150 IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. PWRD-1, No.

2, April 1986

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING-

STEP AND TOUCH POTENTIALS NEAR TRANSMISSION STRUCTURES

PART I BACKGROUND

A report prepared by the Working Group on Transmission Line

Structure Grounding, Towers, Poles and Conductors Subcommittee.
G. B. Niles (Chairman), R. Baishiki, J. W. Cartwright, F. Dawalibi,
W. K. Dick, W. G. Eisinger, J. G. Engimann, W. G. Finney, R. J. Heh,
D. C. Hubbard, D. T. Jones, H. T. Lam, D. J. Nichols, H. Parker,
P. D. Quinn and R. Ralston.

ABSTRACT 2.0 Fault Current Available At Structure

The fault current magnitude available at a

This paper provides background Information transmission structure and its duration is major a con-

for analyzing step and touch potentials near transmis-
sion structures. A companion paper provides engineer-
ing evaluation for analyzing these potentials.
1.0 TNT'RODUCTION
Recent papers have cited concern for the pos-
sible hazard of step and touch potentials near faulted
transmission structures [1,2 ,3 ,4 ,51 Step and touch
. faults to be considered: phase to phase, three phase,
potentials have been included as a design parameter in
substation ground grid design. The methodology gener-
ally used is that as given by [61 However, in the
. sequence equivalent network, and the phase to phase
case of potentials due to faults on a transmission line
the same methodology may not be appropriate. Reasons
for this include the multiplicity of factors to con-
sider in the transmission line case: the fault current
available at the structure base, the resultant poten-
tial gradient voltage, the safe voltage limit for a
person, and, most importantly, the probability of the
fault occuring at the place and time coincidently with
a person being there. These factors will be discussed,
with examples so that the transmission line design en-
gineer can apply a methodology universally understood.
In many cases, there is not definitive knowledge to ab-
solutely define the parameters (i.e. design equations),
but a conservative value for these parameters could be
used. In the transmission 1-ine design case there is
normally a wide variation of parameters along the line
(soil differences, structure differences, population
density, .istance from substation). Therefore, en-
gineering judgement has to be used in most cases.
The scope of this paper cannot answer all the
questions concerning step and touch potentials for
humans relative to the transmission line case. Tt is
hoped that this paper will stimulate much discussion on
this topic so that the transmission line design en-
gineer is fully aware of the scope and parameters to be
investigated if a problem is suspected. Moreover, it is
hoped that this paper will stimulate inves-
sideration n assessing step and touch potentials. The
type of fault, the size and conductivity of any shield
wires and the distance along the transmission line to
the terminal source are factors to consider.
2.1 Type of Faults
There are four general types of short circuit
single phase to ground, and two phase to ground. The
three phase fault involves only the so called positive
uses both the positive and negative sequence networks.
Since in this paper we are concerned with ground fauilts
(current flowing to faulted structures base or to other
structure bases via a shield wire), then the first two
fault currents are of no concern to this topic. For
the two phase to ground case, the fault current out on
the transmission l ine is less than the single phase to
ground case and occurs less often. Therefore, the
single phase to ground fault would be of greatest con-
cern and will be the only type of fault considered.
2.2 Effect of Location From Terminal
Generally, the fault current value decreases
as the distance between the feeding point and the fault
increases. Tn analyzing potentials along a line a
problem might exist near a feeding point, but further
out along the line the total fault current would
decrease to a level which might not cause a problem.
The effect is shown in Figure 1 reproduced from Sebo
[2]. This example shows little decrease in fault cur-
rent for spans beyond 10 - 20 spans from the feeding
point. Ic is the current in the compensating conduc-
tors (shield wires) and Tp is the total fauilt cuirrent.
0.a

tigation/research into the areas not fully understood. P ' io OHM METERS
Pt
S OHMS DISTANCES SKTWEEN
This paper is intended for analysis of transmission A 0.1 OHM d ., o0 POINTS tPPAPS ANDP5511
FAULT(PI:
RpI$0.ION
*I - f: 15 VAN%
systems and not distribution systems. Generally fault b FPA-F: 10 SPANS,
current magnitudes are not sufficient on distribution 475 MCM. ACSR GROUND WIRE d FPA - r 3 S
circuits for step/touch potential concerns, although .e4,: FP- Fr I SPANs
the methodology could be applied if warranted.
b
-_~~~ ____*

655 S-t 393-4 A oaoer, recomrcercdeo ard ao-2rc'veo

by the IEEE Trarsmission anc Distributioni Commrnittee 0.

of the X Prowqer Eri!i-r4eeririp SEciet.y tr oreseritfa-

tion at the IEEE/P-ES 1E985 Surisrer Meetirc. Vanrctuver,
O"T -r_
FEEDING
B.C., Caracda, July 14 - 19, 1985. Mar,',-cv-iot sub- FAULT a0 .__NT___
as to 10 0 to as
.l*tted AoriLi l985; mace availabie fo,r orintirn
0

SPANS
r:s
s i 198 .
Ground vire currents, affect of the
FIGURE 1 location of thG fault and the distance
between the feeding point and the
fault, in the case of a fault fed fron
both sides.

0885-8977/86/0004-0150$01.00O1986 IEEE
 151

2.3 Effect of Shield Wire 2.4 Division of Current At Structure

A shield wire (sky wire) is primarily used to The division of fault current between a struc-
prevent direct 1lightni.ng strokes to transmi ssion 1lines. ture and the shield wire is a critical design factor
Tt thereby decreases the number of total faults on a for ground potential calculation. Tn addition, this
line (many faults are due to back flashover faults). design factor can also be critical in ana.yzing the
The minimizing of faults s a direct effect of shield
i sizing of the shield wires for fusing. Several methods
wires. Tn the phase to ground fatult case the shi.eld are available to determine the resultant fault current
wire acts as a neuitral conductor to carry fault current in the different sections.
back to the source. This fault cuirrent returni-ng in
the shield wire can be a substantial amount of the to- Two approaches can be used to determine the
tal, whi-ch decreases the amount at the faulted struc- fault current division. The first is by using the
ture base [71. fault current data computed for substation areas which
are generally known for setting relays and determining
Many shield wires are insulated for com- breaker size. Using the lumped parameter method from
munication and l-oss reasons. However, the insulation [rll and simpl-ifying the ladder network of Figure 2a to
is not adequate to prevent flasbovers at the shield that of 2b yi-elds the structure current of:
wire structure interface, but the voltage is reduced at
adjacent structures until flashovers do not occur.
According to tests and computer simulations, the fault IT = IF (. 5 Z°o
current available at a faulted structure is increased (ZT + .5 Zo )
(1)
when insulated shield wires are used compared to nonin-
sulated shiel-d wires [8]. A safety factor of 1.5 for Where ZoO = 1/2 Zs + (Zs ZT + 1/4 Zs)2 (2)
the insulated case based on computation of the nonin-
sulated shield wire case was ulsed in [8) .
For 7T = 15 ohms and Zs = .231 ohms (305 m
Inspection of Figure 2c shows that i f Zs is
small relative to ZT then very little fault current span, 7 # 8 Alumoweld at 25 C and two shield wires),
the structure current would be:
flows to the structure base and the potential rise of
the structure is proportional to the parallel combina-
tion of the two portions of Zs. Likewise, the struc-
ture potential rise is proportional to ZT if ZT is
small compared to Zs. The effect of shield wire con- IT = IF 15
.5 (1.98)
+ .5 (1.98)
= .062 IF (3)
ductivity is discussed in secti-on 5.1 which shows rela-
tive percentage distri.bution for the fault current
distribution.
Rudenberg [91 uses a similar approach which
involve transcendental functions but yiel-ds a similar
answer as Equation 3.

This approximate approach may be adequate to

Zs
obtain a "ballpark" estimate of the current division.
However, there are restrictions to this method such as
the assumption of constant shield wire impedance, con-
stant structure impedance, and inaccuracy occurs when
the fault is close to the terminal station. Moreover,
the fault current used (i.e., TT) is often calculated
on the basis of zero ground impedances and average soil
resistivity and without mutual effects considered.
The second approach is based on more accurate

a. analytical methods which can Include many more para-

meters. Several methods are avail.able but require com-
puters because of the complexity. Powever, engineering
If
work is minimal and the computations require moderate
space for computer memory and little CPTJ timae. Tt is
tlr zs beyond the scope of this paper to give the description
of these methods but the reader is referred to [101 for
Zr 1/2 ZO Zr
further information. It should also be noted that
recent work by FPRT has made avail-able computer
programs to use for this calcul.ation [81.

3.0 Step and Touch Potential. Gradient Vol-tage

b. C.

Step and touch potentials in the vicinity of

transmission
structure are one of the factors neces-
Zs is impedance per spr sary when the safety of the grounding system is con-
step potential is that voltage
IF A
Section 4.

is total fault curr ent bridged by the separation of a persons' step. A touch
potential is that vol-tage bridged by touching

IT is
person

structure currenl a structuire while

FIGURE 2 standing. The separation assumed for

1
both
usually meter. Fault current,
i-s

ZT is structure impedaince resistivity and the grounding system geometry are

soil
im-

portant factors in determining these potentials.

152

3.1 Step and Touch Voltage Difference

TABLE 1
A tuseful electrode model to consider for the
grounding resistance of a transmission structure when TYPICAL ELECTRICAL SOIL RESISTIVITIES
analyzing step or touch potentials is an equivalent
hemisphere. This hemisphere grounding electrode would Electrical Resistivity
have a radius r with a uniform resistivity of p . The Type of Soil (ohm-m)
potential difference between the center of electrode
and a point X, on the surface of the earth due to a 20
current I is: Saturated organic clay or silt 5 -

Saturated inorganic clay or silt 10 - 50

V = (4)
2 r X Hard, partially saturated clay & silt 50 150
Saturated sand and gravel 50 -
150
Inspecting Equation (4) plotted in Figure 3 reveals
that a larger percentage of the voltage i.s cl.ose to the Shale, dry clay and silt 100 -
500
structure. The touch potential involves this steepest
part of the voltage curve whereas the step potential
Sandstone, dry sand, gravel 200 -
2,000
usually involves the flatter part of the voltage curve
as seen in Figure '.
Sound Crystalline rock 1,000 -
10,000
This simple model assumes uniform soil resistivity and
that the current in the grounding electrodes is equally source [11]
divided and discharges into earth uniformly along the
length of each electrode. Tt is cautioned that
point of water. At 0 C the water in the soil begins to
simplified formulas can fail to accurately predict the freeze and the resistivity increases rapidly. Figure 4
results, sometimes within an order of magnitude, in Curve 2 shows this typical variation for a sandy loam
most cases where the soil structure and grounding con-
soil containing 15.2 percent moisture by weight [12].
figuration is complex. A more detailed model, such as
the equivalent cylindrical elements approach [8] will The composition and the amount of soluble
yield more accurate results. salts, acids or alkali present in the soil may have a
considerable effect on the resistivity. Figure 4
Curve 3, illustrates a typical effect of salt (sodium
chloride) on the resistivity of a soil containing 30
percent moisture by weight [121.
ixo

; Il lej!
;iI;L
Curve l3 Curve 2

(moistureY_ temperature)

E.0 Curi TI Fli.i

o
. (asalit) L fIu

iiiiii T i ;i

1 2 , 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 I

0 5 10 15 20 25 0 35 J.0 %r ?CZSVX
FIG 3 TOUCH AND STEP POTENTIALS
NEAR GROUNDED STRUCTURE
-20 .15 40 -, 0 .5 .10 *15 .20 Ot TPeIMAn=
WITH HEMISPHERE ELECTRODE
Figure 4 Effect of Salt, Moisture, and Temperature
3.2? Soil Resistivity on Soil Resistivity [12]
The earth resistivity (p) varies with the
type of soil and also with temperature, moisture con- 3.3 Multilayer Soil
tent and chemical. content. Representative values of
resistivity for each material. are given in Table [11. The variability of soil resistivity described
in Section 3.2 is based on the assumption that the soil
Electrical conduction in soil is essential-ly is uniform and that the resistivity does not vary
electrolytic. For this reason the resistivity of most laterallTy or with depth. The soil can be considered
soils increase abruptly wheneve r the moisture content essentially uniform if the resistivity does not change
accounts for less than 15 percent of the soil weight. for a distance horizontally or vertically of 3 times
As shown in Figure 4 Curve 1, the resistivity is little the diagonal dimension of the grounding electrode.
affected when the moisture content exceeds 22 percent.
Moisture content may be decreased by the drying effect When resistivity varies considerably as a
of current flowing from a grounding electrode into the function of depth, it is possible In many situations to
sturrounding soil. model the earth with sufficient accuracy as two layers
of appropriate thickness and resistivity. TEFE Guide
The effect of temperature on soi1 resistivity 81 provides methods for determining the equivalent
is nearly negligible for temperature above the freezing resistivity of upper and lower layers and the thickness

of the upper layer ( 13] . Tn addition, a computer
program as described in 18] is available from EPRT
which models two layer soil based on soil resistivity
readings.
4.0 Safety Considerations
Step and touch potential gradients can
develop around a transmission structure when fault cur-
rent or lightning current flows to ground. These
gradients, if bridged by a person with a low path
resistance will cause a resultant current to flow
through the person. The current flow through the per-
son is the ultimate factor to be assessed from a safety
consideration. From Figure 5 the current for touch
potential would be:
ITP= (Vr - Vs)/Req
for step potential:
Isp= (Vsa - Vsb)/Req
4.1 Function of Current
Al-lowable step and touch potentials refer
only to the low intensity current affecting respiratory
arrest or heart fibrillation (circulatory arrest). The
burning and charring which occurs at high current in-
tensities are associated with direct contact of ener-
gized conductors. Respiratory arrest occurs because of
the contraction of chest tiuscles but, for shock dura-
tions of a few seconds or less, respiratory arrest is
unlikely. Therefore, heart fibrillation, which is the
random contraction and relaxation of the heart muscles
resulting in a loss of the pumping action of the heart,
is the main safety issue for step and touch potentials.
Thuis the current which can bridge the heart
is of vital concern, but there is no easy method to ac-
curately calculate the current. The reason i.s the
equivalent circuit for the step and/or touch contact
has many parameters for which it is difficult to assign
values. The general method used to derive a current
value is by tests done on animals which are extrapo-
lated in terms of values to humans. With step and
touch potential accidents, contact would be made
through the extremities (hands or feet) and only an un-
known fractions of the total current would reach the
heart areas. R_ R_
I
R6
RI
(a) TOUCHCONTACT TYPE
ACTUAL CIRCUIT
(b) STEP CONTACT TYPE
FTGURE 5 Touch and Step Contact Type
(Adapted from [8])
153
4.2 Variable Factors
The current needed to initiate the heart
fibrillation i.s influenced by various parameters. The
most significant are current frequency, current dura-
tion and body path characteristics. Power frequency
currents are generally either 50 or 60 Hz. The current
duration is the time for a fault to be cleared.
Current path characteristics involve the path followed
by the current and may be influenced by several
factors.
Frequency is important in the response
mechanism of the bi-ol.ogical tissue of a person. If the
frequency is too high, the body tissue (cell) will not
have time to recover enough to be responsive. As the
frequency increases only a portion of the pulses will
stimulate the tissue cell. This explains why low
(5) frequency (power frequency) currents can produce
ventricular fibrillation more easily than higher
frequency ac currents. Tn effect then, higher currents
are necessary at higher frequencies to produce
fibrillation.
(6)
Most transmission lines incorporate high
speed protective devices which limit the fault dura-
tion. Modern protective systems can clear a fault
within several. cycles. Even faster clearing times are
possible with solid state equipment [14]. Fibrillation
is generally regarded as a function of time.
The circuit
path of the current from either a
step or touch contact is illustrated in Figure 5.
These equivalent circuits show the distribution of the
body current between the heart (R5) and other parts of
the body and depends on the ratio of R5 to the other
tissue resistances, R6 for touch and contact and R4 and
R6 for step contact. Tn practice, the whol.e body path
is replaced by an equivalent single resistance Req and
the total body current is used to determine a safe cur-
rent. Comparing the two contacts types, i t is reason-
able to assume more current will traverse the heart
region from a touch contact rather than a step contact.
Loucks [15] cites that a man can withstand a foot to
foot current about 25 tirmes bigher than a hand to foot
current. This factor could possibly be used to advant-
age as dciscussed In Section 5 - Reduction/Control.
Techniques.
4.3 Dalziel./Other Tests
"7 K8
" 5 ' i 7 r
There are essentially four major time-
dependent electrocuition equations. Dalziel's work (.161
is more widely known and is recommended by (61. Osypka
(171, Geddes [18,], and Biegelmeier [191 al-so have done
extensive studies and concluded with somewhat different
equati.ons. However, from an engineering perspective
and within the time frame of practicat relay operations
(2-20 cycles), the safe body current verses time is not
much different [20,21,8]. To be consistent with sub-
station practices Dalziel's equation will be used as
discussed in (6] and more recently in [221 as the per-
missible body cuirrent limit. This equation is
IB = .116/ (t)2 (7)
where TB is the current (in milliamps) which 99q*5% of
all persons weighing 50 kg (110 lbs) can safely
withstand without ventricular fibrillation and t is
EQUIVALENT CIRCUIT
time in seconds. Minimum fibri.l.ation current in-
creases with body weight and for a 70 kg (155 lbs) per-
son the val.ue of .116 in Eq. (7) would increase to
.157. However, the vaTue of .11.6 corresponding to a 50
kg (110 lbs) person is more reasona.ble to use as a
general. population weight. By knowing time in Eq. (7)
154

TBcan be determi-ned and compared with either Fq. (5) TABLE 2 Contact Resistance of Feet with Mutual Effects
(touch potenti-al) or Fq. (6) (step potential). The b = 8cm (Adult) b = 6cm (Child)
potential voltage in the above equations could be
determined by calculation procedures or design charts p (ohm-m) 100 500 3000 100C
such as in [81 or estimated as in Section 3. This
potential is site specific and depends on the structure 3T-5(
RG (b=8cm) (ohms) 313 1563 9375 31250
1563

type, soil characteristics and location of fault.

The only unknown in the above calculation is

RG (b=6cm) (ohms) 417 2083 12500 8 4167C
the Req of Eqtuation (5) and (6). RMG (df=l (ohms) 153 99 79.5 477 159C

4.4 Body Resistance Variation RMG(df=. 3m (ohms) 53 265 1592 530C

The equivalent resistance bridged across the R2G (b=8) (ohms) 165 821 4926 16450
touch or step voltage can be considered comprised of
three separate resistance categories. The f irst is ex- R2G(b=6) (ohms ) 23 5
_ _ _
1175 7050 23500
ternal resistance such as gloves, shoes or semi-
insulating surfaces on either the soil or structure. Reference [21] gives a good summary of the
The second is the skin resistance. The last is the in- body resistance factors. Touch and step voltages near
ternal resistance of body tissues. A wide range of faulted structures could reach into the hundreds of
valuies can be found for various combination of in- vol-ts so lower voltage tests done for body resistance
dividual resistance items. Only the internal body values may not be adequate. Biegelmeier as reported in
resistance might not be considered extremely variable, [21] combined live human body resistance values ob-
hut even this can range from say 500 - 1 500 ohms tained for 25-200 volts with Frieberger 's measurements
[10,161. on cadavers for voltages exceeding 200 volts and
derived a body impedance range as shown in Figure 6.
Feet and hands would be the most likely
contact area for touch/step potentials near faulted The time duration used in the measurements
structures. Tt is possible for gloves to be worn but given in Figure 6 on living humans is .1 second and is
wotlld only help in the touch situation not the step. within the time frame of relay operation. Based on
Since wearing gloves would be unlikely as compared to this information the resistance term (Req) from equa-
wearing shoes, external hand contact wil-l not be con- tion (5) and (6) can now be evaluted.
sidered. However, the feet contact resistance coulld
consist of a shoe resistance plus a soil covering
resistance. A value of 10,000 ohms is given for a damp 60 \
leather sole including the foot in [231. According to
a study by Flectricite de France as reported in [81 the
resistance of a shoe can vary between 50 megohms when
dry to the I kilohm range when wet. Unless shoes are
expected to be part of safety measures of regulations,
it may he prudent to ignore the effect of shoe
resistance.

For general purposes the resistance of a

human foot to earth is approximately 3p with p in ohm- mm
z~~~~~4 GM m M
meter [6]. For a touch potential the feet would be in
parallel (R2C) but a mutual resistance (RIIG) would also
be included. A more detailed analysis adapted from Figure 6 Probable Range of Conventional Body
[221 allows for a size of feet variation with mutual Impedances (ZTC) for a Group of Humans and Touch Po-
effects considered. tentials up to 700 Volts [21].
C = Measurements on living humans (mostly 10 milli-
RG =
p /4b (8) seconds after starting the current).
where RG = resistance of a human foot * = Measurements on dead humans (3 seconds after
p = earth resistivity (ohm-meters) starting the current).
b = radius of plate equivalent to foot assumed
to be 8 cm for men and 6 cm for child.
5.0 Reduction/Control Techniques
RMG =p /2 rd (Mutual. term) (9) When step or touch potentials present a
distance between feet problem there are methods to either reduce or control
where d =
the resultant body current. These methods may Include
(1 m for man .3 m for child)
reducing the amount of fault current to the base of the
structure by increasing shield wire conductivity, by
For the feet in parallel including the mutual term the
gradient voltage control, by insulation techniques,
fencing off the area, or by lower resistance grounding.
resistance would be These reduction/mitigation measures are discussed in
the following sections.
R2G =
(CG + RMG)/2 (10)
Table 2 shows the values of these parameters for
various values of soil resistivity. 5.1 Shield Wire Conductivity

nry skin of hands and feet offers much resis- As shown in Figure 2 ancd indicated by
tance to the flow of alternating current. At 100 - 200 Equation (3), Es, the shield wire Impedance, hel-ps con-
volts the skin can breakdown thus leaving only the in- trol the amount of fault current to the structure base.
ternal body resistance. Field investigations have been made which show clearly
 155

the value of higher conductivity shield wires in

mitigating the effects of fault cuirrents. One inves-
tigation showed the results of Increasing the conduc-
tivity of the shield wire from that of 1/2 inch
diameter steel strand to that of a 3/8 inch diameter
copper wire. This increase In conductivity resulted in
the potential at the tower nearest the fault being
reduced to 30 - 407 of the value obtained with the
steel shield wire [3]. Another example indicated that
tower potentials could be reduced to approximately 30%
of the original value when Minorca ACSR wire was sub-
stituted for 5/16 inch steel shield wire. However, the
total fault current available i-s increased somewhat
when a higher conductivity shield wire is used.
Clearly, there is a point where the relative benefit of
greater conductivity of shield wire is not economically
justified. Table 3 illustrates the diminishing effects
of conductivity on the current split at the shield
wire/structure junction.
TABLE 3 S3 3S 7b

Percent of current going to base of structure FTGURE 7 (from [24,251)

based on approximate formula of Equation 1. Zs for span
of 305m (1000 ft) parameters [8]. Only when the added resistance is
designed and placed to control the potentials is the
Zl Zs .1 .2 .4 .5 .8 1.0 1.5 decreased resistance effective for step/touch
potentials.
10 5.0 7.1 10.0 11.0 14.0 15.6 19.0
5.3 Gradient Control
15 4.0 6.0 8.0 9.1 11.0 12.8 15.6
20 3.5 5.0 7.1 7.9 10.0 11.0 13.6
The basic idea for gradient control is to
limit the voltage difference for step and touch con-
30 2.9 4.1 5.7 6.4 8.1 9.1 11.0 tacts as seen in Figure 5. If a solid mat is placed
around the structure, then no step or touch potential
50 2.2 3.2 4.5 5.0 6.3 7.1 8.6 would occur except at the edge of the mat. Several in-
terconnected rings of increasing diameter and depth
will approximate this mat. Figure 7a shows unmitigated
potential contour (curve 1) and with control. rings
5.2 Lower Resistance Grounding at Specific Structure (curve 2). The depth increase in 7b eliminates the end
effect of 7a.
When the structture resistance is lowered the
resultant potential for the same fault current value in An example of a design using this concept is
the structure is lowered. This works simply as a shown in Figure 8 [ 5 1. The single ring is at a depth
reduced voltage drop (TR drop). The total fault cur- of 1.22m and located 4.Om from the tower footings. For
rent is affected little by the variation of individual the two ring case, the additional ring is buried .3m
structure resistance value. However, when the struc- deep and 1.!m from the footings and the resultant step
ture resistance is lowered the proportion of fault cur- and touch potentials were reduced to three percent of
rents to the base of the structure is increased if the unmitigated tower potential rise. However, in most
shield wires are present. structure designs, the rebar, anchor bol-ts or stub
angle act as an electrode and the rod and. rebar curve
Therefore, the resultant structure potential. (figure 8) would correspond to curve 1 of Figure 7a.
is slightly decreased, and lowering the resistance at Therefore, in most practical cases a benefit of from
specific structures is not effective for reduc- say 35% (100-65% at 1 meter spacing) to 3% would be
tion/control techniques. Table 4 gives an example of achieved with both rings. The potential profiles for
the use of added resistance and its effect of various these ring arrangements are highly dependent on the
soil resistivity. It is therefore necessary to know
TABLE 4 the soi-l conditions at each location where a potential
gradient ring is to be used.
100
Effect of Reduced Resistance Grounding At Specific Site
,A TWO RINGS
.9
2)
Total Maximum
~~~ 80 1~~~~~~~~~~

Fault Structure Structure Step/Touch z

70 -L VI.,
RING (0.97

Current Current Potential Potential 60-

R (ohms) (Amp) (Amp) (Volts) (Volts) so
~~~~~~RODS IREBAR
0 O'.~~~2 (1.33
40 GROUND
31.67 (Rl) 15,321 377 11940 8250 0~ ~ ~~ ROD

12.17 (R2) 15,346 938 11415 4224 30-

11.03 (R3) 15,350 1026 11324 2265

z

20
7.34 (R4)
-*i

15,369 1482 10876 1588 ~~~~~~KLEINBURG TOWER

AUIL - SJIOlU SJ-M - 15 M

Rl = Structure Foot Resistance ,

R2 = (45 m) Inner Potential Loop + Rl -s -4 -3 -2 -i 0 1 2 3 4 5
= (22 m) Leg Potential Loop + R2 LATERAL DISTANCE,(m)
R3
R4 = (61 m) Outer Potential Loop + R3 FTGURE 8 Potential Control Ring Design
(from [51)
156
5.4 Tsolation Concepts
Isolation concepts can include insulation
and/or fencing. Tnsulation for step and touch poten-
tials can be achieved by two means. For touch poten-
tials either the hand contact touch material (i.e.
transmission structure) or the foot contact material or
both can he insulated.
Tnsulation for the transmission structures
could take the form of plastic/rubber protection bar-
riers wrapped around the leg or shaft similar to in-
sulation on lower voltage wire. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of this insulation it could be treated as a
contact resistance of the hands and used in the resis-
tance of the person. Tn addition, partial insul-ation
in the form of a thin layer of crushed stone could be
placed around the structure. Crushed stone has been
used within substations to help control potentials f6l.
The thin l ayer of c ushed stone could be treated as a
contact resistance .f the feet. The resistivity of
crushed stone is often assum-d to be 3000 ohm-meter but
can vary p121. Asphalt would also be considered as
semi-insulation material but with a higher resistivity
of around 10,000 ohm-meter [81.
A problem with either of these approaches is
the possible degradation of the plastic/rubber insula-
tion or the crushed stone surface or the asphal.t. The
insulation barrier could be subjected to ultra violet
deterioration, other weathering or mechanical abuse.
Tn the case of crushed stone the effectiveness would be
decreased if dirt particles are allowed to intermix.
Asphalt would also deteriorate if not maintained.
Fencing off the structure is another proce-
dure to use. However, this method poses prohlems in
that it would also restrict ready access for
maintenance.
CONCLUTSTON
The background information given in this
paper will allow an engineer to proceed with evaluiating
step and touch potentials near a transmission structture
base. In some cases without shield wires and often
with shield wires the per cent fault current to the
structure base would cause little concern. With the
factors discussed in this paper, a method can be
employed to rationally investigate any concerns and
employ mitigation measures if necessary.
REFERENCES
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Potentials During Ground Faults" IEEE
Transactions, Vol. PAS-86, No. 10, Oct. 1967
2. S. A. Sebo, "Zero Sequence Current Distribution
Along Transmission Lines" IEEE Transactions, Vol.
PAS-88, No. 6, June 1969
3. H. Gammelsaeter and A. Nordboe, "Shield
Conductivity Cuts Faults Effects" Electrical World
Magazine, April 24, 1961
4. S. Karkkainen, V. Palva, "Application of
Probability Calculations To The Study Of The
Earthing Voltage Requirements For Electrical
Safety Codes", Reprint from SAHKO, Electricity in
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Bell, "Step And Touch Potentials at Faulted
Transmission Towers" IEEE Transactions, Vol.
PAS-100, No. 7, July 1981, pp. 3312-3320
6. IEEE Guide For Safety in Substation Grounding,
IEEE Std 80/June 1976, institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers, Tnc., New York 1976
7. F. Dawalibi, "Ground Fault Current Distribution
Between Soil and Neutral Conductors" IEEE
Transactions, Vol. PAS-99, No. 2, March/April 1980
8. Transmission Line Grounding, Palo Alto, CA EPRI
Project RP 1494-1 Final Report, prepared by Safe
Engineering Services Ltd., October 1982
9. R. Rudenberg "Transient Performance of Electric
Power Systems" Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1967,
pp. 355-366
10. F. Dawalibi, G. B. Niles, "Measurements and
Computation of Fault Current Distribution on
Overhead Transmission Lines" IEEE paper 83SM455-3,
Summer Power Meeting, Los Angeles, July 1983
11. Sowers, G. F., Introductory Soil Mechanics and
Foundations: Geotechnical Engineering, 4th Ed.,
MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York, NY,
1979. 621 p.
12. IEEE Committee Report, "Safe Substation Grounding
- Part IT" IEEE Transactions, Vol. PAS-101
October 1982, pp. 4006-4023
13. IEEE Recommended Guide For Measuring Earth
Resistivity. Ground Impedance and Earth Surface
Potentials of a Ground System, TEEE Std 81,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Inc., New York
14. IEEE Committee Report, "Review of Recent Practices
and Trends in Protective Relaying" IEEE
Transactions, Vol. PAS-100, No. 8, August 1Q81,
pp. 4054-4064
15. W. W. Loucks, "A New Approach to Substation
Grounding" Electrical News and Engineering, May
15, 1954
16. C. F. Dalziel, "Electrical Shock Hazard", IEEE
Spectrum, February, 1972
17. P. Osypka, "Quantitative Investigation of Current
Strength, Duration and Routing in AC Electrocution
Accidents Involving Human Beings and Animals",
Technical College of Braunschweig, Bnrnswick. W.
Germany, 1966/SLA Translation Center, TT-6611470
18. L. A. Geddes, L. E. Becker,"Principles of Applied
Biomedical Instrumentation", 2nd Edition, John
Wiley and Sons, 1975
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the Threshold of Ventricular Fibrillation for AC
Shocks at 50-60 Hz", TEEE Proc. Vol. 127, No. 2,
Wire Pt. A, March 1980
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PAS-100, No. 4, April 1981, pp. 1529-1537
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Impedance Values For Low Voltge, Low Source
Impedance Systems at 60 Hz" IEEE Paper Summer
Meeting, San Francisco, July 1982

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Sept. 1981, pp. 4281-4290
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1971
24. VDE Standard
for Earthing Systems in AC
Installation for Rated Voltages Above I kV,
DIN57141/VDE-0141/7.76 (1977)
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(1964)
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The Electric Fence" Underwriters Laboratories,
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Discussion
James R. Stewart (Power Technologies, Inc., Schenectady, NY): This
paper is a good summary of the state of knowledge concerning step and
touch potentials. One question which is not treated in the paper relates
to the transfer of ground potential rise to a customer's service entrance.
If a ground fault occurs on a transmission line which has a distribution
underbuild (typically 115 or 230 kV), the distribution neutral voltage will
rise with the pole ground. If a customer is supplied from the secondary
at the faulted pole, this potential rise will appear at the service entrance.
Has this question ever been considered? If this is not a problem, what
157
factors mitigate it? Is it a probability or a technical argument? The ques-
tion also includes the ground rise due to fault current which flows in
the service entrance ground. Similar questions could be asked concern-
ing telephone facilities underbuilt on high voltage transmission structures.
Manuscript received July 18, 1985.
George B. Niles: Dr. Stewart raises some interesting questions which the
working group did not consider in the paper. However we did mention
that we were dealing with the transmission case but that the methods
could be useful for distribution analysis.
In the case of a distribution underbuild with a nuetral conductor, the
neutral acts as an additional overhead shield wire (OHSW). Since the
neutral and OHSW are in parallel the amount of fault current being
dissipated at the structure base is less than the case of
Hence the potential rise at the structure base is less. If aonly
the OHSW.
customer is sup-
plied from this secondary then a transfer touch or step potential could
be developed. The special transfer potential case was not considered in
the paper for the transmission line case. It is a very unusual case and
probabilities would be for this case even more remote than the step or
touch case. Again referring to the example in the paper, most faults on
the transmission system involve inclement weather so people probably
would not be outdoors. A person would have to have contact with the
neutral at the moment of the fault and in addition most overhead
customer services are located above normal reach.
The hazard for the above situation depends on the cicumstances. In
addition, if the fault occurred at the transmission/distribtion pole out-
side of the customer house and the pole ground impedance value was
much higher than the customer service ground, then there might be
enough fault current to create a high potential rise at the customer ser-
vice ground. Depending on the location of that service ground then
mitigating measures may have to be employed. Again probability is a
critical factor in evaluating this concern. However, Dr. Stewart has cer-
tainly raised a valid question and should be evaluated in an underbuild
situation.
Telephone facilities underbuilt on high voltage transmission lines are
rare. Generally, telephone companies do not underbuild on transmis-
sion facilities due to electromagnetic interference. If there is underbuild
then any potential shock should be evaluated as done
in the
telephone/distribution configuration.
Manuscript received September 9, 1985.