The brain and the neurosciences in Bergson

Pablo Enrique Abraham Zunino

pablo@ufrb.edu.br
UFRB – University of Reconcavo da Bahia

Introduction

Since his first work – Essay on the immediate data of consciousness (1889) –

Henri Bergson proposes a distinction between quantitative and qualitative dimensions of

the real, which gives rise to the opposition between space and time, the latter understood

as duration. However, this opposition is not a dualism of substances such as the radical

separation between body and mind postulated by Descartes in modernity

(Extension/Thought).

That's why when examining the relationship between the act of consciousness and

the body, Bergson tells us the point of contact between spirit and matter: our memory.

While the tradition housed the spirit in the body "as the pilot on his ship" – a metaphor

that presents a completely external relation that calls for an inner homunculus – the

Bergsonian version of the metaphor rather expresses a thesis on the brain function that

points to the functional continuity of the body in view of the action on their

environment: "the brain is something like the prow on which narrows the ship to cut the

ocean," he wrote in a letter to William James and then reshapes the argument, giving it a

temporary move that implies a certain tension, an attention effort assimilated to the

essence of life.

The concept of "psychological stress" explains the unity of the subject along

similar lines to those who dedicated the cone metaphor: "I perceive as the totalization of

my past, this last being contracted in view of the action. A 'unit of the self' that speak

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philosophers appears to me as the unity of a tip or a ridge, where I focus myself by an

effort of attention. "

Maybe in line with the distinction established by Justin Barret between system 1

(faculties) and system 2 (beliefs), this paper examines some results of the scientific

development – specifically, in the neuroscience findings – as a fruitful ground for doing

philosophy in view of the perennial need to investigate and provide answers to the

problems raised by scientific knowledge itself.

I – Memory and matter

Recapitulate, then, the main points of Bergson's theory of memory to measure,

then the impact that had to be confronted with the latest scientific experiments. First,

recall that the brain, as an intermediate concentrates a set of feelings and movements

moving on the tip of mental life, when inserted into the tissue of events. More useful

than evoke memories, the brain contributes to temporarily displace the others, from

which it follows that the body has an important function to link the memory to the present

and direct it for reality.

Thus, Bergson conceives a certain independence of memory in relation to the

matter and denies that the first can be accommodated in the second. In addition to the

philosophical implications that this thesis may have (especially in relation to overcoming

the "dualism"), it establishes an hypothesis about the functioning of the brain that

immediately raises suspicions from the part of modern physiology. Indeed, Bergson

conviction that the spirit (pure memory) can be dissociated from the functioning of

the human brain is not shared by most scientists. But what is striking is that now

proliferate books written jointly by philosophers and neuroscientists who give the action

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a central role in philosophical theories of subjectivity.1 By stating that perception is

an action anticipation, Bergson fits this trend as one of its precursors.

II – Perception as a preparation for action (and not as a knowlwdge of objects)

If all perception extends moving, the power to act of a living being is expressed

by the degree of uncertainty that accompanies the stimulus received by the senses. This

means that the brain state is already an action started and not the condition of the

perception, and the perception of a distinct object of our body is a virtual action.

So we distinguish the real action (affection/ contact) of the virtual action

(perception), but modern neuroscience goes further when considering the perception

as a simulated action and the brain as a simulator of the action. Scientific experiments

show that certain brain areas are activated in the same way when passively observe an

action and when we execute it.

In addition, the science shows that the brain contains not only a set of

sensorimotor mechanisms (as Bergson thought), but also other mechanisms that allow

it to operate independently of the outside world, thanks to internal models of the body's

reality (the corporal scheme) that can simulate the action without executing it. Without

going any further, the dream is already a proof that we do not need sensory input to have

the impression of living and acting.

The neuroscience of movement also confirms the thesis of the unity of action, as

the experiences in the field of biomechanics show that when we make a move as draw

a picture of an "8", there are certain laws operating in that gesture that assure its unit. It

is interesting to note that the action is not produced only by the excitement of the

1
BERTHOZ, Alain. Les théories de Bergson sur la perception, la mémoire et le rire, au regard des données
des neurosciences. Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: PUF, 2008.

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muscles, but thanks to the intervention of certain structures whose neurons are

inhibitory. As already suggested by Bergson, inhibition phenomena prepare the actual

movements of voluntary attention.

III – Some implications between action, freedom, matter and movement

It is not an exaggeration to say that, at least at this point, the philosopher

anticipates scientific discovery, as act is to choose, select and inhibit a series of

movements among those we can do. Acting is uninhibit and movement is produced by

disinhibition.

This is important because we use to attribute to action an active role. The free act,

for example, depends on the activity of the spirit, that is, the act we make "with the whole

soul." Usually, the action is explained as a production of movement. In this sense, to act

is to move our bodies in view of the usefulness (practical action). But there is also a

passive action that should not be overlooked, even when we think about the issue of

freedom. To be free is not to yield to all movements that solicit our attention, or produce

a greater amount of movements. Often, freedom is some kind of denial of the movement.

By inhibiting certain movements, we release others, but we are free in these two

directions: towards activity (initiation of movement) and towards passivity

(movement detention).

Regarding the matter, we could say that Bergson attributes to it an specific length

of time, that is, an apparent continuity of movements made by na infinitely small and

imperceptible discontinuities. These internal vibrations of matter are completely useless

for what today is called "the body in action." It is useless to perceive the trillion of

vibrations in the effective duration of the matter, since, to act, is much more useful to

perceive the light in a split second.

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 This insistence of Bergson in the continuous character of living opens the door to

other current discovery: "The brain is essentially composed of oscillators" (Berthoz,

2008, p.170). They allow us to move our sight of a point in space to another and

understand how on the reading, for example, we read the globally phrases, as a whole,

not letter by letter.

We also highlight the critical from Bergson to Zeno (paradox of the running

between Achiles and the turtle) for its proximity to what today is called "kinesiology"

(science of movement) and has a central role in explaining the constitution of spatial

relations. This criticism shows the importance of action and sensitive experience in

the movement representation. Therefore, to conceive the movement, we must consider

also the muscle sensations (the action of the movement) and not only the underlying

space. Perceiving the line set by our own feets when we walk, for example, it is only

possible when we stand outside it (or regarder by other person).

Conclusion:

Despite all the convergence between neuroscience and Bergsonian intuition,

there is a difference of principle regarding the relationship between body and spirit,

because, from the scientific point of view, the spirit is something that is in the proper

functioning of the brain, contrary what Bergson held. All the powers of mind, also

including memory, would be contained in the brain processes, missing the explanation of

how the spirit comes to men.

We must not forget that philosophical problems, despite its constructive

interaction with scientific problems should be addressed with their own methods

different from those adopted by the natural sciences. The philosophical question is not

extinguished before the science answers, because it always remains an "spiritual"

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holdover that exceeds the matter, but this does not imply an abandonment of the praxis

in favor of pure speculation (theories), since philosophy can remain in constant dialogue

with the scientific experiments, whether in the context of psychology, neuroscience and

evolutionary biology, which leads us to claim for it the status of a rigorous science (as

Husserl wanted).