[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004] brother-in-law of Ferdinand E.
Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN
(Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior
to plea and trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether as a motion to
quash or motion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of
justice and unduly burden the court system. Grounds not included in the first of such
repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and can no longer be used as bases of
similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential
relatives who “intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government.” This provision is not vague or “impermissibly broad,”
because it can easily be understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither
may the constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this be challenged on the basis of
the “overbreadth” and the “void-for-vagueness” doctrines, which apply only to free-
speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the November 20, 2001[2] and the March 1, 2002[3] Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
“WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The
arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as scheduled.”[4]
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
“[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft court]
charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019, [5] as
amended. The Information reads:
‘That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner],
therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there
wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his
self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract
between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned
and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company
(BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to
the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities
including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-
expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops
including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount
of P5,000,000.00.
‘Contrary to law.’
“On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first ‘MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT’ claiming that no valid preliminary investigation was
conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could be said
to have been conducted, the same was null and void having been undertaken by a biased
and partial investigative body.
“On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an order
giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.
“[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan]
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order.
“On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a
Motion to Quash.
“On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U.
Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the reinvestigation of
the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special
Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the recommendation. However,
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed the prosecutors to let the
[petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
“Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second ‘MOTION TO QUASH
AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT’.
“On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
“On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a ‘MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION
TO DISMISS’. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and
admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
“The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
‘I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF
[PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
‘A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN
THE INSTANT CASE; AND
‘B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A
BIASED AND PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:
“Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction –
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite
clear and incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because
its vagueness violates the due process right of an individual
to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him;

‘II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS it violates the due process right of an individual to be
VIOLATED presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;

‘III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of
[PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION the nature and the cause of the accusation against him was
violated;
‘IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PRESCRIPTION’”[6] D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x
x was violated during the preliminary investigation stage in
the following ways:

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan [i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted

for Criminal Case No. 13736; and
The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except the
third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its previous [ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a
Resolutions.[7] In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that Section biased and partial investigator.
17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the basic law was
amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been committed on or about 1975, E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
the amended provision was inapplicable to him.[8] prescription; and

In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan

F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973
passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary
Constitution, petitioner x x x is immune from criminal
investigation was not violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation.[9] It further
prosecution.
held that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not
trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the Information had set forth the essential elements of
the offense charged.[10] And

Hence, this Petition.[11]

II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner[’s] x x x right to equal
protection of the laws.”[12]
 Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act
3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a
valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal
prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time
in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his
December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to
Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to
quash.[13] We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges the denial of his
original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner
could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration been
turned down, the next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition for
certiorari[14] -- if there was grave abuse of discretion -- which should be filed within 60
days from notice of the assailed order;[15] or (2) to proceed to trial without prejudice to his
right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same questions before the
proper appellate court.[16] But instead of availing himself of these remedies, he filed a
“Motion to Dismiss” on June 19, 2001.
Impropriety of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantial distinction between a “motion to quash” and a “motion to
dismiss.” Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such
motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of
proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is generally used in criminal proceedings to annul
a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil
proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use
the term “motion to quash” in criminal,[17] and “motion to dismiss” in civil,
proceedings.[18]
In the present case, however, both the “Motion to Quash” and the “Motion to
Dismiss” are anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The
hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second
motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or different, by
installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to
preliminary objections, and trial would never commence. A second motion to quash
delays the administration of justice and unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117
provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally deemed
waived.[19] Petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss” violates this rule.
Constitutionality of
the Challenged Provision
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed
outright. However, given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and corruption,
the Court will nevertheless address the other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges
the validity of Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal statute, on the ground that the act
constituting the offense is allegedly vague and “impermissibly broad.”
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth [20] and the
vagueness[21] doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
explained the reason as follows:
“A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible ‘chilling effect’ upon protected speech. The theory is that
‘[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity.’ The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general
in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
‘one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.’ As has been pointed
out, ‘vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular
defendant.’”[22] (underscoring supplied)
“To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity.”[23] While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad,[24] the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the
equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec[25] decreed as void
a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec[26] held that a
portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative
powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass
acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation
would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of “actual case and controversy”
and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. InYounger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme
Court in these words:[27]
“[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.”
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes,
described as a “manifestly strong medicine” to be employed “sparingly and only as a last
resort.” In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that
have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant has been charged.[28]
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be examined
only “as applied” to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be declared
unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
“Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of
the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the
above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government
along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application
filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or
rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an
official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.”
Petitioner also claims that the phrase “to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government” is vague and violates
his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him. [29] He
further complains that the provision does not specify what acts are punishable under the
term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be presumed innocent. [30] We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid.[31] On the party challenging its validity weighs
heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[32] Any reasonable doubt about the
validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. [33] To doubt is to
sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive
Secretary,[34] the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was explained by this
Court thus:
“The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.”[35]
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption.
This Court has previously laid down the test for determining whether a statute is vague,
as follows:
“x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by construction.
“A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[36] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. The first may be ‘saved’ by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.[37] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
“The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.[38] It must be stressed, however, that
the ‘vagueness’ doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.”[39]
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,[40] in which the Court said that there
was nothing vague about a penal law that adequately answered the basic query “What is
the violation?”[41] Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters
that the law itself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the uniqueness of every case. [42]
The question “What is the violation?” is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA
3019, as follows:
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; and
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the government.
Applicability of
Statutory Construction
As to petitioner’s claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the
Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple
statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute
will not render the law “void for vagueness,” if the meaning can be determined through
the judicial function of construction.[43] Elementary is the principle that words should be
construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.
“x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; [44] much less
do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act x x x.
“x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, [45] unless it
is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.[46] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.” [47]
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation,
which is to “to come between.”[48] Criminally liable is anyone covered in the enumeration
of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the government. As we have explained, it is
impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention
could be performed. But the courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded.
Thus, the alleged vagueness ofintervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to
the commencement of the trial.
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any
event, the “overbreath” and “void for vagueness” doctrines are not applicable to this case.
Second Issue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner further
contends that the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague, because it does not
specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed. [49] Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. [50] The pertinent
provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
“Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill
of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall
specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.”
 The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable
the court to pronounce judgment. [51] The particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the information. [52]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
information,[53] matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the
nature of the offense -- need not be averred.[54] Whatever facts and circumstances must
necessarily be alleged are to be determined by reference to the definition and the essential
elements of the specific crimes.[55]
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of
a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the
allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to
enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are
evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation
when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayan’s Order
giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.[56] Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[57] he
undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation,
because the PCGG acted both as complainant and as investigator. [58]
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to
conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the “cold neutrality of
an impartial judge” in cases in which it was the agency that had gathered evidence and
subsequently filed the complaint.[59] On that basis, this Court nullified the preliminary
investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the transmittal of the records to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the
Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present Complaint
against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary investigation.
However, he was accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and
afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure outlined
in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayan’s actions are in accord also with Raro v.
Sandiganbayan,[60] which held that the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation
would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already been
filed, the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while
the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed. [61]
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999. [62] Such issue should be
disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion
within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party may not
circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that raises the same issue and the same
arguments.
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is utterly
unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense was
committed “during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975.” He argues that when
the Information was filed on July 12, 1989,[63] prescription had already set in, because the
prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from
the time the offense was allegedly committed. The increase of this prescriptive period to
fifteen (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195.[64]
Act No. 3326, as amended,[65] governs the prescription of offenses penalized by
special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
“The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.”
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the
prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the February 1986
EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.[66] In Republic v. Desierto, the
Court explained:
“This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board
of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were
charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by then President
Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover the so-called ‘Behest Loans’, where the
Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and entities
connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet
prescribed, this Court ruled that:
‘In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to
have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were
made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
‘beneficiaries of the loans.’ Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were
charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from
the day of such commission.
xxx xxx xxx
‘People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the
nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or
obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the
violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run only
from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or
acts.’ (Italics supplied)
“There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present one
which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arose out of
seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both were ‘discovered’ only after the
government created bodies to investigate these anomalous transactions; third, both
involve prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019; and, fourth,in both cases, it was
sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the respondents conspired and connived with one
another in order to keep the alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.
“This Court’s pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite relevant
and instructive as to the date when the discovery of the offense should be reckoned, thus:
‘In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were
made because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate
fraud against the government. The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been
discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then
President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would
have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the counting
of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense,
which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May
1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.’”[67]
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general
rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the crime
cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the
aggrieved party, with knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged
intervention was made. The accused is the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ brother-
in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale involving a private corporation, the
majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question
the legality of the sale or would even have thought of investigating petitioner’s alleged
involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation[68] of PCGG[69] and its
exhaustive investigations that the alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation
on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint against former President Marcos and petitioner for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing of the
Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years from
the discovery of the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as
a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President
Marcos.[70] He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
which we quote:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.
“x x x xxx x x x”
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to
petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the
alleged crime happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[71] this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive
immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability. We explained therein that
executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be
used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done
while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives
his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of
public officials and their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.”
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. [72] On the contrary, it acted prudently, in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon
Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners was severed on July 31, 1994.
[G.R. No. 127718. March 2, 2000] Petitioners did not receive any separation pay.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, ABELARDO SANGADAN, LUCIANO
RAMOS, NESTOR TILASAN, GREGORIO TILASAN, JOAQUIN GARCIA,
ROGELIO SABAITAN, CASTRO LEONARDO, PILARDO POTENCIANO,
RONILLO POTENCIANO, SANTIAGO SABAITAN, JOVENCIO BARTOLOME,
JUANITO CONCERMAN, GEORGE TUMILAS, PATROCINIO DOMINGO,
AVELINO FRANCISCO, MELITON SANGADAN, ALEXANDER GERONIMO,
JOAQUIN GERONIMO, RAMIL MACASO, LAMBERTO JOVEN, CRISTINO
GARINA, SAMMY GANTAAN, NACIAL USTALAN, EDWIN USTALAN,
ROLAND POTENCIANO, RODY CONCERMAN, ELMER DOMINGO,
ARNAGUEZ SANGADAN, UNDING BOLENG, EDUARDO BOLENG,
ROBERTO PANEO and HENRY SANGADAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th Division), PATALON COCONUT
ESTATE and/or CHARLIE REITH as General Manager and SUSIE GALLE
REITH, as owner, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside and annul two (2) resolutions
of the National Labor Relations Commission[1] promulgated on April 24, 1996[2] and
August 29, 1996[3] denying the award of separation pay to petitioners.
On August 1, 1994, the cooperative took over the estate. A certain Abelardo Sangadan
informed respondents of such takeover via a letter which was received by the respondents
on July 26, 1994. Being beneficiaries of the Patalon Coconut Estate pursuant to the
CARP, the petitioners became part-owners of the land.[4]
On April 25, 1995, petitioners filed individual complaints before the Regional Arbitration
Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City,
praying for their reinstatement with full backwages on the ground that they were illegally
dismissed. The petitioners were represented by their labor organization, the NFL.
On December 12, 1995, the RAB rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing complainants’ charge for illegal dismissal for lack
of merit, but ordering respondents thru [sic] its owner-manager or its
duly authorized representative to pay complainants’ separation pay in
view of the latter’s cessation of operations or forced sale, and for 13th
month differential pay in the amount, as follows, for:
Names Separation Pay 13th Mo. Pay
Diff. Total

The pertinent facts are as follows: Abelardo Sangadan P23,879.06 Non

e P23,879.06
Petitioners are bona fide members of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Luciano
Employment. They were employed by private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Ramos 43,605.24 P711.25 44
Reith, general manager and owner, respectively, of the 354-hectare Patalon Coconut ,316.49
Estate located at Patalon, Zamboanga City. Patalon Coconut Estate was engaged in
growing agricultural products and in raising livestock. Nestor
Tilasan 19,726.18 401.46
In 1988, Congress enacted into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as 20,127.64
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which mandated the compulsory
acquisition of all covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer Gregorio Tilasan 25,955.50 Non
beneficiaries under the so-called Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP). e 25,955.50

Pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Joaquin
Agrarian Reform Association (PEARA), a cooperative accredited by the Department of Garcia 7,267.54 1,211.25 8,
Agrarian Reform (DAR), of which petitioners are members and co-owners. 478.79
Rogelio Joaquin
Sabaitan 21,798.00 1,211.25 23,009. Geronimo 24,917.28 1,211.25 26,128.5
25 3

Castro Leonardo, Ramil

Jr. 25,955.50 63.10 26,018.60 Macaso 6,229.32 861.25
7,090.57
Pilardo
Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 Lamberto
6,102.35 Joven 16,611.62 1,011.25 17,62
2.77
Ronillo Potenciano 7,267.54 Non
e 7,267.54 Cristino
Garina 35,299.48 849.65
Jovencio 36,149.13
Bartolome 8,305.76 477.25 8
,783.01 Sammy
Gantaan 14,535.08 961.25 15,49
Santiago 6.33
Sabaitan 4,152.88 1,011.25 5,164.13
Nacial
Juanito Ustalan 38,414.14 79.95
Concerman 7,267.54 611.25 38,494.09
7,928.79
Edwin
George Ustalan 7,267.54 1,011.25 8,27
Tumilas 16,611.52 1,011.25 1 8.79
7,622.77
Roland
Patrocinio Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 6,
Domingo 2,076.44 1,011.25 3,087.6 102.35
9
Rody
Avelino Concerman 7,267.54 691.25 7,
Francisco 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,325.9 958.79
1
Elmer
Meliton Domingo 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,
Sangadan 15,573.30 392.50 15, 325.91
965.80
Aranquez
Alexander Geronimo 15,573.00 Non Sangada 45,681.68 711.25 46,39
e 15,573.30 2.93

Unding Boleng 31,146.60 Non

e 31,146.60
 Eduardo The issue is whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation
Boleng 35,299.48 759.30 because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of
36,058.78 agrarian reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.

Roberto The petition is bereft of merit.

Paneo 23,876.06 911.25
24,787.31
Henry
Sangadan 16,611.52 1,011.25 17,622.77
Total
Benefits P586,774.22
"FURTHER, complainants’ claim for Muslim Holiday, overtime pay
and rest day pay should be dismissed for lack of merit, too." [5]
Appeal was taken by private respondents to public respondent NLRC. [6]
On April 24, 1996, the NLRC issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in
favor of the following findings:
1) Respondents are not guilty of illegally dismissing
complainants. Respondents’ cessation of operation was not due to a
unilateral action on their part resulting in the cutting off of the
employment relationship between the parties. The severance of
employer-employee relationship between the parties came about
INVOLUNTARILY, as a result of an act of the State. Consequently,
complainants are not entitled to any separation pay.
2) The award of 13th month pay differential is, however, Set
Aside. Any award of 13th month pay differentials to complainants
should be computed strictly based on their reduced pay, equivalent to
six (6) hours work, Monday to Friday, pursuant to what the parties
agreed in the November 18, 1991 Compromise Agreement."
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution[8] dated August 29, 1996.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to separation pay citing Article 283 of the Labor
Code which reads:
"ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. –
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee
due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.
In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
(6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year."
It is clear that Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment
and reduction of personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however,
involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as
contemplated under the aforesaid article. When the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed
because a large portion of the estate was acquired by DAR pursuant to CARP, the
ownership of that large portion of the estate was precisely transferred to PEARA and
ultimately to the petitioners as members thereof and as agrarian lot beneficiaries. Hence,
Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable to the case at bench.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the situation in this case were a closure of the business
establishment called Patalon Coconut Estate of private respondents, still the
petitioners/employees are not entitled to separation pay. The closure contemplated under
Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the
employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording of the
said legal provision that "The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to...".[9]The use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it is directory
in nature and generally permissive only.[10] The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in
statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.[11]
In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the
closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the
benefit of the employees.

As earlier stated, the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of
the said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. Hence, the closure of the
Patalon Coconut Estate was not effected voluntarily by private respondents who even
filed a petition to have said estate exempted from the coverage of RA 6657.
Unfortunately, their petition was denied by the Department of Agrarain Reform. Since
the closure was due to the act of the government to benefit the petitioners, as members of
the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association, by making them agrarian lot
beneficiaries of said estate, the petitioners are not entitled to separation pay. The
termination of their employment was not caused by the private respondents. The blame, if
any, for the termination of petitioners’ employment can even be laid upon the petitioner-
employees themselves inasmuch as they formed themselves into a cooperative, PEARA,
ultimately to take over, as agrarian lot beneficiaries, of private respondents’ landed estate
pursuant to RA 6657. The resulting closure of the business establishment, Patalon
Coconut Estate, when it was placed under CARP, occurred through no fault of the private
respondents.

While the Constitution provides that "the State x x x shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare", that constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor
is not intended to oppress or destroy capital and management. Thus, the capital and
management sectors must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the National Labor

Relations Commission dated April 24, 1996 and August 29, 1996 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14859 March 31, 1962
MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Sycip, Salazar and Associates for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On January 1, 1957, Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen, became the owner of
the business establishment known as "Import Meat and Produce", a grocery wholesale
and retail business, previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc. In the business
15 persons were employed 12 of whom are Filipinos and the other 3 Chinese. The three
Chinese were old employees of the previous owner, the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc., one
having been employed as purchaser and the other two as salesmen.
Three weeks after King had acquired the business as aforesaid, he sought permission
from the President of the Philippines to retain the services of the three Chinese employees
pursuant to Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, coursing his letter thru the Secretary
of Commerce and Industry. This official recommended to the President the disapproval
of King's request on the ground that aliens may not be appointed to operate or administer
a retail business under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1180 which requires that its capital
be wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, the only exception thereto being the
employment of technical personnel which may be allowed after securing to that effect an
authorization from the President. The President approved the recommendation of the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry since the positions of purchaser and salesmen
occupied by the three Chinese employees are not technical positions within the meaning
of Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134.
As a result of such adverse ruling, Macario King and his three Chinese employees filed a
petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus on August 25, 1958 against the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry and the Executive Secretary before the Court of
First Instance of Manila praying that they be given relief because they are "uncertain and
in doubt as to their rights and duties under Republic Act No. 1180 and Commonwealth
Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134, in view of the aforesaid rulings of the
Department of Commerce and Industry and of the Executive Secretary." They alleged
that said rulings are illegal in view of the respective situations and positions of petitioners
in the retail establishment, the purpose and language of the laws abovementioned, and the
constitutional guarantee of the rights of an employer to employ and of an employee to
work accorded to citizens and aliens alike. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ex parte upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondents filed an answer setting up certain affirmative and special defenses tending to
show that the petition does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. With
regard to the declaratory relief, respondents claim that such remedy is not available to
petitioners because they have already committed a breach of the statute which is apparent
on the face of the petition, meaning that the employment of the three Chinese as salesmen
and purchaser in the store of Macario King is a violation of the Section 1 of the Retail
Trade Act which provides that only citizens of the Philippines can engage in retail trade,
as well as of Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law which prohibits Chinese citizens to
intervene in the management, operation, administration or control of such business,
whether as an officer, employee or laborer with or without remuneration. Respondents
further claim that the three Chinese employees are not technical men who are exempted
from the operation of the law, and even if they are, they need the authorization of the
President which they failed to obtain in their case.
With regard to the petition for preliminary injunction, respondents contend that the
requisites for its issuance have not been satisfied. And with regard to the petition for
mandamus, respondents alleged that petitioners have failed to show that respondents have
unlawfully neglected any duty which they are called upon to perform and which would
make them liable for such relief. Hence, respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed
and that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court ex parte be lifted.
To this answer, petitioners filed a reply, which was followed by a rejoinder and sur-
rejoinder, with a detailed discussion of the arguments advanced in support thereof. And
because the motion to dismiss filed by respondents had been denied for lack of merit, trial
proceeded, after which the lower court entered judgment holding "that petitioner Macario
King may employ any person, although not a citizen of the Philippines or of the United
States of America, including the three petitioners herein as purchaser and salesmen, in
any position in his retail business not involving participation, or intervention in the
management, operation, administration or control of said business; that petitioners Lim
Pin, Chang Pak and Ng See Keng are entitled to continue as purchaser and salesmen,
respectively, in Macario King's Import Meat and Produce or in any other retail
establishment; that the writ of preliminary injunction issued against respondents ordering
the to desist from interfering by criminal and/or administrative action with the rights of
the petitioners as above defined, is hereby declared final; and, finally, respondents are
hereby ordered to allow and permit petitioners to enjoy and exercise their rights in the
manner and to the extent aforestated." Respondents took the present appeal before this
Court.
The center of controversy between petitioners-appellees and respondents-appellants
hinges on the interpretation be given to Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180, in relation to
Section 2-A, Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134. For ready
reference we quote the pertinent provisions: .
 SECTION 1. No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no
association, partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail
business: ... (Emphasis supplied) .
SEC. 2-A. Any person, corporation, or association which, having in its name or
under its control, a right, franchise, privilege, property or business, the exercise
or enjoyment of which is expressly reserved by the Constitution or the laws to
citizens of the Philippines, or of any other specific country, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, permits or allows the use, exploitation or enjoyment thereof by a
person, corporation or association not possessing the requisites prescribed by
the Constitution or the laws of the Philippines; or leases, or in any other way
transfers or conveys said right, franchise, privilege, property or business to a
person, corporation or association not otherwise qualified under the
Constitution, or the provisions of the existing laws; or in any manner permits or
allows any person, not possessing the qualifications required by the Constitution
or existing laws to acquire, use, exploit or enjoy a right, franchise, privilege,
property or business, the exercise and enjoyment of which are expressly
reserved by the Constitution or existing laws to citizens of the Philippines or of
any other specific country, to intervene in the management, operation,
administration or control thereof, whether as an officer, employee or laborer
therein, with or without remuneration except technical personnel whose
employment may be specifically authorized by the President of the Philippines
upon recommendation of the Department Head concerned.... (emphasis
supplied) .
With regard to the Retail Trade Law, this Court had already occasion to rule on its
constitutionality. We held that the same is valid and that its purpose is to completely
nationalize the retail trade in the Philippines. In other words, its primordial purpose is to
confine the privilege to engage in retail trade to Filipino citizens by prohibiting any
person who is not a Filipino citizen or any entity whose capital is not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines from engaging, directly or indirectly, in the retail business. The
nationalization of retail trade is, therefore, complete in the sense that it must be wholly
owned by a Filipino citizen or Filipino controlled entity in order that it may be licensed to
operate. The law seeks a complete ban to aliens who may not engage in it directly or
indirectly. And the reasons behind such ban are the pernicious and intolerable practices of
alien retailers who in the past have either individually or in organized groups contrived in
many dubious ways to control the trade and dominate the distribution of goods vital to
the life of our people thereby resulting not only in the increasing dominance of alien
control in retail trade but at times in the strangle hold on our economic life. These reasons
were well expressed by Mr. Justice Labrador in the following wise: .
"But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not
seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital,
unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and
merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as
the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be
made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they
would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the
national economy and of the complete subservience of national retailers and of
the producers and consumers alike, can be placed completely at their mercy...
"... Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It
is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly
overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general
feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has
been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions;
that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the
consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the
National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous
hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to
enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and
automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret
combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the
law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants
and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint
of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have
evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and
contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in
corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact
appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by
their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things
may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially
in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger
on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country
isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we
have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of
goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They
owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in
times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and
his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the
potential enemy of the State. (Lao H. Ichong v. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. L-
7995, May 31, 1957).
The purpose of the enactment of the Retail Trade Law, therefore, is clear. As expressed
by this Court, it is to translate the general preoccupation of the Filipinos against the threat
and danger to our national economy caused by alien dominance and control of the retail
business by weeding out such threat and danger and thus prevent aliens from having a
strangle hold upon our economic life. But in so doing the legislature did not intend to
deprive aliens of their means of livelihood. This is clearly pointed out in the explanatory
note of the law: .
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon
our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic
life are those who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound
devotion to our free institutions and who have no permanent state in our
people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our own country. All aspects
of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood.
While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of
our national life and endanger our national security, it respects existing rights.
It is in the light of this view of the Retail Trade Law that the issue was posed whether the
prohibition to aliens from engaging in such trade is intended merely to ban them from its
ownership and not from its management control or operation. However, from the context
of the law as well as from the decision of this Court in the Ichong case, it may be safely
inferred that the nationalization of the retail trade is merely confined to its ownership and
not its management, control, or operation. Nevertheless, this apparent flaw in the Retail
Trade Law cannot be availed of by an unscrupulous alien as a convenient pretext to
employ in the management of his business persons of his ilk to flout the law or subvert its
nationalistic purpose, for in pari materia with such law we have the Anti-Dummy Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134), which seeks "to
punish acts of evasion of the laws of nationalization of certain rights, franchises or
privileges." Read in connection with the Retail Trade Law, the Anti-Dummy Law would
punish acts intended to circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the
retail business.
The question that now arises is: Is the employment of aliens in non-control positions in a
retail establishment or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
Petitioners contend that their employment is not prohibited either by the Retail Trade
Law or the Anti-Dummy Law. The three Chinese petitioners testified that they had
nothing to do with the management and control of the business, nor do they participate in
its profits outside of their monthly salaries. They had been employed long before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1180. They only wait for customers and sell according to
the prices appearing on the tags previously fixed by their manager Macario King. They
desire to continue in the employ of Macario King in his business and their job is their
only means of earning support for themselves and their families. Lim Pin who is
employed as buyer declared that his duties include no more than buying the groceries
appearing in a list prepared and given to him from time to time by Macario King, and at
no more than the prices indicated in said list. Respondents did not present any evidence to
contradict these facts, as they merely relied their motion to dismiss.
It is evident that petitioners' theory is that since they do not intervene in the management,
operation, administration or control of the retail establishment of Macario King they are
not covered by the Anti-Dummy Law. Indeed, they contend, Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 1180 mirrors the legislative intent to nationalize the retail trade merely thru the
ownership by Filipinos of the business, and as stated by this Court in the Ichong case, the
ownership of the retail business by non-citizens lies at the foundation of the prohibition,
and since there is nothing in the Retail Trade Law which prohibits a Filipino-owned retail
enterprise from employing an alien and the dummy law merely limits the prohibition to
any position that relates to management, operation, administration or control, petitioners
contend that they may be allowed to continue in their positions without doing violence to
both the Retail Trade Law and the Anti-Dummy Law. In other words, they draw a line of
distinction between one class of alien employees occupying positions of control and
another class occupying non-control positions.
Respondents, on the other hand, sustain a different view. They hold that the language of
the Anti-Dummy Law bans aliens' employment in both control and non-control positions.
They contend that the words management, operation, administration and control,
followed by and blended with the words "whether as an officer, employee or laborer
therein", signify the legislative intent to cover the entire scale of personnel activity so that
even laborers are excluded from employment, the only exemption being technical
personnel whose employment may be allowed with the previous authorization of the
President. This contention, according to respondents, results from the application of the
rule known in statutory construction as redendo singula singulis. This means that the
antecedents "management, operation, administration and control" and the consequents
"officer, employee, and laborer" should be read distributively to the effect that each word
is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most properly relate and to
which it is most applicable (Vol. 2, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Section 4819).
We agree to this contention of respondents not only because the context of the law seems
to be clear on what its extent and scope seem to prohibit but also because the same is in
full accord with the main objective that permeates both the Retail Trade Law and the
Anti-Dummy Law. The one advocates the complete nationalization of the retail trade by
denying its ownership to any alien, while the other limits its management, operation,
administration and control to Filipino citizens. The prevailing idea is to secure both
ownership and management of the retail business in Filipino hands. It prohibits a person
not a Filipino from engaging in retail trade directly or indirectly while it limits the
management, operation, administration and control to Filipino citizens. These words may
be technically synonymous in the sense that they all refer to the exercise of a directing,
restraining or governing influence over an affair or business to which they relate, but it
cannot be denied that by reading them in connection with the positions therein
enumerated one cannot draw any other conclusion than that they cover the entire range of
employment regardless of whether they involve control or non-control activities. When
the law says that you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to management,
operation, administration and control, "whether as an officer, employee, or laborer
therein", it only means one thing: the employment of a person who is not a Filipino
citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position is prohibited. The reason is
obvious: to plug any loophole or close any avenue that an unscrupulous alien may resort
to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can deny that while one may be
employed in a non-control position who apparently is harmless he may later turn out to
be a mere tool to further the evil designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law be
interpreted in a manner that would stave off any attempt at circumvention of this
legislative purpose.
In this respect, we agree with the following remark of the Solicitor General: "Summing
up, there is no point in distinguishing employments in positions of control from
employments in non-control positions except to facilitate violations of the Anti-Dummy
Law. It does not require ingenuity to realize that the law is framed up the way we find it
so that no difficulties will be encountered in its enforcement. This is not the first time to
use the words of the United States Supreme Court ... that a government wants to know,
without being put to a search, that what it forbids is carried out effectively." .
There is an intimation in the decision of the trial court that if the employment of aliens in
non-control positions is prohibited as respondents so advocate, it may impair the right of
a citizen under our Constitution to select, pick and employ any one who in his opinion
may be amenable to his business provided he is not a criminal, a communist, or affected
by a contagious disease, in the same manner as one may not be deprived of his right to
associate with people of his own choice because those are rights that are guaranteed by
our Constitution. The language of the trial court on this matter follows: .
There is no question that a Filipino citizen has a right under the Constitution
and the laws of this Republic to engage in any lawful business, to select, pick
and employ anyone who in his opinion may be amenable, congenial, friendly,
understanding and profitable to his business provided that they are not originals,
say communists, or affected by some contagious disease or morally unfit. The
right to associate with our friends or people of our choice cannot be seriously
contested in a democratic form of government. This is one of the most
cherished privileges of a citizen. Nullify it and it will produce a communist
control of action in our free movement and intercourse with our fellow citizens
as now prevails in Russia and other Soviet satellites History has amply
demonstrated that in countries where personal liberties are limited, curtailed or
hampered, communism thrives; while in the lands where personal liberties are
protected, democracy lives. We need but look at the horizon and see terrible and
sinister shadows of some catastrophic events threatening to annihilate all our
hopes and love for liberty if we are to traffic with our rights as citizens like any
other ordinary commodities. It is our sacred and bounden duty to protect
individual rights so that by their benign influence real democracy may be
nurtured to full maturity.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no need of any lengthy discussion as to the rights of a Filipino citizen
to employ any person in his business provided the latter is not a criminal,
affected with some contagious disease, or a recognized human derelict. The
right to employ is the same as the right to associate. The right to associate is
admittedly one of the most sacred privileges of a Filipino citizen. If a Filipino
citizen has the right to employ any person in his business, has a naturalized
citizen the same rights? We hold and sustain that under the Constitution and
laws of this country, there is no difference between a natural-born citizen and a
naturalized citizen, with the possible exception, as provided by the Constitution,
that while the former can be President, Vice-President or member of Congress,
the latter cannot. But outside of these exceptions, they have the same rights and
privileges.
It is hard to see how the nationalization of employment in the Philippines can run counter
to any provision of our Constitution considering that its aim is not exactly to deprive
citizen of a right that he may exercise under it but rather to promote enhance and protect
those that are expressly accorded to a citizen such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness. The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of
public policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the
Constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the
citizens of a country. This is what we expressed in no uncertain terms in the Ichong Case
when we declared constitutional the nationalization of the retail trade. Indeed, we said
there that it is a law "clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security
itself, and indisputability falls within the scope police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens." True,
this fundamental policy was expressed in a decision the subject of which concerns the
constitutionality of the Retail Trade Act, but since the Anti-Dummy Law is but a mere
complement of the former in the sense that it is designed to make effective its aims and
purposes and both tend to accomplish the same objective either by excluding aliens from
owning any retail trade or by banning their employment if the trade is owned by
Filipinos, and the target of both is "the removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination" thru the nationalization of the retail trade both in
ownership and employment, the pronouncement made in one regarding its
constitutionality applies equally if not with greater reason to the other both being
complementary one to the other. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the
right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is merely limited to the
citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities.
We note that the case cited by the trial court to substantiate its conclusion that freedom to
employ is guaranteed by our Constitution is Meyer v. Nebraska, 67 Law Ed. 1042, which
is also the same case relied upon by petitioners in support of their proposition that "the
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to engage in any of the common
occupations of life". We also note that this is the same case cited by counsel for Lao
Itchong to support the same proposition in his advocacy of the unconstitutionality of the
nationalization of the Retail Trade Law which did not deserve favorable consideration by
this Court in the Itchong case. To refute counsel's argument that the retail trade is a
common occupation the pursuit of which cannot be impaired and consequently the right
to employ therein is guaranteed by our Constitution, suffice it to state that we brushed
aside such theory in the Itchong case in view of the monopolistic control exercised by
aliens in the retail business and their "deadly strangle hold on the national economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency". The circumstances
surrounding the enforcement of the Retail Trade Law being the very foundation of the
Anti-Dummy Law the same circumstances that justify the rejection of counsel's
proposition in the Itchong case should also apply with regard to the application of the
Meyer case in the consideration of the constitutionality of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The thinking of the lower court that the nationalization of employment in retail trade
produces communistic control or impairs a right guaranteed by the Constitution to a
citizen seems to have as basis its pronouncement that "the right to employ is the same as
the right to associate". This promise has no foundation in law for it confuses the right of
employment with the right of association embodied in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. Section 1, paragraph 6, of said Bill of Rights, provides that "the right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be abridged",
and this has as its main purpose "to encourage the formation of voluntary associations so
that thru the cooperative activities of individuals the welfare of the nation may be
advanced."1Petitioners have never been denied the right to form voluntary associations.
In fact, they can so organize to engage in any business venture of their own choosing
provided that they comply with the limitations prescribed by our regulatory laws. These
laws cannot be assailed as abridging our Constitution because they were adopted in the
exercise of the police power of the State (Lao Itchong case, supra).
It appears, however, that alien petitioners were already in the employ of the establishment
known as "Import Meat and Produce" previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores,
Inc. when Macario King acquired the ownership of said establishment and because of the
doubt he entertained as regards the scope of the prohibition of the law King wrote the
President of the Philippines to request permission to continue said petitioners in his
employment, and immediately after the request was denied, he instituted the present
petition for declaratory relief. It cannot, therefore, be said that King has already breached
the law when he filed the present action..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. This preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus
is dismissed, with costs against appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De
Leon, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Against the charge that this nationalization movement initiated by Congress in

connection with several measures that affect the economic life of our people places the
Philippines in a unique position in the free world, we have only to cite the cases
of Commonwealth v. Hans, 81 N.E. 149, and Bloomfield v. State, 99 N.E. 309, which this
Court considered as basic authorities for nationalization of legislative measures in the
Lao Ichong case. Similar laws had been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of
California and the United States Supreme Court in a series of cases involving contracts
under the Alien Land Law, and because of the similarities of the facts and laws involved
therein we can consider the decisions rendered in said cases of persuasive force and effect
in the determination of the present case.2

We wish to add one word with regard to the procedural aspect raised in respondents'
brief. It is respondents' theory that a complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if
filed after a contract or statute has been breached. The law does not even require that
there shall be an actual pending case. It is sufficient that there is a breach of the law, or an
actionable violation, to bar a complaint for declaratory judgment (Vol. 2, Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., 145). The pertinent provisions of the Anti-
Dummy Law postulate that aliens cannot be employed by Filipino retailers except for
technical positions with previous authority of the President, and it is contended that
Macario King had in his employ his Chinese co-petitioners for a period of more than 2
years in violation of Section 2-A of Republic Act No. 134. Hence, respondents contend,
due to their breach of the law petitioners have forfeited their right to file the present
action for declaratory relief.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE
LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT.
JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA,
COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and
MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY
A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M),
LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO
FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA,
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA,
CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY
A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL
MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A.
BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T.
MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC,
2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio
Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio
Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same
parties and related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution
for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to
9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate
the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to
try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as
granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City are assailed oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over
GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private
respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had
been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate
the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena
dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned
Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan
Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the
pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of
AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO
DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date
above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit
controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet,
sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the
rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various
grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their
objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated
February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the
affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to
writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be
signed by a person subject to military law, and under the oath either
that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set
forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been
made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the
matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition
of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At
such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to
cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to
present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after
such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the
substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and
that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion
for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to
date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they
were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and
members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose.
GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under
P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application
was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ
of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by
the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an
order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his
release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey
'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had
refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as
well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo
Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting
the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable
and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.
Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption
that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial
proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set
aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial
No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications
of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include
other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General
Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the
provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors
Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a
petition for habeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several
opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February
21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect
denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the
General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their
counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that
"failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to
heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in
referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their
defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is
not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does
not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive
a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is
directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986
(1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation
procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-
part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408)
can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of the Army General court
martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to
an accused. Its language is clearly such that a
defendant could object to trial in the absence of the
required investigation. In that event the court-
martial could itself postpone trial pending the
 investigation. And the military reviewing
authorities could consider the same contention,
reversing a court- martial conviction where failure
to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured
an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial
investigations fall short of the standards prescribed
by Article 70. That Congress has not required
analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-
martial is an indication that the investigatory plan
was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the
Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation,
court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not
mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of
a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention
of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended
Article 70 but left unchanged the language here
under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to
the exercise of Army general court-martial
jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether
irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal
procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely
to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was
resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of law as provided
in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-
respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were
signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he
had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent
records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The
charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in
accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge
sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees,
i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the
affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent
Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled
pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was
their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to
subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer
clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with
Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly
convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the
commanding officer of a major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a
military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the
commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may
appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the
accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court
shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no
doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of
General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor
General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff,
AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is
significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way
disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been
improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents
by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally
provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by
Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial
may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause
stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and
validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one
member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall
ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are
offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but
the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the
passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the
National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout
officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a
complete dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the
fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically
made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then
felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be
permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval
of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge
by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused.
After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the
Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
program of training and education in military law, encompassing the
length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until
the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.
After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated
in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that
Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side"
to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law
member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of
military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals).
This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may
be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall
immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members
excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security
Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and
policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of
the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this
decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation
revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created
pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself ceases.Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in
the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in
L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with
the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was
itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under
the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is
curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to
justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be
exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his
deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be
so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The
judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on
their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private
respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the
private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles
of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is
vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite
the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the
Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary
appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent
courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting
power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in
their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry, the
test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their
undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave
abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction.
This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature
as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior
courts and other bodies and on petitions forhabeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the
absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the
Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where
we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where
the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to
exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to
bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are
allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry
out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a
damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July
25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer
number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment
is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to
civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been
charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy
trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991,
and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and
decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the
petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No.
31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12,
1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of the
charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their counter-
affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in
the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it
pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed
coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-
charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that
those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout the
Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers,
have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the
same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991.
Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet
become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed
with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following
observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to
prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as
the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or
it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even
an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance
of a writ ofcertiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave
abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the
Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is
indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the
private respondents should not have been ordered released.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition: ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow
the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and
point that if the participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the
existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
SO ORDERED.
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General
Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must
also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must
be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release
him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be
punished as a court martial may direct. 6
Separate Opinions
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on
February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for
reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The
48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent
insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with
the only exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also states that "[T]he right to
bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the
military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive
meaning of "all persons" — the coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were
sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . .
[b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including
this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice." 3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug
pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail? Would
not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners
should not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to
deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does
not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with
the only exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also states that "[T]he right to
bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the
military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive
meaning of "all persons" — the coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were
sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . .
[b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including
this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice." 3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug
pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail? Would
not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally
dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners
should not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to
deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does
not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent
insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995
PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed by the Philippine National Police
Station Commander in Bato, Leyte for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip in the
afternoon of September 14, 1987. 1 After preliminary investigation by the office of the
provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad with the crime of Homicide as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Leyte accused Rodrigo
Umpad alias "Meon" of the crime of Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of September 1987,
in the Island of Dawahon, Municipality of Bato,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to kill did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot one GENARO
TAGSIP, with a revolver .38 Cal. Snub Nose Smith
and Wesson (Paltik) which the accused had
provided himself for the purpose, thereby causing
and inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wound
on his head which was the direct and immediate
cause of the death of Genaro Tagsip.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Hilongos, Leyte, October 20, 1987.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor
and the consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed
that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead
of homicide as originally charged in the information, and would incur the penalty of "four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
year ofprision correccional maximum as maximum." 2 Consequently, in his decision
promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent judge found the accused, Rodrigo
Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six years of prision correccional maximum, as
the maximum period, exactly in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement. 3
On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by
Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, relative to his
disposition of Crim. Case No. H-223 entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon." In
said letter-complaint, complainant contends that the sentence of respondent judge finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide
and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative, "on its face, of gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct.
Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116
of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused
individual — with the consent of the offended party — to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or
is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. He explains that during the May 3, 1990
hearing, accused and his counsel, with the acquiescence and in the presence of the
prosecutor, informed the Court of the defendant's desire to plea bargain pursuant to the
aforestated rule. Moreover, he avers that in a conference on June 27, 1990, the wife of the
victim herself agreed to the accused's plea of guilty to attempted homicide, instead of
homicide as she needed the monetary indemnity to raise her two orphaned children. In a
Memorandum dated February 5, 1993, the Deputy Court Administrator recommended
that the complaint be dismissed, explaining that:
Section 2 116 is more liberalized as it allows the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense whether or not it is included in the offense
charged in the complaint or information, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal. In this regard, it is inferred that the fiscal
consented to abbreviate the proceedings and in order not to run the
risk of the accused being acquitted, because there was no conclusive
evidence to obtain the conviction of the accused to the offense charged
in the complaint of information.
It may be stated in this connection that unlike in the crime of murder
where the accused may plead to the lesser offense of homicide, in
homicide a misinterpretation may arise, as in this case, when the
accused pleads guilty to attempted homicide, because here the fact of
the death of the victim, which is the principal element of the crime is
 obliterated. This is specially so because the decision/sentence does not
contain findings of fact and conclusions of law but merely an account
that the accused pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and the penalty
imposed. 4
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the
victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple
logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense
of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus
in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of
Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the
Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his
Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a
literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in
opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be
unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice
at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat
coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought
to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
possible misinterpretation. This observation is bolstered by the fact that the same
provision prompted the Department of Justice, on July 31, 1990, or three months after
respondent judge took cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990, to issue Circular No.
35, 8 later amended by Circular No. 55 dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and setting
limitations on the application of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondent reached
compulsory retirement age on April 5, 1995 after a long period of service in the judiciary
entitles him to a certain measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench stands
unique because of the potently absurd result of respondent's application of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS. Let this decision appear in respondent's record of
service.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes

These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a
clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not
only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such
principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects
respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties.
While it is true, as respondent judge contends, that he merely applied the rule to the letter,
the palpably incongruous result ought to have been a "red flag" alerting him of the
possibility of injustice. The death of an identified individual, the gravamen of the charge
against the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a
more expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that
if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.6

Finally, every judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and

independence. 7 A judge should not only be aware of the bare outlines of the law but also
its nuances and ramifications, otherwise, he would not be able to come up with decisions
which are intrinsically fair. In failing to exercise even ordinary common sense, a judge
could be held administratively liable for a verdict that could in no way be legally or
factually sustained or justified.

We note, however, that under the circumstances of the case, respondent judge's erroneous
exercise of his judicial prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad faith. The
phraseology of Sec. 2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely eliminate
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - Time and
again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes
to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the
reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit
and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO
REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE THE
USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTION. - The objective and
purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to
Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names,
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in
its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes,
which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores
of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of
trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which
for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,
rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No.
142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT
TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. - An alias is a
name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and thse are known as
aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION
WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS NAME IN ADDITION
TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. - The use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that
petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,”
which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the
letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely
serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not an
alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use
of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where
he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had
identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still
be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records
hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as
amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not
present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated
by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done
by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner
CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE
COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY
AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. - As C.A. No.
142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor
of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for
violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known
as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases.”[1]
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of
Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation
on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato
through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and
others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the
area.[2]
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office
of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint
against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to
the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to
attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman
petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for
the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However,
Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be
required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.[3]
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was
instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors’ logbook. Instead of writing
down his name petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” after which he was told to
proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He
handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms.
Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he
acknowledged by writing the name “Oscar Perez.”[4]
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance,
Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he
left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as “Oscar Perez” was
actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station,
Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner
be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no
document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of
accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his
conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of
C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term
of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but
modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to
three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as. he reasserts his
innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No.
6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is “Oscar Perez”
his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another
name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as
“Oscar Perez” and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the
express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for
a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085 has not been complied
with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals
erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. [5]
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute
the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose.[6] The court may consider the spirit and
reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. [7]
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was
allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law
was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are
herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its
amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It
provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set
forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was
granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4
August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized
for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of
this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name
and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s baptismal and family name
and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant’s name, if an alien,
and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying
the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the
christian name and the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name
unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
 The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No.
3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True
Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And Industry
in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes,
which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on
28 November 1934.[8] The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow -
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed
receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified
by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or
keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is
conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business
name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business
name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract agreement,
business transaction, or business x x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily
to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
andaliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could
not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they
possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an
alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and
recorded in the civil register.[9]
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic[10] the Court had occasion to explain the meaning,
concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we
ruled –
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner’s use of alias ‘Kheng Chiau Young’ in
addition to his real name ‘Yu Cheng Chiau’ would add to more confusion. That he is
known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not
sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to
his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered
certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to
explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name ‘Yu
Cheng Chiau.’
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his
having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court, argues
the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary
to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as
business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he
is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental
method, ‘he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name ‘Yu
Kheng Chian,’ he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name ‘Kheng
Chiau Young.’
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not
shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition
for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases.[11] Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another
person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within
the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman
as “Oscar Perez,” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have
brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while
merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not
an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of
the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was
not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a
copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not
refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does
not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he
is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are
peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142
as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[12] Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.[13] The
reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and
the discretion of the court limited.[14]Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition
that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner
CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and
Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and
EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG
BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the “original intent” of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions
are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining
the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and
respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as
contrary to the provision of the Constitution, hence void; because
its provision that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order to process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever”
i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank
deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to
satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners’ favor in
violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a
class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could
escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing
it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized
bank.
The antecedents facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and
lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to
February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each
day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people
living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati
Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar
Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK
Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account – China Banking Corp.,
US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)
cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against
Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases
Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a
scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the
accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated
February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February
22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU
Insurance Corporation in the amount P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was
issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on
China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the
notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati
Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the
garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely
incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which
has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy
Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank
in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any
exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has
rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank
responded as follows:
“May 26, 1989
“Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
“Dear Ms. Carolino:
“This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on
Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
“The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any
exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
“The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country’s
banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There
is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in
your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the
law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
“Very truly
yours,
(SGD)
AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
D “Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City but has
irector”[1]
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners’ motion for leave
to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled “Karen
Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott.” Summons with the complaint was
published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli
failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7,
1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, ordering the latter:
“1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages;
“2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and
Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total
of P300,000.00 for both of them;
“3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
“4. To pay attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount
of damages herein awarded;
“5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
“6. Costs of the suit.
“SO ORDERED.”
The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were
related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
“The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of
Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of
the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M.
Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was
charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases
Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel,
summons was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a
newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the
Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant,
however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the
period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the
plaintiffs through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs
were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
“In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen
E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and
a certain Liberato Mandulio, who gave the following testimony:
recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year.
“In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema
Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American
approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was
about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
“The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside
her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister
who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen’s age
and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-
5).
“The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it’s
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino
to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.5-
6)
“They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant’s
house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)
“When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendant’s alleged niece
was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When
Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece
was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
“Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous
because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen’s
hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled
her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her
head. (Id., p. 7)
“Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the
door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her
and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no
sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew
his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger.
(Id., p.8)
“He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex
organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he
was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling
severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little,
because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the defendant was in that
position. (Id., pp. 8-9)
“After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a
shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the
defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a
shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress
because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to
sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00
p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time because defendant removed her
watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up
at about 8:00 o’clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
“The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke at
about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch,
they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00
p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it
was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like “lugaw”. For the third time, Karen
was raped again during the night. During those three times defendant succeeded in
inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.
“Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her
hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear
that she might be killed; besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And even if
she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would
hear her and would be able to call a police, it was still possible that as she was still inside
the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday,
ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
“On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for
thirty minutes after breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the
evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was
covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less
to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered by styrofoam and
plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the
styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
“That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but
kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by
styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for
help through the hole. She cried: ‘Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan n’yo akong
makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!’ Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a
neighbor, but she got angry and said she was ‘istorbo.’ Karen pleaded for help and the
woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no
policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
“She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this
time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some
food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and
coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about
6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 – 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00
noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon
his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was
shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15,
1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting
for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and
she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman
saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her
clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes
being afraid that should the neighbors call the police and the defendant see her in
different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the
American bacause the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)
“Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for
help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change
her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed
her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he
locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she could not understand what
they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
“When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she
knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs
and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and
the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw
about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to them. ‘Nakikipag-
areglo po sa mga pulis,’ Karen added. “The policeman told him to just explain at the
precinct. (Id., p. 20)
“They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the
house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson
and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by
a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her mother together with
some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police
headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
“At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written
statement she gave to the police was marked Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the
National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the
NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in
early morning, of the following day when they reached the NBI, (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p.
22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
“She was studying at the St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident
but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated
along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the
school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft
Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied admission after she told
the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might
be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
“After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and
sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is
ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be
restless or sad. (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen
for this shocking experience which probably, she would always recall until she reaches
old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this experience.” (TSN, Sept.
24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment
and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on
Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction
in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? She Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise
known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 providing that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.” should be adjudged as unconstitutional
on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit
of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege n violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has
provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott
since criminal could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting
their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account
with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took
away: a.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the
civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57
of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the judgment
credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment
debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the
Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power
or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No.
6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants
exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law
(R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to
be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it
applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign
currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order process of any court,
is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System
and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage
the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such
institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in
the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country;
that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure;
and that it applies to all currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to
promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly
by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the
State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so
doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to
secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that
Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are
exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as
amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign
currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons
similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not
unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from
the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is not only too willing to release the dollar
deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has
undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect to these laws on
petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory
relief.[2] However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition
has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be
treated as one for mandamus.[3]
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and
in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested
by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was
raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained
therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and
avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in
the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount
could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and
may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had
wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this
unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court
in its decision,
“Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was
indoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which
could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could
make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once
when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano
University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because
the school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to
her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton
and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of
serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion
whose only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that
defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her
nor capable of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when
that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino
adage that in every forest there is a snake, xxx.”[4]
If Karen’s sad fate had happened to anybody’s own kin, it would be difficult for
him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important
than his child’s right to said award of damages; in this case, the victim’s claim for
damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country
where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when
the country’s economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the
present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The
law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality
such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said that-
“But I also know,[5] that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and
manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions
must advance also, and keep pace with the times… We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to
remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.”
In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to
obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law
and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the
application thereof envisaged by the allien. More specifically, the petition
raises the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or
 other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246 and CB
Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or
investor but from a mere transient who is not expected to maintain the deposit
in the bank for long.
“The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals
who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx
“xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the
Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No.
960:
‘Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. – Foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.’
“Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No.
6426:
‘Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the
Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall
take effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in
the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for
at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the
Central Bank promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing
the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the
deposit was made shall govern.”
“The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426. As amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
‘Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign
currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency
deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential
nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor,
in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative
or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however,
that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever.’
“The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment,
garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its
whereases, viz.:
‘WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking
institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept
deposits in foreign currency;
‘WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034
authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in
the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to
receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;
‘WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the
Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives
were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality
subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest
income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in
trade or business in the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of
confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits, exempting
such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested right of
depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency
deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such
deposits in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more
in a position to properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the
economic development of the country;’
“Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign
currency deposits is to assure the development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines’
(3rd Whereas).
“The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the
purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
‘WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an
offshore banking system, such as political stability, a growing
economy and adequate communication facilities, among others,
exist in the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have
as wide access as possible to the sources of capital funds for
economic development;
‘WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines
will be advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing
our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired
 investments into the Philippines, creating employment which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
opportunities and expertise in international finance, and presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non
contributing to the national development effort. deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
‘WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
resources, and other positive factors provide the Philippines with
the clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;’ It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
“On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
No. 1035. Its purpose are as follows:
Call it what it may – but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against
‘WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central
the Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree; Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit
‘WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This
bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.
have the resources and managerial competence to more actively We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the
engage in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the ends of justice.
grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and
‘WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to
authority of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;’ 3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
“It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. SO ORDERED.
1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these depositors that are induced
by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
“Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not Padilla, J., no part.
the kind of deposit encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives Mendoza, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., on leave.
and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in
the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a
short time.
“Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He
deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for
safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
“For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar
deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.”[6]
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
 Republic of the Philippines 4. Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges
SUPREME COURT protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a mathematical
Manila mistake, resulting in her second place only, instead of the first, which she therefore
claimed.
EN BANC
5. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of
G.R. No. L-4606 May 30, 1952 first instance.

RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, petitioner, 6. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein he give the
vs. participants grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the
HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, best, number 2 to the second best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added,
EMMA IMPERIAL, represented by her guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V. IMPERIAL, and the contestant receiving the lowest number got first prize, the next second prize, etc.
and SOUTHERN LUZON COLLEGE,respondents.
7. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17,
Ramon Felipe, Jr., and L. B. Karingal for petitioner. General 17, the Board of judges having voted as follows:
Ezequiel S. Grageda and Victoriano Yamson for respondents Judge Leuterio and Emma
Imperial. Judge Nosce Imperial Buenavides General
Padilla and San Juan for respondent Southern Luzon College.
Felipe Sr. ......... 3 1 2 4
BENGZON, J.: Obias .............. 1 2 4 3
Rodriguez .......... 1 4 5 3
Statement of the case. The issue in the litigation is whether the courts have the authority Prado .............. 3 2 1 3
to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition.
Moll ............... 2 1 5 4
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board 10 10 17 17
of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later,
Emma asked the court of the first instance of that province to reversed that award, 8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for the first place, the
alleging that one of the judges had fallen to error in grading her performance. After a Chairman, apparently with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to
hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared Nosce and second honors to Imperial.
Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action challenging the
court's power to modify the board's verdict.
9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in
which, after the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge could
The facts. There is no dispute about the facts: not jot down the grades he thought the contestants deserved according to "Originality",
"Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. "Voice". From such data he made up his vote.
The contestants were eight, among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis
General, Jr. 10. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez, one of the Judges,
gave Imperial and General the following ratings under the above headings; Imperial 19-
2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being 15-15-18-14-14 Total 94-Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd.
the Chairman.
11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd
3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have
expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly announced their decision awarding first been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust.
price to Nestor Nosce, second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro
Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr. 12. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; that she
should have been given a total of 95, or placed No. 3, the same as General; that he was
not disposed to break the tie between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give
rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to General.
Discussion. Although it would seem anomalous for one judge to give the same rank to
two contestants, we will concede for the moment that Delfin Rodriguez could have given
3 to Imperial to General.
However if deductions are to be made from his recorded vote (Exhibit 3) one may infer
that after the contest and before submitting his vote he decided to give General an edge
over Imperial. How? Under the caption "English" General was given by himself at first
"14", later increased to "15". Evidently because after he had added the ratings of Imperial
and (erroneously) reached the sum of 94, he added the ratings of General (which were the
same as Imperial with 14 under "English") and (mistakenly) reached 94 also. So what did
he also? He raised the 14 to 15 and thus gave general 95 to place him over Imperial's 94.
(Mistakingly again, because with 15 General got 96 instead of 95).
But to us the important thing is Rodriguez' vote during and immediately after the affair.
His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4. His
calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not bother
to fill out the blank spaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving
one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for "Voice", "English",
"Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted was the vote.
Probably for the above reasons the board refused to "correct" the alleged error.
The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners
announced, one of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the
second place winner should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other
judges refuse to alter their verdict. May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new
award, reversing the decision of the board of judges?
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and
colleges in these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent
origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school
days1, or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts
did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to
the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it
is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the
highest tenets of sportmanship: finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of
protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success
by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was merely the
privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right
unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed
arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found
in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of
judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords
some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially
where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before
allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the
generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012).
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned
out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are
courts of general jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the
hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most.
Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal
principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no
right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or
judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it
would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the
individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the
other judges.
By the way what is here in stated must not be understood as applying to those activities
which the government has chosen to regulate with the creation of the Games and
Amusements Board in Executive Order No. 392, Series 1950.
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so declare, that the
judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and
similar competitions.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Ladrador, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File
SUPREME COURT Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall,
Manila within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate
EN BANC with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized
statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995 election.
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs. No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and
expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND
No. 94-040.
I offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required
herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the
statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and
expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative
fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution
issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p.
14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition
in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes" provides as follows:
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to
advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five
(5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his
jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of
contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this
Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of
the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures,
the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and
Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the
National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to
candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the
election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election
 director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election
supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by
personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to
file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection
with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all
candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation
(Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed
the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which
nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required
within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file
statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and
expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative
offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative
fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution
issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this
section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the
Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his
certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear
from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v.
Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must
be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one
who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued
Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No.
2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the
word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which
may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public
interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757
[1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately
expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass
legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the
publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the
purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No.
2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec.
96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec.
13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of
several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of
candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting
the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the
solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are
designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to
prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the
furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 289). These statutes also enable
voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and
to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor
[Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of
filing (State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W.
2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v.
Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil
sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a
candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a
candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement
to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a
candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or
has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal
of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy
did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MELO, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent
portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall"
in the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally suggest mandatoriness as
to cover all candidates.
But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still
considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not
bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term
'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at
our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125
Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84)
Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof,
can not be voted for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days
from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be
accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes
to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
Padilla, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MELO, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent
portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall"
in the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally suggest mandatoriness as
to cover all candidates.
But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still
considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not
bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term
'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at
our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125
Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84)
Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof,
can not be voted for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days
from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be
accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes
to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
Padilla, J., concurs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C.
CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It
essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal.
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the
accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the
appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed
of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated,
who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans.
Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic),
bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . .Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano
ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in
five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information
charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April
1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Br. 61, found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases
filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced
him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in
the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria
Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. 1 He was
however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party,
Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner
elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but
appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation.
Thus —
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory
words complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried
"about some missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the
Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of
P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words must have been uttered
in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance analogous to
passion or obfuscation. 2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT
(8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . " 3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the
decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by
the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be
arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29
June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ." 4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed
his petition on the following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with
the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4,
1991. Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the
petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that
he had asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in
fact, he had failed to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it
had, in fact, committed any error on the matter. He is, however,
required to move for reconsideration of the questioned
order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of
 his petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v.
Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any
capricious, arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in
denying the petitioner's application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of
time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation
after conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon
terms and conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out
probation where an appeal has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his
petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation
notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal
was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because
the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then
be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial
court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said
court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even
after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to
the duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative
granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all.
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for
the benefit of the accused. 10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to
divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies,
unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person
should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which
interprets the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the
application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While
the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if
the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be
equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en
banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We,
however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any
statutory language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal case
should be given.a "liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority
to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the
words of the statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not
believe that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set
at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to
them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must
obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are charged
with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely
essential to bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the
intent that is to be given effect are derived from the words actually
used by the law-maker, and not from some external, mystical or
metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the
legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict
interpretation" rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation
Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are
adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and principled
search for the meaning which the law-making authority projected
when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning
is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as
the nose on a man's face. The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is
in fact written. There is no need for the involved process of
construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made
necessary only because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning
which shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of the
judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would
like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First
Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will surely follow,
making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more
difficult to achieve:
 . . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary
but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so
much confusion in the law, which has made it so
difficult for the public to understand and know
what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in
considerable measure the unwarranted interference
by judicial tribunals with the English language as
found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words
here and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have
done or what parties should have agreed upon,
giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily
have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and
coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to
advise their clients as to the meaning of a given
statute or contract until it has been submitted to
some court for its interpretation and construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our
people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express
mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause,
"no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we
said —
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of
statutory construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded
as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . .
the use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character
and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law
does not make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.
Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of
several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his
eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are
distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the
Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all
the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he
benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve
a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law does not
intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly
with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to have served his prison
term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each
of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private
complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as
each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is
based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but
because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further
commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised
Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in
a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the
disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant
degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6)
years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision
of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13]
individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to atotal prison term of thirteen (13) years, and
another who has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l)
day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more
perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he
could not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did
not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be,
that the penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have
qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16)
times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is
still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation
Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128
months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his
argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties
exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since
there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation,
instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by
the MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed
penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of
conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in
each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account
of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral
defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC
should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering that the
RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the
sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus
—
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases
and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the
said accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law; and to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted
or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that
any part of thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or
incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other
penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction
rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have
immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being
convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to
unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in
appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.
For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed
by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner
appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to
make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC
Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any
other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3)
statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in
finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive
identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to
the bare statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating
testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner
insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his positive identification
considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who was
their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of
years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged defamatory words were uttered
in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients,
not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court
could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private
complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not
complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties
imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the
purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range.
Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting his innocence therein,
petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal,
petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law
the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so
only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the
Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to
reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase
his penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already
become final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his former
counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par.
(e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4)
Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation,
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a
waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant
case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.
This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is
clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the
Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the instant
petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now SO ORDERED.
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue
— Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.

. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time.
The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the

provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the Separate Opinions
defendant on probation . . . .

Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation

from one who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by
law, the petitioner's plea for probation was filed out of time. In the
petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968
says that the application for probation must be filed "within the period
for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had
passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law.
Even granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is
contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the
trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and was, in fact,
up for actual execution before the application for probation was
attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his application
for probation before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the
petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation
may yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the
conviction already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension.
The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying
probation is the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application
for probation. Reliance is placed on the literal application of § 4 of the Probation Law of
1976 ,as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC
although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted
only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties
imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for
perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition
for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for
probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he
can not appeal. Implicit in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for
probation under any of the cases mentioned in § 9, to wit:
 Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security
or the public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one
day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for
probation, as when the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality
exceeds six (6) years but on appeal the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified,
I believe that the accused should not be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even encouraged —
speculation on the outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation
after he had appealed and failed to obtain an acquittal. 1It was to change this that § 4 was
amended by P.D. No. 1990 by expressly providing that "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he is eligible for probation,
may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal if he knows he can any
way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the
accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying
for probation, the purpose is to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar
where he becomes eligible for probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced.
The purpose of the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who; although eligible for probation, does not at
once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was
principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an
alluring prospect for him, what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because
under the sentence given to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC
had originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision
correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to
suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he
was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The
totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the
limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by § 9(a) and disqualified him for
probation. It was only after this penalty was reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of
eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the
four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal further
although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered
by the present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was
disqualified from applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible
for probation only under the terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by
the letter of § 4: "No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." The majority
opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow probation in this case would be to go
against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p.
9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where
it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that
the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal
law — it is not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA
8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of the law would defeat its purpose to "help the
probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual" (Baclayon v.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to
reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save government
funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and
to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232
(1983), per Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395
(1985) instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never
intended to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant
evidence he can avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a
reduction of the penalty. Neither does the law require a plea of guilty
on the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of
probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional
right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is
that after the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that
he thereby became qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says
that this was because he was afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That
possibility, however, was also there when he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For
by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took as much risk that the penalty
would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence
and not simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused
who, upon being arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied
probation if he is otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the
beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So
does an accused who appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation,
but after the penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence
and applies for probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566
(1989), in which it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he
could not subsequently apply for probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the
accused in that case could have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year
of prision correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for probation must not
"have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
II.
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence
meted out to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the
multiple prison terms imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality
for the purpose of § 9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on
petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional in each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there
are four offenses of grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the
total prison term which he would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly
beyond the probationable maximum allowed by law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified
sentence imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he
has to suffer imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only
"sentence[d] the said accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment." This means eight (8) months times four (4), since there are
four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months.
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences
imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided. For example, § 9(c) disqualifies
from probation persons "who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine
of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121
(1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in five criminal cases, was
qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on different
dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In
each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of
several penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the offense
committed and the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is
convicted of multiple grave oral defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6
years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense than another who is guilty of only
offense of grave oral defamation and sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8
months. The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of
grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more
times. The relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an accused found
guilty of grave oral defamation four or more times and another one found guilty of
mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
III.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this
case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been
remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its decision as modified. But that is because §
4 provides that "an application for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the
circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC,
which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT
petitioner's application for probation.
VITUG, J., concurring:
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his
dissenting opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because
the penalty imposed on him by a court a quoexceeds six (6) years, should not be denied
that benefit of probation if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the
prescribed limit, I am unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple
prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their totality for purposes of Section 9
(a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in
his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for
probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several
offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period." The use of the word maximum instead of
the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to
reveal that such has been the legislative intent.
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying
probation is the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application
for probation. Reliance is placed on the literal application of § 4 of the Probation Law of
1976 ,as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for
probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he
can not appeal. Implicit in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for
probation under any of the cases mentioned in § 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not
be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security
or the public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one
day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for
probation, as when the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality
exceeds six (6) years but on appeal the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified,
I believe that the accused should not be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even encouraged —
speculation on the outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation
after he had appealed and failed to obtain an acquittal. 1It was to change this that § 4 was
amended by P.D. No. 1990 by expressly providing that "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he is eligible for probation,
may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal if he knows he can any
way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the
accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying
for probation, the purpose is to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar
where he becomes eligible for probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced.
The purpose of the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who; although eligible for probation, does not at
once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was
principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an
alluring prospect for him, what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because
under the sentence given to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC
had originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision
correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to
suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he
was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The
totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the
limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by § 9(a) and disqualified him for
probation. It was only after this penalty was reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of
eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the
four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal further
although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered
by the present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was
disqualified from applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible
for probation only under the terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by
the letter of § 4: "No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." The majority
opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow probation in this case would be to go
against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p.
9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where
it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that
the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal
law — it is not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA
8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of the law would defeat its purpose to "help the
probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual" (Baclayon v.
Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to
reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save government
funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and
to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232
(1983), per Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395
(1985) instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never
intended to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant
evidence he can avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a
reduction of the penalty. Neither does the law require a plea of guilty
on the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of
probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional
right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is
that after the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that
he thereby became qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says
that this was because he was afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That
possibility, however, was also there when he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For
by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took as much risk that the penalty
would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence
and not simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused
who, upon being arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied
probation if he is otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the
beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So
does an accused who appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation,
but after the penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence
and applies for probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566
(1989), in which it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he
could not subsequently apply for probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the
accused in that case could have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year
of prision correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for probation must not
"have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
II.
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence
meted out to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the
multiple prison terms imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality
for the purpose of § 9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on
petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional in each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there
are four offenses of grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the
total prison term which he would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly
beyond the probationable maximum allowed by law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified
sentence imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he
has to suffer imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only
"sentence[d] the said accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment." This means eight (8) months times four (4), since there are
four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months.
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences
imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided. For example, § 9(c) disqualifies
from probation persons "who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine
of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121
(1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in five criminal cases, was
qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on different
dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In
each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his
dissenting opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because
the penalty imposed on him by a court a quoexceeds six (6) years, should not be denied
that benefit of probation if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the
prescribed limit, I am unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple
prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their totality for purposes of Section 9
(a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in
his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for
probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several
offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period." The use of the word maximum instead of
the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to
reveal that such has been the legislative intent.
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.

That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of

several penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)

It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the offense
committed and the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is
convicted of multiple grave oral defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6
years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense than another who is guilty of only
offense of grave oral defamation and sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8
months. The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of
grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more
times. The relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an accused found
guilty of grave oral defamation four or more times and another one found guilty of
mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.

III.

Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this
case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been
remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its decision as modified. But that is because §
4 provides that "an application for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the
circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC,
which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final.

The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT
petitioner's application for probation.

VITUG, J., concurring:

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8238 May 25, 1955
CESAR M. CARANDANG, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and TOMAS VALENTON, Sr. and TOMAS VALENTON, Jr., respondents.
S. Mejia-Panganiban for petitioner.
Evangelista and Valenton for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M.
Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await
the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this
criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide
committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr.
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in the criminal case was rendered
on September 1, 1953 and petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents,
damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him on occasion of
the commission of the crime of frustrated homicide by said accused Tomas Valenton Jr.
After the defendants submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial
of the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal case against Tomas Valenton, Jr.
in the Court of Appeals. The judge ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the
result of the criminal case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was submitted, but the
court denied the same; hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as follows:
In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed (under Article 33) is
similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American
law (Reports of the Code Commission, pp. 46-47). But respondents argue that the term
"physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, and therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in
accordance with the rules statutory construction (Sec. 578, 59 C. J. 979).
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the
defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily
injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the
reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question
arises whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in
the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted
with intent to kill or not.
The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries."
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart
to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries"
could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the
same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words,
the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the
Code Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law,
and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved
the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the
bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and
battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense
committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or
even death.
A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs Sioux City, 164 N. W. 641, 643. In that case, the
appellant sought to take his case from the scope of the statute by pointing out that
inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the
person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the
person. The court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is
as certainly "founded on injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover damages for
a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.
For the foregoing considerations, we find that the respondent judge committed an error in
suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he
is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of
the pending criminal case. With costs against the defendant-appellees.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17663 May 30, 1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Roces, Alidio and Ceguera for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of
"libel" as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, for the evident purpose of injuring the name and
reputation of Arsenio H. Lacson, and of impeaching and besmirching the latter's
virtue, honesty, honor and reputation, and with the malicious intent of exposing
him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, in the
course of a political speech delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru
the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of around a hundred
persons, the following, to wit: "Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang
Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City
Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel", which are false, malicious and highly
defamatory statements against Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, delivered with no
good intentions or justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring the
name and reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already prescribed, it having been
allegedly committed on October 5, 1959, or more than six (6) months prior to the filing of
the information on August 11, 1960. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted this
motion and, accordingly, quashed the information, with costs de oficio. Hence, this
appeal by the prosecution.
The only issue in this case is whether the crime charged in the information is oral
defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in
relation to Article 353, of the same Code. Said provisions read:
ART. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a
serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall bearresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos".
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. — A libel committed
by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the
civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
ART. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious imputation of
a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
The prosecution maintains that "the medium of an amplifier system", thru which the
defamatory statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the
purview of the terms "writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means",
appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in "amplifier system" is a means
"similar" to "radio".
This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendant's brief, "radio
as a means of publication is "the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves
without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver" (Library of
Universal Knowledge)" (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 285), "while
transmission of words by means of an amplifier system", such as the one mentioned in
the information, "is not thru "electromagnetic waves" and is with the use of "conducting
wires" intervening between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . . .
Secondly, even the word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be considered in
relation to the terms with which it is associated — "writing, printing, lithography,
engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical
exhibition" — all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature
as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that
prescribed for oral defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming
part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel (Sorensen vs. Wood,
243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasner, 20 P. [2d] 487, 104 A.L.R. 877),
whereas the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous
remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a
person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon (Summit Hotel Co. vs.
National Broadcasting Co., PA-124 A.L.R. 963).1äwphï1.ñët
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation
punished in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribed six (6) months after
its commission, or on April 5, 1960 (Articles 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over four
(4) months before the filing of said information, in view of which the order appealed
from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate
for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to
assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of
a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the
conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional
Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any
provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be
construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to
freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November
3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the
election barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after
setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position
of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on
Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his
mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according
to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of
prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day,
this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an
answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for
Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial
in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set
forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision
of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is
the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material,
under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for
lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in
his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election
being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution
granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part
of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine ofejusdem generis as well
as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on
Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of
the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus:
"Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with
its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is
immediately executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one
of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a
prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the
Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions
referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets,
mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such
an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under
the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was
the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its
failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be
interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions
were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the
fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional
infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may
even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute
provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all
possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also
grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to
such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped
jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to
meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free
speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls
all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil
against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission
justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle,
would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers.
Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a
speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other
mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the
effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly
done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the
criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or
the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest
fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung
in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its
commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of
statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding
cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of
the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic
principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that
fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme
law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly
summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of
the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely 'administrative questions.'"11 It has been the constant holding of this
Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise
any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution.12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by
the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free,
orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification
then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the
effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.
Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent
Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views
of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only
add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness
required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent
Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a
"mobile unit — roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate
... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound
system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application,
however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he
a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there
are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded
form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a
printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under
the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where
said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent
Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district,
respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the
candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal
transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to
the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so
personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a
recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom
of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in
that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are
manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or
carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within
the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner.
I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no
different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of
election advertisements — to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to
the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is
through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it
be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and
arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may
occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to
offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent
Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's
constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the
strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total
expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge
and consent.
# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views
of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only
add the following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness
required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent
Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a
"mobile unit — roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate
... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound
system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application,
however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he
a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there
are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded
form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a
printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under
the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where
said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent
Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the
electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district,
respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the
candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal
transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to
the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so
personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a
recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom
of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in
that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are
manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or
carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within
the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner.
I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no
different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of
election advertisements — to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to
the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is
through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it
be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and
arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may
occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to
offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent
Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's
constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the
strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total
expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge
and consent.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE
BOARD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.)
INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for private respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision
rendered by respondent judge, in Civil Case No. 52276 and in Special Civil Action No.
52383 both of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The
products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold
under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company
(Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries
Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled
Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk
industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for
preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective
rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code
against their filled milk products.
The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the
market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by
Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the
explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with said order
will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid
order. Section 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:
Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which
the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in
the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate
containers, and in all the language in which such containers are
marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February 16, 1963 restraining the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue from requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to print
on the labels of their rifled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of similar import, " as directed
by the above quoted provision of Law, and from taking any action to enforce the above
legal provision against the plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their rifled
milk products, pending the final determination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276, on the
merits.
On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from
the said order by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 1 In view thereof, the respondent
court in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of the absence of
any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them
until their final disposition therein.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and
injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction. Petitioners therein pray that the
respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. I . entitled
"Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,
etc." pending final determination of Civil Case No. 52276. The facts of this special civil
action show that on December 7, 1962, Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both
in their individual capacities and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel and
President of the Philippine Association of Nutrition, respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1
with Fair Trade Board for misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding.
Among other things, the complaint filed include the charge of omitting to state in their
labels any statement sufficient to Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or
as an imitation of genuine cows milk. and omitting to mark the immediate containers of
their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age or with other equivalent words as required under Section
169 of the Tax Code. The Board proceeded to hear the complaint until it received the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance on March 19, 1963.
Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and Special Civil Action No. 52383
were heard jointly being intimately related with each other, with common facts and issues
being also involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued its decision,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
In Civil Case No. 52276:
(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring plaintiffs to print on
the labels of their filled milk products the words: "This milk is not
 suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age" or
words with equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and
without authority in law, the order of said defendant dated September
28, 1961, Annex A of the complaint, and the Ruling of the Secretary
of Finance, dated November 12, 1962, Annex G of the complaint; and
In Special Civil Action No. 52383:
(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board, its agents
or employees from continuing in the investigation of the complaints
against petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No. 2, or any charges related
to the manufacture or sale by the petitioners of their filled milk
products and declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by
the respondent Board on said complaints. (pp. 20- 21, Rollo).
From the above decision of the respondent court, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the Fair Trade Board joined together to file the present petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, assigning the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION
169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY
IMPLICATION.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION
169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND
THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY
TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE PROPER
AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED
FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS
OF FOOD LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG
INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED
MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING
ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-5,
Rollo).
The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed
by implication. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 (which
imposed a Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of
skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by
Section 169). However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of
Sections 141 and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax
purpose, or a penal sanction.
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled
milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and
"condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the
general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed
totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term
"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of
Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in
whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other
hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried,
dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended or compounded with any
fat or oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of
milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled
milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part
is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It
cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk
and filled milk.
The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does
not come within the purview of Section 169, it being a product distinct from those
specified in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been replaced
with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances (p. 58, Rollo). This
opinion bolsters the Court's stand as to its interpretation of the scope of Section 169.
Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement
administrative laws command much respect and weight. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan,
et. al. vs. The Municipality of Pagbilao et. al., L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887;
Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 103).
This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk is suitable for nourishment
for infants of all ages. The Petitioners themselves admitted that: "the filled milk products
of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable
for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants
fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease
attributable to their having been fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).
There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding
infants of all ages. Being so, the declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that
filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would, in
effect, constitute a deprivation of property without due. process of law.
Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk
product and not as against manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed
milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which, as admitted by
the petitioner, the fatty part has been removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil.
The enforcement of Section 169 against the private respondents only but not against other
persons similarly situated as the private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional
denial of the equal pro petition of the laws, for the law, equally enforced, would similarly
offend against the Constitution. Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).
As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the
Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax
purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This
was so held by his predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in
General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts
entered into by the parties, to wit:
... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific
tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the
requirement in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its
immediate containers is a subject which does not come within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of
Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by Republic Act
No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).
Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue of
Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also
"give effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this
Code or other laws" is untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police
power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties
consisting of the "collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and
the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The
enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus
unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and Drug
Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No. 3720. In
particular, Republic Act No. 3720 provides:
Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug
Inspection), conformably with the rules and regulations, to hold
hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters touching the
Administration of this Act, to investigate processes of food, drug and
cosmetic manufacture and to subject reports to the Food and Drug
Administrator, recommending food and drug standards for adoption.
Said Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly
within the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe assigned to it
by the Food and Drug Administrator. The decisions of the Board shall
be advisory to the Food and Drug Administrator.
Section 26. ...
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be conducted by
the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which shall submit
recommendation to the Food and Drug Administrator.
(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the
reports of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any article of food or
any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act is
adulterated or branded he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the
person or persons concerned and such person or persons shall be given
an opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the correctness of the
finding or charge in question.
(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the
knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such character that
a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted against the offender, he
shall certify the facts to the Secretary of Justice through the Secretary
of Health, together with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board
of Food and Drug Inspection, or other documentary evidence on which
the charge is based.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food and
Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution pursuant to
subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he
believes that public interest will be adequately served by a suitable
written notice or warning.
The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to
prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled
milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug
inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the
Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To
hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant
petition granted, would only cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce
confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor desirable.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed en toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78413 November 8, 1989
CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES, INC., Represented by its President, Rogelio
Q. Lim, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA, INC., respondents.
Efren M. Cacatian for petitioners.
San Jose, Enrique, Lacas, Santos and Borje for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of December 5, 1986 in CA-G.R. CV No. 06685 which reversed the decision of
the trial court, and its resolution dated May 5, 1987 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The following antecedent facts generative of the present controversy are not in dispute.
Sometime in 1953, La Tondeña, Inc. (hereafter, LTI for short) registered with the
Philippine Patent Office pursuant to Republic Act No. 623 1 the 350 c.c. white flint
bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as "Ginebra San Miguel". This
registration was subsequently renewed on December 4, 1974. 2
On November 10, 1981, LTI filed Civil Case No. 2668 for injunction and damages in the
then Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Isabela against Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc.
(Cagayan, for brevity) for using the 350 c.c., white flint bottles with the mark "La
Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same
with Cagayan's liquor product bearing the label "Sonny Boy" for commercial sale and
distribution, without LTI's written consent and in violation of Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700. On the same date, LTI further filed
an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant therein. 3 On November 16, 1981, the court a quo issued a temporary
restraining order against Cagayan and its officers and employees from using the 350 c.c.
bottles with the marks "La Tondeña" and "Ginebra San Miguel." 4
Cagayan, in its answer, 5 alleged the following defenses:
1. LTI has no cause of action due to its failure to comply with Section
21 of Republic Act No. 166 which requires the giving of notice that its
aforesaid marks are registered by displaying and printing the words
"Registered in the Phil. Patent Office" or "Reg Phil. Pat. Off.," hence
no suit, civil or criminal, can be filed against Cagayan;
2. LTI is not entitled to any protection under Republic Act No. 623, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5700, because its products, consisting
of hard liquor, are not among those contemplated therein. What is
protected under said law are beverages like Coca-cola, Royal Tru-
Orange, Lem-o-Lime and similar beverages the bottles whereof bear
the words "Reg Phil. Pat. Off.;"
3. No reservation of ownership on its bottles was made by LTI in its sales invoices nor
does it require any deposit for the retention of said bottles; and
4. There was no infringement of the goods or products of LTI since Cagayan uses its own
labels and trademark on its product.
In its subsequent pleadings, Cagayan contended that the bottles they are using are not the
registered bottles of LTI since the former was using the bottles marked with "La
Tondeña, Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" but without the words "property of" indicated
in said bottles as stated in the sworn statement attached to the certificate of registration of
LTI for said bottles.
On December 18, 1981, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the
filing of a bond by LTI in the sum of P50,000.00, enjoining Cagayan, its officers and
agents from using the aforesaid registered bottles of LTI. 6
After a protracted trial, which entailed five (5) motions for contempt filed by LTI against
Cagayan, the trial court rendered judgment 7 in favor of Cagayan, ruling that the
complaint does not state a cause of action and that Cagayan was not guilty of contempt.
Furthermore, it awarded damages in favor of Cagayan.
LTI appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on December 5, 1986 rendered a decision in
favor of said appellant, the dispositive portion whereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
judgment is rendered permanently enjoining the defendant, its officers
and agents from using the 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of
ownership "La Tondeña, Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel", blown-in or
stamped on said bottles as containers for defendant's products.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court is therefore
made permanent.
 Defendant is ordered to pay the amounts of:
(1) P15,000.00 as nominal or temperate damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) Costs of suit. 8
On December 23, 1986, Cagayan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the respondent court in its resolution dated May 5, 1987, hence the present petition, with
the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in the
decision granting that "there is, therefore, no need
for plaintiff to display the words "Reg. Phil. Pat.
Off." in order for it to succeed in bringing any
injunction suit against defendant for the illegal use
of its bottles. Rep. Act No. 623, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 5700 simply provides and requires
that the marks or names shall be stamped or marked
on the containers."
II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in deciding
that "neither is there a reason to distinguish
between the two (2) sets of marked bottles-those
which contain the marks "Property of La Tondeña,
Inc., Ginebra San Miguel," and those simply
marked La Tondeña Inc., Ginebra San Miguel'. By
omitting the words "property of" plaintiff did not
open itself to violation of Republic Act No. 623, as
amended, as having registered its marks or names it
is protected under the law."
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in deciding that the words "La Tondeña, Inc. and
Ginebra San Miguel" are sufficient notice to the
defendant which should have inquired from the
plaintiff or the Philippine Patent Office, if it was
lawful for it to re-use the empty bottles of the
plaintiff.
IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in deciding that defendant-appellee cannot claim
good faith from using the bottles of plaintiff with
marks "La Tondeña, Inc." alone, short for the
description contained in the sworn statement of Mr.
Carlos Palanca, Jr., which was a requisite of its
original and renewal registrations.
V. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in accommodating the appeal on the dismissals of
the five (5) contempt charges.
VI. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in deciding that the award of damages in favor of
the defendant-appellee, petitioner herein, is not in
order. Instead it awarded nominal or temperate,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees without
proof of bad faith. 9
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No.
5700, provides:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the
manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated
waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes,
casks, kegs, or barrels and other similar containers, or in the
manufacturing, compressing or selling of gases such as oxygen,
acytelene, nitrogen, carbon dioxide ammonia, hydrogen, chloride,
helium, sulphur, dioxide, butane, propane, freon, melthyl chloride or
similar gases contained in steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators
or similar containers, with the name or the names of their principals or
products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon,
may register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the
names or marks, and the purpose for which the containers so marked
and used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations,
made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written
consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has succesfully
registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of
the next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels,
steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar containers
so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, disposed of,
buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not,
to use the same, for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes,
foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that registered by the
manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or
imprisonment of not more than one year or both.
 SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer,
bottler or seller, without written permission of the latter of any such
bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flask,
accumulators, or other similar containers, or the possession thereof
without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or
dealer in casks, barrels, kegs boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks,
accumulators or other similar containers, the same being duly marked
or stamped and registered as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima
facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.
The above-quoted provisions grant protection to a qualified manufacturer who
successfully registered with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped or marked
bottles, boxes, casks and other similar containers. The mere use of registered bottles or
containers without the written consent of the manufacturer is prohibited, the only
exceptions being when they are used as containers for "sisi," bagoong," "patis" and
similar native products. 10
It is an admitted fact that herein petitioner Cagayan buys from junk dealers and retailers
bottles which bear the marks or names La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" and
uses them as containers for its own liquor products. The contention of Cagayan that the
aforementioned bottles without the words "property of" indicated thereon are not the
registered bottles of LTI, since they do not conform with the statement or description in
the supporting affidavits attached to the original registration certificate and renewal, is
untenable.
Republic Act No. 623 which governs the registration of marked bottles and containers
merely requires that the bottles, in order to be eligible for registration, must be stamped
or marked with the names of the manufacturers or the names of their principals or
products, or other marks of ownership. No drawings or labels are required but, instead,
two photographs of the container, duly signed by the applicant, showing clearly and
legibly the names and other marks of ownership sought to be registered and a bottle
showing the name or other mark or ownership, irremovably stamped or marked, shall be
submitted. 11
The term "Name or Other Mark of Ownership" 12 means the name of the applicant or the
name of his principal, or of the product, or other mark of ownership. The second set of
bottles of LTI without the words "property of" substantially complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 623, as amended, since they bear the name of the
principal, La Tondeña Inc., and of its product, Ginebra San Miguel. The omitted words
"property of" are not of such vital indispensability such that the omission thereof will
remove the bottles from the protection of the law. The owner of a trade-mark or trade-
name, and in this case the marked containers, does not abandon it by making minor
modifications in the mark or name itself. 13 With much more reason will this be true
where what is involved is the mere omission of the words "property of" since even
without said words the ownership of the bottles is easily Identifiable. The words "La
Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" stamped on the bottles, even without the words
"property of," are sufficient notice to the public that those bottles so marked are owned
by LTI.
The claim of petitioner that hard liquor is not included under the term "other lawful
beverages" as provided in Section I of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic
Act No. 5700, is without merit. The title of the law itself, which reads " An Act to
Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and
Other Similar Containers" clearly shows the legislative intent to give protection to all
marked bottles and containers of all lawful beverages regardless of the nature of their
contents. The words "other lawful beverages" is used in its general sense, referring to all
beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for
drinking. 14 Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law, hence it is within
the purview and coverage of Republic Act No. 623, as amended.
Republic Act No. 623, as amended, has for its purpose the protection of the health of the
general public and the prevention of the spread of contagious diseases. It further seeks to
safeguard the property rights of an important sector of Philippine industry. 15 As held by
this Court in Destileria Ayala, Inc. vs. Tan Tay & Co., 16 the purpose of then Act 3070,
was to afford a person a means of Identifying the containers he uses in the manufacture,
preservation, packing or sale of his products so that he may secure their registration with
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry and thus prevent other persons from using them.
Said Act 3070 was substantially reenacted as Republic Act No. 623. 17
The proposition that Republic Act No. 623, as amended, protects only the containers of
the soft drinks enumerated by petitioner and those similar thereto, is unwarranted and
specious. The rule of ejusdem generiscannot be applied in this case. To limit the coverage
of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. Such rule of ejusdem generis is to be
resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature was in
enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such intent
thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by the
appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. 18
Moreover, the above conclusions are supported by the fact that the Philippine Patent
Office, which is the proper and competent government agency vested with the authority
to enforce and implement Republic Act No. 623, registered the bottles of respondent LTI
as containers for gin and issued in its name a certificate of registration with the following
findings:
It appearing, upon due examination that the applicant is entitled to
have the said MARKS OR NAMES registered under R.A. No. 623,
the said marks or names have been duly registered this day in the
PATENT OFFICE under the said Act, for gin, Ginebra San Miguel. 19
While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, it is entitled to
great weight and consideration. The reason for this is that such construction comes from
the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law
involved. 20
Just as impuissant is petitioners contention that respondent court erred in holding that
there is no need for LTI to display the words "Reg Phil. Pat. Off." in order to succeed in
its injunction suit against Cagayan for the illegal use of the bottles. To repeat, Republic
Act No. 623 governs the registration of marked bottles and containers and merely
requires that the bottles and/or containers be marked or stamped by the names of the
manufacturer or the names of their principals or products or other marks of ownership.
The owner upon registration of its marked bottles, is vested by law with an exclusive
right to use the same to the exclusion of others, except as a container for native products.
A violation of said right gives use to a cause of action against the violator or infringer.
While Republic Act No. 623, as amended, provides for a criminal action in case of
violation, a civil action for damages is proper under Article 20 of the Civil Code which
provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. This particular provision of the Civil
Case was clearly meant to complement all legal provisions which may have inadvertently
failed to provide for indemnification or reparation of damages when proper or called for.
In the language of the Code Commission "(t)he foregoing rule pervades the entire legal
system, and renders it impossible that a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provisions, should find himself without relief." 21 Moreover, under
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, a person entitled to the exclusive use of
a registered mark or tradename may recover damages in a civil action from any person
who infringes his rights. He may also, upon proper showing, be granted injunction.
It is true that the aforesaid law on trademarks provides:
SEC. 21. Requirements of notice of registration of trade-mark.-The
registrant of a trade-mark, heretofore registered or registered under the
provisions of this Act, shall give notice that his mark is registered by
displaying with the same as used the words 'Registered in the
Philippines Patent Office' or 'Reg Phil. Pat. Off.'; and in any suit for
infringement under this Act by a registrant failing so to mark the
goods bearing the registered trade-mark, no damages shall be
recovered under the provisions of this Act, unless the defendant has
actual notice of the registration.
Even assuming that said provision is applicable in this case, the failure of LTI to make
said marking will not bar civil action against petitioner Cagayan. The aforesaid
requirement is not a condition sine qua non for filing of a civil action against the infringer
for other reliefs to which the plaintiff may be entitled. The failure to give notice of
registration will not deprive the aggrieved party of a cause of action against the infringer
but, at the most, such failure may bar recovery of damages but only under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 166.
However, in this case an award of damages to LTI is ineluctably called for. Petitioner
cannot claim good faith. The record shows that it had actual knowledge that the bottles
with the blown-in marks "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" are duly
registered. In Civil Case No. 102859 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "La
Tondeña Inc. versus Diego Lim, doing business under the name and style 'Cagayan
Valley Distillery,' " a decision was rendered in favor of plaintiff therein on the basis of
the admission and/or acknowledgment made by the defendant that the bottles marked
only with the words "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" are registered bottles
of LTI. 22
Petitioner cannot avoid the effect of the admission and/or acknowledgment made by
Diego Lim in the said case. While a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its
stock-holders and from other corporations with which it may be connected, where the
discreteness of its personality is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or
in the case of two corporations, merge them into one. When the corporation is the
mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, it may be disregaded. 23
Petitioner's claim that it is separate and distinct from the former Cagayan Valley
Distillery is belied by the evidence on record. The following facts warrant the conclusion
that petitioner, as a corporate entity, and Cagayan Valley Distillery are one and the same.
to wit: (1) petitioner is being managed by Rogelio Lim, the son of Diego Lim, the owner
and manager of Cagayan Valley Distellery; (2) it is a family corporation; 24 (3) it is an
admitted fact that before petitioner was incorporated it was under a single
proprietorship; 25 (4) petitioner is engaged in the same business as Cagayan Valley
Distillery, the manufacture of wines and liquors; and (5) the factory of petitioner is
located in the same place as the factory of the former Cagayan Valley Distillery.
It is thus clear that herein petitioner is a mere continuation and successor of Cagayan
Valley Distillery. It is likewise indubitable that the admission made in the former case, as
earlier explained, is binding on it as cogent proof that even before the filing of this case it
had actual knowledge that the bottles in dispute were registered containers of LTI As held
in La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc., et al. vs. Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La
Campana (KKM), et al., 26 where the main purpose in forming the corporation was to
evade one's subsidiary liability for damages in a criminal case, the corporation may not
be heard to say that it has a personality separate and distinct from its members, because to
allow it to do so would be to sanction the use of the fiction of corporate entity as a shield
to further an end subversive of justice.
Anent the several motions of private respondent LTI to have petitioner cited for
contempt, we reject the argument of petitioner that an appeal from a verdict of acquittal
in a contempt, proceeding constitutes double jeopardy. A failure to do something ordered
by the court for the benefit of a party constitutes civil contempt. 27 As we held inConverse
Rubber Corporation vs. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc.:
...True it is that generally, contempt proceedings are characterized as
criminal in nature, but the more accurate juridical concept is that
contempt proceedings may actually be either civil or criminal, even if
the distinction between one and the other may be so thin as to be
almost imperceptible. But it does exist in law. It is criminal when the
 purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court and protect its in contempt of court and ORDERED to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00),
outraged dignity. It is civil when there is failure to do something with costs.
ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party (3 Moran Rules
of Court, pp. 343-344, 1970 ed.; see also Perkins vs. Director of SO ORDERED.
Prisons, 58 Phil. 272; Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741.)
And with this distinction in mind, the fact that the injunction in the
Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
instant case is manifestly for the benefit of plaintiffs makes of the
contempt herein involved civil, not criminal. Accordingly, the
conclusion is inevitable that appellees have been virtually found by the Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.
trial court guilty of civil contempt, not criminal contempt, hence, the
rule on double jeopardy may not be invoked. 28

The contempt involved in this case is civil and constructive in nature, it having arisen
from the act of Cagayan in violating the writ of preliminary injunction of the lower court
which clearly defined the forbidden act, to wit:

NOW THEREFORE, pending the resolution of this case by the court,

you are enjoined from using the 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the
marks La Tondeña Inc.,' and 'Ginebra San Miguel' blown-in or
stamped into the bottles as containers for the defendant's products. 19

On this incident, two considerations must be borne in mind. Firstly, an injunction duly
issued must be obeyed, however erroneous the action of the court may be, until its
decision is overruled by itself or by a higher court. 30Secondly, the American rule that the
power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned does not apply in
this Jurisdiction. The provision of the present Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
to where the charge may be filed is permissive in nature and is merely declaratory of the
inherent power of courts to punish contumacious conduct. Said rules do not extend to the
determination of the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. 31 In appropriate case therefore, this
Court may, in the interest of expedient justice, impose sanctions on contemners of the
lower courts.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 623, as amended, creates a prima facie presumption
against Cagayan for its unlawful use of the bottles registered in the name of LTI
Corollarily, the writ of injunction directing petitioner to desist from using the subject
bottles was properly issued by the trial court. Hence, said writ could not be simply
disregarded by Cagayan without adducing proof sufficient to overcome the aforesaid
presumption. Also, based on the findings of respondent court, and the records before us
being sufficient for arbitrament without remanding the incident to the court
a quo petitioner can be adjudged guilty of contempt and imposed a sanction in this appeal
since it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, 32 We so impose such penalty concordant with the
preservative principle and as demanded by the respect due the orders, writs and processes
of the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner is hereby declared
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19337 September 30, 1969
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Laurea, Laurea and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo
Umali and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of
November 20, 1961, which denied recovery of the sum of P28,629.42, paid by the
petitioner, under protest, in the concept of customs duties and special import tax, as well
as the petitioner's alternative remedy to recover the said amount minus one per cent
thereof by way of a drawback under sec. 106 (b) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The petitioner Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling
of centrifugal sugar for exert, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as
jute bags. In 1957 it made two importations of jute bags. The first shipment consisting of
44,800 jute bags and declared under entry 48 on January 8, 1967, entered free of customs
duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's filing of Re-exportation and Special
Import Tax Bond no. 1 in the amounts of P25,088 and P2,464.50, conditioned upon the
exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation. The second
shipment consisting of 75,200 jute bags and declared under entry 243 on February 8,
1957, likewise entered free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's
filing of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 in the amounts of P42,112
and P7,984.44, with the same conditions as stated in bond no. 1.
Of the 44,800 jute bags declared under entry 48, only 8,647 were exported within
one year from the date of importation as containers of centrifugal sugar. Of the 75,200
jute bags declared under entry 243, only 25,000 were exported within the said period of
one year. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were
exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were
exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their
importation.
On February 6, 1958 the petitioner, thru its agent Theo. H. Davies & Co., Far East,
Ltd., requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation
and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, giving the
following as the reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period
of one year: (a) typhoons and severe floods; (b) picketing of the Central railroad line
from November 6 to December 21, 1957 by certain union elements in the employ of the
Philippine Railway Company, which hampered normal operations; and (c) delay in the
arrival of the vessel aboard which the petitioner was to ship its sugar which was then
ready for loading. This request was denied by the Commissioner per his letter of April
15, 1958.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of
86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the Collector of Customs of
Iloilo, on March 17, 1958, required it to pay the amount of P28,629.42 representing the
customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which amount the petitioner paid
under protest.
In its letter of April 10, 1958, supplemented by its letter of May 12, 1958, the
petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the ground that its request
for extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and that its failure to export the
jute bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel
on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line.
Alternatively, the petitioner asked for refund of the same amount in the form of a
drawback under section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
After hearing, the Collector of Customs of Iloilo rendered judgment on January 21,
1960 denying the claim for refund. From his action, appeal was taken to the
Commissioner of Customs who upheld the decision of the Collector. Upon a petition for
review the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
The petitioner imputes three errors to the Court of Tax Appeals, namely:
1. In not declaring that force majeure and/or fortuitous event is a sufficient
justification for the failure of the petitioner to export the jute bags in question
within the time required by the bonds.
2. In not declaring that it is within the power of the Collector of Customs and/or
the Commissioner of Customs to extend the period of one (1) year within which
the jute bags should be exported.
3. In not declaring that the petitioner is entitled to a refund by way of a
drawback under the provisions of section 106, par. (b), of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
 1. The basic issue tendered for resolution is whether the Commissioner of Customs
is vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then applicable law, with discretion
to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Act. Section 23 reads:
SEC. 23. That containers, such as casks, large metal, glass, or other
receptacles which are, in the opinion of the collector of customs, of such a
character as to be readily identifiable may be delivered to the importer thereof
upon identification and the giving of a bond with sureties satisfactory to the
collector of customs in an amount equal to double the estimated duties thereon,
conditioned for the exportation thereof or payment of the corresponding duties
thereon within one year from the date of importation, under such rules and
regulations as the Insular Collector of Customs shall provide. 1
To implement the said section 23, Customs Administrative Order 389 dated
December 6, 1940 was promulgated, paragraph XXVIII of which provides that "bonds
for the re-exportation of cylinders and other containers are good for 12 months without
extension," and paragraph XXXI, that "bonds for customs brokers, commercial samples,
repairs and those filed to guarantee the re-exportation of cylinders and other containers
are not extendible."
And insofar as jute bags as containers are concerned, Customs Administrative
Order 66 dated August 25, 1948 was issued, prescribing rules and regulations governing
the importation, exportation and identification thereof under section 23 of the Philippine
Tariff Act of 1909. Said administrative order provides:
That importation of jute bags intended for use as containers of Philippine
products for exportation to foreign countries shall be declared in a regular
import entry supported by a surety bond in an amount equal to double the
estimated duties, conditioned for the exportation or payment of the
corresponding duties thereon within one year from the date of importation.
It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the
superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the
period within which the containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to
whether the said period may be extended. It was surely by reason of this silence that the
Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66, already adverted to, to
eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, 2 and, more
specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period
mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
Considering that the statutory provisions in question have not been the subject of
previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect
for administrative construction," 3 would, initially, be in order.
Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the
rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or
executive departments of the state.41awphîl.nèt
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an
ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other
agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to
consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded
appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when the
construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment
of the statute was suggested by such agency.5
The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with the intention
of the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one
year, without extension, from the date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff
and Customs Code to supersede the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have
amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the long-standing view of the
Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not extendible.
Implied legislative approval by failure to change a long-standing
administrative construction is not essential to judicial respect for the
construction but is an element which greatly increases the weight given such
construction.6
The correctness of the interpretation given a statute by the agency
charged with administering its provision is indicated where it appears that
Congress, with full knowledge of the agency's interpretation, has made
significant additions to the statute without amending it to depart from the
agency's view.7
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by
it thereon should be given controlling weight.1awphîl.nèt
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical
construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of
the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect
due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence,
expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must
rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of
the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering
deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute; ... 8
If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation are not favored, 9 and that
tax statutes are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority, 10 then we are hard put to sustain the petitioner's stand that it
was entitled to an extension of time within which to export the jute bags and,
consequently, to a refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.
 In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered view that the one-year period
prescribed in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 is non-extendible and
compliance therewith is mandatory.
The petitioner's argument that force majeure and/or fortuitous events prevented it
from exporting the jute bags within the one-year period cannot be accorded credit, for
several reasons. In the first place, in its decision of November 20, 1961, the Court of Tax
Appeals made absolutely no mention of or reference to this argument of the petitioner,
which can only be interpreted to mean that the court did not believe that the "typhoons,
floods and picketing" adverted to by the petitioner in its brief were of such magnitude or
nature as to effectively prevent the exportation of the jute bags within the required one-
year period. In point of fact nowhere in the record does the petitioner convincingly show
that the so-called fortuitous events or force majeure referred to by it precluded the timely
exportation of the jute bags. In the second place, assuming, arguendo, that the one-year
period is extendible, the jute bags were not actually exported within the one-week
extension the petitioner sought. The record shows that although of the remaining 86,353
jute bags 21,944 were exported within the period of one week after the request for
extension was filed, the rest of the bags, amounting to a total of 64,409, were actually
exported only during the period from February 16 to May 24, 1958, long after the
expiration of the one-week extension sought by the petitioner. Finally, it is clear from the
record that the typhoons and floods which, according to the petitioner, helped render
impossible the fulfillment of its obligation to export within the one-year period, assuming
that they may be placed in the category of fortuitous events or force majeure, all occurred
prior to the execution of the bonds in question, or prior to the commencement of the one-
year period within which the petitioner was in law required to export the jute bags.
2. The next argument of the petitioner is that granting that Customs Administrative
Order 389 is valid and binding, yet "jute bags" cannot be included in the phrase
"cylinders and other containers" mentioned therein. It will be noted, however, that the
Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the Tariff and Customs Code, which Administrative
Order 389 seeks to implement, speak of "containers" in general. The enumeration
following the word "containers" in the said statutes serves merely to give examples of
containers and not to specify the particular kinds thereof. Thus, sec. 23 of the Philippine
Tariff Act states, "containers such as casks large metals, glass or other receptacles," and
sec. 105 (x) of the Tariff and Customs Code mentions "large containers," giving as
examples "demijohn cylinders, drums, casks and other similar receptacles of metal, glass
or other materials." (emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that the
customs authorities had intended, in Customs Administrative Order 389 to circumscribe
the scope of the word "container," any more than the statures sought to be implemented
actually intended to do.
3. Finally, the petitioner claims entitlement to a drawback of the duties it had paid,
by virtue of section 106 (b) of the Tariff and Customs Code, 11 which reads:
SEC. 106. Drawbacks: ...
b. On Articles Made from Imported Materials or Similar Domestic
Materials and Wastes Thereof. — Upon the exportation of articles
manufactured or produced in the Philippines, including the packing, covering,
putting up, marking or labeling thereof, either in whole or in part of imported
materials, or from similar domestic materials of equal quantity and productive
manufacturing quality and value, such question to be determined by the
Collector of Customs, there shall be allowed a drawback equal in amount to the
duties paid on the imported materials so used, or where similar domestic
materials are used, to the duties paid on the equivalent imported similar
materials, less one per cent thereof: Provided, That the exportation shall be
made within three years after the importation of the foreign material used or
constituting the basis for drawback ... .
The petitioner argues that not having availed itself of the full exemption granted by
sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code due to its failure to export the jute bags
within one year, it is nevertheless, by authority of the above-quoted provision, entitled to
a 99% drawback of the duties it had paid, averring further that sec. 106(b) does not
presuppose immediate payment of duties and taxes at the time of importation.
The contention is palpably devoid of merit.
The provisions invoked by the petitioner (to sustain his claim for refund) offer two
options to an importer. The first, under sec. 105 (x), gives him the privilege of importing,
free from import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them
within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, which period as shown
above, is not extendible. The second, presented by sec. 106 (b), contemplates a case
where import duties are first paid, subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount
paid, provided the articles mentioned therein are exported within three years from
importation.
It would seem then that the Government would forego collecting duties on the
articles mentioned in section 105(x) of Tariff and Customs Code as long as it is assured,
by the filing of a bond, that the same shall be exported within the relatively short period
of one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. Where an importer cannot
provide such assurance, then the Government, under sec. 106(b) of said Code, would
require payment of the corresponding duties first. The basic purpose of the two
provisions is the same, which is, to enable a local manufacturer to compete in foreign
markets, by relieving him of the disadvantages resulting from having to pay duties on
imported merchandise, thereby building up export trade and encouraging manufacture in
the country. 12But there is a difference, and it is this: under section 105(x) full exemption
is granted to an importer who justifies the grant of exemption by exporting within one-
year. The petitioner, having opted to take advantage of the provisions of section 105(x),
may not, after having failed to comply with the conditions imposed thereby, avoid the
consequences of such failure by being allowed a drawback under section 106(b) of the
same Act without having complied with the conditions of the latter section.
For it is not to be supposed that the legislature had intended to defeat compliance
with the terms of section 105(x) thru a refuge under the provisions of section 106(b). A
construction should be avoided which affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with
the terms of a statute. 13 Rather courts should proceed on the theory that parts of a statute
may be harmonized and reconciled with each other.

A construction of a statute which creates an inconsistency should be avoided when

a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the plain words
of the act and will carry out the intention of Congress.

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle, embodied in the maxim, "ut res magis valeat quam pereat,"
that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence to the
spirit and language of an act, so interpret the statute to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. 14

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals of November 20,

1961 is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
 EN BANC and are presumed to embrace only things or persons of the kind
designated by them. ’“
[G. R. No. 5000. March 11, 1909.]
In short, the court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about the person
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO
would not be a violation of this Act. The rule of construction above referred to is resorted
NIÑO, Defendant-Appellee.
to only for the purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting
the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus
clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would reached by application of the rule
DECISION of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly
WILLARD, J.: indicates that in the view of the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed revolver would
be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its intention to include in the
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “An Act to regulate the prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.
importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the
possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. ” The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED.
“It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: chanrobles Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
virtualawlibrary Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in
possession of persons who have secured a license therefor or who are entitled to
carry same under the provisions of this Act. ”
The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No. 1780,
committed as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and
criminally, had in his possession and concealed about his person a deadly
weapon, to wit: chanrobles virtualawlibrary One (1) iron bar, about 15 inches in
length provided with an iron ball on one end and a string on the other to tie to
the wrist, which weapon had been designed and made for use in fighting, and as
a deadly weapon.
“With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the
Philippine Commission. ”
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the Government has
appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that —
“The words or other deadly weapon’ only signify a kind of weapon included
within the preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis
must be applied in the interpretation of this law, which rule is as
follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“‘The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific
and generic terms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the
latter following the former. While in the abstract, general terms are to
be given their natural and full signification, yet where they follow
specific words of a like nature they take their meaning from the latter,
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136426. August 6, 1999]
E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO I.
BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati
City and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to
annul and set aside the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November 20, 1998 of the
public respondent Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 132 and praying that the public respondent court be ordered to desist from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. 98-824.
Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal
office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio
Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the
construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation
regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.
On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that,
other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments
therein.[1]
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City[2] but the Sheriff’s Return of Service[3] stated that the summons was
duly served “upon defendant E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager
Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo,
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the
original copy of the summons.”
On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss[4]alleging that on May 6, 1998, “summons intended for defendant” was served
upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan
de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its
person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office
at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default[5] alleging that defendant has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly
on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriff’s Return.
On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss[6] alleging that the records show that defendant, through its branch manager,
Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received the summons and the complaint on May 8,
1998 as evidenced by the signature appearing on the copy of the summons and not on
May 5, 1998 as stated in the Sheriff’s Return nor on May 6, 1998 as stated in the motion
to dismiss; that defendant has transferred its office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro to its new office address at Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the
purpose of the rule is to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an Order[7] denying defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss as well as plaintiff’s Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was
given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. The trial court stated that
since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation
through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with
the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.
On August 19, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[8] alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize
but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein;
and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word “manager” was
changed to “general manager”, “secretary” to “corporate secretary”, and excluding
therefrom agent and director.
On August 27, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration[9] alleging that defendant’s branch manager “did bring home” to the
defendant-corporation the notice of the filing of the action and by virtue of which a
motion to dismiss was filed; and that it was one (1) month after receipt of the summons
and the complaint that defendant chose to file a motion to dismiss.
On September 4, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a
Reply[10] contending that the changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general
semantics.
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order dated November
20, 1998.[11]
Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its
discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s motions
to dismiss and for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was
improperly served. Petitioner invokes Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases of Kanlaon
Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. NLRC[12] wherein it was held that service upon a
construction project manager is valid and in Gesulgon vs. NLRC [13] which held that a
corporation is bound by the service of summons upon its assistant manager.
The only issue for resolution is whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
 When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure was already in force.[14]
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
“When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the
laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.”
(underscoring supplied).
This provision revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
provided that:
“SEC. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. – If the defendant is
a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered,
service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors.” (underscoring supplied).
Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be
served is “restricted, limited and exclusive” following the rule on statutory
construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language.
We agree with petitioner.
Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project
manager[15]; a corporation’s assistant manager[16]; ordinary clerk of a corporation[17];
private secretary of corporate executives[18]; retained counsel[19]; officials who had charge
or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager [20]; or
the corporation’s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer[21]. In these cases, these
persons were considered as “agent” within the contemplation of the old rule. [22] Notably,
under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized.
The cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point.
In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that under the NLRC Rules of Procedure,
summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the party
himself; if the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or
agent, summons shall be served on such person. In said case, summons was served on
one Engr. Estacio who managed and supervised the construction project in Iligan City
(although the principal address of the corporation is in Quezon City) and supervised the
work of the employees. It was held that as manager, he had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the
same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner such that summons for
petitioner was validly served on him as agent and authorized representative of
petitioner. Also in the Gesulgon case cited by private respondent, the summons was
received by the clerk in the office of the Assistant Manager (at principal office address)
and under Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule), summons may be made upon the clerk who is
regarded as agent within the contemplation of the rule.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states “general manager”
instead of only “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of “secretary”; and “treasurer”
instead of “cashier.” The phrase “agent, or any of its directors” is conspicuously deleted
in the new rule.
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired
Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:[23]
“x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to ‘be
made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.’ The
aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes
illogical interpretations, especially the word ‘agent’ of the corporation. The Filoil case,
involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the
validity of service of summons but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized
upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of the need for this revised section
with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case
necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the
corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an
independent practitioner.” (underscoring supplied)
Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court
Revision Committee, stated that “(T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be
made to one named in (the) statute x x x”.[24]
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor
Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing,[25] the Court held:
“A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the
court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is
named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and
proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do
with the legal papers served on him. In other words, ‘to bring home to the corporation
notice of the filing of the action.’ x x x.
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain
legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic
corporation. x x x.” (underscoring supplied).
 Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule
14 (old rule) has been held as improper.[26] Even under the old rule, service upon a
general manager of a firm’s branch office has been held as improper as summons should
have been served at the firm’s principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co.,
Inc. vs. Dizon,[27] it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the
insurance firm’s Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been obviated had
the summons been served at the firm’s principal office.
And in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort,
et al.[28] the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar,
“strictest” compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(on Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule
otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to
obviate delay in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of
petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at
its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer
jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. [29] Before, the rule was that
a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special
appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised
other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court.[30]This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[31] which became the basis of the adoption of a
new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules. Section 20 now provides that “the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.” The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the
purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of
a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent
or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance
of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding
undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
public respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Civil Case No. 98-824, and all its orders and issuances in connection
therewith are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines 1. In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was
SUPREME COURT authorized to appear and institute administrative proceedings against Dr.
Manila Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.

EN BANC 2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City of Manila, had
personality nor power to institute administrative proceedings against Dr.
G.R. No. L-32441 March 29, 1930 Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.

DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant, 3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the
vs. Opium Law, is valid.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and the 4. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.
ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.
5. In holding that section 9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force.
Jose Varela Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees. 6. In not holding that section 9 Act No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the
supposition that it was valid.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
8. In denying the motion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed by appellant.
1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation proceedings,
and particularly the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against the plaintiff,
Philippine Islands dated March 30, 1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, who, according to the
to practice medicine and surgery. plaintiff is not authorized by law to file charges with the Board of Medical Examiners,
which therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the matter.
2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the
investigation and the decision of March 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, the
been an investigation and an adverse decision. procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the following:

3. Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a license for the
practice of medicine and surgery in the Philippine Islands, such as he had prior
to the investigation and adverse decision.
4. Granting the plaintiff any proper legal remedy. (Pages 5 and 6, bill of
exemptions.)
The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint be
dismissed.
Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall be begun by
filing a written charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be
preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical
Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges. Said
charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the Board of Medical
Examiners and a copy thereof, together with written notice of the time and place
when they will be heared and determined, shall be served upon the accused or
his counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for said hearing.
(Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.)

After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs
against the plaintiff.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:
The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any
specified person; it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to require its
executive officer to prefer said charges. From the wording of the law we infer that any
person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges referred to in the above-quoted
provision. Wherefore, the fact that the charges were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso
Felix of the City of Manila, does not deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of
jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action according to law.
The appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that section 9 of Act
No. 2381 is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since said section is
foreign to the subject of said Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law prohibiting
the enactment of any bill embracing more than one subject and providing that the subject
be expressed in the title of the bill.
Our opinion is that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not foreign to the
end pursued in said Act, and that in view in the provision of said section it cannot be
maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one subject. The penalty provided in
said section for the physician or dentist who prescribes opium for a patient whose
physical condition does not require the use of said drug, is one of the means employed by
the Legislature to attain the purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary
use of opium; it is one of the details subordinate to the purpose in view. Such punishment
is not the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a means
employed to regulate the use of opium.
In passing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power
expressly granted by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection of the
health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands.
ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON
THE SUBJECT. — The Philippine Legislature is expressly authorized by the
Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, to adopt legislation upon the importation and
sale of opium in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of such legislation was to
protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine
Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the police power of the State.
(United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil., 56.)
And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 relative to
the physicians and dentist are simply detailes and means conducive to the ultimate
purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be stated in the title of the Act for
the very reason that properly speaking, they are not foreign matter.
The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but
one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general
object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only
be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible. (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.)
The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of
the act. The subject must be single; the provisions, to accomplished the object
involved in that subject, may be multifarious. . . . None of the provisions of a
statute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or indirectly,
to the same subject, have natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject
expressed in the title. As very frequently expressed by the courts, any
provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be
included in the act. (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.)
In order to hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground alleged
by the plaintiff, the violation of the constitutional provision must be substantial and
manifest. It is not so in the case at bar.
2. To warrant the setting aside of statutes because their subjects are not
expressed in the titles, the violation of the rule must be substantial and plain.
(Posadas vs. Menzi, Decision of the United States Supreme Court, page 388,
No. 11, May 15, 1929, United States Supreme Court Advance Opinions.)
At all events the validity of this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, has already been upheld by
this court, not only in the above cited case, United States vs. Wayne Shoup, supra, but
also in the subsequent case of United States vs. Jao Li Sing (37 Phil., 211).
Passing to the fifth and sixth assignments of error, wherein counsel for appellant contends
that even granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it was repealed by Act No.
2493 and later by section 780 of the Administrative Code, we note, first, that there is no
express repeal of section 9 of Act No. 2381. Secondly, it cannot be held that it has been
impliedly repealed, for the reason that the provisions of section 9, Act No. 2381, are
neither contrary to, nor incompatible with, the provisions of section 780 of the
Administrative Code, as amended. Upon this point, we approve and adopt the following
statements made by the trial judge:
Counsel contends, in support of the above, that Act No. 2493 being complete,
and "covering the field" by implication repealed all laws relating to the practice
of medicine, powers of the Board of Medical Examiners and allied matters;
hence, the said law, expressly providing the causes for revocation of medical
licenses, necessarily excluded all others, even though embodied in prior
enactments.
Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke
licenses for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the term. Act No. 1761
(the Opium Law) provided that illegaly prescribing opium should be cause for
revocation of medical licenses. Clearly, the Opium Law did not repeal Act No.
310. Act No. 2381 — also an Opium Law — in its section 9, repeated the
provision as to doctors and dentists. The repetition did not repeal Act No. 310.
Act No. 2493, section 11 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of
physicians are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the
phrase. In other words, so far as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No.
2493 is mere reenactment of Act No. 310. The reenactment of the said portion
of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. If said section 9 has
been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends Act No. 2493 (Ad.
 Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words "unprofessional conduct" of the That this action is really a mandamus proceeding, appears clearly from the terms of the
following: complaint filed herein.

"The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable Finding no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
conduct" as used in this chapter shall be construed to include the with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or abeting a criminal abortion; (2)
advertising, either in his own name or in the name of any other person, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
firm, association, or corporation, in any written or printed paper, or Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable
promises are made, or being employed by, or in the service of any
person, firm, association or corporation so advertising, or advertising
in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3) habitual
intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, cocaine or
other drugs having a similar effect; (4) conviction of a crime or
misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) willfully
betraying a professional secret."

It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified
there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct
theretofore deemed grounds for revocation licenses. The maxim expressio unius
est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated
purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by way
of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If, therefore, there exists,
"unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws, with more reason does the
criminal use of opium remain a specific cause for revocation of license. (Pages
11, 12 and 13, bill of exceptions.)

As to the seventh and eighth assignments of error, we find the judgment and appealed
from correctly rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial properly denied.

As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of Medical
Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration and the authority
granted the Secretary of the Interior of confirming or reversing the decision of said board
of examiners, partake of a quasi-judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion.
For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by mandamus, which is the
nature of this cause on its merits.

As in the case of courts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application

that mandamus will not lie to review or control the acts of executive officers
and boards of state and federal governments in respect of matters as to which
they are vested with discretion. In other words, they cannot be compelled to act
or render a decision in any particular way, and this is so, even though the
exercise of this discretion requires the construction and interpretation of
statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their
conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus. (38 C. J., 659-
660.)
 SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,
HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO,
BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents’ and
intervenors’ separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17,
1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this Court en banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for
reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en
banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and
intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without
action the intervenors’ “Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter
To The Court En Banc” filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to
wit:
“the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the Court after their
motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998
Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of the said decision, with a prayer
to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was also denied in the November 17, 1998
Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid motion of December 3, 1998 is in the
nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2,
Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The
impropriety of movants’ December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring
considering that all the respondents in this case did not anymore join them (movants) in
seeking a reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Resolution.” [1]
Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
“Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For
Issuance Of A Restraining Order)” on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a
“Manifestation and Motion”[2] and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill[3]evidencing filing
of the said motion for reconsideration to this Court by registered mail.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors
pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved
by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not
met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc,
relying on the following constitutional provision:
“Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of
such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc.”[4]
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and
matters, on the other hand, such that casesare “decided” while matters, which include
motions, are “resolved”. Otherwise put, the word “decided” must refer to “cases”; while
the word “resolved” must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendo singula
singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII,
Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words
appear.[5]
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second
sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of “case” and not “matter”. The
reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case
has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17,
1998.
It is the movants’ further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this
case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first
impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio M. Martinez during the
resolution of the motions for reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was
expressed:
“Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of
whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the
case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appealswherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the
aforecited case states:
‘WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court’s order allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents’ property; (b) orders
the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert or reclassify private respondents’ property from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
‘xxx xxx xxx’ (Emphasis supplied)
“Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of
all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second
Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not
deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court
in the resolution of movants’ motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.” [6]
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not
dispose of the earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is
flawed. Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of the
nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then,
we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration must be filed with express
leave of court first obtained.[7] In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave
of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional
reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of
the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this
resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have
been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations
contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the
said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the “Win-Win” Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect considering
that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had already become final
and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration which became the
basis of the said “Win-Win” Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a
litany of protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for
a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its
importance and far-reaching effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The
situation, however, is not as simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be
true that on its face the nullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution was grounded on a
procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for
reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the
substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz: “Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.”[8]
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of
the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.[9]
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once
and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been
issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal
farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified
beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they
have already been raised in intervenors’ earlier motion for reconsideration of our April
24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez,
intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or
actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to
own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the
land.[10] Moreover, the “Win-Win” Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries
have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform.[11] Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as
to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them
does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the “Win-Win”
Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely:
intervenors’ “Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The
Court En Banc,” dated December 3, 1998; respondents’ “Motion For Reconsideration Of
The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This
Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order),”
dated December 2, 1998; and intervenors’ “Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme
Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Division’s Resolution Dated 27 January
1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By
The Intervenors,” dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further
motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Puno, J., in the result, he maintain his original position that the case should go to
CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
 SEPARATE OPINION
MELO, J.:
On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case should
be referred to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which under
the rules is generally proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its resolution in
regard to cogent procedural points.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the
Court En Banc’s Resolution No. 99-1-09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the
issue of an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote with the majority in
denying all of the subject motions in the above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to
express my views on this issue and put them on record, so, in the event that the Court
decides to re-open and re-discuss this issue at some future time, these considerations may
be referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding the majority’s position regarding an
even (2-2) vote in a division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required
majority of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided
by the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides that:
xxx
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at
least three of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is
not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a
larger division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to the Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of divisions : one would
be a division composed of 3 justices in which case there will be 5 divisions;
another division is composed of 5 justices each, in which case there will be 3
divisions; and the other is composed of 7 members each, in which case, there
will be 2 divisions.
Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3
votes. Should it immediately go to the court en banc of 15 justices or should it
first go to a bigger division?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of 3, the vote is
2-1, automatically it goes to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not obtained. So, this
last phrase would operate automatically – “WHEN THE REQUIRED
NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED EN
BANC.”
xxx xxx xxx
(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)
Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any
case or matter heard by a division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3
votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having
inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has retired, a
minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any valid decision or
resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur,
i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal
provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a division,
the case should automatically go to Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between “cases” and “matters” referred to in the
above-quoted constitutional provision. “Cases” being decided, and “matters” being
resolved. Only “cases” are referred to the Court En Banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtained. “Matters” are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that “cases” would only refer to deliberations at first instance
on the merits of a case filed with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions,
including motions for reconsideration, are “matters” to be resolved. To give flesh to this
distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the voting on deliberations of “cases”, no
decision is passed, whereas, if a tie occurs in the voting on motions for reconsideration,
the decision which had already been passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed to
appealed cases, filed with the Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the only original cases which are taken cognizance of by this Court are those
wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably, these cases are all required by the
Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. So, there will be no instance when a
division will be ever taking cognizance of an original action filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by the divisions are either petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of petition for review
on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there be a tie in the voting on
deliberation of a “case” by the division, although apparently no action is passed, a
decision may still be rendered-the petition is hereby DENIED due course, and it is
forthwith DISMISSED. This is definitely in consonance with the majority’s line of
reasoning in the 2-2 vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is that, the 2-2 vote in
the deliberation of the “case” at the first instance should still be referred to the Court En
Banc? The reason is simple. Because the express provision of the Constitution requires
a vote of at least three justices for there to be a valid and binding decision of the
Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to motions for reconsideration? Even on
this score alone, it is my view that, in all instances, whether it be in the deliberations of a
case at first instance or on a motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote
cannot pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for
reconsideration because the provision contemplates “cases” or “matters” (which for me
has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned) heard by a division, and a
motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to
be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met,
the matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in
the division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be sustained by a
reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a “case” but
only a “matter” which does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote thereon in
the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is
to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2
vote or any even vote may be sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a
higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1
abstaining) would result in the motion not being carried, but only because there is and
there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En Banc which, does not act on judicial
matters. In a legislative body, an even vote results in the failure of the proposition, only
because there is no higher body which can take over. In our own Court En Banc, if the
voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or
disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be carried because that is the end of
the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there being
recourse to the Court En Banc, and more so, this being expressly directed by the
Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration should, by all means, be
decided by the Court En Banc.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138381. November 10, 2004]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondent.
[G.R. No. 141625. November 10, 2004]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO D.
PINEDA, DANIEL GO, FELINO BULANDUS, FELICIMO J.
FERRARIS, JR., BEN HUR PORLUCAS, LUIS HIPONIA, MARIA
LUISA A. FERNANDEZ, VICTORINA JOVEN, CORAZON S.
ALIWANAG, SILVER L. MARTINES, SR., RENATO PEREZ, LOLITA
CAYLAN, DOUGLAS VALLEJO and LETICIA ALMAZAN, on their
own behalf and on behalf of all GSIS retirees with all of whom they share a
common and general interest, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On April 16, 2002, the Court promulgated a decision on these two consolidated
cases partially granting the petition in G.R. No. 138381 (“first petition”) thereby
reversing the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of certain fringe benefits
granted to GSIS employees. As a result, the Court ordered the refund of amounts
representing fringe benefits corresponding to those allowed in the first petition in favor of
the respondents in G.R. No. 141625 (“second petition”).
The benefits which the Court ordered to be refunded included increases in longevity
pay, children’s allowance and management contribution to the Provident Fund as well as
premiums for group personal accident insurance. On the other hand, the Court affirmed
the COA disallowance of loyalty and service cash award as well as housing allowance in
excess of that approved by the COA. Amounts corresponding to these benefits were
previously deducted by GSIS from respondents’ retirement benefits in view of the COA
disallowance in the first petition. COA did not seek reconsideration of the judgment
ordering said refund, which thus became final and executory.
On August 7, 2002, the respondents in the second petition, all GSIS retirees, filed a
motion for amendatory and clarificatory judgment (“amendatory motion”). [1] They
averred that we did not categorically resolve the issue raised in the second petition,
namely: whether or not the GSIS may lawfully deduct any amount from their retirement
benefits in light of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291.
According to respondents, said provision of law clearly states that no amount
whatsoever could be legally deducted from retirement benefits, even those amounts
representing COA disallowances. They posit that we should have ordered refund not
only of benefits allowed in the first petition, but all amounts claimed, regardless of
whether or not these were allowed by the COA. These include items which were
correctly disallowed by the COA in the first petition, as well as disallowed benefits under
the second petition. The latter consists of initial payment of productivity bonus,
accelerated implementation of the new salary schedule effective August 1, 1995, 1995
mid-year financial assistance and increase in clothing, rice and meal allowances.
Respondents further insist that we should have awarded damages in their favor, citing the
GSIS’ alleged bad faith in making the deductions.
GSIS filed a comment[2] to respondents’ amendatory motion, as directed by the
Court in a resolution dated September 3, 2002. GSIS posited that the other benefits not
passed upon in the main judgment should be understood by respondents as having been
impliedly denied by this Court. It also sought clarification of our decision insofar as it
declared that there was no identity of subject matter between the COA proceedings, from
which the first petition stemmed, and respondents’ claim under the second petition, which
emanated from an order of the GSIS Board of Trustees (“Board”). As for the damages
claimed by respondents, GSIS insists that it made the deductions in good faith for these
were done in accordance with COA directives.
Respondents filed a reply[3] to the comment of GSIS on September 9, 2002.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a second motion, this time for leave to file a motion
for discretionary and partial execution[4] (“motion for execution”). They prayed that GSIS
be ordered to effect the refund, as finally adjudged in our decision, pending resolution of
their amendatory motion as to the other deducted amounts. We granted the motion for
execution on September 3, 2002.
Subsequently, on December 26, 2002, counsel for respondents, Atty. Agustin
Sundiam, filed a motion for entry and enforcement of attorney’s lien [5] (“motion for
charging lien”) and a supplement[6] to this motion on January 10, 2003. He sought entry
of a charging lien in the records of this case pursuant to Section 37 of Rule 138. He
prayed for an order directing the GSIS to deduct, as his professional fees, 15% from
respondents’ refund vouchers since the GSIS was already in the process of releasing his
clients’ checks in compliance with our judgment in the first petition. The payment
scheme was allegedly authorized by the Board of Directors of his clients, the GSIS
Retirees Association, Inc. (GRIA), through a board resolution [7] that he has attached to
the motion.
Atty. Sundiam’s motion for charging lien was opposed by petitioner GSIS on the
ground that it was through its efforts, and not Atty. Sundiam’s, that the retirees were able
to obtain a refund.[8] Meanwhile, the GRIA confirmed the payment scheme it adopted
with Atty. Sundiam and prayed for its approval.[9]
Thereafter, on January 10, 2003, respondents filed another manifestation and
motion as well as supplement thereto, claiming that GSIS was deducting new and
unspecified sums from the amount it was refunding to respondents. These new
deductions purportedly pertain to another set of COA disallowances. [10]
On January 21, 2003, respondents again filed a motion [11] praying for the inclusion
in the refundable amount of dividends on the management contribution to the Provident
Fund (“motion for payment of dividends”). Respondents claimed that the contribution,
which amounted to Fifty Million Pesos (P50M), was retained by GSIS for more than five
years and thus earned a considerable sum of income while under its control. GSIS
declared and paid dividends on said contribution to incumbent officials and employees,
but refused to extend the same benefits to respondents/retirees.
On March 6, 2003, GSIS filed a joint comment[12] to respondents’ two foregoing
motions contending that the new deductions are legitimate. The deductions pertain to car
loan arrearages, disallowed employees’ compensation claims and the like. As for the
dividends on the Provident Fund contributions, respondents are not entitled to the same
because while the first petition was pending, the contributions were not actually remitted
to the fund but were withheld by COA pursuant to its earlier disallowance.
On October 2, 2003, respondents filed another motion [13] for an order to compel the
GSIS to pay dividends on the Provident Fund contributions pending resolution of their
other motions. They also sought refund of Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits
that GSIS supposedly paid to some of the respondents, but once again arbitrarily
deducted from the amount which the Court ordered to be refunded.
In a minute resolution[14] dated November 11, 2003, we denied the last motion for
lack of merit. We likewise denied with finality respondents’ motion for reconsideration
from the denial of said motion.[15]
We now resolve the matters raised by the parties.
On the amendatory motion, it must be clarified that the question raised before this
Court in the second petition was the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction to resolve
respondents’ claim for refund of amounts representing deductions from their retirement
benefits. What was assailed in the second petition was the appellate court’s ruling that
the Board had jurisdiction over respondents’ claim since there was no identity of subject
matter between the proceedings then pending before the COA and the petition brought by
respondents before the Board. The Court of Appeals did not rule on the main controversy
of whether COA disallowances could be deducted from retirement benefits because the
Board ordered the dismissal of respondents’ claim for alleged lack of jurisdiction, before
it could even decide on the principal issue.
Consequently, the only matter that was properly elevated to this Court was the issue
of whether or not the Board had jurisdiction over respondents’ demands. We did not
resolve the issue of whether or not the deductions were valid under Section 39 of RA
8291, for the simple reason that the Board, as well as the appellate court, did not tackle
the issue. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction[16] would ordinarily preclude us from
resolving the matter, which calls for a ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter
that is vested by law with exclusive and original jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto. [17]
However, both the GSIS and respondents have extensively discussed the merits of
the case in their respective pleadings and did not confine their arguments to the issue of
jurisdiction. Respondents, in fact, submit that we should resolve the main issue on the
ground that it is a purely legal question. Respondents further state that a remand of the
case to the Board would merely result in unnecessary delay and needless expense for the
parties. They thus urge the Court to decide the main question in order to finally put an
end to the controversy.
Indeed, the principal issue pending before the Board does not involve any factual
question, as it concerns only the correct application of the last paragraph of Section 39,
RA 8291. The parties agreed that the lone issue is whether COA disallowances could be
legally deducted from retirement benefits on the ground that these were respondents’
monetary liabilities to the GSIS under the said provision. There is no dispute that the
amounts deducted by GSIS represented COA disallowances. Thus, the only question left
for the Board to decide is whether the deductions are allowed under RA 8291.
Under certain exceptional circumstances, we have taken cognizance of questions of
law even in the absence of an initial determination by a lower court or administrative
body. InChina Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court held:
At the outset, the Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that since the filing of this suit
before the trial court, none of the substantial issues have been resolved. To avoid and
gloss over the issues raised by the parties, as what the trial court and respondent Court of
Appeals did, would unduly prolong this litigation involving a rather simple case of
foreclosure of mortgage. Undoubtedly, this will run counter to the avowed purpose of the
rules, i.e., to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. The Court, therefore, feels that the central issues of the case,
albeit unresolved by the courts below, should now be settled specially as they involved
pure questions of law. Furthermore, the pleadings of the respective parties on file have
amply ventilated their various positions and arguments on the matter necessitating
prompt adjudication.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court likewise
held that the remand of a case is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve
the dispute based on the records before it. The Court will decide actions on the merits in
order to expedite the settlement of a controversy and if the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a remand of the case.
Here, the primary issue calls for an application of a specific provision of RA 8291
as well as relevant jurisprudence on the matter. No useful purpose will indeed be served
if we remand the matter to the Board, only for its decision to be elevated again to the
Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Hence, we deem it sound to rule on the
merits of the controversy rather than to remand the case for further proceedings.
The last paragraph of Section 39, RA 8291 specifically provides:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.-
xxx xxx xxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial
agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary
accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his
official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or
work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the
GSIS.
It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted
from benefits under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such
deductions. Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA disallowances in view of
the clear mandate of the foregoing provision. It is a basic rule in statutory construction
that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation. This is what is known as plain-meaning rule or verba
legis.[20]
Accordingly, the GSIS’ interpretation of Section 39 that COA disallowances have
become monetary liabilities of respondents to the GSIS and therefore fall under the
exception stated in the law is wrong. No interpretation of the said provision is necessary
given the clear language of the statute. A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by construction. [21]
Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS’ interpretation, then it would be
unnecessary to single out COA disallowances as among those from which benefits under
RA 8291 are exempt. In such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in the
enumeration of exemptions would be a mere surplusage since the GSIS could simply
consider COA disallowances as monetary liabilities in its favor. Such a construction
would empower the GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly granted by
law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to
his indebtedness to the government has been settled in several cases. In Cruz v. Tantuico,
Jr.,[22] the Court, citing Hunt v. Hernandez,[23] explained the reason for such policy thus:
x x x we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of
the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the
pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise
clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It is true
that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under section 624 of
the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be
attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of section 3 of Act No. 4051,
the appropriation thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same
prohibited result and enable the respondents to do indirectly what they can not do directly
under section 3 of Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved
on February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies section
624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Considering
section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority granted in section 624
of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provisions is avoided.
(Underscoring supplied)
The above ruling was reiterated in Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo,[24] where the Court
similarly declared that benefits under retirement laws cannot be withheld regardless of
the petitioner’s monetary liability to the government.
The policy of exempting retirement benefits from attachment, levy and execution,
as well as unwarranted deductions, has been embodied in a long line of retirement
statutes. Act No. 4051,[25] which provides for the payment of gratuity to officers and
employees of the Insular Government upon retirement due to reorganization, expressly
provides in its Section 3 that “(t)he gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be attached
or levied upon execution.”
The law which established the GSIS, Commonwealth Act No. 186 (“CA No.
186”),[26] went further by providing as follows:
SEC. 23. Exemptions from legal process and liens. – No policy of life insurance issued
under this Act, or the proceeds thereof, except those corresponding to the annual
premium thereon in excess of five hundred pesos per annum, when paid to any member
thereunder, shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized,
taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to
pay any debt or liability of such member, or his beneficiary, or any other person who may
have a right thereunder, either before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof,
when not made payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the
member for payment of his debt.
Presidential Decree No. 1146,[27] which amended CA No. 186, likewise contained a
provision exempting benefits from attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.
However, the exemption was expressly made inapplicable to “obligations of the member
to the System, or to the employer, or when the benefits granted are assigned by the
member with the authority of the System.”[28]
The latest GSIS enactment, RA 8291,[29] provides for a more detailed and wider
range of exemptions under Section 39. Aside from exempting benefits from judicial
processes, it likewise unconditionally exempts benefits from quasi-judicial and
administrative processes, including COA disallowances, as well as all financial
obligations of the member. The latter includes any pecuniary accountability of the
member which arose out of the exercise or performance of his official functions or duties
or incurred relative to his position or work. The only exception to such pecuniary
accountability is when the same is in favor of the GSIS.
Thus, “monetary liability in favor of GSIS” refers to indebtedness of the member to
the System other than those which fall under the categories of pecuniary accountabilities
exempted under the law. Such liability may include unpaid social insurance premiums
and balances on loans obtained by the retiree from the System, which do not arise in the
performance of his duties and are not incurred relative to his work. The general policy, as
reflected in our retirement laws and jurisprudence, is to exempt benefits from all legal
processes or liens, but not from outstanding obligations of the member to the
System. This is to ensure maintenance of the GSIS’ fund reserves in order to guarantee
fulfillment of all its obligations under RA 8291.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, we find it necessary to nonetheless
differentiate between those benefits which were properly disallowed by the COA and
those which were not.
Anent the benefits which were improperly disallowed, the same rightfully belong to
respondents without qualification. As for benefits which were justifiably disallowed by
the COA, the same were erroneously granted to and received by respondents who now
have the obligation to return the same to the System.
It cannot be denied that respondents were recipients of benefits that were properly
disallowed by the COA. These COA disallowances would otherwise have been deducted
from their salaries, were it not for the fact that respondents retired before such deductions
could be effected. The GSIS can no longer recover these amounts by any administrative
means due to the specific exemption of retirement benefits from COA disallowances.
Respondents resultantly retained benefits to which they were not legally entitled which,
in turn, gave rise to an obligation on their part to return the amounts under the principle
of solutio indebiti.
Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code,[30] if something is received and unduly
delivered through mistake when there is no right to demand it, the obligation to return the
thing arises. Payment by reason of mistake in the construction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law also comes within the scope of solutio indebiti.[31]
In the instant case, the confusion about the increase and payment of benefits to
GSIS employees and executives, as well as its subsequent disallowance by the COA,
arose on account of the application of RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law and its
implementing rules, CCC No. 10. The complexity in the application of these laws is
manifested by the several cases that have reached the Court since its passage in
1989.[32] The application of RA 6758 was made even more difficult when its
implementing rules were nullified for non-publication.[33] Consequently, the delivery of
benefits to respondents under an erroneous interpretation of RA 6758 gave rise to an
actionable obligation for them to return the same.
While the GSIS cannot directly proceed against respondents’ retirement benefits, it
can nonetheless seek restoration of the amounts by means of a proper court action for its
recovery. Respondents themselves submit that this should be the case, [34] although any
judgment rendered therein cannot be enforced against retirement benefits due to the
exemption provided in Section 39 of RA 8291. However, there is no prohibition against
enforcing a final monetary judgment against respondents’ other assets and
properties. This is only fair and consistent with basic principles of due process.
As such, a proper accounting of the amounts due and refundable is in order. In
rendering such accounting, the parties must observe the following guidelines:
(1) All deductions from respondents’ retirement benefits should be refunded
except those amounts which may properly be defined as “monetary
liability to the GSIS”;
(2) Any other amount to be deducted from retirement benefits must be
agreed upon by and between the parties; and
(3) Refusal on the part of respondents to return disallowed benefits shall give
rise to a right of action in favor of GSIS before the courts of law.
Conformably, any fees due to Atty. Sundiam for his professional services may be
charged against respondents’ retirement benefits. The arrangement, however, must be
covered by a proper agreement between him and his clients under (2) above.
As to whether respondents are entitled to dividends on the provident fund
contributions, the same is not within the issues raised before the Court. The second
petition refers only to the legality of the deductions made by GSIS from respondents’
retirement benefits. There are factual matters that need to be threshed out in determining
respondents’ right to the payment of dividends, in view of the GSIS’ assertion that the
management contributions were not actually remitted to the fund. Thus, the payment of
dividends should be the subject of a separate claim where the parties can present evidence
to prove their respective assertions. The Court is in no position to resolve the matter
since the material facts that would prove or disprove the claim are not on record.
In the interest of clarity, we reiterate herein our ruling that there is no identity of
subject matter between the COA proceedings, from which the first petition stemmed, and
respondents’ claim of refund before the Board. While the first petition referred to the
propriety of the COA disallowances per se, respondents’ claim before the Board
pertained to the legality of deducting the COA disallowances from retirement benefits
under Section 39 of RA 8291.
Finally, on respondents claim that the GSIS acted in bad faith when it deducted the
COA disallowances from their retirement benefits, except for bare allegations, there is no
proof or evidence of the alleged bad faith and partiality of the GSIS. Moreover, the latter
cannot be faulted for taking measures to ensure recovery of the COA disallowances since
respondents have already retired and would be beyond its administrative reach. The GSIS
merely acted upon its best judgment and chose to err in the side of prudence rather than
suffer the consequence of not being able to account for the COA disallowances. It
concededly erred in taking this recourse but it can hardly be accused of malice or bad
faith in doing so.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the April 16, 2002 Decision in G.R. Nos.
138381 and 141625 is AMENDED. In addition to the refund of amounts corresponding
to benefits allowed in G.R. No. 138381, the GSIS is ordered to REFUND all deductions
from retirement benefits EXCEPT amounts representing monetary liability of the
respondents to the GSIS as well as all other amounts mutually agreed upon by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J. on official leave.
Corona and Tinga, JJ., on leave.
Callejo, Sr., J., no part, Ponente in CA Decision.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143047. July 14, 2004]
RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division), which denied the petitioner’s omnibus motion with supplemental motion, and its
Resolution dated April 25, 2000, denying the petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of the
same.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,[2] committed as follows:
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a
Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of his official functions,
particularly in the operation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations against
alleged pushers or users to enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the city
government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred
during the alleged buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he had no participation in the
said police operations against drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the city
government a total amount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the government as
well as the public interest.[3]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan.
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[4] for the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the referral of the
case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate
proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative Order No. 270 which
prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He
asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by
officials of local government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or
higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the “Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.” He contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction
over the crime charged against him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice
of Adm. Order No. 270.
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted that
the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member of theSangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who, by
express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7975,[5] is classified as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original
jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that the
petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which
amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.[6]
On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus
motion,[7] citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
Sandiganbayan,[8]where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to the
law creating the Sandiganbayan, “collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan,” and that “the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was
made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its
jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.”
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 and
entered a plea of not guilty.[9]
On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s September 23, 1999 Resolution.[10] The motion was, however, denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.[11]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the
penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but
on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in “Lilia B. Organo versus The
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,” G.R. No. 133535, 09
September 1999, settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public officials and employees
with rank and salary grade 27 and above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly committed,
he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG
25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC
and not the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He
asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270,[12] Dapitan City is only a component city, and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang PanlungsodMembers
I with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
without qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Congress
approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions
specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were
specifically included therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod are specifically included as among those falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to Salary Grade
27 and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch other than the regional
director and higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule, otherwise, is to give a
different interpretation to what the law clearly is.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole factor to
determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could
have simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a
Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No.
8249 specifically including the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as
those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the
said sangguniang members shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court
regardless of their Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware that not all the
positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the legislature has explicitly made
the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of these officials’ functions
and responsibilities as well as the power they can wield over their respective area of
jurisdiction.[13]
The threshold issue for the Court’s resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of DapitanCity,
who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled “An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No.
1606,” took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by
Rep. Act No. 8249, entitled “An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” The amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and
Section 4 thereof enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No.
8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
offense.[14] Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of
the crime.[15] However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an
exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of these two provisions which reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive] [16] original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book
II][17] of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
…
In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime
charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The
applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:[18]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code,[19] where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;[20]
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; [21]
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. [22]
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.[23]
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the
government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as falling within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the general
qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as “occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.” In other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019
committed by officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials
specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive branch
with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase “officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.” Or the
category in paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to “[a]ll other national and local
officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of
1989” would have sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress included specific officials,without any
reference as to their salary grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials,
regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayan’s
original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for such
enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words in a statute should not be
construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction which will give them some force and
meaning is possible.[24]
That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their salary
grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the legislative
history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No.
1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No.
7975, Senator Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only
those occupying high positions in the government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of
the court.
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over
cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher by the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction,
therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.
The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices of the
Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at
Grade “26” or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
“27” or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in
government regardless of salary grade;[26]
Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them “big fish” and their
positions important, regardless of their salary grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in
(a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and Management in
1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. For example:
Category New Position Title Grade
16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE
…
Foreign Service

The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject to the …
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of Congress,
judges and justices of all courts.[25] Foreign Service Officer, Class II[27] 23[28]
Foreign Service Officer, Class I[29] 24[30]
More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill No.
844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. …
8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975,
thus: 18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE

…
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO
Local Executives

…
…

By way of sponsorship, Mr. President – we will issue the full sponsorship speech to the
members because it is fairly technical – may we say the following things: City Government Department Head I 24[31]
City Government Department Head II 26[32]

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
concentrate on the “larger fish” and leave the “small fry” to the lower courts. This law …
became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of
the dockets of that court, to wit: Provincial Government Department Head 25[33]
 … the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the
jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying
City Vice Mayor I 26 positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is
City Vice Mayor II 28 given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words,
City Mayor I 28[34] clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
City Mayor II 30 and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole.[39] And courts should adopt a construction that will give
effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.[40]

Sangguniang Members In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No.
3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are specifically included as among those
… within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,[41] or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No.
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25 8249[42] for that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction over the
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27 petitioner’s case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 26[35]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are
Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors[36] AFFIRMED. No costs.

Prosecutor IV 29 SO ORDERED.
Prosecutor III 28 Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Prosecutor II 27 Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
Prosecutor I 26
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in Rep. Act
No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the
consuls, city department heads, provincial department heads and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically
included within the Sandiganbayan’s original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the
respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken into account, these
officials’ respective salary grades when it deliberated upon the amendments to the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975,
specifically including them within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing
so, it obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g)
thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is
the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.[37] From the congressional records and
the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly intended the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid
subsequent laws, to be included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction,[38] can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included
in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials
specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom