1

A Hybrid Routing Protocol for Unobservable

Security in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks

Vinothini.V1,Yuvaraj.R2 and Dr.P.S.K.Patra 3

1
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Agni College of Technology, Anna University
Chennai – 603 103,Tamilnadu,India
vinothinivijayan@gmail.com

2
Research Scholar, Anna University
Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India

3
Head of the Department, Department of Computer Science and Engineering ,Agni College of Technology, Anna University

ABSTRACT
Security of mobile ad hoc network is crucial due to
infrastructureless network and mobility of wireless media. In
this paper, we propose an Hybrid Routing Protocol for
Unobservable Secured (HRPUS) to offer privacy preservation
to all types of packets. HRPUS works with USOR
(Unobservable Secure on-demand Routing protocol)to protect
against blockhole attack. In ad hoc network, when a source
searches for a route to a destination using HRPUS protocol, an
intermediate node can reply with its cached entry. To
strengthen correctness of such routing discovery process, we
propose a method in which the intermediate node requests its
next hop to send a confirmation message to the source. After
receiving both route reply and confirmation message, the
source determines the validity of path according to its
policy. As a result, this strategy discourages malicious nodes
from intercepting packets. Simulation results show remarkable
improvement in throughput with moderate increase of control
messages.
Keywords: Anonymity, privacy, protocols, security.
1. Introduction
Compared to wired networks, Mobile ad-hoc networks
are more vulnerable to both active and passive attacks.
Wireless transmissions are easy to capture remotely and
undetected, whilethe lack of central management and
monitoring make network nodes susceptible to active
attacks. Providingsecurityfor MANETs is a possible for a node to forge the route reply message so
challenging task, and many researchershave engaged in
designing protocols for diverse security related task such
as key management, authentication, confidentiality, etc.
Recently researchers have also tackled theproblem of
privacy protection in wireless networks.
Privacy preserving routing properties [3]:
Anonymity: Anonymity is the state of being not
identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.
The senders, receivers, and intermediate nodes are not
identifiable within the whole network.
Unlinkability: The linkage between any two or more
item protected from outsiders. Note linkages between
any two messages, e.g., whether they are from the same
source node, are also protected.
Unobservability: Any meaningful packet in the
routing scheme is indistinguishable from other
packets to an outside attacker. Not only is the content of
the packet but also the packet header like packet type
protected from eavesdroppers. And any node involved in
route discovery or packet forwarding, including the
source node, destination node, and any intermediate
node, is not aware of the identity of other involved.
There are many research efforts to overcome the
vulnerability in wireless ad hoc networks such as
security in the routing protocol, authentication and
authorization problem, Among many problems in the
wireless environment, we concentrate on the routing
robustness in this paper. In many on-demand ad hoc
routing protocols, intermediate nodes can answer route
discovery request from the source if they have a route to
the destination in their route caches. However, it is
that it may accomplish its malicious attempt. From the
above observation, it is obvious that malicious nodes can
easily corrupt routing information, which may cause
communication failure in the network.
In this paper, we present a method that detects such a
routing misbehaviour by making a neighbour of the

replying node send a confirmation message to the
source.
2. Related Work
A. Routing in ad hoc networks by USOR
Routing protocols for ad hoc networks are
challenging to design: wired networksprotocols are not
suitable for an environment where node mobility
andnetwork topology rapidly change; such protocols also
have highcommunication overheadbecause they send
periodic routing messages even when the network is not
changing. Sofar, researchers in ad hoc networking
have studied the routing problem in a non-
adversarialnetwork setting, assuming a reasonably
trusted environment. However, unlikenetworks using
dedicated nodes to support basic functions like packet
forwarding,routing, and network management, in ad
hoc networks, those functions are carried out byall
available nodes. This very difference is at the core of the
increased sensitivity to nodemisbehaviour in ad hoc
networks and the current proposed routing protocols are
exposedto many different types of attacks.
In MANET, most of them exploit public key
cryptosystems [4] to achieve their goals. These schemes
fail to protect all content of packets from attackers,so
that the attacker can obtain information like packet type
and sequence number etc.
An unobservable secure on-demand routing protocol
[1] based on group signature and ID-based cryptosystem
provide complete unlinkability and content
unobservability.For the colluding outsiders, privacy
information is perfectly protected with USOR. As the
attacker is unable to distinguish a meaningful packet
from a dummy packet, USOR can provide complete
protection for privacy with an appropriate traffic
padding scheme. Even if the target node is surrounded
by more than one attack node, given the assumption
that no node is totally surrounded by compromised
nodes, the attacker is unable to perceive anything except
some random dummy packets. If appropriate dummy
traffic is injected into the network, the colluding
outsiders cannot gain any privacy information about the
network at all.
For the colluding insiders, USOR still offers
unobservability as promised. Though information
disclosure is unavoidable for colluding insiders, and the
adversary knows some keys, the information that the
colluding insiders can obtain is largely restricted by
USOR. The attackers are able to know: 1) a target node
is involved in a route discovery procedure since it is
broadcasting a RREQ packet; 2) a target node is the
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previous hop or the next hop on a path. However, the
colluding insiders are not able to know identity of the
target node or other intermediate nodes on route.
According to the design of USOR, authentication and
key establishment is achieved by group signature, which
perfectly protects user identity from disclosure.
Consequently, unobservability is guaranteed by USOR
under colluding insider attacks according to the
definition of unobservability.
In the Sybil attack [4], a single node presents multiple
fake identities to other nodes in the network. Sybil
attacks pose a great threat to decentralized systems like
peer-to-peer networks and geographic routing protocols.
In USOR, the centralized key server generates group
signature signing keys and ID-based keys for network
nodes. Thus, it is impossible for the adversary to obtain
other valid identities except the compromised ones.
Nevertheless, the anonymity feature of USOR allows the
adversary to launch Sybil attacks which are similar to
collusion attacks discussed above. As discussed in the
collusion attack part, USOR is able to count such attacks
effectively.Although USOR protect packets from
collusion attack and Sybil attack it does not protect
blokhole attack. To protect against blockhole attack, we
propose a method in which the intermediate node
requests its next hop to send a confirmation message to
the source. After receiving both route reply and
confirmation message, the source determines the validity
of path according to its policy.
3. Methodology
A. A Hybrid Routing Protocol for Unobservable
Security
In HRPUS protocol strengthens the correctness of route
information sent by intermediate nodes. Also, it helps
source node filter out possibly stale route information.
By intermediate nodes, we mean nodes that are on a
path between source and destination. Our scheme
requires only two types of additional control messages,
and does not entail extraneous overhead, for example,
operating in promiscuous mode. Our protocol is simple
and interoperable with most on-demand routing
protocols. And, many authentication methods can be
combined with our protocol.
In this paper, we only describe how our protocol
operates with USOR. In addition to RREQ and RREP in
USOR, our scheme also uses the following control
packets: Route Confirmation Request (CREQ) and
Route Confirmation Reply (CREP). On finding a route
to the destination in its cache, an intermediate node
sends RREP back to the source. At the same time, our
protocol requires the intermediate node to send CREQ to
its next hop node toward the destination. Then, after

receiving CREQ, the next hop node looks up its cache
for a route to the destination. If it has one, it sends
CREP to the source with its route information. Then,
the source is able to learn whether the path in RREP is
valid by comparing the information with CREP. On the
other hand, when the destination initiates RREP, CREQ
and CREP are not necessary, since the destination
should give correct route if it wishes to receive data
packets.
Let us take an example. Figure 1 shows an example of
ad hoc network. Suppose node F (Source node) wants to
send data packets to R (Destination node) and has
no route. Suppose further that intermediate node C has
a route to R in its cache. To find a route, F sends RREQ.
B receives and broadcasts this RREQ. When C receives
RREQ from B, C finds it has a route to T and sends
RREP back to F through B. In addition, C also sends
CREQ to its next hop, say D, asking for validation of
RREP. D sends CREP to F if it also knows a route to R;
otherwise, it does nothing. F believes the path claimed
by C only after receiving CREP from D.
If F does not receive CREP from D within a pre-
determined amount of time, it believes that the path is
less reliable, and uses other route for data transmission.
If F receives CREP but the information from the two
does not match, it can choose whether to use the path
according to its policy.
Our protocol discourages malicious nodes that try to
advertise falsely good paths in order to hinder path
finding procedures or intercept all data packets. For
example, even though malicious node C tries to advertise
a better path than it actually has, this attempt can be
precluded since CREP from D will have different
information. So our protocol can avoid blackhole attack,
in which a malicious node advertises that it is on the
shortest path to any particular destination and drops all
packets.
Figure.1 HRPUS Protocol
Architecture
In addition, our protocol ensures robustness of a
path. Intermediate nodes can send RREP after finding a
route to destination. Even though cache contents are
regularly refreshed, there can be stale information and
inconsistency between nodes. In our example, suppose
that C and D both had a route to R in their caches and
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that the route in D is removed for some reason(e.g.
timeout, route failure), while C still has it. Since route
caches of C and D are inconsistent, the path is unlikely
to be available. Hence, it is better to use a more reliable
path if F has another. In our scheme, since Fdoes not
receive CREP from D, it will avoid the possibly stale
path.
Although our protocol is not a node trust rating
system, it is compatible to such notion and can be used
as a basis scheme to identify non-conforming nodes. For
example, suppose C does not want to forward packets
from others (to save battery, etc.) and advertises worse
route than it has. This attempt can be detected when F
receives CREP from D. Based on this information,
rating scheme can be devised.
On the other hand, two colluding nodes can
circumvent our scheme. In our previous example,
suppose C and D are malicious nodes and they are
colluding. Even though C sends RREP with incorrect
information, D will send CREP that supports incorrect
RREP from C, and F will think routing information
from C is correct. In this paper, we only consider
possibility of malicious nodes acting alone. We refer
this protocol as Hybrid. Because, in this example
finding the route from F to C is done by on-demand
basis and from C to R is done by table driven basis.
4. Simulation Result
A. Simulation Environment and Parameters
Network Simulator 2 (ns-2) is used for simulation. ns-
2 is originally developed by the VINT project [20], and
later extended for ad hoc network simulation by the
MONARCH project.
In this scenarios, which are used as inputs to
simulations. Each movement scenario file determines
initial positions and subsequent movements of all nodes.
Traffic scenario files specify source-destination pairs,
and starting and ending times of each communication
session, which are determined in an independent and
random manner.Four different traffic scenarios are
generated during simulation in HRPUs. The simulation
parameters are shown in table. I
TABLE I : SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation Time 500ms
Scenario Dimension 150m x 120m
Wireless Radio Range 250m
Number of Mobile nodes 26

Average Node Speed 0-10m/s
Source-Destination Pair 10
Traffic Type 512-byte CBR traffic
Wireless Bandwidth 2Mbps
Node Pause Time 0s
In the simulation, we consider different parameters
such as the number of malicious nodes, mobility and
policy at source. We use four different numbers of
malicious nodes (0, 2, 4 and 8), and four different pause
times (10, 20, 30, and 40) for performance evaluation.
B.Simulation Result
We implement an HRPUS in NS2. All the
information regarding node is saved in trace file. The
data transmission using HRPUS is shown in figure.2.
Figure.2 Data transmission in
HRPUS
The performance of our scheme is evaluated
against USOR, using the following metrics:
Data packet delivery ratio: The percentage of data
packets delivered to destination with respect to the
number of packets sent. This metric shows the
reliability of data packet delivery.
Figure.3 shows delivery ratio as a function of the
number of malicious nodes. Both USOR and HRPUS
protocol perform well in case of no malicious nodes.
In the presence of malicious nodes, however, the
delivery ratio of HRPUS protocol exhibits 30% higher
delivery ratio than USOR. In USOR, a malicious node
replies to RREQ pretending a neighbor to destination,
and Receives source into choosing the path in RREP
as the shortest path to destination. Consequently, data
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packets sent through the path will not be delivered to
destination. However, HRPUS protocol does not accept
paths replied by malicious nodes since they are not
confirmed. As a result, it maintains relatively high
delivery ratio by avoiding such less reliable routes.
Figure.3 Delivery
Ratio
Data transmission overhead: The ratio of the number
of packets sent or forwarded to the number of received
packets at the destination. This metric reflects the
efficiency of data packet delivery.
Figure.4 Data Transmission Overhead
Data transmission overhead is shown in Figure 4. We
can observe that HRPUS protocol has lower data
transmission overhead than USOR by around 10%.
Packets forwarded through incorrect path increase
transmission overhead since data packets cannot be
delivered to destination despite packet forwarding. In
USOR, since source chooses the path based on RREP, it
may use the path including malicious nodes, which
cause packet loss and consequent increase in data
transmissions overhead. On the other hand, the use of
confirmation packets in HRPUS protocol precludes
paths containing malicious nodes, reducing data
transmission overhead as a consequence.
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4. Conclusions

In this paper, we proposed an unobservable secure

hybrid routing protocol scheme that strengthens
robustness of routing information in ad hoc networks.
Simulation results validate the effectiveness of our
protocol against blackhole attack. With malicious nodes,
delivery ratio and Data Transmission of HRPUS
protocol givesbetter performancethan USOR protocol.

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