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160 T. M. SCANLON
fully explained as parts of “what we owe to each other.” So one consequence
of my view is the fragmentation of the moral: the thesis that morality in the
broadest sense is not a unified normative domain, but a collection of diverse
values.
11. The idea of reasonable rejectability provides a framework within which
we can explain the moral significance of diverse considerations, including not
only factors contributing to people’s welfare, but also fairness, choice, and
responsibility. According to the version of contractualism I present, however,
grounds for rejection must be based on the claims of individuals. Impersonal
values and aggregate gains and losses are thus not determinants of right and
wrong in their own right. But impersonal values are relevant to the assess-
ment of individual claims, and some of the conclusions naturally supported
by aggregative reasoning can be derived within this individualistic framework.
12. Individuals are responsible for all of their judgment-sensitive attitudes
in a way that they are not responsible for other facts about them, such as
their height or eye color. That is, they can be asked to defend these attitudes
and to modify or retract them in the light of criticism. Moral criticism is one
kind of criticism of judgment-sensitive attitudes. It has special force because
of the significance of the attitudes in question for the person’s relations with
others. But the form of responsibility that is a precondition for moral criti-
cism of an action or attitude is just the more general responsibility that a
person has for any judgment-sensitive attitudes that are correctly attributed to
him or her. In this sense a person is responsible for any choice that he or she
has actually made.
13. There is, however, a different sense of responsibility in which to say
that a person is responsible for a certain choice is to say that he or she can be
fairly asked to bear the consequences of having made it. These two senses of
responsibility should be clearly distinguished. The latter depends, in a way
that the former does not, on the value of the alternatives that were available
to the person.
14. The account of right and wrong defended in this book is not a relativ-
istic doctrine. But it does allow for the possibility that standards of right and
wrong may vary if individuals in different circumstances have good reasons
for rejecting different principles of conduct.