Republic of the Philippines AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
SUPREME COURT REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 — AN ACT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO,
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary;
HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local
Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of
Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial
Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial
Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of
Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law.
On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a
plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended
R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city, viz.:
CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO
INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE
KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby
amended by deleting the words "an independent" thereon
so that said Section will read as follows:
Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. — The Municipality of
Santiago shall be converted into a component city to
be known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred
to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The
territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of
Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby
amended deleting the entire section and in its stead
substitute the following:
Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-
Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members,
and any Elective Provincial Position for the
Province of Isabela. — The voters of the City of
Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections
of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other
elective provincial positions of the Province of
Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a
candidate for such provincial positions and any
elective provincial office.
 Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. — All existing laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged as
ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for
ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at
bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng
Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of
Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners
to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political
question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent
public officials. The Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not
real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528
merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,"
hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B.
Aggabao, 3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended that
both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not
require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of
a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local
Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners
lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the
intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the changes
that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is
now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 5Petitioner
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need
the consent of the city council of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the
change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to
a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No.
8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared
with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other
petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the
city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their
city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this
right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as
unconstitutional.1âwphi1.nêt
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the
petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to be
brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section
1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political
and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need
no longer mystify us. In Tañada v. Cuenco, 6 we held:
xxx xxx xxx
 The term "political question" connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
"to those questions which under the Constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino, 7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative
of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by
law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners
claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they
have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite
before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or
not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question.
For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the
requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court
alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate
arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be
the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its
failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its
people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter
2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries
of local government units belongs to Congress. 8 This power is part of the
larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. 9 The
exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the
Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of
Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city
requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The
resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls
within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator —
material change in the political and economic rights of the local government
units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this
reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the
political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of
this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our
previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for
it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its
Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the
basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus,
the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was
required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the
people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city are many and
cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the
city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under
the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions
and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by
the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will
now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far
reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.: 10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear
that R.A. No. 8528 had "merely re-classified" Santiago
City from an independent component city into a
component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act
were operational would be, actually, that of conversion.
Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the
political culture and administrative responsibilities of
Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City
from an independent component city will revert to the
Province of Isabela, geographically, politically, and
administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago
City will be added to the land area comprising the province
of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of the
Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the
subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue
allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section
285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of
local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected
by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue
solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section
151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province
such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources
(Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section
139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140,
R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate
operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a
(sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City
Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in
accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of
R.A. No. 7160. The City Government's share in the
proceeds in the development and utilization of national
wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue
to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.
7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can
be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c],
R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative
supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by
law to ensure that every component city and municipality
within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within
the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section
29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review
(Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted
by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and
(R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local
governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b)
(1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be
effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor
(Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change
in the state of the political autonomy of what is now
Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the
Office of the President which has supervisory authority
 over it as an independent component city (Section 25,
R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987
Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468, (a)
(1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160).
Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the
former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter
(Section 67 R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of
Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component
city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for
the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite
should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago
City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city.
Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law
substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f)
(1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it
provides that:
(f) Plebiscite — (1) no creation, conversion, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law
or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.
xxx xxx xxx
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the
political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice
Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power
to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however,
is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an
amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the
amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.
Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a
former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local
government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a
material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the
downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they
cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities
of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the
theory that "only if the classification involves changes in income, population,
and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes
to be approved by the people . . . ."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions —
first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law
must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government
Code fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements on income,
population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to
help assure the economic viability of the local government unit
concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a
plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state
that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income,
population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10,
Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite
shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and
mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution
have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic
purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators
shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics
Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is
required to achieve a political purpose — to use the people's voice as a
check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is
no better check against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people
power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are ". . . basic to
local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by
Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. .
. . By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also
eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action
designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the
autonomy of local government units." 13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by
certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that
at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted
to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago
and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some
legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status
of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-
economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to
enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To
say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of
an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or
be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of
Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted
to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the
part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of
Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect
was about to be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the
chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the amendment
"after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote
the debates, viz.: 14
BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 — City of Santiago
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729
as reported out under Committee Report No. 971.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the
motion is approved.
Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of
the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to
inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720
ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE
KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the
distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be
recognized.
The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced
in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its
principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks
to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of the
Province of Isabela.
The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is
physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an
independent component city, however, it is completely detached
and separate from the said province as a local political unit. To use
the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City
of Santiago is an "island in the provincial milieu.
The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor
are they qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of
Isabela.
The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with
the power and authority of general supervision over the city and its
officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office
of the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the
City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the
happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress
and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of
Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for
consideration of this august Body Committee Report No.
971 of the Committee on Local Government,
recommending approval, with our proposed committee
amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the
period of interpellations.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the period of interpellations is closed.
Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee
amendments.
Senator Roco. Mr. President.
The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the
ruling on the motion to close the period of interpellations just to be
able to ask a few questions?
Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr.
President.
The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the
closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.
Senator Roco is recognized.
Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentlemen yield for
some questions?
Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman
of the Committee on Local Government, we were with the
sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a
City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that
time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be
"independent." Now we are deleting that word
"independent."
Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-
sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation on what
happened between then and now that has made us
decided that the City of Santiago should cease to be
independent and should now become a component city.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province
said during the public hearing that they are no longer
vested with the power and authority of general supervision
over the city. The power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far
from the City of Santiago.
In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a
clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in
the provincial elections.
Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did
want it on record, however. I think there was a majority of 14,000
who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who
voted for that charter some degree of respect. But if there has been
a change of political will, there has been a change of political will,
then so be it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a
very important point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to
place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are
proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an
objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it
by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution.
Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were
opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a
component city.
Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President — because the
two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city — is that I thought it
should be put on record that we have supported originally the
proposal to make it an independent city. But now if it is their
request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.
Thank you.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our
good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the opinion of
the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the
Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of
Santiago from an independent city.
This opposition was placed on records during the
committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as
mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments
is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes
effect.
The question I would like to raise — and I would like to
recall the statement of our Minority Leader — is that, at
this time we should not be passing it for a particular
politician.
In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being
passed in order that the additional territory be added to
the election of the provincial officials of the province of
Isabela.
Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen
on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.
Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr.
President, may I share some information.
Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the
provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the
provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership
will then campaign in a bigger territory.
As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are
the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in
the provincial electoral process, and whose children will
have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership.
This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is
being put forward.
While it is true that there may have been a resolution by
the city council, those who signed the resolution were not
the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the
congressman of that district who represents a
constituency, the voice of the district.
I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is
paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to
fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been
crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given
account, as we do give account to many of the legislations
coming from the House on local issues.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising
this question is that, as Senator Roco said, just two and-a-
half years ago we passed a bill which indeed
disenfranchized — if we want to use that phrase — the
citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the
provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are
changing the rule.
In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago
participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the
conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe
that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator
Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as
part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be
proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
 Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require that the change from an independent to a
component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
This change from an independent city into a component
city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming
from the House is in adherence to this constitutional
mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is
"conversion". The word "conversion" appears in that
provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the
public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya
was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is merely a
reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are
converting it into a component city. That is how the
members of the committee felt. That is why we have
proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate
a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on
incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only
to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be
enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is
concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who
are opposing it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let
the people decide, instead of the political leaders of
Isabela deciding for them.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can
move to close the period of interpellations.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the motion is approved.
Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the
committee amendments, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none the motion is approved.
Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new
Section 3, as follows:
Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS
HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE
SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE
FOLLOWING:
Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. — THE CONVERSION OF THE
CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF
THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT
UPON THE RETIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A
MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A
PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE
PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE
 APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH
PLEBISCITE.
The President. Is there any objection?
Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr.
President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of
the session.
The President. The session is suspended for a few
minutes if there is no objection. [There was none].
It was 7:54 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The session is resumed.
Senator Sotto is recognized.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening
conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my
amendment.
The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the
withdrawal of the amendment.
Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from
Isabela — I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela
— but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not
only his province but his own city where he is a resident
and registered voter.
So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and
of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands that
we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the
Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters
affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind
them.
Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest
appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from
Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the
feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly
become his great fan for the evening.
May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned
against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not
want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the
young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of
the province. The town is the gem of the province. How
could we extricate the town from the province?
But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and
also the Chairman of the Committee.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I
move that the period of committee amendments be
closed.
The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by
removing the word "independent" preceding "component
city"?
Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the
title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is "An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720". The
title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think that
we should amend that anymore.
The President. What is the pending motion? Will the
gentleman kindly state the motion?
Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of
committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the motion is approved.
Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual
amendments, I move that we close the period of individual
amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the period of individual amendments is
closed.
APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on
Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.
As many as are in favor of the bill, say
aye.
Several Members. Aye.
As many as are against the bill, say nay.
[Silences]
House Bill No. 8279 is approved on
Second Reading.
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real
purpose for the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the
reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning
the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its people in a
plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose
behind its enactment, viz:
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to
have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by
the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The
transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new
Governor and other officials shall by then have been
installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the
election for President and Vice-President." Thus, the
petitioners reported after the event: "With indecent haste,
the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and
proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new
set of government officials headed by Governor Armando
Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were
held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in
place to deliver the "solid North" to ex-President Marcos.
The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte
during the elections — the unashamed use of naked
power and resources — contributed in no small way to
arousing "people's power" and steel the ordinary citizen to
perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one
proud to be a Filipino today.
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional.
Consequently, all the implementing acts complained
of, viz., the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province
of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are
equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in
the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by
Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the
remaining areas of the integral province of Negros
Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and
La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana,
Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San
Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and
Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the
mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973
Constitution that no province may be created or divided or
its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of
a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of
the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the
proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It
follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of
Negros Occidental have to participate and give their
approval in the plebiscite, because the whole is affected
by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its
boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the
areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is
as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists
to vote for the secession that they demanded against the
wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of
majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when
allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component
cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis
Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan 17 whose charters
were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the
election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without
submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of
Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago.
The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the
city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent
component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San
Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel
explained: 18
. . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr.
President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to
vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no
intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City
of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the
enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers
and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San
Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a
component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore,
this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the
city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in
 any way changing the character of its being a component
city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.

It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing

qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial
elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship
speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the
people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a
component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator
Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous
situation then obtaining". . . where voters of one component city
cannot vote simply because their charters so provide." 21 Thus,
Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting
their people from voting in provincial elections.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is

declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147465 January 30, 2002
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF
AUSTRALIA, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), seeking to reverse and set aside the November 13, 2000
decision of the Court of Appeals declaring valid and perfected the waste
management contract entered into by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Secretary of National Resources and the Executive
Committee to oversee the build-operate-transfer implementation of solid
waste management projects, and JANCOM Environmental Corporation.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
In 1994, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum
Order No. 202 creating the Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the
BOT implementation of solid waste management projects, headed by the
Chairman of the MMDA and the Cabinet Officer for Regional Development-
National Capital Region (CORD-NCR). The EXECOM was to oversee and
develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in San Mateo,
Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme.
The terms of reference for the waste-to-energy projects provided that its
proponents should have the capability to establish municipal solid waste
thermal plants using incineration technology. This type of technology was
selected because of its alleged advantages of greatly reduced waste
volume, prolongation of the service life of the disposal site, and generation
of electricity.
While eleven (11) proponents submitted their pre-qualification documents,
most failed to comply with the requirements under Section 5.4 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 6957,
otherwise known as the Build-Operate-Transfer Law. On July 21, 1995, the
Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) recommended the
pre-qualification of three proponents, namely: i) JANCOM International Pty.
Ltd.; ii) First Philippine International W-E Managers; and iii) PACTECH
Development Corporation. On July 26, 1995, the EXECOM approved the
recommendation of the PBAC. On July 27, 1995, MMDA forwarded to the
Investment Coordinating Committee (ICC) Secretariat the pre-feasibility
study on the privatization of the Carmona and San Mateo landfill sites. The
project was later presented to the ICC-Technical Board (ICC-TB) and then
endorsed to the ICC-Cabinet Committee (ICC-CC).
On May 2, 1996, the PBAC conducted a pre-bid conference where it
required the three pre-qualified bidders to submit, within ninety (90) days,
their bid proposals. On August 2, 1996, JANCOM and First Philippines
requested for an extension of time to submit their bids. PACTECH, on the
other hand, withdrew from the bidding.
Subsequently, JANCOM entered into a partnership with Asea Brown Boveri
(ABB) to form JANCOM Environmental Corporation while First Philippines
formed a partnership with OGDEN. Due to the change in the composition of
the proponents, particularly in their technology partners and contractors, the
PBAC conducted a post pre-qualification evaluation.
During the second bid conference, the bid proposals of First Philippines for
the Carmona site and JANCOM for the San Mateo site were found to be
complete and responsive. Consequently, on February 12, 1997, JANCOM
and First Philippines were declared the winning bidders, respectively, for the
San Mateo and the Carmona projects.
In a letter dated February 27, 1997, then MMDA Chairman Prospero I. Oreta
informed JANCOM’s Chief Executive Officer Jay Alparslan that the
EXECOM had approved the PBAC recommendation to award to JANCOM
the San Mateo Waste-to-Energy Project on the basis of the final Evaluation
Report declaring JANCOM International Ltd., Pty., together with Asea Brown
Boveri (ABB), as the sole complying (winning) bidder for the San Mateo
Waste Disposal site, subject to negotiation and mutual approval of the terms
and conditions of the contract of award. The letter also notified Alparslan
that the EXECOM had created a negotiating team — composed of Secretary
General Antonio Hidalgo of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council, Director Ronald G. Fontamillas, General Manager
Roberto Nacianceno of MMDA, and Atty. Eduardo Torres of the host local
government unit — to work out and finalize the contract award. Chairman
Oreta requested JANCOM to submit to the EXECOM the composition of its
own negotiating team.
Thereafter, after a series of meetings and consultations between the
negotiating teams of EXECOM and JANCOM, a draft BOT contract was
prepared and presented to the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste
Management.
On December 19, 1997, the BOT Contract for the waste-to-energy project
was signed between JANCOM and the Philippine Government, represented
by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR Chairman Dionisio dela Serna, and
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta.
On March 5, 1998, the BOT contract was submitted to President Ramos for
approval but this was too close to the end of his term which expired without
him signing the contract. President Ramos, however, endorsed the contract
to incoming President Joseph E. Estrada.
With the change of administration, the composition of the EXECOM also
changed. Memorandum Order No. 19 appointed the Chairman of the
Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Project to be the
EXECOM chairman. Too, Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the
Clean Air Act of 1999, was passed by Congress. And due to the clamor of
residents of Rizal province, President Estrada had, in the interim, also
ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. Due to these circumstances,
the Greater Manila Solid Waste Management Committee adopted a
resolution not to pursue the BOT contract with JANCOM. Subsequently, in a
letter dated November 4, 1999, Roberto Aventajado, Chairman of the
Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Project informed Mr. Jay
Alparslan, Chairman of JANCOM, that due to changes in policy and
economic environment (Clean Air Act and non-availability of the San Mateo
landfill), the implementation of the BOT contract executed and signed
between JANCOM and the Philippine Government would no longer be
pursued. The letter stated that other alternative implementation
arrangements for solid waste management for Metro Manila would be
considered instead.
JANCOM appealed to President Joseph Estrada the position taken by the
EXECOM not to pursue the BOT Contract executed and signed between
JANCOM and the Philippine Government, refuting the cited reasons for non-
implementation. Despite the pendency of the appeal, MMDA, on February
22, 2000, caused the publication in a newspaper of an invitation to pre-
qualify and to submit proposals for solid waste management projects for
Metro Manila. JANCOM thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a
petition for certiorari to declare i) the resolution of the Greater Metropolitan
Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT Contract
and ii) the acts of MMDA calling for bids and authorizing a new contract for
Metro Manila waste management, as illegal, unconstitutional, and void; and
for prohibition to enjoin the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste
Management Committee and MMDA from implementing the assailed
resolution and disregarding the Award to, and the BOT contract with,
JANCOM, and from making another award in its place. On May 29, 2000,
the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment
in favor of petitioners JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, and
JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY., LIMITED
OF AUSTRALIA, and against respondent GREATER METROPOLITAN
MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMM., and HON. ROBERTO N.
AVENTAJADO, in his Capacity as Chairman of the said Committee, METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY, in
his capacity as Chairman of said Authority, declaring the Resolution of
respondent Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee disregarding petitioners’ BOT Award Contract and calling for bids
for and authorizing a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management
ILLEGAL and VOID.
Moreover, respondents and their agents are hereby PROHIBITED and
ENJOINED from implementing the aforesaid Resolution and disregarding
petitioners’ BOT Award Contract and from making another award in its
place.
Let it be emphasized that this Court is not preventing or stopping the
government from implementing infrastructure projects as it is aware of the
proscription under PD 1818. On the contrary, the Court is paving the way for
the necessary and modern solution to the perennial garbage problem that
has been the major headache of the government and in the process would
serve to attract more investors in the country.
(Rollo,p. 159.)
Instead of appealing the decision, MMDA filed a special civil action
for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals which was later docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 59021. The
appellate court not only required JANCOM to comment on the petition, it
also granted MMDA’s prayer for a temporary restraining order. During the
pendency of the petition for certiorari, JANCOM moved for the execution of
the RTC decision, which was opposed by MMDA. However, the RTC
granted the motion for execution on the ground that its decision had become
final since MMDA had not appealed the same to the Court of Appeals.
MMDA moved to declare respondents and the RTC judge in contempt of
court, alleging that the RTC’s grant of execution was abuse of and
interference with judicial rules and processes.
On November 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59021 and a companion case, CA-G.R. SP No. 60303.
MMDA’s motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied,
MMDA filed the instant petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in finding that:
1) There is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and JANCOM given that: a) the contract does not bear
the signature of the President of the Philippines; b) the conditions
precedent specified in the contract were not complied with; and c)
there was no valid notice of award.
2) The MMDA had not seasonably appealed the Decision of the
lower court via a petition for certiorari.
Before taking up the substantive issue in question, we shall first dispose of
the question as to whether it is fatal to petitioner’s cause, that rather than
appealing the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, it instead filed a
petition for certiorari. While petitioner claims that the trial court’s decision
never became final by virtue of its having appealed by certiorari to the Court
of Appeals, the trial court ruled that petitioner’s failure to file an appeal has
made its decision final and executory. At bottom, the question involves a
determination of the propriety of petitioner’s choice of the remedy
of certiorari in questioning the decision of the trial court.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Plain it is from a reading of the above provision that certiorari will lie only
where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. If the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and
of the person, its rulings upon all questions involved are within its
jurisdiction, however irregular or erroneous these may be, they cannot be
corrected by certiorari. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from
the final decision.
Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
xxx xxx xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65.
There can be no dispute that the trial court’s May 29, 2000 decision was a
final order or judgment which MMDA should have appealed, had it been so
minded. In its decision, the trial court disposed of the main controversy by
"declaring the Resolution of respondent Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid
Waste Management Committee disregarding petitioner’s BOT Award
Contract and calling for bids for and authorizing a new contract for the Metro
Manila waste management ILLEGAL and VOID." This ruling completely
disposed of the controversy between MMDA and JANCOM. In BA Finance
Corporation vs. CA (229 SCRA 5667 [1994]), we held that a "final" order or
judgment is one which "disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined." An order or judgment is deemed final
when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives
an end to the litigation. A final order or judgment finally disposes of,
adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties,
either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch
thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue
is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance or non-
compliance with the terms of the judgment or doer, such judgment or order
is final and appealable (Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA
334 [1987]).
However, instead of appealing the decision, MMDA resorted to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, as a mode of obtaining reversal of the
judgment. This cannot be done. The judgment was not in any sense null and
void ab initio, incapable of producing any legal effects whatever, which could
be resisted at any time and in any court it was attempted. It was a judgment
which could or may have suffered from some substantial error in procedure
or in findings of fact or of law, and on that account, it could have been
reversed or modified on appeal. But since it was not appealed, it became
final and has thus gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any
substantive aspect. The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the
judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the
errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave
abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision.
The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort
to certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter
remedy is precisely that "there should be no appeal" (Mercado vs. CA, 162
SCRA 75 [1988]). As incisively observed by the Court of Appeals:
The special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
(Sec. 1, rule 65, id.)
Admittedly, appeal could have been taken from the assailed RTC decision.
However, petitioners maintain that appeal is not a speedy remedy because
the RTC decision prohibiting them from conducting a bidding for a new
waste disposal project has adverse and serious effects on the city’s garbage
situation.
Nevertheless, the RTC decision is not immediately executory. Only
judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support and
such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory shall be enforced after their rendition and shall not be
stayed by an appeal therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court
(Sec. 4, rule 39, id.).
Since the RTC decision is not immediately executory, appeal would have
stayed its execution. Consequently, the adverse effects of said decision will
not visit upon petitioners during the appeal. In other words, appeal is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
But as no appeal was taken within the reglementary period, the RTC
decision had become final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that the
special civil action for certiorari may not be invoked as a substitute for the
remedy of appeal (BF Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267).
Therefore, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari does not lie.
Moreover, petitioners instituted the instant action without filing a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC decision. Doctrinal is the rule that certiorari will
not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors (Zapanta vs.
NLRC, 292 SCRA 580).
(Rollo, p. 47-48.)
Admittedly, there are instances where the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal. In Ruiz,
Jr. vs. Court of Appeals (220 SCRA 490 [1993]), we held:
Considered extraordinary, [certiorari] is made available only when there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law (Rule 65, Rules of Court, Section 1). The long line of decisions
denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was availed or
specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers
the instances when certiorari was given due course. The few significant
exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate; or when the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs
issued are null . . . or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.
In the instant case, however, MMDA has not sufficiently established the
existence of any fact or reason to justify its resort to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. Neither does the record show that the instant case,
indeed, falls under any of the exceptions aforementioned.
The Court thus holds that the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring that
the trial court’s decision has become final due to the failure of MMDA to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period.
With the foregoing disquisition, it would appear unnecessarily to discuss and
resolve the substantive issue posed before the Court. However, the
procedural flaw notwithstanding, the Court deems it judicious to take
cognizance of the substantive question, if only to put petitioner’s mind to
rest.
In its second assignment of errors, petitioner MMDA contends that there is
no valid and binding contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
respondents because: a) the BOT contract does not bear the signature of
the President of the Philippines; b) the conditions precedent specified in the
contract were not complied with; and that c) there was no valid notice of
award.
These contentions hold no water.
Under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, "[a] contract is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other,
to give something or to render some service." A contract undergoes three
distinct stages — preparation or negotiation, its perfection, and finally, its
consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting
parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of
agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of the contract takes place
when the parties agree upon the essential elements of the contract. The last
stage is the consummation of the contract wherein the parties fulfill or
perform the terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating in the
extinguishment thereof (Bugatti vs. CA, 343 SCRA 335 [2000]). Article 1315
of the Civil Code, provides that a contract is perfected by mere consent.
Consent, on the other hand, is manifested by the meeting of the offer and
the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract (See Article 1319, Civil Code). In the case at bar, the signing and
execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the
parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the
material details of the contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the
contract. The execution and signing of the contract is not disputed by the
parties. As the Court of Appeals aptly held:
[C]ontrary to petitioners’ insistence that there was no perfected contract, the
meeting of the offer and acceptance upon the thing and the cause, which
are to constitute the contract (Arts. 1315 and 1319, New Civil Code), is
borne out by the records.
Admittedly, when petitioners accepted private respondents’ bid proposal
(offer), there was, in effect, a meeting of the minds upon the object (waste
management project) and the cause (BOT scheme). Hence, the perfection
of the contract. In City of Cebu vs. Heirs of Candido Rubi (306 SCRA 108),
the Supreme Court held that "the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the
offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the
award to the bidder.
(Rollo, p. 48-49.)
In fact, in asserting that there is no valid and binding contract between the
parties, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid notice of award; that
the contract does not bear the signature of the President of the Philippines;
and that the conditions precedent specified in the contract were not
complied with.
In asserting that the notice of award to JANCOM is not a proper notice of
award, MMDA points to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 6957, otherwise known as the BOT Law, which require that
i) prior to the notice of award, an Investment Coordinating Committee
clearance must first be obtained; and ii) the notice of award indicate the time
within which the awardee shall submit the prescribed performance security,
proof of commitment of equity contributions and indications of financing
resources.
Admittedly, the notice of award has not complied with these requirements.
However, the defect was cured by the subsequent execution of the contract
entered into and signed by authorized representatives of the parties; hence,
it may not be gainsaid that there is a perfected contract existing between the
parties giving to them certain rights and obligations (conditions precedents)
in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof. We borrow the words
of the Court of Appeals:
Petitioners belabor the point that there was no valid notice of award as to
constitute acceptance of private respondent’s offer. They maintain that
former MMDA Chairman Oreta’s letter to JANCOM EC dated February 27,
1997 cannot be considered as a valid notice of award as it does not comply
with the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 6957, as amended. The argument
is untenable.
The fact that Chairman Oreta’s letter informed JANCOM EC that it was the
"sole complying (winning) bidder for the San Mateo project leads to no other
conclusion than that the project was being awarded to it. But assuming that
said notice of award did not comply with the legal requirements, private
respondents cannot be faulted therefore as it was the government
representatives’ duty to issue the proper notice.
In any event, petitioners, as successors of those who previously acted for
the government (Chairman Oreta, et al), are estopped from assailing the
validity of the notice of award issued by the latter. As private respondents
correctly observed, in negotiating on the terms and conditions of the BOT
contract and eventually signing said contract, the government had led
private respondents to believe that the notice of award given to them
satisfied all the requirement of the law.
While the government cannot be estopped by the erroneous acts of its
agents, nevertheless, petitioners may not now assail the validity of the
subject notice of award to the prejudice of private respondents. Until the
institution of the original action before the RTC, invalidity of the notice of
award was never invoked as a ground for termination of the BOT contract. In
fact, the reasons cited for terminating the San Mateo project, per Chairman
Aventajado’s letter to JANCOM EC dated November 4, 1999, were its
purported non-implementability and non-viability on account of supervening
events, e.g., passage of the Clean Air Act, etc.
(Rollo, p. 49-50.)
MMDA also points to the absence of the President’s signature as proof that
the same has not yet been perfected. Not only that, the authority of the
signatories to bind the Republic has even been put to question. Firstly, it is
pointed out that Memorandum Order No. 202 creating the Executive
Committee to oversee the BOT implementation of solid waste management
projects only charged the officials thereof with the duty of recommending to
the President the specific project to be implemented under the BOT scheme
for both San Mateo and Carmona sites. Hence, it is concluded that the
signatories, CORD-NCR Chairman Dionisio dela Serna and MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta, had no authority to enter into any waste
management project for and in behalf of the Government. Secondly, Section
59 of Executive Order No. 292 is relied upon as authority for the proposition
that presidential approval is necessary for the validity of the contract.
The first argument conveniently overlooks the fact that then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Victor Ramos was likewise a signatory
to the contract. While dela Serna and Oreta may not have had any authority
to sign, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources has such an
authority. In fact, the authority of the signatories to the contract was not
denied by the Solicitor General. Moreover, as observed by the Court of
Appeals, "[i]t was not alleged, much less shown, that those who signed in
behalf of the Republic had acted beyond the scope of their authority."
In truth, the argument raised by MMDA does not focus on the lack of
authority of the signatories, but on the amount involved as placing the
contract beyond the authority of the signatories to approve. Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 292 reads:
Section 59. Contracts for Approval by the President. Contracts for
infrastructure projects, including contracts for the supply of materials and
equipment to be used in said projects, which involve amounts above the
ceilings provided in the preceding section shall be approved by the
President: Provided, That the President may, when conditions so warrant,
and upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority, revise the aforesaid ceilings of approving authority.
However, the Court of Appeals trenchantly observed in this connection:
As regards the President’s approval of infrastructure projects required under
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 292, said section does not apply to the
BOT contract in question. Sec. 59 should be correlated with Sec. 58 of Exec.
Order No. 292. Said sections read:
SECTION 58. Ceiling for Infrastructure Contracts.— The following shall be
the ceilings for all civil works, construction and other contracts for
infrastructure projects, including supply contracts for said projects, awarded
through public bidding or through negotiation, which may be approved by the
Secretaries of Public Works and Highways, Transportation and
Communications, Local Government with respect to Rural Road
improvement Project and governing boards of government-owned or
controlled corporations:
xxx xxx xxx
Save as provided for above, the approval ceilings assigned to the
departments/agencies involved in national infrastructure and construction
projects shall remain at the levels provided in existing laws, rules and
regulations.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that all infrastructure contracts require the
President’s approval (Petition, p. 16), Sec. 59 provides that such approval is
required only in infrastructure contracts involving amounts exceeding the
ceilings set in Sec. 58. Significantly, the infrastructure contracts treated in
Sec. 58 pertain only to those which may be approved by the Secretaries of
Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Communications, Local
Government (with respect to Rural Road Improvement Project) and the
governing boards of certain government-owned or controlled corporations.
Consequently, the BOT contract in question, which was approved by the
DENR Secretary and the EXCOM Chairman and Co-Chairman, is not
covered by Exec. Order No. 292.
(Rollo, p. 51-52.)
The provision pertinent to the authority of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources would actually be Section 1 of Executive Order No. 380,
Series of 1989 which provides that "The Secretaries of all Departments and
Governing Boards of government-owned or controlled corporations [except
the Secretaries of Public Works and Highways, Transportation and
Communication, and Local Government with respect to Rural Road
Improvement projects] can enter into publicly bidded contracts
regardless of amount (See also Section 515, Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual — Volume I)." Consequently, MMDA may not claim that the
BOT contract is not valid and binding due to the lack of presidential
approval.
Significantly, the contract itself provides that the signature of the President is
necessary only for its effectivity (not perfection), pursuant to Article 19 of the
contract, which reads:
This contract shall become effective upon approval by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to existing laws subject to the condition,
precedent in Article 18. This contract shall remain in full force and effect for
twenty-five (25) years subject to renewal for another twenty-five (25) years
from the date of Effectivity. Such renewal will be subject to mutual
agreement of the parties and approval of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
(Rollo, p. 94.)
Stated differently, while the twenty-five year effectivity period of the contract
has not yet started to run because of the absence of the President’s
signature, the contract has, nonetheless, already been perfected.
As to the contention that there is no perfected contract due to JANCOM’s
failure to comply with several conditions precedent, the same is, likewise,
unmeritorious. Article 18 of the BOT contract reads:
ARTICLE 18
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
xxx
18.2.1. The BOT COMPANY hereby undertakes to provide the
following within 2 months from execution of this Contract as an effective
document:
a) sufficient proof of the actual equity contributions from the
proposed shareholders of the BOT COMPANY in a total amount
not less than PHP500,000,000 in accordance with the BOT Law
and the implementing rules and regulations;
b) sufficient proof of financial commitment from a lending institution
sufficient to cover total project cost in accordance with the BOT
Law and the implementing rules and regulations;
c) to support its obligation under this Contract, the BOT COMPANY
shall submit a security bond to the CLIENT in accordance with the
form and amount required under the BOT Law.
xxx
18.2.3 Completion of Documentary Requirements as per Schedule 4 by the
BOT Company
As clearly stated in Article 18, JANCOM undertook to comply with the stated
conditions within 2 months from execution of the Contract as an effective
document. Since the President of the Philippines has not yet affixed his
signature on the contract, the same has not yet become an effective
document. Thus, the two-month period within which JANCOM should
comply with the conditions has not yet started to run. It cannot thus be said
that JANCOM has already failed to comply with the "conditions precedent"
mandated by the contract. By arguing that "failure [of JANCOM] to comply
with the conditions results in the failure of a contract or prevents the judicial
relation from coming into existence," MMDA reads into the contract
something which is not contemplated by the parties. If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Art. 1370, Civil
Code).
We, therefore, hold that the Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the
existence of a valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and JANCOM. There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot
revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the
moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of
what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage, and law
(Article 1315, Civil Code). The contract has the force of law between the
parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective
contractual commitments, not weasel out of them. Just as nobody can be
forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a contract is
entered into, no party can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of
the other. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to
change his mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed
contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party. Nonetheless, it has to be
repeated that although the contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or
unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
Moreover, if after a perfected and binding contract has been executed
between the parties, it occurs to one of them to allege some defect therein
as reason for annulling it, the alleged defect must be conclusively proven,
since the validity and the fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the will of
one of the contracting parties. In the case at bar, the reasons cited by
MMDA for not pushing through with the subject contract were: 1) the
passage of the Clean Air Act, which allegedly bans incineration; 2) the
closure of the San Mateo landfill site; and 3) the costly tipping fee. These
reasons are bereft of merit
Once again, we make reference to the insightful declarations of the Court of
Appeals:
Sec. 20 of the Clean Air Act pertinently reads:
SECTION 20. Ban on Incineration.— Incineration, hereby defined as the
burning of municipal, bio-chemical and hazardous wastes, which process
emits poisonous and toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited: x x x."
Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste
disposal; rather only those burning processes which emit poisonous and
toxic fumes are banned.
As regards the projected closure of the San Mateo landfill vis-à-vis the
implementability of the contract, Art. 2.3 thereof expressly states that
"[i]n the event the project Site is not delivered x x x, the Presidential task
Force on Solid Waste Management (PTFSWM) and the Client, shall provide
within a reasonable period of time, a suitable alternative acceptable to the
BOT COMPANY."
With respect to the alleged financial non-viability of the project because the
MMDA and the local government units cannot afford the tipping fees under
the contract, this circumstance cannot, by itself, abrogate the entire
agreement.1âwphi1
Doctrinal is the rule that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party
from an unwise or undesirable contract, or stipulation for that matter, he or
she entered into with full awareness of its consequences (Opulencia vs.
CA, 293 SCRA 385). Indeed, the terms and conditions of the subject
contract were arrived at after due negotiations between the parties thereto.
(Rollo, p. 54.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59021 dated November 13, 2001 AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC High School. The audit covered the period from 1 January 1990 to 30 April
1993.
G.R. No. 133954 August 3, 2000
Per the audit report,4 COA found that there was malversation of public funds.
VICTORIANO B. TIROL, JR. petitioner, It cited the purchase of certain supplies and equipment which was done
vs. through a negotiated contract and not through a competitive public bidding,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Region VIII, represented by its DIRECTOR, contrary to COA Circular No. 85-55A. The circular requires public bidding in
Leyte Government Center, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, respondent. the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment in excess of ₱50,000,
unless the law or agency charter provides otherwise. In the questioned
DECISION purchase the agency failed to ascertain the reasonableness of the contract
prices, resulting in an overprice of ₱35,100 in comparison with COA’s actual
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: canvass of prices, thus:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770,
Per Voucher Per Canvass
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in relation to Rule 45 of Price
Quantity Description
the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner seeks the reversal of the Total Total Variance
Unit Price Unit Price
Resolution1 of 20 March 1997 and the Order2 of 5 March 1998 of the Office Amount Amount
of the Ombudsman which, respectively, found petitioner and his co-
2 Singer Sewing machine ₱7,850 ₱15,700 ₱4,450 ₱8,900 ₱6,800
respondents in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 criminally culpable for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019,3 as amended, and denied petitioner’s 4 16" Hitachi / Union Coiling 3,800 15,200 1,200 4,800 10,400
motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution. Fan

3 Molodione 3,675 11,025 1,850 5,550 5,475

Petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region V. Prior to such assignment 2 Xylophone 1,750 3,500 560 1,120 2,380
he was the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII. In the latter capacity, he 2 Makita Electric Planer Model 8,837.50 17,675 8,500 17,200 475
and some officials of the Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, No. 19008 3 ¼ in. 82 mm
Borongan, Eastern Samar, were charged with the violation of Section 3(g) of
1 Makita Electric Circular Saw 16,900 16,900 7,330 7,330 9,570
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for entering into a contract alleged to Model No. 5601 N 160 mm
be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. The charge
originated from a complaint filed by the school’s Teachers and Employees TOTAL ₱80,000 ₱44,900 ₱35,100
Union alleging overpricing of various school equipment for the Lalawigan
National High School. Specifically, petitioner’s participation consisted in
approving the Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) and the check in
connection with the transaction. In its letter5 to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, the COA
recommended the filing of both criminal and administrative cases against the
persons liable therefor, including petitioner for his approval of the RIV for the
On the strength of the complaint, Region VIII of respondent Commission on
assailed purchase and signing of the check in payment therefor. This
Audit (COA) audited the operations and accounts of the Lalawigan National
complaint was docketed as OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836.
In his counter-affidavit,6 petitioner alleged that the aforesaid documents were
previously reviewed by his subordinates. He approved them only upon the
certification and representation of the said subordinates that everything was
in order. Accordingly, his approval was purely a ministerial act.
In her Resolution of 20 March 1997,7 Virginia Palanca Santiago, Graft
Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, rejected
petitioner’s defense because had he carefully scrutinized the documents he
would have discovered that the purchases were made without competitive
public bidding and the magnitude of the amount involved would prevent a
reasonable mind from accepting the claim that petitioner was merely
careless or negligent in the performance of his functions.
Santiago gave credence to COA’s detailed report which clearly showed an
overpriced value of the supplies and materials purchased, to the great
disadvantage of the government. Had the proper bidding procedure been
observed, no such damage would have occurred. Moreover, petitioner’s co-
respondents did not dispute the charge of overpricing. Their main defense
was that the purchase was emergency in nature. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas, however, ruled that emergency purchases could only
refer to those which were urgent such that failure to make them would
endanger the lives of the students. It held that the doubtful purchase did not
qualify as an emergency purchase.
Accordingly, Santiago recommended that petitioner and his co-respondents
be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, for
entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government.
The Resolution was recommended for approval by Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, Arturo C. Mojica. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
Resolution on 21 June 1997.
In an Information8 filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as SB
Criminal Case No. 23785,9 petitioner and two other co-respondents were
charged with the aforementioned offense allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of October, 1992, at Tacloban City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, all public officers, having been appointed and qualified as such
public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a transaction or contract for and
in behalf of Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, Borongan, Eastern
Samar, for the purchase of the following:
2 pcs. Singer Sewing Machine ₱ 15,700.00
4 pcs. 16" Hitachi Union Ceiling Fan 15,200.00
3 pcs. Meodione 11,025.00
2 pcs. Xylophone 3,500.00
2 pcs. Makita Elect. Planor Model No. 19008 3¼ in. 82 mm 17,675.00
1 pc. Makita Elect. Circular Saw Model No. 5601 N 160 mm 16,900.00
TOTAL ₱ 80,000.00
in the total amount of ₱80,000.00, Philippine Currency, with Fairchild
Marketing and Construction, based at Tacloban City, without following the
procedures of competitive public bidding as required by law, which
transaction was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government,
particularly the Lalawigan National High School, as the value of above-
mentioned items were overpriced in the total amount of ₱35,100.00,
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government.10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the Resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman-Visayas. He insisted that his act of approving the RIV
arose from the need of the requesting school, and matters pertaining to the
price and mode of purchase were not yet considered at that stage. It was
only after the approval of the RIV that these matters were deliberated upon,
not by him, but by the officials of the requesting school. As to the check, he
asserted that the supporting documents had been acted upon and approved
by his subordinates and the concerned school officials, and since there was
no indication of any patent irregularity, he signed the check. Finally,
petitioner assailed the finding of conspiracy since there was no direct proof
therefor other than a mere allegation imputing the same.
In the Order of 5 March 1998,12 the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration be dismissed for
lack of merit. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation on 22 May
1998.
Petitioner then filed the instant petition. In the meantime, the proceeding
before the Sandiganbayan continued. Upon arraignment on 24 August 1998,
petitioner’s co-accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. On 2
September 1998, petitioner filed a motion to reset the scheduled hearing on
17 and 18 September citing the pendency of the instant petition. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion as well as his subsequent motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, he filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying his motions. That action, entitled Tirol v.
Sandiganbayan and docketed as G.R. No. 135913, was decided on 4
November 1999 adversely against petitioner.
In the instant petition, petitioner seeks the reversal of the assailed
Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, which, according to
him, erred in concluding that he was culpably liable for alleged overpricing of
the questioned purchase of supplies and materials. He argues that the acts
directly resulting in the overprice were committed by the following officials:
(1) co-respondent Conchita C. Devora, Principal 1, who approved the
transaction, countersigned the checks and requisitioned the items; (2) co-
respondent Maria A. Alvero, Bookkeeper, who affixed her signature in the
voucher; and (3) Salome G. Germana, Designated Storekeeper, who signed
Box No. 4 of the voucher. His participation was limited to signing the RIV
and the check as a matter of routine. Moreover, the RIV did not involve the
determination of the price of the supplies and materials to be purchased,
and his signing the check was done in compliance with the DECS policy
which limited the signing authority of the principal, Conchita C. Devora, to
checks not exceeding ₱50,000. In such case the signing authority was
vested in him as the DECS Regional Director.
In maintaining his innocence, petitioner asserts that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of public functions by public officers should
apply in his favor. He had no ground to doubt the preparation, processing
and verification of his subordinates prior to his act of approving the RIV and
signing the check. His position required the signing of voluminous
documents and it would be unreasonably cumbersome if he were to
scrutinize every document that required his signature.
In support of his arguments, petitioner cites the cases of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,14where this Court held
that heads of office may rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter
into negotiations. He likewise disputes the allegation of conspiracy for the
acts imputed against him were functions discharged in the performance of
his official duty. He did not overstep or exceed said functions. For
conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to
commit an offense.
In the Comment for the public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General
contends that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be
established by circumstantial evidence. It avers that what prevails in the
instant case is a conspiracy of silence and inaction. Petitioner should have
been vigilant in protecting the interest of the government. The magnitude of
the amount involved should have cautioned him to verify the truthfulness of
the documents presented for his signature. Petitioner ignored this telling
warning and in so doing he was guilty of negligence. His reliance on his
subordinates is no excuse, otherwise his position would be a mere rubber
stamp for the said subordinates.
As a final argument, the Office of the Solicitor General asseverates that it is
beyond the ambit of this Court’s authority to review the power of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The
Ombudsman is constitutionally mandated to investigate and prosecute
matters falling within his jurisdiction.
In his Reply petitioner states that the nature of the petition does not involve a
review of the factual finding of the Office of the Ombudsman but rather its
conclusion based on undisputed facts. The issue is a question of law and
may, therefore, be reviewed by this Court.
A meticulous review and re-evaluation of the pleadings in this case, as well
as G.R. No. 135913 leads this Court to a conclusion unfavorable to
petitioner.
Petitioner is indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, which
provides:
Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(g) Entering into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
There is no dispute that the Office of the Ombudsman included him as a
respondent because of his participation in signing the RIV and issuing a
check pertaining to the questioned purchase. Whether, on the one hand, the
said acts were done in good faith as to exonerate him from any liability, and
on the other, whether there was conspiracy among petitioner and his co-
respondents, involve questions of fact. These are matters of evidence to be
weighed and appreciated by the Sandiganbayan, which has original
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.15
Only questions of law may be appealed to us by way of certiorari. This Court
is not ordinarily a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of law.
There is a question of law in any given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact
arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts.16
From the pleadings it is clear to this Court that, contrary to the
representations of petitioner, what he wants us to do is review the evidence
and determine whether in fact he acted in good faith and that no conspiracy
existed among the accused.
The rulings in Arias v. Sandiganbayan17 and Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan are inapplicable to petitioner. It must be emphasized that
18
the petitioners therein were indicted and submitted themselves to trial before
the Sandiganbayan, which convicted them of the offenses charged. In short
the Sandiganbayan had, in due course, received the evidence of the parties
and weighed its probative value. Unsatisfied with the findings of fact and
conclusion of law of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners therein appealed to this
Court.
In Arias this Court set aside the judgment against the petitioner because
there was no evidence that the Government suffered undue injury. As stated
by the Solicitor General which recommended Arias’ acquittal, (a) the
"P80.00 per square meter acquisition cost is just, fair and reasonable," and
(b) "the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing
evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused."
In Magsuci, the reversal by this Court of the judgment of conviction was
based on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and that "there has been
no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed
by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Acla."
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence on conspiracy.
In this case, there is only the claim of petitioner that he had acted in good
faith and that there was no conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes otherwise.
It is settled that this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts.19 This rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by immeasurable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it,
in as much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an and similar maneuvers are not only unethical, they also almost always
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.20 betray the weakness of the client’s cause.26

Petitioner has not convinced this Court that his case falls within any of the
exemptions, enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile,21 to the rule that criminal
prosecution may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final
injunction or a writ of prohibition.
There is yet another basic reason for dismissing the instant petition. This is
an appeal under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We have declared Section 27
to be unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto22 for increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its
advice and consent. Moreover, even if said provision had not been declared
unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of appeal to parties aggrieved
by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases 23 as in fact
said Section mentions only appeals from "all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman."
The actions filed by petitioner before this Court, specifically G.R. No. 135913
and the instant petition, were in fact a modified form of forum shopping.
Perhaps realizing that this instant petition could be dismissed in light
of Fabian, which was promulgated on 16 September 1998, petitioner
instituted GR. No. 135913 on 3 November 1998. The two petitions could
have created havoc to the judicial system had petitioner succeeded with his
ploy. Petitioner’s counsel is hereby warned that a repetition of his dilatory
tactics or some other similar scheme to thwart justice will be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED and
the Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of
the Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED.
Double costs against petitioner.

Even if we were to brush aside technicality – which action we would SO ORDERED.

ordinarily reserve for cases having transcendental importance to the
public24 – and considered the instant petition one for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, it would still suffer from a failure to denominate the
proper party. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 has for its object the
review of an action of a tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-judicial
functions made without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant
petition, the tribunal whose action is sought to be reviewed is the Office of
the Ombudsman yet, petitioner impleaded the Commission on Audit as
respondent, and not the Office of the Ombudsman.1âwphi1

Additionally, the totality of petitioner’s and his counsel’s acts, including that
in the other case he filed with us in G.R. No. 135913,25 manifests a scheme
to frustrate the ends of justice by using court procedures to delay the
resolution of a pending case. It is with much regret that we must reiterate to
petitioner’s counsel our command laid down some thirty years ago that a
lawyer, as an officer of the court, should never induce a court to act contrary
to the dictates of justice and equity nor should he befuddle the issues. These
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-
CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL
UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE
CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES,
PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER
N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN,
RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE
G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA
SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS,
ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR.,
SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN
MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN
TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC.
and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack
of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of
112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of
IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed
a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts
that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the
State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it
prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains,
and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions
thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on
the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP
that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification
to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said
area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to
property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65
and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson
and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease
and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with
his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago
join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice
Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the
law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted
as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should
be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not
have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3
(a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 123547 May 21, 2001
REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE JOHNSON
BALLUTAY, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 25, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CABANA TUAN CITY, HONORABLE JUDGE ADRIANO
TUAZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY, SPOUSES REYNALDO VENERACION
and SUSAN VENERACION, SPOUSES MAXIMO HIPOLITO and
MANUELA DE LA PAZ and GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 7, 1995, and
resolution, dated January 31, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 251 and
28,2 Cabanatuan City, finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and
Susan Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioner's rights
as a builder in good faith.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and
his sister Manuela De la Paz, married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an
oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish
priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe
Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. The lot is located
along Maharlika Road near the Municipal Hall of Cabanatuan City. At the
time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la Paz,
mother of private respondents, although the latter had already sold it to
private respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated May 26, 1976 (Exh. N/Exh. 2-Veneracion).3 Private respondent
Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name on October 22, 1981
and was issued TCT No. T-40496 (Exh. 9).4 When the land was offered for
sale to petitioner, private respondents De la Paz were accompanied by their
mother, since petitioner dealt ' with the De la Fazes as a family and not
individually. He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela De la
Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a downpayment of P3,000.00
to private respondents De la Paz and that the balance would be payable by
installment. After giving the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the
construction of a house on the lot after securing a building permit from the
City Engineer's Office on April 23, 1981, with the written consent of the then
registered owner, Claudia de la Paz (Exh. B/Exh, 1).5 Petitioner likewise
began paying the real estate taxes on said property (Exh. D, D-l, D-
2).6 Construction on the house was completed on October 6, 1981 (Exh.
V).7 Since then, petitioner and his family have maintained their residence
there.8
On January 31, 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which
private respondents De la Paz executed two documents. The first document
(Exh. A) read:
1-31-83
Ang halaga ng Lupa sa Villa Fe Subdivision na ipinagbili kay Fr.
Dante Martinez ay P15,000.00 na pinangangako namin na ibibigay
ang Deed of Sale sa ika-25 ng Febrero 1983.
[SGD.] METRING HIPOLITO
[SGD.] JOSE GODOFREDO DE LA
PAZ9
The second writing (Exh. O) read:
Cabanatuan City
March 19, 1986
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
 This is to certify that Freddie dela Paz has agreed to sign tomorrow
(March 20) the affidavit of sale of lot located at Villa Fe Subdivision
sold to Fr. Dante Martinez.
[Sgd.] Freddie dela Paz
FREDDIE DELA PAZ10
However, private respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale
they promised to petitioner.
In the meantime, in a Deed of. Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase
dated October 28, 1981 (Exh. 10),11 private respondents De la Paz sold
three lots with right to repurchase the same within one year to private
respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum of
P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was the lot previously sold to petitioner.12
Reynaldo Veneracion had been a resident of Cabanatuan City since birth.
He used to pass along Maharlika Highway in going to the Municipal Hall or
in going to and from Manila. Two of the lots subject of the sale were located
along Maharlika Highway, one of which was the lot sold earlier by the De la
Pazes to petitioner. The third lot (hereinafter referred to as the Melencio lot)
was occupied by private respondents De la Paz. Private respondents
Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these lots during the
period of redemption, but all titles to the lots were given to him.13
Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondent Godofredo
De la Paz informed private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion that he was
selling the three lots to another person for P200,000.00. Indeed, private
respondent Veneracion received a call from a Mr. Tecson verifying if he had
the titles to the properties, as private respondents De la Paz were offering to
sell the two lots along Maharlika Highway to him (Mr. Tecson) for
P180,000.00 The offer included the lot purchased by petitioner in February,
1981. Private respondent Veneracion offered to purchase the same two lots
from the De la razes for the same amount, The offer was accepted by
private respondents De la Paz. Accordingly, on June 2, 1983, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed over the two lots (Exh. I/Exh. 5-
Veneracion).14 Sometime in January, 1984, private respondent Reynaldo
Veneracion asked a certain Renato Reyes, petitioner's neighbor, who the
owner of the building erected on the subject lot was. Reyes told him that it
was Feliza Martinez, petitioner's mother, who was in possession of the
property. Reynaldo Veneracion told private respondent Godofredo about the
matter and was assured that Godofredo would talk to Feliza. Based on that
assurance, private respondents Veneracion registered the lots with the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan on March 5, 1984. The lot in dispute was
registered under TCT No. T-44612 (Exh. L/Exh. 4-Veneracion).15
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been
sold to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter, (Exh. P/Exh. 6-
Veneracion) from private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion on March 19,
1986, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the
property and remove their improvements thereon.16 Petitioner, in turn,
demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private
respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the
owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from private
respondents De la Paz.17
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of San
Juan, Cabanatuan City for conciliation, but the parties failed to reach an
agreement (Exh. M/Exh. 13).18 As a consequence, on May 12, 1986, private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action for ejectment in the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Cabanatuan City against petitioner and his
mother (Exh. 14).19
On the other hand, on June 10, 1986, petitioner caused a notice of lis
pendens to be recorded on TCT No. T-44612 with the Register of Deeds of
Cabanatuan City (Exh. U).20
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to have the case decided
under the Rules on Summary Procedure and defined the issues as follows:
1. Whether of not defendant (now petitioner) may be judicially
ejected.
2. Whether or not the main issue in this case is ownership.
 3. Whether or not damages may be awarded.21
On January 29, 1987, the trial court rendered its decision, pertinent portions
of which are quoted as follows:
With the foregoing findings of the Court, defendants [petitioner Rev.
Fr. Dante Martinez and his mother] are the rightful possessors and
in good faith and in concept of owner, thus cannot be ejected from
the land in question. Since the main issue is ownership, the better
remedy of the plaintiff [herein private respondents Veneracion] is
Accion Publiciana in the Regional Trial Court, having jurisdiction to
adjudicate on ownership.
Defendants' counterclaim will not be acted upon it being more than
P20,000.00 is beyond this Court's power to adjudge.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing plaintiff's
complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay Attorney's fee of P5,000.00
and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.22
On March 3, 1987, private respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal
with the Regional Trial Court, but failed to pay the docket fee. On June 6,
1989, or over two years after the filing of the notice of appeal, petitioner filed
a Motion for Execution of the Judgment, alleging finality of judgment for
failure of private respondents Veneracion to perfect their appeal and failure
to prosecute the appeal for an unreasonable length of time.
Upon objection of private respondents Veneracion, the trial court denied on
June 28, 1989 the motion for execution and ordered the records of the case
to be forwarded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court. On July 11, 1989,
petitioner appealed from this order. The appeal of private respondents
Veneracion from the decision of the MTC and the appeal of petitioner from
the order denying petitioner's motion for execution were forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Cabanatuan City. The cases were
thereafter consolidated under Civil Case No. 670-AF.
On February 20, 1991, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding
private respondents Veneracion as the true owners of the lot in dispute by
virtue of their prior registration with the Register of Deeds, subject to
petitioner's rights as builder in good faith, and ordering petitioner and his
privies to Vacate the lot after receipt of the cost of the construction of the
house, as well as to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit. It, however, failed to rule on petitioner's appeal of the
Municipal Trial Court's order denying their Motion for Execution of
Judgment.
Meanwhile, on May 30, 1986, while the ejectment case was pending before
the Municipal Trial Court, petitioner Martinez filed a complaint for annulment
of sale with damages against the Veneracions and De la Pazes with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City. On March 5, 1990, the
trial court rendered its decision finding private respondents Veneracion
owners of the land in dispute, subject to the rights of petitioner as a builder
in good faith, and ordering private respondents De la Paz to pay petitioner
the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and for private respondents to pay the costs of the suit.
On March 20, 1991, petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals of the RTC's decision in Civil Case No. 670-AF (for ejectment).
Likewise, on April 2, 1991, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision in
Civil Case No. 44-[AF]-8642-R (for annulment of sale and damages) to the
Court of Appeals. The cases were designated as CA G.R. SP. No. 24477
and CA G.R. CY No. 27791, respectively, and were subsequently
consolidated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts' decisions,
without ruling on petitioner's appeal from the Municipal Trial Court's order
denying his Motion for Execution of Judgment. It declared the Veneracions
to be owners of the lot in dispute as they were the first registrants in good
faith, in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code. Petitioner Martinez
failed to overcome the presumption of good faith for the following reasons:
1. when private respondent Veneracion discovered the construction
on the lot, he immediately informed private respondent Godofredo
about it and relied on the latter's assurance that he will take care of
the matter.
 2. the sale between petitioner Martinez and private respondents De
la Paz was not notarized, as required by Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the
Civil Code, thus it cannot be said that the private respondents
Veneracion had knowledge of the first sale.23
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
dated January 31, 1996.24 Hence this petition for review. Petitioner raises
the following assignment of errors:
I THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES JOHNSON
BALLUTAY AND ADRIANO TUAZON ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS REYNALDO VENERACION AND
WIFE ARE BUYERS AND REGISTRANTS IN GOOD FAITH IN
RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE.
II THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING
AND DECIDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASES OF SALVORO VS.
TANEGA, ET AL., G. R. NO. L 32988 AND IN ARCENAS VS. DEL
ROSARIO, 67 PHIL 238, BY TOTALLY IGNORING THE SAID
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE ASSAILED
DECISIONS OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS.
III THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN
CA G. R. SP. NO. 24477.
IV THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DENYING
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW AFORECITED
INEVITABLY SANCTIONED AND/OR WOULD ALLOW A
VIOLATION OF LAW AND DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY PUBLIC
RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE ADRIANO TUAZON WHEN
THE LATTER RENDERED A DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 670-
AF [ANNEX "D"] REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE SENDON DELIZO IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 9523 [ANNEX "C"] AND IN NOT RESOLVING IN THE
SAME CASE THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY DEFENDANTS ON
THE ORDER OF THE SAME COURT DENYING THE MOTION
FOR EXECUTION.
V THAT THE RESOLUTION [ANNEX "B"] (OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS) DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [ANNEX "1"] WITHOUT STATING
CLEARLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID
RESOLUTION WAS BASED, (IS ERRONEOUS).
These assignment of errors raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in
good faith of the lot in dispute as to make them the absolute
owners thereof in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on
double sale of immovable property.
2. Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the
period to appeal is not necessary for the perfection of the appeal
after a notice of appeal has been filed within such period.
3. Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration is contrary to the
constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion for
reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based.
First. It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that
petitioner is assailing the findings of fact and the appreciation of the
evidence made by the trial courts and later affirmed by the respondent court.
While, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be
granted under certain exceptions, namely: (a) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issue of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (I) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; (j) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.25
In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents
Veneracion are the owners of the disputed lot on their reliance on private
respondent Godofredo De la Paz's assurance that he would take care of the
matter concerning petitioner's occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting
good faith. This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art.
1544 of the Civil Code provides that where immovable property is the
subject of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry of Property; (2)
in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession;
and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title.26 The
requirement of the law, where title to the property is recorded in the Register
of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To
be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior
recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e., without knowledge
or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be
ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land.27
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18
days before the execution of the first Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase,
he inspected the premises and found it vacant.28 However, this is belied by
the testimony of Engr. Felix D. Minor, then building inspector of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, that he conducted on October 6,
1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in dispute in the performance of his
duties as a building inspector to monitor the progress of the construction of
the building subject of the building permit issued in favor of petitioner on
April 23, 1981, and that he found it 100 % completed (Exh. V).29 In the
absence of contrary evidence, he is to be presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty.30 Thus, as early as October, 1981, private
respondents Veneracion already knew that there was construction being
made on the property they purchased.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of
sale between the private respondents by considering their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts.31 More specifically, it overlooked the fact that the first
contract of sale between the private respondents shows that it is in fact an
equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as
an equitable mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale and (2) that their intention was to secure
an existing debt by way of mortgage.32 A contract of sale with right to
repurchase gives rise to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in
any of the following cases: (1) when the price of a sale with a right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the expiration of
the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser
retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds
himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may
be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.33 In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to
repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage.34
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private
respondents intended the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not a
contract of sale: (1) Private respondents Veneracion never took actual
possession of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz remained in
possession of the Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where they
resided; (3) During the period between the first sale and the second sale to
private respondents Veneracion, they never made any effort to take
possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption had
expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la
Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to another person for
P200,000.00, they never objected. To the contrary, they offered to purchase
the two lots for P180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr. Tecson was
prepared to purchase it for the same amount. Thus, it is clear from these
circumstances that both private respondents never intended the first sale to
be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to secure a debt of
P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between
the parties, it should be noted that this Court in several cases,35 has ruled
that a purchaser who is aware of facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in good
faith. Private respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-trial
conference in the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) that petitioner
was already in possession of the property in dispute at the time the second
Deed of Sale was executed on June 1, 1983 and registered on March 4,
1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already occupants on the property
as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other than the vendors, in
actual possession of the disputed lot should have put private respondents on
inquiry as to the nature of petitioner's right over the property. But he never
talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his right. He merely relied on the
assurance of private respondent Godofredo De la Paz, who was not even
the owner of the lot in question, that he would take care of the matter. This
does not meet the standard of good faith.
3. The appellate court's reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to
determine private respondents Veneracion's lack of knowledge of
petitioner's ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.
Art. 135736 and Art. 1358,37 in relation to Art. 1403(2)38 of the Civil Code,
requires that the sale of real property must be in writing for it to be
enforceable. It need not be notarized. If the sale has not been put in writing,
either of the contracting parties can compel the other to observe such
requirement.39 This is what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded that
a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his favor by private respondents De
la Paz. There is nothing in the above provisions which require that a contract
of sale of realty must be executed in a public document. In any event, it has
been shown that private respondents Veneracion had knowledge of facts
which would put them on inquiry as to the nature of petitioner's occupancy of
the disputed lot.
Second. Petitioner contends that the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for
ejectment) erred in denying petitioner's Motion for Execution of the
Judgment, which the latter filed on June 6, 1989, two years after private
respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the MTC on March 3,
1987 without paying the appellate docket fee. He avers that the trial court's
denial of his motion is contrary to this Court's ruling in the cases
of Republic v. Director of Lands,40 and Aranas v. Endona41 in which it was
held that where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the
reglementary period, the decision of the MTC becomes final and
unappealable as the payment of docket fee is not only a mandatory but also
a jurisdictional requirement.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of
Lands deals with the requirement for appeals from the Courts of First
Instance, the Social Security Commission, and the Court of Agrarian
Relations to the Court of Appeals. The case of Aranas v. Endona, on the
other hand, was decided under the 1964 Rules of Court and prior to the
enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B. P. Blg. 129) and
the issuance of its Interim Rules and Guidelines by this Court on January 11,
1983. Hence, these cases are not applicable to the matter at
issue.1âwphi1.nêt
On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,42 it was held that although
an appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the
municipal trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a prerequisite for the
perfection of an appeal under §2043 and §2344 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections,
there are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a)
the filing of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the
expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Even in the procedure for
appeal to the regional trial courts,45 nothing is mentioned about the payment
of appellate docket fees.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the
appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate
court.46 Thus, private respondents Veneracions' failure to pay the appellate
docket fee is not fatal to their appeal.
Third. Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the
Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof.
This contention is likewise without merit.
(1) declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by private
respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz in favor of private
respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion;
(2) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz
to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner Rev. Fr.
Dante Martinez;
(3) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz
to reimburse private respondents spouses Veneracion the amount
the latter may have paid to the former;

Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that "No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the basis therefor." This requirement was
fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying. reconsideration of
its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its
ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new.47 Thus, its resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration states:
(4) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to cancel
TCT No. T-44612 and issue a new one in the name of petitioner
Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez; and
(5) ordering private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and
severally the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the
costs of the suit.

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision SO ORDERED.

filed by the petitioners.

Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and

arguments raised by the movants have been considered and
passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, We
find no reason to disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.48

Attorney's. fees should be awarded as petitioner was compelled to litigate to

protect his interest due to private respondents' act or omission.49

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and a

new one is RENDERED:
 EN BANC
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession
of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent
is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty
candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which
was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed
by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before
the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant
alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission
to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for,
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin
L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar
bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly
D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated
that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld
even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations
but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages
in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law
does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court
or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice
of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for
a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila
SUPREME COURT
Manila Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

EN BANC Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989 Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

PER CURIAM: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
(hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
proclaimed as officers: main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
NAME POSITION use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP
Atty. Violeta Drilon President By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.
Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates
voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to
prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted
by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were
unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly
employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta
C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart,
soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit
far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted
leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for
her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by
some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion,
Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and
that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor
Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort
to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously,
womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x
x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the
election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by
closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a
room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP
Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to
the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that
in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of
the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well
as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including
vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one
hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP
By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro
R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C.
Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty.
Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and
the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their
supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and
the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that
an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB
planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the
charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the
convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the
Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly
campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said,
on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to
have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom
Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing
and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have
direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political"
character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly
non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be
eligible for election or appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate,
Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an
officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the
prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to
elections. — The following acts and practices relative to
election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate
for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other
 member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by
himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election
campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
material other than a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet
of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be
done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1)
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar
consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or
causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised
to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above
rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar
shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or
his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the
imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant
to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga,
and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47)
where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP
chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested
the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the
chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies
of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
 RAMON M. NISCE The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit
C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the
as Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane
from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
National President of the Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane
manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu),
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony
Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of
the passengers were IBP candidates.

______________ _______________ Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that
she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n.,
July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Chapter Signature"
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor
went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at
L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado
business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C.
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he
Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores,
asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to
Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C.
Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to
Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio
the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their
C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr.,
support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the
Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR
commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit
in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated,
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695;
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with
the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga,
Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente
Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater
Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco
(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A.
Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for
Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon
(Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo
(Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-
1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S.
Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles
was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles
said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to
Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp.
77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-
Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-
3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites
were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his
delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet'
Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo
Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy,
Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, (b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used (d) Jay Castro 10,000
as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of (e) Danny Deen 20,000
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON (g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza
banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with
her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food,
and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of
P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation
with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been
contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they
contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid
seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her
delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose
name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room
where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that
she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma,
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato
Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary
Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate,
two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a
sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members
of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He
made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n.
July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by
soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a
contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-
floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager,
respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto
G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those
who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno
Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate
while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he
took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He
stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some
moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member
of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma
Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in
the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong,
Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress
of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of
113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his
room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of
Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao)
and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms
served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were
discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where
the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto,
the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate
who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in
the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989,
pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of
legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to
be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as
wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their
tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000.
They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-
Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials
on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years.
The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's
ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him
to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run
as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989,
pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio
and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third
week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin
and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited
her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her.
Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region
(t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was
offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When
Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that
there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP
candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused
to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my
wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters
informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who
allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an
assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar,
Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had
been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-
106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels:
Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He
mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in
Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-
104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own
tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks
of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he
was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City
lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces
(Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not
include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before
the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with,
or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the
expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon
and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances"
among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and
distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of
Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of
uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the
giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her
group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort
them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied
them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by
inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some
rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated
the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold
the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in
unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of
the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials
and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less
than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves
to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers.
The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that
office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress
upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP
and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the
By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President
shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not
run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have
been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex
oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of
Governors to be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP
shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of
the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-
Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of
Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine
(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration
Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for
each region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor
should be rotated among the different Chapters in the
region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at
least one (1) month before the national convention the
 delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible
be rotated among the chapters in the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following

provision as part of the first paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the

general membership shall be held prior to any election in
an election year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the

Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that
are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from
among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president.
In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national
officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as
those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities
attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves
as candidate for any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by

the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of
such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City
Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO,
Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of
Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of
any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the
crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled
"An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting
and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that
of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored
principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power
to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal
circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this
Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent
Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall
be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being
a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to
reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as
the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on
October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the
hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only
petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the
debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for
decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and
rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented
by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved.
As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the
principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The
other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be
considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the
matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing
of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and
not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the
public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of
private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover,
petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their
standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat
from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the
doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we
are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to
the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their
claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in
common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate
as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.'
That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States.
For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v.
Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been
lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest
violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in
informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open
to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This
Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated
September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which
shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide
the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary
which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special
Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a
Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It
began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has
the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its
appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for
what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of
the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call
for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase
from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest —
can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The
rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to
all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are
affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the
Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a
starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The
experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered
to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal
courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as
training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence,
to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth
noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became
effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt
that the last two decades of this century are likely to be attended with
problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are
pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily
those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are
asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not
proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so
much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be
quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The
national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for
solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus
may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be
less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly
stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike
in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards
economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained increases in
per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New
Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to
"the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and
economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social
justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the
government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The
efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements
in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice
and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively
implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed
inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on
grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be
filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas
for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would
not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the
execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably
expected. That is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as
mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged
dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity.
Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court,
through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and
the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the
courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more
and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the
accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the increasing
urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much
oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a
crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no
choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of
the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be,
of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth
noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such
scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations .
enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice
previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the
Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten
appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one
of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions
may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of
1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the
Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The
membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously
increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five
members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen
divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of
Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in
1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two
other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit
Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same
qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of
First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later
became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After
setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation
has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the
attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of
jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper
meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some
options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to
confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to
appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather
than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the
Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary
procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some
amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there
was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the
'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was
drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these
guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of
upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and
parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were
adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on
the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with
the distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted
written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the
invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such
Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the
disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in
the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the
rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies
of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable
future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the
proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted
to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort
as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on
August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how
lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the
vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good
faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the
Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office
within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from
no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias,
Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to
be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal
issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid
abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ...
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to
the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The
above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial
Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having
preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government,
so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good
faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even
more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De
la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by
petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of
judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was
a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of
original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such
statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he
received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on
Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with
respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act
insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did
not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the
result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of
good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with
due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the
opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among
other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely
new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is
valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that
section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of
tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the
same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A
mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198
U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible
to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move
deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of
tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of
Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson
and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or
constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity
of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and
emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the
constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain,
and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be
the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am
satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative
department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely
to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under
these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative
department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity
for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new
government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the
defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts
there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of
their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is
engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid
exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion
of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the
reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the
reorganization of all branches of the government, including the courts of first
instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by
new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there
was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel
that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid
and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged
statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial
courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other
metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in
municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less
reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For
the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was
the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for
solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not
for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion
penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha
abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha
quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario
correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de
desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se incapacite no priva al
Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not
held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City
creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus:
"Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo
se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno
local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could
not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative
authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive,
may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept
independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all
inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned,
with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on
such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory
provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out
in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian
Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit
Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized,
until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by
the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the
office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but
to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure
provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is
thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution
adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong
executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former
Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto
of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept,
categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to
govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by
unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was
cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the
1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle of
separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by
actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state
and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65Moreover, it is
equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under
the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang
Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks
categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the
position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there
was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising
the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified
parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments
though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary
system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister
with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the
regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not
more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members
of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the
system of government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is
that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is
likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to
enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as
usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence
of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing
inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent
Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was
a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as
conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under
the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is
in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to
its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration.
No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the
basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could
not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is
no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power,
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save
and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated
last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the
Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection.
As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in
the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a
case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be
construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers
vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
committed. It commends itself for approval." 80Nor would such a step be
unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into
Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall
carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a
province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act,
but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order
contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could
stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to
reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the
Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize
inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the
practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this
Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither
agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well
in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such
a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was
so famous "The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed
in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes
in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only
because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them
are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to
the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force
and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh
unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The
constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent
necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the
academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus
right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this
attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of
power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners
would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances
of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of
the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The
questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along
the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that
underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which
is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them,
the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions
when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links
that bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended
Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency.
There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone
Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws
leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such
means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is
worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early
as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern
government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be
"a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from
the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not
haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what
petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of
merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme
Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of
the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant
to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by
the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding
section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical:
"The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance
with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly
petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the
meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to
hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance,
and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal contemplation
without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally
reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the
government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary
in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be
a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by
the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that
even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not
supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the
principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981,
petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-
named was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on
Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made
clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any
hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They
were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is
entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was
limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the
undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since
1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It
has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution,
it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman
or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed
legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt
from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century
the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial
reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of
this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit
institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief
Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at
the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the
state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the
people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them
either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for
their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more
than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public
official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and
fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the
security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed.
It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their
judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge
of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are
assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely
personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The
challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this
Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century
that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
farther thought to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government,
is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that
judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains
appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of committed.
office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be
subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not
one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of
the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we
do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior
courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the
King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed
out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the
judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm
Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of
law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to
perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are
independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and
coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108 There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration
of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing
inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and
the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to
discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust
reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will
attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It
cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to
the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so,
that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as
expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this
pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay