177
VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 177

2
2
well as in previous national elections; almost a million
votes between the first place and the eight. Furthermore,
in 1965, the total number of electors who cast their votes
was 6,833,369 (more or less). If every voter had written
eight names on his ballot, the total number of votes cast for
all the candidates would be that number multiplied by 8,
namely 54,666,952. But the total number of the votes
tallied for the candidates for senator amounted to
49,374,942 only. The difference between the two sums
represents the number of ballots that did not contain eight
names for senators. In other words, some 5 million ballots
did not carry eight names. Of course, this is a rough
estimate, because some ballots may have omitted more
names, in which case, the number of incomplete ballots
would be less. But the general idea and the statistical
premise is there.
The same statistical result is deducible from the 1963
election data: total number of electors who voted,
7,712,019; if each of them named eight senators, the total
votes tallied should have been 61,696,152; and yet the total
number tallied for all the senatorial candidates was
45,812,470 only. A greater number of incomplete ballots. It
must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one
return gives to one candidate all the votes in the precinct,
even as it gives exactly zero to the other. This is not a case
where some senatorial candidates obtain zero exactly, while
some others receive a few scattered votes. Here, all the
eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of
them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the
eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.
The main point to remember is that there is no
blockvoting nowadays.
What happened to the vote of the Nacionalista
inspector? There was one in every precinct. Evidently,
either he became a traitor to his party, or was made to sign
a false return by force or other illegal means. If he signed
voluntarily, but in breach of faith, the Naciona-
________________
2 The weight received 3,629,834; 3,472,689; 3,463,159; 3,-234,966;

3,191,000; 3,037,666; 3,014,618; 2,972,525, respectively.
178

lista inspector betrayed his party; and, any voting or

counting of ballots therein, was a sham and a mockery of
the national suffrage.
Hence, denying prima facie recognition to such returns
on the ground that they are manifestly fabricated or
falsified, would constitute a practical approach to the
Commission’s mission to insure free and honest elections.
In Mitchell vs. Stevens, supra, the returns showed a
noticeable excess of votes over the number of registered
voters, and the court rejected the returns as obviously
“manufactured”. Why? The excess could have been due to
the fact that, disregarding all pertinent data, the election
officers wrote the number of votes their fancy dictated; and
so the return was literally a “manufactured”, “fabricated”
return. Or maybe because persons other than voters, were
permitted to take part and vote; or because registered
voters cast more than one ballot each, or because those in
charge of the tally sheet falsified their counts. Hence, as
the Mitchell decision concluded, the returns were “not true
returns x x x but simply manufactured evidences of an
attempt to defeat the popular will.” All these possibilities
and/or probabilities were plain fraudulent practices,
resulting in misrepresentation of the election outcome.
“Manufactured” was the word used. “Fabricated” or “false”
could as well have been employed.
The same ratio decidendi applies to the situation in the
precincts herein mentioned. These returns were obviously
false or fabricated—prima facie. Let us take for example,
precinct No. 3 of Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648
registered voters. According to such return3 all the eight
candidates of the Liberal Party got 648 each, and the eight
Nacionalista candidates got exactly zero. We hold such
return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of the
inherent improbability of such a result—against statistical
probabilities—spe-
________________
3 One hundred per cent voted. Yet statistics show that all over the
Islands, the percentage of voting was 79.5% only and in Tarlac and
Bulacan where facilities of communication are abundant, the percentage
was 85.98 and 85.81 only
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VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 179

cially because at least one vote should have been received

by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the
Nacionalista inspector. It is, of course, “possible” that such
inspector did not like his party’s senatorial line-up; but it is
not probable that he disliked all of such candidates, and it
is not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the
Liberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to
sign an obviously false return, or else he betrayed his
party, in which case, the election therein—if any—was no
more than a barefaced fraud and a brazen contempt of the
popular polls.
Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the
election should be handled—and finally settled—by the
corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the
general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence,
is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the
return itself (res ipsa loquitur —the thing speaks for itself),
there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value.
At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty
precincts may ultimately
4
be ascertained before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. All we hold now, is that the returns
show “prima facie” that they do not reflect true and valid
reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by
candidate Climaco—in the corresponding election protest.
The well-known delay in the adjudication of election
protests often gave the successful contestant a mere
pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is
about to expire, or has expired. And so the notion has
spread among candidates for public office that the
“important thing” is the proclamation; and to win it, they
or their partisans have tolerated or abetted the tampering
or the “manufacture” of election returns just to get the
proclamation, and then let the victimized candidate to file
the protest, and spend his money to work for an empty
triumph.
________________
4 This answers the erroneous claim that our decision usurps functions
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
180

It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in

all previous elections. Never was the point pressed upon us
in a more clear-cut manner. And without, in any way,

modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacio-nalista Party
vs. Commission decision, we feel the mores of the day
require application—even extension—of the principle in the
Mitchell decision, which is realistic and common sensical
even as it strikes a blow at such pernicious “grab - the -
proclamation - prolong-the-protest” slogan of some
candidates or parties.
It is strongly urged that the results reported in these
returns are quite “possible”, bearing in mind the religious
or political control of some leaders in the localities affected.
We say, possible, not probable. It is possible to win the
sweepstakes ten times; but not probable. Anyway, judges
are not disposed to believe that such “con-trol” has proved
so powerful as to convert the electors into mere sheep or
robots voting as ordered. Their reason and conscience
refuse to believe that 100% of the voters in such precincts
abjectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious freedom to
choose the senators of this Republic.
Indeed, social scientists might wonder whether5 courts
could, consistently with morality and public policy, render
judgment acknowledging such “control” or validating such
“controlled votes” as candidate Climaco chose to call them.
In view of the foregoing, and overlooking some
intemperate language which detracts from the force of the
arguments, we hereby deny the motion to reconsider our
resolution of December 24, 1965, as well as the petition for
a re-hearing.
Justices Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon and Maka-

lintal, concur. Justice Barrera concurs in a separate
opinion. Justices Regala, Bautista Angelo, Zaldivar and
Beng-zon, dissent.
________________
5 Block-voting has been abolished.
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VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 181

BARRERA, J., concurring:
I vote with the majority, for, as the dissenting opinion of

Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon points out, the line must be
drawn somewhere and because I believe the Chief Justice
has traced it at the point where it can at all be reasonably

placed, where logic and experience both direct it to be. I
take it that Justice Bengzon does not question the logic of
the prevailing doctrine that the board of canvassers can
legally discard “obviously manufac-tured” returns, as he
accepts the exercise of that power where the returns report
a number of votes cast in excess of the number of registered
voters. He merely objects to the extension of that power to
the situation obtaining in the present case wherein more
than 50 precincts in the same provinces where our
experience proves election has never been without
extensive frauds, the returns disclose uniformly 100%
voting, 100% in favor of 100% of the candidates of one party
and 100% zero for 100% of the candidates of the other
party. And the basis of his objection is that this result is
not physically or theoretically impossible and could
possibly reflect the actual voting, fraudulently as it may be,
the solution of which he states, lies with the Electoral
Tribunal. My answer is, if physical or theoretical
impossibility is to be the criterion, then returns evincing
greater number of votes cast than registered voters should
not also be discarded as it is theoretically possible that
with our experience regarding flying voters, ballots could
possibly be cast in excess of the registered voters, which
constitutes likewise, a fraud that could be corrected in an
electoral contest. Then where shall we draw the line? Or
shall we draw no line at all as insinuated by Justice Regala
in his own dissenting opinion, and leave all questions
relating to returns, to the corresponding electoral tribunal?
Both dissents express fear as to the consequences of the
majority opinion, suggesting that the board of canvassers
could become the tyrannical arbiters of the result of
elections. In my opinion, if the line is not drawn as it has
been done in the majority opinion, there would be the
greater evil of the tyranny of the board of inspectors
182

who prepare the returns in the hundreds of thousands of

electoral precincts, who, because of their number and their
widespread distribution all over the country, are more
prone to political influence and more difficult to subject to
scrutiny and supervision of those entrusted by law to
preserve clean, honest and free elections. As between the
two tyrannies, possible if we adopt a too sanctimonious
regard for the election returns, that of the board of

canvassers, less numerous in number and composed of
sworn public officials, seems to be the less pervasive and
pernicious as the perpetuators are likely to be more
amenable to reason, supervision and control.
BENGZON, J.P., J., dissenting:
As once observed by a renowned jurist: “In law, as in life,

lines have to be drawn. But the fact that a line has to be
drawn somewhere does not justify its being drawn
anywhere. The line must follow some direction1
of policy,
whether rooted in logic or experience.” For me, the
majority view in the case at bar, by adopting the criterion
of “statistical probabilities” in drawing the line between
returns “obviously manufactured” and returns not of that
kind, has drawn a shifting, movable and uncertain line,
liable to run without direction of policy, without regard to
logic and contrary to experience.
Furthermore, in my view, the majority would, against
the provision of our Constitution, share the Senate
Electoral Tribunal’s exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Sen-
ators. For it has in effect exercised, and authorized boards
of canvassers likewise to exercise, the power to annul votes
on the ground of fraud or irregularity in the voting—a
power that I consider alien to the functions of a canvassing
body and proper only to a tribunal acting in an electoral
protest. For these reasons, I am impelled to respectfully
express the following dissenting opinion, in accordance
with the reservation made at the time the resolution of this
Court was adopted.
________________
1 Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissenting, in Pearce vs. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 315 U.S. 543, 558.
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VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 183

The present suit is clearly a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65, not an appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. For its ground it alleges “a grave2 abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction”. Such a
ground is proper only in a petition for certiorari as a special
civil action and not as an appeal. For that matter the

petition does not cavil the fact that it seeks an
extraordinary writ. It states that “Petitioners have no other
plain, speedy
3
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law” and does not even bother to indicate that a notice of
appeal has been filed with the Commission on Elections, as
required by section 2 of the Rule 43 in cases of4 appeals. It is
captioned “For Cer-tiorari and Prohibition”. Needless to
say, prohibition cannot be joined with appeal, for such a
remedy can be resorted to only where appeal does not lie.
The Supreme Court, under the Constitution, has no
general powers of supervision over the Commission on
Elections except those specifically granted by the
Constitution, that is, to review the decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission which may be brought up
properly before the Supreme Court (Nacionalista Party vs.
De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129). In this instance, no appeal
from the decision of the Commission has properly been
taken to this Court.
As raised by the pleadings, therefore, the point at issue
is this: Did the Commission on Elections gravely abuse its
discretion in finding the election returns in question to be
genuine?
As a board of canvassers with respect to the election of
Senators, pursuant to Section 166 of the Revised Election
Code, the Commission on Elections is a ministerial body,
duty-bound to accept the returns transmitted to it in due
form, and to ascertain and declare the result only as it
appears therefrom (Nacionalista Party vs.. Commission on
Elections, 85 Phil. 149). A prerequisite to the performance
of said ministerial functions, however, is the power to
determine the genuineness of the returns. For this reason,
as a step sine qua non to the
________________
2 Petition, p. 6.
3 Petition, p. 10.
4 Petition, p. 1.
184

fulfillment of its proper task, it can also exercise the quasi-

judicial power of deciding whether a particular return is
genuine. Nonetheless, in so deciding, it cannot go behind
the returns. In short, the genuineness of the returns—as far

as canvassing is concerned—is to be determined solely from
the face of said returns. The rulings to this effect are clear:
“It is settled beyond controversy that canvassers cannot go behind

the returns. The returns provided for by law are the sole and
exclusive evidence from which a canvassing board or official can
ascertain and declare the result. The canvassers are not
authorized to examine or consider papers or documents which are
transmitted to them with the returns, or as returns, but which
under the statutes do not constitute part of the returns.” (Dizon
vs. Provincial Board of Canvassers, 52 Phil. 47. See also 29 C.J.S.
659; McCrary on Elections, pp. 198-199.)
So it is that all the instances petitioner cites of a board of

canvassers being held justified in refusing to count a
return, involve returns that can be pronounced non-
genuine simply on the basis of what appears therefrom. For
purposes of this case, the noteworthy example is that
mentioned in Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on
Elections, supra: “where the returns are obviously
manufactured, as where they show a great excess of votes
over what could legally have been cast”.
For me, there is no doubt that in such a case the returns
betray their falsity by their very contents. They set forth as
the result of the voting in a precinct something which can
be seen to be false without having to examine anything but
the returns themselves. And the reason is simple. It is
impossible for the votes to have in fact been as the returns
assert them.
Petitioner would however extend the same treatment to
returns where 100 per cent voting1 is shown and the
candidates of one party are credited with all such votes. In
my opinion the situation is radically different. For this time
it is possible for such a voting to have in fact taken place.
Consequently, it is possible for the returns to be in fact
genuine.
The discussion by the majority opinion of “statistical
probabilities” does not establish that the votes inside the
ballot boxes are not or cannot be as the returns say they
185
VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 185

are. Resort to the ballot boxes themselves would be needed

to prove that the returns are false, that is, that in fact the
votes are not as the returns state them to be.

A conclusion, then, that the aforesaid returns are
obviously manufactured, does not necessarily follow from
the 100 per cent voting that they set forth. Appreciation of
probabilities, statistical or otherwise, can at most only
classify such voting as highly improbable.
Stated otherwise, when the point at issue is whether it
is possible or impossible, the Commission on Elections or
the Supreme Court is empowered to find that a return is
obviously manufactured, in that it states what is
impossible. Not so where the question is whether it is
probable or improbable, no matter the degree of
improbability, in which case the subject matter pertains to
the Electoral Tribunal. In the former, one deals with a
certain-ty, namely, the impossibility. In the latter, one is
faced with something debatable, namely, probability or
improbability, which necessarily entails an element of
doubt, and to resolve said doubt perforce one has to open
the ballot boxes. As long as the voting stated in them is a
possibility, returns in due form must be accepted by the
board of canvassers.
It is true that chances are that in cases of 100 per cent
voting, fraud, intimidation or other violations of the
Election Law obtained. But said irregularities could have
been in the conduct of the elections itself. From the face of
the returns alone the irregularity cannot be fixed on said
returns. So the board of canvassers soundly exercised its
discretion in accepting said returns and leaving the deeper
inquiry into the presence of fraud or other irregularities,
not shown on the face of the returns, to the proper forum,
namely, the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Said tribunal is
under the Constitution “the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of
Senators (Arts. VI, Sec. II, Constitution of the Philippines).
Stated differently, it does not strike me as contrary to all
“statistical probabilities” for the votes in some precincts to
be what the returns in question state them.
186

For other factors, such as fraud or irregularity in the voting

—factors which “statistical probabilities” ought likewise to
reckon with—could have been present and responsible for
the straight voting therein. In such event, the fraudulent
and irregular voting notwithstanding, the returns showing
the straight voting are genuine, not manufactured, since

they but faithfully reflect the count of votes inside the
ballot boxes. For the annulment of those votes, no matter
how detestable the fraud or irregularity vitiating them, the
remedy is not to reject the returns for being obviously
manufactured, which they are not, resulting in this case in
the disenfranchisement of the affected voters in the three
provinces without due process of law. The remedy is to file
a protest with the proper Electoral Tribunal and there
raise the issue of fraud in the voting, where it is exclusively
cognizable.
The set-up in our system of determining the results of
elections of Senators, places the acceptance and counting of
the returns on the Commission on Elections, subject to
correction by the Supreme Court in case of grave abuse of
discretion or error of law, and the decision of electoral
protests on the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Speaking again of drawing lines, I hold the view that the
jurisdictional line between the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and other bodies, such as the Supreme Court or the
Commission on Elections, should not be plotted along
“statistical probabilities”. For that is not where the
Constitution draws the line. It constitutes the Senate
Electoral Tribunal the SOLE judge of ALL contests relating
to the ELECTION, RETURNS, and qualifications of Sen-
ators, without regard to whether the voting subject matter
of said contests is or is not contrary to all “statis-tical
probabilities”. “SOLE JUDGE”, “ALL CONTESTS” and
“RELATING TO x x x RETURNS” are the meaningful KEY
PHRASES in the Constitution.
Following “statistical probabilities” as the norm for
judging the genuineness of election returns is, as aforesaid,
drawing a line without direction of a policy rooted in logic
or experience. Not in logic, because the consideration that
fraud or irregularity attended an election
187
VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 187

which results in straight voting, only strengthens the view

that their corresponding returns accurately stated such
voting and are therefore genuine. Not in experience, for
straight and one-hundred per cent voting has in fact
occurred before, in other places. It occurred among others
in at least 4 precincts
5
of 3 municipalities in Cavite during
the last elections. It may indeed be irregular, but it is not
impossible. This is not to give a stamp of approval on any of

the so-called controlled voting. In my view such voting is
derogatory of the freedom that underlies our democracy.
The point, however, is that in regard to such evils the
forum of solution lies elsewhere.
Assuming that the instant suit is but an appeal from a
decision of the Commission on Elections, the result would
be the same. Although the issue would be not grave abuse
of discretion but mere error of law, I do not think the
Commission on Elections erred on a point of law in finding
genuine the returns with the aforesaid 100 per cent voting.
There is no provision of law repugnant to such a finding.
And this Court, in passing on appeal upon the decision of
the board of canvassers, cannot depart from the rule that
the genuineness of election returns, for purposes of
inclusion in the canvass, is to be judged solely from what
appears on their face. Applying such a rule, the returns in
question cannot be struck out as false or obviously
manufactured. At least, respondent Commission on
Elections cannot be said to have erred in not so striking
them out.
Nonetheless, even as I disagree as to procedure and
choice of means, I fully agree with the desire of the
majority to purify the elections. Such a noble intention and
such alone, I do not hesitate to say, is behind the deci-
________________
51965 Elections: Bailen, Cavite—Precinct No 10, all

Liberals got 255 votes, all others, got zero, Precinct No. 12,
all Liberals got 228 votes, all others got zero Silang, Cavite
—Precinct No. 34, all Liberals got 287 votes, all others zero
Ternate. Cavite—Precinct No. 7, all Liberals got 90 votes,
all others zero. Also, in 1961 Elections: Saramain, Lanao
del Sur—Precinct No. 1, NP Senatorial Candidates—all got
383 votes each; LPs all got zero.
188

sion of this Court. In a deliberative body like this Court the

right to dissent is indeed essential, but I feel it is also the
privilege and, at times like this, the duty of a dissenting
member to stress the fact that the difference of opinions,
does not detract from an ideal firmly, and with devotion,
held in common.
As one, therefore, who shares their ideals and realizes

that theirs is the purest of motives, I disagree with the
majority in the pursuit of these ends. The intensity of the
zeal shown by the majority to achieve a laudable purpose
has taken them beyond the limits set by our Constitution.
And sublime though the objective is, I cannot go that far to
attain it.
I therefore sustain the view that the decision of the
Commission on Elections accepting and counting the
returns in question should not be disturbed herein and that
the remedy is electoral protest. Between the lines, I could
see against the good intention of the majority opinion.
Subscribe to the aim of the majority view to strengthen our
democracy we should, and I do, as long as we remain
within the bounds laid down by law. For “we cannot 6
transcend the law to foster the reign of law”. The
realization of an eminent purpose, such as preserving
democracy, must still be done through proper channels
ordained by law. The fact that an electoral protest is often
decided so late that the people’s choice could not even serve
them is a problem which, I agree with the majority, needs
to be solved; but it is not for the Supreme Court to solve,
been use the Supreme Court is not a policy-making body in
our government. It is indeed one of the three pillars of our
Republic, but each of said pillars has its own sphere of
action. In the name of purifying elections, this Court
cannot go against the policy laid down by statutes and the
Constitution.
Finally, this Court has frowned upon what came to be
popularly known as “short cut” in the discharge
7
of powers
or duties authorized or required by law. The deci-
_________________
6 Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, supra, at 154.

7 E.g., Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., L-21897, October 22, 1963.
189
VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 189

sion of the majority from which I dissent, notwithstanding

its praiseworthy intention, tends to sanction a short cut of
the nature hitherto frowned upon.
I therefore dissent from the decision of the majority.
Bautista Angelo and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

REGALA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bengzon but I

wish to add a few words.
In the first place, I cannot subscribe to the majority
opinion that “obviously manufactured” returns may be
annulled by this Court. With respect to the contested
returns, it is my view that the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
and only that body, has the right and the jurisdiction to
exercise that power. Our Constitution has been most
careful to provide that the said Tribunal shall be “the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of Senators (Article VI, sec. II). The
assumption by this Court of the power that it did in this
case, in effect amends the aforementioned provision to
provide that the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be “the
judge of some contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of Senators. The result is that the word “all”
has been reduced to just “some” by this Court as it excludes
therefrom such returns as are, in the language of the
decision, “obviously manufactured.”
Of course, the majority opinion attempts to deny the
above by rationalizing that “the verdict in these fifty
precincts may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. All we hold now, is that the returns
show ‘prima facie’ that they do not reflect true and valid
reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by
candidate Climaco in the corresponding elec-tion protest.”
In the second place, the majority opinion has rejected
fifty (50) election returns covering fifty (50) different
precincts spread over three provinces in favor of Climaco on
the ground that they are “obviously manu-
190

factured,” contrary to the finding made by the Commission

on Elections that the said election returns are “re-gular and
genuine returns,” a finding which the Commission on
Elections made after examination and verification of the
returns in the presence of parties concerned and their
counsel.
The majority opinion has failed to lay down any
standard as to what returns are to be considered as
statistically “probable” or “improbable.” The judgment in
that regard, it would seem, has been left solely to the
boards of canvassers. I am profoundly alarmed that this

void in the majority opinion and this failure to set the
minimum element for what may be deemed as “statistically
improbable,” leaving the matter completely at the hands of
partisan or politically influenced boards of canvassers, will
only allow for the commission of far more brazen and far
more barefaced frustration of the popular will than has
ever been experienced by this country.
What right has this Court to determine for the Senate
Electoral Tribunal the “prima facie” value of the returns
which it must go over? Why must this Court impose upon
the said Tribunal its own judgment as to what is prima
facie “statistically probable or improbable”?
Electoral protests may, indeed, take the whole term of
the office concerned to decide. The victory of the winning
candidate may after all be an empty one. But that is no
reason for this Court to take a step not allowed by the
Constitution. This Court, we have need to remind ourselves
I think, is not the repository of remedies for all our ills. And
not even the best of intention and the noblest of motives
will justify it from assuming power it is not given under the
Charter.
For these, as well as the reasons given in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Bengzon, I would vote for granting of the
motion for reconsideration filed by the attorney for
Climaco.
Bautista Anqelo, J., concurs.
Motion for reconsideration denied.

191
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4/7/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 016

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 175

No. L-25444. January 31, 1966.

WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY, petitioner, vs. THE

Election Law; Courts or Electoral Tubunals should settle

PETITION for review by certiorari of an order of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This petition prays for revision of an order of the

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of

The matter being urgent, and having reached the

“It appearing therein that—contrary to all statistical probabilities

We opined that the election result to said precincts as

1 23 Kans. 456, 33 Am. Rep. cited in 18 Am. Rep. and Nacionalista

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 177

2 The weight received 3,629,834; 3,472,689; 3,463,159; 3,-234,966;

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lista inspector betrayed his party; and, any voting or

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 179

cially because at least one vote should have been received

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in

in a more clear-cut manner. And without, in any way,

Justices Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon and Maka-

5 Block-voting has been abolished.

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 181

BARRERA, J., concurring:

I vote with the majority, for, as the dissenting opinion of

has traced it at the point where it can at all be reasonably

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

who prepare the returns in the hundreds of thousands of

regard for the election returns, that of the board of

BENGZON, J.P., J., dissenting:

As once observed by a renowned jurist: “In law, as in life,

1 Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissenting, in Pearce vs. Commissioner of

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 183

The present suit is clearly a petition for certiorari under

civil action and not as an appeal. For that matter the

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

fulfillment of its proper task, it can also exercise the quasi-

the returns. In short, the genuineness of the returns—as far

“It is settled beyond controversy that canvassers cannot go behind

So it is that all the instances petitioner cites of a board of

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 185

are. Resort to the ballot boxes themselves would be needed

votes are not as the returns state them to be.

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

For other factors, such as fraud or irregularity in the voting

the straight voting are genuine, not manufactured, since

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 187

which results in straight voting, only strengthens the view

impossible. This is not to give a stamp of approval on any of

51965 Elections: Bailen, Cavite—Precinct No 10, all

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sion of this Court. In a deliberative body like this Court the

As one, therefore, who shares their ideals and realizes

6 Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, supra, at 154.

VOL. 16, JANUARY 31, 1966 189

sion of the majority from which I dissent, notwithstanding

Bautista Angelo and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

REGALA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bengzon but I

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED