Analysis
June 19, 2009
Summary: In his April visit
to Turkey, President Barack
Obama used the term “model
partnership” to describe U.S.-
Turkish relations. This termi-
nology can be given content
when partners contribute to
managing grand strategic
challenges—issues central to
the national interests of each
side.
Three “meta” issues—Russia,
Europe, and Iran—will pose key
tests for U.S.-Turkish cooperation
over the next few years.
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Russia, Europe, Iran: Three Grand Strategic
Issues in U.S.-Turkish Relations
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
WASHINGTON — In the wake of
President Barack Obama’s very well
received visit to Turkey, officials and
analysts have been uncharacteristi-
cally optimistic about the outlook
for U.S.-Turkish relations. During
a recent visit to Turkey, this author
found Turks at all levels to be remark-
ably positive about Obama and his
early foreign policy initiatives. Turkey’s
newly appointed Foreign Minister,
Ahmet Davutoğlu, has also concluded
a successful visit to Washington. He is
inclined to think in broad geopolitical
terms, and has been at pains to under-
score Ankara’s continued attachment
to the West even as Turkish engage-
ment around the Middle East and
Eurasia continues to expand.
The improved atmosphere allows
policymakers to consider next steps
and new priorities. The short list does
not look very different from American
and Turkish perspectives: cooperation
against the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK); dealing with a near-nuclear
Iran; new energy projects; regional
security cooperation in the Black Sea,
South Asia, and the Middle East; Cy-
prus; and the broader issue of Turkey’s
relations with the European Union
and NATO. Recent analyses in the On
Turkey series have explored the pros-
pects for collaboration in these areas.
This analysis looks ahead to a shorter
list of key issues with grand strategic
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
significance; issues where the politi-
cal, security, and economic aspects of
Turkish and American policy come
together. Three “meta” issues—Rus-
sia, Europe, and Iran—are capable of
transforming the environment and
rationale for U.S.-Turkish cooperation
over the next few years.
Dealing with Russia
The Georgia crisis underscored the
striking asymmetries in Turkish and
American approaches to Russia. Tur-
key will be no more comfortable than
the United States with a resurgent and
assertive Russia. But the implications
of a more competitive relationship
with Russia are quite different when
seen from Washington and Ankara.
When the varied European perspec-
tives on Russia are added, the picture
becomes even more complex. At
base, Turkey will seek to decouple the
security relationship with Moscow
from the elaborate web of energy and
commercial ties that have developed
across the Black Sea since the early
1990s. Russia is Turkey’s most impor-
tant individual economic partner, and
the relationship has a diverse com-
mercial and official constituency on
both sides. The level of anxiety about
Russian policy is relatively low among
Turkey’s strategic elites. When it comes
to regional security policy in the Black
Sea and the Caucasus, Ankara is likely to
Analysis
prove a cautious and conservative partner for the West—and a
very sovereignty conscious one. Notwithstanding centuries of
geopolitical competition (and marked cultural anxiety about
Turkey on the Russian side), Turks are likely to worry more
about the potential for internal instability and spillovers of
political violence from other quarters around the Black Sea
than about the prospect of Russian aggression per se.
Even if Western relations with Russia remain stable, Turkey
will be a leading stakeholder in Russia policy, including
aspects of NATO strategy where Russia is a central concern.
Almost certainly, Ankara will prefer a very slow approach to
NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. In the absence
of a strong alliance consensus on the issue, Turkey may
well prefer to avoid the issue of further NATO enlargement
around the Black Sea. Turks are already skeptical of the
credibility of NATO security guarantees on their borders.
There will be little enthusiasm for new Article V commit-
ments, especially if these risk provoking a Russian response
in Turkey’s backyard. To be sure, Turkey had a similarly
ambivalent approach to the first round of NATO enlarge-
ment, and Turkish strategists eventually came to accept that
a wider alliance brought stability benefits. But this time
around, the debate with Ankara could be more contentious.
On questions of nuclear strategy and arms control, and the
future of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty,
Turkish and American perspectives may be closer. The good
news is that Turkey’s “Eurasianists,” who had pressed for
closer ties to Moscow as a strategic alternative to NATO,
have been pushed further to the margins in Turkish politics.
The end of European certainties
Turkey’s European project becomes more complicated and
troubled by the day. Growing European ambivalence, and
outright opposition to the idea of full membership for
Turkey in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, interacts with mounting
skepticism about the process in Turkey to produce an
atmosphere of pessimism and malaise. Turkey’s own
impetus for reform has slowed. Near-term deadlines for
movement on Cyprus loom, and in the worst case, failure
to open Turkish ports to Cypriot shipping could result in a
formal suspension of Turkey’s candidacy. The European
Commission is unlikely to recommend suspension, not least
since a suspension could be difficult or even impossible to
reverse under current conditions.
2
The general atmosphere of gloom in EU-Turkey relations
has been reinforced by developments on the economic and
political fronts. The deepening economic crisis in Europe
—including Turkey—is widely assumed to have a dampen-
ing effect on Europe’s already weakened enthusiasm for
enlargement. As the most significant candidate for member-
ship on the horizon, Turkey will be most affected by shifting
European perceptions about costs and benefits. More
disturbing, the recent European parliamentary elections have
strengthened the position of conservative parties across the
continent, many opposed to Turkish membership. Move-
ments on the extreme right have also gained, and these can
be expected to take a very negative, identity driven line on
Turkey. Turkey’s EU candidacy may be a 10-15 year project,
but it risks becoming the victim of near-term political
expediency in key European states. Sweden, a strong
supporter of Ankara’s EU bid, will face considerable
challenges in making the case for Turkey during its up-
coming European presidency.
Sweden will not be alone. Obama has clearly restated
American support for Turkey’s EU candidacy. American
arguments on this score have not changed very much since
the 1990s. U.S. advocacy continues to turn on broad geopo-
litical notions about the importance of anchoring Turkey to
the West and the symbolism of bringing a Muslim country
into the European Union. As French and German resis-
tance to Washington’s argumentation on these points makes
clear, grand strategic arguments about Turkey and Europe
are no longer enough. U.S. policymakers will need to think
more imaginatively about the logic of Turkish membership
as a trilateral, transatlantic proposition. Turkey’s practical
contributions to transatlantic interests, from regional
stability to energy security, may be a better line of approach
in discussions with increasingly hesitant European partners.
If Turkey’s EU project continues to lose momentum, this
does not necessarily clear the way for closer relations with
Washington. The United States and Europe offer Turkey
quite different things in grand strategic terms. For Turkey,
relations with the United States and Europe are complimen-
tary, but not fungible. Moreover, a Turkey driven back to a
more sovereignty-conscious, nationalist posture (along with
others in Europe) is also likely to be a more difficult part-
ner for the United States. In this environment, it would be
surprising if Turkey’s foreign policy leadership did not
Analysis
continue to move in the direction of a portfolio approach to
the country’s international engagement, as a hedge against
uncertainties emanating from Europe. But this approach
could also impose opportunity costs if Turkey’s new
attention to global partnerships diverts attention from
completing Turkey’s convergence with Europe.
Iran: Confrontation, détente, or revolution?
Turkey is a leading stakeholder in the internal and external
evolution of Iran. The contested results in Iran’s recent
presidential election highlight what is at stake. A reformist
victory would have greatly simplified the politics of American
and European dialogue with Iran, and might well have changed
the outlook for Iranian external behavior. The prospect of a
nuclear capable Iran might still pose unacceptable risks, but
without President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory
rhetoric, Iranian intentions would appear in a different light
when viewed from the United States, Israel, Europe, and Turkey.
Turkish strategists remain relatively relaxed over the prospect
of a nuclear Iran, despite the country’s direct exposure to
Iranian ballistic missiles. But over the longer term, a nuclear
armed, even a near-nuclear Iran, is certainly not in Turkey’s
interest. Ankara’s close economic and political ties to Iran, and
an understandable desire to avoid new conflicts in Turkey’s
neighborhood, make Turkey a leading potential beneficiary
of détente between Tehran and Washington. The outcome of
Iran’s presidential election makes this a more distant prospect.
If Iran presses forward with its nuclear program—and this is
most likely—Turkey could face new tests in the relationship
with Washington, both bilaterally and in the context of new
UN Security Council actions.
Mounting protests over the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad’s
reelection suggest the potential for an extended confrontation
between the regime and its popular opponents. It is too soon
to say where this might lead. But a new revolutionary period in
Iran is not out of the question. At a minimum, doing business
with the Iranian regime will now pose more complex political
dilemmas for Ankara and others. If Ankara and Washington
are serious about the desire to build on recent public diplo-
macy achievements, closer coordination on Iran policy should
be at the top of the agenda. The Turkish government stresses its
potential role as a valid interlocutor in relations between Iran
and the West, along the lines of Ankara’s role as a facilitator in
talks between Syria and Israel (Turkey may also have
intervened with Tehran in the case of the recently released Ira-
nian-American journalist Roxana Saberi). But Iran is not Syria.
Relations with Iran are far more consequential for American
and European security, and there will be greater reluctance to
outsource engagement with Iran. A key question for Washing-
ton is whether the Turkish government, with its more com-
fortable relationship with Tehran, is willing and able to deliver
tough messages to the Iranian leadership on the nuclear issue,
democracy, and human rights.
In his April visit to Turkey, Obama used the term “model
partnership” to describe U.S.-Turkish relations. This terminol-
ogy can be given content when partners contribute to manag-
ing grand strategic challenges—issues central to the national
interests of each side. In very different ways (and sooner rather
than later), Russia, the future of Turkey-EU relations, and Iran
will pose key tests of this proposition.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was vice president of the
Pacific Council on international policy, and spent over a decade at the
RAND Corporation. From 1994-1995, Dr. Lesser was a member of the
U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff.
About the GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
America and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on
the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides
of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF
has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
Ankara, and Bucharest.
About the On Turkey Series
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tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
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