ELSIE S. CAUSINGv.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN

D. BIRON, SR. G.R. No. 199139, 09 September 2014, EN BANC,
(BERSAMIN, J.)

The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 are
transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one
government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a
government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment”; while detail as
defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an appointment.

Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac

Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 (Office
Order No. 12), commanding for the detailing of Causing at the Office of the
Municipal Mayor.

Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron
ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the
election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it
violated of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of
transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her
functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-
employees and with the public transacting business in her office.

The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the

complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
findings and recommendation.

ISSUE:

Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election period from
her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constitute
a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of
the COMELEC?

RULING:

No. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code there
was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of
the Omnibus Election Code.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015

 The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or
a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only physically
transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor. Causing
is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely
required to physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as
Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her
work physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her
supervisory function over the staff as she continues to review their work and signs
documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her
duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however,
does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. Moreover, Causing’s too-
literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions
involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with
an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a
basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the
accused.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015

 OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205136, 02 December 2014, EN BANC, (Perez, J.)

COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of
the COMELEC.

On October 2012, Kimberly filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for

Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born
on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the
elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on the day of the elections. As such, Kimberly was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of attending the hearing,
Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously,
Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. The COMELEC rendered a
decision ordering the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and the denial of the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia.

COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was
never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason of her
age, and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she
seeks to be elected to. Olivia countered that although Kimberly may not be qualified
to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid
COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s COC on the ground
of lack of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not
misrepresent her birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was
no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew
her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid substitution?

RULING:

Yes, in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered
to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we
find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Firstly, subject to its
authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the COMELEC has the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015

 The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the
requirements for a valid substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First, there was a
valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs;
second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which
Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election
day.

UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015