US v FORTALEZA

Petitoner: The United States

Respondent: Esteban Fortaleza
Citation: G.R. No. L-4596
Date of Promulgation: January 13, 1909
Ponente: Crason, J.

FACTS:

 Fortaleza was charged with the crime of atentado contra los agentes de la autoridad (criminal attempt against agents of
authority for gravely intimitating and threatening to assault with a club one Gregorio Tulang and his policemen Roman
Paganpang and Julian Tosloc.
 This at a time when Tulang, in the performance of his duties as lieutenant of the barrio of Hinatungan, was undertaking to
arrest the accused who had been discovered, in flagrante delicto, conducting a candlestine cockpit.
 Fortaleza filed a demurrer to the information on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute a crime.
 The trial court sustained the demurrer, ordered the information to be dismissed, and held that "in the arrest in question,
Gregorio was not in the discharge of the functions of his office as lieutenant of a barrio," and that accordingly no criminal
attempt against an agent of authority had been committed by the accused in intimidating and threatening to assault him;
and that "so-called police of the lieutenant of the barrio" were not agents of authority, "for the reason that the said lieutenant
had no authority to appoint police."
 From this order sustaining fiscal appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gregorio Tulang was in the lawful performance of the duties of his office when he attempted to arrest the accused.

RULING:
YES.
Criminal attempts against an agent of authority are defined in paragraph 2 of article 249 of the Penal Code as follows:

Those who attack the authorities or their agents, or employ force against them, gravely intimidate them, or offer an equally grave
resistance, while they are discharging the functions of their office or on the occasion thereof.

Viada, discussing the meaning of the phrase agente de la autoridad, as employed in this article, says that —

The code gives no definition of what are agentes de la autoridad (agents of authority); but it well may be said that all those persons
who may direct provision of law or by appointment of competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property must be characterized as such, and further that in accordance with the final section
of article 264 (Spanish Penal Code), it may be affirmed that, for the purposes of this chapter and of the two following ones, all
persons who come to the aid of agents of authority, and also all public functionaries, are entitled to be considered as agents of
authority, it being understood, nevertheless, that in order that the person who come to the aid of agents of authority may be
considered as agents of authority, it is an essential condition that they lend assistance, by virtue of an order or request of such
agent of authority.

Accepting Viada's definition of agents of authorities, it is clear that, if a lieutenant of a barrio is charged with the maintenance of
public order, and the protection and security of life and property within his barrio, he must be considered an "agent of authority;"
and that, if an officer charged with the maintenance of public order has authority to make arrests, without warrant, for violations
of law committed in his presence, then Gregorio Tulang, the lieutenant of the barrio of Hinatungan, was in the performance of his
duty at the time, who was discovered, in flagrante delicto, conducting a candlestine cockpit.

We agree with the trial judge that the determination of the questions involved "depends largely upon the provisions of the law fixing
the powers and duties of lieutenants of barrios," and that these provisions are to be found in section 37 and 38 of Act No. 82, defining
the duties of municipal councilors and lieutenants of barrios. Those sections are as follows:

SEC. 37. (a) If the number of barrios in a municipality is less than equal to the number of councilors the council shall put each of its
members in immediate charge of a barrio or part of a barrio, so that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or more councilors.

(b) If the numbers of barrios exceeds the number of councilors, including the vice-president, the council shall group the barrios
into as many districts as there are councilors, and shall place each councilor in charge of one such district. Each councilor shall be
empowered to appoint one lieutenant in each barrio or part of barrio which comes under his immediate supervision. A lieutenant of
barrio shall serve without compensation and shall report directly to the councilor appointing him.

SEC. 38 (a) Each councilor shall keep the people of his barrio or barrios informed as to the acts of the council or other governmental
measures which directly concern them, by means of suitable notices posted in a public and conspicuous as the representative of the
people of his barrio, or barrios and shall bring their special needs to the attention of that day.

(b) He shall further promptly inform the president of any unusual or untoward event occurring within the barrios assigned to
him.

(c) He is authorized to use as a symbol of office a cause with silver head, plated ferule and black cord and tassels.

It will not be doubted that under these provisions of law, a lieutenant of a barrio, duly appointed by the councilor in charge of such
barrio, is clothed with all the authority of the councilor himself within the limits of such barrio, subject, of course, to the commands
of his principal. But it must be admitted that the authority expressly and explicitly conferred upon the councilor in charge of a barrio,
within such barrio, would appear, upon a superficial examination of the above-cited sections of Act No. 82, to be somewhat limited,
and to be confined to the keeping of the people of his barrio informed of acts of the council, and other governmental measures which
directly concern them, and informing the presidente of any unusual or untoward event occurring within the barrio assigned to him.
We are of the opinion, however, that it was not the intention of the lawmaker to limit the functions of municipal councilors within in
such narrow boundaries, and that the provisions of section 37 which put out or more barrios in immediate charge of each councilor,
so that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or more councilors, and authorizes and empowers each councilor to appoint
one lieutenant in each barrio or part of barrio "which comes under his immediate supervision," must be understood as conferring
upon, or confirming to municipal councilors functions of wider scope and higher import than those with which they are explicitly
charged in section 38.

To say that "each of the members of the council shall be put in immediate charge of a barrio or part of barrio, so that each barrio shall
be under the direction of one or more coucilors" and that each barrio is placed "under the immediate supervision of a councilor"
would seem necessarily to imply a grant of some degree of control over the conduct of the residents of the barrio by the councilors
placed in charge thereof. Certainly it implies something more than a mere authority and obligation to post notices of acts of the council
and other governmental measures and to inform the municipal president of unusual or untoward events occurring in the barrio; and
taking into consideration the general provisions of Act No. 82, entitled "A general Act for the organization of municipal governments
in the Philippine Island," which divides the greater part of these Islands into municipalities and each of these municipalities into barrios,
and places these barrios under the charge of designated councilors and lieutenants of barrios, adopting in this respect the general
scheme of the Spanish system of municipal administration in existence when the Act was promulgated; and keeping in mind, first, the
imperative necessity for providing for the maintenance of order in each of these barrios, many of which are located at long distances
from the centers of population, where the municipal officials reside; second, the fact that nowhere else in the Act is any provision
made for the appointment of peace officers for the various barrios with the necessary authority to maintain order; and, third, the fact
that under the municipal system which was superseded by the system provided in this Act, municipal councilors and their lieutenants
placed in charge of particular barrios were always recognized as agentes de la autoridad and clothed with the necessary authority for
the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property; we think that the Commission, in the providing for the assignment
of one or more councilors in charge of each barrio or part of barrio, so that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or more
councilors, must be taken to have entrusted to these councilors and their lieutenants a duty of maintaining order within their
respective barrios, substantially similar to that which was imposed upon municipal councilors under the Spanish law existing at the
time of the promulgation of the Act, and thus to have conferred upon, or confirmed to them the functions of agentes de la autoridad
(agents of authority) within their respective barrios, with the necessary authority incident thereto for the maintenance of order and
the protection of life and property.

There is no express provision of the Municipal Code defining the authority necessarily incident to the duty of maintaining order, and
protecting life and property, thus imposed upon these officials within their respective jurisdictions; but the extent and limitations of
the authority thus conferred, in so far as it requires the exercise of powers to make arrests without warrant, may be ascertained from
an examination of the "Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code," as modified and amended by legislation enacted since
the American occupation of these Islands. Rules 27, 28, 29, and 30 of this law are as follows:

RULE 27.Anyone may detain:

First. A person who attempts to commit a crime, when about to commit the same.

Second. An offender is flagrante.

Third. A person who is escaping from the penal establishment where serving sentence.

Fourth. A prisoner who is escaping from the jail while awaiting transfer to the penal establishment or place were he is to serve the
sentence imposed upon him by final judgment.

Fifth. A prisoner who is escaping from confinement while his case is pending.

Seventh. A defendant in a criminal prosecution or convicted person en rebeldia (at large).

RULE 28.Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is a reasonable
ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third, A person charges with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the
circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of
the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge
or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coming under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been
filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. that the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such
unlawful act or crime.

RULE 29.A private individual who detains a person must take or have such person immediately taken to the district jail or to the
courthouse of the town, and deliver to the warden of the prison or to the person in charge of such prison, a written statement setting
out the cause of the arrest.

If such private individual is unable to sign, the statement above referred to will be signed by the warden of the prison in the presence
of two witnesses.

RULE 30.The executive authorities or their agents detaining a person shall release the same or else turn him over to the judicial
authorities within twenty-four hours after the arrest if made in the head town of the district, or within as brief as period as distance
and transportation facilities permit.

These provisions of Spanish law have never been expressly repealed, and are still in force in so far as they have not been repealed or
amended by implification by the enactment of the laws put in force in these Islands since the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty. They are undoubtedly modified in many respects by the enactment of the Philippine Bill, General Orders, No. 58, the
various acts of the Commission creating courts and judicial offices, defining their jurisdiction and prescribing rules of procedure
therefor, the Manila Charter, the Constabulary Act, and other laws which might be cited; but it would be difficult, and for the purposes
of this decision it is unnecessary, to state precisely the extent to which these amendments by implication have gone. We can and do
hold, however, that they have gone to the extent of depriving officials who by different provision of law or by appointment of
competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property," of
authority to make arrests without warrant such as, in the United States, is generally conferred upon "peace officers" and more
especially that class of peace officers known to Amercican and English law as "constables."

Section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila), which designates certain officials, including police officers, as "peace officers" expressly
provides that within the territory defined in the Act they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious
places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person had committed, or is about to commit any
crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or to cause to be arrested without warrant, and offender, when the offense is committed in
the presence of a peace officer within his view." These provisions quite clearly set out the powers usually conferred by American and
English law upon "peace officers" including "constables" in making arrests without warrants; and since similar powers are clearly
included in the powers conferred upon "agents of authority" in the above cited articles of the "Provisional Law," there can be no doubt
that the Commission, in imposing the duty of maintaining order and preserving and protecting life and property within their respective
barrios upon municipal councilors and their lieutenants of barrios, conferred upon such officials authority to make arrest without
warrant not less extensive than that conferred upon peace in Manila in the above-cited provisions of the Manila Charter. (The Unites
States vs. Vallejo,1 No. 4637, decided by this court on Sept. 3, 1908; also the United States vs. Burgueta, 10 Phil. Rep., 188.)

We are of opinion, therefore, that Gregorio Tulang was in the lawful performance of the duties of his office when he attempted to
arrest the accused, who was also discovered, in flagrante delicto, conducting a candlestine cockpit; and that the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer interposed to the information filed in the case.

After ten days let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the trial court, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned
to the court below, for further proceedings. So ordered.

DONATO v LUNA
Petitoner: Leonilo Donato
Respondent: Hon. Artemon Luna and Paz Abaya
Citation: G.R. No. L-4596
Date of Promulgation: April 15,1988
Ponente: Gancayco, J.

 On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy
against Leonilo C. Donato with the CFI of Manila based on the complaint of Paz B. Abayan.
 On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, Abayan filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Donata.
 The case was based on the ground that Abayan consented to entering into the marriage, which was Donato's second one,
since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping.
 Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by Abayan to obtain
his consent to the marriage.
 Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, Donato and Abayan had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years, for which reason, the
requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character.
 Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the bigamy case, Donato filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said
case contending that civil case seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by Abayan raises a prejudicial question
which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
 In an order, Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in bigamy.
 Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova.
 A motion for reconsideration was flied by Donato thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the
ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito which was a much later case than that cited by respondent
judge in his order of denial.
 The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit.
 Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Donato Can apply the rule on prejudicial question.

RULING:
NO. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed
the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer
the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied
to the present case. Said case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that
"prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that
his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation
in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed
the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant
in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to
suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use
of threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the
one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was
accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed.
Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from
the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of
the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage
was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz
was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet
no such judgment in the civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a
case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved
that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal
that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as
husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained
by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the
fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second
marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on
September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is
no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy
can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.