Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Gazmin, GR 212444
Main Point: Foreign policy indeed includes security alliances and defense cooperation among
states. In the conduct of negotiations and in the implementation of any valid and binding
international agreement, Article II of the Constitution requires: Section 2. The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. . . . . Section 7. The State shall pursue
an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to selfdetermination.
FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement
that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine military bases
and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the
backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute with China over the West Philippine Sea.
The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary requirements
for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President Benigno
Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not submitted to Congress on the
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of the
agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should have been concurred by the senate as it
is not an executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong
sense that in order for EDCA to be valid and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate
for deliberation and concurrence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is constitutional.
RULING: YES. The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's
concurrence. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties
that it purports to implement.
Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by Senate.
They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx ”
The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive Agreements
are defined as international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of twothirds of the
Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already allowed the
return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the
details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces is not at
all unusual in this jurisdiction.
In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at the same time against the
destructive forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what form the
friendships will take, are for the President to decide. The only restriction is what the Constitution
itself expressly prohibits. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it
remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Section 8. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons
Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570, October 10, 2000
Main Point: In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Facts: This is a consolidation of cases questioning the Visiting Forces Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America. The VFA was created pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty after the RPUS Military Base Agreement have expired. It was ratified on 1998
by the thenpresident Estrada.
Petitioners contend that the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed into the
Philippines only by a treaty that is duly concurred in by the Senate and ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose and is recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.1 Since the Government were not able to concur with the stated requisites,
the Petitioners contend that the accepting the terms of the VFA is violative of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the VFA is violative of the Constitution
Ruling: No, it is not violative of the Constitution. Ratification is generally held to be an
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be,
through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. In our jurisdiction, the power to
ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange
of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory
and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,[46] declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.
Section 9. Social Order
Section 10. Social Justice
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726
Main Point: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
1
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may atleast be approximated.
Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought
before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution, resolved to recommend to the Director of
the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, recommended to the Director of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548
which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
As a consequence of such enforcement, all animaldrawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places abovementioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security
of all the people.
Issues: Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security
of all the people
Ruling: No. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
Section 11. Personal Dignity and Human Rights
Section 12. Family Life; Mother; Unborn
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)
Main Point: The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case
of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is
narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.
Facts: In order to obtain legal abortion, Norma McCorvey, aka Jane Roe, went to Dallas, Texas
and falsely asserted that she have been raped. However, this scheme failed as there was no
records of the allegations of rape. She then attempted to obtain illegal abortion however the site
where the abortion could have been made was already shut down by the police.
She sought the advice of lawyers who filed a case with the courts to allow the abortion even
though it is not medically advised. This is contrary to the laws of Texas which generally
disallows abortion except in cases of saving the life of the mother.
Issue: Whether or not the mother can terminate the life of an unborn child or stated differently
can the State have invaded the right of the mother in prohibiting abortion
Ruling: The US Supreme Court found that the abortion laws of the State of Texas is violative of
the right to privacy of the mother. They stated that is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
It must be noted that the US Supreme Court did not decide on the justiciability of abortion
because the mother in this case have already given birth to the child, rendering the issue moot
and academic.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1922)
Main Point: That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of
its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected.
Facts: Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska, taught the German
language to his students which included 10year old Raymond Parpat. Later this was discovered
by the Hamilton County General charging him with violation of the Siman Act2.
Meyer was convicted and fined. They upheld the Siman Act as a proper response to "the baneful
effects" of allowing immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with results
"inimical to our own safety."
The Petitioner then brought to the Supreme Court of the United States the question of the validity
of the Siman Act.
Issue: Whether or not the Siman Act is unconstitutional or stated differently was the State of
Nebraska allowed to enact such a piece of legislation
Ruling: The Supreme Court of America ruled in favor of Meyer. Mere knowledge of the
German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly
looked upon as helpful and desirable. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage
him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment.
That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak
other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced
by methods which conflict with the Constitution—a desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 US 510 (1925)
Main Point: The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the
right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
2
Facts: A law in Oregon was filed compelling children of the age between eight to sixteen to
attend public schools. The said law provides for a few exceptions not including children that
attending schools such as the Society of Sisters.
Further, the parents of the children allege that the said law infringes to the right of the parents to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.
Issue: Whether or not the law violates the right of the parents to the upbringing of the education
of their children.
Ruling: The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians
have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
Wisconsin v. Yoder 40 LW 4476 (1972)
Main Point: The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on other fundamental rights.
Facts: Three Amish students from different families stopped attending school because of the
religious belief of their parents. One of the fathers of the children was convicted for this while
the others were fined.
Under Amish church standards, higher education was deemed not only unnecessary for their
simple way of life, but also endangering to their salvation. These men appealed for exemption
from compulsory education under the basis of these religious convictions. They sincerely held to
the belief that the values their children would learn at home would surpass the worldly
knowledge taught in school.
Issue: Whether or not the State can penalize the family of the students because of disallowing
their children to go to school due to their religious beliefs
Ruling: The State cannot penalize the family members. The State's interest in universal
education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental
rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary
education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing
evidence that accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years
of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an
inability to be selfsupporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in
any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629 (1968)
Main Point: The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for
even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, "the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adult”.
Facts: Ginsberg was found guilty of selling “girlie” magazines to minors. Under New York Law
it was illegal to willfully sell to a minor under 17 any picture which depicts nudity, is harmful to
minors and any magazine which taken as a whole is harmful to minors.
Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify
two different sets of the population in regards to obscene material and that it was an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.
Issue: Whether or not the State can protect minors from the obscene material or stated otherwise,
was there deprivation of liberty of the minors in regulating the obscene materials
Ruling: The court rejected Ginsberg’s argument that New York had deprived minors of their
liberty. The court found that it was well within the state’s power to protect minors and that just
because the material is not classified as obscene to adults it may still be regulated with minors.
The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms, "the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adult”.
Orceo v. COMELEC, GR 190779 March 26, 2010
Main Point: Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family
members. Families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities.
These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. In its Comment, the
COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, states that it adheres to the aforementioned state
policies, but even constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some
extent to serve appropriate and important interests.
Facts: Petitioner, in a petition for certiorari questions the validity of Resolution No. 8714 insofar
as it provides that the term firearm includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations, which
results in their coverage by the gun ban during the election period this year.
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members.
Families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. They are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties,
petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that
Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies State policies in these
constitutional provisions:
Art. II, Sec. 12.; Art. XV, Sec. 1.; and Art. II, Sec. 17.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
Ruling: NO. The COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and
their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns
in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be
able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter,
whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun, which is sought to be
averted. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure the holding of free.
However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term
“firearm” in Resolution No. 8714.
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
Main Point: The RH Law does not violate the right of an unborn child as guaranteed in S12, A2.
The question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided
without proper hearing and evidence. The framers of the Constitution intended “conception” as
“fertilization” and protection is given upon “fertilization.” Not all contraceptives are ban. Only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are prohibited. The intent of the framers was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure that would allow abortion. The IRR redefinition
of abortifacient in S4a of the RH Law is violative of S12, A2. S7 of the RH Law which excludes
parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage is antifamily and is violative of S12, A2.
Facts: Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy,
as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitionsinintervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
right to life of an unborn child
Ruling: The RH Law does not violate the right of an unborn child as guaranteed in S12, A2. The
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided without
proper hearing and evidence. The framers of the Constitution intended “conception” as
“fertilization” and protection is given upon “fertilization.” Not all contraceptives are ban. Only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are prohibited. The intent of the framers was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure that would allow abortion. The IRR redefinition
of abortifacient in S4a of the RH Law is violative of S12, A2. S7 of the RH Law which excludes
parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage is antifamily and is violative of S12, A2.
Orceo v. COMELEC, GR 190779, March 26, 2010
Same as above
Section 13. Vital Role of Youth
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 252
Main Point: Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for PD
1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise,
their petition must fail.
Facts: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, alleging that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to
morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is
violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the
state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and
13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: PD 1869 null and void for being contrary to morals, public policy and public order
Ruling: No. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for PD
1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise,
their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869
remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational
values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, GR 177131, June 7, 2011
Main Point: The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in
order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which
reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social wellbeing. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by paragraph 2,
Article 44 of the Civil Code
Facts: In this petition, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) seeks that the COA be prohibited
from implementing its Decision and its Resolution to conduct an annual financial audit of the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards xxx.
Which states that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No.
111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278
The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution believing that the case laws has been
superseded by RA 7278. Thereby weakening the cases conclusion that the BSP is a government
controlled corporation Also, the Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds
invested in the BSP. That BSP is not an entity administering special funds. It is not even
included in the DECS National Budget. x x x
And that It may be argued also that the BSP is not an agency of the Government.
Issue: Whether BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COAs audit
jurisdiction.
Ruling: YES. The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created
in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which
reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social wellbeing. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by paragraph 2,
Article 44 of the Civil Code which reads: Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law; and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same
Code.
Section 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women
Section 15. Right to Health
Imbong v. Ochoa
Main Point: The RH Law does not violate S15. It does not do away with RA 4729 (Regulation
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices) and RA 5921 (Regulation of Pharmacy) – laws that
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without prescription,
Facts: Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section
9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive
pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that
the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and
distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a dulylicensed physician.
Issue: Whether RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the
right to Health
Ruling: The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, nonabortificient and
effective”.