Int. J.

Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijhcs

The influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on individuals’

knowledge sharing behavior
Shin-Yuan Hunga, Alexandra Durcikovab,n, Hui-Min Laia,c, Wan-Mei Lina
a
Department of Information Management, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan, ROC
b
Department of Management Information Systems, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, United States
c
Department of Information Management, Chienkuo Technology University, Taiwan, ROC
Received 28 August 2009; received in revised form 11 November 2010; accepted 16 February 2011
Communicated by P. Mulholland
Available online 24 February 2011

Abstract

A major challenge in knowledge management involves motivating people to share knowledge with others. The objective of this study
is to deepen our understanding of how to influence an individual’s tendency to engage in knowledge sharing behavior in a team setting.
Specifically, we investigate the effects of intrinsic motivation (altruism) and extrinsic motivation (economic reward, reputation feedback
and reciprocity) on knowledge sharing (number of ideas generated, idea usefulness, idea creativity and meeting satisfaction) in a group
meeting. Results of our experiment show that a knowledge management system with built-in reputation feedback is crucial to support
successful knowledge sharing.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Knowledge sharing; Intrinsic motivation; Extrinsic motivation; Knowledge management systems; Experimental study

1. Introduction
Knowledge management (KM) issues have increasingly
captured the interest and attention of researchers and practi-
tioners. Organizations implement KM initiatives with the
expectation that they will result in increased competitive
advantage (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Bock and Kim, 2002;
Jones, 2006; Parent et al., 2000; Tiwana, 2002). Previous
research in KM has largely focused on understanding how
existing knowledge should be gathered, organized, stored, and
shared within an organization (e.g., Markus, 2001). However,
creation of new knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) that
is supported by new cultural and work practices (Holthouse,
1998) is an important factor of an organization’s competitive-
ness as it is a prerequisite for future strength (Krogh et al.,
2000). In order to support knowledge creation and to opti-
mally structure its flow so that it is more visible (Holthouse,
1998), employees have to engage in knowledge sharing
(Nonaka, 1994). Organizations have tried different motivators
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 520 621 3927; fax: +1 520 621 2433.
E-mail address: alex@eller.arizona.edu (A. Durcikova).
(Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Muller et al., 2005) that have been
shown to play a critical role in KM success (Alavi and
Leidner, 2001; Bock and Kim, 2002; Davenport and Prusak,
1998). However, researchers argue that there is a relative lack
of attention paid to understanding the link between motiva-
tion and knowledge sharing behavior (Kalling and Styhre,
2003). Therefore, one of the major challenges in KM involves
motivating people to share their knowledge with others
while also making their contribution visible and concrete
(Holthouse, 1998). Our study fills this gap in current literature.
Davenport and Prusak (1998) have argued that people’s
time, energy and knowledge are limited such that they
eventually consider whether the value of their knowledge
contribution is rewarded. This reward can be extrinsic or
intrinsic in nature (Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Ryan and
Deci, 2000). Because of this, organizations have developed a
wide variety of KM practices that use incentives to build a
culture of knowledge sharing. Prior research has highlighted
the importance of motivation on knowledge contribution
behavior (i.e., Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Wasko and Faraj,
2005); however, the results have been equivocal. For example,
some research (Hall, 2001a, 2001b; Kankanhalli et al., 2005)

1071-5819/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2011.02.004
416 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
has found a positive relationship between the reward system
and knowledge sharing; others have found a negative
relationship (Bock and Kim, 2002; Bock et al., 2005).
Findings are similar when it comes to economic rewards:
some suggest that economic rewards have a negative
impact on creativity (Amabile, 1985) while others find
economic rewards irrelevant to an individual’s continued
knowledge-contribution behaviors (He and Wei, 2008).
Results are also equivocal regarding reciprocity, as some
studies have suggested a positive relationship between reci-
procity and knowledge contribution (Kankanhalli et al., 2005;
Wasko and Faraj, 2005), but other research has found
different results (He and Wei, 2008; Wasko and Faraj, 2005).
Because teams are often the fundamental social units of an
organization’s knowledge creation, it has become important
to study knowledge sharing in team settings (Joshi et al., 2007;
Parent et al., 2000). Additionally, knowledge sharing requires
collaboration between the seekers and contributors of knowl-
edge (Yang and Chen, 2008). Hence, team-based collaborative
work can facilitate knowledge sharing (Tiwana, 2002). Teams
can exchange knowledge synchronously and asynchronously.
When knowledge needs to be shared synchronously it often
takes place in a meeting. The objective of this study is to
strengthen the understanding of how to influence an indivi-
dual’s tendency to engage in knowledge sharing behavior in a
team setting. Specifically, we investigate the effects of intrinsic
motivation (altruism) and extrinsic motivation (economic
reward, reputation feedback and reciprocity) on knowledge
sharing behavior (measured through number of ideas gener-
ated, idea usefulness, idea creativity and meeting satisfaction)
in a group meeting under experimental conditions within a
school context. To our knowledge, this is the first experimen-
tal study investigating these relationships. Because findings
from previous studies have been inconclusive, we believe that
conducting a laboratory experiment can more definitively
clarify these relationships. The results of this study show that
existence of a built-in reputation feedback mechanism is
necessary to support knowledge sharing.
In Section 2, we briefly review four motivation theories for
knowledge sharing. In Section 3, we identify the proposed
motivation and framework for developing our hypotheses.
In Section 4, we describe our research method. Section 5
discusses the results and their implications for practice and
research. We close with conclusions.
2. Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
Knowledge is a critical asset of an organization (Davenport
et al., 1998; Krogh et al., 2000; Nonaka, 1994). Frequently,
organizations use Information Technology (IT) in order
to ensure that newly created knowledge is stored, transferred
and shared. One of the aims of IT is to establish knowledge
repositories and connect communication networks (Alavi,
2000), therefore playing a critical role in successful KM.
Information system research has demonstrated the value of
studying intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (e.g., Venkatesh,
1999). When an employee is motivated it means he/she is
moved to do something (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Since
motivation is therefore a main concern of any manager, it
has been one of the most studied factors in KM (Bock et al.,
2005; Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Wasko and Faraj, 2005), and it
has been identified as a key determinant in information
technology acceptance behavior (Davis et al., 1992; Lee
et al., 2005; Shang et al., 2005). People can be motivated
either extrinsically or intrinsically. If a person is intrinsically
motivated, he/she will engage in an action because it is
enjoyable and he/she finds it inherently interesting (Deci and
Ryan, 1980). On the other hand, an extrinsically motivated
individual’s actions are driven by a goal (Deci and Ryan,
1980). Research has shown that these two categories of
motivation can lead to very different behavior and perfor-
mance (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
Prior research has shown that KM practices cannot
improve business performance simply by using IT to
capture and share lessons learned (Alavi and Leidner,
2001; Cross and Baird, 2000; O’Dell and Grayson,
1998). Gold et al. (2001) found that it is an organization’s
formal organizational structure and the incentive systems
that make up its overall KM structure that support open
sharing of valuable knowledge (Wood and Gray, 1991).
Therefore, we will focus on different theories that incor-
porate extrinsic and intrinsic motivation to identify those
factors that have the highest impact on knowledge sharing.
Our literature review suggests that there are four such
theories:
(1) Economic exchange theory—In the economic exchange
theory (EET) perspective, each person’s behavior is
influenced by rational self-interest. When a person feels
that the obtained rewards are more than the cost, she will
share her knowledge (Constant et al., 1994; Kelley and
Thibaut, 1978). According to Karlsen and Gottschalk
(2004), IT projects often fail because there are no
incentives to promote knowledge sharing. These incentives
will not only influence user behavior but also users’
interactions with the system (Ba et al., 2001). This implies
that people will expect to receive extrinsic benefits such as
monetary rewards, promotions, or educational opportu-
nities (Bock and Kim, 2002). In the context of this study,
individuals’ knowledge sharing would depend on the
existence of monetary rewards.
(2) Knowledge market perspective—Davenport and Prusak
(1998) used the knowledge market perspective (KMP)
to propose knowledge circulation. It consists of the one
who demands knowledge (the buyer), the one who
provides knowledge (the seller), the broker who acts as
the connecting thread between the buyer and seller,
and the price mechanism. Instead of the price mechan-
ism that exists in real exchange markets, the price
mechanism here refers to the exchange rewards, which
include reputation, reciprocity and altruism. In the
context of this study, individuals’ knowledge sharing
will depend on existence of reputation feedback and
their level of reciprocity and altruism.
 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
(3) Social exchange theory—Social exchange theory (SET)
proposes that all human behavior involves benefit
maximization and cost minimization. SET posits having
relatively long-term relationships of interest in contrast to
a one-time exchange (Molm, 1997). The difference
between SET and EET is that there is no clear obligation
to receive future benefits (Kankanhalli et al., 2005).
During a social exchange, social and individual costs
and benefits can influence knowledge contribution. For
example, cost factors include the loss of knowledge
power and the codification effort, while the benefit
factors include organization reward, knowledge self-
efficacy and enjoyment in helping others (Kankanhalli
et al., 2005). Therefore, the factors include both intrinsic
and extrinsic benefits (Deci and Ryan, 1980; Vallerand,
1997). In the context of this study, an extrinsic benefit
would be monetary reward for knowledge sharing (Beer
and Nohria, 2000; Hall, 2001b) that can lead to a
comparatively better life (Kankanhalli et al., 2005). Other
extrinsic benefits would be reputation feedback that can
lead to active participation (Donath, 1999) and recipro-
city, the expectation that an individual’s sharing efforts
will be reciprocated, thereby ensuring ongoing sharing
(Wasko and Faraj, 2005). The one intrinsic motivation is
altruism. Altruism is derived from the intrinsic enjoyment
of helping others (Kankanhalli et al., 2005).
(4) Social capital theory—The social capital theory (SCT)
perspective recognizes that social capital can promote
knowledge sharing among partners because they pos-
sess common values, enabling them to build mutual
trust. Several prior studies used SCT to understand
organizations’ knowledge creation and sharing process
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998;
Wasko and Faraj, 2005). SCT argues that cooperation
and tacit understanding are formed over a long period
of time. This leads to the development of mutual trust
and establishment of long-term interpersonal relation-
ships of reciprocity within and across groups. In the
context of our study, individuals will reciprocate
others’ effort to share knowledge by contributing more.
The above literature review suggests that there are four
key motivators affecting knowledge sharing: one intrinsic
motivator (altruism) and three extrinsic motivators (eco-
nomic reward, reputation feedback and reciprocity). This
finding is consistent with the work of Davenport and
Prusak (1998, p. 31 and pp. 47–48) who argue that a
market price system for knowledge exchange exists within
organizations. While the medium of exchange for knowl-
edge is rarely money, there are some agreed-upon curren-
cies that make this exchange happen. These agreed-upon
currencies are reciprocity, reputation, and altruism. More-
over, Davenport and Prusak argue that monetary rewards
are vital element in establishing the culture of knowledge
sharing (p. 48). Next, we discuss in detail how these four
motivators influence knowledge sharing.
417
3. Research model and hypotheses
3.1. Economic reward
Money is the most obvious way for an organization to
reward its employee for suitable behavior. Carrillo et al.
(2004) surveyed UK construction organizations and found
that most reward schemes in organizations were financially
based. In order to encourage knowledge contributors to
share, the organization can provide different forms of
economic rewards such as salary increases, bonuses, job
security, or promotions (Ba et al., 2001; Beer and Nohria,
2000; Bock et al., 2005; He and Wei, 2008; Kankanhalli
et al., 2005). Results from recent empirical research also
provide evidence that economic rewards significantly influence
usage of electronic repositories by knowledge contributors
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Kankanhalli et al., 2005).
Thus, when individuals receive an economic reward for
their knowledge, they will feel more motivated to share
knowledge, which will lead them to generate more unique,
useful, and creative ideas. They will feel that money is a
fair exchange for their knowledge sharing behavior (Bartol
and Srivastava, 2002; Hall, 2001b). Furthermore, as a
consequence of receiving money, an individual will experi-
ence a higher level of satisfaction (Calder and Staw, 1975;
Osterloh and Frey, 2000). This leads to the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Economic reward will positively influence
the number of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 1b. Economic reward will positively influence
the usefulness of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 1c. Economic reward will positively influence
the creativity of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 1d. Economic reward will increase the perceived
level of satisfaction with the meeting.
3.2. Reputation feedback
Reputation can help an individual to obtain and main-
tain his or her status within a community (Jones et al.,
1997; Marett and Joshi, 2009) and prevent the retention of
free riders who do not contribute to the team effort. In
open-source software projects, a good reputation is the
capital that drives the key contributors to make important
changes (Stewart, 2005). Several studies suggest that
people participate in KM practices because they believe
that they can establish and improve their individual
reputation (Constant et al., 1996; Donath, 1999; Wasko
and Faraj, 2005) or earn peer recognition (Carrillo et al.,
2004). As a result, when individuals feel that knowledge
sharing can elevate their reputation, they will be more
inclined to share their knowledge (Ba et al., 2001; Daven-
port and Prusak, 1998; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Reputa-
tion may also be related to social status: when the
contributor’s status increases, the quality of his or her
418 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
performance also increases (Stewart, 2005). Results from
recent empirical studies also confirmed that reputation
feedback significantly affects the contributor’s volume and
helpfulness of contribution (Wasko and Faraj, 2005).
It follows from the arguments above that reputation
feedback positively affects an individual’s self esteem.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the reputation feedback
mechanism will motivate an individual to perform better
and he/she will then develop more unique ideas, more
useful ideas, and more creative ideas. The presence of
reputation feedback will also positively influence an indi-
vidual’s satisfaction with the team meeting, as her/his
effort to share knowledge will be publicly acknowledged.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. Reputation feedback will positively influence
the number of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 2b. Reputation feedback will positively influence
the usefulness of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 2c. Reputation feedback will positively influence
the creativity of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 2d. Reputation feedback will increase the per-
ceived level of satisfaction with the meeting.
3.3. Reciprocity
In order to contribute knowledge, individuals must
believe that their contribution is worth the effort. Accord-
ing to Davenport and Prusak (1998), people’s time, energy
and knowledge are limited. Therefore, except when profit-
able, people are usually unwilling to share these scarce
resources with others. Reciprocity is a form of conditional
gain; that is, people expect future benefits from their
present actions. This means that a behavior is done in
response to previous friendly actions (Fehr and Gachter,
2000). Many studies have carried out detailed analyses of
reciprocity and found that it can be beneficial to knowl-
edge contributors because they anticipate future help from
other people (Connolly and Thorn, 1999; Kollock, 1999).
The norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) makes two
minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have
helped them, and (2) people should not harm those who have
helped them. In a team environment, people who anticipate
and are more willing to share their good ideas also expect
others to respond to their ideas and generate new ideas.
Fehr and Gachter (2000) pointed out that one of the most
important consequences of reciprocity is the power to enhance
collective actions and enforce social norms. Research has
revealed that reciprocity, a deeply held human behavioral trait
(Schultz, 2006, Heineck and Anger, 2010), significantly affects
how much an individual contributes (Bock et al., 2005;
Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Thus, people who expect reciprocity
will share more ideas, their ideas will be more useful and
creative, and their satisfaction with the meeting will be higher.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a. Reciprocity will positively influence the num-
ber of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 3b. Reciprocity will positively influence the useful-
ness of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 3c. Reciprocity will positively influence the crea-
tivity of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 3d. Reciprocity will increase the perceived level
of satisfaction with the meeting.
3.4. Altruism
Altruism can be seen as a form of unconditional kindness
without the expectation of a return (Fehr and Gachter, 2000)
where an individual provides help and achieves a sense of
satisfaction from the action (Kollock, 1999). In many cases,
individuals help others whether or not they get anything in
return (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). Constant et al. (1994)
suggested that people who share tangible information may
do so due to pro-social attitudes. Wasko and Faraj (2000,
2005) pointed out that these individuals are motivated
intrinsically to contribute knowledge to others because they
enjoy helping others. Results from recent empirical studies
have also confirmed the positive relationship between altru-
ism and knowledge contribution. For instance, Kankanhalli
et al. (2005) found that altruism significantly affects electronic
repository usage by knowledge contributors and it also
significantly increases the helpfulness of the contribution.
This is further supported by He and Wei (2008), who suggest
that knowledge workers contribute knowledge to the KMS
because of their enjoyment in helping others.
Therefore, we propose that in a team environment
people with greater altruism will contribute more unique
ideas, propose more useful ideas, generate more creative
ideas and also have a higher satisfaction with the meeting.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a. Altruism will positively influence the num-
ber of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 4b. Altruism will positively influence the use-
fulness of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 4c. Altruism will positively influence the crea-
tivity of ideas generated.
Hypothesis 4d. Altruism will increase the perceived level of
satisfaction with the meeting.
The above research model is shown in Fig. 1.
4. Research methodology
4.1. Research design
We conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test
the hypotheses delineated in the previous sections. Experi-
mentation as a research method allowed us to manipulate
economic rewards and reputation feedback in a systematic
 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
Extrinsic Motivation
Economic Reward H1
Reputation Feedback H2
Reciprocity H3
Intrinsic Motivation H4
Altruism
Fig. 1. Research model.
fashion, as well as control extraneous variables more
effectively. Furthermore, this method makes it possible
to replicate experiments using different subject groups and
conditions that will eventually lead to the discovery of an
average effect of independent variables across people,
situations and time (Emory and Cooper, 1991). This type of
experimentation has been successful in small group interac-
tions (Babbie, 2004). Moreover, one extrinsic and one intrinsic
factor which cannot be manipulated, reciprocity and altruism,
were measured in the post-experiment session. This study
represents a 2  2 factorial design (with/without economic
reward  with/without reputation feedback) that assessed the
motivation for knowledge sharing behavior.
Reputation feedback was reported to each participant
regarding his/her creative tasks. The facilitator counted the
number of unique ideas and rank-ordered the team
members from the most productive to the least productive.
This feedback was provided every 7 min. The same facil-
itator was used in all experiments.
4.2. Subjects
A total of 140 upper division undergraduate and MBA
students from a university in Taiwan volunteered to partici-
pate in the study. In a pilot study, 20 subjects were recruited
into four groups to test and fine-tune the questionnaire and
experimental manipulations and procedures. In addition, a
total of 120 subjects volunteered for the actual experiments.
After reading and signing a consent form, subjects completed
a pre-session survey that gathered some background data.
Subjects were then randomly assigned to a five-person group.
There were 24 groups, 6 groups in each treatment, and 5
participants in each group. Five-person groups were used, as
this size was found to be optimal for brainstorming (Osborn,
1953; Slater, 1958; Stewart, 2005). Participants were randomly
assigned to groups, and groups were randomly assigned
to different treatments. No significant differences between
subjects existed across the four experimental treatments in
terms of their gender or age. Each participant was awarded $3
(US) for participation. Moreover, additional incentives were
provided for the groups receiving an economic reward. Cash
bonuses $2 (US) were awarded to those who performed above
419
Outcome of Knowledge Sharing
Number of Ideas
Idea Usefulness
Idea Creativity
Meeting Satisfaction
average and an additional $7 (US) was awarded to those who
performed best. Subjects were informed about this economic
reward in advance. The level of monetary reward would be
attractive to these student subjects according to the results of
prior similar studies (Chen et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2007;
Quigley et al., 2007).
4.3. Tasks
McGrath (1984) classified group tasks into four major
categories: generate (e.g., generate creativity ideas), choose
(e.g., choosing solutions), negotiate (e.g., negotiating conflicts)
and execute (e.g., performing tasks). The generation task was
chosen for this experiment as it is the most suitable for
knowledge sharing. Two tasks that had been previously tested
and validated were used in the study (Parent et al., 2000).
Since the experiment results are likely to be influenced by the
degree of familiarity with certain tasks and systems, our
subjects were first requested to accomplish a practice task. At
the completion of the practice task, the subjects were asked to
complete the experimental task. The first task, the practice
task, was to identify which features the new university library
should have. The second task, the experimental task, was to
describe how tourism could be improved in the local area.
The two tasks are described in Appendix A.
4.4. Experimental system
A web-based group support system using JAVA tech-
nology was developed to support a number of functions
that occur in team meetings: brainstorming, organizing
information, list building, information gathering, prioritiz-
ing, consensus building, and the best choice building.
Several tools provided by GroupSystems, a group support
system developed originally at the University of Arizona,
were used. To support the generation task, the system
provided: (1) an electronic brainstorming tool; (2) an issue
analyzer; and (3) a ranking/voting tool. The electronic
brainstorming tool is an idea-generation tool that allows
participants to input their ideas anonymously and freely.
The issue analyzer is then used for the identification and
consolidation of issues generated during electronic
420 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
brainstorming sessions. The ranking/voting tool allows
participants to privately rank order their choices and vote
on the list of issues generated by the issue analyzer.
The group support system ran in a Microsoft Windows
environment on a local area network. Participants were
seated around a U-shaped table in a computer lab and
were supplied with a networked computer and keyboard.
4.5. Variables and measures
4.5.1. Independent variables
The two extrinsic motivators, economic reward and reputa-
tion feedback, were manipulated, whereas one extrinsic and
one intrinsic motivator, reciprocity and altruism, were mea-
sured. The experiment was thus designed to assess the
willingness of individuals to contribute ideas under two
conditions: (1) reciprocity—a deeply held human behavioral
trait (Schultz, 2006; Heineck and Anger, 2010), defined as the
belief that current contributions to group meetings would lead
to future requests for knowledge to be met in order to obtain
mutual benefit through knowledge sharing (Davenport and
Prusak, 1998; Kankanhalli et al., 2005); (2) altruism—defined
as the perception of pleasure obtained from helping others
through knowledge shared in a group meeting without
expecting anything in return (Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Wasko
and Faraj, 2000). At the end of the experiment, the subjects
rated themselves on reciprocity and altruism. The reciprocity
and altruism constructs are shown in Appendix B.
4.5.2. Dependent variables
Knowledge sharing behavior is defined as the degree to
which an individual conducts knowledge sharing activities in a
group meeting (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). In this study,
the dependent variables showed how well the subjects
performed in the idea generation task and how satisfied they
Table 1
Measures of dependent variables.
Variables Measure
Number of ideas Each idea was recorded by the group support system and
generated then independently judged by two tourism experts. The
third judge would join the discussion to reach consensus if
any conflict cannot be resolved between two judgesa
Idea usefulness Each of the three tourism experts reported one item on a
four-point Likert scale (4—very helpful; 1—not helpful)
and were averaged as a usefulness ratingb
Idea creativity Each of three tourism experts reported two items
(originality and paradigm relatedness) on a seven-point
Likert scale). The scores were averaged as a creativity
ratingc
Perceived meeting Five self-reported items. Each item used a seven-point
satisfaction Likert scale. The questionnaire is attached in Appendix B
a
Raters were unaware of the hypotheses.
b
The inter-rater reliability for all three judges was 0.94.
c
The inter-rater reliabilities of idea originality and idea paradigm relatedness for all three judges were 0.90 and 0.88, respectively.
were with the sharing process. This was measured by the
participants’ outcomes of knowledge sharing, which included
knowledge quantity (number of ideas), knowledge quality
(idea usefulness and idea creativity) and perceived meeting
satisfaction. Table 1 summarizes the measures of dependent
variables.
4.5.3. Control variables
A number of control variables, such as group size, task
type, and some contextual factors, were fixed. In this study,
the group size was controlled to five people per group.
All groups had to solve the same task. All experiments had
the same facilitator. Since group members were randomly
assigned to treatments, it was assured that several other
factors (e.g., group history and individual characteristics)
known to influence the measures were also controlled for.
4.6. Experimental procedures
The experiment was comprised of seven steps:
 Step 1—Subjects were randomly assigned to a five-
person group. There were 24 groups. Subjects began
with a 10 min hands-on introduction to this system.
 Step 2—Each group member was given additional
10 min to perform the practice task and to get to know
the system.
 Step 3—The experimental task was explained to the
subjects (5 min).
 Step 4—Subjects were then given 20 min to brainstorm ideas.
The system enabled group members to comment on options,
ask questions, comment on other members’ comments, watch
other members’ options, and so on. Participants typed in their
responses and the system would immediately make these ideas
available for other subjects to read on their screens.
Operationalization Source
The number of ideas generated by each participant Easton et al.
after eliminating duplicate and irrelevant ones (2003)
Each participant was independently assessed by Wasko and Faraj
three tourism experts to indicate his/her idea (2005)
usefulness. The average usefulness score for each
participant was calculated thereafter
Each participant was independently assessed by Hender et al.
three tourism experts to evaluate his/her idea (2002)
originality and idea paradigm relatedness scores.
The average creativity score for each participant was
calculated thereafter
Participant’s satisfaction with the meeting process Green and Taber
(1980)
 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427 421

 Step 5—Subjects were then asked to discuss why the Table 3

ideas were appropriate for the task (5 min). Results of factor analysis.
 Step 6—Following a two-round voting procedure, sub- Scale items Reciprocity Altruism Satisfaction
jects selected three ideas and assigned weights reflecting
the relative importance of the selected ideas (5 min). In Reciprocity 1 0.614 0.292 0.203
this phase, subjects were voting on the best ideas. Reciprocity 2 0.866 0.167 0.121
Reciprocity 3 0.754 0.244 0.198
 Step 7—Subjects were asked to complete the post-
Altruism 1 0.169 0.839 0.267
experiment questionnaires. Data collected during this Altruism 2 0.215 0.863 0.214
phase included the demographic data, manipulation Altruism 3 0.311 0.837 0.029
check, reciprocity, and altruism, as well as perceived Altruism 4 0.175 0.847 0.138
meeting satisfaction. Satisfaction 1 0.156 0.064 0.758
Satisfaction 2 0.143 0.112 0.742
Satisfaction 3 0.207 0.097 0.735
5. Results Satisfaction 4 0.072 0.134 0.782
Satisfaction 5 0.089 0.299 0.799
5.1. Profiles of the participants

A total of 118 (out of 120) usable responses were used in
the analysis. The sample consisted of 62 males (53%) and
56 females (47%) with an average age of 23. Most of the
subjects (82.2%) had taken at least one course on compu-
ters. All subjects used computers frequently and most of
them (98.3%) were very efficient at typing. Most subjects
(93.2%) had experience working in teams.
5.2. Data reliability and validity
The constructs were assessed for their reliability and
validity. Internal consistency for all constructs was inves-
tigated using Cronbach’s alpha. The results in Table 2
show that the reliability of the three constructs ranged
from 0.72 to 0.91, which exceeds the recommended value
of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978).
To ensure content validity, previously validated measure-
ments were used. Furthermore, the final questionnaire was
validated by three professionals to ensure that no syntax or
semantic biases occurred during the translation from English
to Chinese. The questionnaire was then translated back to
English to ensure that proper translation of all the items
occurred. Finally, the pilot study with 20 subjects revealed no
problems with the questionnaire design.
In order to assess construct validity, principal component
with varimax rotation was performed. The Kaiser–Meyer–
Olkin (KMO) index of sampling adequacy was 0.845,
confirming the appropriateness of the analysis. Three factors
were extracted that cumulatively explained 69.3% of the
variance; these are shown in Table 3. All the loadings of each
Table 2
Results of reliability analysis.
Number Cronbach’s Reciprocity Altruism Satisfaction
of items alpha
Reciprocity 3 0.72 0.637
Altruism 4 0.91 0.614 0.825
Satisfaction 5 0.85 0.442 0.429 0.725
The bold numbers in the diagonal row are square roots of the average
variances extracted (AVE).
observed indicator on its latent construct exceed 0.60 and the
average variances extracted (AVEs) of these three constructs
are larger than 0.5, therefore good convergent validity was
demonstrated (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Additionally,
in terms of discriminant validity, all the AVE values of the
three constructs exceeded the squared correlation coefficients
between the constructs (see Table 2) demonstrating good
discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
5.3. Experimental findings
Prior to testing our model, we performed manipulation
checks. The t-test results indicate that the manipulation
was successful for both factors: specifically, for economic
reward the means for the two groups were 4.75 and 1.85
(t =8.905, p = 0.000) and for reputation feedback the
means were 4.20 and 2.55 (t =3.735, p = 0.001).
To understand the effects of motivational factors on
knowledge sharing, Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA) with four categorical independent variables
(economic reward, reputation feedback, reciprocity, and
altruism) and four continuous dependent variables (number
of ideas, idea usefulness, idea creativity, and meeting satis-
faction) was performed. Subjects were assigned to high and
low levels of reciprocity and altruism based on median split.
The results of the MANOVA are summarized in Table 4.
Z-skewness/Z-kurtosis and Levene’s tests were used to
test normality and variance homogeneity. Z-skewness/
Z-kurtosis test results demonstrate that all the Z-values
ranged between 2.58 and 2.58, implying that the present
data meet the normality assumption. The F-values of the
Levene’s test are 1.239 (p= 0.229; for number of ideas
generated), 0.409 (p = 0.747; for idea usefulness), 0.232
(p = 0.874; for idea creativity), and 1.428 (p= 0.239; for
meeting satisfaction), respectively, indicating that no
statistically significant differences exist among the variances
of different groups. The correlation of the dependent
measures was tested by Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The
p-value was below 0.001, satisfying the requirements of
intercorrelation for MANOVA (Hair et al., 1995). Thus,
MANOVA was appropriate.
422 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427

Table 4 significant (p=0.578, 0.287, and 0.500, respectively). Hence,

Results of the MANOVA analysis. hypotheses H4a, H4b and H4c are rejected. Yet altruism
Source SS DF F-value Significance
significantly increases meeting satisfaction (mean/st.dev were
4.99/1.04 and 4.20/0.83). Consequently, hypothesis H4d is
Number of ideas generated supported (po0.05).
Economic reward 2.523 1 0.211 0.647 The above results demonstrate an interesting phenom-
Reputation feedback 589.539 1 49.222 0.000nnn
enon that economic reward, reciprocity, and altruism
Reciprocity 4.399 1 0.367 0.546
Altruism 3.728 1 0.311 0.578 affect meeting satisfaction, but show no significant effects
on number of ideas generated, idea usefulness, and idea
Idea usefulness
creativity. Furthermore, reputation feedback has an effect
Economic reward 0.530 1 1.264 0.263
Reputation feedback 10.471 1 24.976 0.000nnn on the number of ideas generated, idea usefulness, and idea
Reciprocity 0.034 1 0.081 0.777 creativity, but no significant effects on meeting satisfac-
Altruism 0.480 1 1.146 0.287 tion. The discussion of these findings follows.
Idea creativity
Economic reward 0.113 1 0.022 0.881 6. Discussion
Reputation feedback 95.294 1 18.970 0.000nnn
Reciprocity 0.328 1 0.065 0.799 6.1. Implications for research
Altruism 2.300 1 0.458 0.500

Meeting satisfaction
Economic reward 4.408 1 5.526 0.020nn
Reputation feedback 0.235 1 0.294 0.589
Reciprocity 4.078 1 5.113 0.026nn
Altruism 8.022 1 10.057 0.002nn
nn
po 0.05.
nnn
po0.001.
Results show that the effect of economic reward on number
of ideas generated, idea usefulness, and idea creativity are not
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (p=0.647, 0.263, and
0.881, respectively). Consequently, hypotheses H1a, H1b and
H1c are rejected. However, subjects receiving an economic
reward are more satisfied with the meeting than subjects
without it (mean/st.dev were 4.7/0.96 and 4.33/1.00). Conse-
quently, hypothesis H1d is supported (po0.05). Economic
rewards make the meeting more enjoyable but do not promote
knowledge sharing.
The effect of reputation feedback on number of ideas
generated, idea usefulness, and idea creativity are statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.000 for all). Providing reputation
feedback can stimulate subjects to generate more unique
ideas (mean/st.dev were 11.21/3.86 and 6.55/2.95), generate
more useful ideas (mean/st.dev were 2.67/0.60 and 2.08/
0.69), and generate more creative ideas (mean/st.dev were
6.82/2.10 and 5.03/2.32). Consequently, hypotheses H2a,
H2b and H2c are supported. However, the effect of
reputation feedback on meeting satisfaction is not statis-
tically significant (p =0.589). Consequently, hypothesis
H2d is rejected.
The effect of reciprocity on number of ideas generated,
idea usefulness, and idea creativity is not statistically
significant (p= 0.546, 0.777, and 0.799, respectively). Con-
sequently, hypotheses H3a, H3b and H3c are rejected.
However, high reciprocity significantly increases the meet-
ing satisfaction (mean/st.dev were 4.91/1.09 and 4.27/0.85).
Consequently, hypothesis H3d is supported (po 0.05).
Finally, the effect of altruism on number of ideas gener-
ated, idea usefulness, and idea creativity is not statistically
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this research is that
economic incentives did not achieve the desired outcome of
increased knowledge sharing. Instead, reputation feedback
had the most significant effect on all measures of knowledge
sharing. The goal of this research was to understand the role
that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation play in knowledge
sharing behavior, as the results of previous studies conflicted.
To address this gap in the literature we conducted an
experiment that investigated the effects of altruism (intrinsic
motivation) and economic reward, reputation feedback and
reciprocity (extrinsic motivation) on knowledge quantity,
quality (idea usefulness and idea creativity) and satisfaction
with a meeting (because the knowledge was exchanged
synchronously). When discussing the results of this study
we compare our findings with three recently published studies
on knowledge sharing (see Table 5).
6.1.1. Economic reward effects
The first extrinsic motivational factor studied was
economic reward, a concept adopted from EET, KMP
and SET. According to these theories, an individual’s
decision to share knowledge is affected by the presence
of an economic reward. In our study, the provision of an
economic reward significantly affected only satisfaction
with a meeting but had no effect on the quantity and
quality of contribution that are of foremost interest in any
KM project. Our result is consistent with Bock et al. (2005)
who showed that providing an economic reward did not
improve the user’s attitude toward knowledge sharing.
However, Kankanhalli et al. (2005) found that organiza-
tional rewards can increase users knowledge contribution
through Electronic Knowledge Repository (EKR). The
explanation of this result is attributable to two factors.
First, Kankanhalli et al. (2005) suggested that the influence
of organizational reward on knowledge contribution may
be constrained by the contributor’s organizational identi-
fication. If the knowledge contributor has more in com-
mon with the organization, the contributor will be more
likely to receive other rewards from the organization. The
 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427 423

Table 5
Comparison of this study and three recent studies.

Method KMS Sample Dependent Economic Reputation Reciprocity Altruism

variable reward feedback

Kankanhalli Survey Electronic 150 respondents EKR usage by Significant N/A N/A Significant
et al. (2005) knowledge from 10 knowledge
repository organizations in contributors
Singapore
Wasko and Survey Electronic 173 responses Helpfulness of N/A Significant Insignificant Significant on
Faraj (2005) network of from a national contribution helpfulness of
practice legal professional contribution
association in (po0.1)
U.S.
Volume of Significant Significant Insignificant
contribution
Bock et al. Survey No specific 154 responses Intention to Extrinsic N/A Significant N/A
(2005) KMS. from 27 share reward has a
(Executives organizations knowledge negative effect
enrolled in the across 16 on attitude
CKO program industries in toward
offer by a Korea knowledge
university) sharing
(p o0.1)
This study Laboratory Group support 118 participants Number of Insignificant Significant Insignificant Insignificant
experiment system from a university ideas generated
in Taiwan
Idea usefulness Insignificant Significant Insignificant Insignificant
Idea creativity Insignificant Significant Insignificant Insignificant
Meeting Significant Insignificant Significant Significant
satisfaction

experimental groups were temporary groups and therefore
group identification could not be established within the
timeframe of the experiment. Consequently, economic
rewards were not a strong enough factor to be influential in
motivating knowledge sharing. Second, Bock and Kim (2002)
noted that the extrinsic reward is only a trigger for the sharing
of knowledge; it does not change the contributor’s attitude
towards knowledge sharing. Without creation of personal
commitment, economic reward only supports knowledge
sharing for a short period of time. Hence, an economic
reward is only a weak reinforcement in the short term
that enhances employees’ compliance with knowledge sharing
practices at the beginning of a project, but may hinder later
knowledge sharing (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). In addition,
a previous study by Bartol and Srivastava (2002) also
indicated that monetary rewards may be less useful in
communities of practice. Therefore the non-existence of
organizational commitment in our experiment supports the
findings of Bock and Kim (2002) and suggests that con-
tributors will be satisfied with the participation because there
is a short-term benefit. However, the knowledge sharing
outcome, the focus of KM strategies, will not be helped as
economic rewards do not increase the quantity or quality of
knowledge contributions.
6.1.2. Reputation feedback effects
The second extrinsic motivational factor in our study
was reputation feedback, a concept adopted from KMP
and SET. Reputation mechanisms, such as eBay’s Feed-
back Forum, are widely used in practice. Our results
indicate that reputation feedback has a significant effect
on both the quantity and quality of contributions, but does
not have a significant effect on perceived meeting satisfac-
tion. This is consistent with Wasko and Faraj (2005), who
found that reputation feedback can increase both the
helpfulness of contributions and the number of contribu-
tions, and with Marett and Joshi (2009), who pointed out
that reputation improvement and status-building within
the community are motivation factors for sharing rumors.
Helping individuals build expertise and providing recogni-
tion may itself encourage knowledge sharing (O’Dell and
Grayson, 1998).
Appropriate feedback would allow people to understand
that sharing their knowledge helps others. That, in turn,
would increase their sense of self-worth (Bock et al., 2005)
and peer recognition (Sheehan, 2000) . In addition, Wasko
and Faraj (2000) found that when knowledge is owned by
individuals, people participate primarily out of reputation,
status and obligation. The reputation mechanism in this
study provided the participants information regarding the
number of unique ideas generated by everyone. A partici-
pant may feel honored that he/she created a high number
of ideas. Those who fall behind can be stimulated by this
mechanism to get back on track. However, ranking may
cause some participants to feel pressured and therefore be
dissatisfied with this approach to knowledge sharing.
424 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
6.1.3. Reciprocity effects
The third extrinsic motivational factor in our study was
reciprocity, a concept adopted from KMP, SET and SCT.
Reciprocity denotes that when people share their knowl-
edge they expect to be compensated with equally valuable
knowledge. Our results (see Table 4) indicate that recipro-
city does not have a significant effect on the quantity or
quality of contributions. However, reciprocity has a
significant positive effect on meeting satisfaction. Previous
research has found that reciprocity is positively related to
intention to share knowledge (Bock et al., 2005) and
quantity of contribution (Wasko and Faraj, 2005);
however, it had no effect on the quality of contributions
(Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Three reasons can explain this
inconsistency. First, the correlation between intention and
behavior is approximately 0.5 (Sheppard et al., 1988) and
therefore reciprocity can positively affect intention and in
some cases also quantity of contribution. However, not all
contributions can be of high quality. Second, previous studies
on motivational factors discussed reciprocity that is mostly
long-term in influence, such as in an online community
(Wasko and Faraj, 2000) or knowledge repository usage
(Kankanhalli et al., 2005). Fehr and Gachter (2000) noted
that reciprocity is deeply embedded in social interactions.
Due to time and cost limitations, this experiment was
conducted only once. Therefore, future research should
examine ‘‘long-term reciprocity’’. Finally, the group meetings
represent network-based interactions rather than dyadic
interactions and therefore direct reciprocity is not necessary
to sustain collective action (Wasko and Faraj, 2000).
When a member proposes an idea in the group meeting
environment, others quickly respond to this idea. This fast
exchange of ideas can lead to fast problem solving and in
turn is very satisfying for those who care about reciprocity.
6.1.4. Altruism effects
The intrinsic motivational factor in our study was altruism,
a concept adopted from KMP and SET. Altruism can be seen
as unconditional kindness without the expectation of a
reward. The reward is usually a good feeling about helping
others out. The results of this study indicate that altruism had
a positive impact on meeting satisfaction but it did not have
significant effects on either the quantity or quality of
contributions. This finding is consistent with Taylor’s (2006)
viewpoint that altruistic motivation may be insufficient to aid
knowledge sharing. This factor remains the most puzzling out
of the four investigated as it has been shown in the past to
affect (He and Wei, 2008; Kankanhalli et al., 2005) and not
affect quantity of contribution (Wasko and Faraj, 2005) and
positively affect quality of contribution (Wasko and Faraj,
2005). Given that the reward for an altruistic person can come
as a good feeling about his/her action, this might have been
captured by the sense of satisfaction with the meeting or
fulfillment of duty in helping to brainstorm ideas about how
to increase tourism in the local area. This is why satisfaction
with the meeting was significantly affected by altruism.
6.1.5. Implications for practitioners
This research has several implications for practitioners,
both KMS software developers and managers. The impor-
tance of the alignment of information system design with
incentives has recently been recognized (Ba et al., 2001). In
this study, we used economic reward and reputation
feedback as extrinsic incentives that were aligned with
the goal of higher quantity and quality of knowledge
sharing. Our study indicates that KMS software devel-
opers should incorporate a built-in reputation feedback to
the KMS due to the strong influence of reputation feed-
back on both quantity and quality of knowledge shared.
First, the quantity of the contributions can be implemented
as a system feature and therefore would not require more
human capital investment. Second, implementation of a
ranking mechanism for quality of contributions would
require both system and personal changes. An interface in
the KMS would need to be created that allows idea quality
ranking. Then, managers need to assign an employee to the
role of a moderator who, like the facilitator in our
experiment, would rate the quality of the contributions.
Third, managers should realize that traditional individual
performance-based economic reward has no significant
influence on knowledge sharing in group settings and it
can sometimes be seen as demeaning (Bock et al., 2008;
O’Dell and Grayson, 1998). Thus, for a company manager
who wants to increase knowledge sharing, using solely
individual based economic rewards may be an ineffective
method. However, as previous research indicated, eco-
nomic rewards may serve the purpose of stimulating
participation at the beginning of a project, however, over
the long term, they may have negative impact (Benabou
and Tirole, 2003). This is because individual performance-
based economic rewards could create a tournament-like
atmosphere (Taylor, 2006) and trigger competition among
people who were expected to closely collaborate (Bock
et al., 2008). A viable alternative would be using group-
based economic rewards that has been shown to outper-
form individual based economic reward in group setting
(Taylor, 2006). Finally, while altruism improves meeting
satisfaction, the results show that it does not promote
knowledge sharing. Taylor (2006) suggests that to aid
knowledge sharing, high levels of both altruism and knowl-
edge of the subject may be necessary. Thus, when knowl-
edge sharing is considered an important part of the job, it is
vital to hire employees that are both knowledge content
experts and altruistic.
6.1.6. Suggestions for future research
As with any empirical research, limitations of the
present study should be recognized. The experimental
context of this study, while allowing for precise control
of factors without any extraneous influence and confound-
ing factors, may decrease the applicability of the findings
to real-world KMS scenarios. We have attempted to
minimize this inherent limitation of an experimental study
by using a web-based group support system that any
 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
organization can utilize for idea generation. Additionally,
using students as participants may limit the generalizability
of our results to the rest of the population. However, we
were controlling for this limitation by selecting a task that
did not require knowledge of a specific subject matter and
students appeared to participate satisfactorily during their
task. Finally, reputation feedback was provided by one
facilitator for each group. It is possible that another
facilitator would rate reputation differently. However,
given that this facilitator provided feedback to all groups,
the potential bias was uniform across all groups. In
conclusion, despite the potential limitations this research
makes some important contributions to both research and
practice. Other studies using different research methods are
needed to gain a thorough understanding of knowledge
sharing in group settings.
Several suggestions for future research stem from this
experiment. First, we examined only one intrinsic motivation
– altruism – in this study. However, there are other intrinsic
motivations such as knowledge self-efficacy and collaboration
norms (Bock et al., 2006) that have been shown to influence
not only the behavior of those actively contributing informa-
tion but also lurkers (Marett and Joshi, 2009). Several theories
also suggest that social influence is crucial in shaping user
behavior. For instance, social capital theory noted that group
members tend to contribute due to norms, trust, obligations
and identification (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Therefore,
running this experiment over a longer period of time could
lead to a better understanding of intrinsic motivation in
knowledge sharing. Also, theory of conformity (Bernheim,
1994) suggests that groups tend to comply with the group
norm and this in turn influences knowledge sharing behavior.
The effects of these motivations should be examined in future
research. Second, although our experiment is conducted in
groups, our reward structure was individually oriented.
Future studies should consider team-based rewards that have
been shown to foster cooperation and encourage knowledge
sharing by individuals within teams (Bartol and Srivastava,
2002). Third, knowledge can be viewed from different
perspectives, such as object, knowledge embedded in indivi-
duals, and knowledge embedded in a community. The
motivators for knowledge exchange of these different types
of knowledge are different (Wasko and Faraj, 2000). In our
study, knowledge was viewed as an individual asset; however
future studies should investigate it from the other two
perspectives. Finally, Constant et al. (1996) pointed out that
individuals with higher expertise were more likely to share
useful knowledge. Our experiment focused on novices rather
than experts in the area of tourism. Therefore, future research
should examine whether higher expertise would lead to more
and better quality contributions.
7. Conclusion
The study aims to explicate the roles of motivators that are
effective in encouraging knowledge sharing in a group meet-
ing. The results of our experiment indicate that extrinsic
425
motivation such as economic reward may not be an adequate
motivator of knowledge sharing. However, economic reward,
together with reciprocity and altruism, positively influence
meeting satisfaction. The most important finding of this
study is that reputation feedback served as a strong incentive
for both quantity and quality of knowledge shared. Several
other studies have used these motivators previously, however
the results were equivocal. This study contributes to theory
and practice in three ways: first, it uses fours theories to select
three extrinsic motivators and one intrinsic motivator to
understand their effects on individuals’ knowledge sharing
behavior; second, a controlled experiment is performed to
test the derived hypotheses; third, it measures actual knowl-
edge sharing (both quantity and quality of knowledge) in a
team setting.
Appendix A. Task description
1. Practice task: What functions and features should a new
university library have?
The university you are attending is planning to build
a new library. The planning committee is looking for
opinions or ideas from students on what functions and
features a new university library should have. Please
provide as many useful ideas as you can.
2. Experimental task: How could tourism be improved in
the local area?
The Chiayi County Government has been promoting a
program which can encourage the tourism industry in
Chiayi County. The County Government is looking for
opinions or ideas from student groups on how to improve
tourism. Please provide as many useful ideas to improve
the tourism industry in Chiayi County as you can.
Appendix B. Post-experiment questionnaire
Manipulation check for economic reward:
1. I will receive a financial reward for performing well on
this task. (using a Likert scale; where 1 =strongly
disagree, 5= strongly agree)
Manipulation check for reputation feedback:
1. Others were aware of the quality of my performance on
this task. (using a Likert scale; where 1=strongly disagree,
5=strongly agree)
Reciprocity (Source: Kankanhalli et al., 2005) was
measured using a Likert scale; where 1 = strongly disagree,
7= strongly agree
1. When I share my knowledge through a group meeting,
I believe that I will get an answer when I give an answer.
426 S.-Y. Hung et al. / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 69 (2011) 415–427
2. When I share my knowledge through a group meeting,
I expect somebody to respond when I’m in need.
3. When I contribute knowledge to a group meeting,
I expect to get back knowledge when I need it.
4. When I share my knowledge through a group meeting,
I believe that my queries for knowledge will be answered
in the future.1
Altruism (Source: Kankanhalli et al., 2005) was mea-
sured using a Likert scale; where 1= strongly disagree,
7 =strongly agree
1. I enjoy sharing my knowledge with others through a
group meeting.
2. I enjoy helping others by sharing my knowledge
through a group meeting.
3. It feels good to help someone else by sharing my
knowledge through a group meeting.
4. Sharing my knowledge with others through a group
meeting gives me pleasure.
Meeting satisfaction (Source: Green and Taber, 1980)
was measured using a Likert scale (1–7). Subjects were
asked to answer the following question: How would you
describe your group meeting process?
1. 1= very inefficient, 7 =very efficient.
2. 1= very uncoordinated, 7 = very coordinated.
3. 1= very unfair, 7 = very fair.
4. 1= very confusing, 7= very understandable.
5. 1= very dissatisfying, 7 =very satisfying.
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