GAMILLA v MARIÑO square meters of "lot 2082 Albay Cadastre.
square meters of "lot 2082 Albay Cadastre." On appeal, the decision was
FACTS:
Atty Marino, Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other
union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting to
P35 Milllion. The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but
efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989, the faculty members
of UST went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the
employment of 16 officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including
Atty Marino, Jr.
The Sec of Labor prescribed the retroactivity of the collective
bargaining agreement to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of UST and the
UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the
payment to settle backwages.
The important fact in this case is that Atty, Marino, as president,
negotiated with UST as union attorney, even though he was an interested
party since he was one of the officers who were dismissed (conflict of
interests)
ISSUE: WoN Marino should be reprimanded?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. Atty Marino failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he
negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse
roles of union president, union atty and interested party being one of the
dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he
obtained the attys fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the
circumstances justifying such clain to the members of the UST Faculty
Union.
2. As one of the 16 union officers and directors seeking
compensation from the UST for their illegal dismissal, Atty. Marino was
involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as
concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the
compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is
“whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an atty from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. In
the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an atty to put
himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels
him to do less than his best for his client.
3. Atty Marino. Both as lawyer and president of the union was duty
bound to protect and advance the interest of the union members and the
bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was jeopardized when his
personal interest complicated the negotiation process and eventually
resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly
brought money to him at the expense of the other faculty members. He also
ought to have disclosed his interest (which he only did only years after the
consummation of his share.. tsk bad.)
SHIRLEY TOLEDO and ROSIE DAJAC vs. JUDGE KALLOS
Facts: Prior to his appointment as a judge, Judge Kallos was complainants’
counsel of record in a Civil Case involving the recovery of hereditary shares
with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the
defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the
plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executor.
In 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, a Civil Case for the
issuance of an order constituting in his favor an attorney’s lien to the extent
of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants representing
his attorney’s fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement
on attorney’s fees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled
to one-third share of what would be awarded to the complainants. He
claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when "one of
the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of
damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the other two lots
went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share.
Later, the complainants filed a complaint praying for three things. First,
they pray for an order directing the respondent to stop demanding his "1/3
share attorney’s fees. Second, the recovery of the property involved in said
Deed of Absolute Sale. Lastly, the removal of the respondent from his
position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.
Issues:
1.WON respondent has the right to demand his attorney’s fees.
Held: Yes. Respondent judge was, indeed, complainants’ counsel in a Civil
Case and he should therefore be compensated for his services. The act of
demanding payment for his attorney’s fees is not a ground for
administrative liability.Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility “
A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees”.As what constitute fair
and reasonable fees in this case is not yet certain. The respondent’s claim
for attorney’s fees was still being litigated in a Civil Case.Thus, said
reasonable fees is not yet certain.
As a lawyer, it is but just that he be fairly compensated for his services. And
his filing of a claim for attorney’s fees in a Civil Case was an appropriate
legal remedy. Considering the pendency of such claim, the suspension of
the determination of the instant administrative complaint until the rendition
of a final judicial ruling on the matter of respondent’s attorney’s fees is just
proper. In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative
evaluation. The hearing on the matter being conducted by the trial court
should be allowed to run its course as that court is the appropriate forum for
a ruling on the dispute.
Here,the duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and
lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful
fees.
2. WON respondent Judge be removed from his position as RTC judge for
his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge
Held:No. There was no evidence presented to prove respondent’s alleged
abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. Here, the respondent was not yet a
judge when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly committed by him.
As such, and to that extent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict
standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct for acts committed as counsel to
a case prior to his appointment as a judge.
SC: the instant administrative complaint was DISMISSED for being
premature and for lack of merit.
DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-
634. JUNE 10, 2002
Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him
recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand
letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former
intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the
lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in
the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has
already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice
Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in
the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court
to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the
news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office
of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner
found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only
when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the
complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own
purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him
by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000
deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing
fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees
for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the
time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and
his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds.”
PNB v ATTY CEDO
Facts: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02
that states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving gov’t. service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he had
intervened with in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of
the Asset management Group of PNB.
During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became
involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.)
intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action
arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the
counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the
Almedas were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.
Cedo claims that he did not participate in the
litigation of Ms. Ong’s case. He also claims that even if it was his law firm
handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.
Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.
Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.
In the complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between the atty. and the client, inquiry of the nature suggested
would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said
as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client information given to him
in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all the parties concerned after the disclosure
of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.
GLORITO MATURAN vs. ATTY. CONRADO GONZALES
Sps. Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in law, Glorito
MAturan as their atty- in-fact, thru a SPA. Said SPA authorized MAturan to
file ejectment cases against squatters occupying the lot, located in GEnSan
as well as criminal cases against the latter for violation of PD 772 again in
connection with the lot. Respondent, prepared and notarized said SPA.
Subsequently, Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting
several squatters occupying the lot. While the said lot was registered in the
name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a
case for reconveyance of property and declaration, instituted a case for
reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former.
Respondent declared that he was of the belief that the filing a motion for
issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client
relationship between himself and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal
as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-
client relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his
acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to
honestly earn a little more for his children’s sustenance.
HELD: Respondent here was guilty of representing conflicting interests
thus, he was suspended for two years. It is improper for a lawyer to appear
as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a
related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests
or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. That the representation of
conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of
the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. The reason for the
prohibition is found in the relation of atty and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. As lawyer becomes familiar with all the
facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given
him to take advantage of client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest
confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will
suffer by the loss thereof.
A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of motion for writ
of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the
case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the
same to the prejudice of his client.
ERLINDA ABRAGAN ET.AL. VS. ATTY MAXIMO RODRIGUEZ A.C. NO.
4346. APRIL 3, 2002
Facts: Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the
respondent to represent in a case before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro
City. The case was won by the complainants. Subsequently, when the
lawyer allegedly surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with other
persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer – client relationship.
On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against
Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent
represented the sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants
was a former student of respondent, said counsel, egged by the
suggestions of respondent withdrew the case without the petitioner’s
consent. That as a result of such withdrawal, subsequent events occurred
to the prejudice of the complainants.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred.
Held: Yes. In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.”
NAKPIL v VALDES
Facts:
Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in
Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the
latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil.
Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands’
titles were transferred to his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the
services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of
the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the
list of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he
contracted.
What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI.
While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint
for disbarment against Valdes.
The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA
reversed the CFI.
The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was
decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in
trust for Nakpil.
Issue:
W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his
acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting
firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN
against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Held:
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for
1 year.
The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes
broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to
use his professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear
that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be
buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property
from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own
benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose
and him (they had a close relationship since the 50’s), which was the basis
for Imelda’s decision to use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the
case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of
its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm
prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict
between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of
the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
77 ARTEZUELA v MADERAZO
Facts: Echavia had a vehicular accident in Mandaue City. Echavia was
driving a Ford Telstar owned by a Japanese national but in the name of his
brother-in-law Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by
Artezuela.
Artezuela engaged the services of Atty.
Maderazo in filing a damage suit against Echavia. Artezuela paid Maderazo
the amount of P10,000 as attorney’s fees and P2,000 as filing fee.
Artezuela filed a suit for disbarment against
Maderazo. She alleged that Maderazo grossly neglected his duties as a
lawyer. According to Artezuela, atty. did not do anything to keep the case
moving and atty. withdrew his services without obtaining Artezuela’s
consent. Artezuela also alleged that Atty. Maderazo engaged in activities
inimical to her interests. She says that while acting as her counsel, Atty.
Maderazo prepared Echavia’s answer.
Atty. Maderazo claims that the document of
Echavia was not prepared by him. According to him, the answer by Echavia
was only printed in his office.
Issue: W/N Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests.
Held: Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests. Suspension of 6
months.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a
counsel-of-record of one party need not also be the counsel-of-record of the
adverse party. He does not have to hold himself as the counsel of the
adverse party. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the
preparation of the pleading of another party who is claiming adverse and
conflicting interests with that of the original client.
Because of the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and the client, sound public policy dictates that the lawyer be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties.
CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO
Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly
registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25,
1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the
complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to
refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP
investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of
office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994,
the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
commissioner's report and recommendation. 2
As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:
On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent
Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation
by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc.
On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent
and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of
even date (Exh. "3-b").
On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's
retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several
employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of
filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the
case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a
complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing
in their behalf. 3
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his
oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma,
Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We
agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of
office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for
reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering
on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath". 4
However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency
to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or
admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in
the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990
at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August
1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his
family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the
family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense
for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client
relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself
and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against
Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake
and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in
the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him
afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client
under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the
former case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in
the highest degree. 7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An
attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of
the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the
secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and
client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the pursuance of a request from the latter. Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to
confidence of the people. 9 receive a reasonable compensation.
Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent
is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on Atty Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed by Dee when
April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a Dee alleged that Mutuc was acting as agent of Ceasar’s Palace. Mutuc’s
year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an representations in behalf of petitioner Dee were not in resistance to the
examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional casino’s claim but were actually geared toward proving the liability of true
Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after debtor, Ramon Sy.
the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his
mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must
start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal
profession as well.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of
law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record the defenseless or oppressed;
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts
and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable
DEE v CA means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to
present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may
Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty Mutuc to seek his advice be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother
Dewey Dee, to Ceasar’s Palace. Petitioner’s father was apprehensive over Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an
the safety of his son, Dewey having heard of a link between the mafia and attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if
Ceasar’s Palace and his possibility that his son may be harmed at the upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to
instance of the latter. employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to
secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
Atty Mutuc assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless
matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000. he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Further investigations revealed that the alleged debt of Dewey had actually
been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing for the chits. Atty Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of
Mutuc talked with the president of Ceasar’s palace and advised the secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of
president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to
better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor
him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or
Dewey would be exculpated from liability. Ramon Sy acknowledged the of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal
obligation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was cleared. any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.
Atty Mutuc sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
P50,000 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner Dee ignored said letters. Atty Mutuc solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a
filed a complaint against petitioner Dee for the collection of attorney’s fees. client or having received confidential information from said client in a case,
shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without
Petitioner denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney the consent of his first client.
and client between hin and Atty Mutuc. Dee insists that the visits made to
Atty Mutuc was merely informal and that Atty Mutuc had not been
specifically contacted to handle the problem. The P50,000 given to Atty
Mutuc was alleged to be given not in the nature of attorney’s fees but
merely pocket money.
Issue:
W/n there was a lawyer-client relationship…
Held:
YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that
there was a professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for
professional services rendered. To establish the relationship, it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in
 CANON 14
A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

The relation of attorney and client may be created not only by the voluntary agreement between them but also by the appointment of an attorney as counsel de oficio for a poor or indigent litigant, and the attorney so appointed has as high
a duty to the indigent as to his paying client.

*RULE 14.01

Rule 1138, S. 20(h). Duty of attorneys:

x x x never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.

Rule 138, s.20 (i).

In the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion to the guilt of the accused to present every evidence that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life
or liberty, but by due process of law.
Rule 14.01 however is not applicable in civil cases because of obvious reasons. It is the lawyer’s duty –
“© To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear o him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.” (Rule 138, section 20 ©, RRC)

when the lawyer signs a complaint or answer, his signature is deemed a certification by him “that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support xxx” (Rule 7, Section 5,
ROC). For violating this rule, the lawyer may be subjected to disciplinary action.

*RULE 14.02

I. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO
 A counsel de officio is the counsel appointed by the court to represent and defend the accused in case he cannot afford to employ one himself

Rule 138, s. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants:

A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to
secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Rule 116, s.7 – Appointment of counsel de oficio. WHO CAN BE APPOINTED COUNSEL DE OFFICIO?
WHO:

1. members of the bar in good standing;

2. any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, in localities without lawyers
WHAT CONSIDERED:

1. gravity of offense
2. difficulty of questions that may arise
3. experience and ability of appointee

II. AMICUS CURIAE

Rule 138, s. 36

Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Definition: bystander; “friend of the court” whose function is “to remind the court or tribunal of some matter which otherwise might escape its notice and in regard to which it might be wrong. One who gives information upon some
question of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken, or upon a matter of which the court may take judicial cognizance.

*RUL 14.03

The rule involves indigent clients who come to a lawyer for legal services. Under Rule 138, Section 31 of the Rules of Court, a judge may assign a lawyer to render a professional service free of charge to any party in a case, if upon
investigation, it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney. The lawyer assigned must render the required legal service unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient of cause shown.