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15 Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the

Origin of the Uniqueness Rule for
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic
mathieu marion and mitsuhiro
o kad a

1. Introduction
Reuben Louis Goodstein studied mathematics at Cambridge from
1931 until 1935.1 His work on ordinal notation systems of transfinite
ordinal numbers, under the supervision of John Littlewood, is at the
basis of the result that bears his name, “Goodstein’s theorem”.2 He was
also one of Littlewood’s students that attended Wittgenstein’s lectures.
Although there is no reason to believe that Wittgenstein was particu-
larly close to Goodstein, it seems that he nevertheless held him in some
degree of esteem. Indeed, when Wittgenstein cancelled his lectures in
1933 and chose instead to dictate The Blue Book to a selected group of
students, which included Goodstein, alongside Alice Ambrose,
Margaret Masterman and two further mathematics students,
H. S. M. Coxeter and Francis Skinner. Goodstein and Skinner had
been close friends since their schooldays at St. Paul’s, London.3 This
may explain why upon Skinner’s death in 1941, Wittgenstein mailed to
Goodstein a number of important manuscripts that had been until then
in Skinner’s possession, including a set of revisions to The Brown
Book.4

1
On Goodstein’s life, see Rose 1988.
2
See Goodstein 1944. Goodstein’s theorem is a purely number-theoretic statement
using implicitly the fact that all strictly decreasing sequences of transfinite ordinal
notational systems up to ε0 are finite. Its importance was only recognized when
Laurence Kirby and Jeff Paris showed that it provides a concrete example of
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, i.e., a true number-theoretic statement which
not provable within first-order Peano Arithmetic (Kirby & Paris 1982).
3
See Monk 1990, 336.
4
These manuscripts resurfaced in 2002, and are now housed at Trinity College.
For detailed information about their content, see Gibson 2010.
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254 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

On the other hand, Goodstein was deeply influenced by Wittgenstein

and kept praising him both in print and in his lectures.5 For example, in
his first philosophy paper, ‘Mathematical Systems’, Goodstein wrote:
. . . for [the paper’s] critical ideas I am indebted, to a far greater extent than it
will be possible to make apparent by references and acknowledgements, to
my former teacher Dr. L. Wittgenstein (Goodstein 1939, 58).

He also wrote in the preface to Constructive Formalism, published

while Wittgenstein was still alive:
Of the many friends who have helped, encouraged and inspired this work,
first and foremost I must mention Ludwig Wittgenstein, to whose lectures in
Cambridge between 1931–34 and the many conversations I was privileged to
have with him, I am immensely indebted; only in recent years have I grown to
understand how much he taught me. (Goodstein 1951, 10)

Aside from his theorem, Goodstein is also known for his contribu-
tion to the foundations of mathematics, with studies of recursive arith-
metic and analysis,6 and one of his important but lesser-known
contributions in this context is his introduction in 1945 of a rule of
uniqueness of a function defined by recursion. This rule allows one to
dispense with the principle of mathematical induction for primitive
recursive arithmetic. We show that Goodstein owed this idea to
Wittgenstein, who introduced it in his MS 113, in May 1932, and
then lectured about it a few days later, in front of Goodstein. After
a brief explanation of the meaning and purpose of this rule in the next
section, we ask in Section 3 why Wittgenstein needed it, and in
Section 4 explain the reasoning that led him to it. In Section 5, we
discuss the light these developments shed on broader, related philoso-
phical issues, and we conclude with some remarks on the middle
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. We limit our discussion
throughout to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, at the
expense of a detailed presentation of the mathematical logic involved,
skipping unnecessary routine details. Our presentation is thus infor-
mal, but minimal knowledge of logic and algebra is unavoidably pre-
supposed. There are, alas, historical issues that we could not get into;

5
Robin Gandy, who got his first appointment at Leicester in the 1950s thanks to
Goodstein, told one of us in conversation that Goodstein kept referring
frequently to Wittgenstein in his lectures as well as in conversation.
6
See Goodstein 1957 and Goodstein 1961.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 255

we regret in particular not being able to discuss further Paul Bernays’

role in the discovery of the uniqueness rule.

2. From Mathematical Induction to the Uniqueness Rule

One way to understand the significance of the uniqueness rule is to
think of it in terms of the connection between logic and arithmetic.
There are three ways one might envisage this connection. First, one
might see arithmetic as based or “founded” on logic, as logicists
notoriously suggested. A second possibility, which was first suggested
by Hilbert in 1904, is that of a “simultaneous” or “common construc-
tion” of logic and arithmetic (Hilbert 1967, 131). First formulations of
mathematical induction from these perspectives were second-order, of
the form:
∀F (F(0) & ∀x(F(x) → F(Sx)) → ∀x F(x)) (ISO)
Logicists would prove (ISO) as a theorem of second-order logic, but
others, such as Hilbert later on, introduced it as an axiom. As first-
order logic emerged as the proper framework for mathematics,7
axioms such as (ISO) where replaced by the now standard first-order
schema:8
(F(0) & ∀x(F(x) → F(Sx)) → ∀x F(x) (IS)
As we shall see, Thoralf Skolem’s ideas played an important role in
Wittgenstein’s thinking on these issues, so we would like to focus very
briefly on his role within these developments. In 1922, he had already
argued, for the purpose of showing the relativity of its notions, that set-
theory should be formulated within first-order logic.9 He also had
worries concerning the quantifiers,10 and in 1923 he developed
7
Hilbert was the first properly to distinguish first-order logic as a distinct
subsystem of logic in his 1917 lectures. His suggestion of a first-order
axiomatization of Peano Arithmetic in 1922 (Hilbert 1998) was followed by
Wilhelm Ackermann in his doctoral dissertation. (See Ackermann 1924, 34 for
a proof from the axioms of the ε-calculus, and Zach 2003 for details.) One
should not confuse this development with related issue of the proper system of
logic needed for the foundations of mathematics – for example, Hilbert &
Ackermann introduced not first or second-order, but ω-order logic for that
purpose in Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik (1928).
8
See Herbrand 1968, 109–110, for an early statement of the need to resort to
a schema.
9
Skolem 1967a. See Moore 1988, 123. 10 See Skolem 1967b, 304 & 332.
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256 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

arithmetic within a quantifier-free calculus, with introduction axioms

(rules) for primitive recursive functions, in which theorems are free-
variable formulas (Skolem 1967b). He simply assumed a formal rule
for induction in his proofs, however, and did not state one explicitly.
Taking into account Gödel’s incompleteness results, Hilbert &
Bernays followed Skolem’s lead in formalizing primitive recursive
arithmetic in a calculus of equations, in chapter 7 of Grundlagen der
Mathematik, vol. 1, because they believed that it corresponds to
“intuitive” (anschaulich) finite number theory.11 They provided
a first-order axiom schema that corresponds to (IS) as well as an
inductive rule, restricting F(x) to quantifier-free arithmetical
formulas.12
When (IS) is taken in its full generality, F(x) ranges over all first-order
arithmetical formulas and goes beyond the scope of his primitive
recursive arithmetic, given that the latter is expressed in quantifier-
free equations. Thus, F(x) should be taken here in the restricted sense
of equality between terms:
u(x1, . . ., xn)=v(x1, . . ., xn),
where u and v are terms composed of primitive recursive functions.
Omitting parameter variables for simplicity’s sake, Skolem’s implicit
induction rule may be stated in natural deduction form, for arbitrary
terms u(x), v(x), as follows:13

uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ
..
.
uð0Þ ¼ vð0Þ uðx þ 1Þ ¼ vðx þ 1Þ (IR)
uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ

One may observe a conceptual simplification, doing away in (IS)

with second-order quantification in (ISO), and with seemingly doing
away here with quantifiers in (IS) (although one might argue they are
somehow “hidden”, as we shall see in section 5). Goodstein’s rule of
uniqueness could thus be seen against this backdrop as providing
a purer algebraic (language) framework, within an “equation calculus”
that formalizes primitive recursive arithmetic; a language not only

11 12
Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 286. Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 264/265.
13
See Okada 2007, 123.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 257

without quantifiers, but also with no explicit logical connectives: in

other words, within a calculus which is claimed not to incorporate the
propositional calculus.14
This equation calculus could thus be seen as involving a third possi-
bility: logic and arithmetic are just independent calculi. Haskell Curry
first devised such a calculus in 1941, but he kept a variant of mathema-
tical induction.15 It was Goodstein who introduced the rule of unique-
ness in ‘Function Theory in an Axiom-Free Equation Calculus’.16 In his
own words:
The rule that function signs are equivalent if they satisfy the same intro-
ductory equations renders superfluous the postulation of the Principle of
Mathematical Induction. Inductive proofs of the equivalence of two func-
tions f(x), g(x) proceed by establishing, first the equation f(0)=g(0), and
then the implication “f(x)=g(x) → f(x+1)=g(x+1)”; the basis of this implica-
tion is the expression of f(x+1) as a function of f(x) and g(x+1) as the same
function of g(x), and so proof by induction consists in showing that two
function signs satisfy the same recursive introductory equations.
(Goodstein 1945, 407)17

With arbitrary terms u(x), v(x), w(x, y) and S the successor function,
the rule can be stated thus:18





uð0Þ ¼ vð0Þ u SðxÞ ¼ w x; uðxÞ v SðxÞ ¼ w x; vðxÞ
(UR)
uðxÞ ¼ vðxÞ

This rule asserts the “uniqueness” of a function defined by primitive

recursion:
u(S(x))=w(x, u(x)).
Goodstein provided a proof that (UR) implies mathematical induc-
tion for primitive recursive arithmetic.19 Thus, while logicists claimed

14
Goodstein presented his equation calculus in, e.g., Goodstein 1954; 1965,
63–72; 1971, chap. 7.
15
Curry 1941, 2.74.
16
Goodstein 1945. Although published in 1945, Goodstein’s paper was in fact
written in the late 1930s and submitted in 1941. These developments are thus
nearly simultaneous, albeit independent.
17
We modified the symbol for implication.
18
Omitting parameter variables again for reasons of simplicity.
19
See Theorems 2.8 & 3.7–3.81 in Recursive Number Theory (Goodstein 1957,
55 & 66–67).
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258 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

that mathematical induction is a theorem of higher-order logic,

Goodstein claimed instead that it is a theorem of an arithmetical
equation calculus. The foundational significance of this mathematical
result cannot be explored here, we simply point out the importance of
expressing mathematical induction in equation form for various equa-
tion-based systems, such as primitive recursive arithmetic in a pure
equation form, higher-type extensions (primitive recursive func-
tionals), category theoretic versions of arithmetic, etc.20
If Goodstein got the idea of a uniqueness rule from Wittgenstein,
then it should be counted, to paraphrase him, as one of the
Wittgenstein’s most important contributions to the foundations of
mathematics.21 It is thus remarkable that this contribution has seldom
been noticed in the secondary literature,22 although Goodstein him-
self was quite explicit about it, already in 1945 as well as in a late
paper on ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’ (1972).
It cannot be said to have received its proper place in the interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. It is worth stressing in
this context, as Goodstein himself did, that replacing (IS) with (UR) is
not the outcome of some philosophical critique of mathematical
induction:
. . . the omission of induction as a postulate is justified, not by any criticism of
induction, but because induction is provable in the calculus. (Goodstein
1972, 282)

Wittgenstein’s remarks on mathematics were often misconstrued in the

past as stemming from a “strict finitist” standpoint that rejects math-
ematical induction,23 and attempts at understanding them were by the
same token often stifled by the idea that he could not have held
philosophical theses at all, let alone theses perceived to be so obviously
at variance with mainstream mathematics. Goodstein’s comment
shows, however, that Wittgenstein was – at least on this score – guilty
of no such sins.

20
For example, see Lambek 1988, and the discussion in Okada & Scott 1999.
21
Goodstein 1972, 280.
22
With the exception of von Plato 2014, previous discussion of this topic is solely
by the present authors. The first mentions of Wittgenstein as the source of
Goodstein’s uniqueness rule, other than Goodstein himself, are in Marion 1995,
155, Marion 1998, 107, and Okada 2007.
23
See Marion 1998, chap. 8.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 259

3. A Brief Look at the Tractatus

Because of the war, Goodstein’s paper was only published in 1945, but
he had already sent a first draft (now lost) to Paul Bernays in 1940, and
he apparently revised it in light of their ensuing correspondence.24
In a footnote to the previously-quoted passage, Goodstein attributed
the idea of that rule to both Paul Bernays and Ludwig Wittgenstein:
This connection of induction with recursion has been previously observed by
both Wittgenstein and Bernays. (Goodstein 1945, 407 n)

In the correspondence, Bernays pointed out that he had already dis-

cussed the idea of a uniqueness rule in a lecture in 1928,25 but he did
not publish anything on the topic until 1951.26 This would explain why
Goodstein could not provide a reference. Bernays’ reply also implies by
the same token that Goodstein had come up with the idea indepen-
dently. We must therefore turn to Wittgenstein, from whom Goodstein
could not provide a reference either, for the obvious reason that he did
not publish anything. As it turns out, the idea of a rule of uniqueness
occurs for the first time, in Wittgenstein’s Nachlaß, in MS 113, on
pp. 119 v-120 r, in a passage written between May 17 and 19, 1932,
which is reproduced in print in Philosophical Grammar and The Big
Typescript.27
In ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’, Goodstein refers to
both Philosophical Grammar (to which he had by then access since it
was published in 1969) and Wittgenstein’s lectures, stating that he
got the idea while attending the latter.28 Moore’s full lecture notes
further reveal that Wittgenstein introduced the rule of uniqueness
on May 20, 1932, therefore just a few days after he had come up with
the idea in MS 113.29 Striking parallels between Wittgenstein’s
manuscript, Moore’s lecture notes and Goodstein’s recollections
strongly suggest that Wittgenstein taught with his manuscript in
24
Some letters are preserved in the Bernays Archive at ETH Zurich, copies of
which were made available to us by Jan von Plato.
25
This is confirmed by a notice of a lecture entitled ‘Die Rekursion als Grundlage
der Zahlentheorie’, in the Jahresbericht der deutschen Mathematiker-
Vereinigung, vol. 38 (1929), p. 81. Alas, there remains no corresponding
manuscript in Bernays’ archives at the ETH.
26
Bernays 1951. 27 PG, 397; BT, 445. 28 See Goodstein 1972, 280–281.
29
M, May 20, 1932, 6b:14, p. 162. With hindsight a passage in MWL (pp. 93–94)
can be seen as Moore’s reference to Wittgenstein’s introduction of the
uniqueness rule.
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260 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

front of him.30 In all three instances, Wittgenstein shows how to

frame the rule of uniqueness starting from a discussion of Skolem’s
proof of the associative law in his 1923 paper. We explain this in the
next section. But first we need to answer an obvious question con-
cerning Wittgenstein’s motives. That he would come up with the idea
of a uniqueness rule cannot be fortuitous, thus we need to provide an
explanation as to why he did. Therefore, it is useful to consider,
albeit briefly, the Tractatus, which forms the background to his
thinking in the early stages of his “middle period”.
Wittgenstein held that the fundamental building blocks of mathe-
matics, so to speak, are equations and that these are Scheinsätze (TLP
6.241, 6.2). For this reason, the propositional calculus does not apply,
it is “superfluous” (TLP 6.031). Thus, Wittgenstein probably believed
that a “logic-free” equation calculus would bypass the difficulties
raised by the adoption of, say, the system of Principia Mathematica
as a “model” (in Hertz’s sense). If anything, therefore, Wittgenstein
was strongly committed to the third of the aforementioned possibili-
ties, and Goodstein should be seen as having followed him down that
path.
Wittgenstein also had a striking insight, namely that with equations
one proceeds by substitution:
The method by which mathematics arrives at its equations is the method of
substitution.
For equations express the substitutability of two expressions and, starting
from a number of equations, we advance to new equations by substituting
different expression in accordance with the equations. (TLP 6.24)

The importance of this insight should not be underestimated. One

merely has to think here of the λ-calculus introduced 11 years after
the Tractatus by Alonzo Church (Church 1932). Its only transforma-
tion rule, known as β-reduction, is but variable substitution. And, by
the Church-Turing Thesis, the class of λ-definable functions is equiva-
lent to the class of computable functions on natural numbers. But
Wittgenstein failed to capitalize on his insight, as he did not introduce

30
John King’s account of Wittgenstein’s lectures gives support to this claim:
“W[ittgenstein]’s room was square, with the window on the left side of the wall
which faced you as you entered. He sat near the window, with the light coming
over his left shoulder, at a small collapsible card-table, on which there was
a large ledger-like book which he used for his own writing” (LWL, xiii).
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 261

a variable binding device equivalent to Church’s “λ”. His equation

calculus is for that reason weaker in expressive power than Church’s,
so one cannot claim for it the full scope of the Church-Turing Thesis.
Still, the method of substitution he suggested applies to numerical
calculations, and, as we shall see, he sought to extend it to arithmetical
(recursive) proofs.
In the terminology of modern computer science (especially program-
ming language theory), one may describe Wittgenstein’s strategy as
introducing natural numbers in the form of “recursive data types”
and introducing recursive operations (primitive recursive functions or
iterators) along with these data types. To give an idea, natural numbers
are defined in Haskell data type as:
data Nat = Zero | Succ Nat
where Zero takes no argument, and Succ takes another Nat as
argument, recursively. (Here, Zero and Succ are called “construc-
tors” of the recursive data type Nat.) Besides the type Natural
Number, Wittgenstein’s general scheme for recursive data types
could also allow one to define types such as trees, lists, and so
forth.
In Wittgenstein’s notation, O designates an operation and, if one
takes a as base, then O’a (with the elevated comma, inspired by
Russell’s ι) represents the result of the first application of the operation
to it, and by iteration one obtains the “series of forms”:
a, O’a, O’O’a, O’O’O’a, . . .
Wittgenstein introduces a “general term” for such series at 5.2522:
[a, x, O’x]
Where a is the basis, x any arbitrary term in the series and O’x the
term immediately following it. This “general term” is a sort of template
for rules to generate such data types.
With Ω as the variable for any operation generating such data types,
Wittgenstein defines at 6.02 natural numbers in terms of repeated
applications of any operation. Modernizing the notation31 and using
S for the successor in the series of forms, we thus have an inductive
definition:

31
We are following here Potter 2000, 184.
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262 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

Ω’°x¼Def x
Ω’Sn x¼Def Ω’ðΩ’n xÞ
Numbers are thus defined as indices or “exponents” (6.021) of the
repeated applications of an operation. We thus get what appears to be
an iteration scheme:
[Ω’°x, Ω’nx, Ω’n+1x]
And the natural numbers are defined as follows:
x ¼ Ω°x
Ω’x ¼ Ω1 x
Ω’Ω’x ¼ Ω2 x
…
These form in turn the natural number series at 6.31:
[0, ξ, ξ+1]
which is again recognizably construed in terms of the aforementioned
“general term”, or, in a later variant:32
| 1, ξ, ξ+1|
Wittgenstein also sketches a proof of “2×2=4” at 6.241, from which
one recovers addition and multiplication as calculations on this
series:33
Ωmþn x¼Def Ωm ðΩn xÞ
Ωmn x¼Def ðΩn Þm x
We can thus minimally claim that Wittgenstein aimed at a definition of
the natural numbers as recursive data types upon which one makes
calculations (addition and multiplication).
It is worth noting that the “general form of truth-function” at six,
which was notoriously abandoned already in 1929, is also modelled on
the “general term” of 5.2522. But objections to it do not readily
translate into objections to the “general term” and its use 6.31.
Wittgenstein must have thought so, given that he went on thinking

32
See, e.g., BT, 469, PG, 431–433, quoted later.
33
Again, following Potter 2000, 184. Only the rule for multiplication is given by
Wittgenstein in his proof of ‘2×2=4’ at TLP 6.241. The other is easily
conjectured.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 263

for years afterwards in terms of the latter, including when framing the
uniqueness rule.
It is also tempting to try and read more into these skeletal indica-
tions, e.g., by drawing parallels between Wittgenstein’s definition of
natural numbers as “exponents” and “Church numerals”.34 He
defines indeed calculation in a manner more reminiscent of pattern-
based λ-calculus than primitive recursion. But we saw that such
parallels are limited, and Wittgenstein did not provide any general
scheme for defining primitive recursive functions. In absence of any
proper recursion scheme, his definition of natural numbers remains
at best “philosophical”. Therefore, as far as “foundations” are
concerned, he achieved little, barely sketching an account for num-
ber theory taking as primitive not the notion of “class” or “set”, but
the successor function. Still, one should bear in mind that substitu-
tion is the only method for computation of both λ-terms and primi-
tive recursive function terms: his claim about substitution in 6.24
applies to both.
Another lacuna is the lack of an account of proofs, given that there is
not even reference to mathematical induction in the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein knew only of (ISO), but could not even avail himself of
the first-order axiom schema (IS), because of its “logical” nature: it was
in his attempt to overcome this problem that he came up with the idea
of a uniqueness rule.

4. Wittgenstein’s Lecture, May 20, 1932

Since his return to philosophy in January 1929, Wittgenstein went
back, again and again, in his manuscripts35 as well as in his
lectures,36 to Skolem’s proof of the associative law of addition:37

34
For Church numerals, see Church 1941, chap. 2, and for this claim, see Hancock
& Martin-Löf 1975, 9–10, Frascolla 1997, 357 and Marion 1998, 11.
35
The earliest discussion of Skolem’s proof occurs in 1929, at MS 105, pp. 73 ff.
reprised in PR, § 153. Remarks on Skolem’s proof in manuscripts written since
1929 were for the most part collected in 1930 in chapter XIV of Philosophical
Remarks (PR, §§163–169).
36
The first discussion of Skolem’s proof in Wittgenstein’s lectures was on May 19,
1930. See M, May 19, 1930, Lecture 4, 4:64–4:66. Cf. PO, 301–302, LWL,
18–19.
37
We label the law (A) following PG, 397; BT, 445.
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264 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c (A)
It is likely that the analysis of it he gave in a lecture in May 1932 was
what he was looking for.38
Skolem’s proof exemplifies (IR). Given the primitive recursive defini-
tion of addition, for which the sum of a and b + 1 is equal to the number
following a + b:
a þ 0 ¼ a;
a þ ðb þ 1Þ ¼ ða þ bÞ þ 1;
Skolem proves the associative law as follows.39
The base case c=1 holds in virtue of the aforementioned definition.
For the induction step, Skolem supposes that A “holds for a certain c”
(Skolem 1967b, 305) (Skolem 1970, 155), and arbitrary a and b, so
that we have the assumption that:
a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c
From which one gets the step to c+1 as follows. First, by definition we
get:
a+(b+(c+1))=a+((b+c)+1)
Again by definition the right-hand side transforms into:
(a+(b+c))+1
By the assumption into:
((a+b)+c)+1
And finally, again by definition, we get:
a+(b+c+1))=(a+b)+(c+1)
Thus, if (A) holds for c, then it holds for c+1, this being an instance of
the step from u(x) = v(x) to u(x+1) = v(x+1) in (IR).
In his manuscript as well as in his lecture of May 20, 1932,40
Wittgenstein’s reasoning is easy to follow. He first rewrote Skolem’s
inductive step as follows:

38
M, May 19, 1932, 6b:14 ff, pp. 162 ff.
39
The following is a slightly modified version of Skolem’s proof in 1967b,
305–306 and 1970, 155–156.
40
M, May 20, 1932, 6b:16, p. 162.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 265

ð1Þa þ ðb þ 1Þ ¼ ða þ bÞ þ 1
ð2Þa þ ðb þ ðc þ 1ÞÞ ¼ ða þ ðb þ cÞ þ 1Þ ¼ ða þ ðb þ cÞÞ þ 1
ð3Þða þ bÞ þ ðc þ 1Þ ¼ ðða þ bÞ þ cÞ þ 1
We indicated with bold characters the key idea behind “unique-
ness”. Indeed, one can see here that “(a+b)+(c+1)” is the same
function “+1” of “((a+b)+c)” as “(a+(b+(c+1)))” is of “(a+(b+c))”.
Wittgenstein then suggests that one captures this idea by writing (1)
as:
φ(1)=ψ(1)
then (2) as:
φ(c+1)=F(φ(c))
and (3) as:
ψ(c+1)=F(ψ(c)).
So, for 1 φ(1) will return the same value as ψ(1) and, when c grows
by one, φ(c) and ψ(c) will return their value in the same way, and
so forth. The affinity with mathematical induction should now be
obvious.
When Wittgenstein writes in his manuscript:41
9
α φð1Þ¼ψð1Þ = Δ
β φðcþ1Þ¼FðφðcÞÞ φðcÞ¼ψðcÞ;
;
γ ψðcþ1Þ¼FðψðcÞÞ

the brace should be taken to mean that “Δ follows from α, β, γ”, and it
could be rewritten in the form of (UR) as:
φð1Þ¼ψð1Þ φðx þ 1Þ¼FðφðxÞÞ ψðx þ 1Þ¼FðψðxÞÞ
(UR’)
φðxÞ¼ψðxÞ

Although (UR’) is not to be found in Moore’s notes for the lecture

that Goodstein must have attended – the notes only contain the three
rewritten versions of (1)-(3)– we undoubtedly have here the source of
Goodstein’s (UR).

41
MS 113, 237–238; PG, 397; BT, 445.
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266 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

5. A Possible Misunderstanding
If we were to stop here, we would have succeeded in showing that
Goodstein got the idea of the uniqueness rule from Wittgenstein, who
had been looking for it in order to fulfil a lacuna in his treatment of
arithmetic in the Tractatus. But this is not the end of the story. Indeed,
in a passage of MS113 written on May 17, 1932, whose content does
not appear in Moore’s lecture notes for May 20, Wittgenstein had the
following comment about the idea that he has shown that “Δ follows
from α, β, γ”:
If three equations of the form α, β, γ are proved, we say “the equation Δ is
proved for all cardinal numbers”. This is a definition of this latter form of
expression in terms of the first. It shows that we aren’t using the word
“prove” in the second case in the same way as in the first. In any case, it is
misleading to say that we have proved the equation Δ or A. Perhaps it is better
to say that we have proved its generality, though that too is misleading in
other respects. (MS 113, 237–238; BT, 445; PG,397)

Wittgenstein is here not so much denying that it “follows from” α, β, γ

that “the equation Δ is proved for all cardinal numbers”, as pointing
out that quantifiers are implicit (or “hidden”) in Skolem’s (UR).
The thought recurs for inductive proofs such as Skolem’s proof of the
associative law:
We are not saying that when f(1) holds and when f(c+1) follows from f(c), the
proposition f(x) is therefore true of all cardinal numbers; but rather:
“The proposition f(x) holds for all cardinal numbers” means “It holds for
x=1, and f(c+1) follows from f(c)”. And here the connection with generality
in finite domains is quite clear, for in a finite domain that very thing would
indeed be a proof that f(x) holds for all values of x, and precisely that is the
reason we say in the arithmetical case too that f(x) holds for all numbers. (BT,
453; PG,406. MS 111, p. 124; August 1931)42

It looks, therefore, as if Wittgenstein would ultimately refuse to draw

the inference to φ(c)=ψ(c) in (UR’), and the equivalent inference in (IR),
this being, prima facie, rather odd. At all events, we should note
immediately that, if Goodstein misunderstood Wittgenstein, this was
a fruitful misunderstanding. (And an excusable one, given Moore’s
notes for that lecture show that Wittgenstein did not elaborate on this

42
See also PG, 410; BT, 455 and PG 422; BT, 462.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 267

point.) We cannot hope fully to clarify this matter here, but we would
like to suggest one possible explanation.43
Before doing this, however, we would like to make a brief point
concerning Cora Diamond’s “resolute” reading of the Tractatus.
The passages just quoted are clear evidence that Wittgenstein is still
thinking in terms of the “saying-showing” distinction (TLP, 4.1212).
Indeed, remarks of this sort abound. For example, here:
An algebraic proposition always gains only arithmetical significance if you
replace the letters in it by numerals, and then always only particular arith-
metical significance.
Its generality doesn’t lie in itself, but in the possibility of its correct
application. And for that it has to keep on having recourse to the induction.
That is it does not assert its generality, it does not express it; the generality
is, rather, shown in the formal relation to the substitution, which proves to be
a term of the inductive series. (PR,§ 168)

Or in this telling passage:

But here we mustn’t believe perchance that this sign should really be: “(ξ) | 1,
ξ, ξ+1 |“!
The point of our formulation is of course that the concept “all numbers”
has been given only by a structure like “| 1, ξ, ξ+1 |“. The generality has been
represented by this structure in the symbolism and cannot be described by an
(x). fx. (MS 113, 138-138 v; May 23, 1932. BT, 469; PG,431–432)44

The gist here is that a “recursive proof” can at best only show general-
ity and, while one may assert it using a quantified statement, “for
all . . . ”, this would be going beyond what the proof shows, it would
not respect the particular “grammar” of the language in which proof
is written. Goodstein did not ignore this point, since he expressed it in
the last sentence of his 1945 paper:
Generality in the calculus may be exhibited without use of variable signs, the
generality of the theorem showing itself in the generality of the proof, but
a calculus which contains no variable signs can only show generality, not
express it. (Goodstein 1945, 434)

The “resolute” reading of the Tractatus implies, however, that

Wittgenstein believed his own “saying-showing” distinction to be
43
See Okada 2007, 124–128.
44
The use of parentheses was a common device at the time for representing
universal quantification.
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268 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

utter nonsense to begin with.45 Now, either Wittgenstein changed his

mind or the “resolute” reading is not the final word.
In his preface to the Tractatus, Russell thought one could obviate the
“saying-showing” distinction by introducing the “language-
metalanguage” distinction (TLP, xxii). Wittgenstein notoriously
rejected this distinction, his rejection extending to his criticism of
Hilbert’s “metamathematics”:
I can play with chessmen according to certain rules. But I could also invent
a game in which I play with the rules themselves. Now the rules of chess are
the pieces of my game and the laws of logic for instance are the rules of the
game. In this case I have yet another game and not a metagame.
What Hilbert does is mathematics and not metamathematics. It is another
calculus, just like any other one. (WWK, 120–121; 17 December 1930)

Our aim here is not to defend Wittgenstein’s critique: we only suggest

that the point Wittgenstein was trying to make about (UR’) bears on
this issue. In a nutshell, one should observe that this critique is consis-
tent with a view of mathematics Wittgenstein appears to have held,
namely that it consists of various calculi, each one with their own
“grammar”, but not assembled together in the manner of the usual
foundational metaphor, i.e., as resting one upon another, with a single
(logical or set-theoretical) calculus as the foundation of the whole
edifice. He saw them instead as essentially independent (this being the
third possibility in Section 2), but with possible ties linking them.46
In Wittgenstein’s mind, Skolem’s proof of the associative law would
this link algebra and number theory. He expressed this idea frequently,
including in May 1932:
So Skolem wouldn’t have had to promise us a proof of the associative and
commutative laws; he could simply have said he would show us a connection
between the paradigms of algebra and the calculation rules of arithmetic.
(MS 114, 3 v; May 27, 1932. BT, 463: PG,423)
The purpose of the “recursive proofs” is of course to connect the algebraic
calculus with the calculus of numbers. And the tree of the recursive proofs

45
This is one of the notorious consequences of the “resolute” reading.
To paraphrase Diamond 1991, 181–182, this reading would amount to the
claim that it is not Wittgenstein’s view that there are arithmetical features that
cannot be put into words but show themselves. We provide here textual evidence
to the contrary.
46
For a similar point, see Marion 2011, 156–157.
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 269

“justifies” the algebraic calculus only if that is supposed to mean that it

connects it with the arithmetical one. (MS 114, 3 r. BT, 462; PG,423)47

This would explain Wittgenstein’s interest in Skolem’s proof: in his

eyes it provided a link with algebra which would greatly expand the
scope of the equation calculus he had sketched in the Tractatus, while
fulfilling another desideratum, namely that the connection between the
calculi and their “grammars” is established directly, and not within
a “metalanguage”.48 A direct connection would thus be given in
a recursive or uniqueness proof because it provides a “template” for
any particular number-theoretic calculation,49 when variables are
replaced by numerals:
A recursive proof is only a general guide to an arbitrary special proof.
A signpost that shows every proposition of a particular form a particular
way home. It says to the proposition 2 + (3 + 4) = (2 + 3) + 4: “Go in this
direction . . ., and you will arrive home.” (MS 105, 89. PR,§164)

This seems to us to be a prima facie interesting insight: Hilbert &

Bernays themselves saw in this very point (not, of course, as they would
have found it in Wittgenstein) the key to their consistency argument for
primitive recursive arithmetic.50 This last point, like many of the afore-
mentioned, needs to be expanded, but it should be granted that
Wittgenstein’s thinking on mathematical induction and uniqueness
forms part of a nexus of ideas that deserve further investigation.

6. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics

in the Middle Period
Wittgenstein’s remark in the preface to Philosophical Investigations
contrasting it with his “old way of thinking” in the Tractatus gave
impetus to the now well-entrenched idea that Wittgenstein had two
distinct philosophies, which often comes along with a concomitant
disregard of the “middle period”. The latter is thus seen as merely

47
Translation modified. See also an earlier passage in MS 113, 122v; May 17,
1932. BT, 481: PG, 449. The idea that a proof such as Skolem’s establishes
a connection between the language of algebra and the language of number-
theoretic equations already occurs in Wittgenstein’s earliest discussion of
Skolem’s proof (MS 105, 83).
48
Okada 2007, 127. 49 See Marion 1998, 98.
50
See Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 298–299.
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270 Mathieu Marion and Mitsuhiro Okada

containing material pertaining to a “transition” from the earlier to the

later Wittgenstein, material which is often considered of lesser quality
than that published in either of these masterpieces, and somehow not
really relevant to their interpretation, unless it genetically confirms
one’s interpretation of the later views.
To rise above mere prejudice, this view needs to be argued in a non-
circular way. In this paper, we have presented a development from the
“middle period”, the discovery of the rule of uniqueness for primitive
recursive arithmetic, which is at the same time a significant contribu-
tion on its own to the foundations of mathematics (especially for
equation calculi), and, if we are right, an improvement on the treatment
of mathematics in the Tractatus. It also allows us better to understand
some central ideas in that book, e.g., on the saying-showing distinction,
as well as shedding light on further issues in Wittgenstein’s philosophy
in general, e.g., on the idea of a metalanguage. It is also significant that
Wittgenstein did not return to this issue in his later writings. That
Wittgenstein ceased at one point to discuss uniqueness is not, of itself,
proof that he thought anything wrong with what he had written.
In absence of further justification, this would merely be a non sequitur.
We prefer to claim instead that the discovery of the rule of uniqueness,
being an improvement on the earlier views and having no continuation
in the later views, is as good an example as any of the originality and
value of the “middle period”.
The publication of selected remarks from later manuscripts under
the title Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in 1956 also
convinced many that, alongside Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein had a fully blown “later philosophy of mathematics”,
which was then notoriously interpreted in terms of Dummett’s “anti-
realism”. The controversy generated by “anti-realist” readings con-
vinced many that it is perhaps better simply to drop the topic altogether
and focus on other areas where Wittgenstein seems to have made
enduring contributions, as opposed to sketchy and highly controversial
remarks. Three points need to be made here, independently of the issues
raised by the suggestion that one could simply carve up Wittgenstein’s
philosophy in this way. Firstly, it is obvious that one can and should
read Wittgenstein independently from any “anti-realist” agenda, or
“anti-anti-realist” agenda for that matter. Secondly, it is not even
clear that one can extract from the later writings a clear and coherent
set of remarks that can jointly make up a “later philosophy of
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Wittgenstein, Goodstein and the Origin of the Uniqueness 271

mathematics”, to be opposed to any previous one.51 Thirdly, this view

can only be sustained if one ignores the sources of the ideas said to form
this “later philosophy of mathematics.”52 This is not to say, of course,
that Wittgenstein did not come up with interesting ideas late in his
life,53 but it is clear that a large amount of the so-called “later philoso-
phy of mathematics” is already to be found in the “middle period”,
alongside other interesting developments along lines that were not
pursued later on, such as the idea of an uniqueness rule presented
here or, for example, his concomitant discussion of universal quantifi-
cation in terms of “hypotheses.”54 These are, again, good reasons to
believe that old prejudices should be set aside, and writings of this
period be studied for their own sake.55

51
For this point, see Potter 2011, 135–136.
52
The remarks about ‘surveyability’ from 1938–1939 illustrate this point, since
they are supposedly emblematic of the ‘later philosophy of mathematics’ but
turn out to embody arguments already laid out as early as 1929. See Marion
2011.
53
For example, the very interesting remarks on Turing Machines in 1947,
discussed in Floyd 2012.
54
See Marion 1998, chap. 4.
55
This collaborative work was supported by MEXT KAKENHI grant number
23120002, JSPS KAKENHI grant number JP26284005, JP17H02265, and the
Next Generation Research Project Promotion Program of Keio University.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented by Mathieu Marion at the
CEPERC, Université de Provence Aix-Marseille 1, in December 2010, at the
Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques, Paris,
in March 2011, at the Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar at University of
Oxford in May 2011 and at the international colloquium ‘The Legacy of
Goodstein. His Centennial and the Wittgenstein Connection’, University of
Leicester, in December 2012, as well as by Mitsuhiro Okada at a logic workshop
at University Lyon-3 in May 2013. For comments on earlier versions, we would
like to thank Gabriella Crocco, Daniel Isaacson, Per Martin-Löf, David Stern,
Timothy Williamson, Richard Zach and, especially, Jan von Plato, to whom we
are particularly indebted for information about Bernays and his correspondence
with Goodstein.