determinative factor. For, really, property may have no income.
It may even be a financial
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi- judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Basis
Free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty (Sec. 11, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution). (1991, 2002 Bar)
Right to free access to courts
This right is the basis for Sec. 17, Rule 5 of the New Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma
pauperis. Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and laborers
(Cabangis v. Almeda Lopez, G.R. No. 47685, Sept. 20, 1940).
Q: The Municipal Trial Court denied Dexter’s petition to litigate in forma pauperis on the
ground that Dexter has regular employment and sources of income thus cannot be classified
as poor or pauper. Is the court’s order justified?
A: NO. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. It
suffices that the plaintiff is indigent. And the difference between paupers and indigent persons
is that the latter are persons who have no property or sources of income sufficient for their
support aside from their own labor though self-supporting when able to work and in
employment (Acar v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-21707, March 18, 1967).
Q: The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. seeks to be exempted from paying legal fees for its
indigent and underprivileged clients couching their claim on the free access clause embodied
in Sec. 11, Art. III of the Constitution. Is the contention tenable?
A: NO. The Court cannot grant exemption of payment of legal fees to foundations/institutions
working for indigent and underprivileged people. According to Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court,
only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant that can be exempted from
payment of legal fees. Exemption cannot be extended to the foundations even if they are
working for the indigent and underprivileged people (Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re
exemption from legal and filing fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., A. M. No. 09-6-9-
SC, Aug. 19, 2009).
Q: A pauper is known to have several parcels of land but that for several years prior to the
filing of the complaint in the inferior court said parcels of land had been divided and
partitioned amongst his children who had since been in possession thereof and paying the
taxes thereon. Is he considered indigent? May he apply for free legal assistance?
A. Yes. Republic Act 6034 (An Act Providing Transportation and Other Allowances for Indigent
Litigants), has defined the term "indigent" to refer to a person "who has no visible means of
income or whose income is insufficient for the subsistence of his family."
Even on the assumption that petitioner owns property, he may still be an indigent considering
his sworn statement that he had no income. Under the standard set forth in Acar v. Rosal as
well as the recent legislations heretofore adverted to, it is the income of a litigant that is the
burden (Enaje v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-22109, January 30, 1970).
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he MUST ne provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
EXCEPT in writing and presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Miranda rights (1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2012 Bar)
These are the rights to which a person under custodial investigation is entitled. These rights
are:
1. Right to remain silent (2013 Bar)
2. Right to competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice .
3. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he would be
provided with one
4. Right to be informed of his rights
5. Right against torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will
6. Right against secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or similar forms of
detention
7. Right to have confessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights
considered inadmissible in evidence (Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 1966). (2013
Bar)
NOTE: Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the
moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present.
The “Miranda Rights” are available to avoid involuntary extrajudicial confession.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the
police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating
statements (People v. Rapeza, G.R. 169431, April 3, 2007).
AVAILABILITY
1. During custodial investigation; or
2. As soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry unto an unsolved crime
and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect, as when the suspect who has been
taken into police custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory
questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. (2014 Bar)
NOTE: Sec. 2 of R.A. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation and the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers)
provides that custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is under investigation in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed.
Rights during custodial investigation apply only against testimonial compulsion and not when
the body of the accused is proposed to be examined (e.g. urine sample; photographs;
measurements; garments; shoes) which is a purely mechanical act.
In the case of Galman v. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. 71208-09, Aug. 30, 1985, it was held that the
constitutional safeguard is applied notwithstanding that the person is not yet arrested or under
detention at the time. However, Fr. Bernas has qualified this statement by saying that
jurisprudence under the 1987 Constitution has consistently held, following the stricter view,
that the rights begin to be available only when the person is already in custody (People v. Ting
Lan Uy, G.R. No. 157399, Nov. 17, 2005).
Furthermore, in the case of People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 178300, Mar. 17, 2009, the court held
that: “The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted provision covers the period from
the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime from the time he was singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
offense although not yet in custody.
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda
Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such
investigation. "The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and
is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course
of custodial investigation." (Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, Oct. 19, 2011).
Rights that may be waived
1. Right to remain silent
2. Right to counsel
NOTE: However, the right of the accused to be informed of these rights is not subject to waiver;
and
Requisites for valid waiver
1. Made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
2. In writing
3. With the presence of counsel (People v. Galit, GR. No. L-51770, Mar. 20, 1985).
Admissibility as evidence of confessions given to news reporters and/or media and
videotaped confessions
Confessions given in response to a question by news reporters, not policemen, are admissible.
Where the suspect gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press
reporters, his answers are deemed to be voluntary and are admissible.
Videotaped confessions are admissible, where it is shown that the accused unburdened his
guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of the newsmen. Such confessions do not
form part of confessions in custodial investigations as it was not given to policemen but to
media in attempt to solicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
However, due to inherent danger of these videotaped confessions, they must be accepted with
extreme caution. They should be presumed involuntary, as there may be connivance between
the police and media men (People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, Feb. 20, 2001).
NOTE: What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of the incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Sec. 12 are guarantees to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the State, and not to prevent the suspect from freely and voluntarily telling the truth (People
v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, Mar. 3, 1997).
Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
Once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible.
NOTE: The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should
not be used to gain other evidence, because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained.
Q: Ian Loy is in police custody. Bothered and remorseful, he spontaneously admitted guilt
and that he is the one who killed Dr. Neil. Is his confession admissible?
A: YES. Ian Loy’s statement is a spontaneous statement. It was not elicited through questioning
by the authorities (People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, Jan. 16, 1998).
Q: Mayor Pineda arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant Flores approached him and whispered a request to talk privately. The mayor led
appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, Flores broke down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Villaroman." The mayor
opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was
available she ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the
mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant
confessed his guilt. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. Did such uncounselled confession violate the suspect’s constitutional rights?
A: NO. A confession given to the mayor may be admitted in evidence if such confession by the
suspect was given to the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer. In such a
case, the uncounseled confession did not violate the suspect’s constitutional rights. What the NOTE: This is also applicable not only to criminal cases, but also to civil cases. Administrative
constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights cases follow different requisites.
under Sec. 12 are guarantees to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State and not to
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process. It is a mere statutory right,
prevent the suspect from freely and voluntarily telling the truth (People v. Andan, G.R. No.
but once given, denial constitutes violation of due process.
116437, March 3, 1997).
Sec. 13. All persons, EXCEPT those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
Q: Accused Antonio Lauga was charged and convicted of the crime of rape of his thirteen-
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
year old daughter, AAA. During the proceedings, Juan Paulo Nepomuceno, a bantaybayan in
be released on recognizance as may be provided law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
the barangay, testified that the accused confessed that he had in fact raped AAA. The trial
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
court found him guilty of the crime of rape. Lauga contends that the extrajudicial confession
be required.
he made to Nepomuceno is inadmissible in evidence as it was made without assistance of
counsel. Is his contention tenable? Bail

A: YES. A barangay bantaybayan is considered a public officer and any extrajudicial confession The security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a
made to him without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence as provided for bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required (Sec. 1, Rule 114,
under Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution (People v. Lauga, GR. No. 186228, March 15, 2010). Rules of Court).

Conditions for an extrajudicial confession be admissible Rationale behind the right to bail

1. Voluntary Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of
2. Made in the presence of an independent and competent counsel (unless the right to bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
counsel is waived by the accused in writing) trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
3. Express when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
4. In writing purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s
Kinds of voluntary confession interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring
1. Coerced the accused’s presence at trial (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015).
2. Uncounseled statements (provided that the accused had waived his right to counsel NOTE: For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt
in writing) is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has
1. Due process held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, “such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
2. Be presumed innocent called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
3. Be heard by himself and counsel should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed
4. Be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a
5. A speedy, impartial and public trial hearing with notice to the Prosecution. The hearing, which may be either summary or
6. Meet the witnesses face to face otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
7. Have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, ibid.).
evidence on his behalf
8. Against double jeopardy Application for bail in relation to challenging the arrest
9. Bail
The application or admission of the accused to bail shall not bar him from challenging both the
Requisites of criminal due process (NO-CPJ) validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, provided that he raises
them before he enters his plea. It shall not likewise bar the accused from assailing the
1. Accused is heard by a Court of competent jurisdiction
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him
2. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly Processes of law
3. Accused is given Notice and Opportunity to be heard provided the same is raised before he enters his plea (Rule 114, Sec. 26, Rules of Court).
4. Judgment must be rendered after lawful hearing
The following are entitled to bail
1. Persons charged with offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is not strong
2. Persons convicted by the trial court pending their appeal
3. Persons who are members of the AFP facing a court martial
Q: Sen. Enrile, who was indicted for plunder in connection with the Pork Barrel Scam, applied
for bail arguing among others that he is not a flight risk, and that his age and physical
condition must be seriously considered. May he post bail?
A: YES. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. The Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,
ibid.).
NOTE: The right to bail is available to an alien during the pendency of deportation proceedings
provided that potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing proof that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all orders and processes of the extradition court (Gov’t of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia Jr., G.R 153675, Apr. 19, 2007).
Constitutional provisions connected to right to bail
a. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not impair the right
to bail.
b. Excessive bail is not required.
Instances when bail is a matter of right or of discretion
1. Bail as a matter of right
a. Before or after conviction by the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, and
b. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment (Sec. 4, Rule 114).
c. Before final conviction by all children in conflict with the law for an offense not
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
2. Bail as a matter of discretion
a. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment
b. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is not strong; and
c. A child in conflict with the law charged with an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 28,
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC).
NOTE: The prosecution cannot adduce evidence for the denial of bail where it is a matter of
right. However where the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution may show proof to
deny the bail.
Grounds for denial of bail
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
RTC after notice to the adverse party in either case (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court).
NOTE: The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be before or
after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgment (which
means after appeal). No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as
one is under arrest. (Heras Teehankee v. Rovira, G.R. No. L-101, Dec. 20 1945)
Scenarios where the penalty of the person applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years
1. Absence of the circumstances enumerated in 3rd par., sec. 5 of Rule 114. In this scenario,
bail is a matter of discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion
to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the
bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph are absent.
NOTE: The discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail NOTE: It should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (Jose Antonio Leviste v. CA, G.R.No. 189122, arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even
March 17, 2010). before a complaint or information is filed against him (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148468, Jan. 28, 2003).
2. Existence of at least one of the said circumstances. The appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
Sec. 14.
revoke bail pending appeal (Ibid.).
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
In bail application, if the prosecutor interposes no objection to the accused charged with
law
capital offense, the judge may not grant the application without court hearing
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
Judges are required to conduct hearings if the accused is being charged with a capital offense. contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
Absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, be informed the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
of familiarity with the case (Joselito v. Narciso v. Flor Marle Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
March 17, 2000). evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
NOTE: A hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
or not the evidence of guilt is strong (Baylon v. Judge Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, Apr. 6, 1995).
Section 14 covers the following:
Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
be given the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation, because in fixing - Presumption of innocence
the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors (Cortes v. - Right to assistance of counsel
Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, Sept. 10, 1997). - Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
- Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial
Reason why capital offenses when evidence of guilt strong are not bailable
- Meet witnesses face to face.
Due to the gravity of the offenses committed, the confinement of a person accused of said
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
offenses insures his attendance in the court proceedings than if he is given provisional liberty
on account of a bail posted by him. Rules regarding presumption of innocence
Q: Manolet was arrested for child abuse. She filed a petition for application of bail. The court 1. The prosecution has the burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
granted her application with a condition that the approval of the bail bonds shall be made doubt (People v. Colcol., Jr., 219 SCRA 107, February 19, 1993).
only after her arraignment. Is the court’s order valid? 2. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not in the weakness
of the defense (People v. Solis, 182 SCRA 182, February 14, 1990).
A: NO. The grant of bail should not be conditioned upon prior arraignment of the accused. In
3. Conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution evidence
cases where bail is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense (People v. Mirondo,
accused will be precluded from filing a motion to quash which is to be done before
G.R. No. 210841, Oct. 14, 2015).
arraignment. If the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would be no need
4. The prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution
for the arraignment of the accused. To condition the grant of bail on his arraignment would be
fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal (Delariva
to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
v. People, G.R. No. 212940, Sept. 16, 2015).
thus delay his release until his motion can be resolved because prior to its resolution, he cannot
be arraigned, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient
to charge him with a crime and his right to bail (Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670, Feb. 1, 2000).
Q: Can flight be an indication of guilt? Is this not a violation of the rule regarding presumption
of innocence?
1. Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance
from which an inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person
would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence. (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 214883, Sept. 2, 2015).
2. non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence. There is no law or
dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive proof of innocence. For
the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign
innocence and choose not to flee. (People v. Dandanon, G.R. No. 196258, Sept. 28,
2015).
Equipoise rule
When the evidence of both sides is equally balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259, Feb.
14, 1991).
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Basis
Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has been recognized
and established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused. The rights of an
accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal
procedure (Moslares v. Third division, CA, G.R. No. 129744, June 26, 1998).
Q: In a murder case, Christian was convicted in the trial court but was not given the right to
testify and to present additional evidence on his behalf. Is the conviction correct?
A: NO. An accused has the constitutional right “to be heard by himself and counsel” and the
right “to testify as a witness in his own behalf “. The denial of such rights is a denial of due
process. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. “No
court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that
right.”(People v. Lumague, G.R. No. L-53586).
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Right to assistance of counsel
The right of a person under investigation is to have a “competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice”. The purpose is to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead
the accused to admit something else (People v. Evanoria, 209 SCRA 577, June 8, 1992).
The accused must be amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause of the defense and acts accordingly; an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, and not simply a perfunctory representation (People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420,
Apr. 21, 1999).
NOTE: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service (Carbonel v.
CSC, G.R. No. 187689, Sept. 7, 2010).
NOTE: Assistance of counsel is not mandatory in a police line-up. (1993, 1997, 2012 Bar)
The right to counsel commences from the moment the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to illicit information or confession or admission (Gamboa v. Judge Cruz, GR. No. L-
56291, June 27, 1988).
A PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of Sec
12, Art III, 1987 Constitution
A PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the
Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel
of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse of the accused-
appellant. Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of a
competent and independent counsel for the accused (People v. Bacor, GR. No. 122895, April
30, 1999).
Q: Several individuals were tried and convicted of Piracy in Philippine Waters as defined in
PD 532. However, it was discovered that the lawyer, Ms. Cantos, who represented them was
not a member of the bar although evidence shows that she was knowledgeable in the rules
of legal procedure. The accused now allege that their conviction should be set aside since
they were deprived of due process. Are they correct?
A: NO. Sec. 1 of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "upon motion,
the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy,
but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply
shown that the rights of accused were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance
of Ms. Cantos. An examination of the record will show that she knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Dani Lacap. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People v. Tulin, G.R.
111709, Aug. 30, 2001).
NOTE: In Flores v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35707, May 31, 1979, the Supreme Court held that the right
to counsel during the trial cannot be waived, because “even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.”
Q: Mao was criminally charged in court. He hired Justin as counsel who handles high-profile
clients. Due to his many clients, Justin cannot attend the hearing of the case of Mao. He
requested many times to have the hearings postponed. The case dragged on slowly. Judge
Oliver Punay, in his desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial
system, appointed a counsel de officio and withdrew the counsel de parte. Is the action of
the judge valid?
A: YES. The appointment of counsel de officio under such circumstances is not proscribed
under the Constitution. The preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable an accused
to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable. The choice of counsel
by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the counsel deliberately makes
himself scarce the court is not precluded from appointing a counsel de officio whom it
considers competent and independent to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice
enters his appearance. Otherwise the pace of criminal prosecution will entirely be dictated by
the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case (People v. Larranaga, G.R.
No. 138874-75, Feb. 3, 2004).
Q: Will the absence of counsel during custodial investigation automatically entitle an accused
to an acquittal?
A: NO. The right to counsel is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction.
In this case, neither one of the appellants executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the
records clearly show appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the “call China,
big money.”
The trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial
investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants’ constitutional right to counsel during
custodial investigation. (people v. Chi Chan Liu. GR No. 189272, January 21, 2016)
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
Purpose
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (US v. Karelsen G.R.
No. 1376, Jan. 21, 1904).
Requisites for properly informing the accused of the nature and cause of accusation
1. Information must state the name of the accused
2. Designation given to the offense by statute
3. Statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense
4. Name of the offended party
5. Approximate time and date of commission of the offense
6. Place where offense was committed
7. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information
NOTE: The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that the Rules
of Court require that the Information allege the ultimate facts constituting the elements of the
crime charged. Details that do not go into the core of the crime need not be included in the
Information but may be presented during trial. The rule that evidence must be presented to
establish the existence of the elements of a crime to the point of moral certainty is only for
purposes of conviction. It finds no application in the determination of whether or not an
Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an accused (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
160619, Sept. 9, 2015)
It is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the
crime with exactitude unless such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses
charged (People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015)
Determination of the real nature of the crime
Description, not designation of the offense, is controlling. The real nature of the crime charged
is determined from the recital of facts in the information. It is neither determined based on
the caption or preamble thereof nor from the specification of the provision of the law allegedly
violated.
NOTE: The accused cannot be convicted thereof if the information fails to allege the material
elements of the offense even if the prosecution is able to present evidence during the trial
with respect to such elements.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation cannot be waived. However,
the defense may waive the right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of “not guilty”.
Variance doctrine
In spite of the difference between the crime that was charged and that which was eventually
proved, the accused may still be convicted of whatever offense that was proved even if not
specifically set out in the information provided it is necessarily included in the crime charged
(Teves v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182, Dec. 17, 2004).
Q: What is the extent of the constitutional right of accused to be informed?
A: under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
This right is expressly guaranteed in the 1987 Constitution.
This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform
the accused of the crimes he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the
accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead
to injustice.Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at
all. (Enrile v. People GR 213455, August 11, 2015)
Q: If the information for Rape does not specify the date when the alleged rape occurred, will
this be a violation of the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him?
A: No. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto
make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious.
The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense.
The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Art. 335 of the RPC.
As long as it is illegal that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. (People v. Buca, GR No. 209587,
September 23, 2015)
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC TRIAL
Right to speedy trial (2000, 2001 Bar)
The term “speedy” means free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the
following:
(a) duration of the delay;
(b) reason therefor;
(c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and
(d) prejudice caused by such delay.
Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of
everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings (Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos.
211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
NOTE: The denial of the right to speedy trial is a ground for acquittal.
The right to speedy trial [Sec. 14 (2)] particularly refers to criminal prosecutions which are at
the trial stage, while the right to speedy disposition of cases (Sec. 16) applies to all cases before
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
Right to impartial trial
Impartial trial means that the accused is entitled to cold neutrality of an impartial judge, one
who is free from interest or bias.
Speedy Disposition of Cases
The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial to the extent
that the former applies to all cases, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative cases
(Art. III, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution); whereas, the latter applies to criminal cases only [Art. III,
Sec. 14 (2), 1987 Constitution].
Violation
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause
or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried (Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010).
Right to public trial
GR:
1. Trial must be public in order to prevent possible abuses which may be committed
against the accused.
2. The attendance at the trial is open to all, irrespective of their relationship to the
accused.
XPN: If the evidence to be adduced is “offensive to decency or public morals,” the public may
be excluded.
NOTE: Under Sec. 21, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure it is provided that the judge
may motu proprio exclude the public from the court room when the evidence to be adduced
is offensive to decency and public morals.
In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a
public trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the
opportunity of the members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what
they have observed. The accused’s right to a public trial should not be confused with the
freedom of the press and the public’s right to know as a justification for allowing the live
broadcast of the trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject case to generate
undue publicity with its concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting
the trial. Moreover, the fact that the accused has legal remedies after the fact is of no moment,
since the damage has been done and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the
fundamental right to due process of the accused cannot be afforded after the fact but must be
protected at the first instance (In Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple
Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, Oct. 23,
2012).
RiGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE
Purpose
1. To afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of a witness by cross-
examination;
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
If the failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness is due to his own fault or was not due
to the fault of the prosecution, the testimony of the witness should not be excluded.
The affidavits of witnesses who are not presented during trial are inadmissible for being
hearsay. The accused is denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.
NOTE: Depositions are admissible under circumstances provided by the Rules of Court.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial (Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670,
Feb. 1, 2000).
Elements of trials in absentia
1. Accused has been validly arraigned
2. Accused has been duly notified of the dates of hearing
3. Failure to appear is unjustifiable
The presence of the accused is mandatory in the following instances
1. During arraignment and plea
2. During trial, for identification, unless the accused has already stipulated on his
identity during the pre-trial and that he is the one who will be identified by the
witnesses as the accused in the criminal case
3. During promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense (Ibid.).
NOTE: While the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of judgment, the
absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not affect its validity.
Q: What is the effect of the absence of an accused during the promulgation of judgment
against him?
A: Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it
in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.
However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in
the presence of his counsel or representative.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the
criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies.
He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice.
Promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid provided the following are present
1. Judgment be recorded in the criminal docket
2. Copy be served upon accused or counsel
NOTE: Recording the decision in the criminal docket of the court satisfies the requirement of
notifying the accused of the decision wherever he may be (Estrada v. People, G.R. No.
162371, Aug. 25, 2005).
Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him
to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place, and to show the cause of
his detention.
Called the “great writ of liberty”, the writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.” The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and
summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous regard for personal liberty.” (In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No. 197597, April 8,
2015)
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical
liberty.
When Available
For a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under
any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained (In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, ibid.).
It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the
liberty of abode (Ibid.).
It may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a
means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain
person. When forcible taking and disappearance – not arrest and detention – have been
alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and
proceedings. Habeas corpus generally applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto (Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 153795, Aug. 17,
2006).
If the detainee’s incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases
subsequently filed against them, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies (Ilagan v. Enrile,
G.R. No. 70748, Oct. 21, 1985).
Requisites for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
1. There must be an actual invasion or rebellion; and
2. Public safety requires the suspension
NOTE: The invasion and rebellion must be actual and not merely imminent.
NOTE: The writ applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion and anyone arrested or detained during suspension must
be charged within 3 days. Otherwise, he should be released.
Q: Micheal, Victoria’s husband, disappeared without a trail. A source says that he saw
Micheal at CIDG at Camp Crame, being questioned for the death of Nida Blanca. Victoria then
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC. Will the petition prosper?
A: No. The Court held that the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated
on the disappearance of a person but on his illegal detention.
It may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a
means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain
person. When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been
alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and
proceedings. (Matinez v. Mendoza, GR No. 153795, August 17, 2006)
Q: The relatives of expelled INC minister Lowell Menorca filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the SC alleging that he was abducted and detained by INC officials.
The SC ordered INC to produce Menorca at a scheduled hearing.
A week before the said hearing, Menorca held a press conference and alleged that he
escaped from his detention at the INC Central office.
Considering that he has already appeared, the INC moved that the case be dismissed. Decide.
A: The case should be dismissed. The grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not
predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention.
Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a
person,[11] or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the
disappearance of a certain person.
When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the
proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings.
Once the subject of the petition appears and is no longer in any form of detention, the petition
for habeas corpus should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
WRIT OF AMPARO
A remedy available to any person who’s right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or
is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof (Sec.1, Rule on Writ of Amparo).
Applicability
Writ of Amparo does not apply to a child custody case
When what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a
child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a
remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of
a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life (Yusay v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, Aug. 5, 2014).
Writ of Amparo does not cover the Constitutional right to travel (Reyes v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
182161, Dec. 3, 2009).
Applicable even though petitioners already escaped detention
In case were the victims of abduction were able to escape, it should be stressed that they are
now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors. Understandably, since their escape, they have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and
security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities. Precisely because they are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction,
they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the
circumstances of their abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a Writ of Amparo (Sec. of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff v.
Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008).
Extralegal killings
Killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings.
Enforced disappearance
Arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents
of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such
person outside the protection of the law [Sec. 3(b), R.A. 10353].
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851 [should now be read as R.A. No.
10353], the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an
‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to
enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 [should now be read
as Sec. 3(b), R.A. 10353]. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should
read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851[should now be read as R.A. No. 10353].
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851 [should now be read as R.A. No. 10353], we can
readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an
enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there
was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to
give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention
to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time (Mison v. Gallegos, G. R. No.
210759, June 23, 2015).
Q: Engr. Peregrina disappeared one day and his wife filed a petition for the Writ of Amparo
with the CA directed against the PNP, claiming that the “unexplained uncooperative
behavior” of the respondents request for help and their failure and refusal to extend
assistance in locating the whereabouts of Peregrina were indicative of their actual physical
possession and custody of the missing engineer.” The PNP was held responsible for the
“enforced disappearance” of Engr. Peregrina. Is this valid?
A: YES. The government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the
Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Peregrina. Given their mandates, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG
officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government
completely failed to exercise extraordinary diligence that the Amparo rule requires (Razon v.
Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, Dec. 3, 2009)
Writ of habeas data
A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party (Sec. 1, The
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Jan. 22, 2008).
Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing rules. Writs of amparo and habeas data
may not be issued to protect purely property and commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefore are vague or doubtful. (Manila Electric Company
v. Lim, GR. No. 184769, Oct. 5, 2010).
Writ of Kalikasan
A remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).
Q: Can resident marine mammals file suit to protect their natural habitat?
A: No. Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Sec. 1. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons.
The ruling in the case of Oposa v. Factoran cannot be applied here because the petitioners
therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.
Since the petition was nor brought in the name of a real party- in-interest, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Tanon Strait
v. Reyes, 2015)
Sec.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Self-incrimination
As long as the question will tend to incriminate, it thus includes a right to refuse to testify to a
fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime
by the accused or the witness. (Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 995)
NOTE! A witness cannot refuse to answer questions even if it may tend to establish a claim
against him. (Sec. 3, Rule 132, Rules of Court), except: Right against self-incrimination, Right
against self-degradation.
SCOPE: It applies to testimonial compulsion ONLY.
NO Self-Incrimination in the following cases:
- Person accused with rape was examined for gonnorhea which might have been
transmitted to the victim. (substance emitting from the body of the defendant was
received as evidence.)
- Urine sample. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
measured or his garments or shoes be removed or replaced (for size), or to move his
body
- Hair samples
- Compel the woman accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of being tested for
pregnancy
- Taking of pictures of an accused even without counsel
- when made to undergo ultra-violet ray examination to determine the presence of
fluorescent powder dusted on the money used in buy-bust operation.
Q: May a person be compelled to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence
in a prosecution against him?
A: NO. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is
not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of the intelligence and
attention. It involves one’s intelligence and is equivalent to testimonial knowledge.
NOTE! The right extends to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers, and
chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness EXCEPT where the State has the
right to inspect the same (such as books of accounts) under the police or taxing power.
Q: Select the best answer and explain.
1. An accused’s right against self-incrimination is violated in the following cases:
a. When he is ordered by the trial court to undergo a paraffin test to prove he is guilty
of murder;
b. When he is compelled to produce his bankbooks to be used as evidence against his
father charged with plunder;
c. When he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence
that he is the author of a letter wherein he agreed to kill the victim;
d. When the president of a corporation is subpoenaed to produce certain documents
as proofs he is guilty of illegal recruitment. (2006 Bar)
A: The best answer is (c), ordering the accused to produce a sample of his handwriting to be
used as evidence to prove that he is the author of a letter in which he agreed to kill the victim
as this will violate his right against self-incrimination. Writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence and attention. Producing a sample of his
handwriting may identify him as the writer of the letter (Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570,
[1929]).
The right is available in:
1. Criminal cases
2. Civil cases
3. Administrative cases
4. Impeachment
5. Other legislative investigations that possess a criminal or penal aspect
NOTE: It does not apply to private investigations done by private individual (BPI v. CASA,
GR.No.149454, May 28, 2004). When the privilege against self-incrimination is violated outside
of court, say, by the police, then the testimony, as already noted, is not admissible under the
exclusionary rule. When the privilege is violated by the court itself, that is, by the judge, the
court is ousted of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings are null and void, and it is as if no judgment
has been rendered (Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968).
Q: At what stage of an enquiry may the right against self-incrimination be asserted?
A: A person who is ACCUSED in a criminal case imay assert the right from the moment he is
asked to testify, i.e. an accused has an absolute right to remain silent; a person who is a
WITNESS but not the accused, may assert the right (against self-incrimination) only when the
incriminating question is asked.
Q: In an administrative case for malpractice and the cancellation of license to practice
medicine filed against C, the complainant called C to witness stand. When should C invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination?
A: As in a criminal case, C can refuse to take witness stand and refuse to answer any question.
In Pascual V. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344, it was held that an administrative case
for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine is penal in character,
because an unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the
respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
Q: A man was shot and killed and his killer fled. Moments after the shooting, an eyewitness
described to the police that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with floral design, had boots
and was about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit the description given, was seen
nearby. He was taken into custody and brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt
and boots were forcibly taken and he was weighed, measured, photographed, fingerprinted
and subjected to paraffin testing. At his trial, Borja objected to the admission in evidence of
the apparel, his height and weight, his photographs, fingerprints comparison and the results
of the paraffin test, asserting that these were taken in violation of his right against self-
incrimination. Rule on the objection. (2000 Bar)
A: The objection of Borja is not tenable. As held in People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615, the rights
guaranteed by Section 12, Article in of the Constitution applies only against testimonial
evidence. An accused may be compelled to be photographed or measured, his garments may
be removed, and his body may be examined.
Inapplicability of the right against self-incrimination to juridical persons
It is not available to juridical persons as “it would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state
having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of
sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they have been
abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose.”
(Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. PCG, GR. No. 75885, May 27, 1987).
Sec. 18.
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist EXCEPT as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Sec. 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduce to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Requisites (Sec. 7 Rule 117 Rules of Court)
1. Valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance
2. Filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. After the accused had pleaded to the charge;
o Requires that defendant had been arraigned and had pleaded to the charge.
(People v. Turla, 50 Phil 1001)
o Double jeopardy does not attach in preliminary investigation (Icasiano v.
sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377)
4. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent (Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933
& 211960, April 15, 2015)
o The acquittal may be: (1) after trial on the merits or (2) under secs. 17 and 18, Rule
119 (discharge of the accused as state witness)
NOTE: Consent of the accused to the dismissal cannot be implied or presumed; it must be
expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity (Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54).
Requisites of Double Jeopardy
As held in Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159 for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper the following
requisite must concur: (1) a first jeopardy has attached; (2) first jeopardy was validly
terminated; and (3) the second is for the same offense. A first jeopardy attaches:
(1) Valid complaint or information;
(2) Filed before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment
(4) a valid entry of plea; and
(5) the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the
accused.
Q: A Pajero driven by Jose sideswiped a motorcycle driven by Nelson resulting in damage to
the motorcycle and injuries to Nelson. The Fiscal filed two informations against Jose, to wit:
(1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries under Art.
365, RPC, before the RTC; and (2) abandonment of one’s victim under par. 2 Art. 275, before
the MTC.
Jose was arraigned, tried and convicted for abandonment of one’s victim in the MTC. He
appealed to the RTC. It was only a year later that he was arraigned in the reckless imprudence
charged before the RTC. He pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC relative to the abandonment of
one’s victim charge. Jose filed a petition for review before the CA, invoking his right to double
jeopardy, contending that the prosecution for abandonment under Art. 275 of the RPC is a
bar to the prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the same Code. Decide.
(Suggested Answer) A: Jose cannot claim that his conviction for abandoning his victim in
violation of Art. 275 of the RPC is a bar to his prosecution for negligence under Art. 365 of the
RPC. As held in Lamera v. CA, 198 SCRA 186 there is no double jeopardy, because these two
offenses are not identical. Reckless imprudence is a crime falling under the chapter on criminal
negligence, while abandonment of one’s victim is a crime falling under the chapter on crimes
against security. The former is committed by means of culpa, while the latter is committed by
means of dolo. Failure to help one’s victim is not an offense by itself nor an element of reckless
imprudence. It merely increases the penalty by one degree.
Q: The Sandiganbayan dismissed the malversation charges against Imelda Marcos, et. al.,
and the government filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, is the certiorari petition a
violation of the rights of the accused against double jeopardy?
A: NO. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional prescription on double
jeopardy. Notably, the prescription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on
errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (1) on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and/or
(2) where there is denial of a party’s due process rights.
A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial due process implies an
invalid or otherwise void judgment.
If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a vois
judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense
of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case. (People v. Sandiganbayan and Imelda Marcos, et.
al., GR No. 153304, February 7, 2012)
Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
ARTICLE IV - CITIZENSHIP
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by
their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.
Citizens of the Philippines
1. Those who are Filipino citizens at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution:
a. Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris;
b. Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle,
before Tio Tam v. Republic, G.R. No. L-9602, April 25, 1957.
c. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law (Act 2927).
d. Those who are citizens under the 1935 Constitution.
e. Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
o NOTE: Time to elect: within 3 years from reaching the age of majority.
4. Those naturalized in accordance with law (Sec. 1, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution).
Caram rule
Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in the Philippines of foreign parent, who before the
adoption of the Constitution had been elected to public office, are considered Filipino citizens
(Chiongbian v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-2007, Jan. 31, 1949).
NOTE: The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ had seen first light, confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, Mar. 3, 2004)
Modes of Acquiring Citizenship: The failure to register the election of citizenship in the civil registry will not defeat the
election and negate the permanent fact of having a Filipino mother
1. By birth
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
a. Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship. (2015 Philippine citizenship (Ibid.).
Bar)
Q: Who are natural-born citizens?
b. Jus soli – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of the place of birth.
A:
2. By naturalization – the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
privilege of a native-born citizen. o Citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
3. By marriage - A foreign woman marries a Filipino husband, provided, she possesses all o Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization. (2009 Bar) upon reaching the age of majority
Citizenship of a Filipino woman who married a foreigner under the 1935, 1973, 1987 Naturalization
Constitution
Act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act with the privileges of a citizen.
or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it (Sec. 4, Art. IV, 1987
Constitution). (2014 Bar) Modes of becoming a citizen by naturalization
A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, 1. Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her 2. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 473, as amended
citizenship (1973 Constitution).
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law (1935 Philippine citizenship to an alien (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, Jan. 29, 2007).
Constitution).
Qualifications for Judicial Naturalization (CA No. 473)
In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in
her husband's country, she acquires his nationality (Commonwealth Act 63 Sec 1(7)). 1. Not less than 18 years of age on the date of hearing the petition (as amended by RA
6809).
NOTE: Jus sanguinis and naturalization are the modes followed in the Philippines.
2. Resided in the Philippines for not less than 10 years; may be reduced to 5 years, if;
Statutory formalities in selecting Philippine citizenship
a. Honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of
1. A statement of election under oath; any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
2. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and political subdivisions thereof
3. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry b. Established new industry or introduced a useful invention
(Balgamelo Cabiling Ma v. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 183133, July 26,
2010) c. Married to a Filipino woman

Registration of the act of election does not confer Filipino citizenship d. Engaged as teacher in Philippine public or private school not established for
exclusive instruction of a particular nationality or race, or in any branches of
It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under education or industry for a period of not less than 2 years; and
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is
only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. In other words, the e. Born in the Philippines
actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over half a century by the petitioners is actual 3. Character
notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of
Philippine citizenship (Ibid.). (a) Good moral character

Registration of documents of election still allowed even beyond the time frame (b) Believes in the Constitution

It should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done publicly, (c) Conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during his stay in the
consistently and continuously. These acts constitute constructive registration (Ibid.). Philippines
4. Owns real estate in the Philippines not less than P5,000 in value; or has some
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation that can
 support himself and his family.
5. Speaks and writes English or Filipino and any principal Philippine dialects (as amended
by Sec. 6 Art. XIV); and
6. Enrolled minor children in any public or private school recognized by the government
where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught as part of the curriculum, during the entire period of residence prior to hearing
of petition.
Disqualified from Judicial Naturalization (CA 473)
1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group
of persons which uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments
2. Persons defending or teaching necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault
or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas
3. Polygamists or believers of polygamy
4. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease
5. Persons convicted of crime involving moral turpitude
6. Persons who, during residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or did not evince sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions
and ideals of Filipinos
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period
of such war
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right
to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof (no reciprocity)
Q: Karbasi, of Iranian national, is a long-time resident of Fairview, Quezon City. However, the
UN Commission for Refugees certified his status as a refugee. He now seeks to be a Filipino
citizen through judicial naturalization. The OSG, on the other hand, opposes his petition on
the ground that Iranian Law does not allow naturalization of Filipino citizens as Iranians; thus
non-compliant with the Naturalization Law that there should be reciprocity between
Phillippine law and the foreign law. Is the OSG’s opposition correct?
A: NO. True, the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of
Karbasi’s petition, however, reveals that he has successfully established his refugee status
upon arrival in the Philippines.
In effect, the country’s obligations under its various international commitments come into
operation. Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to
which the Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this case. In the same vein, Article
7 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34
states the earnest obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a
refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine
statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be
read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the granting
of nationality to refugees and stateless persons (Republic v. Karbasi, G.R. No. 210412, July 29,
2015).
Qualifications for Administrative Naturalization (RA 9139)
1. The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
2. The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of
his/her petition;
3. The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles
of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which
he/she is living;
4. The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any
public school or private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught
and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to
any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age,
he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
5. The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from
which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or
has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply
to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession
because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
6. The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of
the Philippines; and
7. The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Persons disqualified for Administrative naturalization (RA 9139)
1. Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
2. Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault
or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;
and
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Grounds for loss of Philippine citizenship
1. Naturalization in a foreign country; or (1992, 2004 Bar)
2. Express renunciation of citizenship (expatriation); or
NOTE: The mere application or possession of an alien certificate of registration does not
amount to renunciation (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999).
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining 21 years of age; or
NOTE: Citizens may not divest citizenship when the Philippines is at war.
4. Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country;
or
NOTE: It shall not divest a Filipino of his citizenship if:
a. the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
foreign country;
b. the said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with its
consent provided that at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does
so only in connection with its service to said foreign country.
5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization (Denaturalization); or
6. Having been declared by final judgment a deserter of the armed forces of the
Philippines in times of war; or
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force
in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
NOTE: Citizenship is renounced expressly (Ibid.).
Ways to reacquire citizenship
1. Naturalization
2. Repatriation
3. Direct act of Congress
Citizenship under RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) (2000,
2002, 2003 Bar)
Upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic:
1. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Filipiino citizenship due to
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship; and
2. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of said RA, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship (Section 3, Republic
Act No. 9225).
NOTE: See the case of David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015, where the SC clearly
distinguished REACQUISITION from RETENTION.
Condition for the enjoyment of full civil and political rights
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship shall enjoy full civil and political rights
subject to the following conditions:
1. Right to vote: must meet the requirements of Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution, and of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) and other existing laws;
2. Elective Public Office:
i. Possess qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws
ii. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
iii. Appointive Public Office - subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;
NOTE: That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
a. Are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
b. Are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens (R.A. 9225).
iv. Practice of profession: apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice (R.A. 9225).
Q: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine Citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority?
A: NO. The election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority (Re: Application for Admission
to the Philippine Bar v. Vicente Ching, B.M. No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999).
Dual citizenship vs. Dual allegiance (2009 DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Bar) DUAL CITIZENSHIP
Arises when, as a result of concurrent Refers to the situation where a person
application of the different laws of two or simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
more States, a person is simultaneously loyalty to two or more States.
considered a citizen of said states.
Involuntary and allowed Result of an individual’s volition and is
prohibited by the Constitution.
NOTE: In Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission ARTICLE V. SUFFRAGE
was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
R.A. No. 7160, section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
to "dual allegiance." Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least
six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without
consequence of conflicting laws of different states (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws
and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
May 26, 1999).
ballot.
Q: What is the nationality of foundlings?
A: The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws (“1930 Hague Convention”) states that: Article 14. A child whose parents are both
unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born
on the territory of the State in which it was found.
Q: Are foundlings considered natural-born citizens?
A: The 1930 Hague Convention is silent. Thus, the question is left to each country’s laws as to
who is granted natural-born status. In the Philippines, foundlings are either adopted or their
birth simulated in a fabricated certificate of birth. This is a legal process to perfect their
citizenship. Since they have to perform an act to perfect their citizenship, they cannot be
deemed natural-born.
in the 1851 case of Anthony Hale, a foundling who lost both parents in the World War II, the
rule was different. Several Filipinos took care of the boy and tried to get him a Philippine
Passport. The DFA said the DOJ must first issue an opinion if the boy could be given a Philippine
passport since he is a foundling. The DOJ then issued an opinion which stated that, following
International conventions, a foundling is presumed to have assumed the citizenship of the
place where he or she is found. Since then, DFA has been issuing Philippine passports to
foundlings in the Philippines in recognition of the 1951 DOJ opinion. But the issue of natural-
born was not addressed.