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Welfare regime transformation in Indonesia: A

sketch of citizenship debate


Tauchid Komara Yuda
Social development & welfare undergraduate program, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta.
Email: tauchid.komara.y@mail.ugm.ac.id

Abstrak

Artikel ini akan mendiskusikan topik rezim kesejahteraan di Indonesia dengan menggunakan
kerangka citizenship. Diargumentasikan bahwa transformasi rezim kesejahteraan Indonesia dari
karakteristik rezim productivist menuju universalisme telah terdisrupsi oleh wacana communitarian
citizenship dan market citizenship yang telah menjadi path-dependency pada rangkaian konfigurasi sistem
kesejahteraan Indonesia kontemporer. Hal ini telah menjadi faktor endogen yang menghambat
inovasi dan perubahan kelembagaan sistem perlindungan sosial universal. Dengan menggunakan
berbagai data dari pengalaman Indonesia, artikel ini pada akhirnya dapat memberikan pemahaman
tentang peliknya hubungan antara distribusi kesejahteraan dan wacana kewargaan dalam konteks
negara-negara berkembang.

Abstract

This article discusses Indonesian welfare regime outlook by using citizenship framework. It is
argued that transformation of Indonesian welfare regime from productivist characteristic to
universalism has been disrupted by the discourse of communitarian citizenship and market
citizenship that has become path-dependency of welfare configuration in contemporary Indonesia.
This circumstance has become an endogenous factor that obstructs innovations and changes
within an administrative body of universal social protection. By using evidences from Indonesia
experiences, this article can be used to develop a further understanding on the complexity of
relations between welfare provision and citizenship in the context of developing countries.

Keywords: welfare regime; citizenship; social policy; Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional (SJSN);
developing countries

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INTRODUCTION
Following the period of democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia began its transformation
toward a process of universalization of social protection that was marked by the enactment of
National Social Security System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional–SJSN) act no. 40 of 2004, which was
followed by the implementation of Social Security Administrative Body (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan
Sosial– BPJS) in 2014. Nevertheless, studies on welfare regime, both theoretically and empirically
are still received scant attention. Some studies on welfare regime in Indonesia (Croissant, 2004;
Gough, 2013; Ramesh, 2000; Torheim, 2013; Tribowo & Bahagijo, 2006; Sumarto, 2017) were
mostly confined in political-economical approach, that stressed on the dynamics of macro
economy and the shifts of political power as determinant factor to the construction of social policy
characteristics. Consequently, in-depth discussion on citizenship approach as its format of inherent
alternative analysis to the series of discussion on welfare regime in Indonesia eventually being
disregarded. A citizenship approach offers a contextual analysis that looks at the comprehensive
range of factors including values, ideational perspective, and the notions of people’s everyday life
as a critical part of the social order that collectively represent ethical considerations in the contexts
of social policy-making and its implementation. Specifically, the citizenship analysis within this
article is positioned as the analytical framework to identify how a state visualizes its citizens,
followed by discussions on power relations constructed between the state and its citizens. Those
two substances have a correlation to the expressions given by the state related to the fulfilment of
citizen’s rights, including social protection.

This article aims to reconstruct ideas of social citizenship in social welfare distribution in
domestic context, and started from hypothesis which states the main problem of transformation
of welfare regime in Indonesia might not be on how far it can actually bring fundamental changes
to the citizens to access their social rights, but on to what extent this transformation has gained
the legitimacy from the society in their everyday life. As a matter of fact, the mainstreaming of
social citizenship that was claimed to be achieved through universal coverage system encounters
some resistances from non-state institutions that are attributed by discourses of communitarian
citizenship and market citizenship.

Reflecting on an empirical case: a number of citizens that demand their rights of social
protection, yet reluctant to participate and contribute to the BPJS scheme have caused a financial
deficit problem (see section 3). This case was not only about pragmatic citizens, as most normative
assumptions would claim, yet it is about the absence of citizen’s willingness to trust the social risks
management to the government. To obtain detailed illustrations on the absence of willingness, we
have to investigate the genealogy of Indonesian welfare regime since Soeharto's reign (1966–1998),
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wherein it was attributed by political process and economical system as historical components that
constructed discourses of market citizenship and communitarian citizenship in the context of
social protection. Adaptations of market citizenship and communitarian citizenship had shaped
path-dependency for many years (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This situation becomes an endogenous
factor that hampers the transformation of welfare regime toward universal model. In fact, the
transformation requires individuals to convert their former imaginary citizenship status into social
citizenship, which means, the status comes with requirements to divert their “willingness” from
“family/community” and “private insurance companies” to the state in forms of compulsory dues.
Of course, this is not an easy task. In European welfare states, convert of imaginary citizenship
status to social citizenship had been ‘completed’ during industrialization period (Marshall, 2009).
This argument is supported by some studies (Esping-Andersen, 1999; 1990; Cox, 2004; Gough,
2004; 2013) that confirm the existence of cross-class coalition in supporting and maintaining
universal social protection program provided by the state. The emergence of this class coalition is
not ahistorical, but based on the long historical genealogy and also different contexts compared to
developing countries (Gough, 2004; Pierson, 2001).

To gain further understanding of this topic, after the research method section, I will
develop an understanding of how citizenship approach contributes to the wider-ranging role series
of welfare regime discussion, that began by reviewing the concept of East Asia and South East
Asia welfare regime model as a loop to look at Indonesian cases.

RESEARCH METHOD

The main objective of this article was to reconstruct ideas of social citizenship in social
welfare distribution in domestic (Indonesia) context. Data for this study were collected using
systematic review methodology. It is a quality-focused approach to summarising the existing
empirical shreds of evidence or studies to response to the main research objective (Petticrew &
Roberts, 2008). It was considered that this method would usefully to reviewing and synthesising
perspective in order to highlight future research agendas, and develop theoritical advancements,
for understanding the complexity of relations between welfare provision and citizenship in the
context of developing countries by using Indonesian evidences.

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WELFARE REGIME AND CITIZENSHIP

The concept and development of welfare regime in East Asia and South East Asia Countries
Welfare regime is understood as a set of institutional arrangements in political, economical,
and social field, which influences how public goods are produced and managed through
constellation between welfare actors, for later be distributed in form of social policy within a
particular welfare system (Gough, 2004; 2013; Powell & Barrientos, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 1991).
A study on welfare regime was initially proposed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990), in his
influential book entitled The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Esping-Andersen classifies that
welfare regime into three typologies i.e social-democratic, liberal-Anglo Saxon and corporatist.
Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen’s typology has been a significant area of debate in beyond
European and Northern American continental territories. Especially in Asia, its democratic
institutions, values system, and capitalistic models have different historical genealogy (Walker &
Wong, 2005; Fleckenstein & Lee, 2017; Gough, 2004; Holiday & Wilding, 2003; Hong, 2008). For
example, the social solidarity principle without equality, the growing patron-client politics, laissez-
faire without libertarianism and the development of household economy-based capitalism (Jones,
1993; Papadopoulos & Roumpakis, 2017).

In addition, informal institution, such as kinship-based institution, still holds an alternative


role that goes hand in hand with state and market institutions as the basis of social welfare
provision (Chan, 2008; Walker & Wong, 2005; Shin & Shaw, 2003; Croissant, 2004). These cases
can be illustrated briefly by looking at East Asia region (Japan, South Korea, China and Hongkong
SAR) and in some parts of South East Asia region (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia).
One of the fundamental ideas on social policy within this areas is productivist welfare regime
(Aspalter, 2006; Holiday & Wilding, 2003; Powell & Barrientos, 2004; Walker & Wong, 2005).
According to this body of literature, social policy was utilized as a supporting components of
economic development including development of business and investment climate as well as
building political legitimacy and loyalty toward regime in power. To support the status-quo, the
government weakened labor union (Holiday, 2000). The prominent characteristics of this regime
is the very low allocation of public expenditure toward welfare programs, and only focusing on
health and education as social investment to boost the productivity and participation toward
market labor (Aspalter, 2006; Cook & Kwon, 2007). The social protection is segmented between
variety of social groups, such as military and civil servants, while for non-governmental employees,
the social protection scheme is focused on two mechanisms: first, market provision, which is based

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on limited social insurance or provident fund. Secondly, family or community based scheme, which
works by redistribution and reciprocity.

The forming element of welfare regime discussed earlier is still related to dominations of
traditional values, such as Confucianism (Cook & Kwon, 2007; Jones, 1993) which has been
strongly rooted in the structure of Asia society. One of the emphases is on obedience toward
hierarchies, collectivism, and kinship that has been institutionalized in Asian society’s social
structure. This basic principle appears to be the constructor of power relations between the state
and its citizens, which also places the leader of the state as high as deputy God, while the citizens
have to be loyal and obedient to the government. Besides, these Confucian principles which are
very patriarchal (Shin & Shaw, 2003) have also legitimated the strong dependency to family as the
provider of social welfare services and social services provided by housewives (Cook & Kwon,
2007). In the later development, welfare regime in Asia had discourse shift from productivist
welfare to universal, redistributive, and inclusive after global monetary crisis in 1997-1998. The
shift was also encouraged by intense dissemination of discourse Millennium Development Goals
that now have been converted to Sustainable Development Goals, injected globally by
international agency (Kühner, 2015; Mok & Hudson, 2014). In Indonesia context, the emergence
of SJSN, which later on was implemented in BPJS ‘is a mark of a critical shift in Indonesian welfare
regime towards the universal model’ (Yuda, 2018, p. 9), with current of German corporatism.

Welfare regime and the construction of citizenship discourse


Many forms of welfare regime embraced by a state in its practice of social policy making
can be seen as basis of epistemology to identify: first, how a state visualize its citizens? And second,
what kind of citizenship that is being constructed? Those two substances will eventually influence
the power relations constructed between the state and its citizens as well as the way the state
regards citizens’ rights and the fulfillments procedures through instruments of social policy.

The discussion on concepts of citizenship will typically refer to Th. Marshall, a scholar that
succeeded in giving comprehensive illustration on citizenship concept. In his work entitled
Citizenship and Social Class, he contends that citizenship as a thorough status given to every single
member of a society within sovereign areas of a state. With that status, every citizen has obligations
to the state and is guaranteed of their basic rights. Based on that understanding, Marshall described
the dimensions in details on what makes an individual’s existence admitted as a citizen, i.e civil
citizenship, political citizenship, and social citizenship (Marshall, 2009).

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Civil citizenship is a form of ‘freedomness’ for citizens to make opinions, to express their
idea, to embrace certain faiths, to pursuit their personal goals and to be treated equally. Meanwhile,
political citizenship is formed by implementations of democratic values, such as provision of
political sites that allows public to participate in controlling the power, secured freedom of politics
and establishment of political parties, legal assurance to press freedom, as well as participation in
public affair. The next one is social citizenship, an assurance of social rights fulfillment including
social and welfare protection that are realized through social policy. It also becomes the
epistemological demarcation between social policy studies and epistemology of other fields of
studies related to citizenship studies, which emphasizes more on civil and political citizenship
aspects (Deacon, 2007).

The concept of social citizenship does not appear out of nowhere but the historicity
embedded in European society’s development, which experienced transformation of communal
landscape characteristics toward individualism, as the result of family dislocation and work
relationship, as well as the dependency over commodification throughout the industrialization
period. Along with it, social risks caused by the industrialization, such as health, environment,
economy, work accidents, etc. are heightened. Consequently, the demand of social risks
management is increased as well. However, it cannot be managed through community system or
kinship because the institutions began to be distant. Meanwhile, if it is managed through private
scheme, it can only be managed as long as the individual has adequate financial capability. The
condition eventually demands discourse that asserts the only way to avoid every social risk is
fulfillment of human rights by the state through social policies funded by either dues or tax. The
state assures, whilst the citizens contribute. That kind of understanding is the one called as social
contract, which is also the main foundation to the development of social citizenship discourses
(Isin & Turner, 2002; Marshall, 2009).

Yet, in liberal welfare regime, the idea of social citizenship has logical understanding closer
to the concept of market citizenship. Because the citizens’ right of social protection has just been
granted after the mechanism of market has failed to bring welfare, instead of a political response
over social risk occurred as the effect of market’s destructiveness (Mas'udi & Hanif, 2011). This
understanding of market citizenship refers to the citizens that are defined as independent entity in
terms of public goods access (Mulhall & Swift, 1992). The role of the state is only to assure that
individual rights to make choice over their lives are fulfilled. According to Rawls (Gaventa & Jones,
2000), in market citizenship, good society can only be achieved through assurance of individual
interests, protection over it, and release it from any individual obstacle.

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What is called as rights in market citizenship is the access to fundamental needs and
resources instead of social protection as concerned in social citizenship. Access is regarded as
rights that are more important compared to the fundamental needs and resources itself. It is based
on the principle of freedom, that has to be granted entirely to each citizen. ‘Freedomness’ will
provide an opportunity for citizens to fulfil their socioeconomic needs, to be used later on the
basis of achieving individual needs more freely (Putri, 2012; Mas'udi & Hanif, 2011; Mulhall &
Swift, 1992).

Apart from those two constructions of citizenship, which were established in developed
countries, there is one construction of citizenship, that becomes characteristic of distinguishable
social formation in developing countries, that is communal citizenship. Communal citizenship is
often used interchangeably with the term communitarian. Communitarian citizens itself refers to
entities that are connected emotionally, has collective interests and then manages multiple aspects
of life collectively to fulfill public goal for the society (Etzioni, 2011). The collectivity values are
the core of communitarian. Collectivity becomes the basis of community to act for or in the name
of entities, language, religion, gender, ideology, geographical border, diversity of natural resources,
etc. (Putri, 2012). The strong character of welfare regime embracing communitarian is the
provision of social policy, which is realized in forms of improvement of social community’s
immunity from many destructive externality. The examples of it include the programs of
community empowerment wherein the recipients are community which is oriented on common
virtue, instead of individual. Hall dan Midgley (2004), see this characteristic as a populist approach,
in which the method of welfare distribution requires the involvement of citizens with certain
identity as well as the values included in the implementation of the social policy. Table 1 is the
summary of correlations between forms of welfare regime embraced, narrative of social policies
implemented, and construction of citizenship discourses provided.

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Table. 1 Correlations Between Forms of Welfare Regime and the Construction of Citizenship
Discourses

Forms of welfare regime Narrative of social policy Construction of citizenship


implemented discourses provided
Universal and egalitarian, in Social citizenship
Social-Democratic form of national social
assistance
Industrial achievment Social citizenship
Corporatist performance, in form social
insurance
Liberal Residual, in form of partial Market citizenship
social assistances to certain
group of citizens. The rest is
given over to market
mechanism
Social protection in form of Market citizenship +
Productivist social insurance limited only for Communitarian citizenship
civil servant and military, while
for non-governmental
employees, the mechanism of
social protection is given over to
market and family/household
and community
Source: modifed by author

THE GENEALOGY OF WELFARE REGIME IN INDONESIA: REFLECTION OF


CITIZENSHIP DEBATES

Returning to the main argument posed at the beginning of this article, which is
transformation of Indonesian welfare regime from productivist characteristic to universalism has
been disrupted by the discourse of communitarian citizenship and market citizenship that has
become path-dependency of welfare configuration. In order to develop that argument, we need to
consider the importance of historicity of institutional welfare, which is embedded in it the political
process and economic system as the historical component that constructed certain values of
citizenship (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The institutionalization of a certain value through political
process over years causes the value to tend to be maintained as path-dependent. This circumstance
has become endogenous factor that obstructs innovations and changes within organization of
universal social protection.
Even though the idea to replicate welfare state in Indonesia, as the maximum role of the
state over welfare (de-commodification) has been written in its constitution, the implementation

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of that particular idea has been through complex dialectic process as the effect of bonapartist1
politics that also influenced the historical current of practices of welfare distribution in Indonesia.
It eventually changed the direction and goal of the state’s welfare development in contemporary
Indonesia.
The characteristic of bonapartism in the early time can be identified from the intrigue of
the first social insurance’s scheme, which was targeted to civil servants (Tabungan Asuransi Pegawai
Negeri – TASPEN) in 1963. It reflected Sukarno’s interest in reinforcing himself with supports
from civil servants at the edge of his regime (Ramesh, 2000; Joedadibrata, 2012; Yuda, 2018).
Likewise, the emergence of the first health insurance in Indonesia, which was Agency for
Healthcare Funds (Badan Penyelenggara Dana Pemeliharaan Kesehatan–BPDPK) for civil servants and
military was established a year prior to major project of Five Year Plans (Pembangunan Lima Tahun–
PELITA). It was then followed by stipulation of retirement insurance that was targeted to armed
forces through Indonesian Armed Forces Social Insurance (Asuransi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia–ASABRI) in 1973. The establishment of those two institutions (BPDK and ASABRI)
can be attributed to the importance of civil servants and military as the key to national stability,
and that was the basis of Suharto’s regime to maintain the status-quo (Pisani, Kok, & Nugroho,
2016).

After 1977, social protection was expanded to worker in private sectors through
Employees Social Insurance (Asuransi Tenaga Kerja–ASTEK). This period was indeed the most
critical juncture to the growth and development of industrialization in Indonesia, which
contributed to the improvement of GDP rill’s average up to 7.7% each year (Pudjiastuti, 2008) as
well as creating job market simultaneously. Politically, ASTEK’s existence can be associated with
the government’s attempt to muffle the labor unions, which were concentrated in several middle
class enterprises after the incident of Malapetaka 15 Januari (Malari) in 1974 (Ramesh, 2000).

Besides, the ideological tendency of mechanism of welfare arrangement that is shown in


these phases refers to productivist welfare regime, as it is implemented in East Asia countries and
some nearby countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (Aspalter, 2006; Holiday, 2000;
Ramesh, 2004). The characteristic of productivist welfare regime can be seen from its social welfare
articulation constructed in Rostow’s logic of economic growth, the ability to consume and to divert
redistributive politics. It can be identified from Soeharto’s social policies’ focus toward the poor
households and informal workers, which was integrated through centered infrastructure

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Bonapartist political practices or also known as benevolence politics are forms of power relations between the state
and its citizens in form of patron-client, instead of social contract. Consequently, construction of “loyal citizens”
becomes political requirement for those to obtain access toward public goods that are politicized by the politicians
(Stokes, 2007)
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establishment, such as programme for left-behind villages (Inpres Desa Tertinggal–IDT) to cope with
problems of infrastructure provision as well as agriculture and food technology development. It
was then continued by micro-credit schemes (Kredit Usaha Keluarga Sejahtera–Kukesra) to aid poor
households in obtaining venture capital with mild conditions. These programs were formulated in
two main functions: first, to boost the society in order to improve their productivity and
purchasing power so that they could seek for their own welfare through cash nexus; secondly, to
strengthen the family and certain social groups’ immunity in order to respond the social risks
caused by industrialization (Yuda, 2018). With the intention to ease the state in turn their
responsibility over social protection toward family and those social groups, in case an individual
had failed to obtain social protection from the market.

The formal social protection for poorer households had just been provided in 1992, along
with the transformation of two social insurance institutions during Soeharto period. The
transformations are BPDPK into PT. ASKES (Health Insurance–Asuransi Kesehatan), followed by
ASTEK into JAMSOSTEK (Workers Social Security – Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja) (Yuda, 2018).
Under president’s mandate, PT Askes then was asked to begin expanding its reach to private sector
as well as managing the scheme of the Public Health Maintenance (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan
Masyarakat–JPKM) for poorer households. The extension was done as an attempt to prevent post-
reformation political and economic instability between 80s-90s (Washington Consensus), which
required: privatization, tightening on fiscal policy, and deregulation of trade barriers as the effect
of the fall of global oil price in 1983 (Robison, 1986).

This period also became the most important juncture throughout the journey of welfare
regime in Indonesia in relation to institutionalization of market citizenship’s value massively as the
basis of social protection provision, while the state withdrew itself by opening space for the market
to be involved in social protection as there were private insurance established through Act No. 2
of 1992 that allows life insurance and insurance loss to sell health insurance. A year later, the
growth of private insurance was fastened due to Government Regulation No. 14 of 1993 on
JAMSOSTEK, which stipulated opt out so that many companies preferred to choose private
insurance instead of JAMSOSTEK (Thabrany, 2014).

Shortly after enjoyed a long period of economic growth, the monetary crisis strucked in
almost all Asia region, including Indonesia. Within one year (1997-1998), the currency of Rupiah
toward American Dollar had dropped as much as 85%, and the average domestic price increased
almost 80%. The crisis had heightened the percentage of absolute poverty almost twice from the
previous year that was only 14%. As the crisis was aggravated, mass riots happened in Jakarta and

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other major cities. The crisis wave reached its peak by the fall of president Soeharto in 1998, who
had been president for three decades (Yuda, 2018).

Following the recommendation and guidance from World Bank, president Habibie
introduced the scheme of Social Safety Nets (Jaring Pengaman Sosial–JPS) that was aimed in the
recovery of purchasing power after the crisis. This JPS program covered (1) subsidized rice that
was distributed monthly to low income family/household with minimum purchase of 10 Kg (2)
labor-intensive program and community empowerment program to establish infrastructure and
micro-credit innitiative schemes (3) education scholarship ranged from US$ 1 – US$ 2,5 for each
poor household with children as students and (4) health care.
However, the program was potically and ideologically paradoxical due to its basic idea that
was not meant to be a fulfillment of the citizens’ rights but to ‘prepare’ the human resources toward
a more open economic system. According to a study conducted by Sumarto (2007), JPS program
functioned more as a penetration to obtain legitimation over Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
agenda, which demands agendas of political-economical reformation from centralized system into
market system through privatization, deregulation, liberalization and of course the gradual
revocation of subsidy up to 2004. Therefore, SAP was a second momentum after economic
reformation in 80-90s, wherein the discourses of market citizenship was re-injected and re-
institutionalized massively, while the discourses of communitarian citizenship was also
strengthened through labor-intensive programs (community-based).

SJSN: Mainstreaming of social citizenship discourses


The emergence of democratization wave along with the rise of political parties and interest
groups in policy-making had encouraged the initiative to begin a wider welfare program in
Abdurahman Wahid’s reign (1999-2001). That included the idea to integrate the four existing social
security providers (TASPEN, ASABRI, ASKES, and JAMSOSTEK) into a single administration
body (Wisnu, 2012; Thabrany, 2008).
In 2004, president Megawati (2001-2004) validated a law of National Social Security System
(Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional–SJSN) no. 40 in order to facilitate the gradual transition of welfare
regime in Indonesia from productivist into universal model. This main idea of SJSN replicated the
ideas of German corporatist welfare regime (Joedadibrata, 2012) with construction of partial social
welfare without any intention of equality. This statement was supported by the fact that SJSN
adopted social classes system (class i, ii and iii) in its services. The fundings came from: (1) dues
from employers and employees in private sectors (2) government, which was allocated to pay
premium contributions of civil servants, military, and low income citizens of Penerima Bantuan Iuran
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(PBI) (3) independent contributions from citizens who were not categorized as poor, as civil
servants, and as having work relationship with private sectors. Despite the segmentation on social
classes, the benefits were based on “needs” instead of the contributions.

The transition of welfare regime that was expected to be able to fulfill citizens’ social rights
eventually had only become the snatch zone of pragmatic-politicization interests, such as president
Megawati who had interest in building Indonesian Democracy Party’s (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan –PDIP) profile. The profile was imaged as the party for ‘grassroots people’ (wong cilik)
which supports the citizens’ welfare, as well as a political machine to strengthened its electability
in 2004 election (Aspinall, 2014), so was president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004 –
2014) and his Democrat party (Partai Demokrat). Instead of responding to BPJS bill (Rancangan
Undang-Undang – RUU BPJS) that was supposed to be launched maximum five years after the
validation of SJSN law of 2004, BPJS bill was still diverted until 2008. SBY focused on the
development of a set of welfare programs adopted from social safety net program, especially the
ones in form of unconditional cash transfer, such as subsidies for poor students (Subsidi Siswa
Miskin–SSM), improvement on allocation of school operational assistance (Bantuan Operasional
Sekolah–BOS), and direct cash transfer program (Bantuan Langsung Tunai–BLT). Several analyses
(Aspinall, 2014; Yuda, 2018; Sumarto, 2014) associated what SBY had done with his attempt to
strengthen his electability on the upcoming election of 2009. There was also an assumption that
launching BPJS bill would only promote Megawati’s popularity as his political rival in election
2009. Meanwhile, the expansion of social policy, especially ones in form of unconditional cash
transfer, was considered as more beneficial in order to raise political supports from constituents.

A year after SBY emerged victorious in 2009 presidential elections for second times, there
was an attempt made by civil society and labor union to revitalize BPJS bill. They formed an
alliance called the Action Committee on Social Security (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial –KAJS), that
was a coalition of 67 organizations including laborers, farmers, fishermen, students, and academia.
In May 1st 2010, KAJS held a rally in Jakarta, demanding the implementation of SJSN. The alliance
also brought up the issue of BPJS bill through court system by filing citizen’s demands toward
SBY’s administration for not implementing SJSN, and to call an immediate validation of BPJS
(Torheim, 2013). On July 2011, KAJS team won the court which finally forced the government to
stipulate the law of BPJS No. 24 of 2011. It became the basis of BPJS’ management. ‘In 2014,
BPJS law was implemented through two operational bodies, i.e. BPJS-Kesehatan (1 January 2014)
administered the national health insurance (also known as Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional – JKN) for
all citizens, whereas BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan(1 July 2014) provided cover for work-related accidents,

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retirement savings and death benefits for all workers in both private and public sectors’ (Yuda,
2018: 9)

A few months after Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from PDI-P party successfully won the 2014
presidential elections, Jokowi’s administration (2014 – present) politicized BPJS-Kesehatan by
exchanging BPJS cards, which was validated by SBY, with JKN-KIS labeled cards which actually
had no substantial difference. According to Sumarto (2014), the act of replacing “flag” through
welfare programs is a part of attempts to establish political identity, to ease the claim that the
ongoing programs are the product of their positive services.

What had become the highlight was the fact that SJSN was realized under the circumstance
which discourses of market and communitarian citizenship were strongly dominating compared
to discourses of social citizenship itself. In other words, the requirements of ‘social citizenship’ as
social foundation to establish universal welfare regime was not completed. This statement was
strengthened by the fact that institutional historicity of welfare during Soeharto period that re-
institutionalized informal system as management of social protection through a number of
community-based programs, and market system that was proven by the opening of private
insurance market. This factor later on explained why transformation would be difficult to be
realized if the policy had been initiated. According to Hall dan Taylor (1996), a policy has direct
relations to the construction of a discourse and paradigm of collective society anyway. Therefore,
adaptation of communitarian and market discourses, which had been done by the society during
Soeharto’s establishment, had caused institutional re-structurization of universal social protection
to be difficult to implement (Tribowo & Bahagijo, 2006). Along with the implementation of SJSN,
the weak current of social citizenship discourses encountered the strong current of market and
communitarian discourses and eventually caused problems in its implementation, which the author
discusses on the following section. Prior to getting into the next section, the author provides
genealogical summary on citizenship discourses within social protection in Indonesia through table
2 below.

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Table 2. Genealogical citizenship discourses in Indonesia welfare regime journey

Period of Narrative of Construction of


government the welfare citizenship Relations of welfare actors Remarks
regime
The state as a regulator provides limited social protection,  The first time of Bonapartist politics’ occurrence was the end of Soekarno’s regime,
SOEKARNO Informal welfare Communitarian while the market is weak yet the position of informal which utilized TASPEN to accumulate support from civil servantss.
(1945 – 1967) relations is very strong as the provider of welfare basis.
The state as a regulator provides limited social protection,  The practices of bonapartist is strengthened along with expansion of patron-client
while market and community are encouraged to be relations in several sectors with welfare programs that were given to military, civil
provider of welfare basis. servants, and low income citizens, and integrated with developmentalism ideology.
 Mainstreaming of market citizenship discourses during economic reformation and
SOEHARTO globalization in the 80-90s. Throughout this period, the encouragement of market as
(1967 – 1998) welfare provider becomes more intense along with the rapid development of private
insurance. Meanwhile, the state withdraws itself by de-regulating the involvement of
The state as a regulator provides limited social protection, JAMSOSTEK.
Productivist Market + while market is encourages to be superior to community  Post-crisis, the strengthening of community role is heightened through SSN, while
welfare Communitarian as provider of welfare basis. the construction of market citizenship is prepared to be reproducted through
economic market restoration (Structural Adjustment Program – SAP). This becomes
BJ. HABIBIE second phase after economic reformation in the 80s, when market citizenship
(1998 – 1999) discourses become dominant, while social citizenship discourses are withdrawn from
public spaces. This statement is supported by the fact that issues of state-owned
enterprises, and public goods liberalization became main post-crisis issues, which is
also accompanied by the revocation of subsidized daily needs.
ABDURAHMAN The state begins to expand social citizenship discourses  Transition Phase
WAHID (1999-2 through a number of welfare programs, the target started  Megawati and SBY by passed democratic institution by personifying SJSN as
001), MEGAWATI from individuals and community. Meanwhile, market “political commodification”, without any efforts to realize it.
(2001 – 2004) SBY discourses has been institutionalized.
(2004 - 2009)
Universalism Social VS The state as a regulator transforms into provider of social  SJSN is implemented. Yet there is a contradiction between logics of social citizenship
SBY (2009 - 2014) (Corporatist Communitarian + protection, while the discourses of market and constructed by SJSN with the reality of citizenship which has characteristics of
& JOKOWI (2014 based) Market communitarian citizenship are still institutionalized as communitarian and market citizenship.
– present) social protection institution within daily society.

source: modified by author

14
UNIVERSAL COVERAGE: A PROBLEMATIC CITIZENSHIP

The contradiction of citizenship discourses visualized by the state and the reality among
society has caused problems to the sustainability of SJSN. This section would describe some of
those problems. As discussed earlier, the first problem is that SJSN adopted German corporatist
regime model. It is proven by the amount of BPJS dues, either BPJS-Kesehatan or BPJS-
Ketenagakerjaan, which was designed as static adjusting to the formal work mechanism of industrial
society. The government emphasizes on informal sectors that has fluctuative income, in addition
to 6.2% others who are recorded as unemployed (Wilmsen, Kaasch, & Sumarto, 2016). From 60%
of informal laborers, about 50% work in agriculture sector and live in rural areas (Suryahadi,
Febriyani, & Yumna, 2014) which are identical with shared economic model and holds relatively
strong mechanic solidarity. The part that needs to be examined further is, in 2013, a year before
BPJS was began to be operated, from 114 million of Indonesian laborers, only 29.1 millions were
incorporated within the scheme of JAMSOSTEK (embryo of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan) (PRAKARSA,
2013). Some others depended on private insurance or informal scheme. This description indicates
the citizens’ imagination toward the state’s presence as a medium of social protection was still low.

The second problem is the difference on definitions of social risks. By replicating


European social protection system, especially German, without any modification, the government
implicitly had assumed that Indonesians have risk characteristics similar to society of industrial
economic, which are identical with risks of work accidents. In reality, those who work on
agriculture sector, live in rural areas, and are identical with subsistential economic characteristics
that still have multi-functions system of social protection with community risk-sharing basis.
Besides, the agriculture society’s intensity to interact with economic activities and modern industry
is minimum, moreover in harvest time. They need more of income protection scheme which
assures their stable income above the line of poverty in case of crop failure, or the waiting period.

The third problem is, politically, the state’s constitution was not strong enough in terms of
welfare distribution in the face of familianism and kinship-based institutions that are considered
as closer to the citizens’ welfare preference. This assumption can be proven through Indonesian’s
tradition wherein it is natural for elders to be taken care by their descendants (family-based care)
as a form of devotion in relations with ethic and religious codes. Therefore, it is not easy for the
state to suddenly come promoting a formal scheme of pension time protection while most of the
citizens have not considered it as a main priority. It is different compared to industrial citizens in
the West which are individualized and defamilization sociologically, thus the occurrence of the
state with management of pension time protection has strong political legitimation among them.

15
The last problem is not only dealing with traditional institution but also the state that still
has to compete with private institution. Some parts of the citizens who work in formal sector even
government’s officials still believe that BPJS-Kesehatan insurance as complementer instead of main
one. As argued by Hasbullah Thabrany, an expert of Indonesian health insurance, in Kompas (2016):

“officials that manage BPJS consciously don’t use BPJS, they have additional insurance. Those officials
who manage and handle BPJS themselve claim that BPJS has no quality, therefore they need additional one. The
public regulation was designed for citizens, not officials...citizens are just an object, and that means it can be
assured that the services are not good.”
In the opposite with the situations of social democratic welfare regime or German
corporatist welfare regime that has been reference to SJSN, the state can compete excellently in
providing the best social services to its citizens. It was once portrayed in a documenter film by
Michael Moore entitled Sicko, that tells a story of health system in America and compares it with
UK, Canada, Cuba, and France. In a sequel, the film succeeded in representing how a cashier of a
governmental hospital in UK was not functioned as a place to pay the hospital bills, but as a place
where the money went out for patients who could not pay the transportation from the hospital to
their houses. This system was underpinned by the work of political representation in economic
system management and social welfare as well as a factor of solidarity, universalism, and
redistribution values that had become path-dependent factor in the European welfare state.
(Gough, 2013).
Another empirical example would be the fact that for about three years of BPJS Kesehatan
operation, lots of citizens who were incorporated2 with it only paid the dues when they got sick.
Consequently, it made BPJS-Kesehatan experienced deficits three years in a row. First year was Rp.
3.3 trillions, the second was Rp. 5.85 trillions, and the number kept increasing to Rp. 9.7 trillions
in 2016 (Sumarto, 2017). This example indicates that imagination on the state’s presence is only
expected oas complementary institution or alternative when the other institution they considered
as ‘main institution’, such as family and market, failed to manage the social risks.
The implication of the problems discussed above causes the definition of social citizenship
brought up by SJSN has only reached and benefited by some parts of citizens with certain status
(including low class citizens that was certified by the government, some laborers in private sectors,
a few of informal laborers, civil servants and military) and excluded the rest, especially those who
are not categorized as poor to receive the state’s subsidy yet also not quite ‘rich’ to pay the
contribution by themselves. This particular group of people is the one prone to be commodified.

2
Participation is not only limited on dues, but also refers to the wider definition of active citizenship, such as
implementing function control.
16
The explanation above demonstrates that even though the mainstreaming of social
citizenship discourses is still ongoing, the substantial definition of social citizenship, such as
inclusivity, equity of social rights distribution, and citizens’ involvement are not acknowledgeable.
First of all, dichotomy between formal and informal has excluded some group of citizens. Any
form of ideal social citizenship has to be able to reach all the citizens, despite of the socioeconomic
status. Secondly, according to Goodin, distribution of social protection is supposed to improve
the equality among citizens (Sumarto, 2014). Yet, the class system – especially within BPJS-
Kesehatan – asserted the existence of social stratification among the citizens which, of course,
undermines the retribution spirit promoted by SJSN. The third is the minimum involvement of
the citizens, whether as an object or subject matter, which was caused by the absence of social
contract between the state and its citizens. Consequently, the state’s imagination on ‘social rights
fulfillment’ within political practices of welfare distribution that are conducted by the state can be
seen, other than as personification3 of SJSN in relation to political interests. Meanwhile, the
citizens’ imagination of ‘willingness’ to contribute, along with domination of communitarian and
market citizenship discourses – especially among middle class – are still embedded in the daily
society. Therefore, that logic on ‘willingness’ tend to be more about insurance company or
community that has been long playing prominent role in providing welfare, and also has
characteristics as complementary, or even anytime can be substitutive.

CONCLUSION
Referring to the objectives of this study, the ideas to realize social policy with basis of social
citizenship discourse in Indonesia are supposed to be reconstructed. The argument is composed
because the transformation of Indonesian welfare regime from productivist characteristic to
universalism has been disrupted by the discourse of communitarian citizenship and market
citizenship that has become path-dependency of welfare configuration. It is also supported by
three main findings. First of all, the strength of non-state institutions within the welfare system in
relations with the mainstreaming of market and communitarian citizenship discourses during
president Soeharto (New Order) period that was emphasized through a) welfare policies that were
segmented to groups of civil servant, military, and high level officials while communitarian
citizenship was injected through schemes of labor-intensive programs toward low income citizens
whose orientation were economic uplift b) social welfare for middle class citizens was managed by
market design, especially after economic reformation in the 80-90s, when the role of private
insurance had become strongly dominant. The two narratives of policy caused social welfare for

3Especially
after SBY’s administration, the trend of political populism based on the figures occurred simultaneously
with models of welfare arrangement that have become more personalized. It was conducted to show partiality of the
government to public issues that are considered as related to constituents
17
non-govermental employees had become more commodified, while the state withdrew itself
transfer their responsibility of social protection to informal relations in case the citizens failed to
obtain welfare from the market. The conditions made mainstreaming of social citizenship
discourses became difficult to be implemented without any modification.
Secondly, this article also shows, among the strengthening discourses on market and
communitarian citizenship, discourses on social citizenship are installed through law of SJSN in
2004 which later in was implemented into BPJS-Kesehatan and BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan. The clash
between the three currents of citizenship eventually made the transformation of welfare regime
has not yet able to reach the ideal form of social citizenship, which expects the existence of
inclusivity, equity and active participation of the citizens.
Third, Indonesia has historical difference from Europe, especially German, which has been
being reference in social protection development in Indonesia. As discussed earlier, the
individualization and defamilization process that was ongoing massively in German and other
European countries generally, as well as how strong the countries in subordinating capitalism, had
provided the legitimation basis for establishing state-based welfare systems. These preconditions
are still absence in Indonesia. Therefore, to assure the sustainability of universal social protection
in Indonesia, a new mode of governance of a welfare regime is required to stimulate active
citizenship through social contract, instead of merely showing political ambitions. By doing so,
SJSN can be established upon equality and inclusivity values, so that the implementation of the
programs could eventually cover interests and needs from all group of citizens.
This article finally raised important theoretical issues that have a bearing on the developing
of welfare regime approach as well as opening prospects for further studies to explore the
dynamics of political sociology as an inseparable part of welfare institutional system in Indonesia.
Especially the understanding toward the complexity of the relationship between welfare
development and citizenship in context of developing countries, which has fundamental difference
compared to welfare state regime in the West.

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