ISSUE 8

IN THIS ISSUE 14 NATIVE ADVANTAGE:

New enablers bridge the culture,
language gap for squadrons.

16 LEARNING THE LINGO:

A new program teaches foreign
languages to operators.

17
GROWING THE FORCE:
Recruiters and the Center take action
to bring the best candidates to BUD/S.

20 Focusing on Families:
Learn how the FOCUS program
supports operators and families.
22 Third Location
Decompression:
A pit stop after deployment helps
warriors reintegrate into post-combat
life.
24 THE TACTICAL
ATHLETE:
Operators benefit from the same
medical support as pro athletes.
2 FOR A JUST CAUSE:
SEAL Team 4 remembers Operation 26
Just Cause.
SCIENCE ENTERS THE
3
FIGHT:
WHERE THERE’S A Defense scientists use cutting
RHIB, THERE’S A WAY: edge technology to help NSW.
NSW trains with Filipino counterparts.
4 STEALTH ON THE NEW
FRONTIER:
ON YOUR MIND
Unit 10 ramps up in support of SOCAFRICA.
28 TRUST ME:
6 A LONG-TERM HUMAN An essay about an essential
INVESTMENT: virtue from a retired SEAL.
New Anchor Units signify renewed commitment
to foreign partnerships and regional expertise. 29 Book Review:
10 DANGER OR DELUSION? A SEAL reviews Koran, Kalashnikov
and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban
A SEAL describes the Al Qaeda affiliate
Insurgency in Afghanistan.
group in Northern Africa.

COMMANDER > Rear Adm. Edward Winters
FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER > Cmdr. Gregory Geisen
DEP. PAO/EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS > Lt. Cate Wallace
DEP. PAO/INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS > Ms. Patricia O’Connor
S TA F F
PRODUCTION MANAGER > MC1 (SW/AW) Andre Mitchell
ASSOCIATE EDITOR > Ms. Mandy McCammon
STAFF > MC2 (SW/AW) Arcenio Gonzalez, MC2 (SW) Shauntae Hinkle-
Lymas, MC2 (SW/AW) Dominique Lasco , MC2 (SW/AW) Erika Manzano,

EDITOR > MCCS (SW/AW) Scott Williams MC2 (SW/AW) John Scorza

Ethos is an authorized official production of the Naval Special Warfare Command Public Affairs Office, 2000 Trident Way, San Diego, Calif. 92155-5599.
Send electronic submissions and correspondence to editor@navsoc.socom.mil or call (619) 522-2825.
Front cover photo by MC2 Michael D. Blackwell
Table of contents photo by MC2 Michael D. Blackwell
 The Ever-Evolving
Art
WAR
Naval Special Warfare is known for its ability to carry out the
toughest missions and adapt to new threats with innovative thinking
and dynamic action. 2010 will showcase these hallmark traits of our
warriors and organization as we continually adapt our operations.
This issue focuses heavily on our forward operations, highlighting
the newly developed NSW Anchor Teams. As you read further on page
six, the Anchor Teams are our response to SOCOM’s requirement for
a focused, persistent presence in key geographic locations where we
expect to operate for the foreseeable future. Small teams of operators will
provide continuity to our foreign and interagency partners by bridging the
gap between squadron deployments. They will be assigned to an AOR
for a four-year tour, establishing relationships and learning everything
possible about the local culture, language and customs. NSW has a
legacy of serving in an ‘advise and assist’ role. Now it is time for a new
generation of operators to further the legacy.
The first Anchor Teams roll out the door next month. I expect to see
our brightest and most skilled SEALs and SWCC step forward to take
on this new, challenging assignment.
To help bring NSW focus in Africa, read on page four how the
newly formed NSW Unit 10 will set the example of how we work
with our foreign partners in this new front against the enemies
of the United States. While we have tracked terrorist activity
in places like the Horn of Africa, there are emerging threats
in the northern region of the continent. Lt. Cmdr. Chris
Fussell, a SEAL and Naval Postgraduate School
student, wrote an excellent analysis of this new
threat for this issue on page 10.
As we grow our end strength of
operators and expand their mission
sets, our technical enablers are mirroring
their efforts. New units are being organized
and fielded by the Support Activities. These include
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Troops, Multi-Purpose
Combat Canine Teams and Cultural Engagement Troops.
The Center is also in the midst of its own transformation in
training our future warriors. We are now seeing gains in the
quality and quantity of candidates completing BUD/S. Read
more about this beginning on page 14.
While this Ethos is very operationally focused, we are still paying
attention to how we can take care of the warrior and his family here
at home. Beginning on page 20, read how Project FOCUS and the
third location decompression program that we initiated months ago are
maturing and evolving as we learn more about how to maintain and even
improve our lives beyond the battlefield.
NSW is evolving like never before, and we will raise direct and indirect
special warfare capabilities for the fight to new levels. Operators, Sailors
in combat support and combat service support roles, and civilian staff
must recognize this transformation and continually support it with fresh
ideas. I am committed to ensuring Naval Special Warfare remains flexible
and innovative, and building upon the legacy of honor we inherited from
our pioneers.
Rear Adm. Edward Winters
ETHOS 1
 n the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, four SEALs
died and eight were injured during an attempt
to secure Punta Paitilla Airfield, disable Gen.
Manuel Noriega’s plane and prevent him from
leaving the country.
In December 2009 and January 2010, both the White House and
SEAL Team 4 hosted remembrance ceremonies honoring service
members who participated in the action, otherwise known as
Operation Just Cause.
Navy SEAL Capt. Adam Curtis did not attend either ceremony,
but he will never forget what happened.
It was almost Christmas, 1989, and Curtis was looking forward
to a great evening with his wife Bonnie who was visiting him in
Panama. Curtis was a lieutenant assigned as a riverine division
officer at a special boat unit in Panama at the time.
“I transferred on an unaccompanied tour to Panama. I had been
married a year and a half. I went down for what was intended to
be a 14-month tour,” said Curtis.
Curtis and Bonnie had just finished eating dinner at a local
restaurant and were on the way back to his barracks when they
reached a Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) checkpoint.
The couple was questioned and their car was searched. Curtis
recounted. “While we were there, another group of Americans
came to the road block, three Army guys and a Marine – all officers.
They (the Americans) felt threatened, they gunned it through the
road block, and five PDF soldiers turned and fired at the car. The
officer in the back, an Army lieutenant named (Robert) Paz, was
killed.”
That night, the PDF held Curtis and his wife at a detention
center where they were interrogated for hours. Their ordeal was a
moment that changed their lives and American history.
Tensions between the United States and Panama had been
escalating long before Curtis’ situation and the PDF had been
harassing Americans stationed there for a while, he said. According
to Curtis, President George H. W. Bush made the final decision to
invade Panama after hearing about how Curtis had been beaten
during his interrogation, and particularly how wis wife was
terrorized while they were detained.
By Sunday, elements of Navy SEAL Teams 2 and 4 had
infiltrated the country. The two teams were given the task of
destroying Panamanian patrol boats and taking control of Paitilla
Airfield. At that point, Noriega was the leader of Panama and one
of the world’s most scandalous dictators.
At around midnight, elements of SEAL Teams 2 and 4 were
on the move. SEAL Cmdr. Norman Carley, task unit commander
for SEAL Team 2, was with his men aboard combat rubber raiding
crafts in a mangrove, waiting to launch his four SEAL swimmers
to attach explosives to the Presidente Porras patrol boat. “The
commander of the whole operation, Gen. (Carl) Steiner, thought
2 ETHOS
that the operation had been compromised, and he moved up the
time to execute the operation by a half hour,” Carley said. “But
the clocks and safety and arming devices on the explosives
were already set.”
“As they were doing so (attaching explosives to the patrol
boat), a fire fight was going on and grenades were falling into
the water,” said Carley. “They (SEALs) thought that they were
detected. But they finished attaching their explosive devices
before swimming away.”
As the clock struck 0100, a large blast from the SEAL’s
explosives shook the walls of buildings across Panama,
sending PDF soldiers scrambling for an imminent battle. This
part of the mission was a historic success — it was the first
time SEALs successfully executed an underwater swimmer
attack against an enemy ship of battle.
At the same moment near Paitilla Airfield, more SEALs
were coming ashore in small inflatable boats. “We saw and
heard the explosion in Panama City while waiting for our swim
scouts to signal the beach landing site,” recounted SEAL Capt.
Dennis Hansen, a lieutenant at the time, and platoon officer in
charge for SEAL Team 4.
“As we advanced, I heard yelling,” Hansen said. “The plan
was to tell security guards to go away. This seemed to work
well until we got to Noriega’s plane hangar. There, a gun
fight broke out after a brief exchange of words. The platoon
adjacent to mine was directly in front of the hanger. They were
to disable the plane. About half of the platoon was wounded.
I sent my assistant officer in charge (AOIC) and his squad to
support the platoon that was in contact. They took effective fire
also, killing my AOIC and wounding a couple of other men.”
Four team members died in the fire fight: Lt.j.g. John
Connors, Chief Engineman Donald McFaul, Boatswain’s Mate
1st Class Chris Tilghman, and Torpedoman’s Mate 2nd Class
Isaac Rodriguez III.
The SEALs who participated in Operation Just Cause
endured a bittersweet ending. Bonnie and the other SEAL
families remained in Panama, having to endure the nearby
fighting, while Curtis joined his teammates in the invasion.
Noriega turned himself into U.S. authorities 14 days after
SEALs invaded the country.
MC2 Matt Daniels
MC2 Shauntae Hinkle-Lymas
Sharing the Knowledge
JSOTF-P SEALs assist in training
of Philippine Armed Forces
ourteen members of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
recently finished training on 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats
with NSW personnel attached to Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines at Naval Base Cavite.
The six-week course was designed to give students follow-on training
after four RIBs were purchased by the Philippine government in July
2009 from the U.S. Maritime Institute. These are the first 11-meter RIBs
purchased for use by Philippine Naval Special Operations Units.
JSOTF-P’s Task Force Archipelago was asked to conduct an advanced,
detailed course for its Filipino counterparts at Cavite which would be
similar to the training a U.S. SWCC receives.
“The people going through this course will become trainers themselves,
now that they are experts on the boats. After the class, they will go back
to their respective units and train others on what they learned here,” said
the JSOTF-P Navy SEAL officer in charge.
Students in training learned different parts of boat operation and
mission execution, such as mission planning, schematics of the boat,
night navigation, medical training, weapons employment and how to
perform maintenance to keep the boats fully operational.
Sharing this knowledge and enhancing the skill sets of the NAVSOU
was an honor for the East Coast-based Special Boat Team. Military
subject matter expert exchanges are one of the key mission capabilities
of JSOTF-P.
“The (Philippine) Navy SEALs did a great job during this class,” said
OUR GLOBAL
FOOTPRINT
(above) Armed Forces of the Philippines Navy SEALs
participate in a training evolution aboard AFP Navy
logistics support vessel BRP Dagupan City (LC-551)
during a maritime interdiction operation exercise.
(left) Personnel aboard an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable
boats (RIB) owned by Armed Forces of the Philippines
Special Operations Group prepare to perform a
maritime interdiction operation exercise in Manila Bay.
Photos by Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly
JSOTF-P’s RIB detachment leading chief petty officer. “Their motivation
to receive this knowledge is great. I was continuously impressed with their
enthusiasm and commitment to the training. I am fully comfortable with
their ability to operate the boat.”
The RIBs will be sent to various units which will enhance the Armed
Forces of the Philippines’ capabilities to address transnational crimes and
counter maritime threats by conducting maritime interdiction operations.
By Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly
CJOSTF-P Public Affairs
ETHOS 3
OUR GLOBAL
FOOTPRINT
A
FORCE
MULTIPLIER
n emerging Navy component will focus on
foreign special operations partnerships in
Africa. Naval Special Warfare Unit 10 (NSWU 10)
will stand up later this year to support Special
Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA).
Rear Adm. Edward Winters, commander, Naval Special Warfare
Command, recently directed the re-commissioning of NSWU 10 to
be the maritime component command of SOCAFRICA, a theater
special operations command. SOCAFRICA integrates SOF into U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) theater security plans by matching the
appropriate SOF with mission requirements, and maintains operational
command and control over all SOF forces in theater. Immediately after
SOCAFRICA establishment Oct. 1, 2008, it began listing its mission
requirements – many of which were tailored for SEAL and SWCC
operators.
AFRICOM, a unified command, gives DoD one military
headquarters focused on U. S. initiatives on the continent. Previously,
4 ETHOS
responsibility for DoD activities in Africa was shared among U.S.
European Command, U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific
Command. The establishment of U.S. Africa Command indicates
the growing strategic importance of Africa and the need for a united
approach when dealing with regional peace and stability issues.
Co-located with NSWU 2 in Panzer Kaserne, Stuttgart, Germany,
the command that will become Unit 10 is projected to grow to an initial
operating capability of 25 personnel over the next year. Currently,
NSWU 10 has a unit identification code and billets; and over the
next few years, manning will grow to approximately 53 personnel,
mirroring other NSW units.
NSWU 10 is working with select partner nations to increase their
capacity to secure their coastlines by training and advising maritime
counter terrorism units. Additionally, NSWU 10 is establishing the
capability to rapidly deploy SEALs and SWCC as NSW task groups
in support of contingency operations.
NSWU 10 coordinates efforts from deployed NSW leadership and
regional experts with U.S. diplomatic teams and host nation military.
Rotating NSW squadrons deploy to meet most of the operational
Cameroon
elite Battalion d’Intervention Rapide
forces are training with SEAL and SWCC
operators on basic boat handling skills,
waterborne patrols, GPS navigation and
vessel interdiction. The efforts have
already proven successful in halting
MCC Stan Travioli
terrorists’ actions.

requirements in this area of operations. SEALs and SWCC train with
and advise partner nations, work with interagency partners and engage
enemy combatants.
NSW forces are assuming important roles supporting SOCAFRICA
and its subordinate commands, Joint Special Operations Task Force,
Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS) and the Special Operations Command
and Control Element, Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA) in two of the
most volatile regions on the African continent. JSOTF-TS is charged
with countering the growing Al Qaeda threat within the Trans-Sahara
region. SOCCE-HOA focuses on the growing challenges with
piracy and terrorism in Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea and
Tanzania.
Two of NSW’s key partners in Africa are Kenya and Cameroon.
NSW is working alongside select groups from these countries to
combat the emerging threat of piracy and terrorism, and in the process,
creating the model within SOCAFRICA for persistent engagements.
Both engagements are producing tangible results; the Kenyan and
Cameroonian forces have executed successful unilateral vessel
interdiction operations. These engagements are laying the framework
for enhanced security and stability on the African continent.
KENYA
NSW supports operations at Manda Bay, Kenya with a Special Boat
Task Unit, along with assistance from the Navy Small Craft Instruction
and Technical Training School. SEAL and SWCC operators are
training Kenyan naval forces with over-the-horizon interdiction. With
NSW’s mentoring, Kenya’s maritime forces are pushing past the
basics and learning advanced seamanship and tactics, and will soon
have their own trained instructors to develop these skills even further.
The task unit also assists civil engineers with evaluating ports in need
of repair, and indentifying small construction projects to benefit the
local populace.
Cameroon
Kenya
Africa
Illustration by MC2 Arcenio Gonzalez Jr.
The contributions by NSW forces in Kenya will enhance the
maritime security environment – especially along the Somali border –
and set the conditions for a more stable economy, both for the Kenyans
and the region.
CAMEROON
NSW forces are also making significant contributions in the nation
of Cameroon. A mix of SEAL and SWCC operators are training the
Cameroon elite Battalion d’Intervention Rapide (BIR) and building
infrastructure for maritime defense.
The comprehensive program focuses first on basic boat handling
skills. As the students progress, NSW operators incorporate waterborne
patrols, GPS navigation and vessel interdiction.
Like the Kenyan partnership, the efforts in Cameroon have quickly
produced results; the first graduates have already halted terrorists’
actions, including a recent engagement which eliminated a small
group of pirates.
As NSW expands into the AFRICOM area of operations,
understanding the mission, partner nation capabilities, the terrain
and the local population will be key. NSWU 10 will be a springboard
and valuable force multiplier for SOCAFRICA, allowing continued
success in bringing stability to volatile regions, thwarting terrorism
and piracy, and ultimately, protecting U.S. strategic interests.
MCC Stan Travioli
NSWG 2 Public Affairs
ETHOS 5
OUR GLOBAL
FOOTPRINT

Anchor Teams

Nearly 2,300 years ago

Sun Tzu wrote,
“Know your enemy
and know yourself
and you can fight a
hundred battles without
disaster.”
Sun Tzu espoused a
philosophy that was
focused on state warfare
but still applies in today’s
struggle against loosely
organized insurgencies and
terrorist networks driven by
ideology.
6 ETHOS
 key component of knowing our
enemy is to understand the human
terrain of the places where we
are engaged. In a recent article
for Joint Force Quarterly magazine, Adm.
Eric T. Olson, commander of USSOCOM,
summed up the value of knowing our enemy in
broader terms: “The surest means of winning
against an irregular enemy is to defeat him
before the shooting starts. Consensus must be
favored over coercion, and the ability to do
so proactively requires a holistic approach to
warfare aimed at both eliminating adversaries
and eroding the conditions that foment and
foster their behavior.”
Irregular warfare against these “non-state
actors” tends to be in areas of strife where
“weak or failed governments” are no longer
capable of adequately meeting the basic
survival needs of the population, he wrote.
Hence, organizations such as the Taliban in
Afghanistan step in to provide those needs or
simply fill the power vacuum. Their strength
lies in the ability to create binding ties of real
value to the population and take advantage of
their knowledge of the terrain, both physical
and human. It is their relationship with the
population that gives them advantage.
Countering this advantage requires persistent
presence in the environment to develop the
knowledge, expertise, relationships and trust
with partner nations and other agencies.
Naval Special Warfare’s traditional six
month deployment cycle and limited repeat
deployments by NSW operators to key areas
hinders ownership, continuity and long-term
expertise. One simple solution would be to
extend all deployments out to nine months or
a year to give time for these relationships to
build, but this would have a negative impact
on our families and eventually the battlefield.
NSW ANCHOR DETACHMENT
In order to adapt to the demands of irregular
warfare and find a balanced operational
tempo, NSW has ordered the reinvestment
and expansion of indirect warfare capabilities.
A tasking order issued in December directed
the implementation of a new organizational
tool that will provide an enduring ownership
of the problem set with a human investment
for creating, nurturing and sustaining various
relationships in places where our forces are
currently involved in SOF missions. This
tool is the Naval Special Warfare Anchor
Detachment (NSWAD).
NSWAD is an umbrella term for small
teams of regionally-focused operators who
are committed to specific Partner Nation (PN)
forces and cultural expertise. The NSWAD
is the CONUS-based element of operators
reassigned to NSW Support Activities.
Each NSWAD will deploy small elements,
missions in support of combatant commanders,
primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, there
is a growing demand for irregular warfare
missions, including counterinsurgency,
foreign internal defense (FID), and security
force assistance (SFA), as well as advanced
intelligence operations and liaison. This
“advise and assist” role is similar to the
missions encompassing SOF operations in
Vietnam with partner nations and interagency
partners during the early days of NSW.
Illustration by MC2 Arcenio Gonzalez Jr.
PERSISTENT PRESENCE
Today’s watchword is “persistent,” as in
maintaining a persistent presence. Personnel
assigned to NSWADs are expected to complete
a four-year tour with multiple deployments of
various lengths to their area of responsibility
(AOR). They will become immersed in the
local language, culture, customs, attitudes
and beliefs in their AOR.
“There are some locations where anchor
teams will be co-located with other DOD
“The mission of forces,” said Cmdr. Robert Newson, deputy
these teams is to assistant chief of staff for operations plans
and policy at NSWC. “In other locations they
“foster continuity, may be the only DOD element. They will
cultural expertise, have extensive interaction with the embassy’s
country team security assistance office and
connectedness, other members of the country team. They
and long-term will be embedded with partner nation forces
and working from forward operating bases.”
commitment – The NSWATs are designed to be the
the four C’s of bridge between DOD forces, partner nations
and interagency partners, eliminating the
counterinsurgency.” awkwardness, disassociation, memory loss
Rear Adm. Edward Winters and transactional friction created by the
commander, NSW complete turnover of personnel every six
months, a phenomenon known in NSW
leadership circles as ‘flush and fill.’
“We’re also talking about the unique
language and culture of other U.S. government
known as NSW Anchor Teams (NSWAT), agencies,” said Newsom, “whether it’s
to geographically-assigned areas. They will Department of State, U.S. Agency for
answer to their Theater Special Operations International Development or anybody else.
Command (TSOC) for tasking. According to We want these guys to be the ones who move
Rear Adm. Edward Winters, commander of seamlessly in and out and communicate
NSWC, the mission of these teams is to “foster DOD thoughts in a language that people
continuity, cultural expertise, connectedness, understand.
and long-term commitment – the four C’s of “Their (NSWATs) year-long deployment
successful counterinsurgency.” shifts their time focus, so they’re not so
Anchor Detachments derive their name concerned about getting things done on a six-
from the SOCOM 2006 Capstone Concept month cycle,” he said. “This is significant to
for Special Operations (CCSO), which says a country team that views six-month TDYs
“Serving as strategic anchors, small forward- as transients; whereas they see guys who are
based joint SOF teams will be situated in there for a year or more as professionals who
or adjacent to critical or sensitive countries. are invested in their problem set.”
They will build stability through sustained “NSWAT members are expected to develop
engagement over a period of years with host and maintain core competencies such as
nation security forces.” combat skills, instruction and assessment,
While today’s NSW operators have security assistance and interagency relations.
been largely focused on direct action and This goes along with the language, regional
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance continued
ETHOS 7
 Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly
Training with partner nation forces is a key mission for Anchor Teams. FID, SFA and combat advisement provides long-
term relationships with partner nation forces, which in turn gives them both the authorities and ground truth they need to conduct operations.

expertise and cultural knowledge they must
attain.”
“The complexity of the present strategic
environment requires that SOF operators
maintain not only the highest levels of war-
fighting expertise but also cultural knowledge
and diplomacy skills,” said Olson to JFQ.
This would require “a multidimensional
force prepared to lay the groundwork in
the myriad diplomatic, development, and
defense activities that contribute to the
U.S. Government’s pursuit of vital national
interests.
“If we do not commit a significant portion
of our personnel to living abroad in other
cultures for extended periods,” he continued,
“and to specializing rather than generalizing
our skill sets, then we will fail to gain the
trust, credibility and faith of those nations and
partners we claim to be fighting alongside.”
A SELECT PERCENTAGE OF THE
SEAL AND SWCC COMMUNITY
The total number of personnel assigned
to NSWADs will remain a very small select
percentage of the entire community of
SEAL and SWCC operators. Initial selection
of personnel has already occurred at the
Group level and more than 100 operators
were considered for the few dozen available
NSWAD billets.
“Each of the Groups nominated a range of
Sailors that fit a discrete profile,” said Cmdr.
Sam Havelock, commanding officer, NSW
Support Activity 1. “There was a very long
list of nominees which was whittled down to
the most ideal people for the job.”
What type of operator fits the description
of the ideal NSWAT member?
“We are looking for a guy who has deployed
to that area,” said Newson. “They have to
be adaptable, mature and professionally
seasoned with an affinity for this kind of work
– it’s a blend of rank, operational experience
and personality.
“This is a refining school for NSW
unit leaders. It’s the refinement and
professionalization of the SEAL/SWCC
capability. If you plan on being a SEAL
master chief in NSW, you should try to get
on an anchor detachment because that will
help make you competitive in the future
environment where an entire squadron is no
longer going to Iraq but instead distributed
across the globe.”
NSWADs will also feature some limited
civilian billets. “We are
looking at prior SOF guys
to be operations and

“If we do not commit a significant portion of our personnel

to living abroad in other cultures for extended periods, and
to specializing rather than generalizing our skill sets, then
we will fail to gain the trust, credibility and faith of those
nations and partners we claim to be fighting alongside.”
Adm. Eric T. Olson
commander, USSOCOM

8 ETHOS
plans officers for the anchor detachments,
but they may also deploy,” said Newson.
“They could be on a multi-tour assignment
with that detachment. It’s an opportunity to
tap into that graybeard experience level that
we need to provide additional maturity and
continuity.”
The first deployment will happen no later
than April. The PCS transfer of personnel to
remaining NSWAD billets is expected to be
final by October.
CAREER MILESTONES
NSW leaders anticipate the community
may wonder how a tour of duty with an
NSWAD will affect career paths. Rear Adm.
Winters plans to give guidance to promotion
selection boards in order to enhance the
careers of those operators participating in the
NSWADs, Newson said. “In his community
guidance, he talks about the career milestones,
the important schools the guy would have;
he would discuss the importance of being
an Anchor Team member and how that is
valuable to the community.”
“Maturing operators view career milestones
as tours of duty with a platoon, task unit,
or cross-functional troop (CFT),” Newson
said, “and they may not understand how an
NSWAD fits into a successful career model. A
misperception might be that a specialization
tour with an NSWAD focused on one
geographic area or country may stunt the
growth of a career, but this is not the case. In
my mind, it’s no different than a disassociated
tour to be an instructor at the Center or a staff
officer of a TSOC.”
SIMILAR TIME AWAY FROM HOME
Operators may also be concerned with how
the longer deployment may affect family life.
Havelock said his first priority after mission
success was to take care of the operators and
their families, but the operator should note
that the actual time spent away from home
as a member of the NSWAD will be quite
similar to a tour of duty with a squadron.
“If you do a comparative analysis between
a squadron’s inter-deployment training cycle
(IDTC) schedule and what we have planned
for NSWADs, you’re going to find Sailors
will spend nearly the same time TDY away
from home over the course of four years,” he
said.
OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
Havelock said NSW members should look
at duty with an NSWAD as a way of linking
NSW into sustained operational opportunities
with partner forces, especially as the political
U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Micky M. Bazaldua
In order to adapt to and counter the enemy’s
advantage, Naval Special Warfare has ordered the reinvestment and expansion of indirect warfare capabilities. A
task order issued in December implemented a new organizational tool that will provide an enduring ownership of
the problem set with a human investment for creating, nurturing and sustaining various relationships in places
where our forces are currently involved in SOF missions. This tool is the Naval Special Warfare Anchor Team.
appetite for unilateral (U.S.-only) operations advisers.”
decreases. Specific deployment areas and exact
“Many people think Special Forces composition of the NSWADs is too sensitive
embrace FID just because they like doing to discuss here, however, Newson said more
FID,” he said. “They embrace FID because information will be communicated to the
it serves as a platform to remain relevant in force via ‘town hall meetings’ with Rear Adm.
whatever stage of war in which they find Winters, and through other official channels.
themselves. FID, SFA and combat advisement Havelock, in the meantime, is confident
provides long-term relationships with partner the Anchor Detachments will be successful.
nation forces, which in turn gives them both “I have no doubt the guys are going to exceed
the authorities and ground truth they need to everyone’s broadest hopes for the program,”
conduct operations. he said. “Once SEALs and SWCCs are given
“Once major combat operations wind a mission, they succeed. We are committed
down, dynamic operations become fewer and to providing them the training, flexibility,
far between,” said Havelock. “You have to go and command support to make this effort a
out and build the capability you want to fight success.”
beside, develop the information you need, The future may include fleet interoperability
and operate under the authorities that only the initiatives for some Anchor Teams and a
partner nation’s force or other agencies will concentration on a foreign language program
possess. to enhance force flexibility and strengthen a
“If you want operational opportunities,” diverse force.
continued Havelock, “you have to be “The strength of SOF,” said Olson during
forward, you have to be in small teams, and his JFQ interview, “is not in raising basic
you have to be alongside people who have armies or police forces; it is in developing and
the authority to operate. This notion that mentoring the special forces, commandos,
you are going to be operating less, and that paramilitary, and surrogate forces of other
you will have no operational opportunity as nations, which we are doing in both Iraq and
an NSW adviser is flawed. Mike Thornton Afghanistan.”
won the Congressional Medal of Honor while
serving as one of two SEAL advisers leading MCCS Scott Williams
a Vietnamese squad in combat. His story is
just one across a long legacy of NSW combat
ETHOS 9
 Al Qaeda
in the land of the Maghreb:
Danger or Delusion?
n Sept. 11, 2006, senior Al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-
Zawahiri announced via video release that the Algerian-
based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
would henceforth be officially affiliated with Al Qaeda.
This was followed in January 2007 with an announcement from GSPC
that its name had officially changed to the Organization of Al Qaeda
in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At first glance, this
represents the manifestation of many Western fears about the Al Qaeda
organization. GSPC was created as a militant Islamic organization
10 ETHOS
Matthew Binard
focused strictly on the power struggle inside of Algeria with the goal
of putting an Islamic government into power; their transformation
into AQIM purported to represent a unifying jihadist banner for
all movements in North Africa under the umbrella of the Al Qaeda
(AQ) global association. A merger such as this, to the reactionary
constituency, represented the viral nature of the Al Qaeda organization
and was a sure sign of things to come in the ongoing struggle to defeat
AQ. The merger and subsequent GSPC-to-AQIM name change could
be read as a sign of Al Qaeda’s impressive ability for expansion and
suggested that AQ’s global jihad ideology would begin to turn once-
regionally focused organizations such as GSPC into part Al Qaeda’s
ever-expanding global terror network. This view is captured well by
analysis from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center: “The name
change is indicative of the group’s desire to transform itself into an
Al-Qaeda regional affiliate, expand its aims beyond Algeria to create a
regional caliphate, and adopt a pan-Islamic, as opposed to nationalistic,
jihadist ideology.”
But does such rhetoric overstate the importance of the GSPC-AQ
merger and the emergence of AQIM while missing the true meaning
of the evolution? In simplest terms, does this merger represent the
emergence, in AQIM, of a new globally-focused jihadist organization;
or, is it simply a marriage of convenience resulting from the selfish
interests of both GSPC and Al Qaeda? The following analysis will
address this question by tracing the membership, actions and tactics of
GSPC and AQIM to demonstrate that there is, in fact, little evidence
of the emergence of a significantly more dangerous transnational
threat as a result of the merger. What will be evident is a dominantly
Algeria-focused campaign, with minimal actions in the Maghreb and
Sahel regions, that sees AQIM continuing on a very
similar course as their predecessors. But while
there is little evidence to support the alarmist view,
the existence of AQIM as a transnational network
of contacts and relationships warrants close
monitoring and continued dismantling efforts.
Regardless of the demonstrated kinetic capability
of the organization, the connectivity of the network
implies a latent danger that should be aggressively
disrupted as it does improve the global reach and
information campaign of Al Qaeda.
History
The history of Algeria from the late 1980s to the late 1990s
is violent and complex. Along with radical political struggles,
the decade saw the emergence of a series of Islamist groups
whose ideologies were, in most part, expressions of discontent for
the ruling regime in Algeria. This is not, of course, an
uncommon pattern in the post-colonial Middle East,
where corrupt ‘democratic’ regimes have often served
as a catalyst for the creation of violent opposition
groups. The Algerian government, however,
demonstrated a particularly poor approach to its
first encounter with the progenitor of Algeria’s anti-
regime movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).
The FIS was, albeit under the banner of excessively
militant rhetoric, seeking power through legitimate
democratic channels and their electoral gains in the
early 1990s caught the Algerian regime by surprise.
The threat of a legitimately elected Islamist element
gaining control of the parliament was too much for
the Algerian military leadership to accept and they
chose to execute a bloodless coup in 1992, thereby
blocking FIS’s legitimate avenue to political control.
Five years of extreme violence would follow, as the
military’s heavy-handed oppression tactics fueled
the ideology of more militant Islamist groups who
had believed all along that FIS’s approach had been
destined for failure.
The ensuing conflict between the military regime
and the Islamist groups, spanning most of the 1990s,
would witness the violent deaths of 150,000-200,000 Algerian citizens,
rebels and military personnel in the combined efforts of both camps.
The strongest element to emerge from the anti-government forces
was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), but the atrocities they inflicted
upon Algerian citizens during this period, combined with improved
counterinsurgency strategy on the part of the Algerian government, led
to their slow delegitimization in the eyes of the Algerian citizenry. In
1998, then senior and seasoned GIA leader Hasaan Hattab broke away
to start his own faction, the Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le
Combat (GSPC). Hataab’s breakaway was due, in large part, to his
discontent with GIA’s targeting of Algerian citizens that was, for all
practical purposes, highly indiscriminate. In announcing the creation
of GSPC, Hattab quickly established the intent of GSPC was to focus
on outside enemies and their collaborators in Algeria, not on innocent
Algerian citizens.
But the counter insurgency of the Algerian regime was proving
effective, and following the GSPC’s establishment, the group quickly
came under great pressure from the increasingly successful efforts of
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Hataab would leave the organization
in 2001, and the organization would see a series of leadership changes
over the years following. By 2003, GSPC was in a position of relative
weakness, having come under additional pressure following
the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks as the United States increased
financial support to Bouteflika’s counter-terror efforts.
From this position, GSPC began a campaign of overtly
aligning themselves with Al Qaeda. This relationship
continued to evolve for several years, culminating in
the 2006 announcement by Zawahiri that officially
welcomed GSPC into the fold of Al Qaeda’s global
jihadist movement. The organization subsequently
changed it name, and AQIM was officially born.
This analysis of AQIM will look at four aspects of comparison
between GSPC and AQIM activities: membership, the number
of kinetic operations executed, the locations of these operations
and the tactics utilized by AQIM. Taken in total, these variables
will offer conclusions as to the actual threat posed by AQIM, and
demonstrate whether the transition from GSPC to AQIM created a
more dangerous entity.
Membership
Given Hattab’s initial rhetoric concerning the
creation of AQIM, one would expect to have seen
consistent efforts on the group’s behalf toward
unification with other jihadist groups in the
Maghreb. This has not occurred. AQIM has not
become a coalition-led organization with Tunisian,
Moroccan and Libyan jihadist leaders joining the
AQIM leadership circle. Nor has it been able
to establish a relationship with the other well-
established jihadist organization in the Maghreb, the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that waxed
and waned in its interest in establishing a similarly
direct relationship with Al Qaeda. Ultimately, based
on the membership variable, there is little evidence
that AQIM has had any success in creating the
pan-Maghreb jihadist organization it is intended to
represent. Instead, its leadership and membership
remains dominated by Algerian nationals. While
this does not make the organization any less of a
threat within Algeria, it does suggest that there is
continued
ETHOS 11

U.S. Army 2nd Lt. Michael
Snodgrass, of 2nd Platoon,
Charlie Troop, 1st Squadron,
32nd Cavalry Regiment, 101st
Airborne Division, speaks with
Sons of Iraq members about Al
Qaeda activity in Abu Bakur, Iraq.
U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Micky M. Bazaldua
While these attacks likely
represent a vision of where the
organization hopes to go,
they by no means represent a
legitimate capability to execute
an effective trans-national
kinetic campaign.
12 ETHOS
little about its current make-up to differentiate it from what GSPC
would have likely evolved into.
Kinetic Operations
Table 1 below from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center
provides a visual representation of the increases and decreases of
AQIM kinetic operations, within Algeria, from 2002 to 2009. The
figures are divided into micro and macro attacks, where macro attacks
are those specifically designed to kill more than 20 people, involve
explosive devises more than 100 lbs., or involve the destruction of a
major transportation asset (aircraft, train, etc.).
This shows a steady but not dramatic increase in both micro and
macro attacks following the 2007 named change to AQIM, with a
dip in macro-attacks in 2009. (Final statistics for 2009 are not yet
available, but numbers are trending down from previous years.) This
level of violence, while notable and warranting attention, pales in
comparison to the bloodshed seen in Algeria during the 1990s. As
noted by Hanna Rogan, “compared to [the violence of the 1990s], the
levels of violence and numbers of attacks that have taken place during
the last eight years [2001 – 2008] have been limited and relatively
constant.” On scale, this level of kinetic activity does not demonstrate
a radical increase in capability on the part of GSPC following its
transformation into AQIM in 2007.
Table 1 is limited to those AQIM kinetic operations within Algeria,
which provide the best picture of the majority of the organization’s
activities. AQIM has not demonstrated a high capability for executing
kinetic operations in parts of the Maghreb or in the Sahel. Table 2
below (AQIM area of operations) will provide greater data on these
strikes, but the numbers are minimal and the attacks have posed a
relatively small threat to governments in neighboring nations.
Area of Operations
As to its ability to expand its area of operations, AQIM has shown
similarly lackluster results since its inception. Similar to membership
expansion, one would expect that AQIM would focus heavily on
expanding its operational area in order to establish itself as the
transnational threat it was purporting to be. However, since the 2007
name-change, the majority of its operations have taken place in the
same areas once struck by GSPC, with only a very small number of
attacks taking place outside of Algerian territory. As noted in Jane’s
Insurgency and Terrorism data base: “Despite its new international
image, attacks since early 2007 have been largely confined to a swath
of territory east and southeast of Algiers. This area of operation
suggests AQIM has yet to expand itself beyond the traditional GSPC
strongholds, particularly those areas under Droukdel’s [current AQIM
commander] direct control.”
Table 2 from Jane’s shows the number of incidents associated with
AQIM in the Maghreb and Sahel regions over the past 12 months:
Algeria clearly remains the focal point of AQIM activities, and its
ability to affect other nations of the Maghreb is limited. Additionally,
in Mali and Mauritania, where there seems to be a respectable amount
of AQIM activity, there are actually very few fatalities associated
with these incidents. The vast majority of terrorism-related deaths in
the Sahel are tied to local, nationally focused organizations (e.g., the
Taureg rebel groups in Mali).
While AQIM’s rhetoric and publicized vision is trans-Maghrebian
and global in nature, its actual activities are strictly regional. They
are mostly limited to traditional strongholds within Algeria. Attacks
outside of Algeria have been sporadic, with single-digit occurrences
in 2008 and 2009, and limited mostly to countries of the Sahel with
marginal results. While these attacks likely represent a vision of where
the organization hopes to go, they by no means represent a legitimate
capability to execute an effective trans-national kinetic campaign.
Tactics
The tactics employed by AQIM have shown a dangerous evolution,
but not necessarily in a positive direction for the organization.
Following its formal change to AQIM, suicide bombers and suicide
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) were soon
adopted as a tactic, with the first SVBIEDs appearing in April 2007,
less than three months after the name-change. These tactics have
had a significant impact on the visibility and level of destruction
associated with AQIM operations. These new tactics are most likely
explained by the return of knowledgeable fighters from Iraq (both
Algerian and some non-Algerians), where these tactics continue to be
the mainstay of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As noted by Jean-Pierre Filiu,
the statements of AQIM consistently present a global jihadist tone,
but the only major shift has occurred at the tactical level. “Despite
the inflamed global rhetoric and the Internet echo chamber,” said
Filiu, “the main difference [between GSPC and AQIM] lies in the
generalization of the suicide attacks, which were practically unknown
in Algeria before 2007.”
As seen in Iraq, the benefit for a terror organization of utilizing
large suicide attacks is seen in the return on investment (the loss
of one member can inflict great harm on the opposition) and in the
information-operations realm, as the world media has an established
pattern of devoting significant coverage to large scale bombings.
However, the down side (also visible in the lifecycle of AQI) is the
indiscriminate nature of such strikes that commonly involve civilian
casualties. Lianne Boudali, with West Point’s Combating Terrorism
Center, summarized the situation: “Detonating a large bomb in a
public place represents a reversal of GSPC’s pledge to avoid civilian
casualties; however it is entirely consistent with al-Qa’ida’s fondness
Table 1.
Table 2.
The tactics
employed by
AQIM have
shown a dangerous
evolution,
but not necessarily
in a positive
direction
for the
organization.
for mass casualty attacks that generate a lot of publicity.” The
employment of these tactics, while increasing the visibility of AQIM,
is likely to keep them isolated from the Algerian people from whom
AQIM would hope to garner support. In essence, without expanding
its area of operations, adopting AQI tactics simply makes AQIM
appear as a myopically focused, more brutal, regional problem.
The empirics of AQIM’s history tell a story that clearly runs
counter to the group’s rhetoric. It has not become a global, or even
significant regional threat. Instead, it has defaulted to activities in
the same areas that GSPC traditionally struck. It has not been able
to significantly increase its level of kinetic operations, nor has it
managed to diversify its membership, with its ranks and leadership
still dominated by Algerian nationals. The most significant change
has been its willingness to adopt the indiscriminate suicide bombing
tactics of AQI, a decision that makes AQIM look as unconcerned with
civilian deaths as its forebears, the GIA.
It should not be discounted, however, that Al Qaeda can still claim
an information-operations victory in its acquisition of GSPC. In its
ongoing efforts to maintain global relevance and a perceived ability
to control jihadist actions around the world, any internationally
recognized terror-group carrying the Al Qaeda brand name increases
the perceived power of the parent organization. The vast majority of
the global audience will never know the nuances of the AQ-AQIM
relationship, or the details of its transition from GSPC. Instead, the
real target of this overt expansion – the global consumer of main
stream media – simply sees that Al Qaeda is now able to execute
operations in Africa, and will make little distinction between Maghreb
and Sahel, or between high or low complexity in targeting. From this
angle, despite its inability to truly grow as a regional or global threat,
AQIM represents a small win for Al Qaeda as long as it is able to
remain active in the eyes of the world’s media and the consumers of
that media.
Note: This article was originally created by the author for the
Naval Postgraduate School as part of a curriculum requirement.
Source citations are available upon request.
Lt. Cmdr. C.L. Fussell
ETHOS 13
 OUR GLOBAL
FOOTPRINT

NSW’S
CULTURE
MOVEMENT
Since the early days of the Korean War and Vietnam, the
U.S. military has used a variety of different programs to
leverage the language and cultural awareness skills of foreign
nationals or foreign-born service members. Today’s combat
theaters also require these valuable enablers.

eaders at Naval Special Warfare recognized the demand and activities for theater task unit special operations commanders and
incorporated a new organization that will meet this need: interagency and host nation partners.
the cultural engagement troop (CET). Cmdr. Sam Havelock, “The concept is to recruit heritage-born language and regional
commanding officer of Naval Special Warfare Support Activity 1, experts from specific geographical areas,” said Senior Chief Special
illustrated the reason for importing the talents of culturally-diverse Warfare Operator (SEAL) Daniel Gearhart, senior enlisted advisor for
Sailors. the program.
“When we show up to “The LREs will have
peoples’ villages and it’s deep organic regional and
the first time they’ve seen cultural expertise,” added
Americans up close, they’re Lt. Jason H. Booher,
usually terrified,” he said. commander of the CET.
“They don’t understand “We’re going to look at the
what’s going on and individual: his background,
contracted translators can’t his education level, his
really help because they tactical competency and
aren’t service members and his experience, then
don’t really know the full deploy him to the location
context of our mission. that will have the greatest
“If we want those who strategic impact.”
have been exposed to combat The idea is based very
situations to understand loosely off the Army’s
Scott A. Thornbloom

what just happened in their “09 Lima” program, the

village,” he continued, “we military occupational
have to bring people who specialty for interpreters.
understand them, their NSW has been in frequent
language, their region and contact with the Army and
their culture. If we don’t TAKE YOUR OATH The first U. S. Navy Sailors to participate in the Secretary of Defense’s several other organizations
Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) pilot program are issued the Oath of
have cultural experts to Citizenship at the Region Legal Service Office.
that have created similar
advise us and translate our programs in the past.
mission, we simply create more insurgents.” “We’ve approached the development of this program from a ‘best
The CET is charged with organizing, manning, training, equipping practices’ perspective of attempting to learn from others’ successes
and deploying language and regional experts (LRE) to strategic and failures,” said Booher.
locations across the NSW area of operations. These experts will Sailors are recruited into the CET through various pipelines,
interface with local cultures and provide other combat support including the Special Operations Forces Access Recruiting Program,

W ay NSW culture movement Kultura ng paggalaw ng NSW ay NSW utamaduni harakati Cultuur NSW beweging m
Filipino Swahili Dutch H
14 ETHOS
 SO1 Joel Beam
BUDDY AID A member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Naval Special Operations Group participates in a battlefield exercise during a combat medic subject
matter expert exchange at Naval Base Cavite, Philippines. The new language and regional experts will be able to assist operators in specific geographical locations.

consisting of the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest The CET will be located away from other NSW units to limit
(MAVNI) and the Navy’s Heritage Language programs. The CET security risks. LREs will deploy and augment NSW operational units
program is a USSOCOM priority and aligns with the U.S. Navy upon successful completion of their individual qualification training
language skills, regional expertise and cultural awareness strategy, and security screening process.
said Booher. Some MAVNI candidates have already graduated recruit training
The MAVNI program is designed to encourage foreign nationals and are in the process of being received at Support Activity 1.
to join the Department of Defense by offering expedited U.S. Deployments are expected to begin next year.
citizenship in return for a four-year enlistment in the military. Prior to MC2 Kevin W. Clark
recruitment, the MAVNI graduates are subjected to extensive security NSWG 2 Public Affairs
screenings due to the sensitive nature of special warfare. This includes
an appearance before an oral board of NSW leadership. Then the
candidates attend recruit training with other Sailors prior to reporting
to the CET.
“The Navy has been very careful to develop a program with
high standards and careful screening to limit the risk,” said Lt. Cmdr.
Renee J. Squier, Navy Recruiting Command liaison to the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations staff. “Because we want them to be
SEALs or in support of SEALs, we knew that security screening was
Lt. j.g. Theresa Donnelly

most important.”
“They’ll come from boot camp and begin training that will
prepare them to be area expert advisors as well as to shoot, move and
communicate,” said Booher.
The training pipeline will be similar to that completed by NSW
combat support personnel. They will learn weapons, communications,
AFTER ACTION An SO1 medic assigned to JSOTF-P critiques students
field medical procedures and everything else they’ll use on the from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Naval Special Operations Group
battlefield on top of what’s required for them to function as competent who are administering first aid to a victim with an arm injury during a field
LREs, said Gearhart. medical exercise.

mouvman kilti NSW a NSW se kultuur beweging NSW kulttuuri liikkuvuus Gerakan budaya NSW DCN’s diwylliant symu
Haitian Creole-Alpha Afrikaans Finnish Indonesian/Malay Welsh
ETHOS 15
OUR GLOBAL
FOOTPRINT
The Center teaches language,
regional expertise and
cultural awareness
As NSW continues to evolve and take on new missions around
the world, it needs to maintain the ability to adapt and rapidly
move into these areas. Just as competent Special Operations
Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur,
language and cultural capabilities cannot be created
after the need exists. NSW must continuously
look forward to the needs of future battlefields,
while continuing to support the operations
of today.
dm. Eric T. Olson, commander of USSOCOM,
directed all SOF forces to dramatically increase their
language and cultural abilities, building highly proficient
operators into the basic units of operations, defined for
NSW as the SEAL platoon. “Our ability to communicate directly
with indigenous peoples in our highest-priority operating areas has
withered significantly,” he said. “In order to regain this essential
mission skill, we must revamp and reprioritize our language training
and management.”
The Naval Special Warfare Center has been tasked with establishing
local (East and West Coasts) language,
regional expertise and cultural awareness
(LREC) training and education
programs to support the NSW Groups.
LREC training will focus on developing
individual linguists as well as provide
deployment specific training support to
every operational element. The goal is to
meet USSOCOM’s guidance of having
one 2/2 (DLPT score for listening/
reading) and one 3/3 qualified linguist in
every tactical element. A level two score
indicates basic proficiency and ease of
cultural comprehension. A level three
score indicates fluent speaking, listening
and writing of target language. This
fluency will include accent and the ability
to form cogent arguments at academic
and thoughtful levels, including abstract
concepts.
More than 400 NSW operators will receive initial acquisition
training (IAT) in foreign languages per year in order to reach the goal
of developing individual linguists. Every new SEAL and SWCC
operator will attend the 12-week IAT training, as will a select group
of current operators in order to meet the requirements of specific
16 ETHOS
deployments. Approximately one quarter of the IAT students will be
selected to move on to advanced language training (12 or 24 weeks),
with the goal of reaching a 2/2 in their target language. The Center
is formalizing a curriculum for immersion and other specialized
programs to sustain fluency and continue to grow an individual’s
capability. This will be flexible enough to support operators despite
duty station and deployment rotation.
LREC training will be provided to tactical units during the inter-
deployment training cycle that is specific to deployment location.
Each unit will receive a two-week LREC primer during professional
development, unit-level training and
squadron integrated training. Role
players with regional language expertise
will be inserted into scenarios, enabling
units to continue to develop their LREC
capabilities in a simulated operational
environment.
Initially, NSW will build a capability
in eight languages tailored to needs of
the current fight while keeping the next
ridgeline in sight. Operators attaining
proficiency in languages are eligible
for additional pay benefits as incentive.
Currently, the targeted languages include
pay bonuses of between $100 and $500
per month based on language, assignment
and proficiency. Up to three bonuses can
be stacked for proficiency in multiple
languages, to a maximum of $1500 per
month.
NSW will develop robust, competent and adaptive language abilities
and cultural understanding across the force and at the tactical levels to
remain at the forefront of special operations.
Lt. Frederick Martin
NSW Center Public Affairs Officer
Since Sept. 11, 2001, the need for SEALs to conduct
global operations has increased dramatically. In
response, Naval Special Warfare’s authorized
enlisted billets have doubled to support the
development of four new NSW squadrons as well
as Support Activities. This rapid growth caused
an immediate and dramatic difference between
authorized end strength and qualified personnel on
hand. This required the community to recruit and
train enlisted SEALs at a dramatic rate in order to
meet battlefield demand.
he growth goal of the community is to balance retention and

Illustration by MC2 Erica Manzano

production. In the first few years following 2001, retention was
challenged by civilian security companies who lured operators
away with large salaries and bonuses for short-term contractor
positions. In 2004, the net loss to the enlisted SEAL inventory was
46. As a result, reenlistment and retention bonuses were dramatically
increased to contend with those external competitors. Retention goals
were set at 75 to 100 per year to make up the deficit of roughly 500
enlisted SEALs; and although retention dramatically improved, the
NSW community only grew by an average of 11 each year from 2005
to 2007.The SEAL Production Process Improvement (SPPI) working
group was established in 2006 to evaluate and guide the process of
increasing production through BUD/S and SQT. The group was
chaired by Deputy Commander USSOCOM (then Vice Adm. Eric
T. Olson) and the Chief of Naval Personnel (then Vice Adm. John
Harvey). Other key members of the board of directors were the
commanders of the three predominant commands that directly affect
recruitment, basic military training, assessment, selection and training
of SEAL candidates: Commander, Naval Recruiting Command
(CNRC); Commander, Naval Services Training Command (CNSTC);
and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC). The
SPPI established cross-functional teams and evaluated the entire
process, from recruitment to recruit training through BUD/S and SQT.
All phases of training were reviewed. A core mission of the SPPI was
to maintain the standards of BUD/S and not sacrifice quality of SQT
graduates simply to gain quantity.
CNRC succeeded in recruiting quality candidates at rates never
before achieved by increasing from approximately 850 recruits to
1,289 annually. CNRC also established the Special Operations Mentor
program at each Naval Recruiting District, pairing a retired SEAL,
EOD or Diver with recruits during their delayed entry program to
ensure that they maintain their PT regimen as well as learn more about
the program prior to entering recruit training.
The Naval Special Warfare Center invested in a robust Recruiting
Directorate (RD) run by a SEAL captain to assist CNRC with its
marketing and recruiting of quality recruits. The NSW RD initiated
multiple studies of successful candidates and contracted Gallup,
a human behavior research organization, to provide data for a
revamped marketing campaign to target successful SEAL candidates.
Additionally, the NSW RD Web site, www.sealswcc.com, provides
potential candidates with accurate and updated information directly
from the Center on physical preparation, nutrition and expectations.
It provides a forum for young men to discuss their own preparations
with each other and RD personnel, which is now realigned under
WARCOM.
CNRC recently implemented an additional classification screening
test at the Recruiting Districts for SEAL recruits. The Computerized
Special Operations Resiliency Test (C-SORT) was developed over
continued
ETHOS 17
 three years by a multi-command group that measures a candidate’s
tolerance for psychological adversity, or “mental toughness.”
When combined with the other significant factor that could predict
success, the candidate’s initial Physical Standards Test, the result
was an assessment that could accurately predict – with 97.5 percent
confidence – who would likely drop out of BUD/S by the completion
of Hell Week. Armed with knowledge gained from C-SORT, CNRC
implemented new policy for recruitment of SEAL candidates and
effectively removed 20 percent of applicants who would have
previously dropped under instruction at the Center.
Naval Recruiting Command has also changed vision standards from
20/200 to 20/40 and 20/75. This more stringent requirement eliminates
about 150 candidates annually who would have to be placed in a

MC2 Michelle Kapica

medical hold status at the Center to receive corrective eye surgery
prior to starting BUD/S. Candidates with the poorer vision historically
were at a severe disadvantage, less likely by half to graduate compared
to their peers with better vision.
Naval Services Training Command focused on decreasing SEAL
candidate losses at recruit training in Great Lakes, Ill. Recruits
with SEAL contracts go through basic training together in a special
division. This allows a medical officer to be available on accession
day to rectify any medical discrepancies found in the recruit’s record.
The special division conducts extra physical training events to keep
them physically fit during boot camp. These measures have reduced
the decline in physical performance traditionally found in boot camp,
and allows recruits to attend the basic training with individuals with
similar career goals.
Following the lead of the EOD and Diver community, NSW
established the Naval Special Warfare Preparatory School at Great
Lakes. This eight-week course following boot camp focuses on
physically and mentally preparing candidates for the rigors of BUD/S.
All enlisted candidates including fleet accessions go through the
course. Candidates work out five days a week, focusing on strength
and conditioning and learning running and swimming techniques and
The mental and
physical quality of
candidates entering
UP AND OVER Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) students battle
through the surf during their last day of Hell Week. SEAL candidates coming to
Coronado for training have already completed an eight-week prep course in Great
Lakes, Ill., hopefully improving their chances of graduating from BUD/S.
other testable skills at BUD/S. Candidates learn SEAL heritage and
history, military bearing, ethics, the SEAL Ethos, mental toughness,
nutrition, stretching and physical training theory. Classes ship from
the NSW Preparatory School as a team and arrive at the Center having
already met entry standards.
Cdr. Brian Sebenaler, commanding officer of the Naval Special
Warfare Basic Training Command, said the Prep School and new
recruiting efforts are producing dramatic results. “Students are more
physically fit and mentally prepared than ever before, and it shows in
the improved success rates, as well as the number of students we are
graduating,” he said.
BUD/S Orientation, formerly INDOC, was restructured to
three weeks to ensure that candidates were not being broken down
physically prior to entering BUD/S. It specifically focuses on
transitioning a “coached” candidate into a safe and knowledgeable
trainee who understands the exercises, standards and requirements of
BUD/S. BUD/S Orientation includes training on the obstacle course,
log PT, IBS (inflatable boat small) drills, open water swimming and
running on the soft beach sand. The standards to transition from
BUD/S Orientation to BUD/S also remain the same as the old INDOC
program.

the BUD/S pipeline

is the highest it
has ever been in
the history of the
program.

18 ETHOS
 medical losses from training. It has a new medical and rehab facility
that is remarkably staffed to support the increased student load and
resultant increase in medical rehab demand. The medical facility
now has an X-ray machine for immediate diagnosis, which enhances
decisions regarding candidate retention in the event of injury. The NSW
medical facility has a direct link to Naval Medical Center San Diego
to rapidly review all specialist’s assessments and radiology reports.
The medical staff educates the instructor cadre on early detection
of injuries and contributing exercises or activities that exacerbate
the possibility of overuse and acute injuries. Curriculum activities
have been modified to lessen potential causes of catastrophic injuries.
For example IBS squats during Hell Week were reduced in response
to an increase in hip and pelvis fractures. The Center continues to
explore the edge of medical science, using a small pill, swallowed by
MC2 Dominique Lasco

candidates before Hell Week, which measures their core temperature

and reports it to a corpsman via a handheld scanner. This allows for
faster, more accurate and more thorough tracking and diagnosis of
heat and cold-related injuries.
KEEPING COUNT Sailors perform pull-ups while taking a physical screening Naval Special Warfare Center’s Commanding Officer, Capt.
test at Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado. Sailors interested in applying for SEAL Stewart Elliott, said “Our program is a systematic, time-proven and
training must not only pass the physical requirements, but must take an exam that objectively verified curriculum – but a curriculum isn’t a program.
evaluates their tolerance for psychological adversity, or “mental toughness.”
The instructors, all combat-proven SEALs, are professional, dedicated
and committed to training the next generation of frogmen.”
In addition to focusing on the candidate and the curriculum, the
The Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL program itself was also Center has focused on supporting the development of its instructors.
carefully examined. The curriculum and standards over the last 20 Every SEAL instructor now attends the Center’s Instructor Qualification
years were left largely unchanged. In 2009, the Naval Audit Service Course. This four-week course not only satisfies Naval Enlisted
was commissioned to analyze BUD/S and recommend changes that Classification requirements, but also addresses the unique situations
might increase candidate success while not jeopardizing fundamental of the SEAL training process. It touches on the philosophy of basic
standards. As a result, they recommended building an “ocean-side training, training techniques, risk management and the psychology of
galley” to reduce the volume of running that was not directly attributed the SOF training environment. Reviewed by instructors as “a course I
to training requirements. This would theoretically reduce candidate wish I had before my LPO tour” and “every E-6 and E-7 should have
rollback and loss rates due to stress this course,” it has been very successful at supporting the transition
fractures. This expeditionary-style of operators and leaders from combat to the training environment and
meal-service facility is scheduled providing them with the skills to be professional instructors.
for construction at Gator Beach The mental and physical quality of candidates entering the BUD/S
and should be ready for use by pipeline is the highest it has ever been in
July. Additionally, the audit team the history of the program. Larger BUD/S
identified the remarkable difference classes are, and will continue to be the new
in success rates between the winter status quo. The quality of new SEALS upon
season and the summer season. The graduation from the 58-week BUD/S and
Center complied and rescheduled SQT training pipeline has never been better.
classes to avoid beginning during The Center consistently interacts with the
the winter season. Now six BUD/S NSW Groups to ensure that the quality of
classes per year will begin between the new SEAL graduate meets current and
February and October vice January future operational requirements. First-time
and October. deploying SQT graduates are meeting or
The Center is also employing exceeding professional development, unit
research and technology and cutting level and squadron integration training
edge protocols to reduce the rate of standards at the Groups and Squadrons and
Spc. Bobby L. Allen Jr.

their performance on the battlefield has

been magnificent.

NSW Center Public Affairs

ETHOS 19
 What would you do if your daughter hadn’t spoken to you
in a month? She’s hurt and angry with you, that much you
know, but why? She won’t speak. When you ask, you fight.
And you’re leaving for deployment in three weeks.
With the current cycle of deployments within NSW, more
parents are faced with this or a similar scenario, more often
than ever before.
In the United States today, about 1.2 million children have
an active duty military parent, and within NSW, about 40
percent of service members have at least one dependent
child under the age of 18. And since 2001, nearly every
child has been affected by a recent or current deployment
of a parent to the combat zones of Iraq or Afghanistan, or
sometimes worse – location unknown.
Wartime deployment takes a toll on both the service member and
family members on the homefront, with multiple deployments often
causing additional stress. Research on parents with stress reactions has
demonstrated that such difficulties interfere with parenting, family life and
child adjustment across a range of contexts, disrupting family roles and
routines, and decreasing support within the family. To date, thousands of
military service members, their children and families are at risk and stand to
benefit from family-centered resiliency training.
The growing awareness of the significant impact of deployments on
military family life and child and family well-being prompted a new initiative
from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Department of the Navy and
the Marine Corps.
In 2007, the Defense Health Board Task Force on Mental Health identified
FOCUS supports the mission of NSW by
providing support to service and family members
in the form of resiliency training.
Mia Bartoletti
Project FOCUS site director, NAB Coronado
20 ETHOS
a critical need for prevention and intervention services to foster resiliency
within military families and initiated with UCLA Project FOCUS.
FOCUS (Families OverComing Under Stress) for the Navy Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery’s (BUMED) is a psychological health resiliency-
building program designed for military families facing the psychological
challenges of combat operational stress during wartime. FOCUS is based
on leading evidenced-based family intervention models for at-risk families
and has been shown to have positive emotional, behavioral and adaptive
outcomes for families. FOCUS services augment existing Navy Medicine
and Navy and Marine Corps community support programs in order to
provide a comprehensive system of care that supports family readiness and
wellness. In addition, FOCUS services are offered to Army and Air Force
families at select installations through funding from DOD Office of Military
Family and Community Policy.
The Marine Corps saw much success in the San Diego area and in 2008,
the FOCUS Project was brought to NSW.
“Communication between a child and a parent is so critical in life –
especially when you are living and dealing with multiple deployments in a
time of war,” said Cmdr. Dave Barnes, the family and community support
program manager for NSW. “We are very grateful to have Project FOCUS
here in the NSW community.”
Resiliency is the ability to effectively cope with, adapt to and overcome
adversity, stress and challenging experiences.
 “FOCUS supports the mission of NSW by providing support to service Some of the
and family members in the form of resiliency training,” explained Mia ways FOCUS
Bartoletti, the NAB Coronado site director for Project FOCUS. “This includes helps families learn
working with parents and children to prepare for upcoming missions, trips to communicate are
and trainings, as well as to assist families throughout the deployment.” to :
Because of the unique nature of NSW missions, FOCUS staff work Help families
closely with family members to understand and adjust services in order to to identify and build upon
provide a highly customized level of family support. their existing strengths
Working with the existing teams of dedicated military family services and positive coping
personnel, FOCUS staff assists families in understanding how combat strategies ,
operational stress affects them and the service family member, how to Increase
manage stress, and how to strengthen their family. parents’ and children’s
understanding of how different
family members might react to
FOCUS uses a structured approach to facilitate engagement and wartime stress,
skill building across the family. Initial sessions focus on preparing family Help service members and
members to identify and share their concerns and understanding of family family members communicate and better
members’ deployment reactions. In separate sessions with parents and understand how each were affected by
children, family members are taught emotional regulation, problem solving, deployment ,
goal setting and communication skills. Work with spouses to better
Families then meet together to share their experiences using these skills support one another in dealing with the
and tools to enhance family communication and support. stressors that can arise from long separations ,
FOCUS works with families to strengthen their skills in meeting many of Assist couples to work more effectively as a team in parenting
the challenges and stressors commonly experienced by military families their children before, during, and after deployment, as well as increase
during wartime, including: parents’ skills in dealing more effectively with some of the emotional and
Children often become worried, sad or even angry about their behavioral reactions that children can have when experiencing stress.
parent leaving for deployment.
Children and parents miss sharing special events together (e.g.,
birthdays, anniversaries, child taking their first steps), as well as the daily Using some of the project’s core components, like parent and child skill
routines of their lives. building, dealing with deployment stress, and goal stressing, families can
Parents may have a hard time readjusting to their usual roles receive a variety of assistance to meet their specific needs.
upon return from deployment (e.g., the non-deployed parent may be used “Family members are provided with an opportunity to get trained and
to handling all the household tasks by themselves, the deployed parent may practice on core resiliency skills, including active communication, effective
have difficulty adjusting to being in a non-combat environment again). problem solving, setting and maintaining goal achievement strategies and
Children may show concerning behaviors, such as acting successful family emotion regulation,” said Bartoletti. “Results of FOCUS
argumentative, disruptive, aggressive, withdrawn or tearful. Similarly, program evaluation suggests that military family members benefit from
couples may argue more, have a harder time communicating, or may higher levels of overall satisfaction and lower distress and difficulties as a
withdraw from each other. result of participation in the program.”
“Our goal is to strengthen communication within the families,” “FOCUS is not the answer to all problems,” Barnes explained. “FOCUS is
Barnes explained. “We should not leave our families with the ‘bill’ from our a tool to help families overcome issues, and they do a great job.”
community being at war for essentially nine years.”
Mandy McCammon
Source information courtesy of BUMED

FOCUS PROJECT POCs

There are resources for Project
FOCUS on both coasts, as well as NAB Coronado Island, California Naval CBC Gulfport, Mississippi
in Mississippi and Hawaii. For more Phone 619.522.7674 Phone 228.224.3457
information, please contact your Mia Bartoletti, Psy.D. Shelly Gomez, LCSW
Site Director Site Director
local representative.
MBartoletti@focusproject.org SGomez@focusproject.org
JEB Little Creek - Fort Story /
NAS Oceana Dam Neck Annex, Virginia Naval Station Pearl Harbor
Phone 757.962.4470 Phone 808.257.7774
Kimberly Lahm, M.A., LMFT Devin Price, LMFT
Site Director Site Director
KLahm@focusproject.org DPrice@focusproject.org

ETHOS 21
 WarZone
Going from the

Home
to the

front

Illustration by MC2 Dominique Lasco

oming home from a deployment can be a
happy occasion, however changing your
state of mind from the battlefield to home
life isn’t as easy as turning off a switch.
Sometimes, a break from both can make
for a smoother transition.
Third location decompression (TLD). You might
think it has something to do with a new science to
decompress persons after a dive. However, it is
actually a program to emotionally “decompress”
special warfare operators and combat support
Sailors returning from deployment.
TLD was first tested by the Canadian Special
Forces with a goal of detecting Post Traumatic

22 ETHOS
Stress Syndrome (PTSD) early. The program
later proved invaluable in not only detecting
PTSD early, but helping members switch from
a high-stress mindset before returning home to
families. After hearing of the success, former
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command,
now Vice Adm. Joseph Kernan, mandated the
program for the NSW squadron post-deployment
schedule and included it as part of the
Operational/Combat Stress Control program.
Before TLD, the cycle for a SEAL team was
to deploy, return and take leave, start training,
begin work ups and deploy again. TLD is now
mandatory between the team’s deployment and
leave period.
Each NSW Group has a different TLD location
chosen for different reasons.
“They are in a city with military infrastructure
that they can tap into, but they are also
completely out in the local economy, where they
“The psychological benefits of TLD and
the family retreats are going to create a
more stable person who can handle multiple
deployments. It is also going to create a more
stable home life that will allow the operator
to handle the deployments better.”
can begin reintegrating with non-military people,”
said Lt. Cmdr. James Celani, Group 1 TLD officer
in charge.
When returning deployers arrive at their TLD
location, they are assisted by a support team to
help keep the desk work, such as checking in
gear and travel claims, to a minimum.
“They are afforded the opportunity to take
a break from the work and the stressors that
accompany that work,” said Celani. “We are
setting up a designated travel claim point where
they can complete and process their claim within
a day. We have worked on the support team
manning and are picking up gear that is sensitive
and making sure that it gets back (to San Diego).”
Deployers are given a hotel room rather
than a barracks to start the relaxation and
decompression process. “We are trying to get
them to relax without the annoyance of someone
asking for their ID card every time they go
somewhere,” said Celani. “It allows them time to
take a shower in a room that has constant hot
water or sleep in a bed that is more comfortable
than what they had been sleeping on.”
Once they settle in, each Sailor attends training
seminars on topics such as dealing with stress,
family reintegration and anger management.
Although not all of the operators who go through
the program have families, Celani said all
personnel go through the same training.
“Maybe one particular piece of info doesn’t
apply to one Sailor but it may apply to people who
you are working with or leading. You have to be
able to be sympathetic to that as a leader.”
They are also given a “checkup from the neck
up” by the Group psychologist.
“They get a brief checkup by the psychologist
to give them the opportunity to talk about issues
they might have after deployment and to address
them prior to going home,” said Cmdr. Eric
Potterat, Group 1 psychologist. “The discussions
are private and confidential, and it gives the
operator a chance to talk about issues that they
may not talk about publicly because they don’t
want to be perceived as weak or crazy.”
This check up is one of the vital parts of TLD. It
allows for the early detection of PTSD and gives
the operator the knowledge of how to handle
combat stress or PTSD once they get home. It
also provides information on further treatment if
necessary.
After completing the mandatory training and
exam, the operator has the next two days free “so
when they come back they have a clear head and
they are fresh and are ready to tackle their next
set of requirements,” said Celani. “They are on
the buddy system, but formal group activities are
not part of the program. We have found people
want to not be part of the big group, they want
a little bit of time to hang out with just a couple
people.”
Many spend it by sightseeing, dining or simply
going for a jog.
Some operators and their spouses were
concerned when they found out the trip home
was delayed. “My wife wondered why I was
spending three days away to blow off steam, why
couldn’t I just come home three days early,” said
one SO1. “Once I explained it to her though, she
got onboard with the program.”
Despite some objections from both family and
operators, feedback on TLD has overall been
positive and most understand why the program is
necessary.
“I had a good time,” said Chief Special Warfare
Operator William Gibbens. “It was managed
extremely well. The support staff there managed
both the force protection and the moving of
people so there wasn’t any trouble.”
Gibbens, having previously deployed four
times, said the TLD stop combined with a family
retreat organized by Group 2 capped off a good
deployment. Other SEALs just enjoyed the time
to relax.
“My favorite part was really just having a beer
with my meal, sitting back and getting a chance to
relax and kick back with my friends,” remarked a
West Coast-based SEAL. “It’s nice to switch over
from that combat atmosphere to something more
normal.”
SOC (SEAL) William Gibbens
Force Medical Tactical Advisor
Currently it is each Group’s responsibility
to monitor, organize and execute the training
according to instruction. As of the end of March,
all the SEAL teams will have rotated through
TLD at least once. The Groups closely monitor
changes and feedback, and certain adjustments
have been made to accommodate the ever-
changing deployment cycles of NSW squadrons.
As of now, only operators and support personnel
that have been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq
go through TLD. Individual Augmentees and other
DoD personnel continue a war fighter transition
program elsewhere.
The TLD program will continue for the
foreseeable future, and many operators agree
that continuing it would benefit the future of the
NSW community.
“The psychological benefits of TLD and the
family retreats are going to create a more stable
person who can handle multiple deployments,”
said Gibbens. “It is also going to create a more
stable home life that will allow the operator to
handle the deployments better.”
MC2 Dominique Lasco
ETHOS 23
Illustration by MC2 John Scorza
It is commonly understood
that over the course of a
career, most warfighters
will experience some type of
injury. Naval medical experts
often compare warfighters to
professional athletes and refer to
them as tactical athletes. A career
tactical athlete will typically
complete 20 years or more of active
military service. In comparison, the average
pro baseball player career span is a mere 5.6
seasons and the average professional football
player lasts only 3.5 seasons, according to
professional players associations. The tactical
athlete may sustain a wide variety of injuries
during 20-plus “seasons” that sports athletes
would not expect, some similar, such as
torn knee ligaments and some unusual like
gunshot wounds.
“If you compare SEALs to professional
“Ultimately, this will help
us accomplish
which is to expand the
functional lifespan of
the operators.”
24 ETHOS
athletes, it’s a similar demanding lifestyle,
but probably more rigorous,” said Lt. Kirk
Parsely, medical officer for NSW Group 1.
Lt. Cmdr. Jim Cowan, head of BUD/S
physical therapy, said his patients today are
not regarded as “an injured military guy, but
rather as an injured athlete.”
With that in mind, NSW medical
professionals are investing in sports
medicine, human performance practices,
and specialized staffing for treatment and
prevention of injuries to special operations
personnel. According to Capt. Scott Jonson,
NSW deputy force medical officer, this
fiscal year SOCOM allocated funding to
the components to begin Warrior Human
Performance and Sports Medicine programs
for operators. This initiative sprouted into
NSW’s Tactical Athlete Program (TAP).
“TAP is designed to combine sports
medicine and human performance initiatives
our goal
- Lt. Kirk Parsely,
Group 1 medical officer
for NSW tactical athletes to optimize injury
recovery, physical training, and overall
continuous performance and longevity,”
summed Jonson.
“Our new program model is more in line
with a division one (collegiate) program or
professional organization,” said Cowan.”They
(NSW Groups) will have sports medicine
rehab personnel, a nutritionist, and really
move toward preventative and performance
types of programs.”
This year alone, SOCOM has funded
WARCOM with $2.2 million to hire 15 civilian
subject matter experts to aid tactical athletes
in performance and injury recovery. These
specialists include strength and conditioning
coaches, nutritionists, rehabilitation experts,
and sports psychologists. Additionally, $15
million is budgeted for the program over the
next six years.
“Ultimately, this will help us accomplish
our goal which is to expand the functional
lifespan of the operators,” said Parsely. “We
want to make them able to withstand the
rigors of the job for 20 years and still be able
to live a healthy life.”
In addition to getting more help at the group
level, BUD/S Medical is looking to round out
its staff. Currently, BUD/S Medical has two
physical rehabilitation personnel helping 900
students per month. It will gain two strength
and conditioning coaches this year.
The TAP model is broken down into two
sections: human performance and sports
medicine.
 “The human performance model was
designed to enhance the physical performance
capabilities of healthy individuals,” said
Jonson. “The sports medicine model was
designed to diagnose and treat injuries and
rehabilitate athletes.”
These two models, said Jonson, are
designed to work together to individually
tailor a road map for injury prevention and
recovery.
NSW experts agree that preventive care is
an essential part of keeping tactical athletes

MC2 John Scorza

healthy.
“The way you’re going to get 20 years
out of SEALs is to prevent them from being
injured, not to recuperate their injuries
WATERY WEIGHTS SN Shaun Roberts and HM3 Justin Richins, BUD/S candidates, train in the BUD/S state
more quickly,” said Parsely. “There is a of the art swimming pool to help them recover from thier injuries.
big difference between treating disease and
maintaining health.” program for several years. With the increase buying in to the program,” said Wood. “We’ve
Data collection is becoming a bigger in funding, NSW now has the opportunity to progressed a lot and things seem to be going
element in injury prevention. NSW is blend best practices across the force. pretty well, but we are still learning and still
collaborating with the University of Pittsburgh “The last two years we’ve been able to refining new programs and ideas. Things are
to gather data to detect trends of what injuries combine team and individual level training only going to keep getting better.”
are caused on specific career paths. Currently, programs,” said Dallas Wood, Group 2 human According to NSW Force Medical Officer
data is collected by all medical centers performance program manager. “We have Capt. Gary Gluck, “Our vision of the Tactical
treating tactical athletes. Teams and centers designed performance enhancing programs Athlete Program is to draw the very best
are working together to streamline the type of specific to unit level training.” practices from the Teams, human performance,
data to be tracked to help paint a clear picture Wood is proud of the progress NSW has sports medicine and professional athletes
of how injuries occur and where they occur. made and is optimistic about the TAP model’s alike to develop a comprehensive physical
“Maintaining health is all about prevention future. lifestyle that encompasses the entirety of an
and as we get more educated on the mechanism “We’ve received a lot of positive feedback operator’s career and beyond.”
and trends of what’s causing the injuries from the operators and they seem to be really
within the teams, we’ll be able to predict MC2 John Scorza
certain injuries,” said Parsely. “Once we can
predict them, then we can prevent them.”
“We’re reaching out (to operators) through
videos and documents on the Web site (www.
sealswcc.com) which are mainly preventive
strength programs,” said Cowan.
Prior to and during BUD/S, experts reach
out to new recruits to stress preventive care.
Once a recruit has been selected for the SEAL
program, they are provided a mentor to help
prepare them for training. The mentors, who
receive specialized training themselves,
are retired and former SEALs strategically
located in in regions around the United States
to maximize contact.
As a result of the Web site and mentors,
Cowan said stress fracture rates at BUD/S
have fallen from 16 percent to four percent
in the last two years. “Stress fractures are our
most common injury at BUD/S,” said Cowan.
“For every stress fracture, candidates will
lose roughly 110 days of training.”
MC2 John Scorza

The NSW Groups and Teams have

been on the leading edge of this initiative,
experimenting with versions of the TAP

ETHOS 25
NHRC’S WARFIGHTER
PERFORMANCE LAB
STUDYING THE MILITARY’S MOST COMPLEX WEAPON
Wouldn’t it be something if the Navy had a virtual reality
simulator that could test a military member’s performance in battle
without putting anyone in danger? Or, test how warfighters are able
to think in extreme hot or cold environments? A place where the latest
equipment is tested to its limits? Wouldn’t it be something if there was
a research facility available where you could walk in, pose virtually
any question and have scientists find the answer?
This place is not a fantasy. Naval Health Research Center’s (NHRC)
Warfighter Performance Lab, located at Naval Base Point Loma, is
that place.
The lab’s goal is to provide Sailors and Marines with a warfighting
“
edge through advances in human performance, protection, autonomy
and power and energy. In the simplest terms, the lab helps to improve
the warfighter.
The main research explored by the lab includes applied physiology
and biomechanics, applied cognitive science, epidemiology, physical
therapy and psychology.
The Warfighter Performance Lab is an 8,100 square-foot facility
equipped with state of the art equipment such as a Virtual Environment
The VE research will be used to optimize warfighter
capabilities as well as advance the rehabilitation of
wounded warriors.
26 ETHOS
(VE) system, dual-temperature chambers, Dual-Energy
X-ray Absorptiometers (DXA) and much more.
NHRC ‘s $1.1 million VE system is one of only 15 VE systems in
the world, three of which are located in the United States.
The VE is a full biomechanics and exercise physiology lab on a
motion platform that can pitch, yaw and roll by 25 degrees. On the
platform, is an integrated split-belt (side-by-side) treadmill and
instrumented force plates to measure the pressures applied during
walking, running or marching. In front of the motion platform is a
nine-foot tall screen that curves 180 degrees around the platform to
view programmed simulations. The environment is also equipped
with a full-motion capture volume to record the subject’s movements.
These movements are picked up from reflective markers similar to the
ones used in making video games.
“By placing little reflective markers all over their body, you can
record exact movements in real time,” said Senior Chief Damage
Controlman Eric Duckworth, lab manager. “The markers control the
interaction between the subject and the computer program. The system
can also be integrated with other equipment such as reduced-oxygen
”
- Capt. Lanny Boswell,
head of Warfighter Performance
MC2 John Scorza

breathing devices to simulate different altitudes.”
“The screen is used so we can create an immersive environment for
people to move in,” said Lt. Jamie Bartlett, Warfighter Performance
Lab’s operations officer. “Right now we have eight programs including
a virtual Afghanistan where we can perform studies as if the warfighter
was out in the field. The platform moves in sync with the terrain, so
when they see an incline they feel an inclination of the platform while
moving on the treadmill belt. It feels realistic.”
“We intend to use virtual environments as a research platform to
immerse subjects in realistic military environments and see how they
perform,” said Bartlett. “For example, load carriage is a big issue now.
We can test a subject in full battle rattle, with a 150-pound pack on
his back and walk at patrol pace in Afghanistan terrain. While moving
in this environment, not only can we examine the effects of load and
fatigue on the body, we can also see how they do performing cognitive
tasks such as land navigation, working memory, identifying targets or
using a first-person shooter type of simulation.”
Experts agree that although all warfighters will benefit from VE
research, personnel within the Special Operations Forces may see the
greatest impact from the research.
“The VE will be critical for studying groups that continually operate
in diverse and highly extreme environments such as SWCC and SEAL
units,” said Bartlett. “The changing demands of their duties make
them one of the military’s most complex weapon systems and now we
have the ability to keep up.”
“This lab is very unique,” said Capt. Lanny Boswell, head of
Warfighter Performance. “With it, we can immerse a warfighter in a
virtual reality and measure his physical and cognitive performance
simultaneously. Once this is fully developed we can study
operationally-relevant issues in a controlled environment. The VE
research will be used to optimize warfighter capabilities as well as
advance the rehabilitation of wounded warriors.”
Although the VE is a huge acquisition for the lab, it’s not the only
tool used for testing and research. The lab’s temperature chambers are
beginning to play a bigger role.
“These are used a lot for heat tolerance testing,” said Bartlett. “For
Never-ending room City walk Simulation
(bottom left) Senior Chief Damage Controlman Eric
Duckworth test out a program on the VE simulator used
to enhance the performance of warfighters and rehabili-
tate wounded warriors. (top left) Dr. Jessie Hascall and
Lt. Jamie Bartlett perform a load carriage test during a
study.(below) Sailors test out the joint-service aircrew
mask developed by NHRC.
U.S. Navy Photo
U.S. Navy Photo
example, if a guy falls out on a 15-mile march from a heat injury, they
would recover, then come back here and see if they are truly recovered;
or, if their core temperature jumps right back up during testing, we
would know then that they have a physiological problem. We can put
people on treadmills, bikes or on whatever we need to in order to
accurately test them in an extreme temperature environment.”
BUD/S Medical is now sending patients with heat related injuries to
the Warfighter Performance Lab for testing.
“Patients who have had a heat stroke are sent over to NHRC after
six weeks of recovery to find out if they have an inborn problem with
cooling off their bodies,” said Cmdr. James Doran, BUD/S senior
medical officer. “Based on if they can show normal physiology in a
heat environment, we will put them back into the program (BUD/S).”
“Creating a cold environment within the chamber is used for
studying performance with hypothermia,” said Bartlett. “One of our
scientists is working on a wet clothing study. You have these SWCC
guys out there getting soaked, moving really fast. Well, what happens
is you get cold. So, we are studying the clothing they wear as well as
the adverse effects of how these guys perform mentally while being
under adverse temperatures and conditions.”
For more than three decades, the Warfighter Performance Department
has been a leader in applied physiology and cognitive science research
and will continue to provide Sailors and Marines with a war fighting
edge through their research efforts.
MC2 John Scorza
Virtual Afghanistan Boat driving simulation
ETHOS 27
 chance, and have trusted us to keep striving and
to get better. They teach us to trust ourselves.
The LPO, the chief, the platoon commander, the
CO develop their subordinates, by trusting them
to do things they may have never done before.
The coach as leader takes risk by giving Trust.
In my own leadership, Trust is something I give
to subordinates initially and readily, and it is then
theirs to lose. I have rarely been disappointed,
but I have been disappointed. That’s part of the
deal.
Machiavelli: Machiavelli warns us against
trusting unwisely and counsels us to exercise
prudent caution in whom we trust. We must
protect ourselves from predators who would
manipulate or exploit us, who seek their own
ends at our expense. Yes, these people also
exist in the Navy and even in the Teams, though
in the crucible of life in the Teams, they are
usually found out. Machiavelli saw the world as
Mother Theresa, an unforgiving place, in which self-serving people
the Coach, compete, sometimes viciously, in the game of life,
eagerly preying upon those who are less clever
and Machiavelli or less wary than themselves. Without being
deceitful, one must be wary of those for whom
being trustworthy is not as important as their
TRUST IS an essential element in any high functioning organization, but especially in a small, personal ambition. This practical aspect of Trust
very inter-dependent special operations unit. I’ve always thought that an important part of pre- was reflected in Benjamin Franklin’s axiom, “Love
deployment training is sorting out Trust issues within a platoon, a Team, a task unit, a boat det. No thy neighbor; yet don’t pull down your hedge.”
one wants to deploy with someone they don’t trust; members of a Team must trust each other not But then, Will Rogers once said, “I would rather
only to do their job to the best of their ability, but also to put the Team’s success ahead of their own be the person who bought the Brooklyn Bridge
personal comfort and advantage. When we deploy overseas, for training or combat, we insist on than the one who sold it.”
deploying with others who will ‘have our back,’ no matter what the circumstances. This short essay Trust is a complicated subject; books have
is a simple look at three aspects of Trust I think are important. been written about it, to include “The Speed of
Mother Theresa: The Mother Theresa side of Trust speaks to that part of us which seeks to Trust: the One Thing that Changes Everything,”
be good. An essential part of being good is being trustworthy, in almost any context. Trust is recently published by Stephen M. R. Covey.
something we seek for ourselves, and when we’ve earned it, we’ll do almost anything to preserve Here I’ve distilled the complexity of Trust
it. That part of us which is ‘good’ is not deceitful, in word, deed or demeanor. If what we say is down into three simple dimensions: First, be
false or we fail to keep a commitment, it is either unintentional, or due to circumstances beyond our trustworthy; second, don’t be afraid to give Trust;
control, or because our initial commitment may be over-ridden by the dictates of honor, common third, don’t foolishly expose yourself by trusting
sense or a good greater than our own. In striving to be ‘good,’ we consider it a matter of honor to unwisely. Like so much in leadership and ethics,
be trustworthy – to never do anything that would cause anyone to question our integrity. good judgment and experience are necessary
The Coach: Being a good coach is a key function of effective leaders at all levels. All good to effectively balance these three imperatives.
leaders are coaches – we have all been developed by our mentors, and good leaders, in turn, Trust is (ideally) a two-way street; for the truly
develop others. The coach, the boss, the person in charge, develops subordinates by trusting trustworthy, the two-way street becomes a
them. Sometimes our coaches have pushed us and trusted us when we weren’t sure we were network of roads and highways which allow the
ready. Even when we have failed, good coaches have continued to trust us, have given us another rich flow of positive energy and collaboration
between and among trustworthy people. This is
what we strive for in the teams, in our Navy, and,
Trust is (ideally) a two-way street; for in fact, in our society.

the truly trustworthy, the

Bob Schoultz retired after
two-way street becomes a network spending 30 years as a
of roads and highways which allow NSW officer. He is currently
the Director of the Master
the rich flow of positive energy and of Science in Global
collaboration between and among Leadership School of Business
trustworthy people. Administration at the University
of San Diego.
28 ETHOS
 Koran, Kalashnikov from differing regions, provinces and tribes. His
superb assessment not only provides insight into
and Laptop: the key factors of the insurgency, but also the
failures of the counterinsurgency to orchestrate a
The Neo-Taliban consistent strategy.
In the last chapter, Giustozzi smartly
Insurgency in acknowledges that the Neo-Taliban influence is
Afghanistan not independent of the counter-insurgency efforts
waged by the state of Afghanistan and its allies.
By Antonio Giustozzi
Since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001,
After studying Afghanistan and its counter-insurgency policies since Giustozzi aptly brings to light the high turnover
the pro-Soviet regime in the early 1980’s, Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, a of senior military officers and the consequent
variation of coalition strategies. These coalition
research fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, strategies fluctuated between targeting insurgents
offers a striking portrait of the resurgent Taliban and why it is making a through conventional “clear and sweep”
comeback. His extremely well researched monograph plainly identifies operations versus the irregular warfare approach
significant events that sparked the birth of a Neo-Taliban insurgency, that seeks to separate the population from the
marked its growth, and displayed glaring incongruities of allied insurgents. This inability of the coalition to remain
counter-insurgency strategy. As the national debate over Afghanistan consistent gave the Neo-Taliban insurgency
enough political and physical space to develop
persists, this book provides an authoritative social context that must be their strongholds.
understood by all Special Operations Forces personnel currently serving, Now, two years after this book was published,
or soon to be, downrange in Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal is faced with the
In his book, Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency would have been nothing more than same Neo-Taliban insurgency that has grown in
a “mere annoyance” if it had not been able to exploit weaknesses within the state of Afghanistan and strength. Coalition hopes have been pinned on
counter-insurgency efforts had been quicker to identify the sources of the insurgency and appropriately the U.S. military commander, but the key factor to
mitigate them. He effectively supported his argument through a litany of relevant sources and a success is the special operators remotely located
systematic chapter structure. and on the ground. Any special operator with a
Giustozzi divides his book into six chapters, five of which concern the Neo-Taliban insurgency future deployment to Afghanistan would do well to
sources, recruitment, organization, strategy and tactics. Appropriately, the sources of the insurgency read this book. It is not enough that the general
are identified first and help characterize the Neo-Taliban movement as one that maintains fundamental in charge understand the inherent complexities
Taliban beliefs coupled with an aspect of selectivity. This selectivity becomes a reoccurring theme as of the insurgency in Afghanistan; the counter-
the Neo-Taliban seeks to utilize new technology, strategies and tactics that the old Taliban regime did insurgency practitioners must be the ones to
not practice. successfully engage the populace to achieve a
Perhaps the most significant component to the Neo-Taliban insurgency was the shift in policy real victory.
concerning the various tribes within Afghanistan. Instead of maintaining a rigid standard concerning
Lt. W. Jake Roberts
which tribes or individuals should be included within the Taliban organization, the Neo-Taliban Roberts is a Navy SEAL and has made
movement took a more open stance willing to accept any ethnicity or tribal affiliation. Giustozzi goes deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and the
to great length to highlight the effect of this strategy in garnering popular support amongst Afghans Philippines.

Any special operator with a future deployment to Afghanistan would do well to read this
book. It is not enough that the general in charge understand the inherent complexities of
the insurgency in Afghanistan, the counter-insurgency practitioners must be the ones to
successfully engage the populace to achieve a real victory.
SEAL Lt. W. Jake Roberts

ETHOS 29
 PREVENTING
SEXUAL ASSAULT IS
EVERYONE’S DUTY.
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228-596-0697 757-438-3504
HAWAII: SAN DIEGO:
808-722-6192 619-692-5909