STRATEGIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE AND NAVAL STRATEGY Tom Stefanicl Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies th Wy Fy 4j\ Ais Lexington Books D.C. Heath and Company/Lexington, Massachusetts/TorontoLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Pubtication Data Stefanick, Tom, Strategic antisubmarine warfare and naval strategy. Includes index. 1. Anti-submarine warfare, 2, Fleet ballistic missile ‘weapons systems. 3. Naval strategy. 4. Nuclear warfare. 5. Nuclear disarmament. 6. Underwater acoustics. I. Title. 214.874 1987 359.43 86-4596 ISBN 0-669-14015-5 (alk. paper) Copyright © 1987 by Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies All tights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher, Published simultaneously in Canada Printed in the United States of America Casebound International Standard Book Number: 0-669-14015-5 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 86-4596 ‘The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39,48-1984, en 87 8 8 909187654324You have seen a 688 class submarine. Ttis ¢ mean rooking machine. They are paranoid ‘about that big black submarine. ‘Adm. Kinnaird McKee Congressional testimony May 1984 ‘The Soviet Union will not allow any disruption of the present military-strategic balanes in peacetime, and in @ var it will always be ready to take crushing retaliatory action against any aggressor. G. M. Sturua «Strategic ASW: American Views and Policies” February 1985 It will come, Hramanity must perforce prey on itself Like monsters of the deep- William Shakespeare King Lear First performed in 1606Contents List of Figures ix List of Tables xiti List of Symbols xv Foreword xix Randall Forsberg, IDDS Acknowledgments xxiii 7 4. Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare 1 Introduction 1 Submarine Detection and Destruction 4 Potentials and Limits of Passive Acoustic Detection 8 Potentials and Limits of Nonacoustic Detection 15 Destruction of Submarines 25 United States ASW Threats to Soviet SSBNs 33 Soviet SSBN Operating Policy 33 ‘Area Search for Soviet SSBNs 35 Area Barrage against Soviet SSBNs 37 Acoustic Surveillance of Submarines 38 Acoustic Surveillance under the Ice 41 Trailing and Mining in Soviet Bastions 46 Soviet Defense of Bastions 53 Attrition to US Attack Submarines by Soviet Bastion Defenses 61 Summary of US ASW Threats to Soviet SSBNs_ 63 Soviet ASW Threats to US SSBNs 71 ‘Area Search, Trailing, and Surveillance against US Submarines 74 ‘Area Barrage against US SSBNs 76 Nonacoustic Surveillance of Submarines 76 Attacks on Soviet SSBNs to Tie Up Naval Forces 81 US Naval Strategy 82 Soviet Naval Strateg ‘The Interaction of 86 ind Soviet Naval Strategy 89vi + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare Attacks on Soviet SSBNs for Damage Limitation and War Termination 103 ‘The Roles of Strategic Submarines 103 Strategic ASW and Damage Limitation 106 Strategic ASW and War Termination 109 Summary and Recommendations 115 Technology 115 Strategic ASW Policy 120 Soviet Responses to US Strategic ASW: The Risk of Escalation 122 Nuclear Arms Control and ASW 124 Recommendations 126 Appendixes 129 1 4 The Design of Submarines 131 Pressure Hull and Outer Hull 133 Reactor, Steam, and Cooling Systems 138 Propulsion System 141 Submarine Communications 145 ASW Forces of the United States and the Soviet Union 155 Ballistic Missile Submarines 155 ASW Platforms and Systems 157 Soviet ASW Forces 158 US ASW Forces 166 Sonar Systems 171 SSBN Attrition 174 Nonacoustic Means of Submarine Detection 181 Observable Submarine Disturbances 181 Magnetic Anomaly Detection 184 Detection of Submarine-induced Bioluminescence 188 Detection of Surface Waves Generated by Submarines 192 Submarine-generated Turbulent Wakes and Internal Waves 197 Internal Wave Generation 199 Detection of Submarine-generated Temperature Changes 202 Detection of Submarines by Laser 204 Conclusions 210 The Oceans and Submarine Detection 217 Introduction 217 General Description of the Oceans 2195. Contents + vii Introduction to the Theory of Sound Transmission through Water 227 Acoustics in the Ocean 228 Sonar and Sonar Arrays 241 Sonar and the Passive Sonar Equation 241 Transmission Loss 243 Array Gain 247 Radiated Sound from Submarines and Ambient Noise in the Ocean 265 Characteristics and Origins of Submarine-generated Sound 265 Estimates of Submarine Source Levels 272 Ambient Noise 283 Detection of Submarine Signatures in Noise 293 Estimates of Sonar Detection Threshold 299 Detection Probability and Range to Target 305 Submarine Detection in the Arctic Ocean and Northern Seas 307 Climate and Oceanography 307 ‘Acoustic Oceanography of the Arctic Ocean and Adjacent Seas 324 ‘Acoustic Detection in the Southern Barents Sea 328 Acoustic Detection in the Northern Barents Sea 340 ‘Acoustic Detection in the Central Arctic Ocean 347 ‘Acoustic Detection in the Norwegian Sea 350 Acoustic Detection: General Conclusions and Tactical Considerations 357 Glossary 367 Index 371 About the Author 385 About the Institute 387 IDDS Publications 389List of Figures 1-1. 4-1. Al-1. Al-2. Al-3. A3-1. A3-2. A3-3. A3-4. A4l. A4-2. A4-3. A4-4. A4-5. A4-6. The electromagnetic spectrum 16 US attack submarine movements in forward areas 95 Interior layout of a US Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarine 132 ‘Schematic diagram of a typical current naval pressurized water reactor and propulsion system 139 Airborne network for missile submarine communications 148 Magnetic noise in an ASQ-10 MAD system due to a moderate magnetic storm, compared with a typical submarine-generated signal 187 Nondimensional shape of the near-field surface disturbance (Bernoulli hump) over a moving submarine (dimensions of the Ohio class) 194 The Kelvin wave pattern 196 The wake behind a submarine 198 Main features of an ocean basin, with greatly expanded vertical scale 220 Depths of the world ocean, including the continental shelf 221 Bathymetry of the Eurasian Arctic and adjoining seas 222 Bathymetry of the North Pacific Ocean 223 Average surface currents and bathymetry in the Arctic and adjoining seas 225 Average surface currents and bathymetry in the Pacific Ocean 226x A4-7. A4-8. A4-9, A4-10. A4-11. A4-12, A4-13, A4-14, AS5-1. AS-2. A5-3, A5-4, A5-5, A5-6, A5-7. A5-8. A5-9. A5-10. A6-1. * Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare Refraction of a sound wave passing through the interface of two layers with different sound speeds 229 Annual cycle of the seasonal thermocline in the North Pacific 231 Typical mean temperature/depth profiles in the open ocean showing the main thermocline 231 Derivation of the sound speed profile from temperature and depth dependence of sound speed 232 Ray diagram associated with a hypothetical sound speed profile 234 Velocity profile and the critical depth 236 Convergence zone prediction curves 238 Reflection and scattering from the rough ocean bottom 239 Schematic diagram of the passive sonar equation 244 Sound attenuation coefficient as a function of frequency, showing the regions of different dominant processes 245 Low-frequency attenuation in the northeast Pacific Ocean, showing regional dependence 246 A compilation of shallow water transmission loss observations from the literature 249 Directivity pattern of a sonar array 250 Using time delays to steer the sensitivity beam of a passive sonar array 258 Beam pattern and angular width of an array as a function of steering angle, frequency, and array length 260 Schematic diagram of localization error from sensors with finite beamwidth 261 Localization error for two sonar arrays with 2-3 degree beamwidth: Nearfield 262 Localization error for two sonar arrays with 2-3 degree beamwidth: Farfield 263 Vibration spectrum of a marine turbine generator, illustrating tonal components. Inset: Measured sound spectrum of a World War II submarine 267A6-2. A6-3. A6-4. A6-5. A6-6. A6-7. A7-1. A7-2. AT-3. A7-4. A7-5. A7-6. AT-7. A8-1. A8-2. A8-3. A8-4. A8-5. A8-6. A8-7. A8-8. A8-9. List of Figures + xi ‘Typical propeller cavitation spectrum 269 Noncavitation and cavitation noise from World War IT submarines 270 Effect of speed and depth on cavitation noise 270 Estimated broadband acoustic sound level of US and Soviet submarines 274 Estimate of US and Soviet submarine total radiated sound levels since 1958 278 Broadband sound level versus surfaced displacement 281 Possible states of a sonar detection/decision system 294 Sonar signal processing 295 Frequency analysis of a total signal, showing broadband ambient noise and narrowband signature “tonals” 296 Probability distributions of noise only and signature plus noise in a given frequency band 297 Nomograph for detecting processor sensitivity 300 ‘Threshold detector level versus false alarm probability 301 Adjustment to processor sensitivity for specific values of Puce and values of p;, for BT of 50 304 Maximum coverage of 4,200-nm-range submarine-launched. missiles fired from Soviet SSBN deployment areas 308 Location map of the Eurasian Arctic and adjoining seas 309 Average surface currents in the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents seas 312 ‘Surface water temperature in the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents seas, degrees Fahrenheit: Winter — Surface water temperature in the Norwegian, Greenland, and Barents seas, degrees Fahrenheit: Summer 314 Arctic ice concentration and extent: Winter 316 Arctic ice concentration and extent: Summer 317 General bathymetry in the Eurasian Arctic and adjoining seas 320 Bathymetry of the White Sea 321xii + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare ‘A8-10. Cross section of bathymetry and temperature from Greenland to Iceland: Summer and Winter 322 8-11. Cross section of bathymetry and temperature from Iceland to the Shetland Islands: Summer and Winter 323 A8-12. Typical sound speed profile and ray diagram in the central Arctic 327 A8-13. Transmission loss as a function of range in the central Arctic 330 A8-14. Transmission loss as a function of range in 600 to 900 feet of water under smooth annual ice, Parry Channel (Canadian Arctic) 331 ‘AB-15. Estimated detection range of narrowband signals in the southern Barents Sea in conditions unfavorable (lower limit) and favorable (upper limit) to detection 334 A8-16. Transmission loss as a function of range in ice-free water 900 feet deep, Parry Channel 338 8-17. Transmission loss as a function of range in 1,300 feet of water covered by pack ice in the Parry Channel 342 8-18. Estimated detection range of narrowband signals in the northern Barents Sea in conditions unfavorable (lower limit) and favorable (upper limit) to detection 344 A8-19. Estimated detection range of narrowband signals in the northern Barents Sea in conditions unfavorable (lower limit) and favorable (upper limit) to detection 346 A8-20. Estimated detection range of narrowband signals in the central Arctic Ocean in conditions unfavorable (lower limit) and favorable (upper limit) to detection 349 A8-21. Transmission loss in deep water 353 8-22, Estimated detection range of narrowband signals in the Norwegian Sea in conditions unfavorable (lower limit) and favorable (upper limit) to detection 354List of Tables Al-2. A2-1. A2-2. A2-3. A2-4. A2-5. A2-6. A2-7. | Yield-range combinations for achieving 590 psi overpressure underwater 27 | Estimated EMT required to create 590 psi overpressure throughout Soviet SSBN patrol areas 37 . Number of US attack submarines required to trail Soviet SSBNs 47 Detection-range advantage of US submarines over Soviet submarines 49 Passages into the Barents Sea: The Soviet Arctic bastion perimeter 55 . Passages into the Sea of Okhotsk from north to south 55 Minelaying capacity of older classes of Soviet naval vessels 56 Weight loads for carly nuctear submarines as percent of normal displacement/Weight and volume distribution by function in modern US submarines 135 Unclassified speed estimates and predicted speed from equation Al4 143 Soviet SSBN basing and warheads 156 NATO SSBN basing 157 Soviet attack and cruise missile submarine deployment | 159 Soviet surface ships and ASW capability 162 Soviet surface ship deployments 164 Approximate deployment of Soviet ASW aircraft 164 Characteristics of Soviet and US ASW aircraft 165xiv * Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare . Active US nuclear and attack submarines (mid-1985) 167 US surface combatants (active) 168 Some nonacoustic methods of submarine detection 185 3-2. Optical transmission loss as a function of submarine depth 190 ‘3-3. Signal-to-noise ratios for bioluminescence detector at the sea Surface for various sky conditions and source depths 191 A3-4. Height of the near-field wave (Bernoulli hump) 195 3-5. Maximum far-field wave height due to a moving submarine (equation A3.4) 197 A4-1. Average vertical temperature, salinity, and sound speed Sradients in the upper 1,000 meters at middle latitude 230 AS-1. Shallow water transmission loss equations and coefficients 248 A5-2. Summary of coherence length data 254 A6- 6-2. Ambient noise levels due to wind/waves 286 Ambient noise levels due to shipping and drilling 285 A6-3. Ambient noise due to rain 287 A6-4. Ambient noise levels under ice 288 A8-1, Arctic wind speed percentage distribution, winter (February) 311 8-2. Arctic wind speed percentage distribution, summer (August) 311 A8-3. Percentage occurrence of Arctic cloudiness and precipitation, winter (January) 311 AB-4. Percentage occurrence of Arctic cloudiness and precipitation, summer (July) 311 A8-5. Population density of large whales in the Arctic 324 A8-6. Relative change in detection range due to a 1dB change in the figure of merit 361List of Symbols om & 8 a ee ee eS Surface area of a submarine Approximately half the length of a submarine (App. 3) Mutual kill probability (Chp. 2) Processor bandwidth (A7.2) Hull shape coefficient (A1.3) Probability of clean blue kill (Chp. 2) Speed of sound in seawater Speed of light Surface friction coefficient Submarine hull diameter (A1.3; A3.1) Detector threshold level (App. 7) Hydrophone separation Exchange ratio Center frequency of narrowband Nearfield wave shape function Acceleration of gravity Separation of sonar arrays for triangulation Depth of submarine centerline Acoustic intensity Threshold for detectionxvi + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare hh 22s = = n(t) PHT) Pee Pmax Perms Constant in propulsion equation Wavenumber Length of submarine (App. 1) Length of sonar array (App. 5) Length of submarine-generated waves Difference between two intensities in decibels Number of hydrophones in an array Average noise power per Hz Integer number (A3.4) Geometric spreading factor (n = 2 is spherical) (App. 5) Noise signal Maximum propeller shaft horsepower Instantaneous pressure Probability of detection Probability of false alarm Maximum pressure Root mean squared pressure Correlation coefficient Sound transmission range Correlation distance Probability of clean red kill Signal from hydrophone Average signal power per Hz Signature of target Processor averaging time Brunt-Vaisili period Wave period Round-trip travel time of laser pulse between ocean surface and submarineList of Symbols + xvii t Time U Speed of submarine 0 Average total signal power per Hz u(o) Total signal W(U,D,h) __ Nearfield wave scaling function x Distance Greek Symbols « Acoustic attenuation coefficient by, 1(%50) Nearfield surface elevation on centerline 1,0) Farfield surface elevation on centerline 1” Propeller efficiency 6 Angle » Acoustic wavelength 7 3.14159... p Density of seawater & Noise variance as Variance of signature plus noise we ‘Average power per HzForeword Randall Forsberg Executive Director Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies Tom Stefanick has performed an exceptionally useful service for all concerned with the issues of peace and arms control: He has identified the major differ- ences between the United States and the Soviet Union in the vulnerability of strategic submarines (SSBNs) and in strategy and forces for conducting stra- tegic antisubmarine warfare (ASW). For too long, Western analysts have tended to assume, without hard evi- dence, that Soviet SSBNs, like their US counterparts, were virtually invulner- able to detection. The first detailed, unclassified study to investigate this critical assumption, Stefanick’s work shows that throughout the past 30 years, Soviet SSBNs have been much more vulnerable to detection than US SSBNs. Stefanick’s study also shows that threatening Soviet strategic submarines has been a deliberate part of US naval strategy. Among other things, there are plans to send US attack or “hunter-killer” submarines, which are quieter than their Soviet quarry, into areas near Soviet SBN ports. There they can, in theory, detect, trail, and destroy exiting submarines of all types, ignoring the risks that would be involved in attacking SSBNs. Alternatively, they could be directed to discriminate by sound signature between strategic and nonstrategic submarines and limit their attacks to the latter. The vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs has undoubtedly had a profound impact on other aspects of Soviet policy. It has certainly increased Soviet reliance on land-based ICBMs. It has probably made the Soviet Union reluc- tant to accept fully symmetrical quantitative limits on strategic forces. Together with other factors, it may have influenced the size and composition of the Soviet general purpose Navy, which is designed in part to provide defensive barriers around SSBN deployment regions. (The US Navy has no counterpart to this mission.) For years, the goal of arms control has been to increase crisis stability — making the use of nuclear weapons in a war or crisis extremely unlikely—while the goal of US nuclear policy has been to make escalation to acts of nuclear warfighting plausible, in order to help deter an East-West conventional war.xx + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare Strategic ASW is just one of the varied means of implementing the long- standing US policy of extended deterrence. Perhaps more than any other fea- ture of US nuclear-warfighting capability, however, strategic ASW tends to crode the firebreak between nuclear and conventional war. For clandestinely destroying a strategic submarine carrying up to 200 nuclear warheads, using a Conventional torpedo fired from an attack submarine, blurs the st arp line that we typically draw in our imaginations between nuclear and conventional war. Given the risk that strategic ASW might lead to a general nuclear war, it is reassuring to learn from Stefanick’s study that the vulnerability of Soviet SSBNS is declining. For some time it has been widely known that Soviet SSBNs became somewhat less vulnerable to detection in the 1970s, when long-range missiles allowed them to begin operating in shallow northern seas, instead of mid-ocean areas, where the deep sound channel can carry submarine noise for hundreds of miles. The new evidence assembled by Stefanick indicates that Soviet SSBNs have become even less vulnerable in the 1980s, and are likely to continue the trend in the 1990s. This is due to increased Soviet emphasis on submarine quieting, and diminishing returns to the US submarine quieting and sonar programs, as they approach the physical limits of achievement. Stefanick concludes with several recommendations for US policymakers. He Proposes that the US Congress mandate a study of the control of strategic ASW. He argues that the United States should stop contemplating threats to Soviet strategic submarines as an indirect means of forcing the USSR to end a conventional war. He observes that although in the near future Soviet general- Purpose naval forces, especially new, quiet submarines, may be tied down defending SSBNs, this is unlikely to be so in the next century, given steady improvements in Soviet SSBNs. He concludes that such “tie down” should not be assumed in planning future US naval forces. Stefanick also points out that in order to strengthen US ASW capabilities against the increasingly quiet Soviet submarines of both types (strategic and general purpose), greater empha~ sis must be given to “distributed” airborne and fixed systems. Such systems will do much more to improve tactical ASW, aimed at defending the sea lanes across the Atlantic and the Pacific, than to strengthen capabilities for strategic ASW. Stefanick’s concluding recommendations stress technical developments and Policy changes that tend to improve US military or naval efficiency while reducing the far forward ASW operations that threaten strategic submarines. Similarly, Stefanick’s analysis of potential bilateral arms control measures to reduce or prevent strategic ASW stresses incentives for the US Navy to agree. He argues, for example, that limiting the ratio of each side’s SSNs relative to the opponent’s SSBNs might be “in US interest” because the United States “will be facing a decline in its technical advantage” over Soviet SSNs; and he dismisses SSBN sanctuaries on the grounds that they would release Soviet general purpose forces for other uses and would not benefit the already secure US SSBNs.Foreword * xxi ‘The most basic point raised by Stefanick’s study is whether the conduct of strategic ASW in a time of severe crisis or conventional war will increase the risk of a general nuclear war. Although concerned about this possibility, Stefan- ick concludes that US attacks with conventional weaponry on Soviet strategic submarines are not likely to provoke the use of nuclear weapons by the USSR, for several reasons: large-scale Soviet nuclear attacks on US cities would be suicidal; Soviet nuclear attacks on US aircraft carriers carrying nuclear weap- ons would not be necessary to sink or disable the carriers; and use of Soviet nuclear weapons against US attack submarines or other naval forces might start a tactical nuclear war near Soviet territory. ‘These points are plausible. The firebreak between conventional and nuclear war may hold, even if many Soviet strategic submarines are sunk by US forces in a war, because Soviet use of nuclear weapons is not a rational response. However, in a time of war or crisis, control and information will be in short supply, and responses may not be fully rational. Thus, in assessing the impact of strategic ASW, it is important to ask not only whether it will make the use of nuclear weapons igely, but also whether it will make the use of nuclear weap- ons more likely than if threats to Soviet strategic submarines were assiduously and explicitly avoided. Even if we accept Stefanick’s view that US strategic ASW during a conventional war will not make Soviet use of nuclear weapons likely, we must allow that it may make Soviet use of nuclear weapons more likely than it would be otherwise. In fact, US attacks on the Soviet strategic nuclear reserve, in the heat of battle and with incomplete information, are almost certain to increase tension, confrontation, fear, suspicion, and hostility in a way that will pull the Soviet nuclear tripwire tighter than it might be otherwise. Since US wartime conduct of strategic ASW will almost certainly increase the risk of a general nuclear war—even if it does not make a general nuclear war likely—policy recommendations in this area should look beyond the narrow “interest” of the United States as defined by pre-nuclear military standards to the broader global, US, and even post-nuclear military interest in avoiding a nuclear war. The standard of minimizing the risk of nuclear war—which should be the bottom line of every policy in the nuclear age—suggests that the United States, the Soviet Union, and the international community should all support stringent bilateral limits on the SSN-SSBN ratio—preferably less than one, certainly no more than one—and should adopt peacetime practices and wartime rules of engagement that provide SSBN sanctuaries in areas contiguous to SSBN ports. These strategic ASW arms control measures may conflict with other inter- ests of the United States, NATO, the US Navy, and, indeed, of the Soviet Union. And they may raise problems in regard to implementation (c.g., whether to count allied SSNs in the ratio) and enforcement (what to do if an agreed sanctuary area is violated). But the conflicting interests and the practical prob- Jems can and should be subordinated to the general interest in minimizing the risk of nuclear war. In force design, in warplans, and in peacetime deployments,xxii + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare threats to the opponent’s strategic submarines should be strictly avoided. The US Navy should be directed to follow this policy by the US civilian leadership; and the international community should press the US civilian leadership to adopt the policy. This difference on concluding policy recommendations concerns an important but small part of Stefanick’s impressive study. The appendixes cover a truly extraordinary range of relevant technical material, which they digest and expli- cate clearly for the nonexpert. The analytical chapters of the main text clarify many poorly understood connections not only between strategic and tactical ASW, but also between nuclear and conventional war, between naval and land warfare, and between offensively oriented and defensively oriented naval forces. In sum, Stefanick’s work represents a major advance in the unclassified literature on nuclear policy, on naval strategy, and on antisubmarine warfare. Perhaps most important for the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Stefanick’s study provides an essential piece of the technical foundation, Previously lacking, needed to develop sound alternative defense policies. One component of such policies must be to dismantle the huge, dangerous panoply of US and Soviet nuclear-warfighting forces, built up over the past 30 years, cutting back to small, stable minimum or finite deterrent forces. Because stra- tegic submarines are less vulnerable than other nuclear forces, they are the preferred candidate for carrying the residual force, after other nuclear systems are abolished, Whether or not they are adequately invulnerable to comprise the only remaining nuclear forces, on both sides, and for how long are important questions that Stefanick’s thorough, meticulous study will help answer.Acknowledgments technical and editorial skills were extremely helpful in turning this project from a “study” into a manuscript, Dr. Robert Urick spent many hours answering my questions about under- I am very grateful to Josie Stein for her help and encouragement. Her the Net Assessment Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense offered Probing and valuable comments on an earlier draft Charles Glaser, Peter Hayes, Robert Aldridge, and Frank von Hippel reviewed parts of the manuscript at an early stage, and afl raised points which found their way into the final version. Capt. James Bush offered useful insights on submarine operations. Jan Breemer shared data from hic files on subma- Institute during that Period made the work Possible: the CS Fund, the Max and Anna Levinson Foundation, the Rockefeller Family Fund, Alan Kay, Hayward Alker, Jr., Stewart Rawlings Mott, several major individual donors Randall Forsberg for initially suggesting the Project, and for supporting it f scope and definition.xxiv + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare “The Federation of American Scientists supported the project in 1986, during the final stages of editing and preparing the book for publication. I am grateful to Jeremy Stone for generously allowing me the time to complete the work. We were both surprised at how long the “finishing touches” took. ‘Computer support at IDDS was provided by Bart Wright. Word processing and in-house editing were performed by Deb Mapes, Nancy Piore, Amy Lus- tig, and Sarah Leinbach.1 Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare Introduction In the United States, missiles on submarines at sea are considered the most survivable strategic nuclear force, and submarines carry about as many nuclear sai peads ag ICBMs and bombers combined. Soviet submarines are considered to be more vulnerable, and for geographical, technical, and bureaucratic rea- sone submarines carry a smaller portion of Soviet strategic warheads A concept from arms control theory closely associated with survivability is that of crisis stability: the reluctance of each side to launch strategic weapons in crisis when itis clear that the opponent will retain enough nuclear weapons 9 + saliate with an intolerable blow, in the perception of the side that might have to bear the retaliation, This form of stability increases with the survivability of the weapons on both sides. The quintessentially unstable situation is one in a vie all strategic nuclear weapons on each side are vulnerable to rapid and wtal destruction, As long as leaders on each side believe that some portion of veer own and the opponent's forces are invulnerable, some measure of crisis stability is preserved. This is the context in which the question of submarine vulnerability is usually posed: “Can enough strategic submarines survive a preemptive attack to deter the use of any strategic nuclear weapons 18 a preemptive first strike?” The requirements of a sudden, totally disarming strike against missile submarines (SSBNs) are extremely stringent. Such a strike must be coordi ated with attacks on land-based missiles and bombers; virtually all submarines aust be destroyed, since the nuclear warheads on just a few submarines could destroy many targets on the homeland; and the entire attack must be very rapid. Moreover, the planning and preparation for such an attack must be cement, These requirements place a huge demand on command and control systems and on general purpose naval forces, which would have t0 be diverted from other missions to this one. The coordination requirement alone rules out such an attack, since the time needed for one side’s ICBMs to attack the other’s is just 30 minutes, while the time needed for one side’s antisubmarine forces to2 + Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare detect, localize, tral, and destroy the other's submarines could be on the order of days or weeks. The time allowed for this process can be reduced—but then the likelihood of finding and destroying all of the opponent's submarines diminishes. A disarming or damage-limiting strike becomes more plausible, however, if attacks on strategic submarines are carried out in an extended campaign of attrition prior to attacks against land-based forces. Morcover, the likelfhecd that World War IIT would begin as a conventional war intreduces period during which such an attrition campaign could be waged. In seenarins involv- ing a protracted conventional war, for example, in east Asia or Europe, US naval forces would attack a wide range of targets, including bomber bases, shipyards, surface ships, aireraft, submarines, and their bases. In the course of, Such attacks, missile submarines at sea and in their hardened bases could be attacked by mines, torpedoes, and missiles, ‘The Soviet Navy is extremely unlikely to find even one US strategic sub- marine at sca. The US Navy, in contrast, has a good chance of finding at least a few Soviet missile submarines, and given time perhaps more than few The US Navy plans to take advantage of this capability by trailing some Soviet SSBNs in peacetime, and destroying them immediately upon the outbreoe of conventional war. In addition, some Soviet SSBNs would Probably be de- Stroyed by US mines or by US attack submarines operating “far forward,” engaged in a random search for Soviet submarines, This raises several important questions: How much capability does the be willing to invest in defending the missile submarines? There are four interlocking objectives that might be achieved by a partial US strike (or threatened strike) against Soviet missile submarines, The first is significantly limiting damage to the United States—that is, eliminating at least some of the weapons that can strike the United States. Without nearly complete climination of the Soviet submarines and all other strategic forces, however, an axtemp* to limit damage is of questionable value for protecting population in an era of massive overkill. A second potential objective is to help win a conventional war by means of 2 strategy of “horizontal escalation,” in which a stalemate or US disadvantageStrategic Amtisubmarine Warfare * > states. If the forces needed to carry out that mission are deliberately threatened by the United States in response (0 Soviet actions elsewhere, implying that continued hostilities will lead to the loss ‘of more and more submarines, this Tay create pressure to end hostilities or t© ‘concede some other political objec ive, History suggests, however, that the calculated responses, risks, and bene~ fits of such an indirect strategy are highly uncertain, and that horizontal csealation can backfire in many ways.) 'h third potential objective of threatening partial destruction of the Soviet strategic submarine fleet is to provide the US Navy with conventional advan- tage at sea. Given the high priority of the strategic reserve mission in the Soviet Navy the threat to destroy strategic submarines of their actual destruction may reasonably be expected to elicit a defensive response. Uncertain as to the mag- nitude of the threat, the Soviet leaders, some ‘US planners believe, would tend to overestimate it and would allocate # disproportionately large part of their general-purpose naval forces to Miefend their strategic submarines. The basic principle is that an unknown threat (© a highly valued asset can produce @ magnified response because of uncertainty, a principle loosely referred to #8 leverage. In the words of Adm. Kinnaird R. McKee, director of the Nuclear Propulsion Program: In acrisis, fear of our attack submarines ties 9P Soviet naval and air forces that might otherwise be used against Our NATO resupply, in support of a land Campaign in Europe, or against our own supply lines. What we would most Tike to do is insert such uncertainty inte ‘Soviet estimates that they will be aicrerved from executing their war plans in the first place? ‘The major concern of the US Navy in confrontations between US and Soviet general-purpose forces is the large Soviet fleet of attack submarines armed with torpedoes or cruise missiles. The Navy hopes to “tie up” many of these vessels, so as to lessen the porentia) threat to US aircraft carriers—a threat that is growing as Soviet attack ‘submarines are built with quieter propulsion machinery. At the same time, reducing the number of Soviet attack submarines in the North Atlantic and North Pacific eases the burden of protecting the in teime sea lines of communication to Europe and Japan. “The aim of “tying up” the Soviet fleet ‘during conventional war is to gain sufficient use of the sea, so that the Soviet Teadership will be unlikely to be able to stop the resupply of allies (these scenarios assume a long conventional war). ‘according to Navy officials this prospect is expected to inhibit the Soviet ‘Union from going to war in the first place and from directly interfering with the United States in regions of competing intere’ "The fourth objective of threatening Soviet SSBNS is to apply leverage a the strategic nuclear level. The Soviet Teadership is sufficiently concerned “bout the survivability of its sea-based strareBi° forces that it has dedicated an4° Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare Version of the third objective.3 This study addresses Strategic antisubmarine warfare in two basic contexts: the threat ofa preemptive disarming first Strike by either side against the other, abit ete has been relatively litte analysis in he open literature on the vulner. ability of Soviet submarines, The remainder of chapter 1 outlines the various means of attacking strate- Submarine Detection and Destruction There are several essential tasks involved in destroying a submarine: detection, classification, localization toa small area, and destruction. Detection may provideStrategic Antisubmarine Warfare © 5 very little information or a great deal, depending on the circumstances under hich it is made. At one extreme, if the Nietection information is, say, that Submarine has passed through a strait from one &°% to another, antisubmarine a_i task in localizing it. At the other wNereme, if a submarine enters an area fully monitored by a network of detec- fon devices, it may be detected and tracked continuously. If the initial detec” tion is made using a few long-range sensor: that give only a rough indication of where the submarine is located, then additional effort will be needed to pin point it. Ifa detection system comprising many widely distributed, short ring vensors is used, then the detection and focalization will be simultancous. At ome point in the process of detecting and localizing a submarine, itis usual tO Classify it by country, type, and class, ‘Once a submarine is located and sufficient information about it has been gathered, it may be attacked. If the Tocalization is very precise and if the submarine can be attacked promptly, a ‘mall weapon such as a torpedo may have a high probability of destroying it If che Jocation of the submarine will be Tess certain by the time the weapon arrives, then the attacking forces must use several weapons, or a far more powerful weapons Mf ‘a weapon that can seck out the target. Modern navies take all three approaches: Soviet surface ships use short-range, rocket-propelled conventional depth charges in barrages; both the United States and the Soviet Union have rnuclear-tipped ship- and submarine- taanched weapons; and both sides use homing torpedoes of various types.