APPELLATE DIVISION SUPREME COURT

7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT STATE OF NEW YORK

KEVIN PATRICK BRADY

v NOTICE OF ACTION AND
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
JUSTICE JOHN J ARK, official capacity
WELLS FARGO BANK National Association
HSBC BANK National Association

BE ADVISED.

On putative plaintiffs [below] failure to timely serve Notice of Order Entry for appeal of the
trial court dismissal identified herein, action by Article 78 is cognizable and necessary.

On the annexed affidavit and supporting documents of Kevin Patrick Brady, petitioner
complains that the Honorable John Ark has [1] failed to perform duties enjoined upon him
law, and has [2] proceeded, and continues to proceed without or in excess of subject
matter jurisdiction; and [3] made determinations arbitrarily, capriciously, in violation of
lawful procedure, and in defiance of specifically enacted law and with abuses of power.

Petitioner moves for an Order waiving fees [CPLR 1100] to prosecute this action pro se
and reducing the number of briefs required.

This Court must recognize the ‘in your face’ fraud on the court below, the urgency for the
relief requested and grant any other relief deemed appropriate.

Answers, if any, must be submitted to the Court on or before June 15, 2018 with copies to
petitioner at the address identified.

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TO THE COURT

I do hereby swear that on ______________________ the parties below were served Notice and Petition
for this action by US Mail AND, where necessary, by a qualified, non-interested party.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

c/o Woods, Oviatt, Gelman LLP
2 State Street
Rochester, New York 14614
(585) 987-2800

HSBC Bank National Association

c/o Woods, Oviatt, Gelman LLP
2 State Street
Rochester, N.Y. 14614
(585) 987-2800

NY Dept of Law
144 Exchange Blvd.
Rochester, NY 14614

Monroe County Dept of Law

39 W. Main Street
Rochester, NY 14614
(585) 753-1380

I depose that everything alleged herein is true and complete to the best of my knowledge except for
matters alleged on information and belief, and I believe those matters to be true. Nothing is intended to
be frivolous, vexatious, and/or completely without merit as defined by 22 NYCRR 130.1

Kevin Patrick Brady

BOX 862
Henrietta NY 14467
585 752 0778

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New York v King, 36 NY2d 59, 64;
Matter of Steingut v. Gold, 42 NY2d 311,], quoting CPLR 7803
Roberts v. Health and Hospitals., 87 A.D.3d 311, 928 N.Y.S.2d 236 ( 1st Dep't) 2011
Wells Fargo, N.A. v Cohen, 80 AD3d 753, 915 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dept ) 2011
Argent Mtge.Co., v. Mentesana, 79 AD3d 1079, 915 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dept ); 2010
Campaign v Barba, 23 AD3d 327, 805 NYS2d 86 (2nd Dept ). 2005
Aurora Loan Services, v Taylor 102 AD3d 420, 2015
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, 137 S. Ct. 1645,-1651 2017
Thrasher v U.S. 19 N.Y.2d 159 1967

Matter of Huie [Furman], 20 NY2d 568, 572 1967

Lacks v Lacks, 41 NY2d 71-75 1976

Nash v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 102 AD3d 420,

Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.
Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.
Nager v Inc. Vil. of Saddle Rock, 140 Misc.2d 644, 530 N.Y.S.2d 966 [Sup Ct, Nassau County)
1988
Third Preliminary Rep of Advisory Comm on Prac and Pro, 1959 NY Legis Doc No. 17

CPLR 3211, subd. [a], par. 7).

CPLR 5015 (a) (4)
Penal Law 195.00

87 A.D.3d 311, 928 N.Y.S.2d 236 ( 1st Dep't) 2011

80 AD3d 753, 915 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dept ) 2011
Argent Mtge.Co., v. Mentesana, 79 AD3d 1079, 915 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dept ); 2010
23 AD3d 327, 805 NYS2d 86 (2nd Dept ). 2005
102 AD3d 420, 2015
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, 137 S. Ct. 1645,-1651 2017
1967

1967
Lacks v Lacks, 41 NY2d 71-75 1976

Nash v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 102 AD3d 420,

Nager v Inc. Vil. of Saddle Rock, 140 Misc.2d 644, 530 N.Y.S.2d 966 [Sup Ct, Nassau County)
1988
1 APPELLATE DIVISION SUPREME COURT
2 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT STATE OF NEW YORK
3

4 KEVIN PATRICK BRADY

5 TRIAL COURT FRAUD AND
6 FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS
7 v
8
9 JUSTICE JOHN J ARK, official capacity
10 WELLS FARGO BANK National Association
11 HSBC BANK National Association
12
13
14 Petitioner asserts his right to liberal construction of these pleadings. The issue MUST not
15 be whether pro se petitioner has plead a cognizable cause of action but rather whether he
16 HAS a cause of action and is entitled to relief from this Court. I submit that I am absolutely
17 so entitled.
18
19 Petitioner [defendant below] has been unjustly labeled a ‘judicial gadfly: a litigant courts
20 love to cheat, This action exemplifies how such adverse labels [frivolous, vexatious] can
21 poison courts with prejudice and invoke a ‘witch hunt’ that frees judges to express their
22 antipathy for them. As shown herein, they render ‘law, only as good as their ability to
23 enforce.’ Non lawyers are deprived of such ability. For them, controlling principles of law
24 become neither binding nor persuasive

25 On April 4, 2018 a hearing was held in the courtroom of respondent, John Ark, JSC for
26 petitioners’ affidavit to Show Cause [annexed and incorporated as [‘A’] Like all previous
27 proceedings below’ the hearing proved an exercise in futility. The issues subjudice were
28 clearly enunciated in the motion papers, the relief requested was mandatory, but the Hon.
29 judge failed to perform as required. He failed to read the pro se papers before court
30 convened.

31 In fact, Petitioner has no reason to believe that Ark, or anyone on his staff, had ever read
32 any of the pro se defendants papers.

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33 From the commencement of Wells Fargo Bank N.A v Kevin Patrick Brady, Ark presented
34 as an insurmountable co-adversary: unrestrained by Rules of Law: even those enacted by
35 emergency legislation. He has manifested prejudice and a latent, disqualifying contempt for
36 this pro se defendant and has refused to adjudicate any issue, and/or assertion of law the
37 defendant raised.

38 This action is therefore necessary to prohibit Ark and the putative plaintiff from perpetrating
39 fraud, intrinsic and extrinsic, on your petitioner and on the court. Petitioner will demonstrate
40 that the Honorable John Ark has [1] failed to perform a duty enjoined upon him by law, has
41 [2] proceeded, and continues to proceed, without or in excess of subject matter jurisdiction,
42 and has [3] made determinations in violation of lawful procedure, and in defiance of law ,
43 that are arbitrary, capricious and egregious abuses of power.

44 “The general rule is that excess of jurisdiction or power **** is unlawful use or abuse of the
45 entire action or proceeding as distinguished from [same] as to the proper purpose of the
46 action or proceeding" New York v King, 36 NY2d 59, 64; Rush v. Mordue, Matter of
47 Steingut v. Gold, 42 NY2d 311,], quoting CPLR 7803

48 The record annexed is proof of Arks perverted proceedings.

49 IGNORING FATAL DEFECTS

50 The complaint presented NO JUSTICIABLE QUESTION .Defendant’s threshold challenge

51 to plaintiffs standing [*pg 7] sounded in failure to state a cause of action.

52 Arks summary judgment ignored the defense. It contains multiple redactions of date
53 rendering it unlikely to be accidental error. Although the proposed order was received and
54 time stamped by Monroe County Clerk on July 24, 2009 (a month before the return date) it
55 purports to have been effectively signed on December 17, 2009.

56 It purports ‘no one heard in opposition’.

57

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58 Defendants cross motion and demand to vacate were filed in January 2010 but were
59 dismissed with prejudice, and without explanat6ion, on August 12, 2010. Contrary to the
60 findings the appearance on August 5, 2010 was not for oral argument. It was ‘restored’ for
61 a ‘Settlement Conference”, that never actually occurred.
62
63 No Order to this date resolved the contested issue of standing,
64
65 March, 2013
66
67 Defendants Motion to Show Cause cited [2] new evidence, [3] fraud, misrepresentation and
68 [4] lack of jurisdiction to render judgment. The courts findings failed to address these
69 allegations completely.. The order purports only ‘the issue of standing was necessarily
70 decided against defendant’.
71
72 PLEASE NOTE. This assertion is fiction. It is illusory: an artifice and expedient at
73 defendants’ expense. Threshold challenges are to be resolved at the outset. Roberts v.
74 Health and Hospitals Corp., 87 A.D.3d 311, 928 N.Y.S.2d 236 ( 1st Dep't 2011
75
76 In fact, ‘standing’ could not have been decided against defendant. The commencing
77 petition at [parag 7] admitted plaintiff’s inability to produce even a copy of the promissory
78 note. Plaintiff was therefore required to establish standing by other means, including
79 explanation to the court why it didn’t apply for lost note application.
80
81 Plaintiff initially claimed to be ‘owner and holder’ of the note and mortgage being foreclosed
82 but later moved to omit this falsity. Nevertheless, plaintiffs must plead and prove ownership
83 AND the right to foreclose. Wells Fargo, N.A. v Cohen, 80 AD3d 753, 915 N.Y.S.2d 569
84 (2d Dept 2011) Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v. Mentesana, 79 AD3d 1079, 915 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d
85 Dept 2010); Campaign v Barba, 23 AD3d 327, 805 NYS2d 86 (2nd Dept 2005).
86
87 Failure to do so was not an insignificant flaw. It was the reason for enacting emergency
88 legislation. In 2012, the Attorney General reported egregious ‘flaws in the foreclosure
89 process’, included widespread claims by foreclosure plaintiffs to be the owners and holder
90 of the note and mortgage being foreclosed. [‘Ethics]
91

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92 THE SMOKING GUN

93 Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion of April 2014 obviates intention of new attorneys to cover up the
94 defects of their predecessor, Steven Baum Assocs, AND circumvent the newly mandated
95 affirmation requirements. Ark enabled this subterfuge by allowing the material alterations,
96 nunc pro tunc, under the guise of CPLR 2001 and 5019. He also ratified evidence Plaintiff
97 had admitted could not be substantiated.

98 The following explains why pro se defendant was not served Notice of the ex-parte
99 appearance. [from pg ]

100 ‘ CPLR 2101 governs the form of legal papers in civil practice and requires that leave to
101 correct be freely given, IF a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced. A party is deemed
102 to waive objection to a defect unless within 2 days of receipt it is returned to the serving
103 party with a statement of particular obje4ctions. ‘

104 The memorandum of Attorney Mullen claims the action was based on a note, albeit missing
105 and unverifiable. He claims the decision to accelerate the [debt] was based on terms of the
106 mortgage. Defendant repeatedly alerted Ark to these overt misrepresentations but was
107 continuously ignored.

108 Defendant asserted that plaintiffs were actually debt collectors and that ‘the mortgage’ was
109 not the dispositive issue. Aurora Loan, v Taylor [ 2015 ] Ark continued to obfuscate, divert
110 the issue by questions, such as ‘when is the last time you made a mortgage payment.

111 In fact no payments were due, no interest, penalties and/or servicer advances could accrue
112 when the plaintiff lacks authority to declare a loan default. [Town of Chester v. Laroe
113 Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645,-1651 (2017) AND, the separation of debt/mortgage creates a
114 nullity. Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872).
115

116 Decision and Order of June 27, 2013 incorrectly states that the motion cited ‘want of
117 jurisdiction’. This too is patently false. The motion correctly alleged ‘lack of jurisdiction to
118 render judgment.

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119 In Thrasher v U.S. 19 N.Y.2d 159 (1967) the Court Appeals declared ‘plaintiffs' failure to
120 plead and prove [standing] ******did not affect Supreme Court's competence to entertain
121 the suit. Plaintiffs' failure to do so only affected Supreme Court's power to render a
122 judgment on the merits in plaintiffs' favor because they failed to state a cause of action
123 upon which relief could be granted (CPLR 3211, subd. [a], par. 7).
124

125 Order of April 23, 2014 conspicuously omits the incriminating assertion. It is thus void for
126 fraud on defendant/petitioner and fraud on the court. Decision[s] and order[s] of December
127 17, 2015 and February 2017 are similarly defective.
128

129 DEFENDANTs FAILURE TO APPEAL

130

131 Although a courts determination from which an appeal has not been taken should "remain
132 inviolate," that rule applies "[a]bsent the circumstances shown here and cognizable under
133 CPLR 5015" (Matter of Huie [Furman], 20 NY2d 568, 572 [1967]; also Lacks v Lacks, 41
134 NY2d 71-75 [1976] [objections made under CPLR 5015 (a) (4) survive a final judgment];
135 Nash v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 102 AD3d 420, Third Preliminary Rep of Advisory Comm
136 on Prac and Pro, 1959 NY Legis Doc No. 17 at 204-205
137

138 CPLR 5015 permits a party to seek vacatur of judgment or order on the following grounds:
139 (1) instantly inapplicable (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or
140 other misconduct of the adverse party and (4) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
141 over the controversy.
142

143 In the final analysis, the defects are fatal. They render the action below VOID for inter alia
144 due process abominations and jurisdictional excess .
145

146 They invoke the QUESTION? ‘as the following principles of law are of constitutional
147 dimension, why were they not observed by the judge and his chief law clerk.?
148
149

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150 “A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law,
151 however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the
152 effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction.” See Wuest v.
153 Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.

154 “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law,
155 court is deprived of juris.” See Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.

156 ‘Excess of jurisdiction is a court acting beyond the limits of its power, usually. in one of
157 three ways: (1) when the court has no power to deal with the kind of matter at issue, (2)
158 when it lacks power to deal with the particular person concerned, or (3) when the judgment
159 or order issued is of a kind that the court has no power to issue.

160 ‘[A]’ judgment or order is final if it "disposes of all causes of action between the parties in
161 the proceeding and leaves nothing for further judicial action apart from mere ministerial
162 matters."

163 Under this definition, an order or judgment that disposes of some but not all of substantive
164 and monetary disputes between the parties, in most cases, is not final, or where the court
165 disposes of a counterclaim or affirmative defense but leaves other causes of action
166 between the same parties for resolution in further judicial proceedings.

167 Petitioner MUST object to further judicial proceedings. I am clearly at risk of more prejudice
168 and more ‘blocking’ of judicial remedies by a VOID ‘gatekeeper order’. This Court should
169 note that Arks orders include two additional ‘copycat’ injunctions issued by Ark without
170 cause, without Notice, and without a hearing. In fact, all of Arks orders have issued
171 arbitrarily, capriciously, and overreaching.

172 The terms `arbitrary' and `capricious' mean willful and unreasoning action without
173 consideration of or in disregard of the facts. Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction consists
174 of powers granted by statute. Where determinations are made either without statutory
175 power or in excess thereof, the orders are VOID.

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176 A court cannot reach conclusions not permitted by the statute, AND, it is arbitrary and
177 capricious to not give due weight to the evidence. Both the `arbitrary and capricious'
178 standard and the `substantial evidence' rule relate to justification rather than to power.
179 Nager v Inc. Vil. of Saddle Rock, 140 Misc.2d 644, 530 N.Y.S.2d 966 [Sup Ct, Nassau
180 County1988], affd, 160 A.D.2d 785 [2d Dept 1990]).

181 February 23, 2017

182 Ark violated the above precedent by his unconscionable blanket dismissal of ALL judicial
183 relief, [past, present, future] Transcripts .pg 14 He also demonstrated egregious lack of
184 concern for the financial destruction his void proceedings have caused. Additional
185 prejudicial comments are found in transcripts d/t/d November 30, 2016.

186 Petitioner submits these comments are inconsistent with petitioner’s right to, inter alia,
187 equal protection of law.

188 Accordingly, there is nothing to be reviewed by appeal.

189 SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

190 Insofar as supreme court possesses inherent power to vacate its own judgments for
191 sufficient reason in the interest of substantial justice, motions requested relief pursuant to
192 these principles. [INHERENT]

193 In the final analysis, Petitioner is absolutely entitled to relief from the fraud, mistakes,
194 exploitive overreaching, misconduct, irregularity, collusion, and void court judgments
195 below. see GML Tower LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 04952 [129 AD3d 1439] June 12, 2015
196 Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

197 The Hon. John Ark has [1] failed to perform a duty enjoined upon him law, and [2] has
198 proceeded without or in excess of subject matter jurisdiction; [3] has made determinations
199 in violation of lawful procedure, in defiance of law, arbitrarily, capriciously and by abuses of
200 power.

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201 In fact, Arks malfeasance constitutes criminal violation of Penal Law 195.00

202 “Not every action by any judge is in exercise of his judicial function. It is not a judicial
203 function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the
204 Courthouse. When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the
205 law, [s/he] loses subject matter jurisdiction and [his/her] orders are void, of no legal force or
206 effect” Yates vs. Village of Hoffman Estates, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962)

207 ’If a judge continues committing legal error after the mistake is drawn to [his/her] attention,
208 the judge commits judicial misconduct as well as legal error.

209 SUMMARY AND RELIEF

210 The proceedings below were a clear fraud on petitioner and fraud on the court. They are
211 VOID and this Court must declare them so. Petitioner claims $3,250 expenses for having to
212 defend fraudulent proceedings I am absolutely entitled to against Wells Fargo Bank N.A

213 I have subsequent losses of $20,075. for wrongful eviction from my home in 2016. These
214 losses continue accruing by $ 725.00 monthly. Wells Fargo Bank N.A and HSBC Bank N.A
215 should be held equally liable for these damages

216 This Court is authorized; in fact mandated, in the interest of justice, to award such relief
217 and any other relief deemed appropriate.

218 Upon the failure to act on this pro se petitioners behalf I request permission to
219 APPEAL TO COURT APPEALS.

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 I swear that everythingcontained herein is true and complete to the besl of my knowledge except where
stated on information and belief, and I also believe in the truth of those statements.

I swear that I have never filed any action in any court that legally or constructively rose to the level of
frivolous, vexatious or cornpletely without merit as defined in 22 NYCRR 13CI and that NO REAL PARry
has alleged otherwise and NO EVIDENCE has been submifted to any court to prove otherwise.

lfl*Lffia*-
Kevin Patrick Brady
10
PO Box 282
1.1
Henrietta, New York 14467
L2

L3 'flf ^DL* ;i{tltrtlffi],n*

t4
15

16

17

18

19

2A

21

22

23

24

25

26
1 MEMORANDA
2 82 N.Y. Jur. 2d Parties § 13

3 The issue of standing concerns whether the litigants should be allowed access to the courts
4 to adjudicate the merits of a dispute. 1 Lack of standing is a legal impediment to bringing an
5 action 2 that, when raised, must be considered at outset of the litigation. 3 Standing, a
6 threshold requiremeni,4 must exist at al stages of the proceeding and not merely when the
7 action is initiated. 5 lack of standing is not a jurisdictional defect. 6

8 Standing, which is conceptually distinguishable from capacity to sue 7 is an element of the

9 larger question of justiciability. 8 It rests in part on policy considerations that a person should
10 be allowed access to courts to adjudicate the merits of a particular the merits of a particular
11 dispute if justiciability criteria are met.9

12 The various tests that have been devised to determine standing are designed to insure that
13 the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome of the case to cast
14 the dispute in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. 10 The requirement of
15 standing rests, in part, on policy ccnsiderations of judicial restraint, 11 which prohibit the
16 issuance of advisory opinions. 12

17 Although a plaintiffs close relationship to the subject of the action may sometimes give rise
18 to a presumption of standing. as a rule, before the plaintiff has standing, he or she must
19 show injury in fact to oneself. that falls within the relevant zone of interests sought to be
20 protected by the law, 15 and is distinct from that of the general public

21 FOOTNOTES

22 [1 ] Town of Riverhead v. NYS Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 50 A.D.3d 811, 858

23 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2d Dep't 2008).

24 [2] Gilman v. Abagnale, 235 A.D.2d 989, 653 N.Y.S.2d 176 (3d Dep't 1997).

25 [3] Roberts v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 87 A.D.3d 311, 928 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1st Dep't
26 2011), leave to appeal denied, 17 N.Y.3d 717, 935 N.Y.S.2d 287, 958 N.E.2d 1202 (2011);

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27 Caprer v. Nussbaum, 36 A.D.3d 176, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 2006); Rudder v. Pataki,
28 246 A.D.2d 183, 675 N.Y.S.2d 653 (3d Dep't 1998), order aff'd on other grounds, 93 N.Y.2d
29 273, 689 N.Y.S.2d 701, 711 N.E.2d 978 (1999); Hoston v. New York State Dept. of Health,
30 203 A.D.2d 826, 611 N.Y.S.2d 61 (3d Dep't 1994). As to procedure on objections based on
31 lack of standing, see § 23.

32 [4] NYS Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 2 N.Y.3d 207, 778 N.Y.S.2d 123, 810
33 N.E.2d 405 (2004); Marone v. Nassau County, 2013 WL 1567369 (N.Y. Sup 2013).

34 [5] People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 54 A.D.3d 180, 861 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1st Dep't 2008).

35 [6] HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Ashley, 104 A.D.3d 975, 961 N.Y.S.2d 337 (3d Dep't 2013);
36 US Bank N.A. Ass'n v. Tate, 102 A.D.3d 859, 958 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 2013).

37

38

39

40

41

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IN NEW YORK SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF T'IONROE
. STATE OF NEW YORK

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., plaintiff

Supplement to' affidavit for
Order to Show Cause

Defendants Answer to Plaintiff

Affirmations

KEVIN PATRICK BRADY, defendant #4419n9

r. On the " well-established equitable power of this Court to modify it's foreclosure orders
and vacate referee's deeds where a mistake andor change in the law casts doubt upon the
f;airness of the sale,"' defendant comes to move this Court on the numerous short shrifts, due
process denials and deprivations that have occurred in this case .

,r}

2. From the outset, this case has shown enough "oppression, injustice and fundamental
unfairness" to justify the exercise of said equitable powers to undo the foreclosure sale and
modify the judgment (Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Lld.,42 Misc.3d 1232[A], 986
N.Y.S.2d 864,2014 N.Y. SIip. Op.50311[U],

Even after a judicial sale to a good faith purchaser, " [a] court may exercise its inherent
=;
q.ritable power over a sale made pursuant to its judgment or decree to ensure that it is not

rnade the instrument of injUstice . . Although this power should be exercised sparingly a court of
equity may set aside its own judicial sale upon grounds o.thenruise insufficient to confer an
absolute legal right to a resale in order to relieve [a parV] of oppressive or unfair sduct' (

Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515,520-521,392 N.E.2d 124A,419 N.Y.S-2d 56; see
Fleet Fin. v. Gillerson,277 A.D.2d279,28A,716 N.Y.S.2d 66).

Generally, such discretion, is exercised where fraud, mistake, elploitive overeaching,

miwrduct, irregularity or collusion " casts suspicion on the faims of fie sah" ( Fleet Fin.,

AD.2d at28A; see Guardian Loan Co.,47 N.Y.2d at 521; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. IPA Asset
Mgt. lll, LLC, 111 A.D.3d 820,821-822,975 N.Y.S.2d 156). orwhere judicialsale has been "
made the instrument of injustie" ( Guardian Loan Co.,47 N.Y.2d at 520).

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