The Continuing Relevance of Strategic Studies in the Post-Cold War Era JOHN BAYLIS With the end of the Cold War many felt that Strategic Studies as a field of intellectual enquiry had finally had its day.' It had been one of the dominant sub-fields in the study of international politics from the 1950s to the 1980s, but with the easing of East-West tension in the early 1990s it became to be regarded by some as a ‘Cold War’ subject which was no longer relevant to the new developments taking place in world politics.” The utility of force was seen to be in decline and intellectual attention shifted to new issues associated particularly with the processes of globalization which many believed were transforming the whole basis of international relations. To the extent that conflict remained an area of academic study, the focus was now on ‘security’, broadly defined to take in a range of political, social, economic and environmental, as well as military aspects.” ‘At one level, the decline in the significance of strategic studies is understandable and perhaps even to be welcomed. In many respects, as a sub-field of international politics, it was too dominant during the Cold War, obscuring other important areas of the subject (particularly international political economy). However, this article argues that attempts by some to abolish the subject from the academic syllabus are not only premature, but unwise. As the various conflicts which have occurred since the end of the Cold War have testified, the role of force remains a significant feature of domestic and world politics, and an understanding of strategy continues to be, not only relevant, but important in any study of international relations. In order to make the case for the continuing John Baylis, Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations and Director of the (Centre for the Study of Conflict of the University of Wales, Swansea Defence Seudies, Vol.1, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp.t-14 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON.2 DEFENCE STUDIES relevance of Strategic Studies, three main issues are considered: the nature of the subject; the criticisms that have been made, and continue to be made, of it; and whether it should be replaced by security studies, The Nature of the Subject ‘The definitions of ‘strategy’ contained in Figure 1 display some common features but also some apparently significant differences. The definitions by Clausewitz, von Moltke the Elder, Liddell Hart and Beautre all focus om a fairly narrow definition which relates military force to the objectives of war. This reflects the origins of the word from the ancient Greek term for ‘generalship’. The definitions from Foster and Osgood, however, draw attention to the broader focus on ‘power’, while Murray and Grimslay FIGURE 1 DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGY rategy (is) the use of engagements for the object of war.” Carl von Clausewitz “Strategy is the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to che attainment of the object in War” Helmuth von Moltke “Strategy isthe art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends cof policy” Sir Basil Liddell Hare “Strategy is .. the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute” nave Bows “Strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power” Gregory D. Foster “Strategy isa plan of action designed in order to achieve some end a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.” J.C. Wylie “Stravegy is process, a constant adaptation to the shifting conditions and circurnstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate. Murray and Grimslay “Strategy must now be understood 25 nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion ~ in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and psychological ingeraments of power ~ to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert and tacitSTRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 3 highlight the dynamic quality of ‘process’ inherent in the formulation of strategy. ‘While the essence of strategy is conveyed in the former definitions, increasingly writers on the subject have emphasized that strategy — particularly in the nuclear age — has a peacetime as well as a wartime application. It is much wider than simply the study of wars and military campaigns. Thus, the most usefill definition of contemporary strategy, is the application of military power to achieve political objectives, or more specifically ‘the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political purposes’.* Broader still is the concept of Grand Strategy which involves the coordination and direction of ‘all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political objectives’ sought." In the post-Cold War environment, some have argued that force is often without political purpose. It is utilized by mafia-type gangs and drug-crazed groups who sce violence as an end in itself. Undoubtedly, criminal and psychotic elements have been a feature of many post-Cold War conflicts, but it would be wrong to conclude from this that, in places like Rwanda and Sierra Leone, force has not been designed to serve political objectives. Violence may often have cultural, religious or criminal roots and purposes, but, in contrast to the views of Martin van Creveld, Sir John Keegan and Robert Kaplan, it is also invariably political in the objectives it is designed to serve. In this sense the classical Clausewitzian definitions continue to serve us well. Because strategy provides the bridge between military means and political goals, students of strategy require knowledge of both the political process and military operations. As Richard K. Betts has argued: ‘Te is impossible to understand impulses and choices in the political dimension of war and peace without understanding the constraints and opportunities in the military dimension.’ * This point has also been made in a slightly different way by Henry Kissinger who has argued that the separation of strategy and policy can only be achieved to the detriment of both. It causes military power to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over-concern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the areas where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as ‘purely military advice’. ’ It follows from this that strategy has to be studied from an interdisciplinary perspective. To understand both dimensions of strategy,4 DEFENCE STUDIES it is necessary to know something about politics, economics, psychology, sociology and geography, as well as technology, force structure and tactics, ‘This is particularly true given the complex nature of the ‘new wars’ or ‘degenerative wars’ which have emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.* The recognition of the multidimensional nature of modern warfare has also been an important feature of the response by the US and its allies to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 Another aspect of the subject which follows from the definition of strategy as the link between military power and political purpose is that it is essentially a pragmatic and practical activity, This is summed up in Bernard Brodie’s comment that ‘Strategic theory is a theory of action.” It is a ‘how to do it’ study, a guide to accomplishing and doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in strategy is: will the idea work? As such, in some ways strategic studies can be scen as ‘policy relevant’. It can be an intellectual aid to official performance. At the same time, however, itcan also be pursued as ‘an idle academic pursuit for its own sake’, Despite the criticisms which have been leveled against it (see below) it provides an exacting intellectual training for those who wish to pursue a strategic education. ‘As a subject of study, however, it is worth noting that strategic studies cannot be regarded as a discipline in its own right. It is a subject with a sharp focus — the role of military power — but no clear parameters, and it is parasitic upon arts, sciences and social science subjects for ideas and concepts which its practitioners have developed.” Many of those who have made a contribution to the literature on the subject have come from. very different fields. Herman Kahn was a physicist, Thomas Schelling was an economist, Albert Wohlstetter was a mathematician, Henry Kissinger ‘was a historian and Bernard Brodie was a political scientist. One of the results of these different academic backgrounds of writers on the subject has been an ongoing debate about methodology — how to study the subject. Bernard Brodie, who more than anyone else helped to establish strategic studies as a subject in the aftermath of the Second World ‘War, initially argued that strategy should be studied ‘scientifically’. He was concerned that strategy was ‘not receiving the scientific treatment it deserves either in the armed services or, certainly, outside them’. Writing in an article in 1949 entitled ‘Strategy as Science’, Brodie called for a methodological approach to the study of strategy similar to the one adopted by economics. Strategy, he argued, should be seen as ‘an instrumental science for solving practical problems’. What Brodie wanted was a much more rigorous, systematic form of analysis compared with the rather superficial narrow approach to security problems adopted by the military, who were preoccupied with tactics and technology.STRATEGIC STUDIES [IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 5 ‘As Brodie himself was later to recognize, however, the enthusiasm for science, which he himself had helped to promote, meant that strategic studies in the 1950s ‘developed a scientistic strain and overreached itself”, By the 1960s Brodie was calling for a ‘mid-course correction’. The conceptualization of strategy using economic models and theories had been taken further than he had expected. Brodie was concerned about the ‘astonishing lack of political sense’ and the ‘ignorance of diplomatic and military history’ that seemed to be evident amongst those writing on the subject. Significantly, Brodie’s worries were heeded and from the 1970s onwards when there was a leavening of the scientism by better ‘comparative historical analysis. ‘Apart from this problem of methodology and the debate about science, the academic approach to the subject also raised concerns about the neglect of operational military issues. For Brodie (echoing Clemenceau) strategy was too serious a business to be left to the generals. As strategic studies developed from the late 1940s onwards civilian analysts came to dominate the field. By the 1980s, however, there was a growing feeling that many of the civilian strategists in their university departments and academic ‘think tanks’ were leaving out the essential understanding of ‘matters military in their analyses and theorizing. For a new breed of strategists at the time operational issues had to be brought back in, Military science had become the ‘missing discipline’. Writing in 1997 Richard K. Betts argued that: ‘if strategy is to integrate policy and operations, it must be devised not just by politically sensitive soldiers but by military sensitive civilians’. * Just as Brodie had been concerned about the overly narrow approach of the military in 1949, so Betts was concerned that the pendulum had swung too far in the opposite direction. Civilian strategists were neglecting the military side of strategy. This concern with operational issues helped to revive an interest among strategists with the different ‘elements’ or ‘dimensions’ of strategy. In his study On War Clausewitz argued that ‘everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very casy’. " Reflecting, this sentiment, Clausewitz pointed out that strategy consisted of moral, physical, mathematical, geographical and statistical elements. Sir Michael Howard, in a similar vein, refers to the social, logistical, operational and technological dimensions of strategy. This notion of strategy consisting of a broad, complex, pervasive and interpenetrating set of dimensions is also taken further in Colin Gray's recent study of Modem Strategy. Gray identifies three main categories (People and Politics’; ‘Preparation for War’; and ‘War Proper’) and 17 separate dimensions of strategy. Under the ‘People and Politics’ heading6 DEFENCE STUDIES he focuses on people, society, culture, politics and ethics. ‘Preparations for War’ includes economics and logistics, organization, military administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, and technology. The dimensions of ‘War Proper’ consist of military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary and time. Echoing Clausewitz, Gray argues that the study of strategy is “seriously incomplete’ if itis considered in the absence of any one of these (interrelated) dimensions." Strategic Studies and the Classical Realist Tradition Apart from understanding the complexities of strategy, it is important to understand the philosophical underpinnings or assumptions of those who write about the subject. According to J. C. Garnett ‘despite differences of interpretation and emphasis... it is fair to say that most contemporary strategists in the Western World belong, in an important sense, to the same intellectual tradition. Their minds are tuned to the same wavelengths; they share a common set of assumptions about the nature of international political life, and the kind of reasoning which is appropriate to handling political-military problems.”” In general, this seems to be just as true today, as in the mid-1970s when Garnett made the point. ‘Realism’, as a theory of political behaviour, remains pervasive in contemporary strategic writings (even though it holds a much less dominant position in the literature on international relations as whole). Although there are differences between ‘Realists’, there are certain views and assumptions that most would agree upon. These can be best illustrated under the following headings: * Human nature + Anarchy and power + International law, morality and institutions Human Nature Most realists are very pessimistic about human nature. Reflecting the views of philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, men are seen as ‘inherently destructive, selfish, competitive and aggressive’. Hobbes accepted that human beings are capable of generosity, kindness and cooperation but the pride and egoism which is inherent in human nature means that mankind is also prone to conflict, violence and great evil. For realist writers one of the great tragedies of the human condition is that these destructive traits can never be eradicated. Reflecting this view, Herbert Butterfield arguedSTRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 7 that ‘behind the great conflicts of mankind is a terrible human predicament which lies atthe heart of the story’. Anarchy and Power Based on this rather dark view of the human condition, realists tend to view international relations in similar pessimistic terms. Conflict and war are seen as endemic in the international system and the future is likely to be much like the past. Just as individuals seek their own interests, so states (which realists focus their attention upon) are also engaged in a relentless competitive struggle. Unlike the way that conflicts are dealt with in domestic society, however, through the role of authoritative government, the clash between states are much more difficult to resolve. In the absence of world government, realists argue that states have to adopt a ‘self-help’ approach to their interests and especially their security. Who wins in the constant struggles which take place is not who is right but, as Thucydides demonstrated in his History of the Peloponnesian War, who is most powerful. This stress on the central role of power in international relations is aptly summed up in Hobbes’s description of the human condition as ‘a restless struggle for power which ceases only in death’, Realists, therefore, tend to stress what they see as the harsh realities of world politics and are somewhat contemptuous of Kantian approaches which highlight the opportunities for ‘permanent peace’. As Gordon Harland has argued: Realism is a clear recognition of the limits of reason in politics: the acceptance of the fact that political realities are power realities and that power must be countered with power; that self-interest is the primary datum in the action of all groups and nations. In an anarchical system power is the only currency which matters when security interests are threatened.” International Law, Morality and Institutions Given this ‘realpolitik’ view of world politics, it is not surprising that realists see a limited role, not only for ‘reason’, but also for law, morality and institutions. In a domestic context, law can be an effective way for societies to deal with competing selfish interests. In an international system without effective government, states will agree to laws when it suits them, but will disregard them when their interests are threatened. When states want to break the rules, there is very little to stop them ultimately from doing it — apart from countervailing force.8 DEFENCE STUDIES Similarly, realists do not believe that moral issues can significantly constrain the behaviour of states. Some realists (although not all) believe that very little attention should be given to moralizing about the state of world politics. They point to the absence of a universal moral code and more particularly to the disregard of constraining moral principles by states when they believe their vital interests are under threat. This is not to argue that realists are wholly insensitive to moral questions (see the section on ‘The Criticisms Leveled Against Strategic Studies’). Indeed, many of them, like Richard Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau agonized about the human condition. However, most realist writers are concerned to try and explain the way the world really is, rather than how it ought to be. Realists believe that their task is mainly to describe rather than prescribe. Realists view international institutions in much the same light as they view law and morality, Just as law and morality are unable to constrain state behaviour significantly when interests arc threatened, so international institutions can only play a limited role in preventing conflict, Realists do not dismiss the opportunities for greater cooperation which institutions can create. However, they see these institutions as being sct up by states to serve their national interests. As long as they do this, the member states will support the institution, but when support for the institution threatens their interests, especially in the security sphere, they tend to abandon them. Realists point, in particular, to the fate of the League of Nations in the interwar period and the limitations of the United Nations during the Cold War and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in alleviating conflicts which occurred. ‘The Crit sms Leveled Against Strategic Studies Although the shared philosophical underpinnings of strategists have helped to give the subject intellectual coherence, many of the realist assumptions have been subjected to fierce criticisms. These criticisms have been discussed in detail elsewhere, but the following brief discussion gives a flavour of the concern expressed by the opponents of strategic studies, ® Strategists are said to be: * Obsessed with conflict and force + Insufficiently concerned with ethical issues + Not scholarly in their approach + Part of the problem, not the solution + State-centricSTRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 9 Many critics argue that because the main focus of the subject is on the role of military power, strategists tend to be preoccupied by violence and war. Because their view of the world is conflict-oriented they tend to ignore the more cooperative, peaceful aspects of world politics. This leads critics to claim that strategists have a distorted, rather than realistic, view of the way the world is. Some critics even suggest that strategists are fascinated by violence, and even take grim satisfaction in describing the darker side of the human condition, For their part, strategists accept that they are interested in ~ but not obsessed by - violence and conflict. In their own defence, however, they point out that just as a doctor of heart disease does not claim to deal with all aspects of health, so they do not claim to be studying every aspect of international relations. They therefore reject the view that they have a distorted, unrealistic, view of the world, and that they are fascinated, in an ‘unhealthy’ sense by violence. The claim to moral neutrality, sometimes made by strategists, is another area of criticism. Strategists are seen to be ‘clinical, cool and unemotional’ in the way they approach the study of war, despite the fact that, in the nuclear age, millions of lives are at risk in the calculations that take place about strategic policies. Emphasizing the moral outrage felt by some, J. R. Newman described Herman Kahn’s book, On Thermonuclear War, as ‘a moral tract on mass murder, how to commit it, how to get away with it, how to justify ie." Philip Green, in his study of Deadly Logic, also accused strategists who wrote about nuclear deterrence as being ‘egregiously guilty of avoiding the moral issue altogether, or misrepresenting it. Although many strategists have justified the moral neutrality of their approach in terms of scholarly detachment, itis fair to say that some have been sensitive to this criticism. As a result, studies of ethical issues have been written. These include Joseph Nye’s book on Nuclear Ethics,® Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars and Steven P. Lec’s study of Morality, Prudence and Nuclear Weapons.® These books (together with the moral critical studies by writers like Green) now form an important part of the literature on strategic studies. Another important criticism levelled against strategic studies is that it represents ‘a fundamental challenge to the values of liberal, humane scholarship, that define a University’. The implication is that it is not a scholarly subject and should not be taught at university. This criticism has three related parts. First, according to Philip Green, it is pseudo-scientific, using apparent scientific method to give it a spurious air of legitimacy.10 DEFENCE STUDIES Second, because strategists often advise governments on a paid basis they are operating ‘in a manner incompatible with the integrity of scholarship’. E. P. Thornton described the cosy relationship between strategists and government officials as ‘suspect, corrupt and at enmity with the universal principles of humane scholarship’.” ‘And, third, there have also been criticisms that strategists not only provide advice to governments, but they are also involved in policy advocacy — which is not part of scholarship. ‘With a qualification on the issue of policy advocacy, strategists reject the view that theirs is not a valid university subject. They argue that the study of war and peace are issues of profound importance which can, and should be studied in a scholarly way. It is true that there have been attempts at developing a ‘scientific’ approach to strategy (and some writers might have taken this too far) but the debate about methodology is not confined to strategic studies, ‘The nature of ‘science’ in a social science context remains a lively, ongoing debate. In general, strategists recognize the dangers of developing too cosy a relationship with officials when they advise governments on a paid basis. Like many other experts in their field (e.g. economists), however, they see no necessary inconsistency between scholarship and advice. Being a practical subject there are some benefits from analyzing strategic issues at close hand, providing that a ‘detached’ approach is adopted. Policy advocacy, however, is a different matter. Some strategists do drift into the realm of advocating certain policies, but when they do so they are wearing their ‘concerned citizens’ hat rather than acting in an academic capacity Clearly there is a need for care in this area ‘Another forceful criticism of strategic studies is that ‘it is part of the problem, not the solution’. What opponents mean by this is that the Clausewitzean perspective of strategists which sees military power as a legitimate instrument of policy, helps to perpetuate a particular mindset amongst statesmen and their publics which encourages the use of force. It is this realist thinking, critics argue, which lay behind the development of theories of deterrence, limited war and crisis management which were so dangerous during the Cold War. ‘Anatol Rapoport is one writer who charges strategists with a direct responsibility for promoting a framework of thinking about security which is largely hostile to what he regards as the proper solution, namely disarmament. In a stinging attack he argues that ‘the most formidable obstacles to disarmament are created by the strategists who place their strategic considerations above the needs of humanity as a whole, and who create of help maintain an intellectual climate in which disarmament appears to be unrealistic’STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA uw Linked to this criticism is the view that because strategists are so pessimistic about human nature and the chances of significant improvements in the conduct of international politics, they ignore the opportunities which exist for peaceful change. To see the past as a history of constant conflict and to suggest that the future will be the same is to help create a fatalistic impression that plans for human progress will always fail More than this, by emphasizing mistrust, self-help and the importance of military power in an anarchic international system, is self-fulfilling. Given this ‘socially constructed’ view of the world, itis not surprising that states will constantly find themselves in conflict with each other. Once again, strategists vigorously contest these criticisms. They argue that their ideas reflect (rather than create) the ‘reality’ of world politics. The fact that most statesmen in positions of responsibility tend to share their ‘realise’ assumptions is not due to an intellectual climate ‘socially constructed’ by academic strategists but the result of their own experiences as well as their individual understanding of history. The notion that strategic studies as a subject is ‘2 monstrous crime committed by self-interested strategists against the general public’ is seen as absurd. Academic strategists may occasionally act as policy advisers but their influence over government decision-making has been much less than such critics suggest. On the question of ‘peaceful change’, strategists do not dismiss the fact that periodically there are opportunities for periods of peaceful coexistence. They are, however, very sceptical (to say the least) about the prospects for ‘perpetual peace’ or a radical transformation of the whole basis of world politics. Conflict, they believe can be mitigated (in part through effective strategy), but it is highly unlikely chat it can be transcended completely. In such a context it is impossible to abolish the need for strategic studies. The emphasis on states pursuing effective strategies (which take account of the realities of power) provides the basis for another criticism of strategists. This centres on the state-centric approach, which, it is argued, pervades strategic studies. According to this critique, strategists are so preoccupied by threats to the interests of states that they ignore security issues within the state. Many critical security theorists argue that the state isnot the most appropriate referent for studying security. Rather, attention should be focused on the individual whose security is often threatened, rather than protected by the state. Other writers, who perceive the growing erosion of the state prefer to focus on ‘societal security’ or even ‘global security’ issues. Strategists would argue that while there has been a tendency to stress the role of the state, it is wholly untrue that they have neglected intra-state12 DEFENCE STUDIES conflict. Clausewitz himself dealt with peoples’ wars and a considerable part of the strategic studies literature deals with terrorism and revolutionary warfare. As wars of national disintegration (Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya) have become more prevalent in the post-Cold War era, more attention has also been given in the literature to these kinds of conflicts. Despite this, strategists continue to argue that even with ail the contemporary challenges to the modern state, it continues to be the major actor in world politics. Strategists offer no apologies for their continuing interest in the issues relating to state security. This said, there is a growing emphasis in the literature that the twin processes of globalization and fragmentation have brought about significant changes in the nature of contemporary warfare. Conflicts associated with the disintegration of the state and international terrorism have always been areas of interest to strategists. Now they have become an even more (some would say the ‘most) important area of study and analysis.” Should Strategic Studies be Replaced by Security Studies? One of the main challenges to strategie studies since the end of the Cold ‘War has come from those who argue that attention should be shifted away from the study of strategy to the study of security.” According to this view ‘security’, defined in terms of ‘freedom from threats to core values’, is a more appropriate concept for analysis in the contemporary world. The problem with strategy, itis argued, is that it is too narrow and increasingly less relevant at a time when major wars are declining, whereas threats to political, economic, social and environmental security interests are increasing. Defined more broadly, security, therefore, is seen, by some, to be of more valuable as an organizing framework for understanding the more complex, multi-dimensional risks of today.” Faced with this challenge, Richard K. Betts, writing in 1997 asked the question ‘Should Strategic Studies Survive?! Betts conceded that security studies in the United States has been squeezing strategic studies out of the university curriculum. He is not opposed to security studies, but he makes two very important points. First, it is appropriate to distinguish between ‘strategy’ and ‘security’ studies in order to recognize that ‘security’ includes a wide range of topics, ‘as long as no doubt is left that security policy requires careful attention to war and strategy’. In other words, military power remains a crucial part of security. ‘And second, Betts argues that ‘expansive definitions of security quickly become synonymous with ‘interest’ and ‘well-being’, and do not exclude anything in international relations or foreign policy, and this becomesSTRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 13 indistinguishable from those fields or other sub-fields’, In this sense, ‘security’ becomes so elastic that it no longer has any usefull meaning.” ‘A case can certainly be made for security studies, even if there are legitimate concerns about the coherence of the field and overly permissive definitions of what is covered by the term. At the same time, however, strategy clearly remains a distinctive and valuable area of academic study. Strategic Studies is part of Security Studies, just as Security Studies is part of International Relations, which itself is part of Political Science. Despite all of the changes which have occurred in world politics since the late 1980s there is an underlying continuity with earlier eras. The cuphoria that a fundamental transformation of international relations was underway has proved to be ill founded. As we have seen from the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and now from the campaign against international terrorism, force and military power continue to be an important currency in the international system at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Critical contemporary strategic debates — such as those relating to the significance of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, the impact of globalization and state fragmentation on warfare, the prospects and value of arms control in a changed environment, post-Cold War conceptions of deterrence, and the consequences for strategic stability of proposals for an American National Missile Defense system (among a wide range of other issues) and especially the nature and role of military force as part of a broader campaign against fanaticall terrorist groups ~ all require careful detailed analysis Certainly important changes are taking place in world politics which necessitate a broader definition of national and international security. It is undoubtedly true that wars between the great powers, for the moment at least, have slipped into the background. The sad fact remains, however, that the utilization of military power as an instrument of political (and other) purposes and therefore, strategic studies, remains just as relevant and important today as it has been in the past. NOTES 1. This article is based on a forthcoming book by J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, CS. Gray, and E. Cohen eds.) Stagg i che Contemporary World (Oxford: OUP 2002) 2. D. Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of the Cold War’, Wirld Politis 48 (Oct. 1995) p.l35. 3. B.Bucan, People, Stes and Fear: An Agenda for Intemational Security Sadies in the Past-Cold War Era (London: Harvester 1983) 4. CS. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) pt 5. B. Liddell Hirt, Seetegy: The Indret Approach (London: Faber 1967) p.366, 6. R.K. Bets, Should Strategic Studies Survive’, World Polts 50/1 (Oct. 1997) p25. See also:14 DEFENCE STUDIES R. K. Betts, ‘ls Strategy an Ision?”, International Securiy 25/2 (Fall 2000), pp-5-50. 7. HLA Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (NY: Harper & Row 1957) p42 8, M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999). 9. B. Brodie, War and Poles (London: Cassell 1973) p52. 10. J.C. Garnet, Strategic Studies and its Assumptions’, in J. Baylis tal, Contemporary Strategy “Theories and Concepts (London: Croom Helm 1975), Some of what follows is based on the analysis contained in this chapter. 11, B. Brodie, ‘Strategy as Science’, Hérld Poics (July 1949) p.486, 12. Quoted in RK. Bets, ‘Should Strategie Studies Survive?", Wrld Polis $0/1 (Oct. 1997) p.l6. 13. id. p25. 14, Carl von Clausewitz, On Wir (Princeton, UP 1976) p.178. 15. M. Howard, ‘The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy’, Foreign Afar 57 (1979) pp 976-86. 16, Gray (note 4) pp.23-47, 17. Garnett (note 10), 18. Quoted in K. W. Thompson, Policia! Realm and the Criss of World Poltes (Princeton UP 1960) p53. 19. G. Flatland, quoted in A. Herzog, The War-Peace Establishment (NY: Harper & Row 1963) pas, 20. CS, Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Azessment (London: Aldwych Press 1982). 21, JR. Newman, Review in Scientific American, CCIV, 3 (March 1961) p.200, 22. P. Green, Deadly Logic (Ohio State UP 1966) Chapter 6, 23. J. Nye, Nuclear Ethic (NY: The Free Press 1986). 24. M, Waleer, Just and Unjust Wars (London: Basic Books 1992). 25. SP Lee, Morality, Prudence and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: CUP 1993) 26, EP Thornton , ‘A Letter co America, The Nation 232 (Jan. 1981), 27. A. Rapoport, ‘The Sources of Anguish’, Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 21/10 (Dec. 1965) p35. 28, M. van Creveld, The Transfommation of War (NY: The Free Press 1991). 29. D. Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of the Cold Wat’, World Polities 48 (Oct, 1995). 30. See Buzan (note 3). 31. Bets, ‘Should Stategic Studies Survive?” (note 1Copyright © 2002 EBSCO Publishing