Airbus Safety First Magazine 19

The Airbus Safety Magazine
The Airbus safety magazine

January 2015 July 2014
#19 #18
SafetySafety
first first
002 Safety First #19 | January 2015
Safety first, #19 January, 2015. Safety first

Safety first
The Airbus magazine contributing to the enhancement
is published by Airbus S.A.S. - 1, rond point
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Publisher: Yannick Malinge, Chief Product Safety and communication on safety related topics.
Officer, Editor: Corinne Bieder, Director Product
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editorial
YANNICK MALINGE There are things we do so repeatedly that we sometimes
SVP, Head of Product lose sight of why we do them and why in such a specific
way. We also often lose sight of the meaning of the limits
Safety
we comply with and why they are there. Most situations
don’t really require that we even get close to them. How-
ever, when the situation is slightly different from usual, or
when the pressure increases, we don’t necessarily have
the time to stand back and think about the essentials.
Something similar happens in situations that we encoun-

ter infrequently in our daily lives. We tend to forget how to
handle them because we are not able to recall the under-
lying rationale.
This issue of Safety first magazine will take you behind

the scene of safety, back to fundamentals. It will revisit
the why behind the how to handle some situations safely.
Take the time to read these articles. They will give you
some key pointers and advice to help you to be prepared.
I hope you will find your reading interesting.
At this time of challenge to safety, our thoughts are with

the QZ8501 victims and their families. Despite this sad
context, I wish you and your relatives all the very best for
this New Year.
NEWS
A makeover for Safety first!
Your magazine now features a new layout to improve the reading experience
and to ease the identification of subjects of interest:
Sections: each article is now allocated to one specific, colour coded section:
• Procedures • Operations
• Aircraft • General
• Training
Domains: pictograms at the beginning of each article characterize the

domain(s) addressed:
Flight operations Engineering
Maintenance Ground operations
The entire Safety communication team hopes that you will enjoy these
changes, and wishes you a happy reading!
SAVE THE DATE NEWS

21st FLIGHT SAFETY CONFERENCE – 2015
Another year has nearly passed since Mrs. Nuria Soler, email nuria.soler@
our last Flight Safety Conference in airbus.com
Dubai. All the Airbus people who were
present enjoyed very much the oppor- This year the conference will “major”
tunity to network with our customers on the importance of applying judg-
and to share ideas and news. This was ments to available data, as we drive
also confirmed by all the feedback we forward across the industry with
received from airlines delegates who further safety advances and further
valued this great opportunity for shar- information sharing programs. The
ing safety information. whole subject will be being brought
to life with real operational examples
We are pleased to announce that the of when data and judgment has or
21st Flight Safety Conference will take has not been handled optimally and
place in Paris, France, from the 23rd what best practice looks like in this
to the 26th of March 2015. The Flight regard. So, there will be lots to share
Safety Conference provides an excel- and lots of opportunities to learn from
lent forum for the exchange of infor- each other.
mation between Airbus and its cus-
tomers. To ensure that we can have As always, we welcome presentations
an open dialogue to promote flight from our operators. You can partic-
safety across the fleet, we are unable ipate as a speaker and share your
to accept outside parties. ideas and experience for improving
aviation safety. If you have something
The formal invitations with informa- you believe will benefit other operators
tion regarding registration and logis- and/or Airbus and if you are interested
tics, as well as the preliminary agenda in being a speaker, please provide
have been sent to our customers in us with a brief abstract and a bio or
January 2015. For any information resume at nuria.soler@airbus.com
regarding invitations, please contact
Flight safety conference
Paris, 23-26 March 2015
Safety First #18 | July 2014 05
Safety
first #19
OPERATIONS
P06 - Tidy cockpit for safe flight
Flight operations P12 - L
anding on contaminated
runways
Maintenance P26 - U
nderstanding weight
& balance
Engineering P38 - W
ind shear: an invisible
enemy to pilots?
Ground operations
OPERATIONS
Tidy cockpit for safe flight
THE “CLEAN COCKPIT” PHILOSOPHY
Tidy cockpit
for safe flight
One would not normally think of everyday life objects,
apparently as inoffensive as a pen or a cup of coffee, as being
a real threat to the safe operation of a commercial flight. Yet,
leaving them unsecured or forgotten in a cockpit could rapidly
turn them into real trouble makers…
XAVIER BARRIOLA DAVID MARCONNET

Director Flight Safety – Flight Operations Safety
Accident investigator Enhancement Manager
Safety First #19 | January 2015 07
At the beginning of 2014, the crew of a cruising A330 and

their passengers unintentionally lived a new flying experience
at negative g by night… The culprit? A digital camera left
between the Captain’s side stick and the seat arm rest that led
to inadvertent nose down inputs as the PF seat was adjusted
forward.
LOOSE ITEMS IN THE COCKPIT:

UNINVITED GUESTS!
Common sense generally instructs anyone

in a cockpit to maintain an orderly environment.
However, over the past decade, serious incidents
involving unsecured or forgotten items have
continued to happen. For the most part, being
complacent is not intentional. It just happens.
But in view of the possible consequences, truly
the cockpit must remain clean and tidy at all time
during flight.
The resulting consequences
Investigations into the cited 2014 entered this steep descent, the Cap-
event showed that the camera had tain was alone in the cockpit, in a night
been left unsecured between the environment; therefore these 20 sec-
Captain’s side stick and the seat arm onds were necessary indeed for him to
rest, such that when the pilot moved analyse the situation properly, remove
his seat forward, it pushed the cam- the camera, and eventually recover by
era forward too, and eventually, the pulling the stick back and stabilising
side stick. the aircraft at a safe attitude.
The aircraft dutifully answered this side 4 000 feet were lost in altitude during
stick motion and abruptly pitched its the dive, after which the flight contin-
nose down for around 20 seconds, ued uneventfully, but a few passen-
reaching a maximum 15 000 feet a gers and crew members were injured
minute descent rate. When the aircraft in the process.
OPERATIONS
This event is just one in too many reduced, an iPad the Pilot had
operational incidents over recent left on the throttles control mod-
years where a loose item left unse- ule became jammed between the
cured or forgotten in the cockpit is throttles and the fuel levers. When
involved. The following incident sum- the Pilot removed his iPad, both fuel
maries for example, illustrate some levers were activated, thus shutting
common – and preventable – scenar- down the two engines. The crew
ios related to unsecured or forgotten managed to recover the situation
items: safely and no one was injured.
• During an aircraft landing, the roll- Other common situations are regu-
out jerks caused the pilot’s cap to larly heard of:
fall off right onto the Park Brake
handle because it was hung too •
Coffee cups placed on the glare
loosely. A jump seat rider present shield or pedestal: unexpected
in the cockpit at that time, was turbulence or unintentional bump-
quick to react and while attempting ing by the crew causes fluid to be
to secure the hat, he inadvertently spilled onto the cockpit control
turned the Park Brake handle and panels. Beverage spill onto elec-
set it ON. This obviously led to a tronic equipment may not neces-
rather abrupt stop and the aircraft sarily have an immediate effect on
tires to burst. Thankfully no one was the flight, but at best, it can lead to
injured in this event. an early and expensive overhaul of
the equipment.
• On another aircraft in cruise, docu-
mentation that had been left on the • Books placed on the glare shield or
center pedestal moved and inter- pedestal: these fall off and may oper-
fered with the rudder trim knob. ate some switches or pushbuttons,
This resulted in a sudden rudder such as a fuel lever being pushed off,
movement and unexpected aircraft or even de-select a radio frequency.
yaw, from which the pilot managed
to recover. Again thankfully no one •
Forgotten pens, cutlery (during
was injured. meals) or clipboards: as small as
they can be, they can get jammed
•
An aircraft with moving throt- in the controls – typically the rudder
tles was approaching the Top Of pedals – when they fall on the floor
Climb (TOC). At TOC, when thrust and move during flight.
Each one of the above incidents must serve as important reminders of

the critical need to ensure that items are properly stowed and secured
before AND during flight.
The culprits
Establishing an exhaustive list of all This list could be longer, but it gives an
potential candidates that may inter- idea of the kind of common equipment
fere with the controls would be too likely to create hazards when left loose
long and ineffective. These items can in a cockpit.
include aviation-related items such
as portable GPS units, clipboards; The aircraft cockpit ergonomics are
non-aviation-related Portable Elec- designed to be as robust as possible
tronic Devices such as personal cell against these kind of threats. Where Prevention
phones or laptops; and personal items relevant, Airbus has developed modifi- is essential
such as clothing or carry-on items. cations to prevent the ingestion of for-
eign objects into the controls. The flap
and discipline
Following are the most common lever mechanism for instance is pro- in the cockpit is
objects that can be found unsecured tected by a brush covering the lever paramount
or forgotten in a cockpit: slot, thus efficiently preventing foreign
• iPad objects ingress.
• Laptop
• Cell phone However, even a perfectly well-de-
• Digital camera signed cockpit can never be fully pro-
• Spectacles and sunglasses tected against the malicious behaviour
• Scattered papers of unsecured objects. For this reason,
• Pen prevention is essential and discipline in
• Clipboards the cockpit is paramount.
• Meal tray
• Coffee or any beverage cup
• Pocket calculator
• Lighter
OPERATIONS
PREVENTION: A PLACE FOR

EVERYTHING, AND EVERYTHING
IN ITS PLACE…
The 2014 event could have resulted in far worse

consequences, had the aircraft been at a lower
altitude. This was a strong reminder to the flight
crew that they should never under-estimate the
potential for harm of everyday life objects, when
left unsecured!
In fact, the solution against such events Then, we encourage flight crews
lies in one word: discipline. to incorporate the following simple
To help efficiently curb the number of checks in their preflight actions in
operational incidents involving a loose order to ensure their working environ-
item in the cockpit, pilots need to be ment is well secured for a flight:
vigilant and ordered.
• Inspect the cockpit for forgotten
First, items that are brought in a cock- or misplaced items before take-off
pit must be put and stowed in their and ensure all are properly secured
dedicated compartment: and isolated from other equipment
in the cockpit. This also helps
• Cups in the cup holders assure their availability throughout
• Headsets not in use, on the hook the flight.
stowage • Make sure all your personal items
• Books and paper, if any, in the lat- such as hats and jackets, iPads or
eral stowage luggage are secured.
• Trash in the waste bin in the lateral • If necessary, remind jump seat rid-
console ers not to create distractions and
• Meal trays on the floor behind the to adopt the same measures and
flight crew. The flight attendants same discipline against unsecured
should collect the meal trays as items.
soon as possible. And maintain this attitude and level of
• Personal equipment properly se- alertness prior to AND during flight,
cured in the various stowage areas. putting a particular emphasis on the
The Pilot Pocket in particular, is the preparation for the approach phase
answer to where to stow valuable during the approach briefing prior to
items such as a portable GPS or descent.
cell phone.
• Flight bags should be kept closed
after obtaining whatever was nec-
essary.
DID YOU KNOW

Airbus Clean cockpit philosophy is available in FCTM NO-010
GENERAL-Clean cockpit.
Loose items in a cockpit environment are not welcome: they can

too easily drive a crew into a hazardous, and yet easily preventable,
operational situation.
To efficiently curb the number of incidents related to unsecured or
forgotten items, pilots need to be vigilant and adopt a clean and
tidy cockpit philosophy from preflight through to landing and arrival
at the gate.
When entering the cockpit, ask yourself these questions: is all of
the luggage secure? How about my own flight bag and my iPad?
And just remember: a place for everything, and everything in its
place…
OPERATIONS
Landing on contaminated runways
THE QUESTION OF PERFORMANCE
Landing on
contaminated
runways
Landing performance is a function of the exact landing
runway conditions at the time of landing. A simple statement
for a more complex reality. Indeed, knowing what exact
contamination is or remains on the runway at a given point
in time is often challenging.
ROBERT LIGNEE LARS KORNSTAEDT

Experimental Flight Performance expert –
Test Engineer Flight Operations Support
Landing on a contaminated runway may be an almost daily

experience for some pilots or a more exceptional one for
others. In any case, doing it safely requires some background
understanding and thinking on a variety of questions, especially:
What does the term “contaminated runway” actually mean?
How are contaminated runway conditions reported to pilots?
How to translate the reported runway condition terminology into
a safe assessment of the aircraft landing performance? How
to prepare for a safe landing and then perform it?
CONTAMINATED RUNWAY: WHAT

DOES IT MEAN IN REALITY?
If weather can to some extent be anticipated,

the runway surface conditions with natural
contamination may be more difficult to forecast.
Indeed, runway surface conditions depend on a
variety of factors including state changes due to
surface temperature effects, chemical treatment,
or run-off and removal.
A variety of contaminants
The most common and natural con- • ice (solid contaminant, its depth is
taminants are limited in number: irrelevant).
• compacted snow (solid contami- They are the ones for which sufficient
nant, its depth is irrelevant), historical data has been gathered
• dry or wet snow, depth at or more and safe performance levels defined
than 3 mm - 1/8 inch (*) by EASA, assuming a homogeneous
• water, slush, depth at or more than condition of the contaminant along
3 mm - 1/8 inch (*) runway length.
(*) DRY and WET normal runway conditions, without abnormal contamination by rubber or other pollution, are
by aeronautical language convention classed as “non-contaminated”.
Dry or wet snow, water and slush of a depth less than 3 mm - 1/8 inch or frost are considered equivalent to a
wet runway (non-contaminated).
A wet runway excessively contaminated by rubber, reported by NOTAM as “Slippery when Wet” as defined by
ICAO, is a contaminated runway. It is considered to have the same performance as snow (MEDIUM).
OPERATIONS
In some situations though, the contam- of the contaminant be no longer true

The inant reported to be present on the run- compacted snow. A downgrade of
way may not make it possible to identify performance should then be con-
most common the corresponding performance level sidered as risk mitigation to support
contaminants just by considering the contaminant safe operations.
for which aircraft type and depth. It is the case particu-
larly when the contaminant is: •
a piling up of layers of differ-
performance ent contaminants: the few cases
level can be • too variable as to its impact on documented water on top of com-
aircraft performance: e.g. volcanic pacted snow, water on top of ice (or
defined have been ash, hydraulic fluid spillage. Opera- wet ice), or dry/wet snow over ice,
synthetized into the tions cannot, in general, be sup- have shown unacceptable impact
Runway Condition ported with specific performance
information;
on aircraft performance and oper-
ations cannot be supported, even
Assessment adoption of the most conservative
Matrix that permits • a common natural one, but out- contaminant, i.e. ice, for snow over
side of the temperature condi- ice condition might be unsafe.
deterministic tions where its characteristics are
classification of the well known: e.g. compacted snow Eventually, the most common con-
if the outside air temperature subse- taminants for which aircraft perfor-
expected landing quently raises above -15°C. Indeed, mance level can be defined have
performance. compacted snow is a specially pre- been synthetized into the Runway
pared winter runway when temper- Condition Assessment Matrix that
ature is very low, at or below -15°C. permits deterministic classification of
Above that, there is a risk that some the expected Landing Performance.
A dynamic weather
Weather conditions evolve quickly the temperature leads to a change
and elude a forecast accurate of state of the contaminant: landing
enough to be compatible with performance is poor on dry ice, but
the sensitivity of landing perfor- can become non-existent if ice sur-
mance. As an example, Landing face is melting (here again, the -3°C
performance is defined as GOOD temperature criterion is a necessary
when the runway is normally wet simplification).
(runways quickly drain water during Determining precisely when the pre-
showers with normal precipitation cipitation accumulation will become
rates). It might drop to MEDIUM TO critical or when the ice will start melt-
POOR with standing water accumu- ing in significant proportion is already
lation (the 3 mm water depth crite- a challenge when nothing interferes
rion is a necessary simplification to with it. Yet in reality, a number of other
represent this phenomenon). factors do interfere with this weather
Likewise, the estimated runway dimension and make it even more dif-
condition and resulting landing per- ficult to determine the actual runway
formance may be sensitive to temper- condition, not to mention an anticipa-
ature. It is the case especially when tion of it.
OPERATIONS
A large runway surface area

Although runways vary in size, 3 km than 25% of runway coverage.
long and 45 m wide give a represent- Whatever the actual state of the runway
ative indication of the surface area and its variability, it needs to be simpli-
of a runway. On such a surface, the fied to make a landing performance
exact contamination may vary from computation. Indeed, landing perfor-
one place to another. As an illustration, mance models can only consider a
“patchy snow and ice” may be reported single contaminant evenly distributed
in some airports as representing less on the runway.
Airport operations
Beyond these intrinsic difficulties of laterally from the landing gear.
having an accurate representation An aircraft taking off might also induce
of the runway condition, operations changes in the runway contamination
taking place on the runway modify along its take-off roll, thereby increas-
the runway condition at least in ing as well the heterogeneity of the
some places of the runway. An air- contamination throughout the runway
craft landing on a runway may change surface.
the depth of a contaminant if not its A more obvious case of impact of air-
nature. Indeed, it can for example port operations on runway contami-
induce a change of state at the touch- nation is any runway management
down point or along its deceleration action such as cleaning or de-icing.
path. The contamination will remain In many cases, de-icing fluids are
unchanged though on the un-trafficked applied only to a limited width along
last part of the runway or further away the runway axis.
HOW ARE RUNWAY CONDITIONS

REPORTED TO PILOTS?
For pilots, the main reason why runway

contamination needs to be considered is
because of its impact on the performance
of the landing.
Although this sounds obvious, it means This translation is done by means of the
that what pilots need to know is not the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix
very physical details of the runway con- (RCAM) introduced earlier. The RCAM
ditions but rather how the performance includes, beyond DRY, WET and thin
of the aircraft might be affected, thus contaminants that are equivalent to
what they will need to do to still per- WET, 4 discrete levels of contamina-
form a safe landing. In other words, tion, each of which is associated with a
what pilots really need is a translation landing performance level.
of the runway condition into its practical
effects on the aircraft. The information provided to pilots of
runway condition may vary from one
Yet today, the information provided to country to another and from one air-
pilots on runway condition is not directly port to another. Let’s review the three
What
a level of performance. One of the main categories of possible information pilots pilots need is a
challenges for pilots is to translate from
their vantage point in the cockpit of an
may get on runway condition before
discussing how they can be integrated
translation of the
approaching aircraft the sometimes to come up with a single, representa- runway condition
complex information provided to them tive, performance level. into its practical
on runway surface condition into a sin-
gle classification of the runway condi- effects onto the
tion landing performance level. aircraft.
Contaminant type & depth

In accordance with ICAO standards, all agreed by the Takeoff and Landing Per-
airports around the world should provide formance Assessment Aviation Rule-
this information to pilots prior to landing. making Committee (TALPA ARC, see
It is the primary information about run- article Safety First 10).
way contamination (this reporting is even
more essential for take-off). Providing the contaminant type & depth
to pilots relies on measurements, espe-
Currently, the description of contami- cially that of contaminant depth. Per-
nants in SNOWTAMs is done through forming these measures in a way that
a combination of codes and free text/ provides a representative view of the real
plain-language remarks. There is no depth is a challenge to airports. More
clear distinction between performance generally, measuring runway contamina-
relevant contaminants and other runway tion, whether it is to determine contam-
surface conditions provided for situa- inant depth or to estimate the surface
tional awareness. The ICAO SNOWTAM friction coefficient (see next section), can
codes correspond to a set of generic become challenging for a variety of rea-
contaminants, thus are different from sons (see insert The challenge of provid-
the RCAM landing performance codes ing measures on runway contamination).
OPERATIONS
Estimated surface friction (ESF)

ICAO and national authorities have ESF can be reported in different for-
progressively shied away from report- mats. Either under the terminology:
ing measured friction to pilots. In fact, GOOD / GOOD TO MEDIUM / MEDIUM
there is no established meaningful / MEDIUM TO POOR / POOR by third
correlation on most contaminants of runway length, or through a figure
between estimated surface friction e.g. 26μ. When the surface friction
established by ground measurement is expressed through a figure, it may
There is devices and aircraft performance. give the illusion that it is an accurate
Therefore, reporting ESF is strongly measurement although it still remains
no established discouraged by ICAO on contaminants of limited practical use in characteriz-
meaningful for which it is now known that it may ing winter runway conditions for aircraft
correlation on be dangerously biased (fluid winter operations. Indeed, no related landing
contaminants as snow or slush, i.e. performance level can reasonably be
most contaminants dry or wet snow or slush). (see insert derived from the sole figure.
between estimated The challenge of providing measures
on runway contamination). Yet, it is a
surface friction secondary information pilots may get in
established some areas of the world.
by ground Pilot Reports of Braking Action (PiRep of BA)
measurement
devices and aircraft The last secondary information pilots conditions. PiReps should always be
may get on runway conditions, communicated to the approaching
performance. although its use largely varies region- pilots with a time and emitter of the
ally, is through the air traffic controller report including the airline and the air-
in the form of a Pilot Report or PiRep craft type.
of Braking Action. PiRep of BA are
encouraged in some countries. These PiReps of Braking Actions are
reports are individual perceptions that also reported using the terminol-
may be influenced by a number of fac- ogy: GOOD / GOOD TO MEDIUM
tors: whether the pilot is familiar with / MEDIUM / MEDIUM TO POOR /
contaminated runways and this par- POOR, and can also be reported by
ticular type of conditions or with the third of runway length.
type of aircraft or the use of decelera-
tion devices. It is also easy for a pilot In countries where PiReps of Brak-
to mistake aerodynamic and reverse ing Action are transmitted to follow-
thrust deceleration forces for braking ing traffic, it is the sole responsibility
forces. However, the usefulness of of the pilot performing the In-Flight
such subjective reports should not landing performance assessment to
be underestimated, as they often (but determine whether the transmitted
not always) provide the most recent information can be considered relia-
information available under dynamic ble or not.
weather, and resulting runway surface
OPERATIONS
Integrating the various types of information on

runway surface condition
Eventually, pilots need to integrate all the pieces of information they receive
in relation to runway contamination to come up with a single level of landing
performance. They can receive up to three different information types, coming
from different sources:
• R
unway contaminant type and used to determine the Related Landing
depth: mandatory as primary infor- Performance Level for in-flight land-
mation; ing performance assessment (down-
•
Estimated Surface Friction (ESF): grade). When ESF is higher than the
not systematic as secondary infor- performance associated to contami-
mation; nated type and depth in the RCAM, its
•
Pilot Report of Braking Action use to determine the Related Landing
(PiRep of BA): not systematic as Performance Level is not supported
secondary information. (no upgrade).
Some rules do exist for pilots to inte- When PiRep of BA is lower than the
grate these various types of information. performance associated to contam-
inant type and depth in the RCAM,
As a general rule, the Related Landing it should be used to determine the
Performance level derived from the Related Landing Performance Level for
primary information (contaminant type in-flight landing performance assess-
& depth) prevails if considering other ment (downgrade). When PiRep of BA
sources of information would lead to is higher than the performance associ-
being less conservative than EASA ated to contaminated type and depth
regulation. in the RCAM, its use to determine the
Related Landing Performance Level is
When ESF is lower than the perfor- not supported (no upgrade) by EASA,
mance associated to contaminant type but under pilot responsibility in USA.
and depth in the RCAM, it should be
THE CHALLENGE OF PROVIDING MEASURES ON RUNWAY CONTAMINATION
Providing quantitative information on runway contamination combines two major

challenges. The first one is to perform accurate and representative measures.
As for the second one, it relates to the validity of the measurement with time.
Interfering with operations on except for the few airports in the world
an active runway equipped with above mentioned
automatic measurement devices for
Performing measures on a runway real-time water depth.
requires sending a measurement
vehicle on the runway (except for few Runway friction
airports equipped with contaminant Airport runway friction assessment can
depth automatic measurement be performed using a variety of devices
devices). For any airport, this could and vehicles that are based on an equally
induce a risk for active runways. wide palette of measurement principles
and ways of implementing these.
The time needed to perform the They are all subject to limitations that
measures affect the accuracy and reproducibility
of measurements. The correlation of
Even if the number of measurements data produced with them with aircraft
performed to assess the runway performance is challenged by factors
condition must remain limited despite such as test wheel size and inflation
the runway surface area, it takes some pressure, load on the test wheel, and last
time to perform them. On an airport but not least testing speed, which are all
that has infrequent winter weather at least an order of magnitude different
events and thus has limited equipment from those of the aircraft. Airport runway
and personnel available, the time for friction assessment should thus at best
a runway condition assessment and be considered as a way to monitor
runway cleaning may be very similar. trends rather than determine absolute
Yet, when weather “piles up”, both values. It can in no way be used as
are needed. The measurements then primary information to directly derive
allow for validating the success of the landing performance from.
cleaning operations.
The sustainability of the values
The limitation of measurement measured
tools
Measures are performed on a discrete
Contaminant depth basis not only space wise but also
Measuring the contaminant depth time wise. In other words, a measure
is done by means of tripods put is representative of whatever it
on the ground, or lasers, or FOD measures at the time of the measure.
cameras or in very few airports so far, Yet, actual conditions may quickly
sensors built into the runway surface. drift from a measurement performed
Whatever the tool, very dynamic at a given point in time.
weather conditions make it difficult to
perform an accurate measure. Heavy
rainfalls are among these conditions,
OPERATIONS
PERFORMING A SAFE LANDING

ON A CONTAMINATED RUNWAY
Performing a safe landing on a contaminated
runway involves a number of dimensions,
including lateral control, max X-wind… However,
for simplification purposes, this section will
put the emphasis on aircraft performance.
Beyond the dispatch calculation of the
landing performance, preparing to land on a
contaminated runway also relies on a number of
activities in-flight.
Reevaluating landing performance calculation
in-flight
Even if under EASA regulation, land- characteristics described in EASA

ing performance is calculated based CS25.1591 (see SAFETY FIRST n° 10
on the probable contamination before August 2010 P8-11). Airbus concurs
dispatch, it is necessary to re-evalu- with the FAA in recommending a min-
ate the landing performance prior to imum margin of 15% on these dis-
landing. Dispatch considerations will tances, achievable in line operations
most probably no longer apply to the when no unexpected variations occur
actual conditions at the time of land- from reported outside conditions and
ing. In addition, should the conditions assumed pilot technique.
be exactly the ones anticipated, the
most recent in-flight landing perfor- The improvements brought by the
mance models can lead to longer RCAM are so widely recognized that
distances. Indeed, the in-flight land- they allowed EASA, in combination
ing performance models used today with a minimum margin of 15%, to
rely on more realistic assumptions accept a new still safe but more real-
thus allow for deriving more realis- istic (better) performance level for
tic, though often more conservative, POOR. This level is consistent with
landing distances. ICE (COLD & DRY) rather than with
WET ICE (as previously), for which
The model used for all Airbus aircraft the RCAM prohibits operations.
for In-Flight Landing Distance assess- These new computation options have
ment is based on the comprehensive started to appear at the end of 2014
work of the TALPA-ARC group. This on the Airbus fleet and will continue
work relies itself on the contaminants progressively.
OPERATIONS
Assessing realistic worst conditions

Anticipate in which landing is still safe
all the realistic
degradation or While performing the in-flight check
on landing performance, anticipating
mm (1/8 inch) of snow, asking your-
self: “is it going to exceed the critical
aggravating factors all the realistic degradation or aggra- depth of 3 mm (1/8 inch)? If it does,
and determining vating factors and determining the am I still safe?” is a way to proactively
thresholds below which a safe land- get prepared to a safe landing. Like-
the thresholds ing can still be performed is a way to wise if it is raining, “what is the max-
below which a safe cope with the uncertainty of the infor- imum cross-wind under which I can
landing can still be mation available in approach, hence
remove a potential element of sur-
still perform a safe landing” is the kind
of question that contributes to a good
performed prise should one or more parameters preparation to a safe landing.
evolve by the time you actually land.
For example, if it is snowing and the
latest airport report states less than 3
Understanding the margins
As mentioned earlier and illustrated • Pilot timely activation of decelera-

in SAFETY FIRST n°10 fig.5, a 15% tion devices assumed (brakes if no
margin is to be integrated in the cal- Auto-Brake, reversers)
culations of In-Flight Landing perfor- • Lower performance than expected
mance, on DRY, WET and on con- (even if friction models of CS25.1591
taminated runways (Factored In-Flight are generally conservative)
Landing performance), except in case If the 15% margin is fully “eaten” by
of failure. This margin is meant to the sole effect of runway conditions
cover some uncertainty related to a worse than expected, there is no
variety of aspects: margin left for any other deviation as
a slightly long flare or slight pilot lag in
• Pilot achievement of the assumed applying deceleration means.
touch-down location and touch-
down ground speed
BEST PRACTICE
MANAGEMENT OF FINAL APPROACH,
TOUCH-DOWN AND DECELERATION
With the rationale for the recommended 15% safety margin in mind, the man-
agement of final approach, touch-down and deceleration appear as key fac-
tors that deserve special attention upon landing on a contaminated runway.
The following tips are worth keeping in mind:
• Consider diversion to an uncontaminated runway when a failure affecting

landing performance is present
• Land in CONF FULL without speed additives except if required by the condi-
tions and accounted for by appropriate in-flight landing performance assess-
ment, with the auto-brake mode recommended per SOPs
• Monitor late wind changes and GA if unexpected tailwind (planning to land on
contaminated runway with tailwind should be avoided)
• Perform early and firm touchdown (early as runway behind you is no use, firm
to ensure no delay in ground spoiler extension, brake physical onset, and
reverse extension by sluggish wheel spin-up and/or delayed flight to ground
transition of the gear squat switches)
• Decelerate as much as you can as soon as you can: aerodynamic drag and
reverse thrust are most effective at high speed, then moderate braking only
at low taxi speed after a safe stop on the runway is assured
• Do not delay lowering the nose wheel onto the runway (it increases weight
on braked wheels and may activate aircraft systems, such as auto-brake)
• Throttles should be changed smoothly from Reverse max to Reverse idle at
the usual procedure speed: be ready to maintain Reverse max longer than
normal in case of perceived overrun risk
• Do not try to expedite runway vacating at a speed that might lead to lateral
control difficulty (Airport taxiway condition assessment might be less accu-
rate than for the runway)
OPERATIONS
Understanding Weight & Balance
Understanding
Weight & Balance
To “feel” the aircraft response through the flight controls as
being “heavier or lighter” than anticipated at take-off can result
from a weight & balance inaccuracy. In fact, when the CG is
out of the operational limits, the safety consequences can be
far more critical than just a strange feeling.
CATHERINE BONNET XAVIER BARRIOLA

Senior Director Director Flight Safety –
Performance and Weight Accident investigator
& Balance
Customer services
What does actually lie behind the aircraft weight and the
%RC or %MAC mentioned on the load and trim sheet? What
do these limits account for? Beyond the compliance with
regulatory requirements dimension, let’s take a journey through
the underlying physical phenomena at stake. But first let’s take
a look at what can happen when the loading and C of G is
incorrect or becomes out of limits.
A VARIETY OF EVENTS,
A COMMON ORIGIN
Images of airplanes sitting on their tail or
experiencing a severe tail strike or even stalling
right after take-off unfortunately do not all
belong to the past. In recent years, commercial
aviation has faced multiple accidents or serious
incidents related to weight & balance issues.
Tail strike at take-off

While taking-off for the second leg of loaded. The investigation revealed
a flight, a single aisle aircraft experi- that the passengers proceeding to
enced a tail strike. Despite signifi- the second destination airport were
cant damage, the aircraft was able all seated at the back of the cabin and
to turn back and land at departure their luggage was loaded in the aft
airport. The first leg had been une- cargo bay. No movement of passen-
ventful. During the intermediate stop gers between legs took place. The
over, some of the passengers disem- load sheet had been prepared for the
barked the aircraft and their luggage first leg only. The CG position for the
was offloaded. No new passengers second leg turned out to be outside
boarded nor was any new cargo of the safe envelope: it was too far aft.
Unexpected pitch-up during climb

The next story is based on a real cargo detached and moved aft. The
event with a wide body cargo aircraft. CG warning alert went off and the AP
The aircraft was carrying several sim- disconnected. The pilot successfully
ilar heavy pieces of special cargo. manually controlled the aircraft and
During climb, the aircraft experienced eventually landed safely.
an unexpected pitch-up when the
Tail tipping
While being unloaded, a wide body lack of training of the load master
cargo aircraft tipped up on its tail. It on the aircraft type contributed to
turned out that a less than optimum the non-compliance with the correct
shift handover had taken place, and unloading sequence.
OPERATIONS
Tail strike and take-off after runway end

A long-range aircraft type failed to take-off within the runway length, and
experienced a significant tail strike whilst ultimately managing to take-off way
outside the runway limits. The aircraft was severely damaged but fortunately,
was ultimately able to make a successful landing. The investigation revealed
that the aircraft weight entered into the system to compute the take-off speed
was incorrect. One digit was incorrectly entered. While the aircraft weight was
DID 362 tons, the take-off performance data were calculated for a 262 tons air-
craft, thus the expected performance was significantly over estimated. The real
YOU KNOW aircraft performance was much worse than that which had been calculated.
Among the accidents related to a Stall and crash

weight and balance issue*:
- 21% are due to overweight Right after take-off, a long-range wide-body cargo aircraft experienced a vio-
-3 5% are due to a CG which lent pitch-up that couldn’t be recovered by the crew. The rapid decrease in
exceeds the certified limits airspeed led to the aircraft stalling and crash. It turned out that the load had
*National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) broken free and had shifted aft just after take-off.
study for the period 1997-2004
Four recent events, one safety lesson: the impact of weight & balance issues
on a flight can range from merely a “strange feeling” to a fatal accident.
WEIGHT & BALANCE: WHAT IS IT ABOUT?
In order to well understand the impact of weight and balance on the stability and
maneuverability of the aircraft, it is worth getting back to the forces that apply to the aircraft,
and more specifically to focus on the vertical ones.
There are two of them, applying at distinct points along the aircraft longitudinal axis:
• The Weight of the aircraft, applied at the Center of Gravity (CG) of the aircraft;
• The Lift, applied at the Center of Pressure (CP).
The CG is further forward than the CP for aircraft stability reasons. Thus, the more distant the two points,
the bigger the pitch-down moment.
Pitch down moment
Center Center
of Gravity of Pressure
Lift
Weight
The distance between the CG and the CP induces a pitch down moment that needs to be compensated
for to keep the aircraft level. This is done through the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) that exerts a
downward force. This force applies at the THS, thus far from the CG; therefore it creates a big pitch-up
moment, but also increases the required overall lift to keep the aircraft level at the same time.
Pitch down moment
Center Center
of Gravity of Pressure
Lift
THS
Downward
force
Weight
Pitch up moment
Counter moment
OPERATIONS
KEEPING THE CG WITHIN THE

OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE: A
MUST FOR A SAFE FLIGHT
The influence of the CG position on aircraft
performance, stability and maneuverability
varies along the flight, depending on the phase
of flight. The main safety issues related to an
inappropriate position of the CG depend on
whether the CG is forward or aft as developed
hereafter.
CG forward
As explained earlier, the more distant increases the distance between the
the CG and the CP, the bigger the CP and the CG. A CG position further
pitch-down moment. Since for air- forward than the most forward position
craft stability reasons the CP is always of the operational envelope can affect
located behind the CG, a forward CG the safety of the flight in many ways.
Impact on aircraft maneuverability at all phases of flight
A CG position that is too far for- be maneuvered any more.

A CG position ward induces such a big pitch-down
that is too far moment that the aircraft maneuvera- As an example for take-off, if the CG
bility can no longer be guaranteed. position is too far forward, the aircraft
forward induces has such a “heavy nose” that the
such a big pitch- Indeed, the more forward the CG, the correct take-off rotation rate using
bigger the horizontal stabilizer and the elevator becomes impossible
down moment elevator deflections needed to give to reach. The impact of an exces-
that the aircraft the aircraft a pitch-up attitude to com- sively forward CG position on aircraft
maneuverability pensate for the pitch-down moment.
However, at some point of CG for-
maneuverability applies at all phases
of flight. However, it is most noticea-
can no longer be ward position, the horizontal stabilizer ble at low speed due to the reduced
guaranteed. and elevator maximum deflections effectiveness of the elevators.
are reached, and the aircraft cannot
Impact on aircraft performance at all phases of flight

A CG exceeding
A CG exceeding the most forward formance is calculated based on the
CG position of the envelope is also most forward CG position within the the most forward
the most penalizing situation in terms envelope. Therefore, if the CG posi- CG position of
of aircraft performance. tion is even more forward, the actual
aircraft performance will be lower
the envelope is
Indeed, the take-off and landing per- than the calculated one. also the most
penalizing situation
Impact on aircraft structure at take-off in terms of aircraft
performance.
On the ground, the total weight of the if the CG position exceeds the most
aircraft is supported by both the nose forward CG position of the envelope,
and main gears, the further forward the aircraft structural limits of the nose
the CG, the bigger the proportion of landing gear can be reached with a
total weight is carried by the nose consequent risk of damage.
landing gear. At high weights (TOW),
OPERATIONS
CG aft
A CG aft position brings the CG close most aft position of the envelope can
to the CP. Yet, exceeding the CG lead to a variety of safety issues.
Impact on aircraft controllability at …
… Go-around … Take-off
In case of go-around, setting TOGA At lower take-off weight (for exam-
power induces a significant pitch-up ple for a positioning flight or short
moment that needs to be compen- leg flight), a CG position too far aft
sated for. The more aft the CG, the impairs the nose wheel controlla-
bigger the pitch-up moment. If the CG bility during taxi and at the begin-
is too far aft, and outside the enve- ning of the take-off run. Indeed, the
lope, the pitch-up moment induced weight of the aircraft being mostly on
by initiating the go-around may be too the main gear, the adherence of the
big to be compensated for. nose wheel to the ground is limited.
At low speed, high angle of attack and This is especially true on wet or con-
TOGA power, the pitch-up moment taminated runway surfaces. Until the
(fig.1)
increase due to having a CG position aircraft reaches a sufficient speed for
Tail strike at take off
too far aft, may also trigger the alpha the rudder to be effective, nose wheel
floor protection, thus prevent its suffi- steering is the only way to control the
cient compensation. aircraft. The nose wheel adherence is
even further reduced when full power
is applied for take-off due the induced
pitch-up moment.
This “very light nose” effect of too aft
a CG position also makes the rotation
so easy that it could as easily lead to
a tail strike (fig.1). In some cases, the
aircraft will “self rotate” without any
action by the pilot.
Impact on aircraft structure at take-off
As mentioned earlier, on the ground, landing gear can be reached with a

the total weight of the aircraft is sup- consequent risk of damage.
ported by both the nose and main
gears. Therefore, the further aft the Likewise, in such high TOW con-
CG, the bigger the weight on the ditions, the load on the wings may
main landing gears. At high weights exceed their structural limit. This is
(TOW), if the CG position exceeds the the reason why the speed is limited
most aft CG position of the envelope, during taxi for turns.
the aircraft structural limits of the main
Eventually, a CG outside the operational envelope may significantly

impair the aircraft capabilities, and thus ultimately jeopardize the A CG outside
safety of the flight.
the operational
envelope may
significantly
impair the aircraft
capabilities, and
thus ultimately
jeopardize the safety
of the flight.
OPERATIONS
Summary along the flight path of the main safety impacts of an ill-located CG
HOW TO MAKE SURE THE CG

IS AND REMAINS WITHIN
A SAFE ENVELOPE
THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT?
Both the CG position and the safe envelope evolve
throughout the flight. Indeed, the weight of the
aircraft evolves mainly as fuel is burned. As for the
CG, its position is sensitive to various phenomena
ranging from landing gear, flaps and slats position DID
to passengers or cabin crew movements from one
end of the cabin to the other.
YOU KNOW
On an A320 37,57m long, the
Although there were attempts at an operational envelope that includes maximum distance along which
developing systems to measure the safety margins and to perform a the CG position may move is
aircraft weight and CG position, no correct CG calculation. Indeed, as 1.34m i.e 4%.
robust solution has yet been found. explained in the previous section, On an A380 72.57m long,
The best way to make sure the an excursion of the CG outside of its it is 1.97m i.e 3%.
CG remains within a safe envelope operational envelope could lead to
throughout the flight is to both define dramatic consequences.
Understanding the safety margins

Determining the CG safe envelope results from calculations based on a num-
ber of assumptions. These assumptions are simplifications of the actual but
evolving aircraft situation. They include inaccuracies and uncertainties that
need to be compensated for. This is the purpose of the safety margins taken
to define the operational envelope. Among the sources of inaccuracies and
uncertainties are:
• The determination of the dry actual CG position is usually lim-

operating weight of the aircraft: ited. In case of free seating though,
This weight is based on the aircraft some significant difference may
weighing results and on assump- exist between the actual and the
tions on the weight of items on calculated CG positions with poten-
board such as catering or crew. tial impact on safety (see insert Free
From one weighing to another the seating section);
aircraft weight may evolve;
• Moving parts of the aircraft: The
• Weight of passengers and their
hand luggage: In the CG deter-
CG position is calculated based
on a given aircraft configuration.
DID
mination a single average passen- Yet, in the course of the flight, the YOU KNOW
ger weight is taken into account aircraft configuration evolves: flaps
to reflect as much as possible the and slats are retracted, landing gear On an A320, a duty free trolley of
reality. moves up…; 150kg rolling from the back end to
the front of the aircraft moves the CG
• Passengers embarkation: Some • In-flight cabin movements: A sin- by more than 5cm out of a 1.34m
changes in passengers seating may gle passenger moving from one end leeway.
occur either before or during the of an aircraft to the other is sufficient
flight. Their impact on the aircraft to affect the CG position.
OPERATIONS
• Cargo loading: Although there are the difference may require to fill
relatively few errors on the cargo in the trim tank with a significant
weight there may be some in the impact on the CG. The fuel logic
distribution of containers; of the A340-500/600, A380, 350
is based on weight rather than vol-
• Fuel weight and distribution: The ume. Therefore these aircraft types
fuel density used to perform the are less sensitive to this aspect;
calculation is not always the actual
density. It is indeed quite sensitive • Calculation method: The figures
to temperature. A tank full in vol- used to calculate the CG position
ume doesn’t always correspond to are rounded off.
the same weight. In some cases,
FREE SEATING: FREEDOM UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY
As a passenger, choosing your seat at the very last minute, when entering an aircraft relatively empty may be
exciting. From a weight and balance viewpoint, it is another story. Free seating means uncertainty in terms
of CG position, thus special caution to make sure the CG is within operational limits. Indeed, if free seating
doesn’t affect the total weight of the aircraft, it affects weight distribution, even more so if the cabin is not
fully occupied.
In order to determine the aircraft CG position, the aircraft cabin is divided and modeled in several sections,
usually 2 to 4. The aircraft CG position is calculated based on each section’s weight and relative CG position.
The assumption is that passengers are at the barycenter of the section.
When less than 80% of the seats are occupied in the cabin, not knowing where the passengers are
seated may lead to a difference between the actual CG and the calculated one that can reach 2 to 3%.
This translates into a significant difference between the actual and expected aircraft behavior.
The pilot will trim the aircraft for take-off using the calculated CG. If at take-off, the actual aircraft behavior is
different from the expected one, the risk is that the pilot overreacts to this discrepancy. The type of reaction
will depend whether he/she feels the aircraft nose too heavy or too light.
In order to prevent this, except for A318/319 where the cabin is small enough, it is needed to split the cabin
into at least 3 sections to have sufficient precision.
Ensuring consistency between actual operations

and load and trim sheet calculations
For each flight, a load and trim sheet is to be developed to ensure the CG will
remain within the operational envelope. A number of assumptions are made
when doing so. Ensuring that the calculated CG corresponds to the actual
aircraft CG requires consistency between these assumptions and the actual
operational framework and practices. Among the aspects that can challenge
this consistency are:
• Assumptions on the weight of ry-on luggage with new items com-

passengers and their hand lug- monly taken onboard such as com-
gage: The average weight to be puters, cameras, cell phones…;
considered for a passenger and his/
her carry-on luggage is mentioned • Last minute changes: To load a
in regional regulations. Yet, in some container at the last minute is an
regions, the assumptions date back operational practice that may signifi-
from quite a long time whereas a cantly impact the aircraft weight and
variety of sociological evolutions balance. If not updated accordingly,
have taken place. The average both the weight of the aircraft and the
weight of passengers tends to CG position calculated are incorrect
increase. So does the weight of car- (see insert Last minute changes);
• Fuel burned during taxi: In reality, mis-conception as they believed

the impact of the fuel burned for that the fuel burned first was that of
taxiing on the CG position is very the tank filled last, namely the trim
limited. The fuel mainly comes from tank (for aircraft equipped), which is
the inner tanks. For a while, some not the case in reality.
people in the industry held a serious
Eventually, if the calculation underlying assumptions are realistic, the calculated

CG position is as good an estimate as possible. Still, in order to compensate
for a number of inaccuracies, safety margins are required to make sure that the
CG will remain within a safe envelope throughout the flight. These margins are
the ones that allow for defining the operational envelope.
LAST MINUTE CHANGES

To load a container at the last minute, because “there is room for it” is tempting for an airline. Recalculating the weight
and CG position “at the last minute” is no option from an operations viewpoint for the delay it would induce. Yet, from
a safety standpoint, a last minute change involves not only an increase in weight but also a change in the CG position
that need to be considered carefully to avoid an excursion of the CG outside the safe envelope in the course of the flight.
A good compromise that allows for reconciling the two perspectives is to calculate the maximum impact of LMCs and
integrate it into the safety margins calculation.
Keeping the CG within a safe envelope

throughout the flight: a collective effort
As mentioned earlier, the CG safe envelope depends on the aircraft weight.
As for the CG position, it depends on the weight distribution along the aircraft.
In practice, making sure the CG remains within the operational limits relies on a
wide range of actors and actions that can be summarized as follows:
Actor Actions
Airbus Provide the aircraft weight at delivery, and raw data on
positions and maximum weight of elements that can be
loaded.
Provide also the CG and Weight limits applicable
to the aircraft
Airline ops Determine the operational limits (one for Take-off

and another one for Zero Fuel).
Load planner Prepare a load sheet ensuring the CG remains within

the operational limits: one per segment/flight.
Load master Load and secure the cargo at the anticipated places.
Load and unload according to the predefined
sequence.
Pilots During the walk around, visually “notice” the contrac-

tion/extension of the landing gear oleos and also the
angle of any nose wheel steering link to carry out a
gross error check for loading normally.
Type in the correct values into the aircraft systems to
compute aircraft performance. Cross-check aircraft
performance with the other pilot.
Check the CG is within the operational limits.
OPERATIONS
Wind shear
Wind shear:
an invisible enemy
to pilots?
Weather plays a significant role in aviation safety and is
regularly cited as a contributing factor in accidents or major
incidents. Wind shear in the form of microbursts particularly,
can be a severe hazard to aircraft during take-off, approach
and landing.
JEAN DANEY XAVIER LESCEU

Director Flight Safety – Experimental Test Pilot
Accident Investigator
As commercial aviation began to develop in the middle of

the last century, we knew very little about wind shear. The
detection and reporting of wind shear related events was
actually really poor. Yet, in its many forms, although actual
encounters with severe wind shear are fairly remote in a pilot’s
career, this phenomenon can change a routine approach into
an emergency recovery in a matter of seconds.
As research and technology progressed, we have learned to
identify, prevent and if necessary, handle such events.
We will look at the effects of wind shear on an aircraft and at
piloting techniques for coping with a shear situation, focusing
more particularly on microbursts.
UNDERSTANDING WIND SHEAR
Definitions
>> Wind shear
Wind shear can be defined as a sud- decreasing headwind or increasing

den change in wind velocity and/or tailwind, or a shift from a headwind The change in
direction over a short distance. It can to a tailwind – of up to 100 knots
occur in all directions, but for conven- per nautical mile. (Fig.1) shows
velocity or direction
ience, it is considered along vertical how a penetration would appear as can drastically
and horizontal axis, thus introducing an aircraft crosses a cold front. alter the aircraft
the concepts of vertical and horizon-
tal wind shear: This weather phenomenon can occur lift, indicated
• Vertical wind shear consists of wind at many different levels of the atmos- airspeed, and thrust
variations along the vertical axis of phere; however it is most dangerous
typically 20 to 30 knots per 1000 ft. at the lower levels, as a sudden loss
requirements when
The change in velocity or direction of airspeed and altitude can occur. climbing
can drastically alter the aircraft
lift, indicated airspeed, and thrust It is usually associated with the follow-
or descending
requirements when climbing or ing weather conditions: jet streams, through the wind
descending through the wind shear mountain waves or temperature shear layer.
layers. inversion layers, frontal surfaces,
• Horizontal wind shear consists of thunderstorms and convective clouds
variations in the wind component or microbursts, occurring close to the
along the horizontal axis – e.g. ground.
>> What is a microburst?

COLD C
A microburst clearly creates the most Microbursts are either dry (i.e. little or
B
dangerous forms of wind shear. It con- no rain reaches the ground) or wet
sists of a small column of exceptionally (usually within a downpour). They typ- A
intense and localized sinking air, which ically form under or close to thunder-
descends to the ground (called “the storms and cumulonimbus clouds in Wind-Shift Line
downdraft”) and upon contact with the particular (fig.2).
earth’s surface, diverges outwards in The radial pattern means winds of var-
WARM
all directions, thus forming a ring vor- ious directions within a small area, and
tex. It is capable of producing powerful hence considerable wind shear near
(fig.1)
winds near ground level. the ground, for up to several minutes. Horizontal wind shear
OPERATIONS
Wind shear
(fig.2)
Microburst caused by a cumulonimbus
Typical characteristics of microbursts

Size Covers an area less than 2.5 nautical miles in diameter.
Downdrafts are 40 knots (4000 ft/minute), horizontal winds

Intensity
between 45 and 100 knots.
Duration Approximately 15 minutes.

Visual signs Often associated with heavy thunderstorms, embedded in heavy rain.
Microbursts: a threat to aviation safety

From a safety perspective, microbursts bring a threat to aircraft due to the
scale and suddenness of this phenomenon. To put it briefly, microbursts com-
bine two distinct threats to aviation safety (fig.3):
• The downburst part, resulting in • The outburst part, resulting in large

strong downdrafts that rapidly push horizontal wind shear and wind
the aircraft downward. The power of component shift from headwind to
the downburst can actually exceed tailwind. This sudden change from
aircraft climb capabilities. headwind to tailwind reduces the lift
of the aircraft, which may force the
aircraft down, typically during take-
off or landing.
An aircraft actually encountering a microburst in the vicinity of an airfield while

it is about to land or take-off, may be flying through 3 different and difficult
phases of wind conditions at a critical phase of flight, at low altitude. For exam-
ple, an aircraft flying through a microburst at landing should expect to encoun-
ter the following phases:
>> Phase 1: Headwind
•
When first entering a microburst, •
To descend the aircraft back on
the pilot notices a performance its descent path and decrease
enhancing headwind gust, which speed, the pilot will naturally retard
instantaneously increases the air- the engines and push the side
craft airspeed, thus causing lift and stick, thereby forcing the aircraft to
the aircraft to rise above its intended descend.
path and/or accelerate (see (fig.3),
items 1 and 2).
>> Phase 2: Downdraft

A microburst
•
As the aircraft continues into the • The pilot, now traveling at a lower
microburst, it meets a sudden speed and pushed downwards, will
is a serious threat
surge of downdraft affecting both attempt to regain the original trajec- to flight because
the aircraft flight path and then the tory by initiating a climb. of its direct and
Angle-Of-Attack (AOA): the aircraft
will sink and the AOA will increase aggressive impact
(see (fig.3), item 3). on the aircraft
>> Phase 3: Tailwind
airspeed, altitude,
Angle-Of-Attack,
•
As the pilot attempts to climb to
recover his/her altitude, the aircraft
•
The tailwind gust instantaneously
decreases the aircraft lift and air-
and thus, lift
now experiences a change in wind speed and thus, it tends to make capability.
direction and encounters a tailwind. the aircraft fly below its intended
path and/or decelerate(see (fig.3),
item 4).
A microburst is a serious threat to flight because of its direct and aggres-

sive impact on the aircraft airspeed, altitude, Angle-Of-Attack, and thus,
lift capability.
(fig.3)
Effects of a microburst on aircraft
performance
Downburst
1
2 Gust front
3
Headwind Tailwind
4
OPERATIONS
Wind shear
PREVENTION: HOW TO DETECT

AND AVOID WIND SHEAR
Wind shear has a negative effect on aircraft

performance and is therefore a real threat
to the safe conduct of flight. The best line of
defence against such hazards is: detection and
avoidance.
Since the discovery of the effects of priate actions. In practice, flight crew
wind shear on aircraft performance in awareness and alertness are key fac-
the early 1980’s, different tools have tors in the successful application of
been developed to help pilots recog- wind shear avoidance techniques.
nize these events, and take appro-
Wind shear awareness and detection means

The best ways a pilot can prevent an encounter with wind shear is to know
wind shear is there and to avoid it where possible. However, should an encoun-
ter be unavoidable, it is important to know the likely magnitude of the change,
and be prepared to react immediately. Although there is no absolutely reliable
way to predict the occurrence, different tools and information can be used to
detect areas of potential or observed wind shear, and thus be able to develop
efficient avoidance strategies.
A good >> Weather reports and forecast

communication Many airports – particularly those These devices are able to detect
between flight that are prone to microburst and microbursts and warn aircraft of their
crews and ATC wind shear – are now equipped occurrences by sending an alert to
with a Low Level Wind shear Alert- ATC. In this respect, a good com-
is essential. ing System (LLWAS) and/or a Termi- munication between flight crews and
nal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR). ATC is essential.
INFORMATION
The LLWAS is comprised of a central anemometer (sensing wind velocity and
direction) and peripheral anemometers located approximately two nautical
miles from the center. Central wind sensor data are averaged over a rolling
two-minute period and compared every 10 seconds with the data from the
peripheral wind sensors.
There are two LLWAS alerting modes: wind shear alert and microburst alert. A
wind shear alert is generated whenever the wind speed loses 15 to 29 knots,
or gains more than 15 knots. Microburst alert condition is when the wind speed
loses more than 30 knots. LLWAS may not detect downbursts with a diameter
of 2 nm or less. This system enables Air Traffic Controllers to warn pilots of
existing or impending wind shear conditions.
The TDWR enables to detect approaching wind shear areas and thus, to pro-
vide pilots with more advance warning of wind shear hazard.
>> Crew observations
Blowing dust, rings of dust, dust dev- of potential or existing downburst. A

ils (i.e. whirlwinds containing dust and large difference between actual wind
sand), intense rainfall or any other evi- (on ND) and wind reported by tower
dence of strong local air outflow near can also be a good indication. There-
the surface often are good indications fore it is better to avoid these areas.
>> Pilots’ reports (PIREPS)
PIREPS of wind shear in excess of bursts intensify for several minutes

20 knots or downdraft / updraft of after they first impact the ground, the
500 ft per minute below 1000 ft above severity may be higher than that ini-
ground level are all good indications tially reported. Conversely, the micro- Remember that
of severe conditions and should be burst reported may well have dissi-
avoided at any time. pated by the time the aircraft plans to
the aircraft ahead
Considering that these conditions cross the incriminated area. may experience
develop, change or dissipate rap-
idly, those reports should however
Therefore it is very important to
remember that the aircraft ahead may
vastly different
be interpreted with great care and experience vastly different conditions conditions than
judgement. A pilot must consider the than the following one will encounter the following one
amount of time since the report was in the same airspace.
made. Indeed, knowing that micro- will encounter in the
same airspace.
>> On-board weather radar
Generally microbursts are accom- on-board weather radar. Those areas

panied by heavy rainfalls, which can should be avoided.
be detected and identified using the
OPERATIONS
Wind shear
>> On-board predictive wind shear system
Today, most aircraft models have pre- The PWS provides typically a one-min-
dictive wind shear equipment to warn ute advance warning by showing first
pilots of possible threats via aural and an amber “W/S AHEAD” message on
visual means. the PFD (fig.4).
To provide an early warning of poten- If conditions worsen and the wind

tial wind shear activity, some on-board shear location gets closer to the air-
weather radars feature the capability to craft, the “W/S AHEAD” amber cau-
detect wind shear areas ahead of the tion turns into a red warning and is
aircraft, based on a measure of wind associated with an aural synthetic
velocities ahead of the aircraft both ver- voice “WIND SHEAR AHEAD, WIND
(fig.4) tically and horizontally. SHEAR AHEAD” during take-off,
“W/S AHEAD” predictive caution
display on PFD
or “GO AROUND, WIND SHEAR
This equipment is referred to as a Pre- AHEAD” at landing. This is a pos-
dictive Wind shear System (PWS). This sible indication that the aircraft is
system is active and provides reliable indi- approaching a microburst.
cations between 50 and approximately
1000 feet above the ground surface.
>> Summary
Flight crew should consider all availa- • Weather radar implemented at

ble wind shear awareness means and airports. These systems serve to
assess the conditions for a safe take- detect microbursts in close proxim-
off or safe descent, approach and ity to the airport and send out alerts
landing based on: to both pilots and ATC alike.
• Most recent weather reports and • On-board weather radar to ensure
forecast. Pay a careful attention to that the flight path is clear of hazard
ATC indications in particular. areas.
• Visual observations. • On-board Predictive Wind shear
• Crew experience with the airport System (PWS).
environment and the prevailing
weather conditions.
Operational best practices: how to avoid wind

shear and get prepared altogether
The wealth of tools and indications listed previously should allow crews to
gather sufficient knowledge about the weather conditions ahead, and thus
plan accordingly. But how can these pieces of information be best used to be
prepared to react and effectively avoid an actual encounter with wind shear?
Here are a few tips.
>> Take-off
• Consider delaying the take-off until • Use the weather radar (and the
conditions improve. Remember predictive wind shear system, as
a downburst is not a long-lasting available) before commencing the
phenomenon and can clear within
minutes.
take-off roll to ensure that the flight
path is clear of hazard areas.
BEST
• Select the most favourable • Select the maximum take-off PRACTICE
runway and initial climb out path, thrust.
considering the location of the • Closely monitor the airspeed and If wind shear is suspected, or is de-
likely wind shear / downburst. This speed trend during the take-off tected by the Predictive Wind shear
may involve asking ATC for “an roll to detect any evidence of wind System (PWS), delay the take-off.
immediate left or right turn after shear.
take-off to avoid”.
>> Descent and approach
• When downburst / wind shear • Closely monitor the airspeed,

conditions are anticipated based speed trend and ground speed
on pilots’ reports from preceding during the approach to detect
aircraft, or based on an alert issued any evidence of imminent wind
by the airport LLWAS, the approach shear. If the presence of wind
and landing should be delayed until shear is confirmed, be prepared
conditions improve, or the aircraft for a possible missed approach
should divert to a more suitable and escape maneuver. A
airport. minimum ground speed should be
• Select the most favourable holding maintained to ensure a minimum
point, approach path and runway, level of energy to the aircraft, and to
considering the location of the likely ensure proper thrust management
wind shear / downburst condition, during the approach in case of
and the available runway approach sudden headwind to tailwind
aids. change. This is automatically
• Select less than full flaps for performed on Airbus fly-by-wire
landing (to maximize the climb aircraft by the Ground Speed mini
gradient capability) and adjust the function, when the speed target is
final approach speed (i.e. VAPP)
accordingly.
managed.
• In anticipation of a possible wind
BEST
• If an ILS is available, engage the shear event, be alert to respond PRACTICE
autopilot for a more accurate immediately to any predictive
approach tracking. wind shear advisory, “W/S If wind shear is suspected, or is de-
• If a gusty wind is expected, consider AHEAD” caution or warning. tected by the Predictive Wind shear
an increase in VAPP displayed on the And be prepared to perform a System (PWS), delay the approach
FMS CDU (a maximum of minimum missed approach or go-around if until conditions improve, or divert to
approach speed (i.e. VLS) + 15 knots necessary. a more suitable airport.
is allowed).
OPERATIONS
Wind shear
RECOVERY: HOW TO
RECOGNIZE AND HANDLE
ACTUAL WIND SHEAR
CONDITIONS
Despite the available prevention means, an
actual encounter with wind shear can happen.
A timely recognition of this weather phenomenon
is crucial to allow enough time for the crew to
decide on the next course of action.
As far as wind shear is concerned, the encounter, piloting techniques exist for
best course of action is almost always coping with a shear situation.
avoidance. But in case of an actual
Recognition
As rare as an actual encounter with severe wind shear may be, timely recog-
nition of this condition is key for the successful implementation of wind shear
recovery / escape procedures.
>> How to strengthen the wind shear situational awareness
The following deviations should be • Vertical speed excursions of 500 ft/

considered as indications of a possi- minute
ble wind shear condition: • Pitch attitude excursions of 5
• Indicated airspeed variations in degrees
excess of 15 knots • Glide slope deviation of 1 dot
• Ground speed variations • Heading variations of 10 degrees
• Analog wind indication variations: • Unusual autothrust or auto throttle
direction and velocity activity.
>> On-board reactive wind shear system
A reactive wind shear warning system The wind shear warning system asso-
is available on most aircraft models. ciated to the Speed reference System
(SRS) mode of the flight guidance con-
This system is capable to detect a wind stitute the Reactive Wind shear Sys-
shear encounter based on a measure tem (RWS), since both components
of wind velocities, both vertically and react instantaneously to the current
(fig.5) horizontally. When it activates, the variations of aircraft parameters.
“WINDSHEAR” reactive warning audio “WIND SHEAR” is repeated 3
display on PFD times, and a red “WINDSHEAR” warn-
ing appears on the PFD (fig.5).
Recovery technique for wind shear encounter
The aircraft can only survive severe floor protection, even if TOGA was
wind shear encounters if it has already selected (do not forget to
enough energy to carry it through the disconnect the Autothrust in this
loss-of-performance period. It can case, when out of alpha floor).
sustain this energy level in the follow- • If possible, trade height energy for
ing three ways: speed. Any aircraft can do this.
• Carry extra speed. The aircraft does
this automatically when in approach Proper pilot technique helps in this
in managed speed (Ground speed process, providing the following few
mini). recommendations are duly followed,
• Add maximum thrust. The aircraft in a timely manner.
does this automatically with alpha
>> During take-off
If a wind shear is detected by the exceeding the target V1) and the
RWS or by pilot observation during pilot assesses there is sufficient run-
the take-off roll, V1 may be reached way remaining to stop the aircraft.
later (or sooner) than expected. In
this case, the pilot may have to rely • After V1:
on his/her own judgement to assess if - Maintain or set the thrust levers
there is sufficient runway remaining to to the maximum take-off thrust
stop the aircraft, if necessary. (TOGA);
- Rotate normally at VR;
In any case, the following recovery - Follow the Flight Director (FD) pitch
techniques must be applied without orders if the FD provides wind
delay: shear recovery guidance, or set
• Before V1: the required pitch attitude as rec-
Reject the take-off if unaccept- ommended in the FCOM.
able airspeed variations occur (not
OPERATIONS
Wind shear
>> During initial climb, approach and landing
If a wind shear is detected by the pilot, • Applying full back stick on Airbus
or by the RWS, during initial climb or fly-by-wire aircraft, or flying close
approach and landing, the following to the stick shaker / stall warning
recovery technique must be applied Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) on aircraft
without delay: models that do not have full flight
envelope protection, may be nec-
• Set the thrust levers to the maxi- essary to prevent the aircraft from
mum take-off thrust (TOGA); sinking down;
• If the Auto Pilot (AP) is engaged • Do not change the flaps and land-
and provides wind shear recovery ing gear configuration until out of
BEST guidance, keep the AP engaged;
or, if the AP is not engaged, do
the wind shear condition;
• Closely monitor airspeed, airspeed
PRACTICE not engage it. Follow the FD pitch trend and flight path angle (if flight
command if the FD provides wind path vector is available and dis-
If wind shear is detected by the Reac- shear recovery guidance, or set the played to the PM);
tive Wind shear System during take- required pitch attitude, as recom- • When out of the wind shear, let the
off or approach, recover with max- mended in the FCOM; aircraft accelerate in climb, resume
imum thrust and follow the Speed • Level the wings to maximize the normal climb and clean aircraft con-
Reference System (SRS) guidance. climb gradient, unless a turn is figuration.
required for obstacle clearance;
NOTE
To recover from an actual wind shear encounter, recovery measures are indi-
cated in the FCOM ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES. Refer
to PRO-ABN-80, or FCOM Inclement Weather Operations on A300/A310/
A300-600.
RWS and PWS compared characteristics
RWS PWS
- Detect in the wind shear - Detect ahead of the aircraft

PURPOSE - Guidance to escape - Guidance to avoid the event
- Aural - Aural
WARNING - Visual - Visual
- Comparison between inertial - Doppler weather radar

PRINCIPLE and aerodynamic data
SUMMARY: OPERATING IN
WIND SHEAR CONDITIONS
Considering the threat that a severe The following key points and recom-
wind shear represents to safety, mendations on avoidance, recogni-
the best option is always to avoid it tion and recovery can be considered
whenever possible. Nevertheless, in for the development of company
the case of an actual encounter with strategies and initiatives aiming to
wind shear, it is essential to recognize enhance wind shear awareness.
it and then, recover from it.
Avoidance
• Assess the conditions for a safe more suitable airport.
take-off or approach-and-landing • Be “go-around minded” when flying
based on all the available meteor- an approach under reported wind
ological data, visual observations shear conditions.
and on-board equipment. • Be prepared and committed to
• As far as possible, delay the take- respond immediately to a predictive
off or the approach, or divert to a wind shear caution or warning.
Recognition
•
Be alert to recognize a potential and on the monitoring of the aircraft
or existing wind shear condition flight parameters and flight path.
based on all available weather data, •
Scan instruments for evidence
on-board equipment indications of impending wind shear. NOTE
To safely operate an aircraft in wind
Recovery shear or downburst conditions, best
recommendations are indicated in
•
If a wind shear warning occurs, •
Make maximum use of aircraft the FCOM SUPPLEMENTARY PRO-
apply the recommended FCOM equipment, such as the flight-path CEDURES.
recovery / escape procedure i.e. vector (as available).
set maximum thrust and follow the
FD wind shear recovery / escape
pitch guidance.
Wind shear can be a serious threat to aviation safety. Thanks to

extensive research into the understanding of the phenomenon,
efficient equipment is now available to assist pilots in identifying,
avoiding and if necessary, handling wind shear conditions. With the
technology, flight crew awareness and alertness are key factors in
the successful application of avoidance techniques and recovery
/ escape procedures.
But above all, remember that avoidance is undoubtedly the best
defence against the hazards of wind shear.
ARTICLES PUBLISHED
IN PREVIOUS
‘SAFETY FIRST’ ISSUES
Issue 18 Issue 17 Issue 16
July 2014 January 2014 July 2013
• Control your speed... at take-off • Airbus Brake Testing • Performance Based

• Safe operations with composite •H ard Landing, a Case Study Navigation: RNP and RNP AR
aircraft for Crews and Maintenance Approaches
• Learning from the evidence Personnel • Atlantic Airways: Introduction
• A320 Family cargo Containers/ •A ircraft Protection during Washing of RNP AR 0.1 Operations
pallets movement and Painting • Flight Crews and De-Icing
• Parts Departing from Aircraft (PDA) •F light Data Analysis (FDA), Personnel – Working together
a Predictive Tool for Safety in Temporary Teamwork for
Management System (SMS) safe Skies
•F lying a Go-Around, Managing • Low Speed Rejected Take-Off
Energy upon Engine Failure
• Late Changes before Departure
January 2013 July 2012 January 2012
• The Golden Rules for Pilots •T hrust Reverser Selection means • A320 Family / A330 Prevention
moving from PNF to PM Full-Stop and Handling of Dual Bleed Loss
• Airbus Crosswind Development •T ransient Loss of Communication • The Fuel Penalty Factor
and Certification due to Jammed Push-To-Talk • The Airbus TCAS Alert Prevention
• The SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS A320 and A330/A340 Families (TCAP)
SMOKE Procedure • A380: Development of the Flight • A380: Development of the Flight
• Post-Maintenance Foreign Controls - Part 2 Controls - Part 1
Objects Damage (FOD) Prevention • Preventing Fan Cowl Door Loss • Facing the Reality of everyday
• Corrosion: •D o not forget that you are not Maintenance Operations
A Potential Safety Issue alone in Maintenance
July 2011 January 2011 August 2010
• Airbus New Operational •W hat is Stall? • A380: Flutter Tests

Landing Distances How a Pilot Should React in Front • Operational Landing
• The Go Around Procedure of a Stall Situation Distances: A New Standard
• The Circling Approach •M inimum Control Speed Tests for In-flight Landing Distance
• VMU Tests on A380 on A380 Assessment
• Automatic Landings • Radio Altimeter Erroneous Values • Go Around Handling
in Daily Operation •A utomatic NAV Engagement at • A320: Landing Gear Downlock
Go Around • Situation Awareness and Decision
Making
February 2010 July 2009 February 2009
• A320 Family: Evolution of Ground • The Runway Overrun Prevention • Airbus AP/FD TCAS Mode:
Spoiler Logic System A New Step Towards Safety
• Incorrect Pitch Trim Setting at • The Take-Off Securing Function Improvement
Take-Off • Computer Mixability: • Braking System Cross
• Technical Flight Familiarization An Important Function Connections
• Oxygen Safety • Fuel Spills During Refueling • Upset Recovery Training Aid,
Operations Revision 2
• Fuel Pumps Left in OFF Position
• A320: Avoiding Dual Bleed Loss
July 2008 December 2007 June 2007
• A320: Runway Overrun • New CFIT Event During Non • Operations Engineering Bulletin
• FCTL Check after EFCS Reset on Precision Approach Reminder Function
Ground • A320: Tail Strike at Take-Off? • Avoiding High Speed Rejected
• A320: Possible Consequence of • Unreliable Speed Take-Offs Due to EGT Limit
VMO/MMO Exceedance • Compliance to Operational Exceedance
• A320: Prevention of Tailstrikes Procedures • Do you Know your ATC/TCAS
• Low Fuel Situation Awareness • The Future Air Navigation Panel?
• Rudder Pedal Jam System FANS B • Managing Hailstorms
• Why do Certain AMM Tasks • Introducing the Maintenance
Require Equipment Resets? Briefing Notes
• Slide/raft Improvement • A320: Dual hydraulic Loss
• Cabin Attendant Falling through • Terrain Awareness and Warning
the Avionics Bay Access Panel Systems Operations Based on
in Cockpit GPS Data
December 2006 September 2005 January 2005
• Dual Side Stick Inputs • Tailpipe or Engine Fire • Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due
• Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer • Managing Severe Turbulence to VOR Reception Problems
Damage • Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP) • The Importance of the Pre-flight
• Pitot Probes Obstruction • Runway Excursions at Take-Off Flight Control Check
on Ground • A320: In-flight Thrust Reverser
• A340: Thrust Reverser Unlocked Deployment
• Residual Cabin Pressure • Airbus Flight Safety Manager
• Cabin Operations Briefing Notes Handbook
• Hypoxia: An Invisible Enemy • Flight Operations Briefing Notes
NOW AVAILABLE
ON TABLETS

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The Airbus Safety Magazine

The Airbus safety magazine

Safety first, #19 January, 2015. Safety first

Something similar happens in situations that we encoun-

This issue of Safety first magazine will take you behind

At this time of challenge to safety, our thoughts are with

Domains: pictograms at the beginning of each article characterize the

Flight operations Engineering

Maintenance Ground operations

SAVE THE DATE NEWS

THE “CLEAN COCKPIT” PHILOSOPHY

XAVIER BARRIOLA DAVID MARCONNET

At the beginning of 2014, the crew of a cruising A330 and

LOOSE ITEMS IN THE COCKPIT:

Common sense generally instructs anyone

Each one of the above incidents must serve as important reminders of

PREVENTION: A PLACE FOR

The 2014 event could have resulted in far worse

DID YOU KNOW

Loose items in a cockpit environment are not welcome: they can

THE QUESTION OF PERFORMANCE

ROBERT LIGNEE LARS KORNSTAEDT

Landing on a contaminated runway may be an almost daily

CONTAMINATED RUNWAY: WHAT

If weather can to some extent be anticipated,

In some situations though, the contam- of the contaminant be no longer true

A large runway surface area

HOW ARE RUNWAY CONDITIONS

For pilots, the main reason why runway

Contaminant type & depth

Estimated surface friction (ESF)

Integrating the various types of information on

THE CHALLENGE OF PROVIDING MEASURES ON RUNWAY CONTAMINATION

Providing quantitative information on runway contamination combines two major

PERFORMING A SAFE LANDING

Even if under EASA regulation, land- characteristics described in EASA

Assessing realistic worst conditions

Understanding the margins

As mentioned earlier and illustrated • Pilot timely activation of decelera-

• Consider diversion to an uncontaminated runway when a failure affecting

CATHERINE BONNET XAVIER BARRIOLA

Tail strike at take-off

Unexpected pitch-up during climb

Tail strike and take-off after runway end

Among the accidents related to a Stall and crash

WEIGHT & BALANCE: WHAT IS IT ABOUT?

Pitch down moment

Pitch down moment

KEEPING THE CG WITHIN THE

Impact on aircraft maneuverability at all phases of flight

A CG position that is too far for- be maneuvered any more.

Impact on aircraft performance at all phases of flight

Impact on aircraft controllability at …

Impact on aircraft structure at take-off

As mentioned earlier, on the ground, landing gear can be reached with a

Eventually, a CG outside the operational envelope may significantly

HOW TO MAKE SURE THE CG

Understanding the safety margins

• The determination of the dry actual CG position is usually lim-

FREE SEATING: FREEDOM UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY

Ensuring consistency between actual operations

• Assumptions on the weight of ry-on luggage with new items com-

• Fuel burned during taxi: In reality, mis-conception as they believed

Eventually, if the calculation underlying assumptions are realistic, the calculated

As mentioned earlier and illustrated • Pilot timely activation of decelera-

• Consider diversion to an uncontaminated runway when a failure affecting

• The determination of the dry actual CG position is usually lim-

• Assumptions on the weight of ry-on luggage with new items com-

• Fuel burned during taxi: In reality, mis-conception as they believed

• The downburst part, resulting in • The outburst part, resulting in large

Flight crew should consider all availa- • Weather radar implemented at

• When downburst / wind shear • Closely monitor the airspeed,

The following deviations should be • Vertical speed excursions of 500 ft/

- Detect in the wind shear - Detect ahead of the aircraft

- Comparison between inertial - Doppler weather radar

• Control your speed... at take-off • Airbus Brake Testing • Performance Based

• Airbus New Operational •W hat is Stall? • A380: Flutter Tests