Issue: W/ON the DOCUMENT can be considered as a deed
CASE DIGEST: Teodoro Acap vs CA, Edy Delos Reyes G.R. of sale?
No. 118114 December 7, 1995 (251 SCRA 30) (Yellow Pad
digest)
Document = “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights”
Rental = 10 Cavans of Palay
Facts:
· Lot 1130 is registered in the name of Spouses Vasquez, they
died. Their son, Felixberto inherited the lot, he then executed
a DEED OF SALE to Cosmo Pido. Teodoro Acap a tenant
that occupies 9,500m still occupied the lot even after the
transfer of ownership, he paid his rentals religiously, even
after Pido died. Pido’s heris waived their rights (via
the DOCUMENT) in favor of Edy.
· Edy informed Ted that he is the owner and that the monthly
should be paid to him, Ted agreed to pay the
annual RENTAL.
· Come 1983, Ted refused to pay anymore monthly lease, this
prompted Ed to ask for assistance from the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR).
· MAR invited Ted to a conference to discuss the matter but
he did not attend, however, he sent his wife, MAR told the
wife that Ed is the new owner of the lot but she said that they
do not recognize Ed’s ownership.
· After 4 years, Edy filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against Ted.
· During Trial, Ted contended that he does not recognize the
ownership of Edy but still recognize the ownership of Pido, he
as well told that Pido’s widow told him that he should stay in
the lot and withhold any monthly payment until she arrives or
demands it (The widow is in USA).
· RTC ruled in favor of Edy. CA brushed aside Ted’s
argument.
Held: No. IN A CONTRACT OF SALE, ONE OF THE
PARTIES OBLIGATES HIMSELF TO TRANSFERAND
DELIVER, THE OTHER TO PAY THE PRICE. Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights operates as a public instrument
when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the instestate
heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the descendant.
ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR. VS. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Ccarpio Morales, j.:
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed theCommittee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursementsand expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The
complaint was endorsed and was referred tothe House
Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was"sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.On
October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned HouseResolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense?2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12thCongress are unconstitutional.3. Whether or not the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of theConstitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sounddiscretion of
the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the
Constitution enumerates six groundsfor impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of
public trust, elude a precisedefinition.2. Yes. The
provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules contraveneSection 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."3. Yes. Having concluded that the
initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaintand referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoingmanner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI,Section 3(5) of the Constitution.In
fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed on June 2, 2003 and the secondimpeachment
complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the
constitutional prohibition against theinitiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
C-J YULO & SONS, INC vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
SAN PABLO, INC.
[G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005]
FACTS: On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto
respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna
on the condition that it shall be used for the construction of a
home for the aged and infirm and for other charitable
purposes and cannot be used for any other purposes without
the consent of the former said land with all real improvements
thereon shall revert in otherwise trust to the Donor for prompt
disposition in favor of some other charitable organization that
Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of
generating funds to build the perimeter fence on the donated
property and the construction of a nucleus building for the
aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property
to one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar
cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was
entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of
the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to
Gomez ended in 1985.
The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property
was again leased by the donee, this time to one Jose Bostre
who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the
donee, it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to
protect the premises from vandals and for the electrification of
the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the
infirm, which was named as “Casa dela Merced.” As before,
however, the donee executed the lease contract without the
prior written consent of the donor.
After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the
donee, for the third time, leased a portion of the donated
property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for
fattening cattles. The donee explained that the lease
agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of
generating funds for the completion of “Casa dela
Merced.” Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior
written consent of the donor.
Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board
resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel A. Yulo,
addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was
revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the
deed due to the donee’s non-compliance with and material
breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.
ISSUE: W/N revocation is proper?
HELD: NO. In Republic vs. Silim, where the donor sought to
revoke the donation on the ground that the donee breached
the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school
purpose only, the Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was
not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged
with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the
same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact,
the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the
donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the
release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
school building which could not be accommodated by the
limited area of the donated lot.
As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into
by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the
objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such
lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the
deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of
the donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donee’s
acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the
donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a
lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute
casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the
revocation of the donation.
Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior
written consent by the donor for all contracts of lease to be
entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for
revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not
correlated with the purpose of the donation, would constitute
undue restriction of the donee’s right of ownership over the
donated property.
Republic of the Philippines v. Leon SilimG.R.
No. 140487. April 2, 2001Kapunan,
J.:
Facts:Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq.
m parcel of land infavour of the Bureau of Public Schools,
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In theDeed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said
propertyshould "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes
only." This donationwas accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the
District Supervisor of BPS, through anAffidavit of Acceptance
and/or Confirmation of Donation.A school building was
constructed on the donated land. However,
theB a g o n g L i p u n a n s c h o o l b u i l d i n g t h a t w a s s u p
p o s e d t o b e a l l o c a t e d f o r t h e donated parcel of land
could not be released since the government required thatit be
built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy
this predicamentBuendia was authorized to officially
transact for the exchange of the old schools i t e t o a n e w
and suitable location which would fit the
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e government. Pursuant to this,
Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deedof Exchange
whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot
ownedby the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings
were constructed on the newschool site and the school
building previously erected on the donated lot
wasdismantled and transferred to the new location.The Silim
spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay
learnedt h a t V i c e -
Mayor W ilfredo Palma was constructing a house
o n t h e d o n a t e d property. They filed a complaint to
annul the donation claiming that there was nov a l i d
acceptance made by the donee and that there
w a s a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e condition in the donation.Issue:
(1)
Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the
NCC?(2)Was the condition in the donation violated?Ruling:
(1)
Yes. There was a valid acceptance.The last paragraph of Art.
749 reads: “If the acceptance is made in aseparate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form,
andt h i s s t e p s h a l l b e n o t e d i n b o t h i n s t r u m e
n t s . ” T h e p u r p o s e o f t h e f o r m a l requirement for
acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance
isduly communicated to the donor.Here, a school building was
immediately constructed after the
donationw a s e x e c u t e d . R e s p o n d e n t s h a d k n o w l e d
g e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s c h o o l building. It was when
the school building was being dismantled and transferred tothe new
site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a
house onthe donated property that respondents came to know
of the Deed of Exchange.The actual knowledge by
respondents of the construction and existence of theschool
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance
of the donationby the donee be communicated to the
donor.U n d e r A r t . 7 4 5 , t h e l a w r e q u i r e s t h e d o n e e t
o “ a c c e p t t h e d o n a t i o n personally, or through an authorized
person with a special power for the purpose,or with a general and
sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.”The
respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of
the donationwas ineffective because of the absence of a
special power of attorney from theRepublic of the
Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the
Bureau of
Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendia’s accep
tance was authorizedunder Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative
Code which states:SEC. 47.
Contracts and Conveyances
. - Contracts or conveyances maybe executed for and in
behalf of the Government or of any of its branches,subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by
theexigency or exigencies of the service and as long
as the same are notprohibited by law.(2)No.
The condition was not violated.The exclusivity of the purpose
of the donation was not altered or affectedwhen Buendia
exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in
furtheranceand enhancement of the purpose of the donation. with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the
The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunanschool building ISSUE
which could not be accommodated by the limited area WON the action has already prescribed
of thedonated lot. HELD / RATIO ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED
. Art. 764 is not applicable in this case. The deed of donation
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v CA involved expressly provided for automatic reversion of the
G.R. No. 77425/77450 June 19, 1991 property donated in case of violation of the, as was correctly
DOCTRINEThere is no need for prescription to be applied in
recognized by the CA.A judicial action for rescission of a
caseswhere there is stipulation for automatic reversion.
contract is not necessarywhere the contract provides that it
Nonetheless,the stipulation is against public policy and thus,
is void.FACTS may be revoked and cancelled forviolation of any of its terms
The administrators of the estate of deceased spouses and conditions. This cancellation can beapplied in the case at
Eusebioand Martina De Castro filed a complaint to nullify the bar. Art. 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations
deed of donation,rescission of contract, and reconveyance of
inter vivos
the property against spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao,
shall be governed by the general provisions oncontracts and
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus,and Roman Catholic
obligations in all that is not determined by the law
Archbishop of Manila.The administrators alleged that in 1930
ondonations.In contracts providing for automatic revocation,
the De Castrosexecuted the deed of donation over their
judicialintervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining
Cavite property to theArchbishop, said deed allegedly
a judicialdeclaration rescinding a contract already deemed
providing that the latter cannot disposeor sell the property
rescinded, but inorder to determine whether or not
within 100 years from execution. Theadministration of the said
the rescission was proper.Thus, the cause of action has
properties was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962. And
not yet prescribed since an actionto enforce a written contract
in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold the property to thespouses
prescribes in ten (10) years. Article 764was intended to
Ignao. The Ignaos were then able to transfer the TCT
provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment
undertheir names.The lower court ruled that the action had
orcontravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation
already prescribedand dismissed the complaint. This was
if andwhen the parties have not agreed on the automatic
reversed by the CA.The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that
revocation of suchdonation upon the occurrence of the
the cause of actionhad already prescribed, relying on Art. 764
contingency contemplated therein.That is not the situation in
which provides that
the case at bar.
"(t)hedonation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor,
NONETHELESS
when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
, while the action may not be dismissed byreason of
which the former imposed uponthe latter," and that "(t)his
prescription, the same should be dismissed on the groundthat
action shall prescribe after four years fromthe non-compliance
the estates of the De Castros have
NO CAUSE OF ACTION
against the Ignaos and other petitioners.The cause of action
of the De Castros is based on the allegedbreach of the
resolutory condition that the property donated shouldnot be
sold within the prohibited period. Said condition,
however,constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising
from ownershipand is, therefore, contrary to public policy and
should be declared as anillegal or impossible condition.The
Ignaos won. The CA decision is reversed.
SICAD VS. CA- Donation Mortis Causa
The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its
language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by
the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
the donees; Aurora retained the document and maintained
possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.
The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land
to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Simultaneously with
alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation.
She asserted that the donation took the nature of mortis
causa and was therefore revocable anytime. She further
averred that the same failed to follow the formality of wills, and
therefore was nullity.
Aurora’s grandchildren found their grandma’s reversal vexing.
They insisted that the Deed was one intervivos and therefore
irrevocable. The RTC adjudicated and found for the
grandchildren.
Aurora took the case to the CA but, alas, kicked the bucket
during proceedings.

FACTS: The Spouses Sicad who were in possession of the property

took Aurora’s her place in the litigation. Sadly, the CA
Capiz, Dec 1979:
reaffirmed the RTC decision.
Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of
her heart, drew up a Deed in favor of her darling grandkids
Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed
bore the title ―Deed of Donation Intervivos.” ISSUE: Whether or not the Donation took the nature of one
inter vivos
Thereafter, Aurora’s able secretary presented the Deed to the
Registrar for the purpose of canceling the original title and
obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three HELD: No. The donation is mortis causa.
donees.
The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never
intended the donation to take effect within her lifetime. First,
A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached
she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her
death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale of the
property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to
possess the property as well as the fruits and authorized such
enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained the
certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the
Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of ownership.
The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to
be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the
parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon
its execution.
The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it
stipulated ―that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated
properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal
of the donor, during her lifetime; and that, without the
knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties
could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale,
mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible.
A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds
form the donee that right to dispose of the donated property
during the donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa ― the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.
Because of Aurora’s actions, nothing was transferred by the
deed of donation in question to her grandchildren. They did
not get possession of the property donated. They did not
acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of
dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not
acquire the right to dispose of the property – this would accrue
to them only after ten years from Aurora’s death. Moreover,
they never saw what the certificate of title looked like.
These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the
donation in question was a donation mortis causa, envisioning
a transfer of ownership only after the donor knocks on
Heaven’s door.
ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ- Donation Mortis Causa
All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed
together in case of conflicting statements in order to
determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa.
FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of
Donation in favor of their children, Olimpia, Angel and Andrea
Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with
reservations on certain lots, to their children and daughters-in-
law and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate
the same to 3rd persons while the couple are still alive and
that they shall continue to administer the same until their
death. The donees manifested their acceptance in the same
deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed a
deed of donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the
siblings each a ½ portion of Lot 2377-A. When Severa died,
Andrea sued Angel to have the lots 2377-A and 2502
partitioned. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of
Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3 portion of Lot 2502.
The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa
because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass
to the donees during the donor’s lifetime but was transmitted
to the donees only ―upon the death of the donors‖. It,
however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since it was an
extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed to the SC,
Andrea contending that it is a donation inter vivos while
Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is a donation inter vivos
or mortis causa
RULING: Donation inter vivos
The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect
during the lifetime of the donors as provided in Art. 729. It was
stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by the
donors to the donees, the latter are donating wholeheartedly
and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and debt.
Likewise, it was accepted by the donees which is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa
are never accepted during the donor’s lifetime.
The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot
sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple is still alive implies
that the ownership already passed.
Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to
themselves the administration, ownership and rights over the
properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to
mean that ownership will pass only after their death. This
refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and
what the donors reserved to themselves by means of that
clause was the management of the donated lots and the fruits
thereof.
PAJARILLO VS IAC
Facts:Perfecta baleen died in 1945 leaving a 28-hectare lot.
Perfecta was survived bysister juana and brother felipe.May
1946 juana and felipe executed an Extrajudicial Sale of the
Estate of Perfecta, which states that Felipe and Juana agreed
to carryout the requests of perfecta that in consideration of her
love and affection it be donated to Salud whois the daughter
of Juana.June 1946 Salud executed the following public
instrument which states:
“that I salud the only done do hereby r
eceive and accept this donation and further express my
gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donors, felipe
and juana.1951, acceding to the request of her mother juana,
salud transferred possessionof the lot to her mother who was
them living w
ith Claudio salud’s brother and his
family. During the period they were occupying the land,
Claudio paid realty taxes.May 25, 1956 Juana executed a
deed of absolute sale conveying the land toClaudio for
12,000. Claudio had the land registered in his name and was
issuetct.1963, juana died.1965 salud filed a complaint for manifested in these separate instrument and aslater
reconveyance on the ground that deed of sale infavor of acknowledge and as latter acknowledged by juana.
Claudio was fictitious and its registration was null and
void.Claudio argues that the fact that acceptance was made in
separate instrumentwas not noted in both instruments as
required by the civil code.ISSUE: WON THE DONATION IS CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY VS. CA- Resolutory
VALIDHELD:YES.It is true that there is nothing in either of the Condition
two instruments showing thatauthentic notice of the
acceptance was made by salud to felipe. And while the
first instrument contains the statement that “the done does When a person donates land to another on the condition that
hereby accept this a construction be made, the condition is akin to a resolutory
donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the (not suspensive) one. The non-compliance to the condition
kindness and liberality of extinguishes the right to the donation, but it need not occur
the donor” the only signatories thereof were Felipe and first in order for the donation to be effected and validated.
Juana.. That was
in factthe reason for separate instrument f acceptance signed
by Salud a month
later. A strict interpretation of art 633 of the old civil code, can FACTS:
lead to no other conclusion that on the annulment of the In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the
donation for being defective in for. Thiswould be in keeping board of trustees of Central Philippine University when he
with the unmistakable language of art. 633. A literal executed a donation to the school, stating that the land must
adherence to the requirement of the law might result not be for exclusive use of a medical college. 50 years later, The
in justice to theparties but conversely a distortion of their heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul the donation,
intentions it is also a policy of the courtto avoid such an stating the failure of the school to construct the medical
interpretation.The purpose of the formal requirement is to college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of respondents,
insure that the acceptance of thedonation is duly which the CA affirmed.
communicated to the donor. Here it is not even, suggested
thatJuana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact
confirmed it later andrequested that the donated land be not
registered during her lifetime by salud.The donation cannot be ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition
declared ineffective just because there is no notation inthe
EJS of donees acceptance that would be placing too much
stress on mereform over the substance. It would also be
RULING:
disregard the clear reality of theacceptance of the donation as
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school
to construct a medical college would give the heirs the power
to revoke the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs
of the donor. It is therefore a resolutory condition. Although,
the period was not stated, and the courts should have fixed a
period, in this case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation
was executed, thus fixing a period would serve no purpose
and the property must already be reverted back.
Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the
obligations are unconditional, and the fulfillment, performance,
existence or extinguishment is not dependent on any future
and uncertain event. It is more accurate to say that the
condition stated is not a resolutory condition, rather a
obligation itself, being an onerous donation. Since this is an
onerous donation, it has to comply with the rules on Oblicon,
and therefore the courts should have fixed a period.
CITY OF ANGELES VS CA, TIMOG SILANGAN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 97882. 1996
In a Deed of Donation , private respondent donated to the City
of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated inBarrio Pampang, City
of Angeles (50,676 sq m). The amended deed provides that: “
The propertiesdonated shall be devoted and utilized solely for
the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Any changeor
modification in the basic design or concept of said Sports
Center must have the prior written consentof the DONOR.
The properties donated are devoted and described as ‘open
spaces’ of the DONOR’ssubdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases the
DONORand/or assumes any and all obligations and liabilities
appertaining to the properties donated.On 1988, petitioners
started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a
portion of the donatedland. Upon learning thereof,
private respondent protested such action for being violative of
the termsand conditions and also offered another site for
the rehabilitation center. However, petitionersrejected the
alternative because the site was too isolated and had no
electric and water facilities. Privaterespondent filed a
complaint for breach of the conditions imposed in the
amended deed of donationand seeking the revocation of the
donation.Petitioners admitted the commencement of
the construction but alleged that the conditions imposed inthe
amended deed were contrary to Municipal Ordinance No. 1,
Series of 1962, otherwise known as theSubdivision Ordinance
of the Municipality of Angeles.ISSUE: Whether a subdivision
owner/developer is legally bound under Presidential Decree
No. 1216 todonate to the city or municipality the “open space”
allocated exclusively for parks, playground andrecreational
use.HELD: PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines open
space as an area reserved exclusively for parks,playgrounds,
recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship,
hospitals, health centers, barangaycenters and other similar
facilities and amenities
.
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds andrecreational
use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable. No
portion of the parks andplaygrounds donated thereafter shall
be converted to any other purpose or purposes.’“Upon their
completion x xx, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds
shall be donated by the owneror developer to the city
or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local
government to accept;provided, however, that the parks and
playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association
of the project with the consent of the city or municipality
concerned. x xx.” (amended sec. 31, PD 957)It is clear
from the aforequoted amendment that it is no longer optional
on the part of the subdivisionowner/developer to donate the
open space for parks and playgrounds; rather there is now
a legalobligation to donate the same. Although there is a
proviso that the donation of the parks andplaygrounds may be
made to the homeowners association of the project with the
consent of the city of municipality concerned, nonetheless, the
owner/developer is still obligated under the law to
donate.Such option does not change the mandatory
character of the provision. The donation has to be
maderegardless of which donee is picked by the
owner/developer. The consent requirement before the
samecan be donated to the homeowners’ association
emphasizes this point.We hold that any condition may be
imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary
to law,morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. The contention of petitioners that the donationshould
be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in
law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that
the donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds
should be unconditional. To rule that itshould be so is
tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the
decree. In the case at bar, oneof the conditions imposed in
the Amended Deed of Donation is that the donee should build
a sportscomplex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly
requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross areaallotted for
parks and playgrounds is “non-buildable,” then the obvious
question arises whether or notsuch condition was validly
imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the “non-
buildable”character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set by
law. If there is any excess land over and above the3.5% to 9%
required by the decree, which is also used or allocated for
parks, playgrounds andrecreational purposes, it is obvious
that such excess area is not covered by the non-
buildabilityrestriction. Inasmuch as the construction and
operation of the drug rehabilitation center
has beenestablished to be contrary to law, the said center
should be removed or demolished. At this juncture,we hasten
to add that this Court is and has always been four-square
behind the government’s efforts toeradicate the drug scourge
in this country. But the end never justifies the means, and
however laudablethe purpose of the construction in question,
this Court cannot and will not countenance an outright
andcontinuing violation of the laws of the land, especially
when committed by public officials
EDUARTE V. CA- Revocation of Donation
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land.
He executed a deed of donation inter vivos of ½ of the land to
his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another
deed of donation inter vivos ceding the other ½ of the property
to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a protion of the lot (157
sqm) to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria
sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some 700
meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the
sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that
the deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria was
unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of
offense against the person, honor or property of donor [par.
1])
ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is
an act of ingratitude against Calapine (considering that
falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which
offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes of
revocation.” Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses
according to their classification under the RPC by deleting the
first sentence. However, this is unwarranted considering that
illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes
against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are
classified as crimes against personal liberty and security
under the RPC.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation
was deemed by the Court to be revocable. The Court applied
the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands were
registered lands and it has already passed from the forger
(Doria) to innocent purchasers for value (Eduarte, et al.).